DUE PROCESS

Lumigued v Hon. Exevea

282 SCRA 125 (89 SCAD 151) – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Due Process; Administrative Bodies – Assistance by Counsel

Law on Public Officers – Right to Due Process – Public Office is Not a Property

Arsenio Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR-CAR. He was charged by Jeannette Zamudio, the Regional Cashier, for dishonesty due to questionable gas expenses under his office. It was alleged that he was falsifying gas receipts for reimbursements and that he had an unliquidated cash advance worth P116,000.00. Zamudio also complained that she was unjustly removed by Lumiqued two weeks after she filed the two complaints. The issue was referred to the DOJ. Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution. The Investigating Committee recommended the dismissal of Lumiqued. DOJ Sec Drilon adopted the recommendation. Fidel Ramos issued AO 52 dismissing Lumiqued.

Lumiqued appealed averring that his right to due process was violated as well as his right to security of tenure.

ISSUE: Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an administrative inquiry?

HELD: No. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, Lumiqued invoked the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime. The investigation conducted by the committee was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed against him. The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law.

“. . . There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side.”

In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one’s side. Whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by the committee was cured by Lumiqued’s appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration.

The Supreme Court also emphasized that the constitutional provision on due process safeguards life, liberty and property. Public office is a public trust. It is not a property guaranteed of due process. But when the dispute concerns one’s constitutional right to security of tenure, however, public office is deemed analogous to property in a limited sense; hence, the right to due process could rightfully be invoked. Nonetheless, the right to security of tenure is not absolute especially when it was proven, as in this case, that the public officer (Lumiqued) did not live up to the Constitutional precept i.e., that all public officers and employees must serve with responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION

FACTS:

Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the “extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty.

On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to the United States.

On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the Philippine Government must present the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.

ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizen’s basic due process rights or the governments ironclad duties under a treaty.

RULING: Petition dismissed.

The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provision of the constitution or statute of the local state.

Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.

“Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere.

“The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.

“Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the incorporation clause in the above cited constitutional provision.

“In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts, for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.

“The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogate priori takes effect – a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution.

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, petitioner, Hon. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, Morales, and Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42; and MARK B. JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO BATACAN CRESPO, respondents.

Facts:

The petition at bar seeking to void and set aside the Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42. The first assailed Order set for hearing petitioner’s application for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.

Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government requested the extradition of Mark Jimenez. A hearing was held to determine whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. Afterwards, such warrant was issued but the trial court allowed Jimenez to post bail for his provisional liberty.

Issue/s: Whether or not the right to bail is available in extradition proceedings

Discussions: The constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.” It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.

Ruling/s: No. The court agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word “conviction,” the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings had already been conducted in that country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the requesting state before those proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from continuing with the due processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due process now has thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.

PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI) represented by its Secretary General George “FGBF George” Duldulao, petitioner,vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 190529. April 29, 2010]

FACTS:

Respondent delisted petitioner, a party list organization, from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system through its resolution, denying also the latter’s motion for reconsideration, in accordance with Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, which provides:

Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.[Emphasis supplied.]

Petitioner was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections. Petitioner filed its opposition to the resolution citing among others the misapplication in the ruling of MINERO v. COMELEC, but was denied for lack of merit. Petitioner elevated the matter to SC showing the excerpts from the records of Senate Bill No. 1913 before it became the law in question.

ISSUES:

Political Law

(1) Whether or not there is legal basis in the delisting of PGBI.

(2) Whether or not PGBI’s right to due process was violated.

Civil Law (Statutory Construction)

(1) Whether or not the doctrine of judicial precedent applies in this case.

RULINGS:

Political Law

(1) No. The MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain PGBI’s delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system. First, the law is in the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law which provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting. Second, MINERO is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBI’s cited congressional deliberations clearly show. MINERO therefore simply cannot stand.

(2) No. On the due process issue, petitioner’s right to due process was not violated for [it] was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of [COMELEC resolution]. The essence of due process, consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x. [It is] obvious [that] under the attendant circumstances that PGBI was not denied due process.

Telecommunications And Broadcast Attorneys Of The Phils. Vs. COMELEC

289 SCRA 337

April 21, 1998

Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. It was declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had the requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881.

Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides:

“Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as the “Comelec Time” which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of campaign.”

Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time.

Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each day and, in this year’s elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELEC’s requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such.

Issue:

Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws.

Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due process of law and without just compensation.

Held: Petitioner’s argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals

who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to operate broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising them.

The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time as against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.

As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.

PEOPLE V JALOSJOS Feb. 3, 2000

Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives

Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee

meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

BIRAOGO VS PTC

G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010

G.R. No. 193036

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.vs.EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD

FACTS: Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010. PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They argued that:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the

President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the “Truth Commission.”

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the “Truth Commission” with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for laudable purposes.

ISSUES:

1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;

2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;

3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;

4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING:

The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.

With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.

Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In private suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”

Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.

The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents

The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be

the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.

3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can

advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities.

There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.

Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.

The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; HON. LEILA DE LIMA, in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice; HON. SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., in his capacity as Chairperson of the Commission on Elections; and the JOINT DOJ-COMELEC PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE and FACT-FINDING TEAM, Respondents.

FACTS:

The Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of a joint committee with the Department of Justice (DOJ), which shall conduct preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses and anomalies committed during the 2004 and 2007 elections.

The Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases composed of officials from the DOJ and the Comelec. In its initial report, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato and Maguindanao were indeed perpetrated. The Fact-Finding Team recommended that herein petitioners Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA), et al. to be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage.

After the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC en banc adopted a resolution ordering that information/s for the crime of electoral sabotage be filed against GMA, et al. while that the charges against Jose Miguel Arroyo, among others, should be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

Consequently, GMA, et al. assail the validity of the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel and of Joint Order No. 001-2011 before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

I. Whether or not the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is valid?

II. Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 violates the equal protection clause?

HELD: Petitions are DISMISSED.

FIRST ISSUE: The creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is valid.

POLITICAL LAW: powers of COMELEC

Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution enumerates the powers and functions of the Comelec. The grant to the Comelec of the power to investigate and prosecute election offenses as an adjunct to the enforcement and administration of all election laws is intended to enable the Comelec to effectively insure to the people the free, orderly, and honest conduct of elections. The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the Comelec was reflected in Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code.

Under the above provision of law, the power to conduct preliminary investigation is vested exclusively with the Comelec. The latter, however, was given by the same provision of law the authority to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government. Thus, under the Omnibus Election Code, while the exclusive jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation had been lodged with the Comelec, the prosecutors had been conducting preliminary investigations pursuant to the continuing delegated authority given by the Comelec.

Thus, Comelec Resolution No. 9266, approving the creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team, should be viewed not as an abdication of the constitutional bodys independence but as a means to fulfill its duty of ensuring the prompt investigation and prosecution of election offenses as an adjunct of its mandate of ensuring a free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.

SECOND ISSUE: Joint Order No. 001-2011 does not violate the equal protection clause.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: equal protection

Petitioners claim that the creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team is in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution because its sole purpose is the investigation and prosecution of certain persons and incidents. They insist that the Joint Panel was created to target only the Arroyo Administration as well as public officials linked to the Arroyo Administration.

While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those subjected to preliminary investigation, not all respondents therein were linked to GMA as there were public officers who were investigated upon in connection with their acts in the performance of their official duties. Private individuals were also subjected to the investigation by the Joint Committee.

The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, it does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons under like circumstances and conditions shall be treated alike both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.

DISMISSED.