Thechallengesofprovidingfree

educationinPapuaNewGuinea

GrantWalton,TaraDavdaandPeterKanaparo

Abstract

Introducedin2012,theTuitionFeeFree(TFF)policyhasbecomeaflagshippolicyofthePapuaNewGuinea(PNG)government.Since2012,furtherchangestothispolicyhavebeenintroduced;thesechangescontinuetoreducefinancialbarrierstoschoolattendanceandattempttorecentralisecontrolofeducationfunding.Whathavethesepolicychangesmeantforschools,administrators,non-governmentalserviceproviders(suchasthechurch),andotherkeystakeholders?Thispaperdrawsonqualitativeandquantitativeresearchconductedin2012and2016inEastNewBritainandGulfprovinces–theformerperformsrelativelywellindeliveringservices,thelatterrelativelypoorly.Interviewswereconductedwitheducationrepresentatives,communitymembers,governmentandchurchofficialsandotherstakeholderstoassesstheimpactofPNG’sfourthandmostenduringattemptatprovidingfreeeducation.Researchersvisited10schools,fourdistrictadministrationsandtwoprovincialadministrations.Theresearchapproachallowsforacomparisonofprogressandregressintheseschoolsbetween2012and2016.ItisarguedthatwhiletheTFFpolicyhashelpedimproveaccessandstrengthenedschoolautonomy,recentpolicyreformshavethreatenedschool-communityrelations,underminedschoolqualityandweakenedconditionsforeffectiveserviceprovision.ThepaperwillproviderecommendationsabouthowPNGpolicymakersandothersmightaddresssomeofthechallenges.

DevelopmentPolicyCentreDiscussionPaper61

August2017

SERIESISSN2206-303X

Thechallengesofprovidingfreeeducationin

PapuaNewGuinea

GrantWalton

TaraDavda

PeterKanaparo

GrantWalton is aResearch Fellow andTaraDavda aResearchOfficer at the Development Policy Centre, Crawford School ofPublic Policy, The Australian National University. PeterKanaparo isa lecturerat theUniversityofPapuaNewGuinea'sSchoolofBusinessandPublicPolicy.1

Walton,G,Davda,T&Kanaparo,P2017-“ThechallengesofprovidingfreeeducationinPapuaNewGuinea,”DevelopmentPolicyCentreDiscussionPaper#61,CrawfordSchoolofPublicPolicy,TheAustralianNationalUniversity,Canberra.

TheDevelopment Policy Centre is a research unit at theCrawford School of Public Policy, The Australian NationalUniversity.Thediscussionpaperseries is intended to facilitateacademic and policy discussion. Use and dissemination of thisdiscussion paper is encouraged; however, reproduced copiesmaynotbeusedforcommercialpurposes.

The views expressed in discussion papers are those oftheauthors and shouldnot be attributed to anyorganisationwithwhichtheauthorsmightbeaffiliated.

FormoreinformationontheDevelopmentPolicyCentre,visithttp://devpolicy.anu.edu.au/

1ThisresearchwasconductedthroughapartnershipbetweentheUniversityofPapuaNewGuineaandtheAustralianNationalUniversity’sDevelopmentPolicyCentre,andfundedbytheAustralianAidProgram.Wethankthefollowingindividualsfortheirinvolvement:DeniseLokinap,TatiaCurrieandColinWiltshire.WethankMichaelCooksonandHusniaHushangformanagingfundingandlogisticalsupport,andAnthonySwanforhisassistancewithdataprovisionandcommentsonanearlydraft.ThanksalsotothetworeviewersandMatthewDornan,theeditorofthisdiscussionpaperseries.AndtoAshleeBetteridgeforediting.Wealsothanktheadministrators,schoolsandcommunitieswhoansweredourquestionsandmadeourvisittosomeofthemoreremotepartsofthecountryfruitfulandenjoyable.Authorcontact:grant.walton@anu.edu.au.

1

AbusyclassroominEastNewBritain

1. Introduction

ThePapuaNewGuinea(PNG)government’sTuitionFeeFree(TFF)policywas

introducedin2012andhasbecomeaflagshippolicyofthePNGgovernment.Inits

presentform,thepolicyprovideselementary,primaryandsecondaryschoolswith100

percentsubsidiesforstudents’tuitionfees.Anearlyevaluationofthispolicy

(conductedin2012),whichfeaturedinNationalResearchInstituteofPapuaNew

Guinea(NRI)andAustralianNationalUniversity’s(ANU)LostDecade?Report(Howeset

al.,2014)foundthatitwasmostlydeliveringonthepromisessetoutbytheNational

DepartmentofEducation(NDoE),althoughconcernswereraisedabouttheimpacton

schoolqualityandmonitoringofsubsidypayments.

SincetheintroductionoftheTFFpolicy,therehasbeenamovetofurtherreducethe

feesassociatedwithschoolinginPNG.Atthestartof2015,thegovernmentbanned

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schoolsfromchargingprojectfees(feesleviedattheschoolleveltofundparticular

projects)andsubsequentlybannedchurchagencyfees(feeschargedbychurch

administeredschools).Therehavealsobeenmovestorecentralisesomefunds.What

havethesepolicychangesmeantforschoolsandsub-nationaladministratorsinPNG?

TheLostDecade?Reportprovidedaquantitativeassessmentoftheinitialrolloutofthe

firstyearoftheTFFpolicy.Thispaperexaminestheimpactofrecenteducationpolicies

byprovidingamorein-depthandqualitativelookattheissuesfacingschoolsintwo

provinces:EastNewBritain(ENB)andGulf.

Whyexaminethesetwoprovinces?TheLostDecade?Reportprovidedanassessmentof

schoolsandhealthfacilitiesineightprovinces,includingGulfandEastNewBritain.It

foundthatGulfperformedpoorlyacrossanumberofindicators,whileEastNewBritain

toppedthetablesforschoolqualityandinfrastructure.Forexample,between2002and

2012,theproportionofparentsclaimingthatmostchildreninthecommunityattended

schoolrosefrom37to90percentinEastNewBritain;yetinGulfitfellfrom63to37

percent(Howesetal.,2014:ix).Theaimoftheresearchinformingthispaperistobetter

understandthereasonsforthesedifferences.WhydoesEastNewBritainout-perform

Gulf,particularlywhenbotharefacedwithsignificantremotenessissues?Wealso

examinethedifferentwayschurchandstateschoolshaverespondedtotheimplications

ofthesepolicies.

Thesequestionsareapproachedthroughacase-studymethodology,whichdrawsdata

fromselectschoolsinbothprovinces.Thepaperproceedsasfollows.Thefirstsection

providesabackgroundonPNG’srecenteducationpolicies2,whilethesecondpresents

themethodologyguidingtheresearch.Thethirdsectionpresentsthekeyfindingsfrom

theschoolsvisitedinbothGulfandEastNewBritain.Itexaminestheimpactoffree

educationpoliciesonstudentenrollmentsandattendanceaswellasteacher

availability;evaluatesthefalloutfromthegovernment’sbanonschoolandprojectfees;

considersthechangingimportanceofnationalfundingovertime;examinesoversight

2Theobjectiveofthispaperistohighlightthefindingsoftheresearch,andpresentpolicyrecommendations.Giventhis,wehavenotprovidedaliteraturereviewinthispaper;forthoseinterestedinabroaderbackgroundoneducationpolicyinPNGwepointthereadertoHowesetal,2014.

3

andcommunityengagement;andconcernsaboutthe‘re-centralisation’ofeducation

fundstoDistrictDevelopmentAuthorities(DDAs).Finally,thepaperconcludeswitha

reflectiononthesignificanceofthesefindingsforthoseseekingtoimproveeducation

standardsinPNG.

2. Background

Introducedin2012,PNG’sTuitionFeeFreepolicyisoneofthefewgovernment

initiativesthathaveshownsignificantsignsofsuccess–particularlyduringitsinitial

rollout(Howesetal.,2014).Morerecentlyhowever,questionshavebeenaskedabout

whetherthepolicyisunravelling,asaccusationsofmismanagement(Robinson,2016)

andquestionablepolicychangesemerge.

OneofthekeyfeaturesoftheTFFpolicyisthatsubsidiesaresentdirectlytoschool

accounts,bypassingprovincialanddistrictadministrations.Whenthepolicywas

introduced,eachprimaryschoolwasallocatedfundingequivalentto270kinaper

student,allowingschoolstodecidehowitshouldbespent.Oncesubnational

administratorshadapprovedtheirbudgets,schoolswereabletodirectlyaccessthis

funding.Thismeantschoolscontrolledmorefundingthanbefore.

TheLostDecade?Reportfoundthat,in2012,mostprimaryschoolswerereceivingTFF

subsidypayments,andbothschooladministratorsandthecommunityhadmoresayin

howthefundswerespent(althoughfewreportedreceivingvisitstomonitorspending).

Sincethen,therehavebeenattemptstoreducethelevelofinvolvementschoolshavein

themanagementofsubsidies.

Atthestartof2016,thePNGGovernmentissuedadirectiveannouncingitwouldsplit

theTFFpaymentintothreecomponents:acashadministrationcomponentof40per

cent;ateachingandlearningcomponentof30percent(forthepurchaseofschool

materials);andaninfrastructurecomponentof30percent(Kuman&Kombra,2016).

Accordingtothedirective,schoolswouldonlybepaidthecashadministration

component,leaving60percenttobedistributedbydistrictandnationallevel

governmentofficers.Whilethegovernmenthashadapolicyofretainingfundsfor

teachingandlearningmaterialswhichpre-datesthisdirective,thenewpolicymeans

thatadditionally,fundingforinfrastructureistobeheldinatrustaccountindistrict

4

treasuries,withthedistributionofthesefundsdeterminedbydistrictofficersthrough

newlyestablishedDistrictEducationImplementationCommittees(DEICs)(Kuman&

Kombra,2016).

Atthetimeofwriting(April2017),thispolicyhadnotbeenfullyimplemented.

ConversationswithofficialsfromtheNDoErevealedthatthedepartmenthadyetto

implementtheproposedfundingdissection.Theroll-outofDEICshasalsostalled,with

theMinisterforEducationNickKumanrecentlysuggestingthat,whileapprovedby

Cabinetinlate2015,administrativestructuresandaccountingmechanismsareyetto

befinalised(StaffReporter,2016).Despitethis,personalcommunicationswith

departmentofficialsconfirmedthatprogresshadbeenmadeintheNationalCapital

District(whichcoversthenation’scapital,PortMoresby)andCentralprovince.By

coincidence,thepilotfortheresearchinformingthispaperwasconductedinCentral

provinceandresearchersconsultedwithdistrictofficials,parents,andschool

managementandteachingstaffabouttheimpactofthisnewinitiative.Sectionthreeof

thispaperincludesfindingsfromCentralprovinceabouttheirexperiencewithDEICs,

alongwithimpressionsofthenewinstitutionfromstakeholdersinGulfandEastNew

Britain.

In2015,thePNGgovernmentwentevenfurtherinitsobjectivetomakeschoolingmore

affordableandbolsterenrolments:itabolishedprojectfees,inadditiontopreviously

abolishedschoolfees.MinisterKumanreasonedthatthegovernmentalreadysubsidises

schoolsandthatitwouldmeanfewerchildrenwouldbeturnedaway.Thepenaltyfor

non-complianceisostensiblyharsh.Duringamediaconference,Kumanthreatened

schoolsthatfailedtocomply,saying,“Anyschoolthatimposesprojectfeeswillnotbe

giventheTFF[subsidy]”(Walton,2015).

Sincethisinitialpolicychangetherehavebeennumerousbackflips–forinstancea

circularpublishedinnationalpapersinJanuary2016allowedforprojectfeestobe

charged(Kuman&Kombra,2016).However,inJanuary2017,MinisterKumanand

EducationSecretaryUkeKombramadeitclearthatthechargingofprojectorschool

feeswasnotpermitted.Theystressedthat“Nofeesofanysortrelatingtostudent

enrolmentbeimposeduponparents”(LoopPNG,2017).Kombrahassaidthatiffound

tobechargingfees,schoolswouldbesuspended,theaccusationsinvestigated,and“the

5

TFFpaymentfortheschoolwillbewithhelduntilsuchtimeastheinvestigationsare

completedandthefindingsarepresentedtotheDepartmenttodecideonwhichaction

tobetaken”(LoopPNG,2017).

TheTFFpolicyisnodoubtfragile.Inrealterms,theallocationfortheTFFsubsidyhas

beendecliningsince2012,andthereareconcernsthatthecurrentfiscalcrunchcould

squeezesubsidiesfurther(SwanandWalton,2017).TherearenumerousreportsofTFF

paymentsbeingreleasedlate,resultingintheMorobe(PNG’slargestprovince)

EducationBoardannouncingthatallschoolsintheprovincewillberequiredtoimpose

schoolfeesin2017tomakeupforshortfallsinTFFfunding(Badui-Owa,2016;Swan&

Walton,2017).Atthisstage,itisdifficulttoknowiftheTFFandassociatedfree

educationpolicieswillcontinuebeyond2017,butthesignsarenotgoodgivenPNG’s

worseningfinancialsituation.Despitethesechallenges,theTFFpolicyremainsthe

longestrunningofthecountry’sfourattemptstoinstitutefee-freeeducation(Walton&

Swan,2014).

3. Aimandmethodology

Thissectionoutlinesthemethodologyframingtheresearchundertakentoinformthis

paper.Itfirstoutlinestheaimsandresearchapproach;itthenoutlinestheresearch

questions,locations,researchinstrumentsandprovidesaprofileofrespondents.

3.1Aimsandresearchapproach

ThispaperformspartofacollaborationbetweentheUniversityofPapuaNewGuinea’s

SchoolofBusinessandPublicPolicyandtheAustralianNationalUniversity’s

DevelopmentPolicyCentre.Broadly,thiscollaborationaimedtoenableabetter

understandingoftheimpactofdecentralisationpolicyandexpenditurereformson

schoolsandeducationsystems,aswellashealthfacilitiesandsystems.Thispaper

focusesonfindingsfromresearchintothecountry’seducationsystem;itprovidesa

multi-scaledanalysisofprovincialanddistrictadministrationsthroughtoschoolsand

theircommunities.

Theresearchbuildsontheresultsoftwopreviousquantitativesurveys.Ina2001/02

survey,researchersfromtNRIandtheWorldBanksampledrandomlyselectedschools

6

acrosseightprovincesofthecountry.Theresultantreporthighlightedthechallenges

facedbyschoolsandhealthfacilities(WorldBank&NationalResearchInstitute,2004).

Adecadelater,in2012,theNationalResearchInstituteandANUDevelopmentPolicy

Centrereplicatedthissurveybyvisiting,wherepossible,thesameschoolsandhealth

facilities.TheresultwastheaforementionedLostDecade?Report(Howes,etal2014).

Theresearchinformingthispaperprovidesbothqualitativeandquantitative

approachestounderstandtheimpactofpolicychangesforschoolsandsubnational

educationadministrators.Researcherswenttotenschools(allofwhichwereapartof

the2012survey),acrossfourdistrictsintwoprovinces.Thisallowedformoreindepth

studyoftheissuesfacingschoolsandtheeducationsystem.Allsubsequentdiscussions

thatreferto‘thesample’makereferencetoasampleoftenschools,fiveinGulfandfive

inEastNewBritain,whichwerevisitedinboth2012and2016.

Theresearchinformingthispapertakesamultiplecasestudyapproach,whereschools

andeducationsystemsarecompared.Attheschoollevel,schoolsofdifferenttypes

(churchversusstate),andindifferentlocations(GulfversusEastNewBritain)are

compared.Thismeanstheanalysisdoesnotprovideastatisticallyrepresentative

sampleofschools,ratheritallowsforamorein-depthlookathowschoolsandthe

educationsystemoperateindifferentcontexts,andhaverespondedtokeypolicy

changes.

Theresearchinvolvedadesignandpreparationphase,whichwasconductedinearly

2016andincludedapilotinCentralprovince.Thedatacollectiontookplaceoveratwo-

monthperiod,betweenMayandJune2016.AnalysisofresultstookplacebetweenJuly

2016andMarch2017.

3.2Locationsandselectionprocess

TheresearchwasconductedinEastNewBritainandGulf(Image1).Withinthese

provinces,twodistrictsincludedinthe2012studywerechosen(PomioandGazellein

EastNewBritain,andKeremaandKikoriinGulf).Ineachprovince,fiveschoolswere

sampled(tenintotal).

7

Image1:MapofGulfandEastNewBritain

Theresearchsoughttounderstandhowschoolsperformedinbetterandworse

performingdistrictsinGulfandEastNewBritain.Tochoosewhichdistrictstovisit

researchersdrewupona‘qualityindex’–acompositionofperformanceindicators3.

Dataonschoolperformance(compiledthroughthe‘qualityindex’)wascollectedin

2012asapartofresearchfortheLostDecade?Report(Table1).

Table1usesthe‘qualityindex’toshowtheaveragescoreatprovinceanddistrictlevel

ofschoolsvisitedin2012.Atprovincelevel,ithighlightsthatschoolsinENBgenerally

performedbetterthanschoolsinGulf.Atdistrictlevel,itshowsthatschoolsinGazelle

performedbetterthanthoseinPomio,whileschoolsinKeremagenerallyperformed

betterthanthoseinKikori.AsGulfonlyhastwo‘open’districts,itwasaneasydecision

tovisitboth(KikoriandKerema).InEastNewBritain,researcherschosetogotothe

3Thequalityindexisacompositescoreofschoolperformancein2012.Itcomprises:qualityofclassroomsandteachers’houses,otherschoolinfrastructure,percentageofteachersregularlyworking,effectivenessoftheschool’sBoardofManagement,timeteachersspendteaching,attendance,andsufficiencyoftextbooks.Ahigherscoreindicateshigherquality.WethankAnthonySwanforprovidinganalysisforthisindex.

8

bestperformer(Gazelle)andtheworst(Pomio).Thisapproachallowedtheresearchers

toanalysegoodandpoorperformingdistrictswithinthesameprovinces.

Table1:Districtqualityindexscores(datacollectedin2012)

Province District

Average

Quality

ENB Gazelle 0.69

Kokopo 0.67

Pomio 0.61

Gulf Kikori 0.46

Kerema 0.50

Table2usesthesameindextoprovideaprofileofindividualschoolsvisitedinEast

NewBritain,whileTable3profilesthosevisitedinGulf.Bothtablesshowhowschool

qualityandadministrationvaried.Churchschoolsinbothprovinceswererunby

CatholicorUnitedchurches.

9

Table2:Schoolprofiles,EastNewBritain(datacollectedin2012)

School DistrictQuality

index

Administeredby

church?

1 Pomio 0.66 No

2 Pomio 0.52 Yes

3 Pomio 0.81 No

4 Gazelle 0.71 Yes

5 Gazelle 0.81 No

SchoolsinGulfprovinceweregenerallypoorerinquality(Table3)thanthosesampled

fromEastNewBritain(Table2).Thisisareflectionoftheprovince’soverallpoor

performanceintheeducationsector.Inbothprovincesschoolswerelocatedinboth

accessible(forexamplenearamajorhighway)andremote(forexampleaccessibleonly

byboat).

10

Table3:Schoolprofiles,Gulf(datacollectedin2012)

School DistrictQuality

index

Administeredby

church?

1 Kerema 0.51 Yes

2 Kikori 0.55 No

3 Kikori 0.36 No

4 Kikori 0.41 Yes

5 Kerema 0.63 Yes

Thesetwoprovinceshaveverydifferenthistoriesandcapacitiesforservicedelivery.In

sum,EastNewBritainhasbeengivenaheadstartbyitscultureandhistorical

engagementwiththeWest,asanthropologistsErringtonandGewertz(1993)have

highlighted.Itisoneofthefewprovinceswheregovernmentisrelativelyeffective,and

generallyindicatorsofservicedeliveryarehigh(Howes,etal,2014),comparedtoother

provincesinPNG.Gulf,ontheotherhand,hasfacedenormousgeographic,historicand

socialchallenges(WaltonandJones,2017;Errington&Gewertz,1993).Asaresult,

thereisevidenceofdifferentdevelopmentoutcomesinthesetwoprovinces,andhence,

theyarecasestudiesthatprovideverydifferentcontexts4inwhichtostudythe

implementationof‘national’educationpolicies.

4KeydifferencesbetweenEastNewBritainandGulfarefurtherexploredinWaltonandJones(2017).

11

3.3Researchinstrumentsandrespondents

Theresearchinthispaperdrewuponfourdifferentresearchinstruments.Thefirst

comprisedstructuredinterviewswithprovincialanddistrictadministrators,andhead

teachers.Thequestionnairefortheserespondentswassimilartothoseutilisedin2012,

withmostofthesamequestions.Essentially,questionshelpedtoquantifythechanges

thathavetakenplaceinschoolsbetween2012and2016.Eighteenindividualstructured

interviewswereconducted,withtencarriedoutinEastNewBritainandeightinGulf

(Table4).Moremalesthanfemaleswereconsultedasmoremaleswereemployedin

administrativepositions;respondentsincludedheadteachers(actingandpermanent),

standardsofficers,andprovincialeducationadvisors.

Table4:Respondentstoindividual-structuredinterviews

Interviews Total

GenderMale 13

18Female 5

Position

Actingheadteacher 2

18Headteacher 8

Standardsofficer 6

Provincialeducationadvisor 2

ProvinceEastNewBritain 10

18Gulf 8

Thequalitativecomponentconsistedofaseriesofsemi-structuredinterviews(the

secondresearchinstrument)andfocusgroupdiscussions(thethirdresearch

instrument)withkeystakeholdersfromthegovernment,church,communityand

12

school.Thisincludedprovincialanddistrictbureaucrats,headteachers,teachers,

membersofschoolmanagementboardsandschoolParentsandCitizensCommittees,

andchurchadministratorsorrepresentatives.Forty-foursemi-structuredinterviews

wereconducted,withroughlytwo-thirdsofrespondentsinGulf,andone-thirdinEast

NewBritain(Table5).Themajorityofrespondentsweremale,reflectingthegender

distributionencounteredinadministrativeandschoolpositions.

Table5:Respondentstosemi-structuredinterviews

Interviews Total

GenderMale 35

44Female 9

Position/

Occupation

Teacher 6

44

HeadTeacher 9

Communityrep 6

LLG,districtorprovincialgovernment

administratororchurchadministrator 23

ProvinceENB 18

44Gulf 26

Giventhegenderimbalanceofsemi-structuredinterviews,additionalfocusgroupswere

conductedwithwomen.Atotalofeightwereconducted-threewithmales,fivewith

females–withthesamenumberconductedinbothprovinces(Table6).Allwere

conductedinTokPisin(PNG’slinguafranca),audiorecordedandsubsequently

transcribedintoEnglish.

13

Table6:Numberandlocationoffocusgroupdiscussions

Focusgroups Total

GenderMale 3

8Female 5

ProvinceEastNewBritain 4

8Gulf 4

Theseresearchinstrumentsweresupportedbyanumberofinformalinterviews(the

forthresearchinstrument)withavarietyofstakeholders.

4. Results

Asdescribedintheprevioussection,sampledschoolsweresituatedwithinvery

differentsocial,economic,culturalandadministrativecontexts.Schoolswerevisitedin

both2012and2016,providinginsightsintohowtheyhavebeenshapedbypolicy

changesoverthatperiod.Again,itshouldbenotedthatthesetrendsarenotstatistically

representativeofschoolsacrossthenationorindividualprovinces(thiswouldrequire

randomisationandalargersample);however,thiscase-studydoesprovideanin-depth

understandingofthewayschoolsandadministratorshaverespondedtorecentpolicy

changes–insightsthatlargersurveyscanoverlook.

4.1Theimpactoffreeeducationpoliciesonenrolmentsandattendance

ImprovingaccesstoschoolinghasbeentheTFFpolicy’sfirstobjective(PapuaNew

GuineaDeparmentofEducation,2012).Figure1showsthatonaverage,thetenschools

sampledin2016hadexperiencedastabilisingofperschoolenrolmentssince2012,

withanaverageof211studentsenrolledin2016.SchoolsvisitedinEastNewBritain

hadexperiencedasubstantialriseinenrolments,whileenrollmentsinGulfschoolshad

declined.

14

Figure1:Averageenrolmentsperschool(2012-2016)

SchoolsinEastNewBritainwereacutelyawareofthechangestoenrolmentstheyhad

experienced.Adistrictofficerintheprovincesaid:

BeforetherewasnoTFF,youcouldnotseecrowdedclassrooms…andthen

peoplesawthemoneycome.Assoonasitwasmentionedthateducationwas

free,allourclassroomsbecameovercrowded.Wehavetobuildextraclassrooms

everyyear.

Therewasmuchevidencetosuggestthatclassroomswerebeingbuiltacrossthe

province,fromGazelletoPomio.ForexampleinoneschoolinPomio,EastNewBritain,

constructionwasunderwaytoaccommodatenewstudents(seeImage2).InGazelle,

researcherssawacrewofbuildersconstructingnewclassroomspaidforbyTFF

subsidies.

-30%

-20%

-10%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

All(10schools)

ENB Gulf Church Government

%ch

ange-2012-16

Stud

ents 2012

2016

%Change

15

Image2:Classroomconstruction,Pomio,EastNewBritain.

SchoolssampledinGulfreportedaveryadifferentexperienceundertheTFFpolicy,

withenrolmentnumbersdeclining.Somerespondentssuggestedthiswasaproductof

poorqualityfacilities.OneboardmemberinKikoridistrictsaid:

Ourchildrenarenotbeingprevented[fromgoingtoschool]….Butlookatthe

facilities…mostofthechildrenhavelefttheschooljustbecausethelearning

roomhereisverysmall.Theyarejustsqueezed.

InoneschoolinKerema,ateacherreportedthatteachingstaffandcommunity

membershadbuilttablesandchairs,tocompensateforinadequateresourcesatthe

school.Theteacherhimselfhadmadethreetables.Teachersinotherpartsofthe

provincealsosuggestedthatpoorinfrastructuremeantthatstudentswerelosing

interestinschools.AteacherinKeremacommented:“[Somestudents]quitbecause

therewerenomaterials.Soenrolmentshavereallydropped”.Inanotherschool,one

teachersaid,“wehavesomeclassesthatstoppedaltogetherbecausethere’snoteacher”.

Giventhereductionsinenrolments,inanattempttoencourageparentstoreengage,

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someschoolsweretryingtopromotegreatercommunityparticipation.Oneteacherin

Keremasaidtheschoolhadstarted“Pikinini[child]sportsjusttomakethingshappen

andget[parentsreengaging]”andtoencouragethemtoconsiderenrollingtheir

children.

TheTFFpolicy’semphasisonincreasingenrolmentshasalsoreshapedthelearning

environmentwithinschools.AstheTFFpolicyisopentoallcitizens,regardlessoftheir

age,manyolderstudentshavecomeintothesystem.OnestandardsofficerinGulfsaid:

Theolderkids,wediscouragethem.Thereisonewhois36yearsold.Itmakesa

lotofdifference.Theyarenotmotivated;theydon’tstaytoolonginschool.They

comeatthestartoftheyear,butmanydropout.

Anotherstandardsofficercommentedthatolderstudentsoftenstartedatalowergrade,

andweresometimesacceleratedquicklybecauseoftheirage,whichcouldbedisruptive

tootherstudents’learning.

Asenrolmentshavestabilised,sotoohasthepercentageoffemaletomalestudents,

withanaverageofjustfewerthan50percentoffemalestudentsinboth2012and2016

(Table7).

Table7:Percentageofenrolledstudentswhoarefemale

2012 2016

All(10schools) 48% 49%

ENB 49% 51%

Gulf 43% 47%

Religious 51% 47%

Government 46% 54%

17

Classroomattendanceimprovedinthesampledschools:in2012,67percentofgrade5

and6studentswerepresentaweekbeforeresearchersvisited,in2016thathadrisen

to79percent.

Thishadbeenachieved,inpart,throughtheeffortsoftheschoolsthemselves.In

Keremaoneteacherexplainedhowtheyworkedtoimproveattendanceattheirschool:

Wehavetheattendancelistwiththeheadteacherandtheteachers.Ifthereisa

consecutive21-dayabsence,parentsmustcomeandexplain…ifthere’snogood

reason,[thematteris]handedovertotheBoM[BoardofManagement].Orthey

areaskedtotransfertoanotherschool.

InKikorioneheadteacherexplainedtheirschool’sprocessforcheckingattendance:

Theteachersareencouragedtohavechecklistforallstudentsonadailybasis.

Theattendanceclearlytellsuswhichstudentsarekeentolearnandcomingto

schooleveryday,andwhichstudentsarenotattendingclasses.

Whileanumberofschoolssawattendancefiguresrise,somehadsignificantproblems

inkeepingstudentsinschools.InPomiodistrict,EastNewBritain,studentswereabsent

duetoopportunitiesforemploymentinoilpalmplantations.Inacommunityfocus

group,researchersweretoldthatsomechildrenwereskippingschooltoworkwith

theirparentsinthenearbyoilpalmplantation.Therewereconcernsaboutattendance

inotherareastoo.InanotherschoolinPomio,aBoardofManagement(BoM)chairman

said:“Somestudentsstartatschoolanddonotattendfortherestoftheyear”.InGazelle

district,onedistrictadministratorsuggestedthatthereasonforpoorattendancewasa

resultofparentsnotvaluingtheTFFpolicy,andbecause:

Theyaretooengagedwithotheraspectsoflifeintheircommunityandtheydo

notsendtheirchildrentoschool–oftenitisbecausetheyarefocusedonvillage

customs…Childrenattendsingsingsbetweenone-twotimespermonth.These

arerelatedtomarriages,weddings,feastsanddances.

Thereweresignsthatmoreteacherswereregularlyworkinginschoolsvisited.

Interviewswithheadteachersrevealedthatoveralltherewereathirdmoreteachers

nowworkinginschools:in2012atotalof46teacherswere‘regularlyworking’at

18

schools,by2016thathadincreasedto73,anaverageofjustover7teachersperschool.

Thishasmeantthattherehavebeenimprovementsinenrolledstudent-to-working

teacherratios,overalltherewere46studentstooneworkingteacherin2012,and29

studentstooneworkingteacherby2016.Thisimprovementwasreflectedintheratios

ofworkingteacherstothoseposted(i.e.theproportionofpostedteacherswho

regularlyattendschool).Figure2showstherewasanoverallimprovementacrossthe

sampledschools;withtheproportionofworkingteachersimprovingfrom85to104

percent.Itislikelythatthisfigureishigherthan100percentduetoschoolsengaging

temporaryteachers(becausethenumberofofficiallyallocatedteachershasnotkept

pacewiththeincreaseinenrolmentssincetheTFF),andmisallocationby

administrators(exploredfurtherbelow).GovernmentschoolsandthoseinEastNew

Britainweremorelikelytohavemoreworkingteachersthanthoseofficiallyposted.

Figure2:Percentageofworkingteachers-to-posted(2012-2016)

Theavailabilityofteacherswasaproductofremoteness.WhilesomeschoolsinGulf

hadseenmoreteachersenterschools(onaveragetherewasonemoreteacherper

schoolin2016comparedto2012),inthemostremoteschoolsstruggledtoattractstaff.

AdistrictofficialinGulfconfirmedthisproblem;reflectingonthepaucityofteachersin

Kikori,shesaid:“teachersarenotteachinginremoteschoolsandmostofthemareand

wanttoteachinandaround[therelativelylessremote]Kikoristation”.Yetthereare

signsthatGulfistryingtoturnthisproblemaround.Aprovinciallevelofficialsaidwhile

staffingdifficultiesintheprovincehadbeenacuteoverthepastfewyearstherewere

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

All ENB Gulf Church Government

Percen

tage 2012

2016

(10schools)

19

effortstotrainmorelocalteachers.Theprovincialgovernment,theEuropeanUnionand

theAustralianaidprogramhadsupportedlocalstudentstostudyteachingaroundthe

country.Hewashopefulthatthiswouldcontinuetobolsterstudentnumbers,sothat,

“schoolsclosingdownbecauseofalackofteacherswillbeathingofthepast”.Without

teachersregularlyturninguptowork,somesampledschoolsinGulfhavehadnochoice

buttocancelgrades.

InEastNewBritain,issuesaroundstaffingweresignificantlydifferent.Astandards

officernotedthat:

Someschoolsareoverstaffed,meaningtheheadteacherandoneortwosenior

teachersmightnothave[toteach]aclass.Icheckedagainstthenumberof

classesandstartedpullingoutpositionsandreallocatedteachers[todifferent

schools].Thereisnoaccuracyabouthowmanystaffareneeded.TheNDoE

figuresarewrong.

Thisshowsthecriticalimportancethataccurateinformationplaysinallocating

resourcesinPNG.

4.2Theimpactofbanningschoolandprojectfees

Asdescribedinthebackgroundsectionofthispaper,thePNGgovernment’sbanonboth

schoolandprojectfeeswasinplacewhenthe2016researchwasconducted.Didthis

leadschoolstorefusetocollectmoneyfromparents?Theresultsoftheresearch

suggestsnot:by2016onlyonechurchschool,inGulfprovincedidnotchargeparents

projectorschoolfees.Figure3showsthatamongschoolsinthesample,although

officialschoolfeeshalvedfrom24kinato12kinaperstudentbetween2015and2016,

projectfeesmorethandoubled–from19to47kinaperstudent.Atthetimeofdata

collection,eightoutoftenofthesampledschoolswerecharginganaverageof59kina

perstudent(intotal),thehighestfeelevelsincetheintroductionoftheTFFpolicyin

2012.

20

Figure3:Schoolandprojectfees,2011-2016(2016prices)

Table8showsthatamongthesample,schoolfeeswereslightlyhigherinGulfand

churchschools,thaninEastNewBritainandgovernmentadministeredschools.

Table8:Officialschoolfees,perstudent(2016prices)

Schoolfees 2011 2012 2015 2016

All(10schools) 115.67 12.42 23.56 12.00

ENB 68.79 0.00 21.20 10.00

Gulf 174.26 24.83 26.50 14.00

Church 77.88 24.83 26.50 14.00

Government 145.90 0.00 21.20 10.00

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

2011 2012 2015 2016

Kina

Schoolfees Projectfees

21

IncreasesinchargesforprojectfeesweredrivenbyschoolsvisitedinEastNewBritain

andgovernmentschools(Table9).

Table9:Officialprojectfees,perstudent(2016prices)

Projectfees 2011 2012 2015 2016

All(10

schools)

9.74 24.18 18.97 47.22

ENB 5.19 14.90 25.44 55.00

Gulf 17.31 38.80 10.60 37.50

Church 21.63 30.16 27.09 38.75

Government 3.25 24.83 11.66 54.00

Table8and9(above)presenttheamountschoolsvisitedofficiallycharge,butthe

amountactuallycollectedfromparentsisanothermatter.Itwasnotpossibletocollect

dataforasufficientnumberofschoolstomakeameaningfulcomparisonofthefunding

receivedfromparents(which,bythetimetheresearchwasconducted,wasillegalfor

manyschools).However,anumberofqualitativeinterviewshighlightedthedifficulties

manyschoolsnowfaceinvolunteeringandcollectingmoneyfromparents,asaresultof

governmentpolicybanningthecollectionoffees.

Indeed,manywereconcernedthatfreeeducationpolicieshadreducedthewillingness

ofcommunitiestovolunteertheirtime.ThiswasthecaseeveninEastNewBritain,

whereprovincialadministratorspermittedschoolstocontinuechargingprojectfees

arguingthattheEastNewBritainProvincialEducationActallowsthemtocircumvent

thenationalgovernmentimposedbanonprojectfees–thisisthereasonofficialproject

feesarehigherinEastNewBritainthanGulf.Despitethis,eveninEastNewBritainthe

nationalbanappearstohaveshapedparents’willingnesstocontribute.Thiswas

illustratedbyadistrictofficial,whosaid:

22

Thereistalkfromthegovernmentthattheywillsubsidisetheprojectfeetoo.

Thisismakingsomeparentsbecomeverylazy.Theyrelytoomuch[on

governmentfunding].Theydoabitofcommunityservice[and]cleaningup,but

anythingtodowithfinancetheyarestartingtoconsiderthegovernment’s

responsibility.Theybecomemorerelaxedsothat’snotgood.

InoneschoolinEastNewBritain,theheadteacherandcommunityrepresentatives

complainedtheywerenotabletoraisefundsfromparentsforthesamereason.In2015,

theschoolhadraised12,000kinathroughfundraisingefforts,butasparents

increasinglyperceivedthegovernmentaswhollyresponsibleforschoolfunding,by

mid-2016parentshadcontributedjust200kinafortheyear.Theheadteachersaidhe

didnotthinkparentswouldbeforthcomingwithanymoremoney.Thiswas,he

believed,adirectconsequenceofthegovernment’spromotionof‘free’education.

SchoolsinGulffacedadifferentproblem.TheydidnothaveaProvincialEducationAct

topushbackagainstthenationalgovernment’sbanonprojectfees,leavingsome

schoolstofindcreativewaystogeneratesupportfromparents.Afemaleteacherfrom

Kikoridistrictdescribedhowtheschoolhadreframedprojectfeestomakethemmore

palatabletoparents:

Lastyearparentswerepayingprojectfees.Thentheeducationdepartmentdidnot

allowustochargethese,sowehadtochangethat‘projectfee’nametoanothername…

Wecalledit‘maintenancefees’atthestartoftheschoolyear[in2015].[Thiswas

important]becausewearenotreceivingtheTFF.

Chargingprojectfeeswasimportantforschoolsfacinglateornon-arrivalofTFF

payments.Reflectingonfundsreceivedin2015,onememberoftheBoMinPomiosaid:

“weonlyreceivedtwooutofthefourpayments”,makingtheraisingoffundsfromother

sourcesallthemoreimportant.

Freeeducationpolicieshavealsoaffectedchurches,andthereforethebanonproject

feeshasotherimplicationsfortherelationshipbetweentheStateandchurch

administrators.TheCatholicChurchiscurrentlyindisputewiththegovernmentand

DepartmentofEducationovertheActingSecretaryforEducation’sCircularNo.6of

2016whichordersschoolsinreceiptoftheTFFsubsidynottoimposeanyfees,

23

includingprojectfeesandchurchagencyfees.Alettercontestingthiscircularwas

addressedtothePrimeMinister,signedbythePresidentoftheCatholicBishop’s

ConferenceofPNG,BishopArnoldOrowae,andpublishedinthePostCourierinMay

2016(Orowae,2016).ItarguedthatthecirculartransgressedtheNationalEducation

Act,andProvincialEducationActsinthe13provinceswheretheseareinplace.Astable

8and9illustrate,thebanonagencyfeeshasnotstoppedchurchschoolsfromcharging

parents(althoughchurchschoolsvisitedchargedlessprojectfeesthangovernment-run

schools,suggestingchurchschoolsmayhaveadheredmorecloselytothebanonproject

fees).

4.3Officialpaymentstoschools

TheTFFpolicyhasmadefundingfromthenationalgovernmentmoreimportantfor

schoolsthaneverbefore.Beforethispolicy,fundsfromthenationalgovernmentwere

directedthroughprovincialordistrictadministrationsandcollectedbyschoolofficials.

Sinceitsintroductionin2012,fundshavebeendelivereddirectlytoschoolbank

accounts.Thismeantthatin2012,schoolsacrosseightprovincesreliedonnational

subsidiesfor80percentoftheirfunds,comparedtoonly52percentin2011(Howeset

al.,2014).In2012,provincialgovernmentswereprovidingjust2percentofschool

funds,downfrom9percentintheyearbeforethepolicywasintroduced(Howesetal.,

2014).

ThisraisesquestionssuchashowmuchoftheTFFsubsidyhasreachedschools,and

whetherschoolsarestilldependentonthenationalgovernmentforfunding?Inthe

schoolssampled,incomefromthenationalgovernment’sTFFsubsidyincreased

substantiallybetween2011and2012,thefirstyeartheTFFpolicywasintroduced

(Figure4).By2015,evenmorefunding-per-studentwasreachingschoolsvisited–on

averageschoolsreceived272kinaperstudent,twokinamorethantheofficialnational

subsidy.ThisincreasewasdrivenbyschoolsvisitedinGulf.Atthesametime,schools

visitedinEastNewBritainexperiencedareductionofalmostonethirdinperstudent

funding.

24

Figure4:Averagefundingfromnationalgovernment,perstudent(2016prices)

Thereasonsforthedivergentfortunesoftheseschoolsoverthepastfewyearsis

evidentininterviewswithkeyschoolstakeholders.AheadteacherinGazelledistrict,

EastNewBritain,commented,“WhatweseeishighenrolmentsbuttheTFF[policy]is

notmatchingup[withenrolments].”Adistricteducationofficer,whoalsonoticedthis,

said:

Wedon'tknowhowtheyarecalculatingtheTFFtoourschools…itwassupposed

tobebasedonenrolments.But[eventhoughenrolmentshaveincreased],the

TFFisbecomingsmaller.Wedon'tknowhowtheycomeupwiththatamount.

WithschoolsreceivinglessTFFsubsidythanexpected,ithasbeennecessaryforthemto

fallbackonsurroundingcommunitiestogetthingsdone.AsoneBoMchairmanfrom

Pomiosaid,“Sometimesteachershavenomaterialandbecauseof[the]TFF[policy]we

havenomoney.Butthevillageworkstogethertohelp[theschool]”.Atoneschoolin

EastNewBritain,scarcityoffundshasledtheschooltomoveawayfromengagingwith

contractors,insteadfavouringcheaperlabourfromwithinthecommunity.Amemberof

theBoardofManagementsaidthatpreviouslytheschoolhadpaidcontractorsfor

schoolbuildingwork,butmorerecentlyitpaidcommunitymembersonekinaperday

toworkonschoolbuildingsandmaintenance.This,hesaid,hadsubstantiallycutlabour

costs.

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

All(10schools) ENB Gulf Church Government

Kina

2011 2012 2015

25

Towhatextentcanschoolsrelyonfundingfromotherorganisations?Overall,school

incomefromprovincialandnationalgovernmentandotherorganisations(suchas

NGOsandbusinesses)increasedbetween2011and2012,butremainedconstant

between2012and2015(Figure5).However,thereweresignificantvariations,with

schoolsvisitedinEastNewBritainandchurchschoolsreceivinglessfundsonaper

schoolbasisbetween2012and2015.

Figure5:Combinedschoolfunding–fromnationalandprovincialgovernments

andotherorganisations(2016prices)

Intermsofthetotalfundingschoolsreceived(fundingfromallsources),onaper

studentbasis,schoolsacrossthesampleexperiencedanincreaseinfundingbetween

2011and2012.In2015,fundingalsoincreasedto294kina(seeFigure6).However,

schoolssampledinEastNewBritainsufferedareductioninperstudentfundingof

approximatelyone-thirdbetween2012and2015,whilethosevisitedinGulf

experiencedanincrease,likelyduetoadeclineinenrolmentsthroughouttheyear.In

thesameperiod,fundingtochurchschoolsinthesampleincreasedslightly,while

governmentschoolsinthesamplewitnessedasmalldeclineinoverallfunding.

0

10000

20000

30000

40000

50000

60000

All(10schools) ENB Gulf Church Government

Kina

2011 2012 2015

26

Figure6:Totalfundingfromnational,provincial,othersources;perstudent

(2016prices)

Figure7showstheextentofschoolrelianceonnationalgovernmentfunding.While

schoolsvisitedreceivedfundsfromprovincialgovernmentsin2011and2012,by2015

thissupporthadcompletelydriedup,andtherewerenoexamplesofschoolsreceiving

fundingfromprovincialgovernments.Between2012and2015,over90percentof

officialschoolfundscamefromthenationalgovernment(comparedtofundingfrom

otherorganisations,suchasprovincialordistrictfunds,ordonors/NGOs).

Figure7:Perstudentincomebyofficialfundingsource(2016prices)

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

All(10schools) ENB Gulf Church Government

Kina

2011 2012 2015

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

2011 2012 2015

Kina

Nationalgovernment Provincialgovernment Othersources

27

Acrossthesample,churchschoolsweremostreliantongovernmentfunding(Figure8).

Inboth2012and2015,allofficial(andlegal)fundingreceivedbychurchschoolscame

fromgovernmentsources.Schoolswereluckyifthechurchprovidedsmalldonations.In

2015,onlyonechurchschool(inGulf)received100kinainfundingfromthechurch,out

ofatotalincomeofover36,000kina.

Figure8:Percentageoffundsreceivedfromnationalgovernment(2012and

2015)

Dependenceongovernmentfundinghasshapedhowlocalcommunitiesviewtheroleof

thechurch.BeforetheintroductionoftheTFFpolicy,fundingforchurchschoolswas

channeledthroughthechurchadministration.Nowthatsubsidiesaretransferredto

individualschoolbankaccounts,schoolshavefarmoreautonomyoverhowthesubsidy

isspentandmanaged.Asaresult,thechurchplaysadiminishedroleinschool

administration.Asoneseniorchurchadministratorsaid:

Before[governmentfunding]wascomingtothechurchandwemonitored[it],

andtherewasimprovement.Nowwhen[fundsgo]intotheschools,thehead

teacher,theboard,andthecommitteetocontrolinfrastructure[theproposed

30%infrastructurecomponentoftheTFFpolicy]andeverythingelse…wehave

nosay…

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%

100%

All(10schools) ENB Gulf Church Government

Percen

tage

Typeofschool

2012 2015

28

Hesaidthatthishasledtomoreinstancesofmisappropriationbecausethechurches

havelesscontrolandoversightoffunds.Itisdifficulttoknowhowextensive

mismanagementattheschoollevelis.Whatisclear,however,isthatsampledschools

werefarmoreempoweredtomanagetheirownfundsthaninthepast,and

consequently,thechurchadministrationhasbeensidelinedfromschoolmanagement

(althoughindividuallocalclergyplayanimportantroleinotherareas).Thislossof

controlislikelyreflectedintheCatholicChurch’srecentlegalchallengeofthe

government’s2016freeeducationpolicy,(Orowae,2016)5.

Sincetheintroductionoffreeeducationpoliciesandthedecisiontorelayfundsdirectly

fromthenationalgovernmenttothebankaccountsofrecipientschools,someschoolsin

thesamplehavebeguntoquestionthebenefitsofbeinglabeleda‘churchschool’.InGulf

province,oneheadteacherinchargeofaschoolrunbyachurchsaid:“[Thisschool…]

canbe[classifiedas]agovernmentschoolbecausethere’sno[financial]contribution

from[thechurch]”.

Thiswasacommonrefrainwithinchurchschoolsinthesample,withsomesuggesting

thattheintroductionoftheTFFpolicyhadsignificantlyreducedthechurch’srole.This

suggeststhatgovernmentpoliciesmayhavestartedtoerodethestandingofthechurch

insomecommunities.Whilethechurchcontinuestoplayanimportantroleinproviding

religiousinstruction,choosingteachersandprovidingextraoversight,theyarefarless

engagedwithdeliveringandoverseeingschoolfundingthanbeforetheintroductionof

theTFFpolicy.

Thesideliningofthechurchadministratorsposesanumberofproblemsnotleast

becausechurchschoolshavespecificadvantagesovergovernment-runschools.For

example,thepresenceofpriestsandpastorsinschooladministrationprovidesanextra

checkonschoolneeds,andcanexpeditethereportingofproblemstochurch

administration.Inaddition,teachersarechosenbythechurchthemselves,often

5Asoutlinedinsection4.2thechurcharguedthatthegovernmentbanonprojectandchurchfeestransgressedtheNationalEducationAct,andProvincialEducationActsinthe13provinceswheretheseareinplace.

29

resultinginchurchschoolshavinghigherqualitystaff(Howesetal,2014).The

governmentcouldbeinadvertentlymarginalisingoneofthefewinstitutionswitha

proventrackrecordofqualityeducation.

4.4Monitoringandcommunityengagement

StandardsofficersareemployedbytheNationalDepartmentofEducationtooversee

andmonitorschools.Theyarestationedatdistrictadministrations,andreporttosenior

standardsofficerswhoarebasedattheprovinciallevel.Onaverage,theschoolsinthe

samplereceivedtwovisitsfromstandardsofficersin2015,slightlyupfromtheaverage

numberofinspectionsin2011(1.6peryear).Standardsofficersdotheirbestto

performphysicalinspectionsofschools,butmanyfacesignificantchallengesin

travellingtoandaccessingthemostremoteschools;somerequireofficerstowalkfor

severaldays.InEastNewBritain,somecomplainedthatstandardsofficerswerenot

performinginspectionsregularlyenough.InoneschoolinPomiotheheadteachersaid:

Thereisashortageofstandardsofficers.Thereshouldbemore...Somestandards

officersspendmoneyonvisitingKokopoorRabaulinsteadofperforming

inspections.Iftheydocome,theydon’thavetimetoaudittheTFF[subsidy]–

theirvisitistooshort.

TheproblemwasevenmoreacuteinschoolsvisitedinGulf,wherestandardsofficers

werefacedwithenormouschallengesingettingouttotheprovince’smostisolated

schools.AstandardsofficerinGulflamentedthattherewasnotenoughfundingtoget

outtothemostremoteschools:

Wearesupposedtovisitfourtimesperyear,butmostschoolsareonthecoast

anditisveryexpensivetogetthere.Forexample,[named]schoolhasnotbeen

visitedinthelastsixyears.Ivisitedlastyear.Ittookthreeorfourhourstoget

therebyroad.Thetripisquiterugged,andtherearenofunds.

Thisrespondentreportedthatstandardsofficersonlyreceived2,000kinaayeartopay

fortheirschoolinspections.However,thecostoftravellingtojustoneremoteschool

oftenexceededthisallowance,aresultofthehighcostofboatfuel.Somestandards

officerseconomisedwherevertheycould,sleepinginschoolstosaveonaccommodation

30

costsandwalkingasmuchaspossible.Buttravellingtoallschoolsintheprovincewas

beyondeventhemosthardenedandcommittedstandardsofficer.

Giventhis,thefrustrationfeltbystandardsofficersatnotbeingabletovisitschoolswas

palpable.Onesaid:

I'vecomeaverylongway,butIgiveup.Ihavethewillpowerbutnotthemeans

togointomyschools.Itisveryfrustrating.Iamnot[supposedtobe]anoffice

worker,yetIsithereallday.IhavetheSLIP[SchoolLearningandImprovement

Plan]butIcan'tgetouttoteachersorschools.Thereisnomoneyfortravelling,

normoneyforphotocopyingtheplanorsharingit.

InGulfprovince,astandardsofficerbrokedownandcriedwhendescribingthe

difficultiestheyfaced,whilesomereportedtakingonpersonaldebtinordertovisit

remoteschools.Anotherstandardsofficer,whowasresponsibleforsomeofGulf’smost

remoteschoolscommented:

Ispent1,400kinaofmyownfundsin2015togettoschools.Ihaveappliedfor

reimbursementbutithasn’tbeengiven[back].

Thisshowsthattheemotionalandfinancialcosttostandardsofficers,particularlyin

Gulfprovince,issignificant.Notonlyarestandardsofficersconstrainedbylimited

resources,buttheirmoraleisgraduallybeingeroded.

WhileschoolsnowreceivethemajorityoftheirincomethroughtheTFFsubsidy,the

abilityofstandardsofficerstomonitorthesepaymentshasbeenseverelyundermined

byalackofinformation.InEastNewBritain,onedistricteducationofficersaid:“We

havenoideahowmucheachschoolisreceiving…howdoImonitorschools[when]I

don'tknowhowmuchtheschoolisreceiving?”Inotherwords,thedistrictand

provincialadministratorsdidnotknowhowmuchfundingeachschoolwasmeantto

receiveeachquarter,northeactualamountreceived.Tosolvethisproblem,the

province’sadministratorswerelookingtoemployaTFFpolicyofficertomonitorthe

fundsgoingtoeachschoolandrelaythisinformationtothedistricts.

Giventhechallengesfacingstandardsofficers,churchesandcommunitiesplayan

increasinglyimportantroleinprovidingoversight.AheadteacherinKeremanotedthat

31

whileinspectionsbystandardsofficerswerenotregular,“Theparishpriestvisitsus

everydaybecauseheresideshereinthecommunity”.Yet,asnotedintheprevious

section,localclergyareplayingadiminishedroleinthemanagementofsomeschools.

Localclergyalsoapplypressuretotheprovincialgovernmentandchurchofficialsto

addressschoolchallenges.Oneseniorchurchadministratorexplained:

Ifthere’snoteacherthereinthatschool,parishpriestswillbetheonetosay:

“Heyman,lookatthis.Myschooldoesn’thaveaheadteacher,orthere’sone

vacantposition.Whatareyoudoingaboutthat?”

Somechurchessupplytheirownprovincialadministratorstovisitschoolsandprovide

oversight–althoughthereisevidencetheirinfluenceinschoolsisonthewane.One

churchadministratorsaidthathehadreceivedreportsfromgovernmentstandards

officers,butinrecentyearsthesereportshadbecomelessfrequent.

4.4.1Challengestocommunityengagement

UndertheTFFpolicy,theschoolcommunityhasostensiblybecomeempoweredlike

neverbefore.Thepolicycallsforfundingdecisionstoinvolvetheheadteacher,the

BoardofManagement(BoM)andtheParentandCitizenscommittee(P&C).Thehead

teacherandBoMareresponsiblefordecisionsinvolvingthespendingofschoolfunds,

whilethroughtheP&Ccommittee;parentsareresponsibleformonitoringandagreeing

tofundingallocations.TheTFFManagementManualcallsforquarterlymeetings

betweenparentsandtheBoM,andnotesthat:

Parents,guardiansandcommunityleadersareresponsibleformonitoringthe

headteacherandBoardofManagementtomakesuretheyspendthe[TFF]

moneycorrectly(PapuaNewGuineaDepartmentofEducation,2012:5).

AllschoolsinthesamplereportedhavingaP&CcommitteeandaBoM;manyreported

thattheBoMandheadteacherconsultedcitizensaboutthebudget.However,on

averageschoolswerenotquitemeetingthemandatedtargetofconveningfour

meetingsperyear.Table10showsthatin2011and2015,theaveragenumberofboth

P&CandBoMmeetingsinsampledschoolsremainedunchangedatthreeperyear.

32

Table10:Communityengagementinschools(10schools)

2011 2015

AveragenumberofBoMmeetings 3 3

AveragenumberofP&CMeetings 3 3

UndertheTFFpolicy,theamountofmoneymanagedbytheBoMandheadteacherhas

significantlyincreased.Thishaslikelybeenacontributingfactorintheincreasein

peopleinvolvedintheBoM(insampledschools),withanaverageof11membersin

2016,comparedtoeightin2012(Figure9).Therehasalsobeenashiftinthegenderof

BoMmembers:in2016,34percentofBoMmemberswerefemale,comparedto22per

centin2012.

Figure9:NumberonBoM;Percentagefemale(2012,2016;10schools)

Unfortunately,largerBoMshavenotalwaysresultedinmoreharmoniousdecision-

making.WiththeBoMplayingacentralroleindetermininghowfundsarespent,the

headoftheBoM–thechairperson–hasbecomeahotlycontestedposition.Insome

schools,thishasledtodisputes.InGulf,apreviouschairmansaid:

IamtryingtobetheBoMchairman.Iwasonce,butwassidelinedbythe

treasurerandsecretary.IamacaretakerBoMchairman,thereisnoformal

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40%

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

2012 2016

%ch

ange

Numbe

r

Year

AveragenumberonBoM

%ofBoMmembersfemale

33

positionbutthereisaverbalunderstandingwiththeschool.Thereis[ongoing]

conflictoverwhowantstobethechairman.

Asaresulttheschool’sBoMdidnotmeetin2016.AccordingtothespurnedBoM

chairman,thisresultedinafundinggridlock:

Theschoolhasfundsbuttheyhavenotbeenused.[Becauseoftheongoing

disputeoverBoMpositions]ourtreasurerdoesn’twanttoapproveteachers’

spendingoffunding.Teachersneedmaterials,andwe’dliketowithdrawfunds

butthetreasurerwon’tletus.Sometimestheteachersusetheirownfundsand

complaintome.

Anassistantteacherfromthesameschoolexplainedthatthestruggleforcontrolofthe

BoMhadtodowithclanrivalries,withtheBoMSecretaryandthechairpersonfromone

ward(thelowestadministrativeunit)excludingthosefromanotherward.Healleged

onlythetreasurerandchairman:

haveasayinmanagementof[TFF]funds.Notthecommunity,nottheother

membersoftheboardofmanagement,notteachers,notchildren,notchurch,not

otherstakeholders.

Suchconflictswereasimilarthemeinconversationsinanumberofotherschools

visited,particularlyinGulf.

4.4.2Otherpressuresoncommunityinvolvement

Schoolsrelyheavilyonthesurroundingcommunitytoprovidearangeofservices.For

instance,inoneschoolinGulfprovince,theheadteacherexplainedthateveryTuesday,

thecommunityhelpedtofixfencesandtoilets,andtidytheschoolgrounds.Poor

relationsbetweencommunitiesandschoolscanleadtoahostofproblems,asoneBoM

chairmaninGulfexplained:

Therelationshipbetweenschoolandthecommunityisverypoor.The

communitystealsdesks,tablesandchairsfromtheschool.Thecommunityisnot

willingtoallowtheschooltoexpandbybuildingmoreclassrooms…Allinall,the

34

community’sattitudetowardstheschoolisnotgoodandtheyare[only]

expectingsomething(i.e.,money)fromtheschool.

Inturn,thequalityofschoolingcanbesignificantlyshapedbythenatureofcommunity-

schoolrelations.

Acrosstheschoolssampled,landissuesalsoposedasignificantthreattocommunity-

schoolrelations.InbothEastNewBritainandGulf,anumberofschoolsfound

themselvesinconstantnegotiationwithsurroundingcommunitiesoverownershipof

schoolland.Somehadmanagedtoplacatelandownersbyensuringtheywere

representedontheBoM,however,externaldevelopmentscouldigniteconflictover

land,leadingtocompensationclaimsandhostilities.InGulf,thepromiseofroyalties

fromapromisedLiquidNaturalGasprojectchangedthewaythesurrounding

communityperceivedthevalueoflandusedbytheschool.Aseniorteacherexplained

thatlandownersnowexpectedtheschooltopaythemroyalties.

Suchdisputesneededtobehandledwithcare.InKikori,landdisputesforcedthe

closureofaschoolforanumberofyears;whileinneighbouringKerema,conflictover

whoownedschoollandresultedinitsclosurein2013.Inthelatterexample,

landownershadrecentlyunsuccessfullypetitionedtheDepartmentofEducationfor

compensationfortheschoolusingtheirland,eventhoughtheschoolwasfoundedinthe

1950s.

InPomio,EastNewBritain,landownerdisputeswereexacerbatedbyloggingandoil

palmoperations.Onemalerespondentcommented:

Whenthe[oilpalm]companycamein,landdisputesbecameacommonissueinthe

community.Priortothecompany,weallwerelivingpeacefully,butwhenthesepeople

gotaccesstoroyalties…[theydevelopeda]royaltymentalityandwantotherservicesto

paythemroyalties[suchastheschoolandhealthfacility]likethecompanyisdoing.

Therewasaperceptionthatthedisputewasperpetuatedbytheyoungergeneration;

withthisrespondentsaying:

[Whentheschoolwasestablished]theeldersandthosewhojoinedforcesto

establishtheschoolworkedtogetherandagreedthatthislandwouldbecomea

35

stateland.However,theseyoungergenerationshaveadifferentmentality…

resultinginthedispute.

Communitymembershadcalledforthegovernmenttomediate,buthadyettoreceivea

rulingonthematter.

Insum,thissectionhashighlightedthepotentialsandpitfallsofcommunity

engagement,thefollowingexaminesthepotentialforchannelingeducationfundingto

districtadministrations.

4.5DDAsandeducationfunding:‘de-centralisation’or‘re-centralisation’?

Thenationalgovernment’sproposaltodivert30percentoffundsfromschoolsto

districtadministrations–DistrictDevelopmentAuthorities(DDAs)–hassomepotential

benefits.Itpromisestopooleducationalresourcessothatgovernmentadministrators

areabletobuildlarge-scaleinfrastructureprojects–projectsthatschoolswouldbe

unabletootherwiseafford.DDAsaretoestablishnewDistrictEducation

ImplementationCommittees(DEICs)todecideonprojectsindistricts.TheseDEICs

havebeenestablishedinPortMoresbyandCentralprovince,butnotinotherprovinces.

ThissectiondrawsondatafromCentralprovince(wherethepilotstageofthisresearch

wasconducted)aswellasEastNewBritainandGulf,tohighlightthepotentialand

pitfallsoftheseproposedinstitutions.

4.5.1TheDEICinCentralprovince

InCentralprovince,thenewlyestablishedDEICwaschairedbytheadministrativehead

oftheDDA(knownasaCEOordistrictadministrator),whowasappointedbytheopen

MP6.Asaresult,somerespondentswereconcernedthisnewlyestablishedstructure

couldbepoliticallycompromised.Inthewordsofonedistrictofficer,“TheCEOwill

neversaynototheMP.Ifhesaysno,heisatrisk[oflosinghisjob]”.Districtofficersalso

notedthattheDistrictServicesImprovementProgram(DSIP)fundingwasbeing

directedtoshoreupsupportfortheMPandLLGpresidentsinthe2017elections.Given

6OpenelectorateMPstypicallycoveroneadministrativedistricts

36

thepowerMPshave,itispossibletheycouldwieldinfluenceoverspendingdecisions,

andthusshapethedistributionoffundschanneledthroughDEICs.

InthetwoprimaryschoolssampledinCentralprovince,therewasapprehensionabout

whattheDEICswouldmeanforfundingallocations.Oneteachersaidthateventhough

theythoughttheTFFpolicyhadimprovedschools,theDEICswere“notagood

initiative,aswemaynotgetthemoneywearesupposedto.”Giventhatin2015,district

funding(allocatedtoeducationinfrastructureandchannelledthroughthe‘District

EducationImprovementProgram’7),andwhichpromisedtoprovideanextra3million

kinaperdistrictreportedlyneverarrived;thisfearisjustified.

Insomecases,puttingdecision-makingpowersinthehandsofdistrictofficersalso

increasestheriskofsubstandardinfrastructureormaintenanceworks.Atoneschoolin

Centralprovince,acontractingcompanyemployedbythedistricttobuildaclassroom

in2012wasallegedlyconnectedtoamemberoftheDDA.The

contractorreportedlyreceived200,000kinabutfailedtofinishthejobandvanished,

forcingtheschooltouse15,000kinaofitsownmoney.Thebuildingwascompletedbut

poorlybuilt.

Incomparison,bothschoolshadexamplesofthesuccessfulindependentmanagement,

fundingandbuildingofteachers’housesandclassroomswithfundsTFFsubsidies.They

hadengagedcommunitymembersinthebuildingworks.Inoneexample,thepresident

oftheschool’sBoMwasinchargeoftheconstruction.Inbothschools,thesebuildings

wereinbetterconditionthanthosebuiltbyoutsiders.Thus,withoutsignificantchanges

togovernancepractices,poolingeducationalfundingatthedistrictlevelisunlikelyto

leadtocheaperorbetterinfrastructure.Indeed,itmaypushpricesupandreduce

quality.

7Setupin2015tofundeducationprojects–thiswasaseparateschemeandnotassociatedwithDEICs

37

4.5.2ResponsestopromisedDEICsinGulfandEastNewBritain

InGulfandEastNewBritain,manypublicservantsandschoolofficialshadlittle

knowledgeabouttheproposedpolicy,butthosethatdidwereworriedthatitwould

preventfundsfromreachingneedyschools.Forexample,achurchadministrator

expresseddoubtthatthedistrictadministrationwouldreleasethesefunds,givenpast

promisesaboutincreasestoeducationfundingthathavefailedtomaterialise.One

churchadvisorsaid:

Overtheyears,fundshavebeenreleasedtothedistricts[suchasthe3million

districtfundingin2015],butschoolshaveneveraccessedanythingfromthose

funds.

WhiletherewasscepticisminbothEastNewBritainandGulfaboutthepotentialof

DEICs,thoseinGulfexpressedthemostincredulitytowardsit.There,district

administrationswereonthevergeofdysfunction.MPsoftendominateddecision-

makingwithinDDAs,renderingthosedesignatedtokeepthemaccountablepowerless,

andtransgressingthe2014DistrictDevelopmentAuthorityAct(whichsetsout

proceduresforkeepingMPsandotherdecisionmakersaccountable).Asonesenior

districtofficial,withextensivefirst-handexperienceofdistrictadministrationnoted:

“Theopenmembers[MPs]directthemoneythemselves–theyspenditwheretheygot

theirvotes”.Inotherwords,districtfundingwasbeingdirected,notwhereitwas

needed,buttobuildpatronagenetworks.Giventhis,thereisariskthatchannelingmore

fundstodistrictadministrationwillmeanthatthemostvulnerableschoolsarenot

prioritised8.

8Foramorein-depthexaminationofthedifferencesinadministrativecapacitybetweenEastNewBritainandGulfseeWaltonandJones(2017).

38

5. Discussionandconclusions

Policiesaimedatreducingthecostsofschoolinghavechangedsignificantlysince2012.

InitialassessmentsoftheTFFpolicyintheLostDecade?Reportwerecautiously

optimistic(Howes,etal2014).Theresearchundertakenanddiscussedheresupports

thissanguineassessment,withtheTFFpolicy(inparticular)receivingpraisefroma

numberofdifferentstakeholders.However,ashighlighted,since2012policychanges

haveledtoanumberofnegativeconsequenceschallengingthebenefitsoftheoriginal

2012TFFpolicy.

AkeyobjectiveoftheTFFpolicyandthegovernment’sdirectivetobanprojectfeeshas

beentoimprovestudentaccesstoschooling.YetinschoolsvisitedinGulf,enrolments

declinedasstudentsandparentswereputoffbythepoorqualityofschooling.This

suggeststhatfreeeducationpoliciesthatfocusongettingstudentsintoschools,without

concurrentlyimprovingqualityeducationandmonitoring,aretakingatollinsome

provinces.Inturn,improvingaccesstoeducationisnotonlyaboutreducingschooland

projectfees,itisalsoshapedbythewayteachersaresupportedandmonitored,the

abilityofstandardsofficerstoinspectschools,andthequalityofclassrooms,teaching

resourcesandotheramenities.Ensuringqualityeducationisalsoaboutimprovingdata

collectionandanalysis.InEastNewBritain,poordatahadledtoamisallocationof

teachers.Thishighlightstheimportanceofensuringthatdataheldbynationaland

subnationaladministratorsisaccurate.Intherushtoincreaseaccesstoschooling

acrossPNG,theseissueshavebeenoverlooked.Thesefindingssuggestitisnowtimeto

placethemattheforefrontofeducationpolicies.

TheTFFpolicyeliminatesschoolandprojectfees;however,manyschoolsarecharging

thesedespitegovernmentdirectives.Thisispartlyaresultoflateanderraticdeliveryof

governmentsubsidies,butalsoareflectionoftheabsenceofotherfundingsources.

Withschoolsmorereliantonnationalgovernmentfunding,delaysplaceschoolsina

vulnerablesituation.SincetheintroductionoftheTFFpolicy,churchschoolshave

becomemorereliantnationalgovernmentfunding,andchurchadministratorsnowplay

diminishedroleinschoolmanagementandoversight.Freeeducationpolicieshavealso

changedthewaysomecommunitiesviewthechurch’sroleinserviceprovision.Since

churchschoolsnowreceivefundingdirectlyfromthegovernment,manyinvolvedinthe

39

schoolsvisitedconsideredthem‘governmentschools’.Enforcedrelianceongovernment

fundinghasresultedinanationaldisputeovertherightofchurchschoolstochargefees

(seeOrowae,2016).Giventhatchurchesplayasignificantroleintheprovisionof

educationalservices,andthegovernmentsubsidyisnotoriouslylate,thereactionof

churchadministratorsisunsurprising.

Asreportsofschoolsdefyingthedirectiveonchargingfeescontinuetosurface,itis

recommendedthatthegovernmentofficiallyreinstatebothprojectfeesandagencyfees

toallowschoolstomanagefundingshortfalls–manyschoolsarechargingthesefees

anyway.Asperpreviouspolicyguidelines,provincialgovernmentsshouldsetupper

limitsonthesefees.Compliancewiththelimitsshouldbemonitoredbystandards

officers,andinthecaseofchurchschools,churchofficials.

TheTFFpolicy’sdevolvementoffiscalmanagementtoschoolshasempowered

communitiestodesignandimplementprojectsthatbenefitstudentsandteachers.It

allowsforfundingtobemoreeffectivelyallocated,ascommunities,notbureaucrats,

haveabetterunderstandingofwhatschoolsneed.Occasionally,ithasencouragedthrift.

Insomelocations,schoolshavedrawnoncommunityskillsandlabourtocutdownon

buildingcosts.Thisdevolutionhasalsolikelyencouragedmorepeopleand

encouragingly,women,tojointheBoM–akeyinstitutionforschoolgovernance.These

grassrootsinitiativesareastrengththatshouldbefurthersupported.

Indeed,nearbycommunitiescanplayaroleinhelpingschoolstoovercomeanumberof

theproblemsidentifiedinthispaper.SchoolsvisitedinGulfwereabletoimprove

studentattendancebyensuringteachersandcommunitymembersjointlymonitored

studentsandreprimandedparentsontheirchildren’snon-attendance.Thisisonearea

whereEastNewBritainadministratorsandschoolscanlearnfromthoseinGulf.Inthe

absenceofofficialoversight,thelocalcommunitycanprovideaneffectivealternative.

Localclergyalsoplayanimportantroleinthisregard:theyhelptoprovideasenseof

disciplineandethicsthroughtheirengagementwithschools.Theyoccupyaunique

moralpositionwithincommunities,andcanprovideguidancewhenthereislittle

bureaucraticorofficialinput.

However,schoolsstillneedoversightfromoutsiders.Standardsofficersplayacrucial

roleinmonitoringspendingandpedagogy.Theycanalsomediatedisputesaboutthe

40

BoM–whichappeartobeincreasing,giventheriseinfundingassociatedwiththese

positions.Thispaperhasreportedonfunding-constrainedstandardsofficerswhoare

unabletoperformessentialoversightandmonitoringroles.Withoutthesubnational

feedbackprovidedbythisrole,itisnotpossibleforthenationaladministrationtoknow

howschoolsarefaring.

Standardsofficersneedtwothings:resourcesandinformation.Resourcesaremost

desperatelyneededinGulf,wherestandardsofficersfaceenormouschallengesin

visitingschoolsandarebecomingincreasinglydemoralised.Therearealsosignsthat

themostbasicinformationaboutschoolfundingisfailingtomakeitswaytoschools,

andvice-versa.Ifstandardsofficersarenotabletovisitschools,theyarenotableto

inspectandmonitorfundinguse,norcantheyrelayinformationontheimpactof

governmentpoliciestoadministrators.InbothGulfandEastNewBritain,senior

administratorsandstandardsofficersdidnotknowhowmuchfundingeachschoolwas

supposedtoreceive.Thisneedstoberectified.TheNationalDepartmentofEducation

shouldalsobeworkingtoimproveinformationsharingwiththesubnationallevel.Itis

hearteningthattherehavebeensomestepsmadetowardachievingthis,withSecretary

forEducation,UkeKombra,announcinginlate2016thatTFFcoordinatorshadbeen

appointedinprovincesacrossthecountry(Naime,2016).Itisimportantthatthese

coordinatorsareproperlyresourced,andhaveappropriateinformationaboutschool

paymentsandschoolsintheirprovince.

Theproposedrecentralisationoffunds–fromschoolstoDEICs(with30percentof

fundssettobeadministeredbythisinstitution)andfromschoolstothecentral

government(withanadditional30percentoffundingsettobeadministeredbythe

NDoE)–isstillslatedtooccur.Findingspresentedheresuggestthattherearethreekey

problemswiththispolicy.First,itmayinadvertentlyincreasethecostofinfrastructure,

particularlyifcontractorsratherthancommunitiesareinvolved.Second,itislikelyto

furtherempowerMPsandleadtoastrengtheningofpatronagepolitics,particularlyin

provincessuchasGulfwheretheadministrationsystemisalreadystretched.Third,

thereisgrowingsuspicionthatdistrictsareunwillingtoredistributefundingintended

fortheeducationsector.Itisadvisabletherefore,thattherolloutofthispolicyis

delayeduntilDDAsarebetterestablished,andthereisgreaterseparationbetween

administratorsandpoliticians.

41

Insummary,thisresearchhighlightstheimpactofrecentpoliciesinverydifferent

contextsforservicedelivery.Whilethesearecasestudies,theypointtothetypesof

challengesthatschoolsandsubnationaladministratorsarelikelytofaceacrossthe

country.Theresearchsuggestspolicymakersnowneedtofocusonthelesspolitically

popularaspectsofeducationpolicy,suchasimprovingteacherqualityandoversight

andmonitoring.Italsomeansbeingbraveenoughtorollbackpoliciesthatwillharm

educationoutputs,particularlymovestotakeevenmorefundingawayfromschools

throughestablishingDEICs.

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