Dušan Nociar - National Interest

7/24/2019 Duan Nociar - National Interest

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CHARLES UNIVERSITY PRAGUE

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Institute of Political Studies

Duan Nociar

NATIONAL INTEREST

The U.S. and the Coup in Venezuela 2002

Magister Thesis

Prague 2008


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Author: Duan Nociar

Supervisor: Doc. PhDr. Bla Plechanovov, CSc.

Opponent:

Thesis Defense: 2008

Classification:


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Bibliographic Notation

NOCIAR, Duan.Inational Interest; The U.S. and the Coup in Venezuela 2002.Prague:

Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Studies, 2008. 94

pgs. Supervisor: Doc. PhDr. Bla Plechanovov, CSc.

Annotation

Magister thesis National Interest deals with national interest in general, its production

and influence on foreign policy. After discussing relevant factors and variables relevant

in national interest formation, theoretical framework is constructed and hypothesis istested against the case of the coup in Venezuela that happened on April 2002, where the

U.S. involvement is closely followed.

Anotace

Diplomov prca Nrodn zujem pojednv o nrodnom zujme vo veobecnosti. Je

tu sledovan jeho vytvranie a vplyv, ktor m na zahranin politiku. Po identifikci a

rozbore jednotlivch komponentov vplvajcich na tvorbu nrodnho zujmu je z nichvytvoren analytick kontrukcia, kto je nsledne testovan na prpade puu, ktor sa

odohral v aprli 2002 vo Venezuele. Tu je podrobne sledovan americk angaovanos.

Keywords

National interest, constructivism, common identity, security imaginary, United States,

Venezuela, coup, foreign policy analysis, identity

Klov slova

Nrodn zjem, konstruktivizmus, spolen identita, bezpenost, Spojen stty,

Venezuela, pu, analza zahranin politiky, identita


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Prohlen

1. Prohlauji, e jsem pedkldanou prci zpracoval samostatn a pouil jen uveden

prameny a literaturu.

2. Souhlasm s tm, aby prce byla zpstupnna pro ely vzkumu a studia.

V Praze dne 21.5.2008 Duan Nociar


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Acknowledgments

Research for this work was conducted in the library of the Uppsala University in

Sweden and in the library of Institute of International Relations in Prague.

I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Stefano Guzzini, Senior researcher at

Danish Institute for International Studies who inspired my research and introduced meinto the constructivism; to my parents who supported me in many ways while

researching and writing, and to Thomas OHaver who helped to proofread the text.

Above all, I want to thank the consultant of this work, Associate Professor Bela

Plechanovova from the Faculty of Social Sciences at Charles University in Prague, for

her patience and tolerance in letting me write about the topic which I found interesting.


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Magister Thesis Duan Nociar

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Index

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS....................................................... ........................................................... ....... 5INDEX ........................................................ ........................................................... ..................................... 6

INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS.............................................. ........................................................... ....... 7

INTRODUCTION ......................................................... ........................................................... ................. 8

METHODOLOGY ........................................................ ........................................................... ................. 9

ON LITERATURE........................................................ ........................................................... ............... 12

1. NATIONAL INTEREST.............. ........................................................... ............................................ 16

1.1 ARTICULATION & INTERPELLATION .................................................... ............................................ 201.2 IDENTITY, COMMON IDENTITY/NATIONAL IDENTITY ....................................................... ............... 23

1.2.1 U.S. National Identity ........................................................ ...................................................... 281.3 CULTURE ..................................................... ........................................................... ......................... 301.5 DEMOCRACY - USA AS A LEADER ANDNEED FOR STRENGTH ................................................... ..... 321.6 CREDIBILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOM ........................................................ ......................... 341.7 SECURITY IMAGINARY ..................................................... ........................................................... ..... 35

1.7.1 Energy Security as a Part of Security Imaginary ..................................................... ............... 361.8 INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, STATES AND ANARCHY ................................................... ............... 38

2. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY & DOCTRINES ..................................................... .................................. 41

2.1 U.S. AND THE LATIN AMERICA ............................................................ ............................................ 45

3. COUP IN VENEZUELA 2002 ...................................................... ...................................................... 503.1 OFFICIAL U.S. POSITION TO ITS ROLE IN THE COUP ........................................................... ............... 503.2 ANALYSIS .................................................... ........................................................... ......................... 523.3 THE ROLE OF INDIVIDUALS AND THE COUP ................................................... .................................. 63

4. CHILE 1970S COMPARED.............................................. ........................................................... ..... 69

5. DEFINING OR DEFENDING THE NATIONAL INTEREST; TRUBOWITZ VS. KRASNER:FORMATION FROM THE INSIDE OR VICE VERSA?................................. .................................. 74

6. NATIONAL INTEREST AND ITS LIMITATIONS ........................................................ ............... 80

CONCLUSION .................................................... ........................................................... ......................... 83RSUM V SLOVENINE ................................................... ........................................................... ..... 87

PROJECT OF MAGISTER THESIS ........................................................ ............................................ 89

REFERENCES......................................................................... ........................................................... ..... 95


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Index of Abbreviations

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CREB cAMP Responsive Element Binding protein

CTV Venezuelan Labor Confederation

EU European Union

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NED National Endowment for Democracy

NI National Interest

OAS Organization of American States

OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

PDVSA Venezuelan state-owned petroleum company (Petrleos de

Venezuela S.A.)

TV Television

U.S./USA/US United States of America

UN United Nations

USD United States Dollar

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction


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Introduction

The main topic of this work is national interest. More specifically, I will try to

describe and analyze the way national interest is produced and which factors influence

its production. Afterwards, I shall map the U.S. foreign policy in recent decades withconcentration on advocating national interests and consequently, analyze how the

national interest influenced U.S. involvement in the coup in Venezuela in 2002. A brief

comparison with the events in Chile will follow regarding the national interest

articulation in this case. After the comparison of two different approaches to the

national interest done by Stephen D. Krasner and Paul Trubowitz that will contribute to

the delimitation of my approach, I shall sum up the output of my work and assess

limiting function of the national interest creating process.My thesis will claim that the national interest in the given anarchic international

system is articulated by the state and that the formation of the interest inside the state is

limited by the exact same factors, structures and processes by which it is generated.

A basic aim of this work is to demonstrate the power of a constructivist approach to

national interest. This approach begins with the assumption that the state can be treated

as an autonomous actor pursuing goals associated with power and general interests of

society. Moreover, I will show here that national interests are not given or forced butconstructed and path-dependent.

I do believe that the understanding of national interest production will contribute to

more accurate analysis of any real-case situation given. In order to do this, it will be

necessary to scrutinize terms like common identity, security imaginary, process of

articulation and interpellation, culture, role of individuals in decision making process

and other variables that play role in this complicated process.

In addition, I will discuss the extent to which these variables interfere with each other

prior to the stage when the decision is made. In other words, I shall examine how a

communication phenomenon between people influences decision-making process.

The Venezuelan Coup 2002 will serve as a ground for the illustration and testing of

my hypothesis and theoretical framework. The intention is to give detailed insight into

the situation in April 2002 in Venezuela and reveal the role and motives of the U.S.

participation in it. This is to be done by the deconstruction of the U.S. national interest.

It is important to abstain from the generalization in every case because every case

exists in different circumstances. On the contrary, knowing common features or


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variables of national interest enables us to make an accurate analysis of any given case.

I realize that it is difficult to state a simple sentence with general and wide validity and

that stating something specific with general applicability might be quite burdensome.

Being inspired by the book Constructing National Interests: The United States and

the Cuban Missile Crisisby constructivist author Jutta Weldes describing the Cuban

missile crisis and defining U.S. national interests, I decided to elaborate on something

more common identity driven but with the use of several variables presented by her.

Another source of inspiration was Alexander Wendts Social Theory of International

Politics and his role played. Also Stefano Guzzini and his introduction to

constructivism during my studies at the Uppsala University help with a puzzle concept

of this work. Most importantly, the final form of this work would never exist without

the guidance of my consultant doc. Plechanovov, who deserves my sincere gratitude.

I also realize that this work is guided by its limited extent and my still limited

knowledge. Therefore, shall I base my thesis on the knowledge already revealed to the

world by remarkable thinkers indicated in the literature.

Methodology

My intention in this work is to analyze all factors relevant to national interest

construction and afterwards apply the theoretical framework on the particular case of

Venezuela 2002 where this framework will be tested and discussed. In the text, I will try

to answer the following questions: What is the national interest? How is it produced?

What influences its production? What influence does it have on the foreign policy?

What are its limits?

Similarly as Jutta Weldes did in her monograph Constructing National Interest, I, inconnection to the Venezuelan coup, base my analysis upon investigating: Why did

decision makers understand and behave in a particular way and how did they come to

define and accept as self-evident a particular national interest?

After examination of the term national interest from the historical and theoretical

perspective, my argument in chapter 2 examines how specific representations of

national and international politics and the problems of foreign policy make particular

national interests possible.


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My preliminary claim is that national interest is constructed out of 7 variables or

factors. I argue that understanding articulation and interpellation, culture, democracy,

common identity, credibility deficit, security imaginary and a formatting element of

international politics provide useful tools that allow us to understand how strong and

persuasive specific representations and interests are for the public.

Defining national interest creation via its components is closely related to the

common identity process of articulation and interpellation. Interpellation is boosting

aggregation of meanings produced by articulation and creates a more solid picture of the

national interest policymakers can afterwards use and work with. This approach is

represented also by Jutta Weldes.

Alexander Wendt, David Campbell and Bill McSweeney believe that the national

interest construction is inseparable from the common identity. National identity and

common identity for simplification of the explanation will be considered as the identity

of one state unit due to the complexity of this issue. And for our case the U.S. national

identity will be more closely followed.

Closely to common identity linked phenomenon is culture. To some, it is just a

synonym -- culture is a set of various practices, repeated actions, traditions, etc. Even

though, the borders between the two are indistinct, we could at least agree that culture

can be considered a part of our identity. Moreover, it influences our actions and

therefore is vital to national interest construction. This concept of culture I based on the

concept presented by Valerie Hudson.

Democracy and U.S. as the world leader with a constant need for strength has a

formatting influence on the national interests of the United States. Being a leader

inevitably means that the others have to be in the position of followers. The ones not

willing to be in this position are then considered unfriendly or if necessary - the enemy.

Then, if we do accept that culture of insecurity in the world led by the United States is apart of U.S. identity, we should also agree that it is in the U.S. national interest to halt

any attempt to undermine a leaders role or simply a threat to security. This position

would be certainly advocated also by David A. Baldwin and Jutta Weldes.

Another set of factors that is an inseparable part of national interest construction is

credibility, the human rights and freedom. The U.S. constant need for strength and its

persistent credibility problem pushes this superpower into a search for new justifications

for its foreign policy actions. Advocating human rights or freedom in the world givesmorality to these actions and consequently, they are perceived as national interest.


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Especially after the revelation of U.S. secret activities, a picture of the U.S. as a world

democratic leader and protector of human rights is severely damaged.

On the other hand, as Robert C. Johansen agrees in his work, all the activities

conducted by the U.S. government prove that the Western Hemisphere is of such a high

priority to the U.S. that it does not hesitate to omit certain principles it normally stands

for. The security imaginary and security phenomenon is one of the most important

variables presented in my NI construction framework. It is activated mainly through

interpellation. It is from ones subject position (role, identity) that the always

heterogeneous reservoir of meanings is opened up for a certain articulation of history

lessons. By omitting this we would miss the sociological link between collective

meanings and the formation of national interests the identity. Moreover, energy

security as a part of security imaginary is especially important to our case study.

The last integral set of ideas contributing to the national interest construction is

international community, states and anarchy. I deal with it the way Alexander Wendt

presented it to the world. By discussing this phenomenon, I am positively answering the

question: Does the character of international system have a significant influence on

national interest formation?

National interest functions as a rhetorical device that generates the legitimacy of and

political support for a state action. Therefore, national interest influences international

system and in return, international system influences the national interest formation.

After providing and discussing a set of conceptual tools for the analysis of national

interest construction, I then closely examine U.S. foreign policy in the past decades with

a particular focus on Latin America. This serves for the examination of how a particular

national interest is advocated by the United States in this area and (if) there were any

constraints for such action.

Drawing on the theoretical material presented in chapter 1, in chapter 3 I do examinethe situation in Venezuela and how the U.S. national interest was employed here and

what was the actual outcome in the coup. In addition, I analyse how the situation was

constrained within the boundaries set by the international and other commitments of the

U.S.

Showing the constraints of the U.S. involvement in Venezuela reveals that energy

security embedded in the security imaginary of the country hinders its behavior that

would otherwise be acceptable from the historical perspective even though with adifferent ideological connotations. For this reason, in Chapter 4 the similar involvement


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in Chile is presented and tools of articulation and interpellation used against the core of

the Chilean coup case. The prevailing U.S. understanding of the relations with Latin

America in the changed post-Cold War atmosphere helped to pick the important

particles of the national interest construction since the change itself contains

explanatory potential.

The discussion presented in the chapters 1 and analysis in chapter 2 highlight the

centrality of the identity of the United States to the process of national interest

formation respecting role of its commitments as the world leader.

In the globalized world, where the interconnection of economies and striving for raw

materials is transforming the international scene radically, I examine the national

interest limitations in the Chapter 6 regarding the identity of the United States.

To delineate more precisely how the national interest is created and how it influences

foreign policy, I am adding a chapter 5 based on comparison of works by Krasner and

Trubowitz. This is done in an attempt to highlight the differences in approach to

national interest formation.

In sum, examining particularities of the national interest construction via the process

of articulation and interpellation on different levels, contributes to the common identity

formation that under the actual circumstances produces national interest that is either

enforced or adjusted to comply with expected optimal outcome, even if the action itself

is unsuccessful as it happened in the case of the coup in Venezuela 2002.

On Literature

Discourse on used literature deals with used titles that significantly influenced

formation of my thesis and are directly mentioned in the text.Beginning with Jutta Weldes and her book Constructing National Interest I want to

stress the influence it had on writing my thesis. To a certain extent, I used her

methodology and few variables used by her to define the national interest. In her

analysis she seems to search for the symptoms of the Cuban missile crisis through

explaining what national interest is, rather than analyzing what was done during the

crisis itself. This book can be considered as a great contribution to understanding of

mentioned crisis as well as to understanding the national interest per se. At the end ofthe book, Weldes concludes that the understanding of everyday cultural conditions


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making particular state actions possible is the key to understanding interstate

interaction.

Another Weldes book is an anthology to which contributed authors with a diverse

personal background. Cultures of insecurity is a work in which authors discuss the

issue of national security from numerous perspectives. Moreover, as it appeared to me,

culture of insecurity is a national security prerequisite and national security is

inseparable from national interest creation. This book helped me to understand the

influence security has on the formation of the culture.

Valerie Hudson and her Foreign Policy Analysis is a summarization of techniques

used to analyze and understand foreign policy. It is quite detailed hand-book that made

me understand certain aspects of foreign policy analysis. In addition, to her, national

identity is the answer to the three basic questions: Who are we? , What we do? Who

are they?What she finds quite crucial and I dwell upon it in the chapter 1.2.

Another book under her name is anthology Culture and Foreign Policy that reveals

the influence of culture on foreign policy. The central idea here is that culture provides a

set of various necessary rules and actions that are used for the action. If action is

successful it is remembered and used again in the similar context. If unsuccessful,

action is abandoned. I used her concept and insight in the chapter 1.2 where I deal

with the identity on the various levels.

Psychological approach represented by Deborah Welch Larson in her book, is an

attempt to explain why and how perception of the Soviet Union in the United States

changed, particularly on the level of the U.S. political representation. This book closely

focuses on changes in beliefs of four men who were particularly influential in shaping

the redirection of American foreign policy from cooperation with the Soviet Union to

containment policy (1944 1947). From our perspective the output of national interest

received its final shape in the form of actual foreign policy change thanks to theseindividuals as I closely examine in the chapter 3.3 when discussing the individuals in

direct relationship to foreign policy making.

Baldwins book Economic Statecraft written in the last years of the Cold War is a

mixture of knowledge from international relations, foreign policy, economy and

political science carefully structured, and integrated. This study of economics as an

instrument of politics is a significant contribution to the understanding of use of various

economic tools in the international relations. The need for an increased number ofavailable alternatives/instruments in nuclear age functions as a leitmotiv. Author


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provides an analytical framework within which reliable knowledge about economic

statecraft can be developed to replace the conventional wisdom. Examples in the book

are used to support his claims and hypotheses which drive him to the final conclusion,

that in virtually every case examined, there was a reason to suspect that thorough and

rigorous application of the framework he developed, would lead to conclusions

significantly different from those of the conventional wisdom. Baldwin captures

dynamics of sanction policies in modern international relations upon which I dwell

more largely when assessing and analyzing the U.S. foreign policy in the chapter 2 and

2.1.

Martin Wolfs book Why Globalization Works is from a different social science

area and presents an influential advocacy of globalization with precisely rational

argumentation. Book starts with the proposition that the world integrated trough the

market should be highly beneficial to the vast majority of the worlds inhabitants.

Failure of our world is not that there is too much Globalization but that there is too little.

We need more global markets if we want to raise standards of the poor of the world.

The question remains if this is in accordance to national interests of rich states.

Johansens book The National Interest and the Human Interest I used mainly when

analyzing U.S. foreign policy and the case of Chile in particular. In his book he

concludes that the United States officials ignored human rights in formulating the goals

and means of United States foreign policy whenever human rights came into sharp

conflict with the vested economic and hegemonic interests of government and corporate

officials.

The Bush Doctrine and Latin America edited by Gary Prevost and Carlos Oliva

Campos is another anthology I went trough and used in my work in chapters 2 and 2.1.

It is a collection of (mostly critical) contributions by various foreign policy analysts

regarding U.S. involvement in the Latin America that offer an interesting insight intomotivations of the U.S. in the area.

A compilation called Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt

and his critics edited by Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander, except for being an

interesting reading, is a compilation of critiques of Alexander Wendt's constructivist

theory of international relations. Moreover, it includes the comprehensive reply by

Wendt and develops here his idea of a quantum social science, as well as its

implications for theorizing international relations which I am mentioning in chapter 1.2.


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Steve Ellner and Daniel Hellinger in Venezuelan Politics in the Chvez Era dwell

upon policies and politics in the present Venezuela with regard to development in the

past decade. This volume was especially useful when trying to find reliable and non-

extremist perspective commenting Chvezs activities in Venezuela.

David Campbells Writing Security examines the way in which the U.S. identity has

been written and rewritten through foreign policies operating in its name. Moreover, it

examines how United States foreign policy helps to produce and reproduce political

identity of the doer supposedly behind the deed. Author here highlights that the very

domains of danger are constituted through writing of threat what I discuss in the chapter

1.7 more broadly. In the same chapter, I use knowledge provided by Bill McSweeney in

Security, Identity and Interest; A Sociology of International Relations, where he

discusses the inadequacy of scientific approach to the security studies in the past

decade. Author employs contemporary trends in sociology and develops a theory of the

international order where the primary role is played by the idea of security offering a

more interpretive approach to understanding and formulating the concept of security

policy.

Scott Burchill is one of the few authors who deal directly with national interest. His

book The National Interest in International Relations Theory is a systematic and

critical analysis of the national interest concept from the perspective of International

Relations theories. Here he mentions realism, Marxism, anarchism, liberalism, English

school and most importantly to us - constructivist perspective. Author believes that the

national interest is a problematic concept and that it fails to explain motivations of

foreign policy which I understand but disagree with.

To offer a different approach to the formation of national interest, I dedicated a

separate chapter for comparison of concepts of Trubowitz and Krasner which should

highlight the difference between my and their concepts of national interest construction.All in all, there is very few recent works that deal directly with national interest as

with the main topic. Perhaps Burchill, Weldes, Krasner and Trubowitz are the most

often cited in literature. Therefore, I hope that my decision to work with this topic will

contribute with its bit to the discussion on this interesting topic.


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1. National Interest

In this chapter, my intention is to analyze all factors relevant to national interestconstruction. The self-regulation of the national interest with regard to circumstances in

Venezuela 2002 will be stressed and discussed.

In the upcoming text, I will try to answer to the following questions:

What is the national interest? How is it produced? What influences its production?

Before I start, I want to note that I dont want to dedicate extensive amount of time to

discussing terms like the nation state, state or nation for purely practical reason related

to desired extent of this work. Therefore, national interest is to be attributed to theinterest of one political unit. In our case the United States of America.

The national interest is best to be understood as a social construction. Process of

interpretation presupposes language shared by at least those that determine state actions.

Or in exact words of Jutta Weldes: The national interest is constructed, is created as a

meaningful object, out of shared meanings through which the international system and

the place of the state in it, is understood (Weldes 1999a:4).

This applies as a certain definition when we are trying to understand the nationalinterest from the outside. From this perspective it is seen as a final product of the

countrys performance on the international scene if there are any results of such actions.

To better understand the internal workings of the creation process of the national

interest we should track down its origins in modern history to understand its very

nature.

National interest as we commonly perceive it these days emerges with the American

and French revolution, their constitutions and the emergence of civil rights. To simplify

our discussion, nation is to be perceived here as a territory under one ruler with common

language, habits and history. The constitutional rulers of political community were then

able to define and justify their policy in front of the nation. Therefore, intellectual

origins of idea of nation-state are inseparable from its constitutional basis (Burchill

2005:9).

In the following text, the state and nation is to be understood here as a one

inseparable state unit.


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Back in the 19th century Jean Jacques Rousseau was one of the first people to write

about common political expressions of a political community what he calls the general

will.Furthermore he explains that for the will to qualify for this term the will must be

general and must be for the object. Another way commonly used to express the national

interest is raison dtat. For the State representative, to behave in accordance with the

raison dtathe must act in attempt to preserve the power of the state what implies that

the ruler is less than the State, and he takes care of the State (Burchill 2005:13-14, 17;

Meincke 1998:10).

On the other hand, from the moralist perspective, State in its very nature is an ethical

force and a high moral goodand Moralists must recognize that the State is not to

be judged by the standards which apply to the individuals, but by those which are set for

it by its own nature and ultimate aims(Treischke 1916:106, 99 in: Burchill 2005:18).

This means that we cannot judge the actions of the state as if it was an individual,

because then comes the responsibility of decision making individuals in question.

Finding the roots and the origins of the national interest in the modern era enables us

to find the most accurate definition of the term itself.

As most of the constructivist would probably agree, the national interest is a product

of shared ideas, national identity, inter-subjectivity and normative practices. Far from

being a set of permanent, objective conditions, the national interests of states are

formed within a cultural context and are the outcome of social interaction. This should

be the focus of those inquiring into the subject. They are not determined in response to

an external given, nor are they fixed. Rather they vary as social conditions and national

identities change(Burchill 2005:210).1

The national interest is thus changing in time with the changing social conditions and

historical memory connected to the national identity. It would be interesting to evaluate

and asset the speed of this changes since all of them appear to be path dependent andincremental. Changes may be evoked from the inside and from the outside as well and

their speed is in direct proportion to the austerity of the circumstances causing the

change.

Alexander Wendts definition of national interest is more specific and treats nation as

a social organism, as he puts it: I define national interest as the objective interest of

1In the sub-chapter later on I will discuss particular components of the National interest based on this definition withfew alterations given by the extent of this study.


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state-society complexes, consisting of four needs: physical survival, autonomy,

economic well being, and collective self-esteem (Wendt 1999:199).

One of the four Wendts variables - the collective self-esteem as constituting factor of

national interest, gives it a truly social dimension.

Of four factors mentioned above three of them are to be found also in realist

interpretation of national interest:Realists of all stripes believe that states do what they

do because it is in their national interest, and that the national interest is self-regarding

with respect to security (Wendt 1999:113). National interest and its respect to security

imaginary will be discussed in the separate subchapter.

In addition, realists approach national interest as a combination of human nature,

material capabilities and anarchy. In their view it is more about material basis2 than a

social one (Wendt 1999:114).

One way or another, in the moment when the materialism plays the role in national

interest creation it is necessary to mention the question of strategicness of the goods

for what the interest will be exercised upon. The strategicness of the good lies in its

relative value and its substitutionality for the opponent in case, that markets fail to

provide it. Economically speaking, its marginal elasticity of demand is extremely low.

Still, goods like oil are strategic commodity regardless of their definition.

The most critical attitude to the very existence of the national interests I came across

has Robert Gilpin when he writes: strictly speaking, states, as such, have no interests,

or what economists call utility functions, nor do bureaucracies, interest groups, or so-

called trans-national actors, for that matter. Only individuals and individuals joined

together into various types or coalitions can be said to have interests (Gilpin 1981:18).

In my opinion, interest groups are individuals joined together and so are

bureaucracies with their SOPs and trans-national actors as well. Moreover, saying that

interest groupsas such dont have interestsis for me very hard to understand.Liberals identify national interests only in proper democratic system, and these then

have pacifying effect on the international system. However, Liberals realize that

particular policies executed by the democratically elected government might have in

fact, very little influence on the final economic outcomes as contrasted to

unaccountable market players who do represent only themselves even though their

power over the output is often decisive. Then, it is not unreasonable to say that the

2In standard material terms the national interest is defined by the desire for material security. See Burchill 2005:210


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output of what is in national interest is quite impossible to successfully influence

(Burchill 2005:114, 139-40).

In certain countries (United States) military-industrial complex lobby can have

sometimes decisive influence on the creation of national interests in terms of pressing

administration into interventions in the third world.3If the lobby has enough leverage on

media (media manipulation), government could afford enormous spending on military

equipment what would be then easy to publicly justify. Citizens will pay almost

anything if sufficient imaginary security threats are created. This will be done via

displaying certain issues as important and valuable and a need to have or to control

them.

This is directly connected to the influencing norms of behavior, social construction of

shared beliefs, principles and the way they work to legitimize certain strategies and

advocate chosen preferences.4

From another focal point we can see the national interest as something that contains

two elements - virtual and material one. Virtual element consists of ideas, power,

emotions and feelings and/or anything non-measurable by standard physics and the

material ones then constituted by measurable parts like goods or needs and desires for

material security. Both of them are ever-present in the national interest. Wendt (Wendt

1999:115) adds ideational part. Under which we can imagine various schemas and

deliberations constituted by shared ideas or culture.5

Constructivist Jutta Weldes sees that national interests are social constructions

created as meaningful objects out of the inter-subjective and culturally established

meanings with which the world, particularly the international system and the place of

the state in it, is understood. More specifically, national interests emerge out of the

representationout of situation descriptions and problem definitions through which

state officials and others make sense of the world around them (Weldes 1996:280).From her definition it is obvious that in an attempt to understand the content of

national interestsper se we will have to deconstruct them onto parts and quarry deeper.

This complex social construction has its origins in the nations culture as well as its

actual position in the international system. Therefore, both of these constituents need to

be discussed.

3More on it in in Kofsky 1993; Nathan & Mecken 19974Well described relations between mentioned variables and international system in: Finnemore 19965See following sub-chapters that elaborate more on this issue


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In addition, Headley Bull believes that thenational interest comprises a rational

plan of action to achieve agreed ends, which can be contrasted with policies based on

sectional interests, the interests of alliances and international organizations, or the ad

hoc and uncritical pursuit of established policy (Bull 1977:66-67).

Bulls approach then sees national interest being constructed by various sectional

interest according to which nations create alliances or if unnecessary the advocate them

themselves. This is perhaps truth but I see this approach quite reductionist and

simplifying. We will try here to dwell upon the very structure of national interest in

order to understand it. Theorizing about alliances of national interest in the international

system we will intentionally omit due to intended extent of this work.

Since I do argue that understanding articulation and interpellation, culture,

democracy, common identity, credibility deficit, security imaginary and formatting

element of international politics are the key constituents of the national interest, their

importance to the creation process will be discussed in the following subchapters.

1.1 Articulation & Interpellation

Defining national interest creation via its components is closely related to the

common identity process of articulation and interpellation. To understand constructivist

concept of articulation and interpellation, it is required to define both terms precisely

and describe their relation to each other.

Under articulation we generally understand process through which meaning is

produced out of extant cultural raw materials or linguistic resources. Meaning is

created and temporarily fixed by establishing chains of connotations among different

linguistic elements (Weldes 1999a:98).

Moreover, all articulations are social constructions, products of concrete social

practices in specific historical circumstances (Weldes 1999a:100).

From this starting point the subject is addressed though the process of interpellation.

Interpellation is boosting aggregation of meanings produced by articulation and creates

more solid picture policymakers can use and work with afterwards. It is some kind of

incremental snowball effect - the more agents we engage, the bigger and more

powerful a snowball/image we get.


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For instance, articulated abstraction of WMD in Iraq became a serious threat via

interpellation. Interpellation itself is a complicated process by which I becomes We

a part of our shared identity.

Interpellation is ever-present on every level/stage of human society regardless of the

country. In the United States, schools play an important role in socializing US children

into US nationalism not only via singing a national anthem but also through

dissemination of a particular interpretation of U.S. and world history (Weldes

1999a:109).

Interpellation consists of various little and at first sight unimportant particularities.

U.S. liberal economic entrepreneurship-based system promotes individualism. This way

of thinking is imprinted into human minds already in the early stage of childhood.

American fairytales always contain happy ending and are full of superheroes able to

carry away disgrace of the destiny on their own side and win. In contrasts to, for

instance, Central European modest bravery of heroes who are often displayed as

entertaining individuals, actually often mentally inferior ones.6I admit that this could be

considered as impropriate generalization but to as large extent it works.

Sociological term labeling is a proof that we do often become what we are expected

to be. More specifically in our case - Interpellation refers to a dual process whereby

subject positions or identities are created and concrete individuals are interpellated by

or hailed into those hailed positions (Weldes 1999a:103).

Articulation and interpellation are interesting for us also from the security imaginary

perspective. Because security imaginary is activated mainly through interpellation, it is

necessary to clarify this in connection to articulation what I intend to do in one of the

following chapters.

As mentioned above, communication is the key element in the identity formation and

is a part of identity itself. Linguistic and non-linguistic practices are in reciprocalrelationship they are mutually constitutive and jointly productive of the meanings of

the social world (Weldes 1999a:110).

In addition, examining linguistic artifacts can help us both how and what particular

situation and response to it means. We can do it via examining rhetoric of state officials

and particular state actions in foreign policy.

6vejk, A JE TO, and others


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Since the TV news in the United States represent U.S. actions in the world in the

spreading-democracy-everywhere spirit, people tend to believe that they are the ones

who are just and everything different from their way of life is not normal or should be

adjusted. Moreover, running the western hemisphere was for decades (almost two

centuries by now) considered by the Americans as normal.

Moreover, when the U.S. democratizing intentions come at variance with their energy

interests, it seems that general public tends to believe that this problem exists because of

some bad guy who hates the United States.7

This is an overly simplified view, but sufficient enough to clarify how all of this

contributed to the process by which Americans recognize themselves to be belonging to

a particular identity. This identity articulated in the media and widely accepted, played

an important role in finding a sufficient support in the Senate and in the public.

Especially the Cold Wars Cuban missile crisis, when the missiles were placed in Cuba,

these were presented as a lethal Soviet Trojan horse in the Western hemisphere and in

accordance with the widely accepted need to fight international communism.

Another reason why U.S. decision makers can justify at home almost anything related

to managing Latin America is because of them being a part of The American Family

Our nations are the product of a common struggle the revolt from the colonial rule.

And people share a common heritage the quest for dignity and freedom of a man

(Quoted from Kennedy 1962:396 Documents on American Foreign relations,

1961:395-401, New York 1962 in: Weldes 1999a:157).

Presenting Chvez in the U.S. newspapers vary. For instance, the NY times are far

more radical anti Chvez than Washington Post.

For example: Political polarization in which opposition to Chvez became

increasingly harsh was also evident in the coverage provided by the U.S. media,

particularly after his first six months in the office. Leading newspapers such as the New

York times and the Washington Post referred to Chvez as Venezuelan rambunctious

president and a firebrand, his policies as Jacobin, and his movement as containing

anti-American elements. The articles in both newspapers vividly described the

militarization of the government, the politicization of the armed forces, the reliance on

populism, and the purging of all cultural institutions. Sometimes Chvez was

systematically compared with Perus Alberto Fujimori without reference to the basic

7Saddam Hussein, Ahmadinejad, Kim Jong-Il, Hugo Chvez etc.


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differences between the two regimes. The New York Times hailed the April 2002 coup

that momentarily ousted Chvez from office8(Ellner & Hellinger 2003:22).

One way or another, U.S. national interest has its roots in the process of articulation

and interpellation. Taken into account the priorities of the administration, formation of

this interest can be largely influenced by emphasizing what is important and therefore

easily abused.

1.2 Identity, Common Identity/National Identity

All physicists agree upon certain practices of scientific inquiry and upon the principle

that the reality is a constraint on truth

-Alexander Wendt (Wendt in: Guzzini & Leander 2006:217)

National interest construction is inseparable from the common identity and in this

chapter I shall try to explore this phenomenon. National identity and common identity

for simplification of the explanation will be considered as identity of one state unit due

to complexity of this issue.

Scholars did not spent much time dealing with common/national identity issues and

its impact or influence on the foreign policy during the Cold War, only after the collapse

of bipolar world, the diversity of the national features of foreign policy were flagrant

enough for them to notice.

According to Valerie Hudson (Hudson 2007) the national identity is the answer to the

three basic questions: Who are we? What we do? Who are they?

In other words, we will have to answer questions like: What creates and transforms

our beliefs?, What actions we take?, Why, and what distinguishes us from the rest ofthe world?

To understand the common identity, it is necessary to go down on the identity of the

individual and discuss the epistemological problematic of it.

A Nobel Prize Laureate Douglas C. North claims that individuals grasp of reality is

imperfect (North 2005:23).

8NY times Jan 20 2001, p-19-A, August 30 2000, April 13 2001 p.A-4; April 24, 2001, p.1, April 13, 2002;Washington Post, May 28, 2000, p.B-1; April 23, 2000, p. B-2; April 14, 2002


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Therefore, it is virtually impossible to get to know the individual well enough to

perfectly asses his or her actions. A good example here would be an experiment with

asking ten people to draw whatever they imagine under the word apple. No doubt

none of the pictures will be identical, even though it is very likely that the pictures will

have several common features.

The existence of this common features enables us to cooperate with each other, and

cooperation makes us - human beings a social creatures. As social beings with shared

system of beliefs, through our perception of the world we can share a living space in a

certain time with other beings. Interaction with these beings via language, gestures

symbols and emotional exchange creates our identity. Identity exists only in relation to

these social connections and even though every individual is unique, its identity is

inevitably a part of phenomena we call common identity.

Taken into the extreme, we can say that when the common identity (or identity of a

certain culture) is threatened, the individual takes it as a threat to its very existence.

When a group identity or colloquially roots is attacked it tends to produce violence

and aggressive backlash in order to preserve the identity. Since our need for identity is

quite a primitive instinct, it might produce more aggression in less intelligent

individuals.9 This would need a further exploration. I had conduced myself several

verbal interviews with Americans and Europeans individually and tried to attack their

English or metric system of measurements respectively. Since this system is a part of

their shared believes and its a way in which they perceive their world, it made some

individuals angry and this was noticeable especially among less clever10 ones.

Backlash arguments were often quite irrational. Especially answers like: they use it like

that on TV too, so it must be true or one inch is more logical because its easier than

2,54cm. Therefore, I believe, individuals do consciously or subconsciously perceive

threat to their identity as an attempt to infirm they reality.

Our understanding and firm trust in reality is essential for every individual because

here it forms and reforms identity commitments from experiences and these result

from forces both within, and external to domestic society(Hall 1999:36).

In our daily reality, our-self is daily bombarded by thousands of images; our-self

instinctively follows successful individuals whose success is in accordance with our

preferences. This is connected to the working process of our memory and brain. I will

9Lets assume that brain and rationality makes us to abstain from violent response10Very subjective perspective


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briefly and tersely explain the process and role of protein-accumulation during CREB

cycle11.

Our mind is set up to remember certain things that are directly connected to our

survival. Actions (even the complicated ones) or events associated with strong emotions

are easy for brain to remember. How is this possible? CREB cycle assures that

important memories are marked with higher amount of proteins while unimportant

ones are during the same cycle marked with a lesser amount. This process influences

the capability of our brain to look the first ones up easily, while the second ones we

either forget or our brain has more difficulties to recall them. Thats how brain protects

itself from being data-overloaded.12 Another positive effect of this process is that

according to this protein accumulation, we have a certain hierarchy of values

according to which we do choose our actions.

Apart from the workings of the brain and common meanings we share, every

individuals behavior is also based on the set of genetic predispositions mixed with

experiences aggregated in certain period of time. Individual is formed like dough by

everything that came across. On the other hand, as rational conscious beings we are

capable to alter our preferences. The preference is based on the system of hierarchy of

values, and hierarchy of the values is partially set by the cultural background and differs

to a certain extent individually.

In the literature on the common identity, so called otherness is one of the key

elements that help to find constraints for the common identity author who deals with it

is David A. Campbell. To him, identity is constituted by fear, search for new frontiers

and otherness. He also argues that Wendt concentrated too much on agents and central

role of a state and marginalized the understanding of identity (Campbell 1998:219).

I would agree with it taking into account his earlier works but not so much in the last

decade. Nonetheless, to Campbell - Identity can only be established in relation to

what it is not to difference. Difference, in turn, is constituted in relation to identity.

Identities, then, are always contingent and relational, and they are performatively

constituted(Campbell 1992:8).

As we see, the identity is nothing given or non-changeable. It is created, formed,

manipulated and abused as well. He explains, that the distinction between difference

11cAMP responsive element binding protein (CREB)12http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/9530494


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and otherness can be graphically understood. Difference is defined and exists as a

bridge between identity and otherness.

Then, the logic of identity existence to him requires difference. Moreover, the

potential for the transformation of this bridge (difference) into otherness always exists

(Campbell 1998:70).

Another contribution to our understanding of the difference brings William Connolly.

He claims that the identity is created in connection to series of differences that have

become socially recognized (Connolly 1991:64 in: Weldes 1999:11).

This means that without the realization of differences there is no common identity.

This is quite true if we think about nationalism in a traditional way. Until masses

havent realized and/or were not informed about their lingual or cultural difference

they did not think about it that way.

Certainly, what we call ourselves, says a lot about us. When we formulate them

we include some and exclude others. This is as true of transnational collective identities

as of national collective identity. We cannot formulate an argument regarding who we

are without at least implying an argument about who are not (Hall 1999:299).

Findings of Anne Norton show the equality in the relationship between likeness and

otherness. There is no priority in its creation. The recognition of both in identity

formation is inter-dependent and exists in the same time (Norton 1988:45-46).

In addition, relationship between the society and its identity also perfectly works both

ways. While every society is constituted by its identity, identity describes society as

well (McSweeney 1999:74).

In his recent works, Alexander Wendt writes about the quantum social theory. 13A

part of it is a quantum consciousness theory claiming that the quantum in effect is

consciousness. Consciousness is ever-present in matter all along (Wendt in: Guzzini &

Leander 2006:190).Apart from this, to him, we have to work on the relations between identity (individual

and collective) to understand the interest. His approach is quite new and to many, quite

a science fiction. To take his side, what in our world today would not had been

considered sci-fi some hundred years ago?

13Excellent description of quantum theory and its application on society and how to understand it (Wendt in: Guzzini& Leander 2006:190-192)


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If we would take his approach for granted we could see common identity with a

quantum focal lens peoples brains joined together into superior social brain. Wendt

admits that in case his assumptions are truth, then he offers these three conjectures:

1) Social systems have wave functions that constitute a collective unconscious;

2) These wave functions collapse by a process of intra-actions described by quantum

game theory;

3) Social systems are super-organisms with collective consciousness.

(Wendt in: Guzzini & Leander 2006:200).

Developing this idea even more in connection to his findings of sub-atomic/non-

material particles our brain/neurons consists of; in my opinion then, the language as the

medium for communication is the key to the identity and to otherness.

Language as a medium trough which we communicate produces sounds that exist

only if perceived. As we know from the very basic physics, the sound is based on

vibrations on different frequencies. Since every language has at least slightly different

set of sounds these certainly have effect on these sub-material particles in the brain.

From this simple premise, the language is the key to the otherness and it has a

measurable base for non-social scientists too. In short, we are similar to other members

in our group and different from the other language groups, just because we use different

sets of sound waves for communication.

It is a fact that the behavior of people able to speak fluently in more languages vary

when they employ different language in a different societal group. It is called cultural

frame switching.14

Moreover, populations within one territory with one language and media images have

every prerequisite to make populations more homogenous (Wendt 1999:325).

Rethinking the relationship between identities, interests, shared ideas, valuesystem, hierarchy of these values and circumstances of the events significantly

influences and shapes interests that are seen as political action or a certain policy.

As Burchill put it: Identities inform interests which, in turn, determine actions

(Burchill 2005:195).

Our actions, based on our perception of the world, personal, collective and historical

memory are grounds for mobilizing our collective action. To understand it fully we need

14More on this issue see Ramirez-Esparza 2006


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to explain patterns of aggregate behavior. This has to do much with the common

identity and search for some master variables of it.

These variables according to Wendt are interdependence, common fate, homogeneity

and self-restraint (Wendt 1999:343).

Still, is the identity changeable? Is it something we can change only via our decision

to do so?

Constructivism treats identities and interests as inseparable, constantly interacting and

in the process. These changes occur when actors stop and redefine themselves and

decide on the new course of actions. Then, radical changes in action planning involve

massive structural changes of the actor. In case that actors identity is threatened,

instinctive defense will not be based on purely rational basis of individual, since a utility

calculation in this case will be group based (Wendt 1999:336-337).

Parts of this group-based calculating unit are intellectuals, political leaders,

journalists and countless others whose voice can be heard and engage in the process of

constructing, manipulating, negotiating or affirming collective image that is limited by

the facts of history15(McSweeney 1999:77).

On the other hand, all mentioned variables relevant to the national identity

construction in the historical context within which nations must act, create strong biases

toward certain courses of foreign policy action (Hudson 1997:28).

After all above mentioned, we explored main problematic of the common identity in

general and now we should discuss more U.S. national identity more specifically, since

it is relevant to our Venezuelan case.

1.2.1 U.S. National IdentityWhile discussing national identity, to the United States and their common history

would apply John A. Halls argument that U.S. national/collective identity developed as

a response to ressentiment induced by colonial oppression (Hall 1999:298).

In addition, United States from the very beginning of the colonization of the New

World was a place of refuge for various types of political, ethnic, religious or

ideological individuals or groups of individuals. From the old-fashioned European

perspective, in sum we could call them deviants positive and negative ones too. This


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division depends solely on the perspective because according to a modern philosophy,

things or people in its very nature are neither good nor bad; its only about perspective

that changes.16

Old world with its rigid structure was incapable to offer adequate environment to

free-spirited or differently thinking liberals. United States became home for brave

individuals pursuing their dreams and happiness. In contrast to 18th century Europe,

United States started to evolve as entrepreneurship based political Unit, with few

constraints made by the Constitution and its amendments. Then, what process imprinted

the identity to this newly emerged country that functioned as a melting pot for countless

ethnic, national and religious groups? The answer to this can be as simple as one word

repetition.

As Campbell explains the identity of any particular state should be understood as

tenuously constituted in time through a stylized repetition of acts, and achieved

through a regulated process of repetition (Campbell 1998:10).

All acts in society, constrained by decisions of the courts and written constitution,

repeated on the daily or regular basis affected the final form of the identity.

Jutta Weldes in her book Constructing National Interestsclaims that there are four

constitutive features of the U.S. identity U.S. leadership, its defense of freedom, its

need for strength and persistent credibility problem (Weldes 1999a:199).

These constitutive features of identity are perceived from the outside and only in

connection to the foreign policy output especially salient in the postwar era. We will

discuss these features later in separate chapters.

Except for their constitutive effect, these features have legitimizing effect too. This is

valid for the intra-state system as well as for the international system.

For the outsider, the U.S. identity in the last century was rewritten several times

through its often contradictory foreign policies. These changes often occurred due to afundamental attribution errorso common in the international relations.

Fundamental attribution error appears when the action is done by non-us actor.

Policymakers in United States tend to think that every unfriendly country acts the way

United States wouldnt on its place. For instance, Hudson uses example with North

Korea and the United States where the U.S. thinks that North Korea builds nuclear

15and material capability16Among others Castaneda 1991


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weapons because it wants to be aggressive, while North Korea feels threatened by the

United States and by others and builds weapons for its protection (Hudson 2007:51).

A part of the identity of still the only world superpower is the ethics. Accent on

human rights and the rule of law is on the list of U.S. foreign policy priorities. Bombing

Beograd as a response to human rights violation in on hand and a massive support for

authoritarian regimes in other parts of the world on the other could appear quite

contradictory. Although we must not forget that the integral part of the U.S. identity is

its incongruousness. Settled by puritans and various outlaws in the same time, America

inherited many discrepancies. Small and seemingly unimportant example could serve as

an illustration. A legal drinking age here is 21 and the age for joining the army equals to

18. In other words, a 19 year old soldier is obliged to kill people / enemy in the Middle

East/ but has to wait 2 more years to have his first beer.

In terms of identity, there are no small or unimportant differences. Identity either

contains certain aspects or it doesnt. No matter if their consequences are visible in the

everyday life of young Americans or as a result of the foreign policy.

In spite of fundamental attribution error empirically, far from facing profound

uncertainty, states are confident about each others intentions almost all of the time

(Wendt in: Guzzini & Leander 2006:210).

1.3 Culture

They may also be times when a Nation is more confused about what we do than about

who we are.

-Hudson 2007:105

Why is culture indivisible part of our identity and a constitutive element of the

national interest creation? Culture is central to the understanding of our world. Close to

and to some just a synonym to the common identity it is a set of various practices,

repeated actions, traditions etc. Even though the borders between the two are indistinct,

we could at least agree that culture can be considered a part of our identity. Moreover, it

influences our actions. Since there isnt one specific definition of what culture actually

is, it is better to define it in an indirect way.


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For instance, Valerie Hudson sees culture as a living organism. To her, culture

provides set of various necessary rules that are used for the action. If action is successful

it is remembered, and used again in the similar context if not it is abandoned. Hudson

treats culture as an evolving fund of semantic elements that can be combined in

certain ways and not others to define situations. Motivate and plan actions, or release

emotions. Culture shapes practice in both the short and long term (Hudson 1997:29).

But how do we then understand our world? How does it work? One way to

understand it is through the myth theory constructed by Hudson. She believes that

Myths are a system of human understanding; powerful historical memories that help

maintain the values of a community. The relevance of myths lies in their ability to gain

broad acceptance by a community, rather than their degree of rationality or realism. It is

irrelevant whether the myth is true or false. Myth is produced cultural variable and they

foster the natural environment we live in. Also the role of the society in the world is

derived from them. Moreover, every myth consists of several stories to support it. These

can change overtime and they can be used and abused as well (Hudson 1997:75-76).

Understanding of the underlying values of the myths is essential to politicians that

need to manipulate public opinion. Myths do not necessarily need to be consistent and

actually can exclude each other to a certain extent; what is important is if they fall into

the same society (Hudson 1997:92).

Looking back on the culture of the United States we can try to define what it is made

of. It is a community of people with common interests. It is as if there really is a

national interest, represented in the constitution, in territorial expansion, in the laws

passed by Congress, the decisions of the courts, the development of capitalism, the

culture of education and the mass media nations are not communities and never have

been. The history of any one country, presented as a history of a family, conceals fierce

conflicts of interest (sometimes exploding, most often repressed) between conquerors

and conquered, masters and slaves, capitalist and workers, dominators and dominated

in race and sex (Zinn in: Burchill 2005:63).

This quite radical support for the existence of culture is based on crystallizing

antagonisms - on the constant fight between superior and inferior. No matter if it is an

idea or material based power.

American exceptionalism is a strong idea that has formed the mentality of the New

World from the very beginning. It is in direct opposite of the Old Worlds rigidstructure (Tassell in: Hudson 1997:237-239).


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On the other hand, cultural heritage might be quite tricky at times. Culture doesnt

have to do anything with a rational course of actions and might be very destructive (if

abused) as it happened during the first half of the 20thcentury.

Nations may choose actions more in line with their heroic history than with more

dispassionate norms of strategy and rational choice. They may also be times when a

Nation is more confused about what we do than about who we are (Hudson

2007:105).

Cultural element influences the national interest when doing is in conflict with

being. When this presented in the public, it can influence actual foreign policy course

of action as it happened in the case analyzed in the latter part of this work.

1.5 Democracy - USA as a Leader and Need for Strength

I start this chapter with posing a question: How to measure the value of political

institution? Robert C. Johansen answers it: the value of laws and political institutions,

as of society itself, may be judged largely by the extent to which they protect and

facilitate the fulfillment of human rights and dignity(Johansen 1980:196).

Another question emerging from institutionally based democracy is question Martin

Wolf posed in his book Why Globalization works? and that is: Whether liberal

democracy can be securely established in much of a developing world (Wolf 2005:38).

In other words, has anyone right to spread the democracy?

The answer for the part of the USA and their interests they pursue is a document

published in 1999 called U.S. Department of State Strategic Plan 2000 which stated that

it was in national interest to prevent regional instabilities from threatening U.S. vital

national interestsreduce the threat to the United States and its allies from weapons of

mass destruction (WMD).The national interest under the section of Democracy was to

open political systems and societies to democratic practices, the rule of law, good

governance, and respect for human rights(Ayerbe in: Prevost & Campos 2007:80-81).

It was still Clintons administration that created this document.

Half a century ago in the times of the notorious Cuban missile crisis, missiles were

more of a symbol and an issue damaging U.S. face as a leader of the free world than a

real military threat. The need to remove Soviets from the U.S. sphere of influence wasmore important and bigger issue than fear from being wiped out by the nukes.


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The United States as the only leader of the democratic world after the victory in the

WW II, felt the burden of responsibility for the new world order.

These are the important consequences of leadership for the US identity:

- The notion of leadership clearly provided a warrant for action. It is expected that

leader will act.

- It is expected both to determine when the action is required and to suggest the

correct course of action.

- Leader is not only permitted to undertake actions but is obligated to do so. So

called burden of responsibility especially for the hemisphere comes into question here.

- Defense of freedom elided any view of U.S. actions as intervention in the affairs

of a sovereign Cuba.

(Weldes 1999a:200)

It was more than obvious in the postwar era that the United States inhabited the role

of a global leader. Moreover, U.S. commitment to freedom legitimized almost all

courses of action.

Being a leader inevitably means that the others have to be in the position of followers.

The ones not willing to be in this position are then considered unfriendly or if necessary

- the enemy. Then if we do accept that culture of insecurity in the world led by the

United States is a part of U.S. identity, we should also agree with the fact that any

attempt to undermine leaders role here is an obvious stability/security violation. Taken

into extreme, Chvezs verbal attacks were a verbal attack on their security.

From the perspective of U.S. as a leader it seems that U.S. policymakers can only do

what they can substantiate domestically and internationally (international dimension is

less acute) and what they can afford in terms of ideology as well as in monetary matters.

Representatives of the United States like to claim and consider themselves leaders in

establishing/spreading democracy and supporting the democratization processesthroughout the globe.

The meaning of democracy, the way American society understands it, contains values

such as free elections, rule of majority with the respect towards the rights of minorities,

freedom of press, secure private property rights etc. Paradoxically, in case of Venezuela,

U.S. policymakers behaved contrary to this perception of the basic meaning of the word

democracy, with the exception of the secure private property rights. Moreover, this

raises the question: What action works as an incentive when the democratic values areviolated after which U.S. direct or indirect intervention is inevitable?


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The policy at variance with basic democratic values could be better explained with a

classical realism.

The ambiguous policy of the U.S. gives the impression that regardless of ideology

and rhetoric involved, the United States are trying to maximize their power and

influence in the region anytime possible.

Then, what prevents it from doing so all the time since their military capability is

indisputably big enough to militarily control the whole continent? Limitations for such

behavior I shall discuss in the chapter about the limitations national interest.

1.6 Credibility, Human rights and Freedom

US constant need for strength and its persistent democratic leaders credibility

problem pushes this superpower into search for new justifications for its foreign policy

actions.

Especially after revelation of secret activities, a picture of the US in the world is

damaged and its role as a world democratic leader and protector of human rights suffers

equally. On the other hand, all the activities conduced by the U.S. government proved

that Western Hemisphere is of such a high priority to the United States that it did not

hesitate to omit certain principles it normally stands for.

Especially during the Cold War, the limitations to the foreign policy making in the

Latin America were almost non-existent. Anti-communism and the ideology were

probably the strongest interest promoter and generator.

However this attitude violates any principle of self-determination either in UN

Charter or Charter of OAS. One way or another, in the real world, illegal does not

necessarily equate to immoral. Immoral is very subjective term and to a certain extentan individual category. Therefore, morality is depended very much on a judging person.

If certain activities are in the United States perceived as in national interest, nobody

feels any guilt for seemingly immoral covert actions. And this is why I claim that the

sum of features in this subchapter is inherent to national interest construction.

David Allen Baldwin says that there cant be equation between 1 billion dollar of

military costs and 1 billion dollar worth of military force. We also can say that 10bn of

economic losses is more than 1bn of military equipment lost. From the economicalperspective it certainly is, but since the use of military equipment causes death, it


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doesnt necessarily have to be truth. In my opinion, there is no economist in the world

with some sense of morality who would be able to calculate the cost of a human life.

I was trying to point out that in connection to U.S. credibility problem it would be

advantageous to rely more on economic statecraft and economic tools in foreign policy

rather than using a military force.

One of the biggest advantages of using economic instead of military statecraft derives

from avoiding the costs associated with military statecraft (Baldwin 1986:129).

Tools used for the pressure on the other states should be chosen carefully and should

cause almost no collateral damage. In addition, problem of credibility is incarnated in

the leadership itself. Freedom in the world is indivisible onto pieces and therefore

extensive involvement of the leader in this fight is unfortunately quite self-defeating for

its extensiveness. U.S. should therefore start thinking more in coalition-building terms.

Nonetheless, the United States is convinced that threat to freedom anywhere is a

threat to U.S. freedom too. This premise became a part of U.S. identity. Therefore, the

export of democracy to Latin America has come to be seen as a legitimate and a

significant goal of U.S. foreign policy (Weldes 1999a:206-207).

In my opinion, credibility problem is the most contradictory and therefore ambivalent

feature of the U.S. identity discussed in our case. Compared to the Cold War, the role

U.S. played in its anti-communist-freedom-safeguarding initiatives in Korea, Vietnam,

Cuba and elsewhere, the defense of freedom in the 21stmillennium already gained quite

a different character.

1.7 Security Imaginary

Starting point of anarchy and the security dilemma can be found in all sections of the

classical tradition. It does not demarcate realism from idealism, but IR from

political science. What distinguished realism is a further assumption: its cyclical view

of history. Whereas, in principle, an idealist position would not exclude the possibility

of the international system becoming domesticated, realism would insist that whatever

improvement there is, it can only be temporary. We are bond by and will inevitably

return to the security dilemma in one guise or another.

- Stefano Guzzini (Guzzini & Leander 2006:75)


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Another constituting part of national interest of any country is its security imaginary.

The security imaginary is activated mainly through interpellation. It is from ones

subject position (role, identity) that the always heterogeneous reservoir of meanings is

opened up for a certain articulation of lessons of history. By omitting this we would

miss the sociological link between collective meanings and the formation of the

national interests the identity (or at least for Weldes and some other social

constructivists).

Security imaginary as a term is a neologism and therefore, it is necessary to define it.

The inventor of this technical term - Jutta Weldes uses it for a structure of a well

established meanings and social relations out of which representations of the world of

international relations are created (Weldes 1999a:10).

It is a whole complex of meanings that create reality and since there is security

involved, there must be also a threat or danger of some kind involved.

To Campbell, danger per se is not an objective condition. It is not a thing that

exists independently of those to whom it may become a threat(Campbell 1998:1).

Threat as a part of security is especially important to constructivists, many (all?)

would claim that national interest is not something that exists or is given, but that

national interest is constructed within military/security frameworks (Burchill 2005:101).

Professor Ken Booth offers an interesting premise while discussing the construction

of security threats in connection to identity when he writes that: Identity - who I really

think I am / who one actually believes one is / who they think they are / what makes us

believe we are the same and them different - is basic to many aspects of the discussion

of security (Booth 1994:4).

As we have seen, security imaginary is indivisible from the national interest and

common identity; one influences the other and constructs each other. In other words,

Security imaginary produces its representations and from these, national interestemerges as the ideological effect of security imaginary (Weldes 1999a:107).

1.7.1 Energy Security as a Part of Security Imaginary

United States need for consolidated relations with such an important oil exporter as

Venezuela, is and for decades to come will be a crucial one. Therefore, one of the goals


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through which national interest is defined in this geographical area is energy security

that has priority to the ideological connotations.

In case, that the coup was successful and US-loyal Venezuelan representation

would have had succeeded, the U.S.A. would have had much stronger influence over

the world oil prices. This was apparently one of the motives for U.S. involvement in the

coup.

The truth of the matter is that American public is very sensitive to the increases in gas

prices and if necessary the American involvement in the coup (no matter what the result

was) wouldnt be too difficult to legitimize at home, since it would be in accordance

with the national interests.

In connection to the national interest we can say that once the national interest is

defined, it functions as a rhetorical device that generates the legitimacy of and political

support for the state action. Or in exact words of Jutta Weldes the national interest

thus wields considerable power in that it helps to constitute as important and to

legitimize the actions taken by the state(Weldes 1999a:4).

Such finding enables vast maneuvering space for policymakers. Especially for the

policymakers in the country on wheels is oil an ace politicians can use quite freely.

Since the security imaginary we already briefly discussed is also to be seen through

the telltale silences, we should examine Chvezs steps and U.S. response to oil industry

nationalization represented by the PDVSA.

Finally, to plug in the oil issue in our attempt to understand interstate interaction we

must understand everyday cultural conditions that make particular state actions possible

(Weldes 1999a:241).

Oil sufficiency and sta

Dušan Nociar - National Interest

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