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What Collins's The Sociology of Philosophies Says about Sociological TheoryAuthor(s): Douglas GoodmanSource: Sociological Theory, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Mar., 2001), pp. 92-101Published by: American Sociological AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/223294.
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7/25/2019 Douglas Goodman - What Collins's the Sociology of Philosophies Says About Sociological Theory
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What Collins's The
Sociology
of Philosophies
Says
about
Sociological
Theory*
DOUGLAS GOODMAN
Wellesley
College
In Collins's
latest
book,
we
see an
attempt
to
apply
his
sociological
theories to
the
history of philosophy.
WhileCollins's
macrosociology of
knowledgeprovides
important
insights
into
the role
of
conflict
in an
intellectual
field,
his
microsociology
is
more
problematic.
In
particular,
Collins's
micro
theory ignores
the
fundamental
importance
of
social
interpretations.
This leads
him to use a
vague
and
unproductive
notion
of
emotions.
Nevertheless,
we can
usefully apply
Collins'sfindings
to
sociological
theory
itself.
As in
philosophy,
we see the same
competitiveappropriation
and elaboration
of
accumulated
intellectual
capital
and the
same
struggle
over the
limited resources
nec-
essary
to intellectual
production,
especially
over
what Collins
calls
the intellectual
attention
space.
Randall
Collins
has
always
been
interested
in what he calls
a non-obvious
sociology
(1982).
A
nonobvious
sociology
is one
that reveals
the hidden
processes
behind
what is
taken for
granted
and
that demonstrates
why
the obvious
questions
are not
necessarily
the
most central
ones.
His first
publication
(Ben-David
and Collins
1966)
revealed
the social
construction
of the
field of
psychology.
Instead
of
looking
at the
seminal
ideas
that led
to
the
founding
of
a scientific
psychology,
he looked
at the
less obvious
contribution
of the
creation
of
new roles.
His
influential book
Conflict
Sociology
(1975)
exposed
the under-
lying interactions that construct the taken-for-granted nature of social stratification. Instead
of
starting
with social
structures,
his
conflict
approach
examined
the micro
interactions
that
create
the
appearance
of
enduring
structures.
In his latest
book,
The
Sociology of
Philosophies
(1998),
he
is at it
again.
Here
he
argues
that
philosophical
ideas are
not the
products
of
individual
geniuses;
instead
they
emerge
from the
interaction
rituals
of
groups
and
the
conflicts
that structure
the intellectual
field.
Sociologies
of other
disciplines
tend to
strike
readers,
especially
those in
the
targeted
field,
as
attempts
to
expand
the
jurisdiction
of
sociology
and
to
fulfill Comte's
dream of
making
sociology
the ultimate
explanatory
foundation
for
all intellectual
pursuits.
Although
we
see
some
of this
in
Collins,
his
primary
goal
in this
latest
work is
not to
sociologically
explain
away philosophical truths. Instead Collins intends to use the history of philosophy to test his
ideas
about
the
relationship
between
concrete
human
interactions
and social
structures-
that
is,
the
relation
between
what
have
come
to be
called the
micro and
the macro.
Conse-
quently,
this
article
will be
less concerned
with what
sociological
theory
can
say
about
philosophy
than what
the
analysis
of
philosophy
can
say
about
sociological
theory.
In this
respect,
The
Sociology of
Philosophies
is both
important
and,
I will
argue,
ultimately
flawed.
Even the
flaws,
however,
say
something significant
about
sociological
theory.
This article
begins
with
an outline
of Collins's
micro-
and
macrosociological
theories.
These will
be familiar
to
any
who
have
read Collins's
previous
work,
but
what
we
see
in
The
Sociology
of
Philosophies
is a credible
application
of
the theories
to the
field
of
*I
thank
Richard
Harvey
Brown
for his
help
and
generosity.
Address
correspondence
o:
Douglas
Goodman,
Wellesley College,
2 Hazelmere
Road,
Roslindale,
MA
02131;
e-mail:
Sociological
Theory
19:1 March
2001
?
American
Sociological
Association.
1307 New
YorkAvenue
NW,
Washington,
DC
20005-4701
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7/25/2019 Douglas Goodman - What Collins's the Sociology of Philosophies Says About Sociological Theory
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COLLINS'S
SOCIOLOGYOF PHILOSOPHIESAND SOCIOLOGICAL
THEORY
93
philosophy.
Whether he details of
the work are
ultimately convincing
is
beyond
the
scope
of
this
article,
but
no readercan
be
unimpressed
by
the
geographic
breadth
and
historical
depth
of
Collins's
attempt.
Following
the overview
of the
theory
is a
discussion both
of
what
I
find
unconvincing
in
the micro
theory
and also of
what
I
feel are
Collins's
important
new
contributions
to the
sociology
of
knowledge. Finally,
I
will
suggest
what
Collins's
sociology
of
knowledge
might say
about
sociological
theory
itself.
MICROAND
MACRO IN
COLLINS'S
THEORY
Collins's view
of the
micro-macro
relation is
inspired by
the
empirical
achievements
of
such
microsociological
approaches
as
ethnomethodology
and
conversational
nalysis.
These
microsociologies
do
not
wholly reject
macrosociological
concepts,
but
they
attempt
to
improve
on their
explanations
by
reconstituting
macroconcepts
n
radicallyempirical
micro-
foundations.Such
macrosociologicalphenomena
as
institutions
and
organizations
are
seen
simply
as
analytical
abstractions that
summarize
the
pattern
of
related
microbehaviors.
The
structure's
apparent
ontinuity
s
due to the
patterned
epetition
of
the
microbehaviors
over
time.
Whether
structures
change
or
persist
depends
entirely upon
whether the
under-
lying
microbehaviors
change
or
persist
(Collins
1981:989).
Collins
often
describes
structuresas
simple
aggregates
of
microevents and
has
sug-
gested
a rather
dubious
sampling
strategy
that
would
ignore
all
traditional
macrosociolog-
ical
variables
(Collins
1981:988).
This has
left him
open
to
the criticism
that he
is unable
to
deal with
macrostructures
uch as
those
social
wholes,
whose
parts
are
related hori-
zontally
and/or
vertically
in
specific ways
(Mouzelis
1995:21). However,
a closer
read-
ing
reveals that
Collins
is sensitive
to
macrorelationsbut
he
(1981:989)
believes that
they
can be
reduced
to three
pure
macrovariables:
1)
the
dispersion
of
individuals in
phys-
ical
space;
(2)
the
durationand
repetition
n
time
of
social
processes;
and
(3)
the
numbers
of
individuals
involved.
Besides
these
pure
macrovariables,
more
traditional
macroconcepts-such
as
states,
institutions,
organizations,
and
cultures-are
also
useful.
These
macroconcepts
allow
the
analyst
to
more
precisely
formulate the
temporal
and
spatial
relations
among
microphe-
nomena,
and
they
provide
a
framework
or
choosing
the
most
interesting
microphenomena
to
analyze.
Although
the
macroconcepts
are
useful
and
perhaps
even
necessary
to sociol-
ogy,
Collins
(1990a)
argues
that
they
must be
translatableback
into the
empirically
acces-
sible
interactions
that
such
macroconcepts
merely
summarize. This is
the
approach
that
Collins follows in his
sociological
study
of
philosophy.
Macroconcepts
such as
schools of
philosophy,
cultural
capital,
opportunity
structures,
and
the
like,
are
used but
always
with
the
understanding
hat
they
should be
translatable
nto
actual
interactions
between
people.
Collins's
microsociology
does
not
focus on
the
individual
subject;
rather,
or
Collins,
the
micro
is the
empirically
observable
interactions
between
individuals.
Therefore,
Col-
lins's
analytical
focus in
The
Sociology
of
Philosophies
is
not
the
individual
philosopher
but
the
small
social
circles that
met
regularly
and
that,
if
successful,
became
the
core of
influential
philosophical
schools. The
celebrated
individual
philosopher
is
nothing
but a
totemic
emblem for
that
social
group
and
its
spatial
and
temporal
network.
For
example,
the
imposing
figure
of
Hegel only
stands in
for
the
Jena-Weimar
creative
circle,
which
was made up of at least 30 individuals.
Even
intellectual
creativity
is
not
a
function
of
the
individual
but of
the
group
as it
builds
networks
of
interactions
that
spread
out in
both
time
and
space.
The
successful
group
draws in
new
recruits,
charges
them
with
creative
energy,
and
guides
them
into the
most
important
new
debates.
Prolific
philosophers
are
products
of
these
circles of
creativ-
ity
and of
chains of
significant
teachers
and
students.
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SOCIOLOGICAL
THEORY
INTERACTIONRITUALS
AND EMOTIONS
According
to
Collins,
the main function
of these
groups
is
not
cognitive
but
emotional.
Emotions have a
physiological basis,
but
they
also
serve a social function.
They produce
moral
solidarity.
The
emotions associated
with ritualized
group
nteractions
onstitutemicro-
mechanisms that
explain
the
patterns
of actions
that make
up
social
structures.Collins
calls these
encounters nteraction
rituals
(IRs).
They generate
the central eatures
of social
organization-authority,
property,
and
group
membership-by
creating
and
reproducing
binding
cultural
symbols
and associated
emotional
energies.
In order o
clarify
the role
of emotions
in moral
solidarity,
Collins
distinguishes
between
three different
types
of emotions.
First
are the transient
emotions,
such as
anger,
oy,
fear,
and so
on,
that can become
the focus
of IRs.
Second,
there is emotional
energy,
the moti-
vational arousal
that
fuels the
creativity
and
drive of individuals
who
participate
n IRs.
Finally,
there
is the emotion
of
moral
solidarity
that
is
producedby
the
IR and that
is
usually
attached
to
group
symbols.
Collins
often does
not differentiate
between
these last
two since
they
are
the
subjective
and social
sides of the
same
experience,
the IR.
IRs build
on a shared
ransient
emotion
and focus the attention
of
a
group
on
a common
object
or action.
Individuals
who
participate
n IRs are filled
with emotional
energy.
This
is the attraction
of
IRs-they charge
individuals
up
like an electric
battery,giving
them
a
corresponding
degree
of enthusiasm
oward
ritually
created
symbolic
goals
when
they
are
out of
the
presence
of
the
group
(Collins
1998:23).
Through
IRs,
participants
begin
to
feel
a moral
obligation
to
one
another,
and
this
obligation
becomes
symbolized
by
what-
ever
they
focus on
during
the IR.
These
symbols
connect
the emotions
of
solidarity
to
social
structures.
The
term interaction
ritual
comes
from Goffman
(1967),
but
the use
to which Collins
puts
it
is
mainly
inspired by
Durkheim
([1912]
1965).
The
religious
rituals
that
Durkheim
described
are
archetypes
of
interactions
which
bind
members
into a
moral
community,
and
which
create
symbols
that
act as lenses
through
which members
view their
world,
and
as codes
by
which
they
communicate
Collins
1998:21).
Goffman's
contribution
was to
present
the
rituals as
both local
and
ubiquitous.
Collins
makes two
further
additions:
first,
that
IRs are
essentially
emotional
and,
second,
that
they generate
conflict
since
the resul-
tant solidarities
are
produced
variously
and
discontinuously
throughout
society.
Philosophers
participate
n such
IRs as
lectures,
conferences,
discussions,
and debates.
These
gather
the
intellectual
community,
focus
members'
attention
on a common
object
and transient
emotion,
produce
emotions
of
solidarity,
charge
the
participants
with emo-
tional
energy,
and
give
rise to
philosophical
schools.
Since
IRs
produce
solidarity
only
in
local
groups-rather
than
in
all
of
society
or
even
an entire
discipline-they
also
give
rise
to
the conflict
of
competing
schools.
According
to
Collins,
what
is
significant
about
these
IRs
is not the
manifest
subject
but
the fact
that it
serves
as a focus
for
attention
and
emotional
involvement.
Traditionally,
he
IRs of
philosophers
have
attempted
o
produce
ruth.
Whatever
ts
intrinsic
value,
this
truth
also
functions
as Durkheim's
([1912]
1965)
sacred
objects,
that
is,
as collective
symbols
that
appear
o transcend
ndividuals,
constrain
behavior,
and demand
respect.
The
partic-
ular
truth
represents
he
solidarity
of
the
group
and
energizes
those
who
participate
n
its
production.
The store
of collective
symbols
can
be understood
as a
type
of cultural
capital.
The most
important
cultural
capital
for
the
philosopher
s that which
facilitates
the creation
of novel
symbols
that become
candidates
for
new
collective
truths.
This
requires
a
knowledge
of
previous
collective
symbols
and
the
relationships
through
which
they
were
created
and
distributed.
Such
collective
symbols
also
facilitate
subsequent
IRs since
they
energize
a
94
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COLLINS'S
SOCIOLOGYOF
PHILOSOPHIES
AND
SOCIOLOGICAL
THEORY
95
group
of
individuals who
value the
same
symbols.
IRs
may
reaffirm
previous
truths,
or
they
often create
new
ones, but,
whether
reverential or
iconoclastic,
IRs
create a chain
connecting previous
IRs to
future ones.
Because of their cumulative effect, Collins (1987) suggests that we should look at
interaction
ritual chains.
Through
their
history
of
ritual
participation,
people acquire
a
personal
repertoire
of cultural
capital
loaded with
significance
for the
group. They
also
acquire
a store of
emotional
energy
that
provides,
among
other
things,
a
motivation to
put
their
cultural
capital
to use.
Collins
(1998:24)
contends that the
meshing
of these inter-
action ritualchains
constitutes
everything
that s
social structure
n
all its
myriadshapes.
This
meshing
can be
analyzed
as a
network of interactionchains
crisscrossing
each
other
in
space
as
they
flow
along
in time
(Collins 1981:998).
The
concept
of IRs is
only
presented
n the
abstract
by
Collins,
and in
The
Sociology of
Philosophies,
he never offers a
single
concrete case taken from
memoirs or diaries of a
lecture,conference, discussion,
or
debate where
participantsdescribe the sort of emotional
content and
results that Collins's
theory
assumes.
Nevertheless,
Collins does
provide
us
with
many
examples
of
interactionritual
chains
in
philosophy,
and it is at this meso
level
and the macro level of the
intellectual field that
we
begin
to see the fruits of
Collins's
approach.
CONFLICT
AND THE LAW
OF
SMALL NUMBERS
Collins's
sociology
combines a micro
theory
of emotional
solidarity
with a macro
theory
based
on conflict.
Collins
believes
that the same
processes
that
produce solidarity
on the
micro level
produce
conflict on the
macro. The cultural
capital,
emotional
energy,
and
group
solidarities
produced
n
IRs allow
individuals to
dominate hierarchiesand encour-
age
groups
to
engage
in
concerted conflict.
IRs are both a site
where domination s
prac-
ticed and
a
supplier
of the
major
weapons
used
in
social conflict.
In
philosophy,
IRs
provide
for the
competitive
appropriation
nd elaborationof accu-
mulated intellectual
capital. Divergent
philosophical
schools
emerge
out of different sets
of IRs and
compete
for the
limited resources
necessary
to intellectual
production.
Accord-
ing
to
Collins,
the
structure
of
the
intellectual world allows
only
a limited number of
positions
to receive much
attention at
any
one time.
Once
a small number of niches
are
occupied,
it is
extremely
difficult for a new
philosophical
school
to
get
the
necessary
material
resources,
cultural
capital,
and
intellectual
attention,
especially
since there are
first-mover
advantages
(Collins
1998:532).
Collins's
study
suggests
that
only
three to six
active
philosophical
schools are able
to
reproduce
themselves for
more than one or two
generations.
He calls this the law of
small
numbers.
Although
the
actual values
for the law of small numbers are determined
through
his-
torical
research,
the
necessity
of
having
an
upper
and a lower
limit can be derived from
Collins's
conflict
theory.
The
upper
imit is a
functionof
competition
or material
esources,
cultural
capital,
intellectual
attention,
and the
need
to attracta critical
mass of followers.
The
lower limit is due to the
intimate link between conflict and intellectual
creativity.
According
to
Collins,
creativity
emerges
from conflict
and
so will not occur without
at
least two
positions,
and
wherever there are
two
positions,
a third s
always
available
since
a
plague
on bothhouses is
always
a viable intellectual
strategy
Collins
1998:81).
The law of small numbers
produces
a structural
ivalry
n the intellectual field. Creativ-
ity
appears
n twos
or threes as intellectual
movements
restructure he attention
space by
developing opposing positions.
The attention
space
divides
along
what
Collins
calls
deep
troubles,
hat
is,
those
incorrigibleproblems
that
shape
the
oppositional space
that rivals
can
occupy.
Conflict
under the law
of small
numbers
encourages creativity along exploit-
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SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY
able
lines of
opposition
in
two
different
ways:
First,
the
creativity
involved
in
creating
or
increasing
he distinctiveness
of a
philosophicalposition;
and
second,
the
creativity
nvolved
in
synthesis.
The
first
type
of
creativity
tends
to occur in
strong
intellectual
movements
and the second type
in
weak movements.
This
approach,
or
example,
allows Collins to
challenge
the
stereotypical
view of
slow
change
and
conservatism
in
the
religious philosophies
of
India. He
demonstrates, nstead,
often radical
philosophical
views
presented
in
the name of traditional
reinterpretations.
For
example,
as
the
Buddhist materialbase weakened in the seventh
and
eighth
centuries,
Hindu
philosophies
begin
to
produce
fertile rivalries structured
by
deep
troubles around
realism and monotheism. There was a
double revolution-first the Mimamsa
revolution,
which
in
the
name of a
conservative defense of ritualscreateda realist
atheism
focusing
on
mantric ounds.
Out
of the
Mimamasan etwork ame the Advaita
revolution,
whose
espousal
of transcendentalmonism
and
world
illusion
opposed
the Mimamsa
philosophy
and
struc-
tured
the
intellectual divisions for the next
generation. By establishing
monastic and
edu-
cational
institutions,
the Advaita movement
provided
the materialbase for these new
lines
of
opposition
to colonize
the
available
intellectual
attention
space.
On
the other
side,
we
see the
syncretism
of weak movements in the
non-Advaita
schools,
both
Hindu and
Bud-
dhist. All of
this, however,
has been
covered
over
by
the
movements' own
presentation
of
their
history
as a
development
of
traditions.
When
the
attention
space
in
a
given
field is
already
full,
there is
always
the
possibility
of a
segmental restructuring.
New
fields
can
emerge
with
their
separate
material
resources,
cultural
capital,
and attention
space.
This
possibility
depends,
at the
minimum,
upon
a
materialbase
that can
provide positions
for this new
field.
Philosophy,
and
indeed
all
intellectual
fields,
requires
a material
base,
although
we can
never
understand he field
simply
as a
superstructural
eflection of
that
material
base.
In
the modern
world,
the material
base of
philosophy
is
found
in
the
universities that are
practically
the
only place
of
employment
for
philosophers.
Before
that
philosophers
had to
rely
on
patronage. Certainly
the
different material
bases affected the
content of the
philosophies-attacks upon
the rich were much
less common under
he
patronage ystem-
but the more
important
and
pervasive
effect is how
the material
base affects the
structure
of rivalries.
Changes
in the material
base can cause
internal
realignments
hat
encourage creativity.
Some
changes
in the
material base
may
differentially
affect the
established factions. For
example,
the
migration
of
most natural
philosophers
to
the
greener
fields of the
natural
sciences
left the
philosophical
attention
space open
to
more varieties of
metaphysics.
Other
changes
have more
general
effects on the
field,
such as
allowing
for
unrestrained
egmen-
tal
restructuring,
which
makes it easier
to create a
new field
with
autonomous material
resources
than it is to
create a rival
position
in
the extant
field.
All
changes
in
the
materialbase are
mediated
through
the law
of small numbers.
This
explains why
political
and
economic
changes rarely
determine
intellectual
ideas,
which
have more
to do with
exploitable
lines
of
opposition.
First,
changes
occur in the
material
base that
supports
the
philosophical
field; second,
philosophical
positions
either
split
or
amalgamate
n
order
to
fill the
space
available to them
under
the
law
of small
numbers.
LIMITATIONSOF
COLLINS'S
MICROTHEORY
Despite
the
insights provided
by
Collins's conflict
theory
and
the
law of small
numbers,
there are
considerable
problems
with his
micro
theory
of
interactionrituals.
First,
his
theory
lacks
the
prime
advantage
that
Collins
sees
in
a
micro
approach,
ts
openness
to
empiricaltesting.
Increases in
emotional
energy
are no
more observable than
any
of the
96
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COLLINS'S
SOCIOLOGYOF
PHILOSOPHIES
AND
SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY
97
macrostructures hat
Collins labels
as
nonempirical
abstractions.
n
an earlier
article
Col-
lins
(1990b:50)
admits as much.
My
argument,
hat
EE
[emotional
energy]
builds
up
or
declines over
a series of
interaction
rituals
depending upon
the
ups
and downs of one's
experiences
of
power
and
status,
is
inferential.There is
little direct evidence
for it.
There
is,
of
course,
the
possibility
of
testimonial
evidence for
subjective
states such
as
emotions,
but
Collins
avoids
these
in his
researches nto
philosophy.
A
numberof
philos-
ophers
have written
abouttheir
emotions;
many
have
kept
diaries;
but
Collins
uses no
such
testimonies to
show,
for
example,
the
greater
emotional
energy
and
creativity
that some
philosophers
experienced
after
the
type
of
group experiences
that Collins
would call
an
interaction
ritual.
Instead,
his indirectevidence
is
his
theory's
ability
to
offer
causal
expla-
nations
for the
professional
successes and career
trajectories
of different
philosophers.
For
this,
he
couples
his
theory
of IRs
to
a
rationalchoice model.
Collins
(1993)
offers emotional
energy
and emotions of
solidarity
as the
primary goods
upon
which rational choice
explanations
can be made.
People predictably
move toward
experiences
that
provide
more
of
these
emotions.
Unfortunately,
we do not
see
in his
sociology
of
philosophies any
explanations
that could not be
made
upon
more obvious
grounds.
For
example,
we would
expect
the
disciples
of
productive
philosophers
to them-
selves
be
productive just
on
the
basis of
the transmission of
such cultural
capital
as
personal knowledge
of
the unwritten
history
of
philosophy
and a feel for the
emerging
issues,
as well as easier access to what is
publicly
available.
In
addition,
we
would
ex-
pect
the
brightest
students
to be attractedto the more
productive
and creative
philoso-
phers.
It is hard to see what
Collins's
theory
of interaction
rituals and
emotional
energy
adds to this.
What would
really support
Collins's
argument
are
examples
of minor
philosophers
with
mediocre
cultural
capital
attracting
average
studentswho were
nevertheless able to mentor
influential
philosophers simply by increasing
the number and
intensity
of
IRs. Unfortu-
nately,
thereis no
attempt
to
separate
the
more obvious influence of
cultural
capital
from
the effects of IRs on emotional
energy.
It is
possible
that
Collins
is not
able to
perform
such
a test because
of
the
vague way
in
which
he
defines emotions and IRs. For
Collins,
emotions are the
residual
category
for
what is not rational.
His
(1981:994)
argument
or the
necessity
of an emotional dimension
to
social order is
simply
that
social
order cannot
be
completely explained by
rational
decisions. He therefore
umps together
all tacit
knowledge, bodily
skills,
and
intuitions,
as
well as Foucault's
disciplines
(1979),
Bourdieu's habitus
(1977),
and Schutz's
lifeworld
(1967).
His
notion
of
an
IR
is
equally encompassing,
including
the
most
rudimentary
ct
of
speaking
Collins
1998:47).
And
just
as
any
interactioncan be called
a
ritual,
any topic
of conversationcan be considereda sacred
object.
Withthis he stretchesDurkheim's
nsight
beyond believability.
Collins's use of emotions is
part
of his
attempt
to establish a scientific
sociology
that
can minimize the role of
interpretivemeaning.
Emotions are described
as
separate
from
their
interpretation,
which is
merely
a
secondary
effect with
no
behavioral
consequences
(Collins 1981:1008).
We see this
throughout
Collins's
career,
from his
(1975:111)
decla-
ration
that
we must
challenge
the
sentimentalnotion
that social behavior
is
inherently
meaningful,
to his
(1986)
selective
appropriations
of
Weber without
any
discussion of
Verstehen,
o the avoidance,mentionedabove, of
using
testimonies as evidence to
support
his
sociology
of
philosophies.
Collins
gives
us no idea of what an
emotion
separate
rom its
interpretation
would be.
He
suggests
that
there is a
quantity
of
energy
that is
analytically
distinct from
any
inter-
pretation,
but
even if we found a
way
to reduce
qualitatively
different
emotions to their
quantitativeexchange
values,
this
is not
enough
to establish
the
autonomy
of the
emotion
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SOCIOLOGICAL
THEORY
from
its
interpretation.
Far from
being
an
inconsequential
secondary
effect,
doesn't the
interpretation
rive the emotional
energy?
How else can we
explain
the diverse
effects that
an
IR
has on the various
participants?
In
fact,
philosophy
conferences
provide
a
fitting
example
of an
IR
from which
some would derive high emotional energy
while others
might
find boredom and
depression.
If
emotions
are
inextricably
bound
up
with
interpretations,
hen
only very
loose rational
choice
explanations
can
be based
upon
them. The
high
emotional
energy
derived from an
IR
could be transformed nto the low
energy
associated with
depression
by
a
postevent
reinterpretation
f the
meaning
of
the IR. We could not
simply
trace a
philosopher's
path
through
a series of
objectively
defined IRs without
trying
to understand he
meaning
that
the
IR
held
for
the
particular
philosopher
n that
particular
social context. The
category
of
emotions would retain an
important
role in
explaining
social
action,
but
it
would
not
be
fundamental.More
important
han the
quantity
of
emotional
energy
would be the
way
that
an
IR
and its
symbols
stabilize
the
meaning
of that emotional
energy.
COROLLARIES
FROM THE LAW
OF SMALL
NUMBERS AND THEIR
APPLICATIONTO
SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY
Despite
these
problems
with his
microsociology,
Collins's conflict
perspective
and his law
of small
numbers ead to a
numberof
important
nsights
for
the
sociology
of
an intellectual
field,
including
sociological
theory.
Collins,
showing
admirable
restraint,
ollows
only
a
few of
those
insights
into his own
terrain of
sociological theory.
Nevertheless,
there is
nothing
to
keep
those of us who have
never been
overly
burdened
by
restraint rom
this
endeavor.
Before we can
proceed
with
that,
however,
we need to look at the
emergence
of
what
Collins
(1994)
calls
high-consensus, rapid-discovery
science,
because
Collins's
macroanalyses
of
science and
philosophy
are distinct and it
is
not
quite
clear into
which
realm
sociological theory
would fit.
According
to
Collins,
high-consensus,
rapid-discovery
science has
escaped
the law of
small
numbers
o
which
philosophy
is in
thrall.This occurredbecause
competition
for
the
attention
space
in
scientific fields has
moved from conflict over basic
concepts
to
conflict
over a
fast-moving
research
front. Scientific fields achieve a
greater
consensus on
basic
concepts
because of an
ability
to build networks not
only
of
people
but also of
research
technologies.
Consensus is
achieved
through
the
authority
of
physical practices,
embod-
ied in
material
equipment
(Collins 1998:538).
The
progressive
chain
of
technical
inno-
vations makes
discoveries
repeatable
and
transportable,
nd
this,
along
with
the
equipment's
material
presence,
fosters a
consensus that
mere
ideas can never achieve. Because of this
consensus on
old
issues,
competition
for the attention
space
is focused on new
discoveries
using
the latest
equipment.
Hence we
have a
convincing
explanation
for the two
most
noticeable
characteristicsof
Western
science,
a
rapidlymoving
research
ront
eaving
in its
wake
a
high
consensus
about demonstrated acts and
fruitful theories.
Sociology
clearly
is not
now a
high-consensus,
rapid-discovery
science.
Collins
(1998:876)
sees
sociology
in a
kind
of
limbo between
philosophy
and science in that
it
encompasses empirical investigation
but
still
lacks
the
consensus
and
hence the
rapid
discovery
of a
field
that has
escaped
the
law of small numbers.He nevertheless believes
that
sociology
has the
potential
to be a
rapid-discovery
science, and,
in line with his
analysis,
he
places
his
hope
in
the
technicizing
of
sociology.
But Collins is unable to
explain why
the natural
sciences
developed
research
technologies
able to
produce high
consensus and
sociology
did not
except
as a historical accident.
Even
if
this were
a
satis-
factory
explanation,
it
appears
to
be
contrary
to
the historical
record.
Sociology,
in
fact,
has
developed
research
technologies,
but
high
consensus has not
developed
around
them.
98
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COLLINS'S SOCIOLOGY
OF PHILOSOPHIES
AND
SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY 99
Most
notably, sociology
has
developed
mathematical
echniques
that,
in
another con-
text,
Collins
(1998:538-42)
himself
convincingly
argues
are a
type
of
research technol-
ogy.
However,
when
discussing sociology,
he
contends hatstatistics s
just
the
manipulation
of data rather
than
a
method of
producing new data. But this seems a rather strained
distinction. Doesn't
the
formula for a standard
deviation
produce
a new
datum,
or
are
we
to
assume
that the standarddeviation is
already lying
around
n
the Platonic
space
of the
data
set? In
addition,
how would Collins
explain
why
statistics
used
in
biological
infor-
matics is able
to
produce
a
high-consensus, rapid-discovery
science
but in
sociology
it is
not?
Again,
the
problem
in
Collins's
analysis
can be traced to the
missing
category
of inter-
pretation.
It
would
seem
that the
interpretive
nature of social
facts
makes
it difficult
to
stabilize
a consensus with a research
echnology
in
the same
way
as in
the
natural
ciences.
Collins
never
engages
the
powerful
arguments
e.g.,
Habermas
1988)
that
a
science whose
basic data are
irreducibly nterpretive
cannot be
technicized.
But
whatever our differences on the
potential
of
sociology,
Collins
and
I
both
agree
that
sociological theory today
is
structured
by
the
same
types
of
conflicts
that he
diagnoses
in
the
history
of
philosophy. Consequently,
hree corollaries from the law of small numbers
also
apply
to
sociological theory.
First,
since
structural
onflict drives
creativity,
we
would
expect
that
a
single orthodoxy
for
more than a
couple
of
generations
would stifle
creativity
(Collins 1998:380),
and,
indeed,
the
historical
record in
sociology
seems to bear this
out.
Certainly,
we
see
this
in
comparing
the
theoretically
sterile
enforced Marxism of the former
Soviet Union
to the
productiveness
of Marxismin the
West,
where it
has
been under
constant
challenge.
And
we
should note that
the
creativity
of American
sociology
has been marked
by
almost
constant theoreticalconflict. We are
so used to this conflict that it is
easy
to
forget
that
the
one case
of theoreticaldominancethatAmerican
sociology
has known-Talcott Parsons's
structural-functionalism-lasted less
than 20
years,
coming
to dominance afterWorld
War
II and
being subjected
to
withering
attack
by
the
early
1960s.
Second,
since
positions
are driven
by
conflict and need
to
differentiate
hemselves from
the
competition,
we would
expect
to see
a
great
deal of innovation in even the most
intellectually
conservative
movements
(Collins 1998:381).
As
in
philosophy,
we also see a
revolutionary
creativity
in
the return
to
traditional
ociology.
We
need
only
think of
Alexander's innovations under cover
of
a returnto
Parsons or Habermas'snovel
refor-
mulation
of the Frankfurtschool
against
the
postmodern
critique.
In
fact,
it is hard to
think of an innovative
sociological theory
that has not
involved,
at least
to some
degree,
a
returnto classical
sources. This would include Collins's
returnto
Weber
(Collins
1986)
and Durkheim
(Collins
1988).
Third,
we would
expect
the
exporting
and
importing
of
ideas,
either from other
cultures
or other
fields,
to have an effect
upon creativity
and the
availability
of niches
in the
attention
space
(Collins 1998:446-50).
The
importation
of ideas
from a
single
source,
especially
a
simple
translation
without
elaboration,
takes
up
a
segment
of the attention
space
that
could
have been used
by
novel movements.
However,
importing
ideas
from
multiple
sources and
elaborating
hem
to fit within the
structural ivalries
of the
receiving
field
encourages
creativity. Similarly, exporting
ideas
opens up
new areasin the attention
space
of
the
receiving
culture and
new sources of conflict.
In
the matterof
importing
and
exporting
ideas,
it seems
to me that
sociological
theory
has done much worse
than
philosophy.
Exchange theory
has
imported
from behavioral
psychology
in a creative
way,
Luhmann
rom
general systems
theory
and
rationalchoice
from
economics,
but,
for the most
part,
sociological theory
has
been
rather
nsular,
pre-
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SOCIOLOGICAL
THEORY
ferring
to mine its own classics.
In
exporting,
it
has
done
even more
poorly.
Fields
that
have
recently
expressed
an interest
in
theorizing
society,
such
as
movements
in
literature
and
in
art,
have
practically gnored
the
sociological
work that
has
been
done
in
those areas.
Collins's own work demonstrates both of these deficits. One of the most influential
social
theories
outside
of
sociology
has been
postmodern
theory.
The
reception
in
main-
stream
sociological
theory
has tended to be defensive
(Ritzer
and Goodman
forthcoming).
Collins
(1992),
for
example,
wrote a
blistering
attackon
postmodernism
hat
never
quotes
or even
cites
a
postmodernist
and that
presents
only
the
broadest caricatureof the
post-
modern
position.
One
could not
imagine
such a cavalier dismissal
of
a
theoretical move-
ment
being
printed
f
the movement had
originated
within
sociology. Conversely,
Collins's
work has
been
received outside of
sociology
with
a
deafening
silence. For
example,
it has
been almost two
years
since the
publication
of The
Sociology
of
Philosophies,
and
it has
yet
to
receive a review
in
any
of the
mainstream
philosophy journals.1
Despite these similarities withphilosophy,there
are
some reservations
about
the
whole-
sale
application
of the law of small numbersto
sociology.
We should remember hat this
law
is,
in
fact,
a historical
observation
and that its
upper
limits in
particular
cannot be
derived
directly
from
the
theory.
In
this,
there
may
be an
important
difference
between
philosophy
and current
sociology.
In most of the
philosophical
movements that
Collins
studied,
the
focus was
upon
the
production
of a
single
truth,
and the idea of a
plurality
of
truths was a
marginal
position.
The
situation is
not
the same
in
sociology,
which has
moved
toward
valuing
and even
encouraging pluralism.
It is
quite
likely
that
such
a
field
can
function
with a
higher
upper
imit for
dividing
its attention
space,
and, indeed,
it
would
be difficult to
point
to
only
six
major sociological
schools.
CONCLUSION
The
Sociology
of
Philosophies
is an
important
but
flawed book.
That the flawed and the
important
should divide so
easily along
the
micro-macro
ine
is
disturbing
for one
who
believes
in
the
necessity
of
linking
micro
and macro
theories.
It
could
be that
there
is
something
in our
insular
disciplinarity
that makes it so difficult
to achieve this
synthesis.
Whether it is emotions
from
psychology,
rational choice from
economics,
or
the
frag-
mented self
from
postmodernism, sociological
theorists
are too inclined to
ignore
the
complexity
outside
our
discipline
and
to
borrow
overly simplistic
versions of
micro
theo-
ries from other
fields.
Whatever
the
micro
theory,
I
don't believe we will
be
able
to
simplify away
the
cat-
egory
of
interpretation.Despite
their scientific
messiness,
interpretations
are
an
irreduc-
ible
part
of
sociology.
Really,
though,
this
is not
the
point
about
which
an
argument
needs
to
be
made.
All
sociologists,
including
Collins,
already
engage
in
interpretations.
Collins's
analysis
of
philosophy,
for
example,
is full of
interpretations.
The
argument
that
appar-
ently
must be
made
is
that
interpretations
are
just
as fundamental or the social
actor
as
they
are
for
the
sociological
theorist.
In other
words,
the
micro-macro
ink must include a
link
between
the
macrointerpretations
f the
sociologist
and the
everyday microinterpre-
tations of
actors. This would have been a richer and more
satisfying
book had Collins
included an
empirical
examination
of the
interpretiveexperiences
of
philosophers.
Collins himself has
quite recently provided
a
counterexample
to the
anti-interpretive
approach
used in
The
Sociology
of
Philosophies.
His
(2000)
article,
Situational
Stratifi-
cation: A
Micro-Macro
Theory
of
Inequality, drops
the focus on an
objective
definition
of
'
Since this
review
was
written,
there has
been
a review
symposium
in
Philosophyof
the
Social Sciences
(30:2)
and an
insightful
review
essay
in Journal
of
the
History
of
the
BehavioralSciences
(36:2),
but,
despite
theirfine
work,
these
are
usually
not
seen
as
mainstream
philosophy
journals.
100
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7/25/2019 Douglas Goodman - What Collins's the Sociology of Philosophies Says About Sociological Theory
11/11
COLLINS'S SOCIOLOGY OF PHILOSOPHIES
AND SOCIOLOGICAL
THEORY 101
emotions
embedded
in
a rational choice
analysis
and does a sensitive
reading
of
the
rela-
tion between
everyday microinterpretations
of
hierarchy
and the
macrointerpretations
of
sociologists.
It is the mark of a
great
theorist that he
produces
his
own
critique.
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