Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 1 point presentatio… · Dr Ted Labuza...

Dr Ted Labuza Bioterrorism and Food Distribution page # 1

Topic 8- xFood safety and Food Bio-Security.Evaluation of the Distribution Chaim

Dr Ted Labuza

Dept Food Science and Nutrition

[email protected]

612-624-9701

US News and World Report 12/24/01

What is bioterrorism?

Bioterrorism is an event resulting from anintentionally introduced biological, chemical, ornuclear agent that would be devastating to people,animals, or crops . . .

What is food safety ?

Unintentional or accidental introductionof food pathogens

Causes illness in local or regional area

Due to under-processing, improperholding, cross contamination

If intentional = bioterrorism ?


Bioterrorism opportunity Bush missedFood safety = terrorism

Precepts of terrorism

Scare people (killing is secondary)

Affect most vulnerable (children)

Create chaos (scared to eat foods)

Create economic disaster (won’t buy foods)

Create farm crisis (no market for commoditiesor death to animals)

Joe Levitt CFSAN Director onbioterrorism

April 22,2002 Consumer Federation of America Meeting

“There is no evidence to suggest food will be a target”


According to Mike Osterholm,author of “Living Terrors”. . . .

9/11 should not have been a surprise

More terrorist attacks “will come”…not “ if”

Our domestic food supply is very vulnerable

The foods we import are at risk

. . . and we are not readyMinneapolis Star- Tribune

July 2002 NEHA

Obviously the Iraq War raises that threat

Challenges presented byfood bio-terrorism

Large number of available agents

Easily accessible targets

Delivery not all that difficult

Many agents are stable to process technology

Perpetrators could be organized terrorist groups,activists groups or a single individual makingprevention extremely difficult

Lack of public sector awareness to potential threats


The government and the food industrylikely couldn’t thwart agro-terroristsSept 20, 2002

Scenario planningWhich biological agents

ToxinsRicin

bot toxin

Staph toxin

alflatoxin

Living pathogensE coli O157:H7

Salmonellae

Listeria

spores,anthrax,

C. botulinum

RicinHeat stable plant lectin found in castor beans

(1–5% of total protein)

Easy to purify(over 100 websites describe ricin production processes)

only need blender, acetone and lye

Ingestion of 1µg/kg can kill an adult by blocking protein synthesis

Rapid onset of symptoms (18-24 hrs) and high mortality rates

What is the threat ?

http://www.ansci.cornell.edu/plants/toxicagents/ricin/ricin.html


Ricin Incidents

US 1993-97 Terrorist History

2001 Thomas Leahy

May 2001 Nevada plot

January 8 2003 UK 7 North Africans

3/4/03 Arkansas man makes ricin threat

3/19/03 3 arrested at Gatwick

3/21/03 France train station locker Gare deLyon Chechan rebels

Bot toxin

Protein from Clostridium botulinum

Lethal dose 1 µg - neuro-toxin

Moderately heat stable

Symptoms - ~ 2-3 days

Double vision

Loss of muscle control

Need respirator

Anti-toxin available (~ 1000 doses)

~ 120 cases / year

Was tested by Japanese Shinryko cult

60,000 fox on ~ 100 farms in Finland

Why anthrax spores ?NFPA recommendations for inactivation

∑∑∑∑ Expose to dry heat at 140∞∞∞∞ C (284∞∞∞∞ F) for 3 hours.

∑∑∑∑ Immerse in water and maintain at 95∞∞∞∞ C (203∞∞∞∞ F) for

25 minutes or at 100∞∞∞∞ C (212∞∞∞∞ F) for 15 minutes.

∑∑∑∑ Autoclave at 120∞∞∞∞ C (248∞∞∞∞ F) for 10 minutes.

∑∑∑∑ Expose to 10% bleach for two hours.

Irradiate > 10 Kg using 40 for letters


Scenario planning

Which agents ?

Which foods?

Pathogens (any food system)

Bioterror - selected systems

Food vulnerability - highWater - Milwaukee incident

Fresh produce - no kill step (wash step ensures spread)especially imported produce

Pasteurized milk and milk products

(NY incident May 2002)

Dairy Attack ??


Food vulnerability - very highWater - Milwaukee incident

Fresh produce - no kill step (wash step ensures spread)especially imported produce

Pasteurized milk and milk products (NY incident May2002)

Animal feed ( 2003 60,000 foxes in Finland)

Food vulnerability - low

Minimally processed foods – deli (Listeria)

Any food where post process tampering is possible e.g.finished dry foods (cereals eg Malt O’Meal)

Grain and flour trains

Canned foods- minimal

Scenario planning

Which agents – biological or chemical?

Which foods?

Potential methods for intentional or accidentalintroduction

on farm eg cows shed e. coli)

in plant (lack of kill step or HACCP plans)

en-route in distribution (Schwans)

at retail (poor handling)


Food Process Chain

Rail ortruck

Distribution

Center Process

Distribution

Center

FARM or

Ingredient

supplier

supermarket

Food Process Distribution Chain

FARM or

Ingredient

supplier

Potential bioterrorism orfood safety vectors

FARM

pesticide applicators

Workers in field (sanitary habits)

Irrigation water

Hydrocooling water

Bulk milk tanks

Fertilizer tanks

silos


Minnesota Vulnerability to threats

Agriculture industries 18.5% of economy

Dairy $2.7 billion 54,000 jobs

2/01 Foot & Mouth in UK -> slaughter of 6thousand head of sheep and cattle on 10,000farms

Hong Kong - poultry virus (similar in LA area)

Farmer solutionsLock tanks

Add alarms - dogs

Know your visitors (Star Trib article 3/20/03)

Know your suppliers

Use sanitary procedures to minimize

Ron Durst farm Dodge County

According to some . . . .

Imported foods are the biggest threat – only 1%of imported food is inspected (produce isgreatest threat)

40 of 300 entry points into the U.S. of foreignproducts has an FDA inspector today

Current plans will increase this number to 93


Country of Origin Concern -consumer concern

Imported Food Poisoning

E coli O157:H7 Parsley from Mexico

Cryptosporodium: Raspberries fromCosta Rica - school lunch program

Unknown: Pineapple from Costa Rica -MN. Govenor’s mansion

Cyanide : grapes from Chile

S. aureus toxin: canned mushrooms fromChina

Country of Origin

Federal Security and Rural Investment Actof 2002 HR 2646

Sec 10816 Country of Origin Labeling

Applies to some foods, mostly perishables


Foods covered by law

Sec 281(2)(A) IN GENERAL- The term `coveredcommodity' means-- (i) muscle cuts of beef, lamb, and pork; (ii) ground beef, ground lamb, and ground pork; (iii) farm-raised fish; (iv) wild fish; (v) a perishable agricultural commodity; and (vi) peanuts.

Labeling requirement

Sec 282(c) METHOD OF NOTIFICATION-

(1) IN GENERAL- The information required by subsection(a) may be provided to consumers by means of a label,stamp, mark, placard, or other clear and visible sign on thecovered commodity or on the package, display, holdingunit, or bin containing the commodity at the final point ofsale to consumers.

Fines

Sec 283(c) FINES- If, on completion of the 30-dayperiod described in subsection (b)(2), theSecretary determines that the retailer has willfullyviolated section 282, after providing notice and anopportunity for a hearing before the Secretary withrespect to the violation, the Secretary may fine theretailer in an amount of not more than $10,000 foreach violation.

Sec 284(b) Regulations by Sept 30, 2004

Sec 285 Action begins Sept. 30, 2002


FARM or

Ingredient

supplier

Rail ortruck


Potential food safety andbio-terrorism vectors

Truckers identity and history (Belzer)

Verify trucks (Koehler-Schwans)

Truck stops

Loading docks management

Time-temperature management

Vermin management

Note

Logistics Management 3/1/03

Robert Spiegel

Carriers are hesitant to spend heavily onnew security technology unless itimproves safety and efficiency



Rail ortruck

FARM or

Ingredient

supplier

Distribution

Center

Potential food safety and bio-terrorism vectors

At cross dock

Intrusion

vermin

Distribution

Center

A&P Distribution System



Rail ortruck

Distribution

Center Process

FARM or

Ingredient

supplier

Potential bio-terrorism vectors

Adulterated ingredients (incoming)

Errors in process (poor GMP and HACCP)vs true bio-terrorism

Process

Potential perpetrators

Employees (Hill Farm ??)

visitors

Competitors

Terrorists ?

In the

plant


Hill Farm Dairy

Several outbreaks of salmonellae overthree months

Company in major dispute with union

Blame on connectors made no sense

Over 200,000 ill in 3 states

Need was only 10 mL of 10+9 CFU/mL

0.001

0.01

0.1

1

10

100

Tim

e m

inu

tes

to in

acti

vati

on

of

105

LD

50

60

70

80

90

10

0

11

0

12

0

13

0

14

0

temperature °C

y = 1758047922066.436 * 10 -0.145x r2 = 0.984canned corn pH 6.2 Q10 = 28.1

y = 34614163.666 * 10 -0.090x r2 = 0.925phosphate buffer pH 6.8 Q10 = 8

C. bot Type A toxin

milk time

time 2

time

5 sec

23 sec

Relative resistance to processing

Spores - generally heat stable unlesssterilized

Bot toxin - somewhat liable to heat

Ricin - extremely resistant to heat

Bacterial pathogens - easily killed by heat


FDA Original Approaches

TACCP Report

FDA Security presentation

September 2002

USDA Guidance for Food-Bio-securityGeneral

Create a food security management team andcoordinator for each plant or company.

Conduct food security drills periodically


USDA Guidance for Food-Bio-securityLogistics

Adopt procedures to trace the source of all rawmaterials

Seal all outgoing food shipments with tamper-proof,numbered seals that are included on the shippingdocuments.

trace the delivery points of all finished products.

Use guards, alarms, cameras or other securityhardware on doors, windows, roof openings,railcars, bulk storage tanks and trailers.

All tanks are sealed

Prepare a daily inventory of hazardouschemicals at the plant and investigate anymissing items immediately.

USDA Guidance for Food-Bio-securityIn plant

Employees and Vendors

Require security background checks on allworkers

Everyone wears identity badges with pictures

Maintain a current list of plant workers with access tothe building.

Control entry to a plant by requiring photo IDs andsign-in procedures.

Illness reporting methods and requirements


FDA ProcessorBiosecurity Guidance Document

FDA Biosecurity GuidanceDocument 3/21/03

Management

assign person as responsible

prepare strategy

plan emergency operations

have contact list 24/7

Promote awareness

Recall strategy

Evaluate process


Staff

Screen all hires

Have daily work assignments

Identity badges

Restricted access

Train in security procedures

Alertness for staff health



Visitors

Limit access

Inspect all belongings, vehicles

Have permission for visit

Keep off floor if possible


Facility security

Perimeter

Doors and openings

Bulk unloading area

Tanks and water supply

Monitoring systems

Adequate lighting

Control of parked vehicles


Storage of poisonous/toxic materials

Limit access

Separate out

inventory

Laboratory

Limit access

Inventory of all chemicals

disposal



Operations - incoming

Know suppliers (check their process)

Check all incoming materials (testing orcontract)

Verify trucker and bills of lading

Supervise off loading


Computer information access

Control systems

Stock

traceability

Storage

Have separate locked area for distressed goods

Track all materials

Label everything

Minimize container reuse


Finished goods

Secure warehousing/DC storage

Do random inspections (HACCP)

Use only locked sealed transport vehicles

Use only scheduled delivery/pickup

Investigate missing/extra stock


GAO Food Processing SecurityReport 3/18/03

Farmers & industry needs to increasesecurity

Should share details with FDA and USDA

FDAFood Producers Guidance Document

Importers Guidance Document

FSIS Biosecurity web page

Security Guide for Processors

NY Times review of USDA rules 5/30/02

WHO document

FSIS


Rapid methods to detect biologic agents (pathogensor agents) on incoming ingredients and outgoingproduct

Survival characteristics of biologic agents consideredthreats to food supply

Effectiveness of food processing CCPs to inactivatebiological agents and pathogens in foods

e.g. will normal pasteurization inactivate XXXXXX

Unknown technology-processing factors

Finished Product questions …

How broadly will the product be distributed?

How fast will the product reach consumers?

Will the agent/pathoogen survive x-plant distribution,and in-home prep?

How soon can/will the government react?

How would the public be notified?

What about a recall?


Rail ortruck

Distribution

Center Process

Distribution

Center

FARM or

Ingredient

supplier

supermarket


Potential bio-terrorism vectors

Docking station

Fresh produce area

Cross contamination in deli

Open barrel dispensers

Disgruntled employee

Terrorist

Tampering

Supermarketor foodservice

Oregon Town Attack 9/9/84Religious sect - Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh

Intent to gain control of town council at Nov. election in The Dalles(pop 10500) because of potential voter threat to their land use

Test for dispersion on salad bars in September using 10 restaurantsbefore election to see impact

751 cases of illness

Informant confessed they did it

They lost vote

Univ Texas Hospital 1994

Disgruntled employee

Injects donuts with shigellae

Sends email to employees that freedonuts in break room

12 made ill


Disgruntled employee or terrorist

COOK ACCUSED OF TRYING TO POISON DINERSSeptember 16, 2002Standard-Freeholder (Cornwall) 8 NewsJERUSALEM (AP) -- A Justice Ministry spokesman was citedas saying that an east Jerusalem Arab and former cook wasindicted Sunday on suspicion of plotting to poison diners at apopular Jerusalem restaurant.

The story says that Othman Kianiya, 22, a cook at popular CafeRimon, was the third man indicted as part of an alleged plot topoison drinks with a substance that slows the heart rate. Incourt, Kianiya told reporters: "I didn't do anything ... Theydidn't find any substance." Kianiya was to dissolve Digoxintablets -- used to regulate the heartbeat but fatal in largeamounts -- in the drinks of diners, according to an indictmentof the two other men last week.

Business competition (envy)

Chinese incident

Cousin of restaurant owner Chen Zhenping

Wanted to improve own business

Used a rat poison - tetramine (rapid onset) in morningrush hour

49 dead (mostly school children)

300 ill in hospital

Hospitals ran out of space

Similar to Guangxi noodle shop incident in July - ratpoison in soup 57 hospitalized

Competition in food service is fierce - lack of moralityand cut-throat business


Out-come

China Cooks Assoc.

Each shop must form food safety team

Boss leads the team

Self audit of safety of environment

Ensure food safety management

Must cooperate with local governmentto enforce

Note: Star Tribune 2/14/03

Grand Rapids Michigan man indicted

Put insecticide in 200 lb ground beef atByron Country Fare Supermarket

Sickened 40 people

Trying to get back at them???

Note: Des Moines Register 3/11/03

60 wedding guest went to hospital in Ankeny

Methemoglobinemia - Nitrite poisoning

Found in high concentration in punch

Punch was brought by guest - not caterer



Rail ortruck

Distribution

Center Process

Distribution

Centersupermarket

FARM or

Ingredient

supplier

home

Scenario planning

Identification of incident as attack orloss of process/distribution controls

or announcement by terrorist

Action at plant, DC or retail

How does consumer respond ?

FDA Retail Guidance Document

Note nothing in document discussesrecalls, containment or remediation

FMI -ISAC


Recalls vs other means

Current policy - voluntary

Low trace-back or forward

Eg ConAgra

Recall manual FMI

FDA current recalls

Fresh Produce Scenario

E. coli contamination of fresh lettuce

Fresh Produce Industry


Fresh Fruit & VegetableConsumptionLate 70’s to Late 90’s

Fresh cutproduce . . .has grown froma “zero base in1990 to accountfor almost 20%of selectretailer’sproduce sales in2001”

Source: Major Retailer

Trend in Retail Produce Sales

25

30

35

40

45

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Sources: Food Industry Management Program, Cornell University; United States Dept. of Commerce

$40.9 billion


Retail Grocery Vegetable/Fruit Sales

Canned 7.8%

Frozen 4.7%

Fresh 87.5%

2001 Sales (in billions of dollars)

*Canned: $3.2 (includes $.9 billion in canned

tomatoes)

*Frozen: $1.9 (excludes frozen french fries)

**Fresh: $40.9*A.C. Nielsen 2001** Food Industry Management Program, Cornell University; United States Department ofCommerce

Lettuce Processing

Harvested and packagedas individual heads oflettuce or sent off toprocessing for baggedsalads

Lettuce Processing

Packed product is movedfrom field to acooling/shipping facility


Distribution model – highly perishable

E coli could be spread by bad water, poor fieldworker sanitation or applied by a terrorist

Product shipped and distributed based on collecteddata

At retail and in-home based on shared retailer data

Illness occurs, medical treatment, and healthdepartment notification based on conservativeestimates

Lettuce Orders 1/7-11/02

Goes to > 5000stores

Lettuce Distribution example


Scenario planning

Identification of incident

Announcement by terrorist

Questions

When will field workers who handle lettucebecome ill ?

When will packaging employees show illness ?

Will retail workers become contaminated as loadproduce on shelves ?

Time to Event

# orsymptoms

To DC To Home

To Supermarketor broker

0 2 3 5 10 12 15 2 0

Days

1st symptoms

CDC-FDA Acts

Visit doctor

Hospitalization

99% stopped


Findings

Good data for distribution to chain DC and/orbroker

Lack of broker data

Need more info on supermarket distribution(mixing)

Lack of data on min-avg-max of onset ofsymptoms

Lack off data on time to hospitalization

When will be time to address crisis

What does a recall do?

What about canned chili ?

Process is high temperature sterilization

Limits agents

But which ones (heat stable)

Final product is secure in can

Canned chili vectors

On the farm - meat and beans

In storage silos - beans like potatoes

Truckers - limits volume contaminated

In the plant - follow FDA/USDA guidance

In transit - not high concern


Potential logistics solutions

Home Security Adm. policy for healthintervention for farm workers as earlywarning system and health care

ie the CANARY

Potential CANARY solutions

Home Security Adm. policy for healthintervention for farm workers as early warningsystem using mandatory health care

Test kits for agents

Development of rapid tests (eg Charm test forbbbb-lactams in milk ~12 min)


Potential CANARY solutions

Home Security Adm. policy for healthintervention for farm workers as earlywarning system using mandatory health care

Test kits for agents

100% non-destructive testing

What rapid, real-time methods are available for detectionand monitoring of pathogens and agents ?


Potential logistics solutions

RFID tags to follow distribution includinginto homes

Tracer Tags


Traceability andEnvironmental Abuse

RFID for identity

T vs t logging for abuseintegration

Infratab Smart Labels For Perishable Products

Fish, Deli, Coffee, Wine, Dairy, Cut Salad,Organics

Blood, Vaccine,Pharma, DoD MealsReady to Eat, Film

Industrials PaintAdhesives SolderPaste

Smart Labels USA MIT 3/25-27

Marks & Spencer

3.5 million tags

PENI Tag - U Pittsburg

Bioett - TTI tags

Benneton

- 15 MM tags in 5000 stores

Scottish Courage Brewing

- used past 4 years on kegs for quality control

A major retail need:How do you handle contaminated facilities e.g.,distribution centers, trucks, retail outlets ?

Who do you call?

Who is responsible (local or main office,processor)?

Who has the equipment ?


Questions

What is government policy on recalls orannounce of threats ?

Public Health Security andBioterrorism Preparedness andResponse Act of 2002

Otherwise known as Bioterrorism Bill:Overwhelmingly passed by the House(425-1) and the Senate (98-0) and signedby the President in to law on June 12,2002.

Title III: Protecting Safety and Security ofFood and Drug Supply

FDA New Powers

30 day temporary detention of food if presumedadulterated and threat of serious healthconsequences to humans or animals

Power to inspect and copy all records at plant(need regs in 18 months)

Registration of every manufacturer (US andforeign)


FDA New Powers

Can debar food importers if repeated violations

Importers must give prior notice of imports

FDA can deputize states or other governmententities

Importers of DS or additives must have completechain of traceability

USA Today 9/20/02

Threat Communications

Sandman web site

Schaefer ppt


Findings

Osterholm - “NOT IF BUT WHEN”

In-plant Bio-security is not HACCP- it is securityissues

Significant work needs to be done

It is more than planning

Biggest threat is the least controlled

Basic research needs:

How long do select toxins, spores, vegetative cells orviruses remain pathogenic on foods?

What dose is required for desired effect?

Sensing evil

Other Challenges presented bybioterrorism

How would we react . . .

Early identification a significant problem largespread if long incubation time

Limited government resources and lack oflaboratory and hospital infrastructure

Lack of awareness/training of physicians todisease symptoms - need for expert system


If these scenarios occurred,what would be the impact on:The public - their reaction to a widespreaddisease outbreak?

The fresh produce industry - are they preparedto respond?

The entire food industry - what would be thefallout?

The retail industry - how do you deal with in-store contamination?

Affected consumers - how do you deal with in-home contamination?

ContactDr. Theodore LabuzaDepartment of Food Science and NutritionUniversity of [email protected] fax 651-483-3302 cell 651-307-2985http://fscn.che.umn.edu/Ted_Labuza/tpl.html

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