May 13, 2023 Word Count: 4,970 (limit: 7.500)

Prepared for inclusion in Peter Munk Christiansen, Jørgen Elklit, & Peter Nedergaard (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Danish Politics, Oxford: OUP (2020?)

Incomplete draft!

Chapter 5

The Electoral SystemBy Jørgen Elklit

Abstract (max 200 ord)

Abstract skrives med mindre skift og rykkes ind som her

Key words: parliamentary elections; electoral system; proportional representation;

compensatory seats; preferential voting

Probably the Best Electoral System in the World

Arend Lijphart, the nestor of electoral systems research, has at several occasions expressed his

appreciation of the system used to elect the Danish parliament, the Folketing, as, e.g., in this

quote:

“Of the electoral systems analyzed in this book, I nominate the Danish system as the closest

approximation to my ‘ideal’ model. … [L]et me merely highlight its main features here:; list PR, an

average district magnitude of about eight seats, national compensatory seats with a low 2 per cent

threshold, and highly proportional allocation formulas. My one misgiving concerns the high degree of

openness of the list system and the complexity of how the partly open lists work. No system is

1

perfect! … Those who designed the system almost a century ago did a much better job than their

contemporary counterparts …” (Lijphart 2005: ix)

The quote highlights some of the system’s main features, which are key to understanding how it at

the same time can be both complex and relatively simple, at least as concerns what Danish voters

need to know both if they want just to cast a vote in the elections or if they want to optimize their

actual electoral power.

The system has now reached its centenary. It has developed incrementally since

1920 when it was first developed and enacted, largely in constructive co-operation between the

then Minister of the Interior, Ove Rode, and a Conservative opposition MP, Asger Karstensen.

Denmark had already in 1915 introduced elements of proportional representation (PR) in its

electoral system as single member constituencies were combined with a system of compensatory

seats outside of the capital district of Copenhagen and Frederiksberg, which was itself made into a

multi-member PR district (Elklit 1992; Shugart and Wattenberg 2001: 580). However, the system

did not – for a number of reasons – achieve an acceptable level of proportionality in the 1918

Folketing elections.

Consequently, it was changed in 1920, as one of several elements in the political

settlement after a major constitutional crisis. The new electoral system was in many ways rather

similar to what we have now.

It is truly remarkable that the basic features of the system have survived for 100

years. The main reason is that incremental changes over this extended period have allowed the

system to develop and adjust to social, demographic, and political changes.

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It also deserves mention that Danish Folketing election are generally perceived to be

among the very best in the world when it comes to election administration and the general quality

of the election processes. Other members of this top league are Finland, Norway, Iceland,

Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, and it is noteworthy that they all have PR electoral

systems, even though their PR systems vary somewhat. This is documented convincingly by The

Electoral Integrity Project (Norris et al. 2018) as well as by the V-Dem project (https://www.v-

dem.net/en/analysis/CountryGraph/ ). However, electoral administration as such is not a topic

dealt with here, even though it deserves mention that Denmark belongs to the “governmental

model of electoral management” (Catt et al. 2014), as elections are organized and managed by the

Ministry of the Interior, in close cooperation with local authorities. An English-language text of the

electoral law is available at

https://www.thedanishparliament.dk/~/media/Publikationer/pdf/english/the-parliamentary-

system-of-denmark_2009.ashx . Furthermore, an annotated edition of the parliamentary electoral

law was published recently (Miller and Elklit 2019).

This chapter deals only with the parliamentary electoral system. The electoral system

used for regional and municipal elections (and European Parliament elections) is a straightforward

list-PR d’Hondt system, which, however, allows for apparentement, something which is not

possible in Folketing elections. Please refer to the chapters on “Municipalities and Regions” and

“Local Elections” elsewhere in this volume or to Elklit (2016: 48-55).

Why is it that the Danish electoral system functions so well? Election results are

accepted by all, the electoral administration (the electoral management board, EMB) based in a

small office within the Ministry of the Interior functions well and is never accused of any kind of

3

political bias, and the general trust in the system is widespread. Why is it so and what can other

countries and other EMBs – maybe – learn from Denmark? Is the main explanation of this positive

state of affairs that Denmark has not had a majority party in parliament since 1909? This means

that all political parties have had to realize that they must compromise to get legislation passed

and that small parties might be necessary coalition partners – and that political parties also

appreciate that the electoral winners of today may be the losers of tomorrow, which is why the

losers of today should not be treated too hard?

The structure of the chapter is the following: First comes an overall presentation of

the electoral system as it has developed since 1920. The second section describes in more detail

how the system works; all descriptions and explanations in this section are based on the outcome

of the Folketing elections on xx May 2019 [actual date to be inserted]. A third section looks at a

couple of electoral law amendments to illustrate how such changes have been discussed and

enacted, the purpose being to see if the political processes leading to the amendments reflect that

electoral laws are of a special – consensus-driven – nature in Denmark. The fourth section

presents a few comparisons with electoral systems elsewhere. A brief conclusion closes the

chapter.

The Structure of the Electoral System

The electoral system is a two-tier PR system, where the national (upper) level is the decisive level

(cf. Lijphart 1994: 32-36); lower level seat allocation takes place in multi-member constituencies

(MMCs). This ensures that members of parliament have at least some links to the constituencies,

where they are elected. This is even more so with the so-called nomination districts, i.e., a sub-

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division of the MMCs, where the local party branches nominate their electoral candidates to stand

for election. Independent candidates are allowed; they are also formally linked to a nomination

district, even though the relevant electoral constituency for both kinds of candidates remains the

MMC. The basic features of the system can be seen in Table 5.1, while Table 5.2 provides an

overview of the development over the last centenary in the key features of the system. Further

details will be provided in the subsequent section, where the system’s actual working is described.

<place Table 5.1 here>

Table 5.2 gives an impression of the system having formally gone through seven phases since its

inception in 1920. However, three of the six apparent changes were (only) caused by changes in

the politico-administrative structures, meaning that the number of MMCs either increased or

decreased.

<place Table 5.2 here>

In 1920 – but after the passing of the electoral law mentioned above – North Schleswig was

eventually reunited with Denmark after plebiscites in accordance with the post-WW1 Versailles-

settlement. The electoral system consequences were an additional MMC, North Schleswig, and a

slight increase in the number of seats in the Folketing. In 1970, a reform of, i.a., the number of

municipalities and counties was followed by a decrease in the number of MMCs from 23 to 17

(and a consequential rise in the average number of constituency seats in the MMCs), but nothing

else happened. According to Lijphart’s 20 per cent criteria (Lijphart 1994: xxx), the change in 1920

was only a minor adjustment, while the second, in 1970, classify as a proper change as the average

number of constituency seats in the MMCs increased with well over 20 per cent. However, in 1970

5

it was only perceived as a politically and administratively unproblematic adjustment caused by the

Municipal Reform.

In 2005, similarly, a so-called Structural Reform led, i.a., to a substantial reduction in

the number of municipalities. The number of MMCs was subsequently also reduced, from 17 to

10, again causing a substantial increase in the average number of MMC constituency seats, which

is now 13.5 (i.e. considerably more than Lijphart praised in the quote on page 1). The increase this

time around was more than 70 per cent. This might have entailed easier access to seats in

parliament for small parties, since the natural electoral thresholds decrease, when M, the number

of seats in a constituency, increases. This possibility made some politicians fear that small parties

might in this way win an unintended “cheap” constituency seat in a large MMC, which would then

give them access to the Folketing (and maybe also a couple of compensatory seats) without having

won even 2.0 per cent of the national vote total. The obvious solution was to replace the Mod.

Ste.-Laguë formula with the d’Hondt formula, which is well-known for not providing small parties

with “cheap” seats. So far, this particular safeguard aiming at avoiding unintended consequences

of the decrease in number of MMCs has worked as expected (evt. citér JE i Festskrift til Lars Bille).

This change is, therefore, also best understood as an (almost) uninteresting electoral law

adjustment to changes in other administrative spheres, even though it according to Lijphart’s

criteria should be classified as a genuine system change.

Table 3 aims at providing information relevant to assessing whether or not the

various changes in electoral system features are followed by systematic changes in

disproportionality scores or in the relative difference between effective number of electoral and

parliamentary parties, r (Laaksoo and Taagepera 19xx: yyy). Table 3 is supplemented by Figure 1,

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which allows one to follow the development from election to election of the two effective

numbers of parties over the entire period. The level of disproportionality, as well as the relative

difference between N (v) and N(s), r, are in any case remarkably low – also in international

comparisons – but the disproportionality score, as well as r, nevertheless increased considerable –

relatively speaking, that is – after the system changes in 1953, when the constitution was

amended and the electoral law was adjusted to reflect the constitutional amendments and the

interparty consensus.

<place Table 5.3 here>

The lowering of the effective threshold in 1961 and the changes in the average number of MMC

constituency seats in 1970 and 2005, respectively, did also not cause upward changes in the two

effect variables considered here. The reason behind the increase in the r-value, which is easily

spotted in Figure 1, is the development in the party stem between the mid-1960s and the mid-

1990’s, where differences in party size – measured in either way – generally decreased, at the

same time as some of the new and/or small parties did not always meet the 2 per cent

requirement.

<place Figure 5.1>

In this way, the number of interesting changes in key electoral system features is reduced to only

three: A particularly dramatic one after the 1947 elections, to be detailed below, the amendment

of the Constitution in 1953, which as one of its consequences entailed an amendment of the

electoral law in 1953, and then an amendment in 1961 of the rules related to the electoral

thresholds. This last case will also be discussed below. These changes do not qualify as changes

according to Lijphart, but the claim here is that they should nevertheless be considered moments

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of system change because they were considered as such by the political actors – and led to

substantial changes in system characteristics such as the effective number of seats and the level of

proportionality (see Table 5.3 and Figure 5.1).

How the Electoral System Actually Works (NB. The 2015 election figures below will be replaced by

2019 figures)

Seat allocation after a Folketing election takes place in six sequential steps, which together reflect

the various political and attitudinal intentions behind the electoral law as it has developed since

1920: Overall proportionality for parties with a minimal level of voter support, regional scattering

of seats, local rooting of candidates, and direct voter influence not only on party representation in

parliament, but also on which individual candidates will eventually take seat in the Folketing.

The two seats allocated to Greenland and the two allocated to the Faroe Islands are

allocated separately, in both cases using d’Hondt. The consequence is normally that the two

biggest parties in each of these two parts of the realm win a seat each. Figure 5.2 displays the

entire allocation process, where one finds the allocation of the four so-called North Atlantic seats

in the upper left corner. The 175 seats available for the third part of the realm (Denmark) are the

sum of 135 constituency seats allocated directly in the MMCs in the first of the six steps in the seat

allocation process and 40 compensatory seats.

<place Figure 5.2 about here, but not earlier>

Step 1. The 135 constituency seats are for five-year periods allocated to MMC based on a formula,

which takes population size, the size of the electorate, and a consideration for the geographical

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area of the MMC into consideration. The calculations are publicly available, so that all can check

them, if they so want. This means that it is clear before the election, how many constituency seats

are up for grabs in each MMC. If the calculations do not result in Bornholm, the island in the Baltic,

getting at least two seats, calculations must be redone to ensure that result which aims at securing

that the island will expectedly be represented by two candidates of different political affiliation.

The consideration for the size of the geographical area is reminiscent of the use in the 19th century

of smaller constituencies in rural Jutland because of the lower population density there. The

consequence now is primarily a slight tendency to secure that parties win marginally more of their

seats in Jutland. However, parties with strongholds in Jutland do not get more seats than they

would otherwise get.

The MMC constituency seats are allocated according to the d’Hondt seat allocation

formula; this allocation is final, i.e. if a party should get more constituency seats than its overall

seat entitlement, it can keep them all. The risk for that outcome is, however, negligible.

Step 2. This step is where it is being found out which parties are entitled to participate in the

allocation of compensatory seats. A party must fulfill a least one of three requirements to qualify

for being included in this calculation. The three requirements are (1) winning at least one

constituency seat in any one of the MMCs, (2) in two of the three main electoral regions winning

as many votes as the regional votes/constituency sets average, or (3) winning at least 2 per cent of

the national (valid) vote total. This is for all intents and purposes the true, effective electoral

threshold. In 2015 2 per cent were 70,380 votes. The Conservatives did easily pass that threshold,

while the Christian Democrats did not. So in 2015, the conclusion was that nine of ten parties were

entitled to participate in the sharing of the 40 compensatory seats.

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Step 3. Each party’s entitlement is found easily by allocating all 175 seats to the parties by using

Hare + Largest Remainders (Table xx). The Social Liberals were entitled to 8 of the 175 seats. They

had, however, won two constituency seats in the MMCs, so they were entitled to six

compensatory seats.

Steps 4 and 5.These two steps are where its being determined in which MMCs the parties will have

their compensatory seats. The first challenge is to allocate each party’s entitlement to one of the

three main electoral regions (to ensure a certain geographical spread). Ste.-Laguë’s formula is

used across parties and regions and the 40 highest quotients entitles the party in question to a

compensatory seat in the region in question, provided that the party has not yet reached its full

entitlement and that the region is within its share of the 40 compensatory seats, as decided in the

five-yearly overall seatss allocation to MMCs and regions (Table xx).

In the next step parties have their compensatory seats allocated to MMCs within the

three regions. The formula used for this is the so-called “Danish” string of divisors (1, 4, 7, 10, … ),

which ensures maximum geographical spread, so that also MMCs where a party is less strong, has

a chance of getting at least a compensatory seat. (Table xx shows what this allocation looks like).

This particular electoral system feature was more important earlier, when MMCs were smaller.

Step 6. All 135 constituency seats and all 40 compensatory seats are now allocated to a particular

party in a particular MMC. This final step is where it’s being decided which of each party’s

candidates in a MMC will eventually become Members of Parliament. However, the political

parties have a range of options, when they prior to the election register their candidates in the

various MMCs. The consequence of this unique Danish peculiarity is that one party can register

candidates in different ways in the MMCs, and also that in a particular MMC parties may have

10

chosen different ways of registering their candidates, which means that the way voters cast their

party or preference votes might have different effects, when it comes to the eventual selection of

the successful candidates in a particular party. Not all voters will understand the finer details of

this system!

MMCs are sub-divided in a number of so-called nomination districts, the idea being

that political party branches at this level will normally present their own candidate for parliament,

while the party’s MMC branch will organize the list, and register the list and the candidates in the

preferred way with the MMC registration authority.

The registration options available to parties are basically two: (1) standing …

(kredsvis opstilling in Danish) and (2) standing in parallel (sideordnet opstilling in Danish). Standing

in … was formerly the normal way of presenting lists and candidates and it means that the

candidates’ total vote is the sum of the party vote in their nomination district and the preference

votes cast in their favour in all nomination districts in the MMC. This is now often combined with

the option of submitting a semi-closed list of candidates (partiliste in Danish), where only a very

high number of preference votes for a particular candidate can change the order of the list.

Standing in parallel means that all candidates are formally nominated in all (or most)

nomination districts and that they share the party votes in each nomination district in proportion

to the number of preference votes they each win in each nomination district. The local candidate

will still be at the top of the list and the other would appear in alphabetically order. This well-

established system was changed through an electoral law amendment in 2017 allowing the parties

to organize the lists under this option almost as they liked. Furthermore, parties were also allowed

11

to submit truly open lists, if all candidates in a MMC were standing in parallel in all nomination

districts.

However, no matter what particular option a MMC party branch has chosen

candidates will eventually be listed according to the number of votes they have won under the

system chosen by their party. If a party in a MMC has won three seats – no matter whether it is

constituency seats or compensatory seats – the three candidates with most votes will – in

declining order – be given a seat each while other candidates will be their substitutes, also in dec

lining order of their number of votes.

The Nature of Electoral Law Amendments

1947 (the most comprehensive electoral law amendments ever, but they are mainly of interests

for political historians now. Shall they be included?)

1961 (lowering of most important electoral threshold to 2 per cent)

2017 (two small, but significant electoral law amendments with new options: completely open lists

in the MMCs, and parties can under certain circumstances in each nomination district place the

“non-nominated” candidates in whatever order they prefer)

Comparisons with Other Electoral Systems

Lav disproportionality (sammenlign med mange lande)

Sverige/Norge (Elklit 2016)

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Conclusions: No Electoral System Reform Expected Anytime Soon

The Danish electoral system functions very well and the electoral system is not a political issue.

The system may not be the best in the world – even though some see it that way – but it has since

its inception a hundred years ago been developed incrementally to fit changing demographic,

political, and other conditions, so that one hears no complaints about its workings.

There is no serious interest in moving towards digital voting.

[Se 2001 politica-artikel om ændring af folketingsvalgloven + konklusionen i Gallagher og Mitchell-

kapitlet Ingen af disse to steder er der dog dramatiske pointer at hente!]

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References:

Catt, Helena, Andrew Ellis, Michael Maley, Alan Wall, & Peter Wolf (2014). Electoral Management Design. Revised edition. Stockholm: International IDEA.

Elklit, Jørgen (1992). ’The Best of Both Worlds? The Danish Electoral System 1915-20 in a Comparative Perspective’, Electoral Studies, 11/3: 189-205.

Elklit, Jørgen (2002). ‘The Politics of Electoral System Development and Change: The Danish Case’, in Bernard Grofman & Arend Lijphart, eds., The Evolution of Electoral and Party Systems in the Nordic Countries. New York: Agathon Press, 15-66.

Elklit, Jørgen (2005/2008). ’Denmark: Simplicity Embedded in Complexity (or is it the Other Way Round)?’, in Michael Gallagher and Paul Mitchell, eds., The Politics of Electoral Systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 453-471.

Elklit, Jørgen (2011). ’Preferential Voting in Denmark: How, Why, and to What Effect?’ Paper presented at APSA’s annual meeting, Seattle, USA 1-4 September, 2011)

Elklit, Jørgen (2016). ’Valgsystemerne’, in Jørgen Grønnegård Christensen og Jørgen Elklit (eds.), Det demokratiske system. 4. ed. Copenhagen: Hans Reitzels Forlag: 30-63.

Elklit, Jørgen (2016). ‘Hvor meget styrer folket? En sammenligning af de skandinaviske lande’, in Børge Dahl, Michael Hansen Jensen, & Søren Højgaard Mørup, eds., Festskrift til Jens Peter Christensen. Copenhagen: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 149-166.

Elklit, Jørgen & Nigel S. Roberts (1996). ’A category of its own? Four PR two-tier compensatory member electoral systems in 1994’, European Journal of Political Research, 30: 217-240.

Laakso & Taagepera - artikel

Lijphart, Arend (1994). Electoral Systems and Party systems. A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies 1945-1990. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lijphart, Arend (2005). ’Foreword’, in Michael Gallagher and Paul Mitchell, eds., The Politics of Electoral Systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press, vii-x.

Miller, Nicoline Nyholm & Jørgen Elklit (2019, in press). Folketingsvalgloven med kommentarer. Copenhagen: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag.

Norris, Pippa, Thomas Wynter, and Sarah Cameron (2018). Electoral Integrity & Campaign Media. The Electoral Integrity Project 2018 mid-year update. Sydney: The EIP Project. www.electoral.integrityproject.com/2018midyearupdate/

Shugart, Matt S., & Martin P. Wattenberg (2001). ‘Conclusion: Are Mixed-Member Systems the Best of Both Worlds?’, in Matt S. Shugart and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds., Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds? Oxford: Oxford University Press: 571-596.

Election statistics available in

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Danmarks Statistik (2020). Folketingsvalget xx. Mm 2019. Danmark, Færøerne, Grønland. Copenhagen: Danmarks Statistik, 2020. Available at www.dst.dk/Publ/FolkeTingsValg. This link also gives access to the main publications of electoral statistics from all Folketing elections, i.e. since 1849.

Hæftet i statistiske meddelelser.:

The election-related homepage of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Interior is available at: https://valg.oim.dk ; an English version can be accessed at: https://elections.oim.dk

The Folketing electoral law (as of 2014) is available in English at https://www.thedanishparliament.dk/~/media/pdf/english/the-parliamentary -system-of-denmark_2009.ashx

15

Table 5.1. The Overall Structure of the Danish Electoral System

Level (tier) Central features Effects/ConsequencesNational Seats are allocated using Hare + Largest

Remainders (LR) for parties with more votes than required by one of three electoral thresholds (the most important being now 2 per cent of the valid vote)

High level of overall proportionality at decisive level (see Table 3)

40 the 175 seats allocated in Denmark (i.e. excluding the two seats in Greenland and the two on the Faroe Islands), i.e. 23 per cent, are compensatory seats

Instrumental in reaching the high level of proportionality (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989: 131)

Lower (multi-member constituencies (MMCs) most often fitted to other administrative borders)

The number of seats in each multi-member constituency (MMC) is now determined for a five year period by a proportional allocation based the sum of total population, the size of the electorate, and a factor reflecting the geographical space of the MMC in question. Seats are allocated within the MMC using a PR allocation formula. Since 2005, it has (again) been the d’Hondt formula.

Allocation of seats across the country is generally considered fair and reasonable. Likewise, the system of allocation of seats within the MMCs is seen as unproblematic, mainly because the allocation of compensatory seats makes up for some of the biases created by the d’Hondt formula

Eventual seat allocation to individual candidates on the parties’ lists

The MMC branches of the political parties decide themselves which of several available systems are to be used for running their candidates in the MMC. This includes how the seats won eventually will be allocated to candidates on the list.

When parties organize their list of candidates in a MMC, they must choose between different systems with different consequences for the eventual selection of the individual candidates. This unique feature to some degree explains the complexity of the Danish electoral system, which some observers complain about (as does Lijphart in the quote above). But it allows MMC party branches to adjust to local circum-stances and to decide themselves what form of intra-party competition among candidates they’ll accept.

Voters have only one vote, which is cast either for a party or for a specific candidate (i.e. a preferential or a personal vote). Lists are either open or various kinds of semi-open, never completely closed. In Folketing elections, about 50 per cent of the voters cast a preferential vote.

The possibility of running on completely open lists has only been possible since the 2019-elections (sic!), so it will be interesting to see to what degree that feature will be used.

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Table 5.2. The Development in Main Features of the Electoral System 1920-2020

Period (by elections)

1920, 4 – 1920, 7

1920, 9 – 1947

1950 – 1953, 4

1953, 9 – 1960 1964 – 1968 1971 - 2005

2007 - 2019

Number of elections

2 10 2 3 3 14 4

Upper level allocation formula

Hare + LR Do do Do Do Do Do

Total number of seats1

139 148 149 175 Do Do Do

Electoral thresholds

One constituency seat or in one of the three regions2 as many votes as the national votes/seats average; eff. electoral threshold approx.: 1.1 per cent

Do do One constituency seat or 60,000 votes or in each of the three regions2 as many votes as the regional votes/constituency seat average; eff. electoral threshold approximatively: 2.6 per cent

One constituency seat or 2.0 per cent of all valid votes or in two of the three regions2 as many votes as the regional average pr. constituency seats; eff. electoral threshold: 2.0 per cent

Do Do, but the three regions delineated differently

Compensatory seats

29 31 44 40 Do Do Do

Compensatory seats in per cent of total

21 Do 30 23 Do Do Do

Number of MMCs

22 23 do Do Do 17 10

Periodical adjustment of allocation of seats to MMCs

No Do Yes Do Do Do Do

Average number of constituency seats in MMCs

5.0 5.1 4.6 5.9 Do 7.9 13.5

MMC seat allocation formula

D’Hondt Do do Modified Ste.- Laguë

Do Do D’Hondt

Allocation of constituency seats final?

Yes Do No Yes do Do Do

1 Excluding the Faroe Islands and Greenland 2 The three regions were: The capital region (Copenhagen and Frederiksberg municipalities), the islands, and Jutland. This regionalization primarily reflect the thinking behind the abandoned 1915 electoral system (only used in 1918), but it remained in use until the changes in regional delimitation in the wake of the 2005 Structural Reform.

17

Table 5.3. Changes in Lijphart’s four system change indicators and average values for Gallagher disproportionality scores, effective number of parties (N(v) and N(s)), and r

Period (by elections) 1920, 4 – 1920, 7

1920, 9 – 1947

1950 – 1953, 4

1953, 9 – 1960 1964 – 1968 1971 - 2005

2007 - 2019

Number of elections 2 10 2 3 3 14 4Upper level allocation formula

Hare + LR

Do do Do Do Do Do

Change in average number of MMC constituency seats

NA + 2 % -10 % + 28 % NA + 34 % + 71 %

Effective electoral threshold?

NA NA NA + ca. 73 % -ca. 23% NA NA

Check hos Lijphart! NAGallagher’s index of disproportionality

0.010 0.015 0.006 0.020 0.018 0.017 0.007 (2019 skal indregnes)

Effective number of electoral parties

3.80 3,72 3.97 3.84 4.17 5.30 5.66 (do)

Effective number of parliament. parties

3.69 3.64 3.91 3.66 3.90 5.02 5.58 (do)

r 0.029 0.039 0.014 0.047 0.066 0.071 0.01 (do)

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Figure 5.1. Effective Number of Parties in the Electorate (N(v)) and in parliament (N(s)), 1918-2019

1918

1920-071924

19291935

19431947

1953-041957

19641968

19731977

19811987

19901998

20052011

20190

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

N(v) N(s)

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Figure 5.2. The Six Steps of Seat Allocation in the Danish Electoral System

20

179 seats175 seats; Hare + LR

40 compensatory

seats

Step 2:

3 electoral thresholds

Greenland: 2 seats (d’Hondt); Faroe Islands: 2 seats (d’Hondt)

Step 1:

135 MMC constituency

seats

Step 3:

A party’s total seats allocation – its number of

seats in MMCs = its number of compensatory seats

Step 4:

Ste.-Laguë formula used to allocate compensatory seats

won by parties to regions

Step 5:

Compensatory seats won by parties in

regions are allocated to MMCs in the

regions using divisors 1, 4, 7, 10 etc.

Step 6:

Finding out which individual party candidates in the MMCs shall have

the constituency seats and the compensatory seats won. This

depends on the how the parties themselves – prior to the election – have determined what system shall

be used (see text for details)