Duns Scotus Intuition

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Medieval Academy of America Theology as a Science and Duns Scotus's Distinction between Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition Author(s): Stephen D. Dumont Source: Speculum, Vol. 64, No. 3 (Jul., 1989), pp. 579-599 Published by: Medieval Academy of America Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2854184 . Accessed: 09/03/2011 06:43 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=medacad. . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Medieval Academy of America is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Speculum. http://www.jstor.org

Transcript of Duns Scotus Intuition

Page 1: Duns Scotus Intuition

Medieval Academy of America

Theology as a Science and Duns Scotus's Distinction between Intuitive and AbstractiveCognitionAuthor(s): Stephen D. DumontSource: Speculum, Vol. 64, No. 3 (Jul., 1989), pp. 579-599Published by: Medieval Academy of AmericaStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2854184 .Accessed: 09/03/2011 06:43

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unlessyou have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and youmay use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at .http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=medacad. .

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Medieval Academy of America is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access toSpeculum.

http://www.jstor.org

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Theology as a Science and Duns Scotus's Distinction between Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition

By Stephen D. Dumont

By all accounts one of the most influential philosophical contributions of Duns Scotus is his distinction between intuitive cognition, in which a thing is known as present and existing, and abstractive cognition, which abstracts from actual presence and existence.' Recent scholarship has focused almost

exclusively on the role given intuitive cognition in the justification of contin-

gent propositions and on the debates over certitude which arose from the

critiques of Scotus's distinction by Peter Aureoli and Williarn of Ockham.2

A shorter version of this study was read at the Eighth International Congress of Medieval

Philosophy, Helsinki, 24 August 1987. The following abbreviations have been used for the works of Duns Scotus: Add. magn.

Additiones magnae; Lect. = Lectura; Ord. = Ordinatio; Quod. = Quaestiones quodlibetales. Authors have been cited according to the following editions and series: ed. 1518 = Quodlibeta Magistri Henrici Goethals a Gandavo doctoris solemnis, 2 vols. (Paris, 1518; repr. Louvain, 1961); Alluntis = Obras del Doctor SutilJuan Duns Escoto: Cuestiones cuodlibetales, ed. and trans. Felix Alluntis (Madrid, 1968); DeCorte = Henrici de Gandavo Quodlibet XIII, ed. J. DeCorte (Leuven, 1985) and Henrici de Gandavo Quodlibet XII, ed. J. DeCorte (Leuven, 1987); PB = Les philosophes belges; SQO =

Henry of Ghent, Summae quaestionum ordinariarum, 2 vols. (Paris, 1520; repr. St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1953); Vat. = I. Duns Scoti Opera omnia studio et cura Commissionis Scotisticae adfidem codicum edita praeside Carolo Balic, vols. 1-7, 16-18 (Vatican City, 1950-82); Vives = Joannis Duns Scoti

Opera omnia, editio nova secundum editionem Waddingi XII tomos continentem recognita, 26 vols. (Paris, 1891-95); Wielockx = Henrici de Gandavo Quodlibet II, ed. R. Wielockx (Leuven, 1983).

On Scotus's notion of intuition see Sebastian J. Day, Intuitive Cognition: A Key to the Significance of the Later Scholastics (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1947); Camille Berube, La connaissance de l'individuel au moyen age (Montreal, 1964), pp. 176-224; C. K. Brampton, "Scotus, Ockham and the Theory of Intuitive Cognition," Antonianum 40 (1965), 449-66; John F. Boler, "Scotus and Intuition: Some Remarks," Monist 49 (1965), 551-70; Richard E. Dumont, "Scotus's Intuition Viewed in the Light of the Intellect's Present State," in De doctrina Ioannis Duns Scoti, 4 vols. (Rome, 1968), 2:47-64; Ludger Honnefelder, Ens inquantum ens: Der Begriff des Seienden als solchen als Gegenstand der Metaphysik nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus, Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, n.s. 16 (Miinster, 1979), pp. 218-67. Most recently Allan B. Wolter has tried to trace the development of Scotus's notion of intuition. Wolter, however, gives no attention to the Reportatio Parisiensis, which, as I hope to show, represents an important stage historically. See his "Duns Scotus on Intuition, Memory, and Our Knowledge of Individuals," in

History of Philosophy in the Making: A Symposium of Essays to Honor Professor James D. Collins on His

Sixty-Fifth Birthday, ed. LinusJ. Thro (New York, 1982), pp. 81-104. 2 On intuition and certitude, see Anton C. Pegis, "Concerning William of Ockham," Traditio

2 (1944), 465-80; Philotheus Boehner, "Notitia intuitiva of Non-Existents according to Peter Aureoli, O.F.M. (1322)," Franczscan Studies 8 (1948), 388-416; Marilyn M. Adams, "Intuitive

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However warranted this focus on the problem of certitude and the role of intuition in its solution might be, it has obscured the actual context in which

fourteenth-century thinkers very often discussed Scotus's famous distinction. As the Appendix to this article makes clear, Scotus's contemporaries, includ-

ing Ockham and Aureoli, nearly always treated intuitive and abstractive

cognition under the rubric of the scientific character of theology.3 I wish to

argue, first, that this nearly uniform application of Scotus's distinction to the issue of theology as a science can be traced to the original problem Scotus intended his distinction to solve and, secondly, that abstractive rather than intuitive cognition played the important and controversial role in solving that

problem. The fourteenth-century pattern of using the distinction between intuition

and abstraction to address the problem of theology as a science is not traceable to Scotus in a direct way. Theologians of the period typically treated theology as a science in the prologues to their commentaries on the Sentences of Lombard. Scotus, however, mentioned intuition only once in the prologue to his early Oxford commentary on the Sentences known as the Lectura, and then not in its technical sense of knowledge of an object as existing and present.4 In the prologue to the Ordinatio, a greatly expanded revision of the Lectura,

Cognition, Certainty, and Skepticism in William of Ockham," Traditio 26 (1970), 389-98; Armand A. Maurer, "Francis of Meyron's Defense of Epistemological Realism," in Studia mediaevalia et

Mariologica P. Carolo Balic OFM dicata (Rome, 1971), pp. 203-25; Leo D. Davis, "The Intuitive

Knowledge of Non-Existents and the Problem of Late Medieval Skepticism," New Scholasticism 49 (1975), 410-30; Paul Streveler, "Ockham and His Critics on Intuitive Cognition," Franciscan Studies 35 (1975), 223-36; Luciano Cova, "Francesco di Meyronnes e Walter Catton nella con- troversia scolastica sulla 'notitia intuitiva de re non existente,"' Medioevo 2 (1976), 227-51; Alessandro Ghisalberti, "L'intuizione in Ockham," Rivista difilosofia neo-scolastica 70 (1978), 207- 26; John F. Boler, "Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition," in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval

Philosophy, ed. Norman Kretzmann et al. (Cambridge, Eng., 1982), pp. 460-78; Katherine H. Tachau, "The Response to Ockham's and Aureol's Epistemology (1320-1340)," in English Logic in Italy in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries: Acts of the Fifth European Symposium on Medieval

Logic and Semantics, ed. Alfonso Maieri (Naples, 1982), pp. 185-218; Rega Wood, "Intuitive

Cognition and Divine Omnipotence: Ockham in Fourteenth-Century Perspective," in From Ock- ham to Wyclif, ed. Anne Hudson and Michael Wilks (London, 1987), pp. 51-61; Onorato Grassi, Intuizione e significato: Adam Wodeham e il problema della conoscenza nel XIV secolo (Milan, 1986). Of utmost importance on the issue of certitude in this period is Tachau's recent book, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham: Optics, Epistemology, and the Foundations of Semantics, 1250-1345 (Leiden, 1988).

3 The Appendix lists the questions under which intuition and abstraction were discussed in the fourteenth century after Scotus. Relevant parts of the larger unedited texts are transcribed. Some authors, such as Gerard of Bologna, did not discuss intuition and abstraction in a question expressly on theology as a science, but the distinction is nevertheless associated with that problem. There are, of course, exceptions to this pattern even within Scotistic circles. Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, Quod. 1.9 (1307-8), "Utrum Deus possit causare cognitionem intuitivam sine exsis- tentia rei et sine reali praesentia obiecti" (Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, MS Vat. lat. 932, fols. 15r-16r). It should also be noted that a number of the questions listed ask whether abstractive or even intuitive knowledge of God can be communicated to the wayfarer (viator). As will be evident, after Scotus this became a chief issue in deciding whether theology is a science, at least with respect to the wayfarer.

4 1 Lect. prol. n.108 (Vat. 16:39-40). Wolter has found six instances of the term intuition in the first book of the Lectura. See "Duns Scotus on Intuition," p. 100, n. 18.

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Scotus still mentioned intuition without comment.5 In neither of the above Oxford commentaries did Scotus broach any express discussion of his dis- tinction until well into the second book, when dealing not with theology as a science, but with angelic cognition.6 How is it that thinkers after Scotus so often discussed intuitive and abstractive cognition in the context of theology as a science, while Scotus, in his great Oxford commentaries that influenced

nearly all subsequent treatments of both intuition and theology as a science, did not? To answer this question, we must first examine the emergence of Scotus's distinction in his Oxford works on the Sentences, especially in the earlier Lectura, and then its context in his slightly later Parisian commentary.

1. THE OXFORD COMMENTARIES

Book 2, distinction 3, of the Lectura contains, as far as we know, Scotus's earliest explicit appeal to the distinction between intuitive and abstractive

cognition.7 In fact, the term "intuition" only occurs in the Lectura six places before the second book, and of these only one seems to be contrasted with abstraction.8 The doctrine, however, of a type of cognition which grasps an

object as existing is found more frequently in the first book of the Lectura but in the terminological garb of vision, not intuition. The proof of this is that in revising the Lectura for publication as the Ordinatio Scotus glossed several of these earlier occurrences of visio with cognitio intuitiva.9 Thus, in

5 1 Ord. prol. nn. 169-71 (Vat. 1:113-14). Here Scotus appealed to intuitive cognition to ground theology as a science of contingents, an innovation which saw great development in the four- teenth century. Steven P. Marrone has drawn attention to this innovation in his paper "Concepts of Science among Parisian Theologians in the Thirteenth Century," forthcoming in the pro- ceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy: Knowledge of the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy.

6 2 Lect. d.3 p.2 q.2 (Vat. 18:315-30): "Utrum angelus habeat actualem notitiam naturalem et distinctam essentiae divinae." See also 2 Ord. d.3 p.2 q.2 (Vat. 7:544-69).

7 On the chronology of Scotus's works, see Wolter, "Duns Scotus on Intuition," p. 83; C. K.

Brampton, "Duns Scotus at Oxford, 1288-1301," Franciscan Studies 24 (1964), 5-20. It is certain that the Ordinatio is after the Lectura and that the prologue of the Ordinatio is before the Reportatio Parisiensis. Indeed it is very likely that Scotus was at work on the second book of the Ordinatio before lecturing at Paris (Wolter, "Duns Scotus on Intuition," p. 104, n. 64). As for Scotus's discussion of intuition in his Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, Wolter (ibid.) puts it after the Lectura but before book 3 of the Ordinatio. The date of the Quaestiones in Metaphysicam is still uncertain, however. It has traditionally been regarded as an early work, and recent evidence suggests that

parts were written before or at the same time as the second book of the Lectura. See Luke Modric, "Rapporto tra la Lectura et la Metaphysica di G. Duns Scoto," Antonianum 52 (1987), 504- 9. There are other indications of a later dating, at least for parts. See 1 Ord. "De Ordinatione historice considerata" (Vat. 1:155*-57*).

8 See n. 4 above. By 1 Lectura d.8 Scotus was employing intuitive to mean existential knowledge: 1 Lect. d.8 n.174; d.10 n.3; d.13 n.17 (Vat. 17:62-63, 115, 170).

9 Compare 1 Lect. prol. n.118 (Vat. 16:42-43) and 1 Ord. prol. n.169 (Vat. 1:112-13); 1 Lect. d.1 nn.41-43 (Vat. 16:74) and 1 Ord. d.1 nn.34-36 (Vat. 2:23-24); 1 Lect. d.2 n.81 (Vat. 16:140) and 1 Ord. d.2. n.129 (Vat. 2:204); 1 Lect. d.2 n.264 (Vat. 16:213) and 1 Ord. d.2 n.394 (Vat. 2:352). R. G. Wengert notes the shift in terminology in the second pair of these passages and

speculates that "when he got to Paris Scotus read something which led him to revise his

terminology" ("The Sources of Intuitive Cognition in William of Ockham," Franciscan Studies 41

[1981], 446). Scotus had already begun to revise his terminology by 1 Lectura d.8 (see n. 8 above) but in any case had probably finished 1 Ordinatio d.1 before he got to Paris.

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the second book of the Lectura Scotus was not so much developing a new doctrine of intuitive cognition as giving it a highly technical and precise vocabulary. This would indicate that Scotus was entering particularly contro- versial ground requiring the exactness of technicality. What remains to be seen is the exact point of controversy.

Scotus first treated intuitive and abstractive cognition in a developed way while addressing the problem of the "natural" cognition of the divine nature

by angels.10 In this context, "natural" refers to the concreated or in via, as

opposed to beatific, knowledge angels possess of God."I According to Scotus, Henry of Ghent and Aquinas both denied that angels have distinct knowledge of the divine nature and that they can know God through some representing species. In the absence of any appeal to species to explain angelic cognition of God, Aquinas held that an angel knows God through its own essence as

imago Dei, while Henry, at least according to Scotus's version, failed to supply any positive account. Against both Henry and Aquinas, Scotus argued that

angels naturally know the divine essence distinctly and that they do so by means of a species.'2 To explain how this is possible Scotus distinguished two

types of cognition: "I respond to the question. First it should be known that a twofold cognition or intellection in the intellect is possible, for there can be one that abstracts from all existence and a second that is of a thing insofar as it is present in its own existence."'3

Scotus did not immediately give these two types of cognition technical labels but did so only in the second of three ensuing arguments to prove their asserted possibility. There Scotus said that the first cognition, according to which a thing is understood by abstracting from all existence, is called "abstractive" (cognitio abstractiva), while the second, by which a thing is seen in its own existence, is called "intuitive" (cognitio intuitiva). Scotus carefully specified that "intuitive" is here taken narrowly, opposed not to discursive reasoning but to cognition through a species.14 Scotus then argued that these two types of cognition are distinct because we expect intuitive, not abstractive, cognition of God in beatitude.'5 Thus, in his earliest text on the matter Scotus introduced the term "intuitive" only when dealing with the beatific vision and seems to have regarded this usage as uncontroversial.

10 See n. 4 above. 1 See 2 Ord. d.3 n.325 (Vat. 7:555-56).

12 2 Lect. d.3 nn.291-97 (Vat. 18:323-26). 13 "Ad quaestionem igitur respondeo. Ad quod primo sciendum est quod in intellectu potest

esse duplex cognitio et intellectio, nam una intellectio potest esse in intellectu prout abstrahit ab omni exsistentia, alia intellectio potest esse rei secundum quod praesens est in exsistentia sua." 2 Lect. d.3 n.285 (Vat. 18:321).

14 That is, angels naturally have intuitive cognition of the divine nature in the sense of nondiscursive knowledge. This is the usual emphasis given to the term intuitus by Henry of Ghent, who does not seem to have made a clear distinction between knowledge which is non- discursive and that which derives from an object present in itself. See texts of Henry cited at n. 20 below and Scotus, 1 Lect. d.13 n.17 (Vat. 17:170). See also R. G. Wengert, "Three Senses of Intuitive Cognition: A Quodlibetal Question of Harvey of Nedellec," Franciscan Studies 43 (1983), 408-31.

15 2 Lect. d.3 nn.288-89 (Vat. 18:322).

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Having established this difference in cognition, Scotus responded to the question. Everyone agrees angels cannot naturally have intuitive knowledge of God, since this is beatific. Nor is it befitting that an angel should be limited to merely confused and imperfect knowledge of the divine nature, since we in the present state can achieve that much.16 It remains that angels naturally have distinct knowledge of the divine nature. This knowledge is abstractive, not intuitive, since it is caused not by the divine nature as actually present to the intellect but by some properly representing species.17

What is here so controversial that Scotus would trouble to draw these technical refinements in types of cognition? It is certainly not the application of intuitive cognition to beatific knowledge of God. In the first book Scotus had repeatedly used without comment the term visio to refer to the beatific

knowledge of the divine essence in the same sense as he here used cognitio intuitiva.18 The argument in which Scotus introduced the term assumes that the description of beatific vision as intuitive is current and acceptable.19 Scotus's immediate source of this terminology was Henry of Ghent, who regularly used the term intuitus to describe beatific knowledge of God in the very texts Scotus had read to reconstruct Henry's position on angelic cogni- tion.20 While it is true that Scotus explicitly and with Henry in view shifted the meaning of intuition from nondiscursive to existential knowledge, this would not have been seen as problematic, at least regarding the beatific vision. Henry had already prepared the way for this usage by associating vision with cognition of a thing as existing and present.21

16 According to Scotus, the created intellect, even in the present state, can achieve a proper, albeit not particular, concept of God: "Tertio dico quod Deus non cognoscitur naturaliter a viatore in particulari et proprie ... Quarto dico quod ad multos conceptus proprios Deo

possumus pervenire, qui non conveniunt creaturis ... " (1 Ord. d.3 nn.56, 58 [Vat. 3:38, 40]). This is possible because being and the divine attributes can be conceived as univocally common to God and creature. For a summary of Scotus's doctrine of univocity, see Allan B. Wolter, The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1946), pp. 31-57.

17 2 Lect. d.3 nn.291-92 (Vat. 18:323-24). 18 See n. 9 above. 19" ... secundum omnes, angelus non possit habere cognitionem intuitivam de Deo ex puris

naturalibus ... " (2 Lect. d.3 n.292 [Vat. 18:323]). 20 ., .. tres personae a beatis omnino nisi unico intuitu videri non possunt" (Quod. 2.7 [ed.

Wielockx, p. 35, lines 28-29]); " ... cum Deus in sua nuda essentia videtur aut intelligitur, ex tali visione nullo verbo complexo concipi potest, sed tantummodo simplici intelligentia, qua simplici intuitu repraesententur ipsa et quod in ea intelligitur" (Quod. 5.26 [ed. 1518, 1:205 P]); "... sed solum ea cognoscendo in simplici intuitu divinae essentiae, cum scilicet omnem nostram scientiam uno simul intuitu videbimus" (op. cit., 1:205 Q); " ... si intellectus apprehendens divinam naturam sub ratione essentiae stet in sola apprehensione tali et nequaquam ulterius

operetur suae considerationis intuitu circa sic apprehensum ... " (Quod. 13.1 [ed. DeCorte, p. 5, lines 43-45]); " ... de necessitate ergo beatus unico et simplici intuitu videt in ipsa divina natura omnes illas rationes simul ... " (op. cit., p. 6, lines 60-62); ... propter suam obtusitatem non sufficit eam primo intuitu dare conspicere, sed oportet eum per discursum notitiam illius

investigare ... " (op. cit., p. 7, lines 83-85); " ... de cognitione habita de illis in vita ista, quia non est nisi discursiva. E.t sic non est simile de cognitione rationum Dei in patria, in qua omnes simul sub uno intuitu iugiter permanente ..." (op. cit., p. 9, lines 30-32). See also SQO 40.5, 49.5 (1:258 O-R, 2:37 0).

21 "Dicendum quod dupliciter contingit ccire rem aliquam esse: uno modo per seipsam ex

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Rather, the controversial aspect to Scotus's doctrine on this point was his

application of abstractive cognition to the divine essence so that angels can have a distinct knowledge of the divine nature short of beatitude. Elsewhere Scotus defined distinct cognition as the complete and explicit grasping of all the necessary features of a nature. It is related to confused cognition as definitional knowledge is to nominal aquaintance.22 It is not difficult to see why Scotus was concerned about being misunderstood on this point. The assertion that angels naturally have a distinct knowledge of the divine essence could easily be construed to mean that angels naturally enjoy the beatific vision. Scotus apparently thought his position susceptible enough to such an interpretation that he repeated seven times in this short question that the distinct cognition angels have of God is not intuitive.23 Originally, then, the controversial aspect to Scotus's distinction between intuitive and abstractive

cognition did not lie in an innovative use of intuitive cognition. On the

contrary, Scotus's original innovation was to exploit abstractive cognition so as to isolate from beatitude a distinct knowledge of the divine nature.

To summarize, then, Scotus used the term intuition in the first book of his Lectura to mean nondiscursive as well as existential cognition. When used

according to the latter meaning, intuition and the related term vision refer, in this early work, only to the beatific knowledge of the divine essence, whether by the created or uncreated intellect. Such usage went unremarked until 2 Lectura d.3, where Scotus distinguished at length intuitive from ab- stractive cognition in order to deal with the natural knowledge of God by angels. If this text is the earliest place Scotus detailed intuitive and abstractive cognition, its context shows that the distinction had its origin in Scotus's attempt to find a middle way of knowing the divine nature which fell between the intuitive knowledge of God in beatitude and the confused knowledge of

evidentia exsistentiae suae apud scientem, ad modum quo scit ignem esse ille qui videt ignem praesentem oculis. ... Alio autem modo contingit scire rem aliquam esse non per se ex rei evidentia, sed per medium notius deducens via ratiocinativa ad illud cognoscendum tamquam ignotius ex colligantia exsistentiae unius ad exsistentiam alterius, quorum unum ex rei evidentia videt per seipsam, alterum vero non visum per se ex rei evidentia. ..." (SQO 22.1 [1:130 L]); "Ad cuius intellectum sciendum quod tripliciter contingit scire de re aliqua an sit in actu exsistens. Uno modo ex praesentia eius, ad modum quo scitur ignis esse praesens oculis ... Primo modo non cognoscitur Deus esse nisi videndo eius nudam essentiam, sicut vident eam sancti in patria, scientes per hoc Deum esse, sicut videns ignem prae oculis, per hoc scit ignem esse. Et hac via

cognoscendi scire Deum esse impossibile est homini ex puris naturalibus in quocumque statu" (SQO 22.5 [1:134 C]); "Dicendum ad hoc, quod ad modum triplicis cognitionis sensitivae contingit imaginari de Deo triplicem cognitionem intellectivam. Est enim quaedam cognitio sensitiva rei ex eius praesentia nuda per essentiam suam, sicut oculus videt colores in pariete. Est autem alia

cognitio sensitiva rei in eius absentia, et haec est duplex. Una qua res ipsa cognoscitur per suam

propriam speciem. ... Alia qua res cognoscitur per speciem alienam. ... Ad modum primae cognitionis sensitivae Deus cognoscitur immediate per nudam essentiam, et hoc simplici intelli-

gentia, non ratione collativa per aliquod medium rationis. Unde et illa cognitio dicitur cognitio visionis, quia in ea videt Deum oculus mentis, ad modum quo videt oculus corporis formam coloris...."(SQO 24.2 [1:138 I]).

22 1 Lect. d.2 n.16; d.3 nn.69, 75 (Vat. 16:115, 250, 252-53). 23 2 Lect. d.3 (Vat. 18:324, lines 1-2, 9-11, 26-27, 28-31; 325, lines 4-6; 326, lines 3-5; 329

line 19-330 line 5).

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the divine essence presently available to us through transcendental concepts. But how does all this account for the close association found in subsequent literature between intuitive and abstractive cognition and the scientific char- acter of theology? Let us follow Scotus on his short but important journey from Oxford to Paris.

2. THE PARISIAN COMMENTARY

Before Scotus began lecturing on the Sentences at Paris in the fall of 1302, his revision of the Lectura for publication as the Ordinatio was already under way. By that time the prologue, which saw a threefold expansion, was cer- tainly finished. Despite such a thorough revision, the prologue of the Ordinatio gives no more developed treatment of the distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition than its counterpart in the Lectura. Intuitive cognition is mentioned only obliquely in the prologue of the Ordinatio in the course of explaining how contingent theological truths can be ordered.24 The prologue of the Reportatio Parisiensis, however, is another matter.25 There Scotus ex- plicitly appealed to his distinction to address perhaps the most fundamental debate in theology, which had recently become heated at Paris. That debate was over the scientific status of theology itself.

On one side was Henry of Ghent, who held that there is demonstrative or scientific knowledge of the truths of faith in the present life, even concerning the Trinity, and that such demonstrative knowledge is compatible with faith as regards the same truth in the same intellect. Put in other terms, the theologian can attain a knowledge of the objects of belief beyond that given in faith which is sufficiently clear and evident to be called scientific.26 Henry

24 1 Ord. prol. n.169 (Vat. 1:113). 25 The text printed as the Reporatio Parisiensis in vol. 22 of the Vives edition is, as Wadding

himself indicates, based upon Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, MS Vat. lat. 876 (Censura Lucae Waddingi [Vives 22:4-5]). For the first book, however, this manuscript carries the Additiones magnae, extracted by William of Alnwick from Scotus's Parisian and Oxford lectures, not a Reportatio Parisiensis. See "De Ordinatione I. Duns Scoti: Disquisitio historico-critica" (Vat. 1:38*-42*, 145*); "Adnotationes" (Vat. 7:4*, n. 2). I have consulted the copy of the

Reportatio Parisiensis examinata contained in Vienna, Osterreichische Nationalbibliothek, MS 1453, for the text of Scotus's Parisian commentary. In fact, the prologue in the Vives edition is generally very close to the Reportatio examinata, and thus for convenience references are to the former unless the two versions differ significantly.

26SQO 13.4 (1:92 M-93 0); 13.6-7 (1:94 A-97 Z); Quod. 8.14 (ed. 1518, 2:324 G-326 0); 12.2 (ed. DeCorte, pp. 14-27); 13.1 (ed. DeCorte, pp. 3-9). Note especially: "Et patet plane, quia in omnibus huiusmodi dictis Augustinus loquitur de intelligere huius vitae, contra eos qui exponunt illud Esaiae, 'Nisi credideritis non intelligetis', solummodo de intellectu futurae vitae, ad quem necessario praeambula est fides huius vitae, quamvis enim hoc verum sit, tamen non solum hoc verum est. Verum enim simul est et pro intelligere praesentis vitae. .. . Absolute

igitur dicendum quod discens hanc scientiam ut congruit super habitum fidei acquirit habitum intellectus, ut quae primo credit fide postmodum intelligit ratione, et cui primo assentit ita suasus alterius auctoritate quasi audiendo, deinde assentit motus ab ipsa credibilis veritate vere intelli-

gendo ..." (SQO 13.6 [1:94 F-95 G]); "Et de tali intellectu dictum est supra, quod credibile fit homini in vita ista quodammodo intelligibile" (SQO 13.7 [1:96 Q]); "Sic ergo patet quomodo articuli fidei probari possunt veridica ratione generante verum intellectum et scientiam de ipsis, quod appellamus demonstrationem. Hoc tamen non nisi fide supposita" (Quod. 8.14 [ed. 1518,

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was aware that his position was at odds with the current view, and he at-

tempted to clarify it throughout his career by distinguishing between fides, intellectus, and visio.27 According to Henry, faith is knowledge of things not

present to the intellect. In faith assent is caused not by-any evidence on the

part of the object itself, but from the testimony or authority of another.

Opposed to faith is visio, in which the object in its own nature is immediately (praesto) and evidently (clare) present to the intellect. Here evidence is from the object itself so present.28 Between the extremes of fides and visio is intel- lectus, in which the object is present to the intellect not in itself but through a species, whether this be the species of the same object or of another.29 In intellectus evidence is provided not by the present object itself but by reasoning (discursus) about the object, whether in definition or syllogistic deduction.30

2:326 M]); "Immo potius suadendum est quod certa ratio haberi potest de credibili, per quam vere sciri et intelligi potest in vita ista ..." (Quod. 12.2 [ed. DeCorte, p. 21, lines 49-51]); "Et per hoc habetur habitus intellectivus de principiis tam extrinsecis quam intrinsecis theologiae, et

scientificus simpliciter de conclusionibus credibilibus" (op. cit., p. 27, lines 99-1). See Jean Leclercq, "La theologie comme science d'apres la litterature quodlibetique," Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale 11 (1939), 360; Paul DeVooght, "La methode theologique d'apres Henri de Gand et Gerard de Bologne," Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale 23 (1956), 61-87; Josef Finken- zeller, Offenbarung und Theologie nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Skotus, Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 38/5 (Munster, 1961), pp. 184-85; Hermann

Theissing, Glaube und Theologie bei Robert Cowton OFM, Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 42/3 (Munster, 1970), pp. 135-37; Joachim D'Souza, "William of Alnwick and the Problem of Faith and Reason," Salesianum 35 (1973), 480-81.

27 SQO 13.6 (1:94 B-D); 13.7 (1:95 O-R); Quod. 8.14 (ed. 1518, 2:325 K-L); 12.2 (ed. DeCorte, p. 23 line 6-p. 24 line 33).

28 "Illa autem proprie dicuntur videri, quae praesto sunt vel animi vel corporis sensibus, quibus intellectus proprio testimonio assentit propter evidentiam veritatis ex natura ipsius rei vel ra- tionis. Sed distinguendo notitiam visionis proprie sumptae a notitia intellectus vel scientiae, proprie dicitur esse notitia visionis quando res est praesto videnti per seipsam, sicut visui

corporali praesto sunt in lumine visibilia corporalia et intellectui angelico et humano in gloria praesto sunt ea quae vident in verbo et luce increata" (SQO 13.7 [1.96 P]); "De cognitione autem visionis, quia ipsa propter rei praesentiam claram in seipsa, nullam in se patitur obscuritatem, sed est omnino clara et perfecta ... "

(ibid.). 29 While accepting it at first, Henry ultimately rejected the impressed intelligible species, even

in the case of an absent object. See Theophiel Nys, De Werking van het menselijk Verstand volgens Hendrik van Gent (Louvain, 1949), pp. 51-98; Steven P. Marrone, Truth and Scientific Knowledge in the Thought of Henry of Ghent (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), pp. 5-6; 21, n. 25; 143. Accordingly, in his earlier texts (SQO 13.6-7) given in n. 30 below, Henry associated intellectus with both discursive reasoning and presence of the known object through a representing species, while in the later texts (Quod. 8.14 and 12.2) he described it solely in terms of discursive knowledge. See also texts at n. 59 below.

30 "Tertius modus est medius quo cognoscuntur credita, non solum auditu nec apparentia rei

quasi visu, sed ex rationis evidentia, qua intellectui conspicuum est naturam rei sic se habere sicut fides tenet" (SQO 13.6 [1:94 C]; "Proprie autem dicitur notitia intellectus quando res est

praesto intelligenti vel scienti per speciem solum suam vel alienam, sicut geometra habet intel- lectum et scientiam figurarum corporalium ad absentiam earum secundum rem per veridicam rationem quam habet de eis adminiculo specierum suarum apud animam.... Sed loquendo de intellectu proprie dicto, cui res praesto est per speciem et maxime per speciem alienam . . . non est ex rei praesentis evidentia, sed ex veridicae rationis efficacia ... " (SQO 13.7 [1:96 P-Q]); "Intelligere autem est verum aliquid cognoscere perspicue per medium certius ex sensus cog- nitione in primis certificatum, quemadmodum conclusiones intelligimus intellecto medio proprio

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In this way, for example, the scientist knows from astronomical calculations that an eclipse is occurring even though he does not actually view it, and the mathematician has a science of geometry even when corporeal figures are not actually present.

Applying this division to theology, Henry obviously held that if "science" or "understanding" is taken in the narrow sense of visio, then there is no scientific knowledge of theological truths in the present state, nor can they be held by faith and understanding at the same time. The immediate presence of God to the intellect in visio constitutes beatitude, which puts us outside the present state and displaces all faith.31 Henry argued, however, that theol-

ogy is truly scientific in the sense of intellectus; otherwise the whole project of faith seeking understanding would be trivial.32 The theologian, beginning with belief, burrows beneath the divine mysteries, as Henry described it, by means of definition, division, and demonstration. Such discursive investiga- tion produces enough evidence so that what was previously held on faith alone is now known with sufficient clarity to warrant the status of true science.33 The evidence supplied by intellectus, however, is never so great as that given in visio, and it can never entirely displace all obscurity of faith. In this way, the same truth is both believed and understood by the same intel- lect.34 Obviously, a theologian using natural methods cannot penetrate the mysteries of faith unless aided by supernatural illumination. This supernat- ural light, which Henry said is between the lumenfidei of belief and the lumen gloriae of beatitude, came to be called simply lumen medium.35

Clearly, intellectus and its associated lumen medium were attempts by Henry to clear out a middle ground between mere faith and the beatific vision, where the theologian could lay claim to a true science. Henry did so by bringing some finesse to the dividing line between the present state and the beatific vision. To the simple distinction between absence of the divine nature in faith and presence in beatitude, Henry added the more refined distinction between presence in itself (visio) and mediated presence in a species, or discursive reasoning (intellectus).

Henry's position proved to have many detractors but none greater than

notiori complexo et applicato" (Quod. 8.14 [ed. 1518, 2:325 K]); "Intelligere autem est cognoscere aliquid ex alio per discursum rationis, vel definitivum vel syllogisticum, qualiter doctor astrologus intelligit per demonstrationem nunc solem eclipsari, quod oculis non videt" (Quod. 12.2 [ed. DeCorte, p. 23, lines 13-16]).

31 SQO 13.7 (1:96 R). 32 "Omnis de hac re sermo quid agit, nisi ut non solum credatur verum etiam intelligatur et

sciatur quod dicitur. Aliter enim vanum esset multo studio insistere expositioni sacrae scripturae, postquam credita sunt illa firmiter circa quorum notitiam laboramus" (SQO 13.6 [1:95 G]).

33 SQO 13.6 (1:94 D-95 G). 34 "Notitia enim quae est hic per intellectum de credibilibus nunquam est pura ab omni

obscuritate fidei" (SQO 13.6 [1:95 I]); cf. SQO 13.7 (1:96 R-T); Quod. 8.14 (ed. 1518, 2:325 K- L). As Henry explairned it, the whole basis for the obscurity of the truths of faith is that they concern particulars while.intellectus is limited to universals: "Quod, quia nunc fide non cogno- vimus nisi indeterminate, in hoc consistit fidei aenigma, quae evacuatur si nobis huiusmodi

particulare determinetur ... " (op. cit., 2:326 L). 35 SQO 13.6 (1:94 D-G, 95 M); Quod. 12.2 (ed. DeCorte, pp. 14-21).

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Godfrey of Fontaines.36 Godfrey contended that absolutely no evidence could be found to support any lumen medium.37 For example, both the simple believer and the most learned theologian alike confess on their deathbeds that they believe the articles of faith, nor has a theologian ever been able to communicate through teaching any true understanding 'of the articles of faith. While conceding that the theologian moves beyond simple faith, God-

frey denied that such theological knowledge is sufficiently different from, or clearer than, what is given in belief that it can be called science in any strict sense of the term. Consequently, in Godfrey's view there is no need to invoke

any supernatural light beyond faith to explain theology. The theologian simply investigates the tenets of faith by purely natural means.38

Debate between Henry and Godfrey on the point seems to have been

personal and acute. Doubtless Godfrey was among those "certain theologians in the faculty" whom Henry called the ruination of the church because they denied theology to be a true science and instead exalted philosophy.39 God-

frey found intolerable Henry's assertion that only those who already pos- sessed the lumen medium could see any evidence of it.40 According to Godfrey,

36 Godfrey's Quod. 8.7 (PB 4:69-82) is an extended refutation of Henry's position, which it

quotes at length and verbatim. Two other early opponents of Henry were James of Therine and Gerard of Bologna. See the articles by Leclecq and DeVooght at n. 26 above. Henry did have his defenders, however, such as the Oxford Augustinian Robert Walshingham. See his Quod. 1.10 (1312-13), "Utrum unum et idem possit ab eodem intellectu simul esse scitum et creditum" (Worcester, Cathedral Library F. 3, fols. 131r-33r): "Sequitur videre de tertio articulo

quod evidentia quam facit scientia de credito non repugnat inevidentiae fidei, et per consequens possunt simul stare. Illud declaro sicut facit doctor quem sequor in hoc, cuius declarationem si multi adverterent, non facerent tales rationes quales faciunt contra eum" (fols. 132v-33r). Walshingham went on to give Henry of Ghent's position as found in SQO 13.6-7. Francis of Marchia also had a view of theology very close to that of Henry. See his 1 Sent. prol. q.3 (1320), "Utrum theologia sit scientia proprie dicta" (Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, MS Vat. lat. 1096, fols. 4va-6va). For a summary of Francis's position, see Gregory of Rimini, 1 Sent.

prol. q.l a.4, in Gregorii Ariminensis OESA Lectura super primum et secundum Sententiarum, ed. A. Damasus Trapp, OSA, et al., 7 vols. (Berlin, 1981-87), 1:40 line 11-43 line 33.

37 Quod. 8.7 (PB 4:69-71). 38 "His visis, ulterius est dicendum quod ad scientiam huiusmodi habendam non est necessa-

rium lumen aliquod speciale ultra lumen fidei et naturalis intellectus, quia non acquiritur notitia tam diversa nec tam clara ad quam haec non sufficiant" (PB 4:77-78); "Dicitur autem talis scientia [sc. ultra fidem] certa certitudine qua et certa fides est ... " (PB 4:80); " ... quia licet

magistri in theologia non studeant frustra, quia ultra notitiam simplicem fidei, etiam quam habent fideles communiter, acquirunt notitiam evidentiorem, quae tamen non attingit ad tantam evidentiam quantam requirit notitia quae scientia proprie dici debet" (PB 4:81).

39 "Et est magnum mirabile quod in quacumque alia facultate peritus nititur scientiam suam, quantum potest, extollere, soli autem theologi quidam, ut philosophiam videantur exaltare, theologiam deprimunt, adserentes ipsam non esse vere scientiam, nec credibilia posse fieri vere

intelligibilia in vita ista. Tales sibi viam sciendi et intelligendi credibilia praecludunt, et aliis

desperationem intelligendi illa incutiunt, quod valde perniciosum est et damnosum Ecclesiae et

periculosum dicere. Immo potius suadendum est quod certa ratio haberi potest de credibili, per quam vere sciri et intelligi potest in vita ista" (Quod. 12.2 [ed. DeCorte, p. 20 line 43-p. 21 line 51]).

40 "Quod ergo Iudaeus quaerit: 'ostendere lumen illud clarius', idem est ac si diceret Pelagius Augustino: 'Tu dicis quod liberum arbitrium non potest velle bonum sine gratia; ostende ergo nobis illam gratiam', aut si diceret Iudaeus christiano: 'Tu dicis gratiam dari in baptismo; ostende

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Henry "claimed much but proved little" about his lumen medium.41 Although Godfrey did not think Henry's hidden theological light could be equated with the gnosticism of the Manichees, he was dismayed at Henry's obstinance in maintaining this light, "which Henry totally lacks as much as others."42

Such were the tensions in the faculty of theology at Paris over its own discipline a few years before Scotus came there to read the Sentences. When Scotus arrived, Godfrey was still alive and active.43 Under the circumstances he could hardly have ignored such a contentious and fundamental issue. Indeed, Scotus's prologue to his Parisian commentary is structured differ-

ently from its Oxford predecessors to meet the exigencies of this debate. This is most apparent in the second question, in which Scotus asked whether it is possible for the wayfarer to have a completely strict and rigorous science of theology.44 Here Scotus examined at length the opposing views of Henry and Godfrey given above.45 This question was clearly precipitated by circum- stances at Paris, since neither it nor the report of the opinions of Henry and Godfrey on this point are found in the Oxford prologues. This can be further confirmed from Scotus's Quodlibet question 7, disputed at Paris, in which Scotus re-used this prologue material to address a related problem.46 Scotus's reply to the second question of his Parisian prologue can thus be taken as his part in the debate at Paris over the status of theology.47

illam'. Re vera spirituale lumen vel gratia non est tale quid quod non habenti possit ostendi, sed ille solummodo bene novit, qui accipit" (op. cit., p. 20, lines 37-42). Cf. "Quod autem dicitur

quod hoc, scilicet quod non inveniuntur sic perfecte habentes habitum scientificum de his quae fidei sunt, provenit ex universali indispositione in auditoribus aliis qui hoc lumen negant, et ideo non immerito lumine carent et non sunt doctibiles Dei, non videtur tolerabile" (Godfrey, Quod. 8.7 [PB 4:71]).

41 " ... qui multa ponunt sed pauca declarant de hoc lumine ..." (PB 4:70)

42 "Unde paucis mutatis, possunt alii dicere istis quod dicit Augustinus Contra Epistolam Fun- damenti manichaeis, qui promittebant evidenti ratione se manifestaturos veritatem eorum quae credenda suadebant. ... Non tamen intelligo istos, absit, aliquo errore notandos sicut erant manichaei qui talem evidentiae notitiam promittebant, quam tamen exhibere non poterant; sed de hoc videntur notandi quod ita vehementer asserunt et affirmant esse possibile illud a quo ipsi sicut et alii penitus deficiunt" (PB 4:71-72).

43 It is doubtful that Godfrey was chancellor of the University of Paris when Scotus was there. See John F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines: A Study in Late Thirteenth-

Century Philosophy (Washington, D.C., 1981), p. xvi, n. 14. 44 "Utrum veritates per se scibiles de Deo sub ratione Deitatis possint sciri ab intellectu viatoris"

(1 Add. magn. prol. q.2 [Vives 22:336-45b]). The expression "sub ratione Deitatis" indicates that Scotus was asking about theology in its purest form. Cf. "Concedo igitur ... quod theologia est de Deo sub ratione qua scilicet est haec essentia, sicut perfectissima scientia de homine esset de homine si esset de eo secundum quod homo ... " (1 Ord. prol. n.167 [Vat. 1:109]). See n. 52 below on the notion that Scotus identified the ratio Deitatis with God as haec essentia.

45 1 Add. magn. prol. q.2 nn.6-14 (Vives 22:36a-41a). 46 "Utrum Deum esse omnipotentem possit naturali ratione et necessaria demonstrari" (Vives

25:282-95; ed. Alluntis, pp. 249-68). Cf. John Duns Scotus, God and Creatures: The Quodlibetal Questions, trans. Allan'B. Wolter and Felix Alluntis (Princeton, 1975), p. 163, nn. 10-11.

47 Of course, the question of whether theology is a science can be asked from viewpoints other than that of the wayfarer. For Scotus, theology could be considered as it is found in either the divine, blessed, or human intellect. In each case, theology can be of either necessary or contingent truths. On these divisions, see 1 Ord. prol. nn.141, 150, 208-9 (Vat. 1:95-96, 101, 141-43). In

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Although Scotus did not think Henry could sustain his own claim for a proper science of theology given his rejection of the intelligible species, he appears sympathetic to Henry's position.48 He dismissed Godfrey's arguments against Henry as inconclusive and insisted, despite Godfrey's statement to the contrary, that Godfrey demeaned theology. At one point he even chided Godfrey for preferring one text of Averroes to Henry's thirty authorities from Augustine and the saints.49 In reply to both sides, Scotus maintained that it is possible for the wayfarer (viator) to have an unqualified (simpliciter) and perfect science of theology. It is an absolute or unqualified science since it is a priori and not merely a posteriori; it is perfect since superior to faith. That is, Scotus here argued nothing less than that a fully rigorous propter quid science of theology is compatible with the wayfarer state.50 In the re- markable words of the parallel text in his Quodlibet, Scotus said that it is possible for the wayfarer to be a perfect theologian.51

Scotus argued that such a science of theology is available to the wayfarer because it is possible for the wayfarer to know the divine nature under the proper aspect of its Deity (sub propria ratione Deitatis).52 Since, as Scotus had

addition to Finkenzeller, Offenbarung und Theologie, the fundamental studies on Scotus's treatment of theology as a science are Aegidius Magrini, loannis Duns Scoti doctrina de scientifica theologiae natura (Rome, 1952), and Edward O'Connor, "The Scientific Character of Theology according to Scotus," in De doctrina loannis Duns Scoti, 3:3-50.

48 "Contra tamen praedictam opinionem arguitur dupliciter. Primo sic: In quocumque lumine non habetur notitia distincta terminorum, ut sunt termini alicuius principii, in illo lumine non potest illud principium distincte intelligi. Sed in isto lumine quod ponunt, non potest haberi distincta notitia Dei, ut terminus principii pure theologici. Ergo etc. Probo minorem: Impossibile est habere distinctam notitiam Dei, nisi sit in se praesens in intellectu, vel in alio repraesentativo, quod distincte ipsum repraesentat; sed hoc non est possibile viatori, quia si esset per se praesens intellectui viatoris, tunc esset in eo beatitudo; nec est aliquid aliud quod ipsum distincte reprae- sentat, quia secundum illos, nullum est repraesentativum intellectui viatoris, nisi phantasma; sed hoc non potest distincte essentiam divinam repraesentare" (1 Add. magn. prol. q.2 n.14 [Vives 22:40b-41a]). As we shall presently see, Scotus accepted Henry's lumen medium if it is interpreted as a species representing the divine nature. It is well known that Scotus rejected Henry's attendant position on the relation between faith and reason. See 3 Ord. d.24 q.un. (Vives 15:34- 54): "Utrum de credibilibus revelatis possit aliquis habere simul scientiam et fidem."

49 Here the Vives text and the Vienna manuscript of the Reportatio Parisiensis (see note 25 above) differ somewhat. I quote the latter: "Similiter quod aliquis doctor, propter unam aucto- ritatem Averrois ... dimittat [commitat MS] aliam opinionem, quae innititur forte plus quam 30 auctoritatibus Sanctorum Augustini et aliorum ... " (fol. 7ra).

50 "Respondeo ad quaestionem quod viator potest scire veritates per se scibiles de Deo sub ratione Deitatis, scire, inquam, simpliciter et perfecte; simpliciter non a posteriori, sed a priori sub ratione Deitatis; perfecte, quia cognitione superiori quam sit cognitio fidei" (1 Add. magn. prol. q.2 n.15 [Vives 22:41a]).

51 "luxta istam conclusionem haberi potest corollarium, quomodo theologia potest esse scientia in intellectu viatoris, stante simpliciter statu viae, quia intellectus potens habere conceptum virtualiter includentem omnes veritates de ipso necessarias ordinatas, immediatius scilicet, et mediatius, potest de illo obiecto habere scientiam completam, sic autem potest intellectus viatoris habere de Deo; ergo etc.... Esset ergo viator perfecte scientifice theologus ..." (Quod. q.7 n.10 [Vives 25:290b-91a; ed. Alluntis, pp. 262-63]).

52 According to Scotus, the divine nature is known under the aspect of Deity when it is known as a nature which is of itself singular (essentia de se haec). See 1 Ord. d.3 nn.56, 57, 192; d.4 nn.3, 11; d.8 n.200; d.21 q.un. (Vat. 3.38, 39, 118; 4:2, 5, 265, 5:339-47).

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already shown, the divine nature so considered is the subject of theology, and since the subject of a science virtually contains all truths in that science, it follows that the wayfarer can have an a priori science of theology superior to that of faith.53

After having read the above text from the Parisian prologue, Robert Cow- ton, a younger colleague of Scotus at Oxford, remarked that "Scotus's posi- tion is scarcely believable and his argument for it even less so."54 As Cowton pointed out, the rub is Scotus's assertion that it is possible for the wayfarer to know the divine nature under the proper aspect of its Deity. To explain how such knowledge of God does not violate the wayfarer state, Scotus appealed to the distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition. Here abstractive cognition is defined as knowledge through a species of a thing not present in itself and intuitive cognition as knowledge of a thing as it has being in actual existence. Scotus argued that abstractive cognition of the divine nature, which is nonetheless distinct, is available to the wayfarer since only intuitive cognition of God constitutes beatitude.55 This distinct, abstrac- tive cognition of the divine essence suffices for an a priori science of theology superior to faith, at least as regards necessary theological truths.

Thus Scotus, like Henry, made a strong case for the scientific character of theology but distinguished his position from Henry's on two points. First, and most important for our concern, Scotus rejected Henry's lumen medium unless it refers to the species that distinctly represents the divine nature in abstractive cognition. In other words, Scotus himself saw his abstractive cog- nition as taking up the role played by Henry's lumen medium in the debate over theology.56 Secondly, Scotus held that although such a strict science of

53 "Probatio primi: intellectus potens intelligere aliquod subiectum sub propria ratione subiecti, potest scire veritates per se scibiles de eo, quia talis intellectus potest intelligere principium complexum, et sic conclusionem inclusam virtualiter in illo principio; sed hoc potest intellectus viatoris; ergo etc." (1 Add. magn. prol. q.2 n.15 [Vives 22:41a]).

54 "Illud dictum est mihi valde mirabile et ratio mirabilior, si talis sit, sicut vidi eam scriptam et iam recitatam. Nam primo falsum sumitur secundum seipsum alibi in alia materia, in hoc

quod accipit, quod viator potest habere cognitionem Dei sub propria ratione Deitatis ut ex tali notitia posset cognoscere a priori et propter quid omnia complexa quae de Deo concipi possunt, licet cognitione abstractiva...." (1 Sent. prol. q.2 in Theissing, Glaube und Wissenschaft, p. 266, lines 7-13).

55 1 Add. magn. prol. q.2 n.15 (Vives 22:41a). 56 "Ex his patet, quod in duobus discordo ab opinione praecedente. Primo, quia non pono

haberi scientiam per quodcumque lumen de Deo, si non sit obiectum in se praesens, nec in suo

repraesentativo; si autem vocant lumen illud rationem repraesentandi, admitto, sed tunc non in illo lumine, sed per lumen habetur" (op. cit., n.17 [Vives 22:43a-b]). Scotus made the same

point in the parallel text of his Quodlibet: "Ex hoc sequitur quod si poneretur theologiam esse

proprie scientiam in quodam lumine citra lumen gloriae et supra lumen fidei, et illud lumen

poneretur talis cognitio, sive conceptus obiecti, vera esset opinio de lumine. Sed sic non videtur intellexisse, qui posuit lumen, quia videtur posuisse lumen in quo cognosceretur obiectum, non autem quod esset formalis ratio, sive formalis cognitio ipsius obiecti, sicut hic est positum" (Quod. q.7 n.10 [Vives 25:291b; ed. Alluntis, p. 263]). Katherine Tachau has passed on to me corrob- orative evidence drawn from Scotus's theory of physical light. Scotus accepted the distinction made in the perspectivist tradition between lux, which is a generating light source, and lumen, which is the visible species produced by the light source and multiplied to the perceiver. That is, when speaking of physical light, Scotus identified lumen with the visible species. See Scotus,

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God under the aspect of Deity is compatible with the wayfarer state absolutely speaking, it is nonetheless not available according to common disposition. The distinct knowledge of God from which this strict science of theology is derived results from a divine action, which, while going beyond common revelation, does not violate the wayfarer state.57 Apparently Scotus had in mind some sort of infusion by God of a species distinctly representing the divine nature, or perhaps the retention of such a species in abstractive cog- nition after the intuitive cognition of God given in rapture had passed.58

In sum, then, Scotus followed Henry in attempting to negotiate the bound- ary between the wayfarer state and the homeland in order to preserve a

rigorous science of theology outside the beatific vision. Indeed, both did so in similar ways and, at least for Henry's earlier texts, in nearly identical language. Where Henry distinguished between visio as knowing the thing as

clearly present in itself and intellectus as knowing it as present in a species or

through discursive reasoning, Scotus distinguished between cognitio intuitiva as grasping the object as existing and present and cognitio abstractiva as knowl-

edge of the nonpresent thing in a species.59 Such similar formulations in identical contexts indicate that Scotus's distinction derived from Henry's. Scotus himself left little doubt about this. While giving an otherwise accurate report of Henry's lumen medium, he slipped into his own vocabulary of intui-

2 Ord. d.13 q.un: "Circa distinctionem 13 quaero simul de luce et de lumine. Et quero primo: utrum lux gignat lumen tamquam propriam speciem sensibilem sui.... Hic sunt tria videnda. Primo, quid sit lux. Secundo, quid sit lumen. Tertio, qualiter lumen a luce gignitur. ... Hoc modo dico quod lumen est proprie intentio sive species propria ipsius lucis sensibilis ..." (Edward McCarthy, "Medieval Light Theory and Optics and Duns Scotus's Treatment of Light in D. 13 of Book II of His Commentary on the Sentences" [Diss., City University of New York, 1976], pp. 24-27). On the distinction between lux and lumen see David C. Lindberg, Theories of Vision from Al-Kindi to Kepler (Chicago, 1976), pp. 96-97, 113, and Tachau's own Vision and Certitude, p. 58. I am indebted to Professor Tachau for the above information on Scotus's treatment of lux and lumen and its background in perspectivist treatises.

57 "In alio etiam discordo, quia huiusmodi scientia de Deo sub ratione Deitatis, non habetur

per studium, sed est donum gratis datum ad utilitatem ecclesiae ... " (1 Add. magn. prol. q.2 n.17 [Vives 22:43b]). Note that Godfrey said that his position was not taking into account any such special action by God: "Sed ita suppono et firmiter credo esse in omnibus quantumcumque perfectis in vita ista vitam communem ducentibus et non raptis vel aliquo modo singulariter elevatis" (Quod. 8.7 [PB 4:70]).

58 Scotus did not, as far as I know, explicitly say how such abstractive cognition of the divine nature is produced. See Wolter and Alluntis, God and Creatures, p. 163, nn. 10-11. In his second

response in the Parisian prologue, Scotus argued that God can bypass the representing species and directly cause in the wayfarer the required cognition, such as the "inner voice" experienced by the prophets. Scotus regarded this directly caused knowledge as equivalent to that given in abstractive cognition through a representing species. See 1 Add. magn. prol. q.2 n.17 (Vives 22:42b-43a).

59 A comparison of Henry's texts with the corresponding ones of Scotus is striking: Cf. "De

cognitione autem visionis, quia ipsa propter rei praesentiam claram in seipsa ... " (SQO 13.7 [1:96 P]) and " ... alia intellectio potest esse rei secundum quod praesens est in exsistentia sua" (2 Lect. d.3 n.285 [Vat. 18:321]); "Sed loquendo de intellectu proprie dicto, cui res praesto est per speciem et maxime per speciem alienam . . . non est ex rei praesentis evidentia . . " (SQO 13.7 [1:96 Q]) and " ... quaedam quidem est per speciem, quae est rei non in se praesentis, et haec vocatur cognitio rei abstractiva ... " (1 Add. magn. prol. q.2 n.15 [Vives 22:41a]).

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tion and abstraction.60 The many contemporaries of Scotus who associated his distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition with Henry's lumen medium show that they were perceived as closely related doctrines designed to perform the same function. The most explicit case of this is the Carmelite master Gui Terrena in his Quodlibet 1.2 (1312): "And in this way some hold that in matters of belief God can communicate an abstractive cognition through which we can understand and know in particular, determinately, and evidently those things we believe. . . . This opinion does not seem dif- ferent from that which holds a middle light between the light of faith and the light of glory, in which light matters of belief are understood but not seen. What the former call abstractive cognition, the latter call intellective, and what the former call intuitive cognition, the latter call vision."61

The reason that fourteenth-century discussions on intuitive and abstractive cognition so often took place under the rubric of the science of theology is now apparent. The reason is that Scotus himself so applied the distinction in

response to the debate over theology at Paris. This obvious, albeit overlooked, historical explanation reveals, however, another less obvious and more pro- found one about the origins of Scotus's distinction.

Scotus's use of the distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition in 2 Lectura to explain angelic cognition of God and his use of it again in his Paris prologue to explain how the wayfarer can have a strict science of

theology are in fact one and the same application of the distinction. For Scotus, the angelic and human intellects are, in their natures, powers of equal scope.62 Thus, for Scotus to have solved the problem of angelic cognition of God is for him to have already solved the problem of the scientific status of

theology in the wayfarer, at least absolutely speaking. In other words, the second book of Scotus's Oxford commentaries and the prologue to his Pari- sian reports point to the same motivation for the distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition. The distinction originated in Scotus's attempt to

explain how a created intellect, whether angelic or human, could have a

60 "Alia est opinio Gandavensis Quodlibet 8 q.4.... Dicit enim quod est triplex lumen: unum sufficiens ad apertam visionem habendam de his, quae nunc credimus, scilicet lumen gloriae, in

quo credita nobis dare videntur cognitione intuitiva et propter quid. ... Contra conclusionem in se: ipse dicit quod ista duo lumina [sc. medium et fidei] simul stant. ... Hoc videtur falsum

quod stant simul, quia lumen illud non facit cognitionem intuitivam de credibilibus, sed scientiam abstractivam .. ." (3 Ord. d.24 q.un. nn.5, 8 [Vives 15:39a, 41a]).

61 Gui Terrena, Quod. 1.2 (Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, MS Borgh. lat. 39, fols. 15vb-16ra). For the text see the Appendix. Later Hugolino of Orvieto made the same identification in his 1 Sent. prol. q.3 a.2 (1365): "Ad hoc dubium respondet Gandavensis ubi

supra articulo 13 quaestione 7 dicens 'Triplex est cognitio,' scilicet 'fide, visu, et intellectu'; seu sub aliis terminis: Est fidei adhaesio; evidentia intrinseca seu intuitiva perfecta visio ac intuitio; et media intelligentia, quae est abstractiva cognitio melior fide, sed tamen infra intuitivam evidentiam" (Hugolini'de Urbe Veteri OESA Commentarius in quattuor libros Sententiarum, ed. Willigis Eckermann, O.S.A., 4 vols. [Wiirzburg, 1981-88], 1:116, lines 46-50).

62 " . .. obiectum adaequatum intellectui nostro ex natura potentiae non est aliquid specialius

obiecto intellectus angelici, quia quidquid potest intelligi ab uno et ab alio" (Quod. 14 n.12 [Vives 26:47a; ed. Alluntis, p. 513]).

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distinct or strictly scientific knowledge of the divine nature short of seeing it

beatifically. When seen in the proper context of its origin, Scotus's own distinction between intuition and abstraction emerges as a development of

Henry of Ghent's distinction between visio and intellectus, between lumen

gloriae and lumen medium.

According to this deeper historical account, Scotus's distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition appears originally designed not so much to account for the certitude of contingent, naturally known truths as to

guarantee scientific knowledge of necessary, theological ones. From the point of view of this original function, it is abstractive rather than intuitive cognition that has an important and controversial role.

APPENDIX

Texts on Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition after Scotus

Alfons of Toledo, 1 Sent. prol. q.l (1344-45), "Utrum aliqua notitia evidens de veritatibus theologiae sit possibilis viatori de potentia dei absoluta quae sit scientia

proprie dicta" (ed. 1490; repr. 1952, coll. 3-30).

Anfredus Gonteri (?), De cognitione Dei q.l (1314), "Utrum de Deo possit haberi

cognitio media inter cognitionem fidei et patriae" (ed. Vives, 5:318-23).

Anfredus Gonteri, 1 Sent. prol. q. 11 (1322-25), "Utrum huiusmodi notitia scientifica possibilis de deo haberi sub ratione divinitatis etc. possit adeo revelari et communicari alicui viatori manenti viatori" (Wroclaw, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, MS 195 [I.F.184], fols. 19vb-24ra).

Ulterius sciendum est quod de deo secundum rationem suae divinitatis in intellectu hominis vel angeli [alio MS], et de quocumque alio obiecto creato vel increato, est duplex cognitio intellectiva possibilis: una intuitiva et facialis, nuda clara et imme- diata, quae est de deo secundum rationem suae exsistentiae ei realiter praesentis. ... Alia est cognitio abstractiva sive scientifica de deo secundum rationem suae essentiae absolutae, sive sit praesens realiter in intellectu secundum suam realem exsistentiam sive non, quia licet deus ex se sit necesse (esse) et necessario exsistens, potest tamen ab intellectu creato considerari secundum rationem formalem suae essentiae, quae ut sic potest obiective cognosci mediante aliquo repraesentativo, scilicet specie .... (fol. 20rb)

Durandus of St. Pourcain, 1 Sent. prol. q.3 (1317-27), "Utrum viatori possit com- municari scientia de articulis fidei" (ed. 1571, fols. 6vb-8ra).

Francis Caracciolo, Notabilia cancellarii (1312-14), "Articulus: cognitio abstractiva. Nota quod aliqua possit esse notitia in via superior fide et tamen non beata" (Worces- ter, Cathedral Library, MS F.69, fol. 164ra-b; edited partially in Charles Balic, Les commentaires de Jean Duns Scot sur les quatre livres des Sentences [Louvain, 1927], pp. 168-69).

Francis of Meyronnes, Quod. 1.4 (1323-24), "Utrum Deus possit revelare suam essentiam alicui viatori abstractive" (ed. 1520, fols. 233 D-234 E).

Quod. 1.5, "Utrum Deus possit revelare suam essentiam intuitive alicui viatori" (ed. 1520, fols. 234 E-235 C).

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Gerard of Bologna, Quod. 2.6 (1306), "Utrum unus angelus ex hoc quod cognoscat alium intuitive sit certus quod ille exsistat" (Paris, Bibliotheque Nationale, MS lat. 17485, fols. 121rb-22vb).

Respondeo: dicendum quod de cognitione intuitiva possumus loqui communiter et extenso nomine vel proprie et stricte. Si primo modo, sic omnis intellectio potest dici intuitio, quia "intueri" idem est quod "inspicere," ut grammatici dicunt, et omnis intellectio est quaedam inspectio eius quod intelligitur. Si autem loquamur de cognitione intuitiva proprie et stricte, posset videri alicui quod cognitio intuitiva est cognitio rei immediata. Et ideo hic primo distinguendum de cognitione et ponendi sunt modi aliqui cognitionum ut accipiatur quid proprie importetur no- mine cognitionis intuitivae. Secundo tractandae sunt aliquae difficultates circa ea quae dicuntur de cognitione intuitiva. Tertio est ad propositum accedendum et ostendendum quid videatur de quaestione tenendum. Circa primum sciendum est quod alia est cognitio immediata, alia cognitio mediata. Multipliciter autem dicitur aliqua cognitio mediata. Primo ex parte cognitionis.... Secundo modo potest dici aliqua cognitio mediata ex parte medii cognoscendi.... Tertio modo potest aliqua cognitio mediata ex parte obiecti. ... Et opposito modo his duobus ultimis modis mediationis dicitur res cognosci immediate. ... Circa secundum est intelligendum quod ex praemissis, aliquis posset accipere rationem cognitionis intuitivae, dicendo quod cognitio intuitiva est cognitio qua cognoscatur res immediate omnino non mediante specie exemplari imagine vel obiecto alio ab ipsa re. Et terminatur haec cognitio ad praesentiam et exsistentiam rei, ita quod non posset non esse. Vel potest dici cognitio intuitiva ubi cognoscatur res sub ratione qua exsistit et videatur exsis- tentia eius et res ipsa exsistere actu in rerum natura. Et ex hoc dicunt aliqui ultra sermonem extendentes [se in marg. add. MS] quod viator potest habere de deo cognitionem quantum ad quidditatem eius, ita quod cognoscet quidditatem et es- sentiam dei in speciali, non tamen cognoscet exsistentiam eius. Et habebit de ipso cognitionem abstractivam, quia quidditas abstrahit ab [ad MS] esse fuisse et fore, non autem intuitivam, quia intuitiva est de ipsa rei exsistentia. Unde abstractiva requirit rem in esse cognoscibili tantum, intuitiva vero in esse reali. (fol. 121rb-vb)

Gregory of Lucca, Quod. 1.1 (1310-11), "Utrum divina essentia possit intelligi ab intellectu creato abstrahendo ab exsistentia" (Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Va- ticana, MS Vat. lat. 1086, fols. 119vb-20ra).

Gui Terrena, Quod. 1.2 (1313), "Utrum deus possit communicare viatori cogniti- onem intuitivam de futuro ut est futurum" (Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vati- cana, MS Borgh. lat. 39, fols. 15ra-19ra).

Circa primum est intelligendum quod quidam ponunt duplicem cognitionem, sci- licet abstractivam et intuitivam. Vocant cognitionem abstractivam cognitionem de re secundum quod res cognoscatur secundum quidditatem ut abstrahit ab esse fuisse et fore; intuitivam autem secundum quam cognoscat rem praesentem in actu et exsistentia, ut color videtur in pariete. Sed illa distinctio non potest stare. ... Et ideo corrigitur et dicitur quod abstractiva est qua cognoscitur res non in se, sed in repraesentativo, ut in aliqua specie, vel lumine non solum quo sed in quo, quidquid illud sit. Istud etiam non potest stare. ... Propter quod dicitur quod cognitio abstractiva est non absolute de re repraesentata in alio, sed repraesentata in illo in quo ita perfecte non potest repraesentari sicut in se. . . . Cognitio autem intuitiva est qua cognoscitur res in se actu praesens vel in repraesentativo in quo relucet ita perfecte vel perfectius quam in se. ... Et secundum hunc modum ponitur a qui- busdam quod de credibilibus potest deus communicare cognitionem abstractivam, per quam ea quae credimus possumus in particulari et determinate et evidenter cognoscere et intelligere. Et hoc probant sic. ... Secundo ... Tertio, quia illud

potest communicari viatori quod non ponit ipsum extra terminos viae. Sed cognitio abstractiva non ponit extra terminos viae, cum non sit beatifica. Ergo potest viatori

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communicari. Videtur quod illa opinio non differat ab illa quae ponit medium lumen inter lumen fidei et lumen gloriae in quo intelliguntur credibilia, licet non videantur.1 Quod dicunt isti cognitionem abstractivam, illi vocant intellectivam, et quod isti dicunt intuitivam, dicunt illi visionem. Contra illud autem lumen et cog- nitionem in illo lumine multa sunt dicta, nec nunc me intromitto. Unde solum arguo contra istam positionem sive sit eadem sive differat. (fols. 15vb-16ra)

Hervaeus Natalis, Quod. 2.5 (1308), "Utrum manente statu viae possit aliquis habere

expressam cognitionem de quidditate Dei" (ed. 1513, fols. 41rb-42va).

Hugh of Newcastle, 1 Sent prol. q. 1 (1307-17), "Utrum theologia possit esse scientia evidens viatori" (Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, S. Crucis Plut. 30 dext. 2, fols. lra-3ra).

De tertio articulo an virtute divini auxilii (theologia) evidens possit esse viatori. Hic sunt duo modi qui reprobantur ab aliis. Primus sit quod duplex est notitia: una quae concernit praesentiam rei et dicitur intuitiva; alia quae non concernit neces- sario et dicitur abstractiva. Exemplum in sensu et imaginatione.... Dicit ergo quod deus per omnipotentiam potest dare viatori evidentem cognitionem suae essentiae non intuitivam sed abstractivam. Contra hoc arguitur . . . Istis rationibus non obstantibus, ut patebit, dico quod distinctio est bona.... (fol. lva-b)

Humbert de Gardia 1 Sent. prol. q.5 (c. 1325), "Utrum intellectus noster in via possit habere aliquam notitiam abstractivam de Deo" (Vatican City, Biblioteca Apos- tolica Vaticana, MS Vat. lat. 1091, fols. 16r-17v):

In ista quaestione sunt quattuor facienda. Primo videbitur quid sit notitia intuitiva et abstractiva. Secundo quot conditiones quaelibet notitia requirat. Tertio tangetur punctus quaestionis. Quarto utrum possumus habere notitiam intuitivam de Deo in via.... Circa primum quaesitum notandum quod dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo utrum de deo possumus habere notitiam abstractivam inquantum est prima causa vel ens infinitum. Secundo utrum sit nobis possibilis nobis huiusmodi notitia sub ratione Deitatis. Si primo modo quaerat quaestio, dico quod sic. ... Si secundo modo quaerat quaestio, dico tres conclusiones. Prima conclusio (est) quod intellectus noster in via non potest habere notitiam abstractivam de Deo sub ratione propria Deitatis. ... Secunda conclusio est quod intellectus noster coniunctus et electus potest habere notitiam de Deo sub ratione Deitatis.... Tertia conclusio: intellectus noster separatus et glorificatus potest habere notitiam de Deo sub propria ratione Deitatis. . . . (fols. 16v-17r)

John Bassolis, 1 Sent. prol. q.l (c. 1320), "Utrum sit possibile quod purus viator habeat aliquam notitiam evidentem (de Deo) aliam a scientiis naturalibus possibilibus haberi" (ed. 1516-17, fols. 2vb-7va).

John of Mount St. Eligius, Quod. 1.2 (1311-12), "(Utrum) viatori manenti tali possit communicari visio Dei intuitiva" (Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, MS Vat. lat. 1086, fol. 127ra-b).

John of Naples, Quod. 6.1 (1315-16), "Utrum scientia theologiae possit communicari

puro viatori" (Toulouse, Bibliotheque Municipale, MS 744, fols. lra-2ra).

John of Pouilly, Quod. 5.1 (1312), "Utrum de divina essentia potest haberi cognitio scientifica absque hoc quod habeatur de eius actuali exsistentia" (Vatican City, Bibli- oteca Apostolica Vaticana, MS Vat. lat. 1017, fols. 179vb-82vb).

Si secundo modo quaeratur quaestio, sic dicunt aliqui quod sic, dicentes quod virtute divina potest viator perfecte cognoscere divinam essentiam et quidditatem et ea quae illis sunt perfecte, sicut ipsum esse trium in suppositis et alia quae fide tenemus.

The manuscript here adds "contra illud," which does not make sense. The scribe appears to have incorrectly started the next sentence but did not return to expunge his slip.

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Distinguentes ergo dicunt quod duplex est cognitio: una intuitiva quae habetur de re secundum suam actualem et realem exsistentiam, ponentes sicut est cognitio qua sensus videt aliquod coloratum; alia vero abstractiva ut dicunt qua cognoscitur res solum quantum ad suam quidditatem, quae abstrahit ab esse fuisse et fore, sicut cognoscitur rosa absens.... (fol. 180va-b)

Landolfo Caracciolo, 1 Sent. prol. q.l (1322), "Utrum de deo possit communicari

aliqua notitia viatori pro statu viae" (Vienna, Osterreichische Nationalbibliothek, MS 1496, fols. lrb-3vb).

In ista quaestione sunt quattuor articuli. Primo ostendam in quo differunt notitia abstractiva et intuitiva et quod inter eas est notitia media. Secundo ostendam quod deus potest communicare aliquam notitiam abstractivam de essentia sua in statu viae. Tertio quamvis in essentia divina omnia sint idem realiter, tamen propter aliquam non identitatem ex natura rei, deus potest communicare abstractivam de uno non communicando de alio quod non est simpliciter idem ex natura rei. Quarto ostendam quod deus posset communicare notitiam intuitivam et notitiam mediam inter intuitivam et abstractivam de essentia sua viatori non exsistenti totaliter extra statum viae. (fol. lrb) Paul of Perugia, 1 Sent. qq. 1-2 (ed. J. Etzwiler, "The Nature of Theological Knowl-

edge according to Paul of Perugia, O. Carm. [fl. 1344]," Carmelus 34 [1987], 135-75): q.l, "Utrum intellectus viatoris possit habere evidentem notitiam de veritatibus

theologiae." q.2, "Utrum viatori pro statu viae possit communicari de divina essentia notitia

abstractiva."

Peter Aureoli, 1 Scriptum prol. q.2 (1317), "Utrum dari possit a Deo lumen aliquod viatori, virtute cuius theologicae veritates scientifice cognoscatur" (ed. E. M. Buytaert, Peter Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, 2 vols. [St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1956], 1:176-217).

Peter of Navarre, 1 Sent. (1320-23), prol. p.l qq. 1-5 (ed. Pio Sagies Azcona, Doctoris fundati Petri de Atarrabia sive de Navarra, OFM, In primum Sententiarum scriptum, 2 vols. [Madrid, 1974], 1:1-44):

q.l, "Utrum notitia abstractiva de Deo, quae abstrahit essentiam vel quiditatem divinam in ratione obiecti cogniti a suo esse actualis exsistentiae, sit possibilis."

q.2, "Utrum notitia abstractiva de Deo absolute sit possibilis." q.3, "Utrum notitia abstractiva scientifica de Deo et credibilibus sit possibilis homini

viatori habenti fidem."

q.4, "Utrum notitia abstractiva de credibilibus, proprie dicta scientia, sit possibilis viatori."

q.5, "Utrum notitia de Deo intuitiva sit possibilis homini viatori manenti viatori."

Peter of Navarre (?), Quod. q.2, "Utrum ab eodem intellectu idem obiectum possit esse creditum per fidei adhaerentiam et scitum per rei evidentiam" (ed. Azcona, 1:48*-69*).

Peter of St. Denis, Quod. 1.3 (1311-12), "Utrum viator manens viator possit de deo habere cognitionem abstractivam et intuitivam" (Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, MS Vat. lat. 1086, fols. 11 vb-12va).

Prosper of Reggio Emilia, 1 Sent. prol. (1317), "Utrum Deus ipse possit causare certam scientiam et evidentem eorum quae fidei sunt in aliquo viatore" (Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, MS Vat. lat. 1086, fols. 49vb-52va).

Ad istam quaestionem dicunt quidam quod duplex cognitio potest haberi de Deo, scilicet abstractiva et intuitiva, et quaelibet est perfecta secundum suum modum. Abstractiva notitia non concernit praesentiam rei, ut quando cognoscitur res secun-

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dum suam quiditatem, quae abstrahitur secundum esse fuisse vel fore, sicut cog- noscitur rosa absens et quod non est. Sed cognitio intuitiva est quae circumcernit praesentiam rei, quia habetur de re praesenti secundum actualem et realem exsis- tentiam. (fol. 51rb-va)

Raymond Bequin, Quod. 1.2 (1320-23), "Utrum intellectus viatoris possit aliqua virtute pertingere ad claram et evidentem divinae essentiae cognitionem" (Avignon, Bibliotheque de la Ville, MS 314, fols. 3ra-5rb).

Quantum ad secundum articulum distinguendum de cognitione, quia quaedam est cognitio intuitiva, alia est abstractiva.... Quomodo autem distinguantur ad invicem varii sunt modi dicendi, quibusdam dicentibus quod intuitiva est illa quae habetur de re secundum suam actualitatem et realem praesentiam, sicut cum aliquis videt colorem quae est in pariete vel rosam sibi praesentem. Abstractiva quidem est illa qua cognoscitur res praecise quantum ad suam quidditatem quae abstrahit ab esse fuisse et fore. Aliis vero dicentibus quod intuitiva cognitio est illa quae est directa et praesentialis eius [casus MS] super quod transit actuativa sui obiecti et quasi exsistenter positiva, ita intelligendo quod istae conditiones "directa" et "praesen- tialis" non se teneant ex parte obiecti cogniti sed ex parte modi cognoscendi, quia ut dicunt, res quae non est directa nec praesentialis, immo non exsistens, potest cognosci intuitive. Abstractiva vero est illa secundum eos quae astrahit a praedictis quattuor conditionibus, quia non est directa nec praesentialis etc. Aliis dicentibus quod intuitiva est illa ad quam res praesens realiter et exsistens movet per se ipsam immediate potentiam cognoscentem, ita quod istud "immediate" tollit omne me- dium cognitum et non medium quod est tantum ratio cognoscendi, sicut similitudo. Abstractiva vero est illa ad quam res ipsa non movet immediate modo supra dicto sed mediate aliquo praecognito sicut causa vel effectu vel aliquo huiusmodi. Nec etiam oportet quod obiectum sit cognitum terminum actum cognoscendi secundum suam realem praesentiam aut exsistentiam. Sed quia istas opiniones non intelligo, ideo pono alium modum qui videtur mihi verior et probabiliorem.... (fol. 3rb-va)

Robert Cowton, 1 Sent. prol. q.2 (before 1312), "Quaeritur an de credibilibus revelatis posset aliquis habere simul scientiam proprie dictam cum fide" (ed. Hermann

Theissing, Glaube und Theologie bei Robert Cowton OFM, Beitrage zur Geschichte der

Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 42/3 [Muinster, 1970], pp. 257-83).

Robert Holcot, Quod. q.84 "Utrum theologica sit scientia" (ed. J. T. Muckle, "Utrum

Theologia Sit Scientia: A Quodlibet Question of Robert Holcot O. P.," Mediaeval Studies 20 [1958], 127-53).

Walter Chatton, 1 Sent. prol. q.2 (1321-23), "Utrum Deus possit causare in puro viatore talem notitiam evidentem abstractivam de rebus significatis per articulos fidei, non causando visionem sui, qualis nata esset adquiri mediante visione eius" (ed. J. O'Callaghan, "The Second Question of the Prologue to Walter Catton's Commen-

tary on the Sentences: On Intuitive and Abstractive Knowledge," in Nine Mediaeval Thinkers, ed. J. R. O'Donnell [Toronto, 1955], pp. 233-69).

Sermo infesto Cathedre Sancti Petri (ed. M. Dykmans, "Les freres mineurs d'Avignon au debut de 1333 et le sermon de Gautier de Chatton sur la vision beatifique," Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen age 38 [1971], 106-48. See especially pp. 143- 44.)

William of Alnwick, Quaestio de scientia, "Utrum scientia possit causari in intellectu nostro a Deo immediate sine obiecto praeostenso" (Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, MS Vat. lat. 1012, fols. 39ra-41vb; cf. Guillelmi Alnwick Quaestiones disputatae et De esse intelligibili et de Quodlibet, ed. A. Ledoux [Quaracchi, 1937], p. xix.)

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Est ergo opinio Doctoris Subtilis quod scientiam proprie dictam de Deo et de credibilibus necessariis potest Deus immediate causare in intellectu viatoris sine obiecto concurrente in ratione motivi. ... (fol. 39rb) Ideo dicit doctor cuius opinionem teneo, scilicet Duns, d.2 in solutione quartae, scilicet in lectura sua Oxoniensi [i.e., 1 Ord. d.2 n.394 (ed. Vat. 2.352)] quod cognitio intuitiva est obiecti ut est praesens in actuali exsistentia, et hoc in se vel in alio eminenter continente. ... (fol. 40vb) 1 Sent. prol. q.l (1314), "Quia negantes theologiam esse proprie scientiam sive

sapientiam, hoc praecipue conantur probare ex incompossibilitate fidei ad scientiam. Utrum ab eodem intellectu eadem obiecta possunt simul esse credita per fidei ad- haerentiam et scita per rei evidentiam" (ed. J. D'Souza, "William of Alnwick and the Problem of Faith and Reason," Salesianum 35 [1973], 425-88).

William of Ockham, 1 Ord. prol. q.l (c. 1317-19), "Utrum sit possibile intellectum habere notitiam evidentem de veritatibus theologiae" (Guillelmi de Ockham Opera theo-

logica, ed. Gedeon Gal et al., 10 vols. [St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1967-85], 1:3-75).

Stephen D. Dumont is a Senior Fellow of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 59 Queen's Park Crescent East, Toronto, Ont. M5S 2C4, Canada.

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