DUDES YOURE SCREWED

Or

HOW TO BEAT BIG OIL

AT THEIR OWN DIRTY GAME

by David Lincoln

PREFACE

This paper is written to all the unfortunate victims of oil and chemical spills past, present, and future. It is an attempt to condense all that is currently known about Health Impacts and Compensation for Oil and Chemical Spills on a global basis.

The popular TV show, Dude Youre Screwed is about a group of trained survivalists who select one of their friends to be placed in an impossible situation with few tools or resources and then they film his techniques and strategies. According to the Discovery Channel, Every episode, one of the world's foremost survival experts is kidnapped, blindfolded, and dropped without warning into one of the harshest environments on earth. The goal: find civilization within 100 hours.

Going up against Big Oil feels very much the same except that it might take 10 years or more and you will be lucky to survive the experience. We hope that by seeing how others have responded you will develop some of the tools which have worked in the past and abandon those which have failed miserably. In this way, you can learn about some of the industrys stalling tactics and inexcusable defensive strategies.

In this survival guide we will teach you how to avoid the pitfalls, how to acquire survival skills, and how to develop the counter offensives needed to fight the battles against the biggest petrochemical polluters the world has ever seen. We have beaten these companies before and we will show you how to beat them again.

First, in order to foster realistic expectations, you must understand the small value placed on human life by some of the richest corporations on earth. This is best viewed by studying the Bhopal India Gas Tragedy, the worst industrial disaster ever reported.

PART A

Table of Contents UNION CARBIDE - BHOPAL, INDIA 1984 ....................................................................................................... 3

PG&E HINKLEY, CA 1993 ......................................................................................................................... 4

W.R. GRACE - WOBURN, MA 1982 ............................................................................................................ 5

4 DOG DEFENSE ............................................................................................................................................ 6

UNOCAL TORREY CANYON, ENGLAND 1967........................................................................................... 7

UNOCAL - SANTA BARBARA, CALIF. 1969 .................................................................................................. 7

AMOCO CADIZ, BRITTANY FRANCE 1978 .................................................................................................. 8

LOVE CANAL, NY 1978 .............................................................................................................................. 9

IXTOC 1, MEXICO 1979 ............................................................................................................................ 10

OCCIDENTAL PIPER ALPHA, NORTH SEA 1988 ...................................................................................... 11

EXXON VALDEZ, ALASKA 1989 ................................................................................................................. 11

AMOCO HAVEN, ITALY 1991.................................................................................................................... 12

CHEVRON / TEXACO ECUADOR 1993 ................................................................................................... 12

BP/ARCO - HASTINGS ON HUDSON, NY 1998 ......................................................................................... 14

PRESTIGE, SPAIN 2002 ............................................................................................................................ 15

HURRICANE IVAN US GULF COAST 2004 ..................................................................................................... 16

BP -Texas City Refinery Explosion 2005 ...................................................................................................... 17

2010 Texas City Chemical leak .......................................................................................................... 18

BP PRUDHOE BAY, ALASKA 2006 ................................................................................................................ 18

Subsequent spill in 2009 ....................................................................................................................... 20

2011 Civil suit ........................................................................................................................................ 20

Alaskan lawsuit settlement ................................................................................................................... 20

BP Health and Safety Violations.......................................................................................................... 21

Hazardous substance dumping 19931995 ........................................................................................ 21

Air pollution violations ....................................................................................................................... 22

Health and safety violations ................................................................................................................. 22

1965 Sea Gem offshore oil rig disaster ............................................................................................... 23

BP - DEEPWATER HORIZON, GULF COAST 2010 ......................................................................................... 24

Health consequences ....................................................................................................................... 25

ENBRIDGE KALAMAZOO RIVER 2010....................................................................................................... 29

Health Impacts .................................................................................................................................... 30

EXXON MAYFLOWER 2013 ..................................................................................................................... 31

LAC MEGANTIC 2013 ................................................................................................................................ 33

Cleanup and environmental costs ............................................................................................. 39

Provincial reaction ......................................................................................................................... 39

Maine and United States .............................................................................................................. 40

Litigation ................................................................................................................................................ 40

Yellowstone River Spill 2015 .................................................................................................................. 43

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................................... 45

UNION CARBIDE - BHOPAL, INDIA 1984 Case Study 1

Excerpted from Wiki

Bhopal disaster - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

An explosion in the Union Carbide (UCC) chemical plant in Bhopal, India, in December1984 released 42 tons of a deadly gas called methyl isocyanate, which is used to make pesticides. An estimated 3,000 to 7,000 died immediately, 15,000 to 20,000 died from the effects in the years after the disaster, and 50,000 to 100,000 suffered from serious injuries as a result of the world's worst chemical disaster.

The Indian government sued on behalf of 570,000 victims and in 1989 settled for $470 million in damages and exempted company employees from criminal prosecution. The company's Indian assets were seized (1992) after its officials failed to appear to face charges.

Dow Chemical Company purchased UCC in 2001, seventeen years after the disaster. Still, by 2008, UCC had not released information about the possible composition of the cloud. The chairman of Union Carbide's Indian branch and seven other of its Indian employees (one deceased) were convicted of death by negligence in 2010, and later that year the Indian government sued to increase the damages paid to $1.1 billion. The UCC CEO at the time of the

disaster, Warren Anderson, passed away at a nursing home in Vero Beach, Florida on September 29, 2014.

The Indian Government's finance department allocated US$14 million for victim relief in July 1985.[34][35] Widow pension of US$3.10 per month later US$12 were provided. The government also decided to pay US$24. From 1990 interim relief of US$3.10 was paid to everyone in the family who was born before the disaster.[7]

The final compensation, including interim relief for personal injury was for the majority US$390. For death claim, the average sum paid out was US$970.

So, the value of a human life in India as determined by an American multi-national petrochemical corporations was less than about a $1000 for deaths and it took more than 25 years for the last victims and their families to be compensated.

On 24 June 2010, Government of India approved a US$200 million aid package which would be funded by Indian taxpayers through the government.[37]

In the early 90s I was working as Asia Exploration Manager for ENRON, traveling frequently to evaluate leases in Malaysia, Pakistan and India. The Union Carbide Case Study was in all the English papers and the hostility for American business practices was palpable. Meanwhile, the people still showed a fondness for Americans and our culture.

If India had realized in time that Union Carbide was going to be purchased by Dow Chemical while the company was negotiating compensation, they could have made a fair settlement a condition of the sale approval. This would have prevented the taxpayers from getting stuck with the final bill. Of course, the nationwide protests against ENRONs Dabhol Nuclear Power Plant near Bombay may have kept the government pre-occupied. The infamous ENRON CEO Ken Lay (Kenny Boy) once confided in me they can either negotiate the price with us or they can negotiate our terms with the U.S. State Dept.

During the same period that negotiations were taking place in India, another giant liability Case Study was proceeding in California.

PG&E HINKLEY, CA 1993 Case Study 2

Excerpted from Wiki http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hinkley_groundwater_contamination

In 1993, Erin Brockovich, a legal clerk to lawyer Edward L. Masry, investigated the apparent elevated cluster of illnesses in the community linked to hexavalent chromium. The Case was settled in 1996 for $333 million to more than 600 Hinkley residents, the largest settlement ever paid in a direct-action lawsuit in U.S. history.

In 2006, Pacific Gas and Electric agreed to pay $295 million to settle cases involving another 1,100 people statewide for hexavalent chromium-related claims.

So, at first glance, it seems that average settlements in Hinkley ranged from about a quarter million up to a half million dollars. However, Roberta Walker, the housewife sick from toxic chromium depicted in the movie Erin Brockovich still lives in Hinkley. Despite non-disclosure agreements, she revealed that attorneys received about 50 percent of the settlements. Walker

said she knew Hinkley residents who received as little as $10,000 from the settlement and one that received $2.5 million.

Following receipt of her portion of the historic $333-million settlement, Walker bought a new home, four miles from the toxic contamination and learned in 2012, that the pollution was seeping into their groundwater. As of September 2013, the Cal/EPA reports show that some progress is being made on cleanup, but also show that the plume has expanded to 6 miles long and 4 miles wide.[6] The PG&E cleanup could last up to 40 years and cost over $800 million.

If the injured residents had known how much the company was spending on clean-up without containing the problem, I doubt that many would have agreed to settlements as small as $10,000. If they knew what it would cost for a lifetime of medical bills, they might not have agreed to at most a million dollar settlement. They might even have lost money when you consider that the homes located over the expanding toxic plume are now worthless after paying hundreds of thousands of dollars to buy into this, formerly idyllic, California community. Now that the school has closed the community is destined to be a ghost town.

I used to pass through Hinkley, throughout the summer of 1973 near where I studied Field Geology at USC. I remember thinking that a town like this in the middle of nowhere reminded me (prophetically) of a ghost town. Not even the best geologists of the time could have envisaged the level of hexavalent chromium contamination or the callous disregard for safety when PG&E dumped this carcinogenic metal into unlined evaporation pits.

W.R. GRACE - WOBURN, MA 1982 Case Study 3 A Civil Action

Another famous liability case also spawned a movie Civil Action with the lawyer Jan Schlichtmann played by John Travolta. The 1982 case involved eight Woburn families and a public water supply contaminated by toxic chemicals like Trichloroethelyne (TCE) a known carcinogen. Schlichtmann, eventually settled the 1982 Case for $8 million minus legal fees that amounted to about 375,000 per family. The EPA later sued both W.R. Grace and Beatrice for $68 million for the estimated clean-up cost.

I lived in Newton MA and Gloucester MA for about 15 years (until 2010) and although I was only about 20 minutes away from this historic pollution case, few people I encountered remembered it. Edmond Burkes famous quote, Those who dont know history are doomed to repeat it should be taken as a warning. Today the drinking water wells which were linked to cancer in Woburn are still contaminated despite a $21 million cleanup effort.

Schlichtmann told me if he had known while he was negotiating that W.R. Grace had seven other contaminated sites in MA he might have gotten more leverage in coming up with a timely settlement. More importantly, if he knew that W.R. Grace was in the midst of a billion dollar deal with Indonesia for filters that would be used at EXXONs CO2 field in the South China Sea he could have threatened to expose their unethical practices in the US. Since Indonesia at the time was concerned with producing the worlds largest subsurface carbon dioxide deposit without destroying the environment, he might have had considerable leverage for his clients. I knew because I was working then for Tenneco Oil Company in Indonesia.

If he had known that W.R. Grace poisoned entire towns in Montana with asbestos for decades he would have had even more leverage. You must know your enemy before you can defeat them.

After asbestos injury claims unexpectedly nearly doubled in 2000, W.R. Grace & Company filed for bankruptcy protection in 2001. The United States Department of Justice alleged that Grace had transferred 4 to 5 billion dollars to daughter companies that it had recently purchased, shortly before declaring bankruptcy. Justice Department attorneys alleged that this amounted to a fraudulent transfer of money in order to protect Grace from civil suits related to asbestos. The bankruptcy court ordered the companies to return nearly $1 billion to Grace, which will remain as part of the assets to consider in the bankruptcy hearings.

By this time, the petrochemical industry had perfected its 4 dog defense. It worked so well in these toxic legacy cases that they are still using it with predictable regularity in spill events. It works like this:

4 DOG DEFENSE 1. My Dog Does Not Bite.

2. My Dog Bites, But It Didn't Bite You.

3. My Dog Bit You. But It Didn't Hurt You.

4. My Dog Bit You And Hurt You, But It Wasn't My Fault

Here is the counter strategy to the 4 dog defense. If all victims and their lawyers used this approach then the companies would have to change their behavior and policies while dealing with the real issues.

1. Know the breed of dog - learn all of the unique toxic characteristics and potential risks. Determine ways to fingerprint the toxic substance such as the wavelengths of fluorescence of the crude oil. Know the statistics about how often it has caused harm.

2. Prove you were bitten - Prepare your health history and be prepared to show your "before and after" condition with pictures, if possible. Determine the exact nature of exposure and use techniques to date the time of exposure even if you have to dig up the waste pits and measure the radiation levels from nuclear tests to nail down the time frame.

3. Proof of harm. Go to the doctor immediately. Prepare your acute and chronic symptoms. Determine your level of maximum exposure. Compare your symptoms with those in this country and globally.

4. Risk / reward - Show the chances of being injured. Compare damage with costs to avoid similar injury. Prepare lists of all previous fines and violations for problems of a similar nature.

While Big Oil is watching you waste all your time and money in the usual ways, they always attack the messenger. This means that before addressing the arguments, they attack the credibility of witnesses (regardless of qualifications) to introduce doubt. They know time is on their side and you will soon run out of money.

The most important lessons are do not be afraid, prepare a defense for every offensive tactic, and always claim the moral high ground. Do not break the law to make your point because then you will be viewed as just another criminal in a never-ending parade of criminals.

Now that we have seen how the petrochemical industry valued human life and how they responded to the risk of cancer following years of toxic exposure, lets look at how Big Oil developed their ideas on short term exposure to massive pollution events and what could have been done to counter their defense.

UNOCAL TORREY CANYON, ENGLAND 1967 Case Study 4

Excerpted from Wiki Torrey Canyon

The attack on the environment really begins in 1967 and the multiple ironies are so bitter you will want to spit them out. In March 1967 a supertanker named the Torrey Canyon ran aground in SW England. This tanker was Liberian flagged with an Italian crew, but owned by Union Oil of California (UNOCAL now BP) which at the time was also leased to BP. This was the largest supertanker wreck and it created the worst environmental disaster of its time. The tanker was bombed by the RAF, but the fire went out and the oil slick stretched 30 miles long and 20 miles wide. As the slick washed ashore volunteers and the British navy were tasked with the cleanup. There was no known financial settlement and for all intents and purposes UNOCAL was never held accountable. UNOCAL eventually blamed the Captain who was asleep and a faulty autopilot. No charges were ever filed and no health studies were conducted on the clean-up workers. This utter disregard for the health of exposed workers has essentially continued to this day.

In fact, of the more than 40 major oil spills prior to 2010, only 8 led to studies of health effects and only two of them included any long-term follow-up. According to the researchers at the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, early data from the two long-term studies "suggested that respiratory and genotoxicity effects were important to capture, as well as mental health outcomes commonly associated with disasters of this scale."[11]

Yet even today, health studies are rarely done on any victims who come in contact with toxic oil. There is almost never any long-term follow-up on health impacts of clean-up workers and usually it is nearly impossible to get the names of those involved.

As a partial response to this public relations disaster, UNOCAL began developing Explorer Scout Posts in California under the Boy Scouts of America. I know this for a fact, because it was at this time that I was recruited from my High School by UNOCAL to help improve their image and restore their tarnished reputation. I was coached on what to say to reporters and given scripts to read on the air.

Tragically, less than two years after UNOCALs Torrey Canyon disaster, the same company was faced with another catastrophe which hit much closer to home in Calif.

UNOCAL - SANTA BARBARA, CALIF. 1969 Case Study 5

Excerpted from Wiki Santa Barbara

According to Wiki, The Santa Barbara oil spill occurred in January and February 1969 in the Santa Barbara Channel, near the city of Santa Barbara in Southern California. It was the largest oil spill in United States waters at the time, and now ranks third after the 2010 Deepwater Horizon and 1989 EXXON Valdez spills. It remains the largest oil spill to have occurred in the waters off California.

The source of the spill was a blow-out on January 28, 1969, 6 miles (10 km) from the coast on Union Oil's Platform A in the Dos Cuadras Offshore Oil Field. Within a ten-day period, an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 barrels [3.4 million to 4.2 million gallons][1] of crude oil spilled into the Channel and onto the beaches of Santa Barbara County in Southern California, fouling the coastline from Goleta to Ventura as well as the northern shores of the four northern Channel Islands.

Both governmental entities and private individuals filed class-action lawsuits against Union Oil to recover damages. These were settled within about five years. The City of Santa Barbara received $4 million in 1974 for damages inflicted.[66] Owners of hotels, beachfront homes, and other facilities damaged by the spill received $6.5 million; the commercial fishing interests received $1.3 million for their losses; and cities, the state, and the County of Santa Barbara settled for $9.5 million in total.[18]

Note that after paying a total of about $20 million for economic damages, UNOCAL tracked no clean-up workers and provided no compensation for health impacts. It was considered the cost of doing business with callous disregard for long-term environmental impacts. That explains why they changed the casing program on the so-called development wells to save money offshore Santa Barbara.

At this stage, you may well wonder how I could know this for certain. I was not only used in their PR campaigns on Los Angeles radio stations, but when I graduated from Santa Fe Springs High School in 1970, I was employed by UNOCAL to archive all their reports at the LA headquarters library. Later, I worked as a pumper on a UNOCAL offshore platform off Huntington Beach, Calif. where I sometimes worked with other field operators.

AMOCO CADIZ, BRITTANY FRANCE 1978

Case Study 6

It was nearly 10 years before the industries luck ran out again and the chickens came home to roost.

Excerpted from Wiki Amoco Cadiz

AMOCO (now also BP) was operating four Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) which were built in Spain. Gradually AMOCO became aware of a design flaw in the steering mechanisms in the 4 vessels. By 1978, two of their supertankers, the AMOCO Cadiz and the Haven were leased to Shell. AMOCO replaced the steering on two of the vessels carrying their own oil, but the two vessels leased to Shell at a high day rate had their maintenance cycle extended from once a year to once every two and a half years.

On March 16, 1978, the AMOCO Cadiz ran aground on Portsall Rocks, three miles off the coast of Brittany, France due to failure of the steering mechanism in high seas. This created the worst oil spill recorded at that time spilling 60 million gallons onto the French coast, over twice that of

the UNOCAL Torrey Canyon. AMOCO refused to accept any responsibility for any of the cleanup or impacts. The French government and local communities conducted and paid for most of the clean-up. The French government paid $12 million to fishermen and others to offset their losses.

AMOCO was found liable largely because of its dismal maintenance record, and because it knew from the first voyage of the Cadiz that the steering mechanism was flawed and failed to repair it. The Captain who argued for 12 hours over the tugboat fee on orders from AMOCO London was never charged and the builders refused to appear in court and were exonerated.

In 1990, the judge awarded the French Government and the spill victims damages totaling $117.5 million, in most cases awarding specific victims only a fraction of what they claimed. No damages were awarded to anyone for general damage to the environment. There was, of course no compensation or follow-up on the 10,000 French soldiers involved in the clean-up.

If AMOCO had been forced to compensate workers and been required to fix the other sister ships steering, lives may have been saved. This event had little coverage in the U.S., but I was working for Occidental (OXY) in Libya at the time and it was a very big deal throughout Europe and North Africa. Everyone I talked to was asking how the Americans could allow this to happen twice.

LOVE CANAL, NY 1978

Case Study 7

Excerpted from wiki http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Love_Canal

It was during this period that the horrendous practices of Hooker Chemical (OXY) at Love Canal in Niagara Falls were exposed and the EPA was forced to take action. As it turned out this legacy site of monumentally reckless waste disposal was sold to the Niagara Falls School Board in 1953 for $1.

If only the School Board had known that this was common practice among the oil industry as a feeble attempt to transfer liability while appearing to help the community. Perhaps, they might have been more willing to look this gift in the mouth and say no.

[Many years later, I personally witnessed this same trick with ENRON giving polluted waste pits to schools in third world countries. It was one of the many reasons I eventually left the oil industry for good.]

Excerpted from Wiki

In early 1978, following complaints from residents the EPA found birth defects and many anomalies such as enlarged feet, heads, hands, and legs. The investigation revealed that the neighborhood sat atop 21,000 tons of buried chemical waste.[17] Many of the residents were evacuated and the responsible parties were sued. The school was closed and demolished, but both the school board and the chemical company (OXY) refused to accept liability. The parties argued that the area's endemic health problems were unrelated to the toxic chemicals buried in the Canal.

Since the residents could not prove the chemicals on their property had come from Hooker's disposal site, they could not prove liability. Throughout the legal battle, residents were unable to sell their properties and move away.

In 1979, the EPA announced the result of blood tests that showed high white blood cell counts, a precursor to leukemia,[19] and chromosome damage in Love Canal residents. In fact, 33% of the residents had undergone chromosomal damage. Over time, reports suggested that dioxin levels at Love Canal were 100 times greater than the community had been told. A federal study indicated that Love Canal residents had a 1 in 10 chance of developing cancer.

Eventually, the government relocated more than 800 families and reimbursed them for their homes, and the United States Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), or the Superfund Act.

In 2002, however, the agency faced perhaps its biggest challenge of all when Congress slashed the Superfunds primary income source a tax targeting industrial polluters that once generated about $1 billion annually. By the end of Fiscal 2003, the funds balance was zero, down from a peak of $3.8 billion in 1996. Since that time, the Superfund budget has generally decreased down to $1.1 billion proposed in fiscal year 2015.

OXY was sued by the EPA and in 1995 agreed to pay $129 million in restitution.[33] This settlement amounts to an average of about $145,000 per family minus lawyers fees. It is estimated that today more than 6,000 people have been impacted. Residents' lawsuits were also settled in the years following the Love Canal disaster and are still being settled nearly 40 years afterward.[34

A few years ago when I visited Niagara Falls, I saw the fence encircling the main danger zone of the Love Canal debacle and thought that if only OXY had put that fence around their waste decades earlier they could have saved so many lives and an entire community from destruction.]

IXTOC 1, MEXICO 1979

Case Study 8

Excerpted from Wiki Ixtoc I oil spill

Also in 1979, a year after the AMOCO Cadiz ran aground in England, the Mexican Government experienced a blowout in the Gulf of Mexico of historic proportions. The Pemex Ixtoc 1 well blew out for 10 months spilling 130 million gallons of oil. This was nearly as much as the BP Deepwater Horizon in 2010 which was eerily similar. Like BP, Pemex tried the very same failed containment procedures and they dumped 1 to 2 million gallons of toxic Corexit dispersant with little positive effect even though the water depth was only 150 feet deep at the source. The US requested that Mexico stop using dispersants in US waters. The oil eventually coated 170 miles of Texas Coastline in some places up to a foot thick. I remember because I was in Houston at the time working for Tenneco Oil and traveling to numerous offshore platforms throughout the Gulf of Mexico.

Pemex spent $100 million to clean up the spill and avoided most compensation claims by asserting sovereign immunity as a state-run company.[11] . No health studies are known and there was no tracking of clean-up workers.

If the US had demanded more information on this spill in the early days and required tracking and health impact studies on US workers for the oil and the dispersant, it is likely that the same mistakes could have been avoided at the BP Deepwater Horizon. They could have immediately banned the use of Corexit and saved lives in Alaska and the Gulf Coast. Instead, since there

was little accountability, the lessons learned were quickly forgotten and the mistakes were inevitably repeated.

OCCIDENTAL PIPER ALPHA, NORTH SEA 1988 Case Study 9

Excerpted from Wiki http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Piper_Alpha

Piper Alpha was a North Sea oil production platform operated by OXY beginning in 1976 when I began working for OXY in Libya. It was an oil platform and then later converted to gas production. An explosion and the resulting oil and gas fires destroyed it on 6 July 1988, killing 167 men, [3] with only 61 survivors. The death toll includes two crewmen of a rescue vessel.[4]

Total insured loss was about US$3.4 billion. It was the worst offshore oil disaster in terms of lives lost and industry impact[5] and it should have been a wake-up call for the entire oil industry.

OXY was eventually found guilty of having inadequate maintenance and safety procedures, but no criminal charges were ever brought against the company.[4] The disaster led to insurance claims of around $1.4 billion USD, making it at that time the largest insured man-made catastrophe. After all the condolences, hand wringing and finger pointing the oil company went back to what it does best, cutting corners and making lots of profit. If Oxy had been held fully accountable for the incident and criminal charges brought against company executives who put cost-cutting bonuses above human lives, then the BP-Deepwater Horizon catastrophe in the Gulf Coast would have been much less likely to occur.

EXXON VALDEZ, ALASKA 1989 Case Study 10

Excerpted from Wiki Exxon Valdez

The EXXON Valdez oil spill occurred in Prince William Sound, Alaska, on March 24, 1989, when the oil supertanker bound for Long Beach, California, struck Prince William Sound's Bligh Reef spilling nearly 40 million gallons of crude oil covering 11,000 sq. miles of ocean and coating 1300 miles of coastline. The Captain of the vessel was not on the bridge as he had passed out from drinking the night before. It was eventually determined that the ships radar had not been working for more than a year before the disaster. Dispersants were used extensively and the main component of the Corexit formulation used during cleanup, 2-butoxyethanol, was identified as "one of the agents that caused liver, kidney, lung, nervous system, and blood disorders among cleanup crews in Alaska. Of the 10,000 people involved in the clean-up, all are now believed to be dead at an average age of 52, nearly 20 years earlier than the national average. EXXON was sued and a jury awarded $287 million for actual damages and $5 billion for punitive damages. After numerous appeals which cut the damage assessments in half, EXXON appealed to the Supreme Court and punitive damages were reduced to about 500 million dollars.

Exxon's official position was that punitive damages greater than $25 million were not justified because the spill resulted from an accident, and because Exxon spent an estimated $2 billion cleaning up the spill and a further $1 billion to settle related civil and criminal charges. Attorneys for the plaintiffs contended that Exxon bore responsibility for the accident because the company "put a drunk in charge of a tanker in Prince William Sound."[45]

Exxon recovered a significant portion of clean-up and legal expenses through insurance claims associated with the grounding of the Exxon Valdez.[46][47]The only negative outcome for EXXON was that the Valdez was no longer allowed into Prince Williams Sound and double hulled tankers would be required in US waters after 2015.

If EXXON had been forced to track clean-up workers and pay all medical and environmental claims promptly, more people might be alive today. The largest company on earth would have been held partially accountable and this might have been a lesson to other oil companies resulting in reduced tanker incidents.

AMOCO HAVEN, ITALY 1991 Case Study 11

Excerpted from Wiki MT Haven

In 1991, the sister ship to the AMOCO Cadiz blew up and sank off the coast of Italy. On 11 April 1991, the AMOCO Milford Haven was unloading a cargo of crude oil to the Multedo floating platform, seven miles off of the coast of Genoa, Italy.

The ship exploded, caught fire and sank off the coast of Genoa, Italy, killing six Cypriot crew and flooding the Mediterranean with up to 45 million gallons of crude oil.[1] It broke in two and sank after burning for three days, and for the next 12 years the Mediterranean coast of Italy and France was polluted, especially around Genoa and southern France. This was the same ship that was scrapped 4 years earlier after being hit by an Exorcet missile during the Iran-Iraq war. It was put back into service with many of the design flaws and maintenance problems that led to the grounding of the AMOCO Cadiz. Apparently, it doesnt take much for a supertanker to be certified.

The ship was leased to Troodos Shipping and the owners, Lucas and Stelios, faced charges of the manslaughter of the six killed, extortion and intimidating and attempting to bribe witnesses. Lucas and Stelios were later acquitted after three retrials (of which 2002 was the last) and much controversy, with subsequent appeals and demands for compensation also thrown out,[1]

So once again, no one was held accountable although, given this ships history, more deaths were predictable. If AMOCO had been forced to pay for their earlier crimes, this disaster might never have happened.

CHEVRON / TEXACO ECUADOR 1993 Case Study 12 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lago_Agrio_oil_field

This brings us to one of the worst crimes ever committed by the oil companies which involves the deliberate dumping of reportedly 18 billion gallons of oil-contaminated produced water for decades into the jungle of Ecuador. Because it occurred in the Texaco held part of the Amazon, the truth has never fully been told. You can choose to believe the oil company propaganda or get lost in the artificial political posturing. You can even believe that the whole process is corrupt, but do not believe data you have not seen because CHEV/TEX refuses to release it.

I have seen it, I started working for Texaco in 1974 in New Orleans about when production in Ecuador began. I was present for the annual meetings when the VPs were touting the huge profits coming from Ecuador and the plans for rapid, unencumbered development by CEPE, then the government oil company. More importantly, I have seen what few others will admit to; namely the company data with Texacos logo on it. In the decades of lawsuits by CHEV/TEX, little if any of the original company generated, operational data showing pressures, volumes, maintenance logs or analyses have been released. What are they hiding?

Instead, there are mountains of partially-sanitized, consultant data in finalized reports which are easy to write in rosy terms near the end of any project. These were written for Texaco by consultant agencies who would follow Texacos guidance and instructions and not dig deeper. That is what they were paid to do. They agreed to study and analyze only what they were given by Texaco and not ask questions about the data they were not shown.

Lawyers for the indigenous residents of the Lago Agrio field sued Texaco in New York in 1993. The 30,000 member class-action lawsuit accused TexPet (now CHEVRON) of discharging produced water into open pits, contaminating the water that was used by the locals for fishing, bathing, and drinking. Plaintiffs in the Ecuadorian court case had initially demanded compensation payments of $27 billion. When the court ordered CHEVRON to pay $18 billion in February 2011 (later reduced to $9.5 billion), the company vowed to appeal.

CHEVRON sued lawyers and consultants personally and argued that compensation by consultants, journalists and activists was fraud while spending tens of millions on the companys defense. CHEVRON even hired lobbyists to convince Obama to pressure Ecuador to block the judgment against them. All the while funding a relentless media campaign portraying itself as victim.

In September 2013, The Hague arbitration panel ruled in favor of CHEVRON, finding that an agreement signed in 1995 by the government of Ecuador released Texaco Corporation from financial responsibility from any claims of collective damage. However, the panel left open the possibility that CHEVRON could still be liable for damages incurred by individuals.[35] While the lawyers argue legal points, more of the victims suffer and go without adequate medical care or merely die off.

CHEVRON practices an age-old strategy of attacking the messenger. It doesnt matter the argument, they have an army of lawyers to attack syntax in legalese without addressing the core issues. They have rarely encountered someone they cannot bully or frighten with money or legal action. Their favorite tactic is to demand access to all information on any media that contains some remotely relevant information. They have done that with hard drives, unedited film and even personal diaries. It would be interesting to see what would happen if a lawyer reciprocated and demanded all of the data on their computers which contains or contained any original data from Texaco.

In 2009, I was interviewed for El Comercio, the Ecuadorian Trade News, where I gave the following advice:

If the Ecuador case comes back to the U.S. Courts, it is possible that the case could be dismissed. I believe that an out of court settlement for $300-400 million may be the best that the families can hope for at this point. That is about $1 for every barrel that Chevron/Texaco dumped. It might be something that the company would accept as the cost of doing business and the price for improving their image.

While I still believe that the amount [approx. $13,000 per person] would have been reasonable for both sides, CHEVRON has since badgered and paid so many people that they dont believe they need to settle with the indigenous victims at all. While this issue is likely to be bogged down in the courts for decades to come, it is unlikely that CHEVRON will ever be held accountable. At the very least, they should apologize to the people for attracting them out of the forest by the thousands to work for Texaco, then establishing towns and villages in an oil production zone. They should issue an advisory to all companies to discourage workers from living in the vicinity of oilfields in the rainforest because villages in these climate conditions are easily contaminated. Many of these victims have lived their entire lives on top of primitive oilfields and now they will spend the rest of their lives dealing with the consequences without any help or medical intervention.

BP/ARCO - HASTINGS ON HUDSON, NY 1998 Case Study 13 BP website http://oneriverstreet.com/site/history.php

On August 5, 1998, the New York Times reported "high levels" of PCBs had been discovered in Hastings-on-Hudson, NY. These were found at the former Anaconda Wire & Cable Company which ceased operations in 1974, a 26-acre toxic waste site owned by ARCO (now also BP). Wire manufacturing operations during a portion of the operating period caused the release of carcinogenic, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and metals to site soil, groundwater and sediments. The highest levels of PCBs in New York State would make this BP/ARCO site one of the hottest toxic dumpsites in America.

15 years ago, I wrote the following recommendation for the Earth Society and it was presented to the Hastings on Hudson community:

When ARCO took over Anaconda [in 1977], it didn't acquire just the land; it acquired the pollution legacy of Anaconda and the responsibility that this knowledge demands. Although by the late 1970's PCBs were no longer being manufactured, companies were still being sued for PCB cleanup. ARCO must surely have investigated its own [PCB] liabilities at the time of the takeover. The courts might find those reports and records very interesting reading. ARCO should be instructed to immediately turn over any files and records remaining from the Anaconda purchase which reference toxic materials utilized at this site. These would include, but not be limited to, photographs, materials transfers, purchase agreements, sales contracts, reports and legal briefs. Far from being an innocent inheritor of Anaconda's problem, ARCO has chosen to conceal and downplay the previous irresponsible behavior and flagrant pollution violations that occurred at the site. ARCO has elected to ignore the true causes of the contamination and to minimize their relevance. It deserves to pay for the consequences of those decisions.

At about the same time my recommendation was circulated, Arco repurchased the site. The Atlantic Richfield Website states that they purchased this site in order to gain control over environmental investigation and remediation efforts.

Once BP/ARCO regained control of the polluted site on the Hudson River, they delayed and resisted action in every way possible. They argued every insignificant detail and always claimed that the site was of no risk to the population since they did not obtain their drinking water from local wells. Somehow, they managed not to do a single long-term health study which might have revealed impacts from airborne PCBs. To this day, there has been no health follow-up for any of the employees who worked in this toxic environment and there has been zero compensation for any potential victims.

On April 18, 2000, ARCO was purchased by BP America and completely merged into BP operations in a $29 billion takeover. The merged firm had an estimated market capitalization of nearly $190 billion, making it the world's second largest oil company behind EXXON Mobil. At the time of the merger, Atlantic Richfield Co and its parent BP America settled a 700 persons lawsuit of the Anaconda mine in Nevada built in 1941 for up to $19.5 million. EPA tested wells in 2009 and found that 79% of the wells north of mine had dangerous levels of uranium and/or arsenic.[21]

The settlement in Nevada from the second largest oil company averaged $27,857 per person potentially poisoned by uranium and arsenic. There has apparently been no settlement offer for Hastings on Hudson victims.

In 2014, the cost of the on-site and off-site remedies at Hastings was estimated to be over $250 million. BP/ARCO will pay for the clean-up and the design and remediation will take approximately four to five years.

The final insult is that BP has given donations to the towns Fire Department and City Council while commandeering the villages website for BP Public Relations. http://oneriverstreet.com/site/history.php

PRESTIGE, SPAIN 2002

Case Study 14

Excerpted from Wiki Prestige

The Prestige oil spill was an oil spill off the coast of Galicia caused by the sinking of an oil tanker in 2002. The spill polluted thousands of kilometers of coastline and more than one thousand beaches on the Spanish, French and Portuguese coast, as well as causing great harm to the local fishing industry. The spill is the largest environmental disaster in the history of both Spain and Portugal.

According to Wiki, one of its twelve tanks burst during a storm off Galicia, in northwestern Spain. Fearing that the ship would sink, the captain called for help from Spanish rescue workers, with

the expectation that the vessel would be brought into harbor. However, pressure from local authorities forced the captain to steer the embattled ship away from the coast and head northwest. Reportedly after pressure from the French government, the vessel was once again forced to change its course and head south into Portuguese waters in order to avoid endangering France's southern coast. Fearing for its own shore, the Portuguese authorities promptly ordered its navy to intercept the ailing vessel and prevent it from approaching further.

With the French, Spanish and Portuguese governments refusing to allow the ship to dock in their ports, the integrity of the single-hulled oil tanker was quickly deteriorating and soon the storm took its toll when it was reported that a 40-foot (12 m) section of the starboard hull had broken off, releasing a substantial amount of oil.

On November 19, the ship split in half. It sank the same afternoon, releasing over 20 million US gallons of oil into the sea. The oil tanker was reported to be about 150 miles from the Spanish coast at that time. An earlier oil slick had already reached the coast. The Greek captain of the Prestige was taken into custody, accused of not cooperating with salvage crews and of harming the environment.

In the subsequent months, thousands of volunteers were organized. It estimated the cost of the clean-up to the Galician coast alone at more $3 billion about the same as the EXXON Valdez.

Spanish investigators have concluded that the failure in the hull of the "Prestige" was entirely predictable and indeed had been predicted already: her two sister ships, "Alexandros" and "Centaur", had been submitted to extensive inspections under the "Safe Hull" program in 1996. The organization in charge of the inspections, the American Bureau of Shipping, found that both "Alexandros" and "Centaur" were in terminal decline. Due to metal fatigue in their hulls, modeling predicted that both ships would fail between frames 61 and 71 within five years. "Alexandros", "Centaur" and a third sister-ship, "Apanemo", were all scrapped between 1999 and 2002. For some reason, however, "Prestige" was not scrapped, and, little more than five years after the inspection, as predicted, her hull failed between frames 61 and 71.[4]

This was one of the few tanker spills which investigated health problems among cleaning staff. Five years later after the cleaning activities, a study found that people participating in the cleaning activities, many of them volunteers, suffered several health problems, such as pulmonary, cardiovascular, and chromosomal diseases. This was found among a study of 800 involved Spanish Navy personnel.[5]

In November 2013, three judges of the high court concluded it was impossible to establish criminal responsibility. The Captain was found guilty of disobedience and given a nine month suspended sentence.

If countries spent a fraction of the energy they use to keep tankers out of their ports making sure that dilapidated tankers are not certified to sail the seas there would be far fewer tanker spills. Maybe now is the time to finally stop supertankers from sailing under flags of convenience with little regulation or oversight.

HURRICANE IVAN US GULF COAST 2004 Case Study 15

Excerpted from Wiki Hurricane Ivan

Along with the 14 deaths in Florida, Ivan is blamed for eight deaths in North Carolina, two in Georgia, and one in Mississippi. An additional 32 deaths were reported as indirectly caused by the storm.[1]

As it passed over the Gulf of Mexico off the coast of Louisiana, Ivan caused the destruction of Taylor Energy's Mississippi Canyon 20-A production platform, 550 feet above 28 producing oil and gas wells drilled in water 479 feet deep. Waves estimated to be 71 feet caused tremendous pressures below the surface, causing a landslide that obliterated the platform. Hundreds of gallons of oil per day were still leaking onto the surface of the Gulf ten years later in 2014, and continue to appear to the present date.

The well is about all that is left of the company, which at one time was the largest independent oil and gas production company operating in the Gulf of Mexico. Taylor died in November 2004, two months after Hurricane Ivan. Five years later, the company sold off the rest of its oil and gas production assets in the Gulf to Ankor Energy.

The companies should long ago have been forced to create an offshore contingency fund to jointly pay for any spills. In this way the companies and their insurers could police themselves and avoid equipment and practices which would cost them all money.

BP -Texas City Refinery Explosion 2005 Case Study 16

Excerpted from Wiki - BP

In March 2005, the Texas City Refinery, one of the largest refineries owned then by BP,

exploded causing 15 deaths, injuring 180 people and forcing thousands of nearby residents to

remain sheltered in their homes.[343] A 20-foot (6.1 m) column filled with hydrocarbon

overflowed to form a vapour cloud, which ignited. The explosion caused all the casualties and

substantial damage to the rest of the plant.[344] The incident came as the culmination of a series

of less serious accidents at the refinery, and the engineering problems were not addressed by the

management. Maintenance and safety at the plant had been cut as a cost-saving measure,

the responsibility ultimately resting with executives in London.[345]

The fallout from the accident clouded BP's corporate image because of the mismanagement at

the plant. There had been several investigations of the disaster, the most recent being that from

the US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board[346] which "offered a scathing

assessment of the company." OSHA found "organizational and safety deficiencies at all

levels of the BP Corporation" and said management failures could be traced from Texas to

London.[343] The company pleaded guilty to a felony violation of the Clean Air Act, was fined

$50 million, the largest ever assessed under the Clean Air Act, and sentenced to three years

probation.[347]

On 30 October 2009, the US Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) fined BP

an additional $87 million, the largest fine in OSHA history, for failing to correct safety hazards

documented in the 2005 explosion. Inspectors found 270 safety violations that had been

previously cited but not fixed and 439 new violations. BP appealed the fine.[343][348] In July

2012, the company agreed to pay $13 million to settle the new violations. At that time OSHA

found "no imminent dangers" at the Texas plant. Thirty violations remained under

discussion.[349] In March 2012, US Department of Justice officials said the company had met

all of its obligations and subsequently ended the probationary period.[350] In November 2011,

BP agreed to pay the state of Texas $50 million for violating state emissions standards at its

Texas City refinery during and after the 2005 explosion at the refinery. The state Attorney

General said BP was responsible for 72 separate pollutant emissions that have been

occurring every few months since March 2005. It was the largest fine ever imposed under the

Texas Clean Air Act.[351][352]

2010 Texas City Chemical leak BP has admitted that malfunctioning equipment lead to the release of over 530,000 pounds

(240,000 kg) of chemicals into the air of Texas City and surrounding areas from 6 April to 16

May 2010. The leak included 17,000 pounds (7,700 kg) of benzene, 37,000 pounds

(17,000 kg) of nitrogen oxides, and 186,000 pounds (84,000 kg) of carbon

monoxide.[379][380] In June 2012, over 50,000 Texas City residents joined a class-action suit

against BP, alleging they became sick in 2010 as a result of the 41-day emissions release from the refinery. Texas has also sued BP over the release of emissions. BP says the release

harmed no one.[381]

In October 2013, a jury found that BP was negligent in the case, but due to the lack of substantial

evidence linking illness to the emissions, decided the company would be absolved of any

wrongdoing.[382][383]

BP PRUDHOE BAY, ALASKA 2006 Case Study 17 BP-Alaska Pipeline Oil Spill

Excerpted from Wiki - Prudhoe Bay Oil Spill

The Prudhoe Bay oil spill was an oil spill that was discovered on March 2, 2006 at

a pipeline owned by BP Exploration, Alaska (BPXA) in western Prudhoe Bay, Alaska. Initial

estimates of the five-day leak said that up to 267,000 US gallons (6,400 bbl) were spilled over

1.9 acres (7,700 m2), making it the largest oil spill on Alaska's north slope to date.[1] The spill

originated from a 0.25-inch (0.64 cm) hole in a 34-inch (86 cm) diameter pipeline. In November

2007, BPXA pled guilty to negligent discharge of oil, which prosecutors said was the result of

BP's knowing neglect of corroding pipelines, a misdemeanor under the federal Clean Water Act,

and was fined US$20 million.[3] In July 2011, BPXA paid a $25 million civil penalty, the largest

per-barrel penalty at that time for an oil spill, and agreed to take measures to significantly

improve inspection and maintenance of its pipeline infrastructure on the North Slope to reduce

the threat of additional oil spills. In November 2012, it was announced that the U.S. state of

Alaska would collect $255 million related to BP Plc's pipeline leaks and a resulting shutdown in

2006. BP's share was $66 million since it would pay the award and then be reimbursed by

partners, including Exxon Mobil Corp and ConocoPhillips, based on their proportionate share of

ownership.

Red flags and warning signs had been raised about corrosion on several occasions both from

within and outside the organization but had been ignored.[3] The 1992 tests on the eastern line

had indicated the presence of calcium in the line, but nothing was done about it.[9] A company

report in year 2005 said BP based its corrosion-fighting on a limited budget instead of needs.[9]

Employees had raised their concerns before the actual incident, which were ignored by BP

management. In an e-mail to a company lawyer in June 2004, Marc Kovac, an official of the

United union representing workers at the BP facility, forwarded a collection of his earlier

complaints to management. One of these, dated February 28, 2003, concerned "corrosion

monitoring staffing levels". It began, "The corrosion monitoring crew will soon be reduced to six

staff down from eight."[10]

One of the reasons for the pipeline failure was an insufficient level of corrosion inhibitor, a

liquid which resists corrosion of pipeline by the corroding liquid, which is water.[12]John Dingell

read from an internal BP email that said budgetary constraints would force the end of a

programme to inject corrosion inhibitor directly into the pipeline system.[11] The process of

injecting corrosion inhibitor directly into a pipeline, though costly, is much more effective than

injecting in a process plant.

In the subsequent investigation, Carolyn Merritt, chief executive officer of the U.S. Chemical

Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, told the committee that "virtually all" of the root

causes of the problems at Prudhoe Bay had "strong echoes" of those that led to the 2005

explosion in Houston. These had included cost cutting and a failure to invest in the plant. The

committee was also told that the spillage happened at a time when BP was making huge

profits.[11]

The leak detection system measures the volumes of fluid entering each pipeline segment and the

volumes of fluid leaving each segment. The system triggers an alarm if the volume

measurements don't match up. The leak detection alarm sounded four times during the week

before the spill was discovered, but BP interpreted the leak detection alarms as false alarms.

The spill went undetected for as long as five days, according to a New York Times report of a

BP press conference on the spill in mid-March 2006.[14]

Subsequent investigation found a six inch layer of sediment in the bottom of the pipe section.

Investigators said that the sludge helped breed acidic bacteria and corrosion that ultimately ate

though the pipe. BP executives said they were surprised that corrosion developed in the large

trunk lines because they didn't carry much water mixed with the oil. But they were aware that

sediment was collecting and that leak technology wouldn't work if the lines were not periodically

cleaned. Federal and state authorities concluded that BP did not spend the money necessary to

maintain the Prudhoe pipes.

On March 15, the U.S. Transportation Department ordered BP to test its three low-pressure lines

in Prudhoe Bay for corrosion using a smart pig. The western line had not been smart-pigged

since 1998 and an eastern section of pipe had not been tested since 1992.[16]Instead, BP relied

on imprecise spot checks of the line using methods such as ultrasound testing. On August 7, BP

announced data from a smart pig run completed in late July revealed severe corrosion and 16

anomalies in 12 locations in an oil transit line on the eastern side of the oil field.

In October 2007, BP was fined US$20 million for the Prudhoe Bay oil spills. BP paid a

US$12 million federal criminal fine, US$4 million in criminal restitution to the state, and

US$4 million for Arctic research. BP's local subsidiary, BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., was

placed on probation for three years.[3]

In 2008 BP announced that it had completed replacing 16 miles/26 km of the Prudhoe Bay transit

lines and the other work as planned. [26]

Subsequent spill in 2009

On November 9, 2009, a spill occurred from an 18-inch three-phase common line carrying a

mixture of crude oil, produced water, and natural gas at BP's Lisburne field,[27][28] part of the

greater Prudhoe Bay area.[29] BP's preliminary estimate for the total volume of oily material

released was 45,828 gallons (1,091 barrels);[28] there were 13,500 gallons (321 barrels) of

crude.[30][31] The spill occurred because the pipe froze.[30] Although sensors provided alarms of

cold temperatures, BP employees testified that operators didn't use the cold alarms as a measure

of flow, but rather as a measurement of the mixture of oil, gas, and water.[30] In November 2010

BP's federal probation officer filed suit to revoke BP's probation stemming from the guilty plea

for the 2006 spill, which could have led to further penalties for the 2006 spill, on the grounds that

the 2009 Lisburne spill showed that BP was still negligent.[32] BP challenged the revocation and

the probation was lifted as planned in December 2011.[31]

2011 Civil suit

In the settlement of a civil suit, in July 2011 investigators from the U.S. Department of

Transportations Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) determined that the 2006 spills were a result of BPXAs failure to properly inspect and maintain the pipeline to prevent corrosion. PHMSA issued a Corrective Action Order (CAO) to BP XA that

addressed the pipelines risks and ordered pipeline repair or replacement. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency had investigated the extent of the oil spills and oversaw

BPXAs cleanup. When BP XA did not fully comply with the terms of the CAO, a complaint was filed in March 2009 alleging violations of the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act and the

Pipeline Safety Act. In July 2011, the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska entered a

consent decree between the United States and BPXA resolving the governments claims. Under the consent decree, BPXA paid a $25 million civil penalty, the largest per-barrel penalty at that

time for an oil spill, and agreed to take measures to significantly improve inspection and

maintenance of its pipeline infrastructure on the North Slope to reduce the threat of additional oil

spills.[33][34][35][36]

Alaskan lawsuit settlement

In November 2012, it was announced that the U.S. state of Alaska would collect $255 million

related to BP Plc's pipeline leaks and a resulting shutdown in 2006. BP's share was $66 million

since it would pay the award and then be reimbursed by partners, including Exxon Mobil Corp

and ConocoPhillips, based on their proportionate share of ownership. The payment, which was

final and not subject to appeal, included a $245 million award for lost state royalties and interest

and $10 million which included per-gallon environmental penalties for the spills, fines for

natural resource damages and other civil charges to settle civil assessments for the spills. BP

argued that no money was owed to the state for lost production, but the arbitration panel

concluded that the pipeline problems and associated reservoir complications resulted in lost or

deferred production of more than 30 million barrels of oil and natural-gas liquids until the end of

the oil field's life.[37][38]

BP is a British multinational company, headquartered in London, England, whose performance in 2012 made it the world's sixth-largest oil and gas company, the sixth-largest energy company

by market capitalization[8] and the company with the world's fifth-largest revenue

(turnover).[9][10] In 2013, the company's revenue was US$396.217 billion, operating income

was $31.769 billion and net income was $23.758 billion.[2] As of 2013, 83,900 people employed

by the company worldwide.[4] By 2013, BP had fallen from the second largest oil company to the fourth after selling off assets to cover Deepwater Horizon oil spill-related payouts.[133]

The US operations comprise nearly one-third of BP's worldwide business interests,[158] and the

US is the country with the greatest concentration of its employees and investments.[159][160] As of

April 2014, per the company website BP employs approximately 20,000 people in the

US.[161][162][163] BP is the second largest producer of oil and gas and the largest leaseholder in

the deepwater Gulf of Mexico.[162]

BP Health and Safety Violations

Excerpted from Wiki - BP

BP has been directly involved in several major environmental and safety incidents. Among them

were the 2005 Texas City Refinery explosion, which caused the death of 15 workers and

resulted in a record-setting OSHA fine; Britain's largest oil spill, the wreck of Torrey Canyon;

and the 2006 Prudhoe Bay oil spill, the largest oil spill on Alaska's North Slope, which resulted

in a US$25 million civil penalty, the largest per-barrel penalty at that time for an oil spill.[17]

The 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the largest accidental release of oil into marine waters in

history, resulted in severe environmental, health and economic consequences,[18] and serious

legal and public relations repercussions for BP. [19] In February 2012 BP North America

launched a $500 million branding campaign to rebuild its brand.[303] The company's advertising

budget was about $5 million per week during the four-month spill in the Gulf of Mexico, totaling

nearly $100 million.[304][305]

The company plead guilty to 11 counts of felony manslaughter, two misdemeanors, and one

felony count of lying to Congress, and agreed to pay more than $4.5 billion in fines and

penalties, the largest criminal resolution in US history.[20][21][22] Legal proceedings are

continuing, with proceedings set to commence in January 2015[23] to determine payouts and

fines under the Clean Water Act and the Natural Resources Damage Assessment.[24][25][26][27] In

September 2014, the judge ruled in the first phase of the case that BP was "reckless" and

committed "gross negligence," in a "worst case" ruling that could cost BP $18 billion in

additional penalties above the $28 billion already expended on the spill by that time. BP is

appealing the ruling, which raised concerns about BP's future.[28][29]

Hazardous substance dumping 19931995

In September 1999, one of BP's US subsidiaries, BP Exploration Alaska (BPXA), pleaded guilty

to criminal charges stemming from its illegally dumping of hazardous wastes on the Alaska

North Slope, paying fines and penalties totaling $22 million. BP paid the maximum $500,000 in

criminal fines, $6.5 million in civil penalties, and established a $15 million environmental

management system at all of BP facilities in the US and Gulf of Mexico that are engaged in oil

exploration, drilling or production. The charges stemmed from the 1993 to 1995 dumping of

hazardous wastes on Endicott Island, Alaska by BP's contractor Doyon Drilling. The firm

illegally discharged waste oil, paint thinner and other toxic and hazardous substances by

injecting them down the outer rim, or annuli, of the oil wells. BPXA failed to report the

illegal injections when it learned of the conduct, in violation of the Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act.[313] [CERCLA or the Superfund Act.]

Air pollution violations In 2000 BP Amoco acquired ARCO, a Los Angeles-based oil group.[85] In 2003

Californias South Coast Air Quality Management District (AQMD) filed a complaint against BP/ARCO, seeking $319 million in penalties for thousands of air pollution violations over an 8-

year period.[314] In January 2005, the agency filed a second suit against BP based on violations

between August 2002 and October 2004. The suit alleged that BP illegally released air

pollutants by failing to adequately inspect, maintain, repair and properly operate

thousands of pieces of equipment across the refinery as required by AQMD regulations. It

was alleged that in some cases the violations were due to negligence, while in others the

violations were knowingly and willfully committed by refinery officials.[315] In 2005 a

settlement was reached under which BP agreed to pay $25 million in cash penalties and $6

million in past emissions fees, while spending $20 million on environmental improvements at the

refinery and $30 million on community programs focused on asthma diagnosis and

treatment.[316]

In 2013, a total of 474 Galveston County residents living near the BP Texas City Refinery filed a

$1 billion lawsuit against BP, accusing the company of "intentionally misleading the public

about the seriousness" of a two-week release of toxic fumes which began on 10 November

2011. "BP reportedly released Sulfur Dioxide, Methyl Carpaptan, Dimethyl Disulfide and other

toxic chemicals into the atmosphere reads the report. The lawsuit further claims Galveston county has the worst air quality in the United States due to BP's violations of air pollution

laws. BP had no comment and said it would address the suit in the court

system.[317][318][319][320][321]

Health and safety violations

Citing conditions similar to those that resulted in the 2005 Texas City Refinery explosion, on 25

April 2006, the U.S. Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health

Administration (OSHA) fined BP more than $2.4 million for unsafe operations at the

company's Oregon, Ohio refinery. An OSHA inspection resulted in 32 per-instance willful

citations including locating people in vulnerable buildings among the processing units, failing to

correct de-pressurization deficiencies and deficiencies with gas monitors, and failing to prevent

the use of non-approved electrical equipment in locations in which hazardous concentrations of

flammable gases or vapors may exist. BP was further fined for neglecting to develop shutdown

procedures and designate responsibilities and to establish a system to promptly address and

resolve recommendations made after an incident when a large feed pump failed three years prior

to 2006. Penalties were also issued for five serious violations, including failure to develop

operating procedures for a unit that removes sulfur compound; failure to ensure that operating

procedures reflect current operating practice in the Isocracker Unit; failure to resolve process

hazard analysis recommendations; failure to resolve process safety management compliance

audit items in a timely manner; and failure to periodically inspect pressure piping

systems.[333][334]

In 2008 BP and several other major oil refiners agreed to pay $422 million to settle a class-action

lawsuit stemming from water contamination tied to the gasoline additive MTBE, a chemical that

was once a key gasoline ingredient. Leaked from storage tanks, MTBE has been found in several

water systems across the United States. The plaintiffs maintain that the industry knew about

the environmental dangers but that they used it instead of other possible alternatives

because it was less expensive. The companies will also be required to pay 70 percent of cleanup

costs for any wells newly affected at any time over the next 30 years.[335][336]

BP has one of the worst safety records of any major oil company that operates in the

United States. Between 2007 and 2010, BP refineries in Ohio and Texas accounted for 97

percent of "egregious, willful" violations handed out by the U.S. Occupational Safety and

Health Administration (OSHA). BP had 760 "egregious, willful" violations during that

period, while Sunoco and Conoco-Phillips each had eight, Citgo two and Exxon had

one.[337] The deputy assistant secretary of labour at OSHA, said "The only thing you can

conclude is that BP has a serious, systemic safety problem in their company."[338]

A report in ProPublica, published in the Washington Post in 2010, found that over a decade of

internal investigations of BP's Alaska operations during the 2000s warned senior BP managers

that the company repeatedly disregarded safety and environmental rules and risked a

serious accident if it did not change its ways. ProPublica found that "Taken together, these

documents portray a company that systemically ignored its own safety policies across its

North American operations -- from Alaska to the Gulf of Mexico to California and Texas.

Executives were not held accountable for the failures, and some were promoted despite

them."[339] The Project On Government Oversight, an independent non-profit organization in the United

States which investigates and seeks to expose corruption and other misconduct, lists BP as

number one on their listing of the 100 worst corporations based on instances of

misconduct.[340]

1965 Sea Gem offshore oil rig disaster In December 1965, Britain's first oil rig, Sea Gem, capsized when two of the legs collapsed

during an operation to move it to a new location. The oil rig had been hastily converted in an

effort to quickly start drilling operations after the North Sea was opened for exploration.

Thirteen crew members were killed. No hydrocarbons were released in the accident.[341][342]

Whatever happened to 3 strikes and youre out? BP is so obviously bad it doesnt belong in the American business picture. How many more innocent people are we going to let them kill in

order to improve their bottom line. They should be immediately disqualified from all government

leases and they should be forced to sell their American assets to companies with better safety

records. No one could do worse. The ubiquitous maximum civil penalty of $25 million represents

a paltry .0063 % of BPs $396 billion revenue in 2013. For perspective, this amounts to about $3 for an average person making an income of $50,000 per year.

BP is the second largest producer of oil and gas and the largest leaseholder in the deepwater Gulf

of Mexico.[162]Since the Macondo, Deepwater Horizon oil spill, BP acquired 75 leases in the

Gulf. Also, of the seven largest drilling platforms in the Gulf, four are operated by BP.[172At the

very least there should be a minimum of one OSHA regulator and one BP Vice President on

every platform at all times. Maybe if it is their lives on the line, they will find a way to shut these

dangerous operations down permanently. Regulating agencies have tremendous power to

change the actions and attitudes of companies. All it would require is for just one company to be

held fully accountable for its crimes and the industry would be a whole lot safer for everyone.

PART B

BP - DEEPWATER HORIZON, GULF COAST 2010 Case Study 18

Excerpted from Wiki Deepwater Horizon

The Deepwater Horizon oil spill began on 20 April 2010 in the Gulf of Mexico on the BP-operated Macondo Prospect. It claimed eleven lives[6][7][8][9] and is considered the largest accidental marine oil spill in the history of the petroleum industry, an estimated 8% to 31% larger in volume than the previously largest, the Ixtoc I oil spill. Following the explosion and sinking of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig, a sea-floor oil gusher flowed for 87 days, until it was capped on 15 July 2010.[8][10] The US Government estimated the total discharge at 4.9 million barrels (210 million US gal).[3] After several failed efforts to contain the flow, the well was declared sealed on 19 September 2010.[11] Some reports indicate the well site continues to leak.[12][13]

A massive response ensued to protect beaches, wetlands and estuaries from the spreading oil utilizing skimmer ships, floating booms, controlled burns and 1.84 million US gallons of Corexit oil dispersant.[14]

in 2011, a White House commission likewise blamed BP and its partners for a series of cost-cutting

decisions and an insufficient safety system, but also concluded that the spill resulted from "systemic"

root causes and "absent significant reform in both industry practices and government policies, might

well recur".[24]

In November 2012, BP and the United States Department of Justice settled federal criminal charges

with BP pleading guilty to 11 counts of manslaughter, two misdemeanors, and a felony count of lying

to Congress. BP also agreed to four years of government monitoring of its safety practices and

ethics, and the Environmental Protection Agency announced that BP would be temporarily banned

from new contracts with the US government. BP and the Department of Justice agreed to a

record-setting $4.525 billion in fines and other payments[25][26][27] but further legal proceedings

not expected to conclude until 2014 are ongoing to determine payouts and fines under

the Clean Water Act and the Natural Resources Damage Assessment.[28][29] As of February

2013, criminal and civil settlements and payments to a trust fund had cost the company $42.2

billion.[30]In September 2014, a U.S. District Court judge ruled that BP was primarily responsible

for the oil spill because of its gross negligence and reckless conduct. The ruling could result in

additional penalties as high as $18 billion, with grave implications for BP's future.[31]

As of July 2011, about 491 miles (790 km) of coastline in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida were contaminated by oil and a total of 1,074 miles (1,728 km) had been oiled since the spill began.[60] As of December 2012, 339 miles (546 km) of coastline remained subject to evaluation and/or cleanup operations.[61]

The fundamental strategies for addressing the spill were containment, dispersal and removal. In summer 2010, approximately 47,000 people and 7,000 vessels were involved in the project. By 3 October 2012, federal response costs amounted to $850 million, mostly reimbursed by BP. As of January 2013, 935 personnel were still involved. By that time cleanup had cost BP over $14 billion.[61]

According to a NALCO manual obtained by GAP, Corexit 9527 is an eye and skin irritant. Repeated or excessive exposure ... may cause injury to red blood cells (hemolysis), kidney or the liver. The manual adds: Excessive exposure may cause central nervous system effects, nausea, vomiting, anesthetic or narcotic effects. It advises, Do not get in eyes, on skin, on clothing, and Wear suitable protective clothing. For Corexit 9500 the manual advised, Do not get in eyes, on skin, on clothing, Avoid breathing vapor, and Wear suitable protective clothing. Neither the protective gear, nor the manual were distributed to Gulf oil spill cleanup workers, according to FOIA requests obtained by GAP.[136]

Underwater injection of Corexit into the leak may have created the oil plumes which were discovered below the surface.[139] Because the dispersants were applied at depth, much of the oil never rose to the surface.[148] One plume was 22 miles (35 km) long, more than a mile wide and 650 feet (200 m) deep.[149] In a major study on the plume, experts were most concerned about the slow pace at which the oil was breaking down in the cold, 40 F (4 C) water at depths of 3,000 feet (910 m).[150]

In late 2012, a study from Georgia Tech and Universidad Autonoma de Aguascalientes in Environmental Pollution journal reported that Corexit used during the BP oil spill had increased the toxicity of the oil by 52 times.[151] The scientists concluded that "Mixing oil with dispersant increased toxicity to ecosystems" and made the gulf oil spill worse."[152][153]

Health consequences Main article: Health consequences of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill

By June 2010, 143 spill-exposure cases had been reported to the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals; 108 of those involved workers in the clean-up efforts, while 35 were reported by residents.[224] Chemicals from the oil and dispersant are believed to be the cause; it is believed that the addition of dispersants made the oil more toxic.[225]

The United States Department of Health and Human Services set up the GuLF Study in June 2010 in response to these reports. The study is run by the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, and will last at least five years.[226][227]

Mike Robicheux, a Louisiana physician, described the situation as "the biggest public health crisis from a chemical poisoning in the history of this country."[228] In July, after testing the blood of BP cleanup workers and residents in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida for volatile organic compounds, environmental scientist Wilma Subra said she was "finding amounts 5 to 10 times in excess of the 95th percentile"; she said that "the presence of these chemicals in the blood indicates exposure."[227][229][230] Riki Ott, a marine toxicologist with experience of the EXXON Valdez oil spill, advised families to evacuate the Gulf.[231] She said that workers from the Valdez spill had suffered long-term health consequences.[232]

A 2012 survey of the health effects of the spill on cleanup workers reported "eye, nose and throat irritation; respiratory problems; blood in urine, vomit and rectal bleeding; seizures; nausea and violent vomiting episodes that last for hours; skin irritation, burning and lesions; short-term memory loss and confusion; liver and kidney damage; central nervous system effects and nervous system damage; hypertension; and miscarriages". Dr. James Diaz, writing for the American Journal of Disaster Medicine, said these ailments appearing in the Gulf reflected those reported after previous oil spills, like the EXXON Valdez. Diaz warned that "chronic adverse health effects, including cancers, liver and kidney disease, mental health disorders, birth defects and developmental disorders should be anticipated among sensitive populations and those most heavily exposed". Diaz also believes neurological disorders should be expected.[240]

Two years after the spill, a study initiated by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health found biomarkers matching the oil from the spill in the bodies of cleanup workers.[citation needed] Other studies have reported a variety of mental health issues, skin problems, breathing issues, coughing, and headaches.[241] In 2013, during the three-day "Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill & Ecosystem Science Conference",[242] findings discussed included a '"significant percentage" of Gulf residents reporting mental health problems like anxiety, depression and PTSD. These studies also showed that the bodies of former spill cleanup workers carry biomarkers of "many chemicals contained in the oil".[243]

A study that investigated the health effects among children in Louisiana and Florida living less than 10 miles from the coast found that more than a third of the parents reported physical or mental health symptoms among their children. The parents reported "unexplained symptoms among their children, including bleeding ears, nose bleeds, and the early start of menstruation among girls," according to David Abramson, director of Columbia University's National Center for Disaster Preparedness.[243]

Legal aspects and settlement

Investigations

The National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling released a final report on 5 January 2011.[298][299] The panel found that BP, Halliburton, and Transocean had attempted to work more cheaply and thus helped to trigger the explosion and ensuing leakage.[300]

It concluded that "notwithstanding these inherent risks, the accident of April 20 was avoidable" and that "it resulted from clear mistakes made in the first instance by BP, Halliburton and Transocean, and by government officials who, relying too much on industry's assertions of the safety of their operations, failed to create and apply a program of regulatory oversight that would have properly minimized the risk of deepwater drilling."[301][303] The panel also noted that the government regulators did not have sufficient knowledge or authority to notice these cost-cutting decisions.[300]

The loss of life and the subsequent pollution of the Gulf of Mexico were the result of poor risk management, lastminute changes to plans, failure to observe and respond to critical indicators, inadequate well control response, and insufficient emergency bridge response training by companies and individuals responsible for drilling at the Macondo well and for the operation of the drilling platform.[22]

In a New York Times opinion piece, Stephen Teague, staff attorney at the Mississippi Center for Justice, argued that BP had become "increasingly brazen" in "stonewalling payments." "But tens of thousands of gulf residents still haven't been fully compensated for their losses, and many are struggling to make ends meet. Many low-wage workers in the fishing and service industries, for example, have been seeking compensation for lost wages and jobs for three years."[313]

In January 2015, court documents revealed a court-appointed administrator has paid out just $331,589 in medical claims in his first 11 months processing requests under BP's settlement, resolving less than 6 percent of the more than 12,000 health-related damage claims submitted so far.

By comparison, a separate settlement fund to pay for economic damages from the disastrous 2010 oil spill has doled out $4.3 billion to more than 53,000 claimants.

Meanwhile, BP paid the medical claims administrator, Matt Garretson of Cincinnati, $2.2 million in November 2014 alone.13 health claims

Litigation and settlements

In July 2013 BP made a motion in court to freeze payments on tens of thousands of claims, arguing inter alia that a staff attorney from the Deepwater Horizon Court-Supervised Settlement Program, the program responsible for evaluating compensation claims, had improperly profited from claims filed by a New Orleans law firm. The attorney is said to have received portions of settlement claims for clients he referred to In a New York Times opinion piece, Stephen Teague, staff attorney at the Mississippi Center for Justice, argued that BP had become "increasingly brazen" in "stonewalling payments." "But tens of thousands of gulf residents still haven't been fully compensated for their losses, and many are struggling to make ends meet. Many low-wage workers in the fishing and service industries, for example, have been the firm.[313] The federal judge assigned to the Case Study, Judge Barbier, refused to halt the settlement program, saying he had not seen evidence of widespread fraud, adding that he was "offended by what he saw as attempts to smear the lawyer administering the claims."[314]

On 13 January 2013, Judge Barbier approved a medical-benefits portion of BP's proposed $7.8 billion partial settlement. People living for at least 60 days along oil-impacted shores or involved in the clean-up who can document one or more specific health conditions caused by the oil or dispersants are eligible for benefits, as are those injured during clean-up.[320] BP also agreed to spend $105 million over five years to set up a Gulf Coast health outreach program and pay for medical examinations.[47]

On 25 July 2013 Halliburton plead guilty to destruction of critical evidence after the oil spill and said it would pay the maximum allowable fine of $200,000 and will be subject to three years of probation