Dr. Aman ullah + Samee

Al-Qalam June 2011 Impact of the Objectives Resolution on Legal System (56)

Impact of the Objectives Resolution on Legal

System Dr. Aman Ullah

Samee Uzair

Although application of Islamic law was part of the British legal system,

however, it was confined to personal laws of the Muslims. After

Independence, there was a surge in the demand to Islamize the laws in

accordance with Islamic injunctions, to enable the Muslims to fashion

their lives in an environment of Islamic culture. Responding to the political

will of the Muslims that its future constitution would base on the

principles of Islam, the Objectives Resolution was passed by the

Constituent Assembly, to insure its Islamic structure. It became preamble

of all future constitution of Pakistan, whether presidential or

parliamentary, permanent or interim, abrogated or suspended. As a

preamble it has been recognized as grund norm, spirit of the constitution

or blue print of the State of Pakistan. Then it was incorporated as a

substantive part of the Constitution. Change of its legal status triggered

controversy, uncertainty and confusion. Finally, its paramount position,

over the Constitution and law was compromised; however, it has been

recognized as a part of basic structure of the Constitution. Devoid of its

overriding effect, its principles have been widely applied; interpreting

human rights, rule of law and independence of judiciary.

Key words: Objectives Resolution, Islam, basic structure, judicial

interpretation, constitutional rights.

1. Introduction At the outset, the article introduces historical background of the

Objectives Resolution. The way it was framed and how it was

recognized as a preamble of all the Constitutions of Pakistan from

1956 to 1973, the last one. Then it explains, in the light of case

law, the impact of the Federal Shariat Court to Islamize the laws. It

deeply digs out the changes brought under Article 2-A in 1985,

incorporating it as an operative part of the Constitution. Then, in

detail, its impact on the Constitution and law is analyzed. The

substantive part of the research also focuses on recognition of the

Objectives Resolution as an integral part of the basic structure of

the Constitutional doctrine. Finally, the work concentrates on its

role in the expansion of various laws, creation of legal theories and

extension of rights, concluding that, as a grund norm and as an

operative part of the Constitution, how it has been welcomed as a

spirit of the Constitution and blue print of the State of Pakistan.

Assistant Professor, Punjab University Law College, Punjab University, Lahore. Assistant Professor, Punjab University Law College, Punjab University, Lahore.


2. Historical Developments Islamic personal law touched the soil of India long before the

military arrival of Islam. First time in its history, the Sultanate of

Delhi enforced Islamic law. Mughals also continued with the

established system. Although they introduced Islamic public law,

but there were many exceptions and exemptions for the local

population, with different religions and castes. When the East India

Company was gradually authorised to govern local masses, it also

went on with more systematic religious freedoms, relating to

marriage, divorce, inheritance and other personal issues.

Regulations of 1780, unequivocally, guaranteed that, in suits regarding inheritance, marriage, caste and other religious usages

and institutions, the laws of the Koran with respect to the

Mohammedans and those of the Shaster with regard to the Gentoos

will be invariably adhered to; and on all such occasions, Maulvis

or Brahmins shall respectively attend the Courts or expound the

law and they shall sign the report and assist in passing the decree.1 Initially, the Companys Courts were established and obliged to apply Shariah, even in the sphere of public law. With the passage

of time, the Company replaced Islamic public law with its own

judicial system; however, in the realm of private law, the Courts

were ordained to apply Muhamedan law with respect to

Mohammedans and Hindu law with regard to Hindus. However,

the general principles of the English concept of justice, equity,

fairness, reasonableness and good conscience were substituted with

traditional ones.

Later on, the English law was applied to British citizens and

local laws to the local people. However, in a case of conflict, the

English legal system was preferred2. Finally, when the Raj

consolidated its power grip over all Indian sub-continents, then it

overhauled the entire legal system. Law started to be codified in

form of Acts and Bills. Worthy to note is that almost all

enactments of that era were made over and above Shariah and

customary law, ignoring personal beliefs, faith and religion3.

To transform the society palatable to the colonial rule, the

British, who were compelled to maintain harmony in various parts

of India, interestingly, did not extend the application of the new

statutes to the whole colony. Instead, they, responding to

administrative expediency, exempted many parts of India from


their application; Punjab was one of the beneficiaries, which was

the stronghold of customs4.

Probably, it was mistakenly presumed by the British that it

applied to the Muslims as well. Even the customary law dominated

the religious laws. Religious laws used to be applied only in the

case of absence of established customs.

Prior to the partition of India, a number of laws were

enacted regarding marriage and divorce of Muslims. The Child

Marriage Restraint Act 1929 was enacted wherein it was laid down

that no child below the age of 14 would be given in marriage. A

great hue and cry was raised by the Muslims. Learning lessons

from the history and realizing the risk to their personal law,

regarding the preference of customary law over Shariah, they

persuaded the British Government to reverse the priority. Their

voice was well received by the colonial masters, who were in dire

need of maintenance of social harmony. The struggle to reform the

law culminated in form of the Shariat Application Act 1937, which

provided that Islamic laws would override the customary law.

However, creating an exception, it was optional for the Muslims,

in a number of their personal law issues, whether to be treated in

accordance with Islamic law or customary law. Notably, it was

applicable to the whole of colonial India5. It is worthy to note that

the statement of objects and reasons issued with the Bill explained

that, apart from the demand of Ulamma, press and activist

Muslims women organizations, The Jami'at alUlama Hind, the greatest Muslim religious body, has supported the demand and

invited the attention of all concerned to the urgent necessity of

introducing a measure to this effect6. No doubt, it was evident that

the demand was unanimous from all corners of the Muslim

community.

Another significant legislation was the Muslim Married

Women's Dissolution of Marriages Act 1939 whereby a Muslim married woman was given the right of seeking dissolution of

marriage through the Court of Law on various grounds, such as

cruelty, husband's whereabouts not known for four years, husband

having been sentenced to seven years' imprisonment, husband's

neglect to maintain his wife for two years or abstaining from

performing marital obligations for three years or for any other

cause recognized by Shar'iah.The Independence Act1947 obliged both India and Pakistan to continue in force all the laws, along


with the British judicial system, until the respective Constituent

Assemblies amended or repealed them. At the time of

Independence, the public law was English and private law was

Islamic for the Muslims, with an option in few matters that they

could opt for customary law7.

3. Impact on Constitution and Law Since the framing of a new constitution suffered setbacks due

to the early constitutional problems, like the form of federation,

representative ratio in parliament, question of Islamic provisions,

and number of national or official languages. It took nine years to

frame the constitution. However, in 1949, the Objectives

Resolution was passed, which outlined the principles of the future

constitution8.It became Preamble of the coming constitutions from

1956 to 1973. In Asma Jilani9case, the Supreme Court put the

Objectives Resolution on a higher pedestal, leading to a perception

that it was a supra-constitutional provision, recognizing it as

grund norm. However, when the question of its higher status was raised in the case of State v. Zia-ur-Rehman

10, the Court clarified

that grund norm was not supra-constitutional as it was not a

substantive part of the Constitution. Again, it led to an

understanding that it would be overriding if it would have been an

operative part of the Constitution. To give it a superior position,

Article 2-A was first introduced by the Presidential Order No. 14

and then it was indemnified by Eighth Amendment in 1985. After

getting protection as a substantive part, the higher Courts were

stormed with petitions to declare a number of laws un-Islamic as

they were repugnant to the Islamic law11

. Although Islamization process to test the laws on the

touchstone of Islamic injunctions was already operative in the form of Federal Shariat Court established in 1980, first as a Shariat Bench in all High Courts and then as an independent and separate judicial organ. However, its jurisdiction was limited and four areas of laws were kept out of its ambit. It could not analyze the provisions of the Constitution, procedural laws, family laws and fiscal laws till 1990, on the yardstick of injunctions of Islam. However, it ceased a number of laws on the ground of their conflict with Islamic laws.

The Federal Shariat Court trespassed its proscribed area to

Islamize the laws, two times. First in the case of Farishta v


Federation of Pakistan12

, decided by the Shariat Bench of

Peshawar High Court, where the provisions of the Muslims

Family Laws Ordinance were declared repugnant to Islam, hence,

invalid. However, in Federation of Pakistan v Farishta13

the

Supreme Appellate Bench, overturned the judgment and held

that the Ordinance was falling within the scope of Muslim

Personal Law and was applicable to Muslims alone, therefore, its

scrutiny was outside the jurisdiction of Shari'at Courts. Second in

the case of Allah Rakha v Federation of Pakistan14

, the Federal

Sahriat Court, once again, crossing the limits of its jurisdiction,

declared some provisions of the MFLO to cease after a particular

date, compelling the Government to replace it with Islamic law.

Here too, in the Hafiz Abdul Waheed v Asma Jehangir15

, the

Supreme Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court, deciding on

technical grounds of jurisdiction, overturned the excess of

constitutional jurisdiction, under Article 203-B(C ).

Although the process of Islamization of laws was fully

operative, under Article 203 of the Constitution, but insertion of

Article 2-A synergized it. When the MFLO was challenged in the

Sind High Court, on the ground, that it was inconsistent with

Article 2-A, the Federal Shariat Court, taking cognizance of its

potential conflict, held in Qamar Raza v Tahira Begum16

(1988)

that the constitutional protection to the MFLO was over and it

was open to be challenged on the ground of the Objectives

Resolution and Article 227. The Court further observed that now

it was an appropriate time for a High Court to ignore its

protection under Article 268 of the Constitution as well. The

approach resulted in cessation of a number of provisions of the

MFLO. Following Qamar Raza17

case, Justice Tanzil also held in

the case of Shaukat Hussain v. Robina18

that In the face of Article 2-A, subsequently added, it would not, perhaps, be possible to

extend recognition to the said protection in so far it derogates or

comes into conflict with the principles and provisions underlying

the Objectives Resolution From 1985 to 1992, nearly, 32 cases were filed to challenge

various laws on the ground of their repugnance with Islamic law.

Not only the Federal Shariat Court, but the four High Courts also

faced a dilemma to assess the supra-constitutional status or

overriding effect of the Resolution on the Constitution and other


laws. Even in one High Court, Judges came up with conflicting

observations and relief19

.

The first case of impact of the Objectives Resolution was

Bank of Oman v East Trading Company20

wherein the provision

of a law was challenged on the ground of repugnancy with Islam.

The Court held that Article 2-A provided jurisdiction of review to

all higher Court, including the Federal Shariat Court, to assess the

validity of a law, along with the Constitution, on the touchstone

of Islamic law. The ratio was followed in Irshad H. Khan v

Pervez Ajaz21

that it was paramount and supra-constitutional.

Therefore, all provisions of the Constitution were reviewable on

the test of Islam, except the Resolution itself.

One of an earlier challenges was the case of Qaiser Ali v

Karachi Road Transport Corporation22

wherein the Sind High

Court observed that after the incorporation of Article 2-A English

Common Law was to be replaced with Islamic Common Law and

its principles, extending the impact not only to the Constitution

and law but also to the discretionary executive powers. In Ajaz

Haroon v Inman Durrani23

and Tyeb v Alpha Insurance

Company24

, Justice Wajihuddin recognized the paramount impact

of Article 2-A on all laws, including the Constitution. Similarly,

In Faisal v Sectary25

, the Federal Shariat Court held that Article

2-A had overriding effect on all laws. While the Lahore high

Court followed the same path and held, in Allah Banda v

Khurshid Bibi26

, that Section 7 of the MFLO was invalid on the

test of Article 2-A.

On the other hand, the Sind High Court was moving to

different direction with another extreme view of Article 2-A. like,

in the case of Mohammad Bachal Memon v Government of

Sindh27

, the full Bench of the Sind High Court held, assessing the

impact of Article 2-A, that all the constitutional provisions had

equal force of law and one provision did not override the other

one. Similarly, in Sharaf Afridi v Federation of Islamic Republic

of Pakistan28

also held that it was not open to the Court to

adjudge any provision of the Constitution invalid on the ground

of its repugnancy with Article 2-A. and in the case of Habib Bank

v Wahid Textile Mills29

, it was held that it was not a self-executory,

supra-constitutional or an overriding provision.

In the same line of approach, the Lahore High Court in

Mustafa Khar v Pakistan30

held that no constitutional provision


could be defeated or struck down on the ground of the Objective

Resolution, as it did not enjoy any higher place. In Kaniz Fatima

v. Wali Muhammad31

, Justice Allah Nawaz held that no Court

could exercise any jurisdiction if already a Court had been

provided an exclusive jurisdiction. In another case he opined that

although the Objectives Resolution was a blue print of the State of

Pakistan, however, it did not change its character and effect32

.

The controversy of overriding effect or supra-constitutional

character of the Objectives Resolution, started by an Order passed

by the Martial Law Authority, which was later indemnified by the

Parliament, was laid to rest forever in the case of Hakim Khan v

Government of Pakistan33

, where in the impact of Article 2-A on

Article 45 of the Constitution was raised before the Court. It was

held in the instant case that as the Objectives Resolution was,

although it was a substantive of the Constitution, not self-

executory, therefore, it was void of impact of supremacy; no

provision of the Constitution could be declared to cease its effect

on the ground that it was inconsistent with Article 2-A.

Unequivocally, its impact was that it was a non-operative part of

the Constitution. Justice Shafi-u-Rehman went further to assess

its status saying that even an ordinary law, apart from the

Constitution, could not be tested on its touchstone, whether it

collided with Shariah or not34

.

The case of Hakim Khan35

determined that Article 45 could

not be declared invalid on the ground of Article 2-A. Whether a

statute could be challenged on that very ground came in question

in the case of Kaneez Fatima v Wali Mohammad36

, where it was

held that even an ordinary law could not be declared invalid on

the ground of Islam. However, as an exception, the Supreme

Court held in Zaheerudin v State37

that right to religion, a

fundamental right, which was a constitutional provision, was

subject to Islamic law.

However, after Zaheerudin, the Courts reverted to the ruling

of Hakim Khan case38

.

4. Part of Basic Structure of Constitution Insertion of Article 2-A raised a huge controversy, in our legal

and constitutional environment, from 1985 and was finally settled

down in the case of Hakim Khan case39

holding that all the

constitutional provisions were equal; no Court had jurisdiction to


review any law on the test of Islam, which was an exclusive

jurisdiction of the Federal Shariat Court. Moreover, it was also laid

that, even as an operative part of the Constitution; it did not change

the basic character of the Objectives Resolution.

Before and after incorporation of the Objectives Resolution as a

substantive part, particularly after the persuasive precedent of

Kesavananda Bharati case40

, it has been contended as a part of

basic structure of the Constitution, whenever a constitutional

amendment was challenged.

From Zia-ul-Rehman v State41

to Khawaja Muhammad

Sharif v Federation of Pakistan42

, the constitutional Courts

sustainably opined that the Courts were creature of the

Constitution and it did not empower them with the jurisdiction to

review a constitutional amendment on any ground. However, they

were just allowed to review an ordinary law, not the constitution;

therefore, the political question needed to be reviewed by an

appropriate forum: parliament.

The Supreme Court turned its trajectory in the case of

Mehmood Khan Achukzai43

, when the constitutionality of Eighth

Amendment was challenged on the ground of basic structure of the

Constitution, inter alia, including the Objectives Resolution. Chief

justice of the Supreme Court observed that the Objectives

Resolution reflected the salient features of the Constitution and

was enough to provide a basic structure. Although the provisions

of impugned 8th

Constitutional Amendment were not declared as

inconsistent with salient features of the Constitution, but doctrine

of the basic structure of the Constitution was recognized and the

jurisdiction to review a constitutional amendment on the yardstick

of the Objectives Resolution was assumed.

Similarly, Fourteenth Amendment was also challenged on

the ground of basic structure of the Constitution, in the case of

Wukala Mahaz Barai Tahaffuz Dastoor v. Federation of

Pakistan44

. However, the Supreme Court went one step back and

refused to excise its jurisdiction to review a constitutional

amendment, returning to Zia-u-Rehman45

.

In October 1999, the Constitution was suspended by Military. The legitimacy of the Military regime was challenged in the Zafar Ali Shah v Chief Executive46. The Supreme Court validated the extra-constitutional act and authorized the regime to amend the Constitution, with a condition that the


authority would not amend any provision of the Constitution which would be in conflict with the basic structure of the Constitution, namely, federal form of government, parliamentary democracy, independence of Judiciary, fundamental rights and its Islamic provisions, including Article 2-A. Ironically, the Military regime never bothered about the limitations and changed its whole complexion47. Although excess of the Supreme Courts mandate was challenged, but a complaint judiciary could not bridle the powerful regime. Later on, all the military acts or Orders were indemnified by the Parliament under Seventeenth Constitutional Amendment48. Like others, it was also challenged on the ground of its conflict with basic structure of the Constitution, defined and elaborated in Mahmood Khan Achakzai v Federation of Pakistan49, and Zafar Ali Shah50. Once again, the Supreme Court stuck to the rule of Zia-u-Rehman, in the case of Pakistan Lawyers Forum v Federation of Pakistan51, recognizing that although there was a basic structure or salient features of the Constitution, and the Achakzais Court had rightly underscored, but it did not mean that the Court had jurisdiction to review constitutional amendments on its touchstone.

The Eighteenth Amendment, passed unanimously by parliament, drastically altered, inter alia, the procedure of appointment of Judges in the higher Courts, inserting Article 175A, which ostensibly affected the independence of Judiciary. A lot of petitioners rushed to the Supreme Court in Public Interest Litigation under Article 184(3). The Court issued a short Order, recognizing that there was a basic structure of the Constitution, established in the cases of Achakzai and Zafar Ali Shah, including the Objectives Resolution as a substantive part of the Constitution under Article 2-A. Instead of declaring the Amendment void as inconsistent with the basic structure of the Constitution, the Court, following Hakim Khan52, asked the parliament to reconsider it in the light of basic structure of the Constitution. Following the instructions of the Court, the parliament passed 19th Amendment to give effect to the Courts Order. Now, it has also been challenged on the ground that it again collides with basic structure and does not comply the Courts Order.


5. Utility in Interpretation All along, as a preamble of the Constitution, the Objectives

Resolution has been a beacon of light for the Courts to interpret the

Constitution and law. However, the twist came when Chief Justice

of the Supreme Court, Hamood-u-Rehman, held in Asma Jilani

v Government of the Punjab53

case that the Objectives Resolution

was a grund norm of the Constitution. Therefore, in Zia-u-

Rehman54

case, the constitutional amendments were challenged on

the ground that it was a supra-constitutional provision. The Court

explained that it never meant that the Resolution had any

overriding effect on other provisions of the Constitution.

Introduction of the Shariat Benches and then the Federal Shariat

Court empowered the Judiciary to Islamize the laws. However, its

jurisdiction was limited to review, inter alia, the Constitution. In

pursuance of the understanding emerged in State v Zia-ur-

Rehman55

, the Objectives Resolution was incorporated as a

substantive part of the Constitution under Article 2-A by Eighth

Amendment 1985. When its overriding effect was raised, the

Judiciary was deeply divided, having various approaches. Few

judges, on the ground of Article 2-A, declared the constitutional

provisions void as repugnant to Islam, others observed a number of

statutory laws against the injunctions of Islam.

However, there has been a consensus that Article 2-A was a

treasure trove to interpret the Constitution and law. In Hakim

Khan, the question of its paramount impact was finally settled

down that all provisions of the Constitution were equal and the

Judiciary was not empowered to review them. On the other hand,

in case of Zaheerudin v State56

, the Supreme Court held that the

constitutional provisions, at least fundamental right to religion,

were subject to Islamic law. Except this maverick case, Hakim

Khan57

Case has been followed as a binding precedent. Before and

after incorporation of the Objectives Resolution as a substantive

part of the Constitution, it has been recognized as a valuable source

to indigenize the law in its light. Its first entry as a guideline to

interpret an ambiguous provision was the definition and scope of

the words justice, equity and good conscience, used in various statutes and judgments

58. Islamic law filled a lacuna or gap where a

statute law was silent59

. In the case of State Bank of India v

Custodian of Evacuee Property60

, the Court depended on the


Islamic law to remove an ambiguity of the Statute. In Nizam Khan

v Additional Sessions Judge61

, the Court expressly held that

Islamic law was to be applied where a statute or judgment would

be ambiguous; all such vacuum must be filled with Islamic

philosophy and jurisprudence. The Court also emphasized that, in a

case of confusing concepts, the Courts were free to apply Muslim

Common Law. The Supreme Court, in the case of A.M. Qureshi v

USSR62

, also recognized to apply Islamic law in the interpretation

of customary international law and statutory law of Pakistan.

However, occasionally, the Courts refused to borrow Islamic law63

.

The real change in jurisprudence occurred when the Shariat Benches in all High Courts were incorporated in the Constitution, with an exclusive jurisdiction to review the laws on the test of Islam and cease them, after an enough time granted to the parliament for its replacement with Islamic law. Although the Benches were devoid of a jurisdiction to review, inter alia, the Muslim family laws, but the Shariat Bench of the Peshawer High Court, removing the barrier of jurisdictional limits, declared the MFLO un-Islamic. The landscape was substantially transformed when the Objectives Resolution was embodied in the Constitution as an operative part under Article 2-A, by a constitutional amendment in 1985. It brought up a revolutionary change in judicial approach to interpret the Constitution and law. Even those Judges who refused to test the Constitution and law on the yardstick of Article 2-A generously welcomed its role in their interpretation. Justice Saleem Ahtar, while refusing to recognize Article 2-A as a paramount provision, emphasized that Article 2-A could be used to interpret a law, not to abolish the law itself64.

Similarly, Justice Khalil-u-Rehman held that the effect of Article 2-A was that it must be applied to interpret Islamic law, therefore, he explained public interest in the light of Islamic law, on the ground of Article 2-A. He also suggested that due process of law, an American doctrine, was not more than fundamental rights, principles of policy and the Objectives Resolution, guaranteed in the Constitution, in meaning and impost65.

In the case of Massu v United Bank Limited66

, Justice Allah

Nawaz, while speaking on behalf of the Lahore High Court,


observed that it was the spirit of the Constitution and a propelling

force in the creation of the country. He further stressed that the State functionaries including judiciary are under a statutory duty to

follow the common law of Islam in the fields where there is no

statutory dispensation and in fields where the State functionaries

had to pass orders in exercise of their discretionary authority.

The constitutional Courts enhanced the ambit of fundamental rights, interpreting them in the light of Article 2-A67. In a number of cases, social and economic justice enshrined in the Objectives Resolution as a substantive part of the Constitution has also been vigorously protected68. The interpretative value of the Objectives resolution also helped promote rule of law. The higher Courts borrowed its golden principles to interpret explain the issues of any ground, no inherent power for the public functionaries, and registration of a vote at two places.

6. Conclusion Although application of Islamic law has not been a new

phenomenon in the legal system of Pakistan as it started with the

Shariat Application Act 1937, however, it was highly limited to

Muslims personal law. After Independence, the Courts embraced

its application except where there was no statute or a precedent.

Judicial role to review the law on the yardstick of Islam emerged,

with the creation of Federal Shariat Court, with a limited

jurisdiction. It was synergized when the Objectives Resolution

turned as a substantive part of the Constitution. Its dominant

position triggered a wave of litigation, which was finally settled as

Article 2-A did not make any difference. However, it can

authoritatively concluded that it brought a revolutionary change in

the jurisprudence of the legal system of Pakistan, promoting,

fundamental rights, principles of policy, womens and children rights, rule of law, principles of equality; social, economic and

political justice, and Independence of Judiciary.

Notes & Reference 1 Cassandra Balchin, A Handbook on Family Law in Pakistan

(Shirkat Gah: 1994) 11 2 See Pearl, David and Werner Menski, Muslim Family Law

(Sweet & Maxwell: 1998) 241


3Dr Tahir Mahmood, Muslim Personal Law: Role of State in the

Indian Sub-Continent (2d ed. All India Reporter Ltd: 1983) 4 Tipu Salman Makhdoom, Law in Transformation: Talaq----a case

study PLD 1998 J 1 5 Mahmood

6 Mahmood; Balchin,

7 Shariat Act, 1937

8 The Idea of Pakistan, Stephen P. Cohen, (Washington: The

Brookings Institution: 2004) 57 9Asma Jillani v Government of Punjab PLD 1972 LAH 139

10 State v Zia Ur Rehman (1973: SC 49)

11 Martin Lau, The role of Islam in the legal system of Pakistan,

(Martinus Nijhoff: 2006) 47 12

Farishta V Federation of Pakistan PLD 1980 Presh. 47 13

Federation of Pakistan v Farishta PLD 1981 SC 120 14

Allah Rakha v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2000 FSC 1 15

Hafiz Abdul Waheed v Asma Jehangir PLD 1989 SC 219 16

Qamar Raza v Tahira Begum PLD1988 Kar 169 17

Qamar Raza (1988: 169) 18

Shaukat Hussain v Robina PLD 1989 Karachi 513 19

Lau, 48 20

Bank of Oman v East Trading Company PLD 1987 Kar 404 21

Irshad H. Khan v Pervez Ajaz PLD 1987 Kar 466 22

Qaiser Ali v Karachi Road Transport Corporation PLD 1986 Kar

489 23

Ajaz Haroon v Anman Durrani PLD 1989 Kar 304 24

Tyeb v Alpha Insurance Company 1990 CLC 488 25

Faisal v Sectary PLD 1992 FSC 195 26

Allah Banda v Khurshid Bibi 1990 CLC 1683 27

Mohammad Bachal Memon v Government of Sindh PLD 1987

Kar 296 28

Sharaf Afridi v Federation of Islamic Republic of Pakistan PLD

1989 Kar 404 29

Habib Bank v Wahid Textile Mills PLD 1989 Kar 371 30

Mustafa Khar v Pakistan PLD 1988 Lah 49 31

Kaniz Fatima v Wali Muhammad PLD 1989 Lah 490 32

Massu v United Bank 1990 MLD 2304 33

Hakim Khan v Government of Pakistan PLD 1992 SC 585


34

Edit by Javaid Rehman and Suzan C. Breau, Religion, human

rights and international law: a critical examination of Islamic

State Practices (Martinus Nijhoff: 2007) 35

Hakim Khan (1992) 36

Kaniz Fatima v Wali Mohammad PLD 1993 SC 901 37

Zaheer Ud Din v State 1993 SCMR 1718 38

Shafi Mohammadi v Islamic Republic of Pkaistan PLD 2003

Kar 1, Malik Asghar v Punjab PLD 2003 Lah 73; Mehram Ali

v Federation Pakistan PLD 1998 SC 1445 39


Kesavananda Bharati v. The State of Kerala and Others (AIR

1973 SC 1461) 41

State v Zia-u Rehman PLD 1973 SC 49 42

Khawaja Muhammad Sharif v Federation of Pakistan PLD 1988

Lah 725 43

Mahmood Khan Achakzai v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1997

SC 426 44

Wukala Mahaaz Barai Tahaffuz Dastoor v. Federation of

Pakistan PLD 1998 SC 1263 45

Zia-ur-Rehman (1973) 46

Zafar Ali Shah v Chief Executive PLD 2004 SC 869 47

Craig Baxter, Pakistan on the brink: politics, economics, and

society: 69 48

Constitutional Amendment (2004) 49


SC 426 50

Zafar Ali Shah (2000) 51

Pakistan Lawyers Forum v Federation of Pakistan PLD 2005 SC

719 52


Asma Jilani v Government of the Punjab PLD 1972 SC 139 54

Zia-Ur-Rehman (1993) 55

Zia-ur-Rehman (1973) 56

Zaheerudin v State 1993 SCMR 1718 57

Hakim Khan v Government of Pakistan PLD 1992 SC 593 58

Martin Lau, The role of Islam in the legal system of Pakistan,

(Martinus Nijhoff :2006) 47 59

Abdul Ghani v Taleh Bibi PLD 1962 Lah 531; Allah Bux v Jano

PLD 1962 Kar 317


60

State Bank of India v Custodian of Evacuee Property PLD 1969

Lah 1050 61

Nizam Khan v Additional Session Judge PLD 1976 Lah 930 62

A.M.Qureshi v USSR PLD 1981 SC 377 63

Niaz Ahmed v Province of Sindh PLD 1977 Kar 3040 64


SC 426 65

Ittefaq Foundry v Federation of Pakistan PLD 1990 Lah 121 66

Massu v United Bank Limited 1990 MLD 2304 67

Philips Electrical Industry v Pakistan 2000 YLR 2724; Ahmad

Nawaz v ,State PLD 1998 Kar 180; Gulzaran v Amir

Bakhsh1997 PLD 309; Khawaja Muhammad Sharif v

Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1988 Lahore 725 ; Human

Rights Case 1993 SCMR 2001; Zaheer v Province of Punjab

1997 PSC 43; Tyeb v Alpha Insurance Company 1990 CLC

428 68

Al-Karam v Federation of Pakistan 2011PTD 1; Javed Hussain v

Finance Department 2004 PSC 586; Income Tax Appelleta

Tribunal Pakistan 2010 PTD 768; Sheikh Tariq v Accountant

General, Punjab 2002 PSC 363; Additional Accountant

General v A.G. Zuberi 2011 PLC 580; Naubahar Ali v Vice

Chancellor 2010 PLC 783

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