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Émile Durkheim

Sociological Conditions of Knowledge  [REVIEW] 

If it is for the first time that the abovementioned rubric appears in L’Année,  it is becausethe issue it raises has remained foreign to us until the present time. The topic, however, for a long

time has stood in the first rank of our preoccupations. Without speaking of our study PrimitiveClassification, which appeared in these pages, and Hubert’s Etude sommaire de la représentation

du temps dans la religion et dans la magie (Paris, 1905; also included in Hubert and Mauss,Mélanges d’histoire re ligieuse 

1, Paris: Alcan, 1909, pp. 189–229), the reader will find each of thesevolumes classified under the “Religious Representations of Being and of Natural  Phenomena,” in

addition to a certain number of books and articles reviewed from this very point of view. Now,since religion is essentially a social phenomenon, in order to seek what religious factors haveentered into our representation of the world, we have rigorously attempted to determine some ofthe sociological conditions of knowledge. Since in these works alone knowledge was studiedespecially in its relation to religion, we could hardly separate other works which also come under

the jurisdiction of religious sociology. This year again, that very reason has obliged us to presentin this very section the works of that nature, such as that by Pechuel-Loesche on the Bavilireligions Being and of Natural2  [the two works by Pechuel-Loesche have been reviewed byAntoine Beuchat. See L’Année , 11, 1910, pp. 218–227, 306–307], which, however, have directbearing on the questions of classification and categories. There was, moreover, a serious problemof corresponding interest on the part of all other works. That is why today we open a newchapter, which, we are quite sure, will not remain empty henceforth. At the very moment whenwe are publishing our works on the subject, some other works devoted precisely to thesociological study of knowledge have just been published or are under preparation. (Année

sociologique , 11, 1910, pp. 41–42; trans. Y. Nandan) Wilhelm Jerusalem. “Soziologie desErkennens.” Die Zukunft , 1909, pp. 236–246. This article is very general and very brief.3 Nevertheless, we feel obliged to present an analysis of it, first because it is interesting andsecondly because it will permit us to indicate in what terms the problem must be considered.

The author takes as his starting point the same main sources from which we draw ourinspiration. He admits that society is the original source of life sui generis, which is superimposedon the individual’s life and transforms it. Now, this creative power has just as much effect on theintelligence as on feeling and the will.

It is in matters of religious representations that we are made most aware of the influenceof society. All those conceptions of souls, of spirits, of demons, of mysterious forces dispersedthroughout nature, would have remained empty and passing fancies, and would consequently nothave played any role in the history of ideas, if they had not been anything more than individualmusings. But men have communicated their opinions and their feelings to each other, andverifying their agreement, have had their convictions mutually confirmed. By becomingcollective, impressions have become fixed, consolidated, crystallized. The author calls this

1 The title is erroneously cited: it should read Mèlange de l’ histoire des religions.2 The two works by Pechuel-Loesche have been reviewed by Antoine Beuchat. See the  Année, 11, 1910, pp. 218-27 and

306-307.3 Imagine Durkheim writing a four-page review of a ten-page article!

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operation a “social condensation,” eine soziale Verdichtung .4  That is what gave to the world ofimagination, where religious ideas hold sway, all the appearances of reality.

Our empirical conception of the universe was not formed in any other way and is of thesame nature. The notion we entertain of something—as long as this notion is not formulated inaccordance with rigorously scientific procedures—is essentially practical in nature; it expresses

above all the automatic reactions matter provokes on our part, depending on how it affects ourvital inclinations. Therefore, two phenomena that elicit similar reactions are quite naturallyclosely related in the mind; they “come under a same concept.” Now, each of us sees how others

react when faced with matters that turn up in the course of our experience; and as we mutuallyimitate each other, there tends to be established, by way of reciprocal borrowings, a sort ofcommon reaction showing how the average person adapts himself to the nature of hissurroundings. Notions likewise found to be byproducts of a “social condensation” correspond to

such typical reactions. Language, which is itself a social institution, achieves consolidation as aresult of this operation.

But, alongside the social factor, there is the matter of the individual, whose importance the

author is far from denying. In every case where the issue was newly considered, the individualwas sheepish in both behavior and thought; he would docilely follow the group. Now, such can bethe case only insofar as personal growth is regarded. On the other hand, to the degree that theindividual personality emerges from the mass of society and acquires a distinct physiognomy, ittoo conspires to have a mind of its own. It would seem that from this arose scientific thought,which, in the author’s opinion, is true understanding (p. 243). Until then,  what was considered asthe truth was generally accepted as such; it was a consensus of opinion that denoted the truth. Inthe present case, truth is arrived at objectively as a result of the exact observation of facts. Theinclination to make individual distinctions is so clearly inherent in science that if there was

nothing to curb it, it would risk giving way to excesses that would make it sterile. For it is notenough that scientific truths be proclaimed to become effective, to be translated into acts; it isnecessary that they be acknowledged as such collectively. If they were denied, it would be as ifthey did not exist; they would remain purely speculative, with no effect on behavior. It is, then,necessary that a social sense be ever-present in scientific research to prevent it from beingsidetracked. But it is not so-called science that can keep alive this sentiment and curb individualexcesses. That is sociology’s affair. 

Such is the thesis. We do not need to say that we accept it in principle. But we fear thatthe way it is presented and justified spoils it, or at the very least seriously weakens its scope.

In fact, if truly the role that the author attributes to society is indeed the only one that

applied to it, it must be said that its influence on intellectual life, great in the past, would bedestined to grow smaller and smaller. It would be responsible for consolidating mythologicalimaginations into obligatory dogmas, into undisputed truths. Similarly, it would formulate a crudeconception of nature. But science would not be under its jurisdiction; it would be an individualcreation. We would owe to society the simple, even crude, notions that would serve us day by dayto direct our activities; but it would be of no use to the more refined conceptions that aim, aboveall, to show things such as they are objectively, with all their characteristic complexitiesmethodically analyzed. In the last analysis, its impact would be completely normal only insofar asit was brought to bear on routine practices alone, and it would make itself felt to good purpose by

4 The English “social condensation” is literally from the expression in French. But  Verdichtung means concentration or

consolidation. Therefore, following the German meaning of the word, it is evident from the context, that the

translation should read “social consolidation” or “social cohesion.” 

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our understanding only insofar as this last is involved in action, and is subordinate to it. But tothe extent that needs properly speculative, cognitive, become self-sufficient, it is by other meansthat their requirements would be satisfied. From then on, the role of society and of social sciencewould be limited to curbing the antisocial tendency that is inherent in pure speculation byreminding this last perpetually of the need for action.

Actually, the pursuit of science is an eminently social matter, however great a roleindividuals may fill. It is social because it is the product of a vast cooperative effort that extendsnot only through all space but through all time. It is social because it presupposes certain methodsand techniques that are the creation of an authoritative tradition, comparable to the authorizedrules that govern morality and law. Scientific institutions are veritable institutions that areinvolved with ideas, as legal or political institutions are involved with methods relevant to action.Again, science is a social phenomenon because it brings into play ideas that dominate all thoughtand seemingly condense—classify by categories—the whole of civilization. It is, then, far short ofthe truth to state that the role of society ceases at that point where pure speculation begins; forspeculation rests on social grounds.

The author would not have excluded society from science in the way he does if he had notalready been mistaken about the part it plays in the genesis of religious beliefs and of theempirical conception of the world. If he were to be believed, it [society] would have been limitedto fixing, to crystallizing, individual conceptions. These last, on becoming collectivized, wouldhave found more strength to resist, more authority, but as far as that goes, they would not havechanged in nature. If social intervention had no other effect than to strengthen the impressions ofindividuals by mutually corroborating them, it would not have amounted to anything original orcreative; it would not have given rise to new conceptions, different from those that the individualcan elaborate under his own power. But, as a matter of fact, the impact of society is otherwise

important and profound. It is the source of a life of the mind sui generis that collaborates with theindividual’s point of view and transforms it. Social ideas, in fact, have on the one hand a powerfuland creative impact that the individual personality cannot reproduce, because it is due to thecollaboration of a multiplicity of intellects and to a collaboration that is carried on even duringthe following generations. In another sense, society is a new reality, which enriches ourunderstanding simply because it is revealed to our minds, and it is revealed simply because itexists, but it can exist only if it is in our thoughts. Yet since it [the social structure] is the highestform of life, it is life as a whole that is imbued with a greater sense of self-awareness in andthrough society.

It is, then, in the special mechanism of collective thought and in the special nature of

collective reality that one must look for society’s genuine contribution in giving form to our ideas.But here we touch upon an error that is still too widespread and that we regard as a sociologicalstumbling block. It is too often believed that what is general is social, and inversely, that thecollective type is nothing other than an average type. Quite the contrary, there is an immensedistance between those two types. The average consciousness is mediocre, as much from theintellectual as from the moral point of view; the collective consciousness, on the other hand, isinfinitely rich since its riches come from the whole civilization.

(Année sociologique  11, 1910, pp. 42–45; trans. J. French)