Dory v. Germany (Case C-186/01)

Before the Court of Justice of the European

Communities

ECJ

(Presiding, RodrÍguez Iglesias, P.; Puissochet ( Rapporteur), Wathelet,

Schintgen and Timmermans ( PP.C.); Gulmann, Edward, Jann, Skouris, Macken,

Colneric, von Bahr and Cunha Rodrigues JJ.) Christine Stix-Hackl, Advocate

General.

March 11, 2003

H1 Reference from Germany by the Verwaltungsgericht (Administrative Court), Stuttgart, under Art.234 EC.

H2 Sex discrimination--public service--Art.2 of Directive 76/207-- compulsory military service in Germany limited to men only--public security-- discretion--proportionality--scope of Community law--choices of military organisation a matter within competence of Member States--compulsory military service a question of military organisation--Community law not applicable. H3 Under German law, German men over the age of 18 were subject to compulsory military service. On call up, D contested this requirement on the basis that it infringed the Community law rules on equal treatment. In particular, he alleged that the access of men to the labour market was delayed in comparison with the access of women because of their military service obligations. The National Court considered that delayed access by men to employment and vocational training could constitute discrimination on grounds of sex within the meaning of Art.2(1) of Directive 76/207 and referred the question of interpretation of that Article to the Court of Justice. Held: Measures relating to organisation of armed forces not entirely excluded from application of Community law on grounds of public security H4 Measures taken by the Member States in relation to the organisation of the armed forces were not excluded in their entirety from the application of

Community law solely because they were taken in the interests of public security or national defence. Certain articles in the *824 Treaty provided for derogations in exceptional and clearly defined situations which might affect public security. There was no inherent general exception excluding all measures taken for reasons of public security from the scope of Community law. [30]-[31] Johnston (222/84): [1986] E.C.R. 1651; [1986] 3 C.M.L.R. 240; Sirdar (C-273/97): [1999] E.C.R. I-7403; [1999] 3 C.M.L.R. 559; Kreil (C-285/98): [2000] E.C.R I-69; [2002] 1 C.M.L.R. 36, followed. Scope of concept of public security H5 The concept of public security under Community law covered both a Member State's internal security and its external security. [32] Richardt and "Les Accessoires Scientifiques" (C-367/89): [1991] E.C.R. I-4621; [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 61; Leifer (C-83/94): [1995] E.C.R. I-3231; Sirdar (C-273/97): [1999] E.C.R. I-7403; [1999] 3 C.M.L.R. 559; Kreil (C-285/98): [2000] E.C.R I-69; [2002] 1 C.M.L.R. 36, followed. Impact of public security considerations on principle of equal treatment H6 The principle of equal treatment for men and women was of general application. Directive 76/207 applied to employment in the public service and was applicable to access to posts in the armed forces. It was for the Court to verify whether the measures taken by the national authorities, in the exercise of their recognised discretion, did in fact have the purpose of guaranteeing public security and whether they were appropriate and necessary to achieve that aim. [33]-[34] Commission v Germany (248/83): [1985] E.C.R. 1459; [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 588; Gerster (C-1/95): [1997] E.C.R. I-5253; [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 303; Sirdar (C-273/97): [1999] E.C.R. I-7403; [1999] 3 C.M.L.R. 559; Kreil (C-285/98): [2000] E.C.R I-69; [2002] 1 C.M.L.R. 36, followed. Member States' choices of military organisation falling outside the scope of Community law H7 Decisions of the Member States concerning the organisation of their armed forces could not be completely excluded from the application of Community law, particularly where observance of the principle of equal treatment of men and women in connection with employment, including access to military posts, was concerned. But it did not follow that Community law governed the Member States' choices of military organisation for the defence of their territory or of their essential interests. It was for the Member States, which had to adopt appropriate measures to ensure their internal and external security, to take decisions on the organisation of their armed forces. [35]-[36] Sirdar (C-273/97): [1999] E.C.R. I-7403; [1999] 3 C.M.L.R. 559; Kreil (C-285/98): [2000] E.C.R I-69; [2002] 1 C.M.L.R. 36, followed. *825 Compulsory military service an aspect of choice of military organisation H8 The decision of Germany to ensure its defence in part by compulsory military service was the expression of such a choice of military organisation to which Community law was consequently not applicable. [39] Impact on equal treatment issues not bringing military organisation within the scope of Community law

H9 Delay in the careers of persons called up for military service was an inevitable consequence of the choice made by the Member State regarding military organisation and did not mean that that choice came within the scope of Community law. The existence of adverse consequences for access to employment could not, without encroaching on the competences of the Member States, have the effect of compelling the Member State in question either to extend the obligation of military service to women, thus imposing on them the same disadvantages with regard to access to employment, or to abolish compulsory military service. [41] H10 Representation W Dory and C Lenz, (in the oral proceedings only), Rechtsanwälte, for Mr Dory. W-D Plessing and B Muttelsee-Schön, acting as Agents, assisted by C Tomuschat, Sachverständiger (in the oral proceedings only) for Germany and the German Government in its capacity as Member State and as party in the main proceedings. R Abraham, C Bergeot-Nunes and C Chevallier, acting as Agents, for the French Government. T Pynnä, acting as Agent, for the Finnish Government. J Sack and N Yerrell, acting as Agents, for the Commission of the European Communities. H11 Cases referred to in the judgment: 1. Commission of the European Communities v Germany (248/83), May 21, 1985: [1985] E.C.R. 1459; [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 588. 2. Gerster v Freistaat Bayern (C-1/95), October 2, 1997: [1997] E.C.R. I-5253; [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 303. 3. Kreil v Germany (C-285/98), January 11, 2000: [2000] E.C.R I-69; [2002] 1 C.M.L.R. 36. 4. Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (222/84), May 15, 1986: [1986] E.C.R. 1651; [1986] 3 C.M.L.R. 240. 5. Leifer (C-83/94), October 17, 1995: [1995] E.C.R. I-3231. 6. Ministre des Finances v Aime Richardt (Richardt and "Les Accessoires Scientifiques") (C-367/89), October 4, 1991: [1991] E.C.R. I-4621; [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 61. 7. Schnorbus v Land Hessen (C-79/99), December 7, 2000: [2000] E.C.R. I-10997; [2001] 1 C.M.L.R. 40. 8. Sirdar v the Army Board and the Secretary of State for Defence (C- 273/97), October 26, 1999: [1999] E.C.R. I-7403; [1999] 3 C.M.L.R. 559. *826 H12 Further cases cited by the Advocate General: 9. Albore (C-423/98), July 13, 2000: [2000] E.C.R. I-5965; [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. 10. 10. Arcaro (C-168/95), September 26, 1996: [1996] E.C.R. I-4705; [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 179.

11. Asscher v Staatssecretaris Van Financien (C-107/94), June 27, 1996: [1996] E.C.R. I-3089; [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. 61. 12. Bickel (C-274/96), November 24, 1998: [1998] E.C.R. I-7637; [1999] 1 C.M.L.R. 348. 13. Casagrande v Landeshauptstadt Munich (9/74), July 3, 1974: [1974] E.C.R. 773; [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 423. 14. Commission of the European Communities v Belgium (C-229/89), May 7, 1991: [1991] E.C.R. I-2205; [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 403. 15. Commission of the European Communities v France (318/86), June 30, 1988: [1988] E.C.R. 3559; [1989] 3 C.M.L.R. 663. 16. Commission of the European Communities v France (C-265/95), December 9, 1997: [1997] E.C.R. I-6959. 17. Commission of the European Communities v Greece (C-120/94), March 19, 1996: [1996] E.C.R. I-1513. 18. Commission of the European Communities v Italy (C-283/99), May 31, 2001: [2001] E.C.R. I-4363. 19. Costa v Enel (6/64), July 15, 1964: [1964] E.C.R. 585; [1964] C.M.L.R. 425. 20. Decker v Caisse de Maladie des Employes Prives (C-120/95), April 28, 1998: [1998] E.C.R. I-1831; [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. 879. 21. Defrenne v Societe' Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aerie'Nne (SABENA) (43/75), April 8, 1976: [1976] E.C.R. 455; [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 98. 22. Distribuidores Cinematográficos v Estado Español (C-17/92), May 4, 1993: [1993] E.C.R. I-2239. 23. France v Stoeckel (C-345/89), July 25, 1991: [1991] E.C.R. I-4047; [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. 673. 24. Gravier v City of Liege (293/83), February 13, 1985: [1985] E.C.R. 593; [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 1. 25. Haug-Adrion v Frankfurter Versicherungs-AG (251/83), December 13, 1984: [1984] E.C.R. 4277; [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 266. 26. Hofmann v Ersatzkasse (184/83), July 12, 1984: [1984] E.C.R. 3047; [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 242. 27. Jackson and Cresswell v Chief Adjudication Officer (C 63-64/91), July 16, 1992: [1992] E.C.R. I-4737; [1992] 3 C.M.L.R. 389. 28. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer (C-162/00), January 29, 2002: [2002] E.C.R. I-1049; [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 1. *827 29. Lawrie-Blum v Land Baden-Württemberg (66/85), July 3, 1986: [1986] E.C.R. 2121; [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 389. 30. Marshall v Southampton and South West Hampshire AHA (152/84), February 26, 1986: [1986] E.C.R. 723; [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 688. 31. Meyers v Adjudication Officer (C-116/94), July 13, 1995: [1995] E.C.R. I-2131; [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 461. 32. Newstead v Department of Transport and HM Treasury (192/85), December 3, 1987: [1987] E.C.R. 4753; [1988] 1 C.M.L.R. 219. 33. Nolte v Landesversicherungsanstalt Hannover (C-317/93), December 14, 1995: [1995] E.C.R. I-4625. 34. Peterbroeck Van Campenhout & Cie SCS v Belgium (C-312/93), December

14, 1995: [1995] E.C.R. I-4599; [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 793. 35. Rewe Zentralfinanz v Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland (33/76), December 16, 1976: [1976] E.C.R. 1989; [1977] 1 C.M.L.R. 533. 36. Steymann v Staatssecretaris Van Justitie (196/87), October 5, 1988: [1988] E.C.R. 6159; [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. 449. 37. Teckal v Comune di Viano and Azienda Gas-Acqua Consorziale (Agac) di Reggio Emilia (C-107/98), November 18, 1999: [1999] E.C.R. I-8121. 38. Van Schijndel and Van Veen v Stichting Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten (C-430-431/93), December 14, 1995: [1995] E.C.R. I-4705; [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 801. 39. Werner v Germany (C-70/94), October 17, 1995: [1995] E.C.R. I-3189.

Opinion of Advocate General Stix-Hackl [FN1] FN1 Delivered on November 28, 2002.

I --Introductory remarks AG1 In Germany there is a general duty to perform military service which applies to men only. The subject matter of the present proceedings is the compatibility of that duty with Council Directive 76/207 of February 9, 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions [FN2] ("Directive 76/207") and with various provisions of the EC Treaty. FN2 [1976] O.J. L39/40.

II --Legal background

A --Directive 76/207 AG2 Article 1(1) reads: The purpose of this Directive is to put into effect in the Member States *828 the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, including promotion, and to vocational training and as regards working conditions and, on the conditions referred to in para.2, social security. This principle is hereinafter referred to as the principle of equal treatment. AG3 Article 2(1) reads: For the purposes of the following provisions, the principle of equal treatment shall mean that there shall be no discrimination whatsoever on grounds of sex either directly or indirectly by reference in particular to marital or family status. AG4 Article 3(1) reads: Application of the principle of equal treatment means that there shall be no

discrimination whatsoever on grounds of sex in the conditions, including selection criteria, for access to all jobs or posts, whatever the sector or branch of activity, and to all levels of the occupational hierarchy.

B --National law AG5 Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Basic law for Germany (GG)) [FN3] FN3 BGBl. I 1949 in the version of BGBl. 2000 I, p.1755. Article 12a(1) and (4) reads: (1) Men who have attained the age of 18 years may be required to serve in the armed forces, in the Federal Border Guard, or in a civil defence organisation. (4) If, during a state of defence, civilian service requirements in the civilian public health and medical system and in the stationary military hospital organisation cannot be met on a voluntary basis, women between 18 and 55 years of age may be assigned to such services by or pursuant to a law. They may on no account be required to bear arms. AG6 Wehrpflichtgesetz (Law on compulsory military service (WPflG)) [FN4] FN4 BGBl. I 1956 p.65, in the version of BGBl. 1995 I, p.1756. para.1(1), in extract, reads: All men who have attained the age of 18 years and are Germans within the meaning of the Grundgesetz are obliged to perform military service ... Paragraph 3(1), in extract, reads: The obligation to perform military service is satisfied by military service or, in the case referred to in para.1 of the Kriegsdienstverweigerungsgesetz (Law on refusal to perform war service) ... by civilian service ...

III --Facts and principal arguments in the main proceedings AG7 Mr Dory, the claimant in the main proceedings, who is of an age liable to military service, made an application to the Kreiswehrersatzamt competent for his call-up to service to be exempted from the obligation to perform military service. As grounds he stated that the German Wehrpflichtgesetz was contrary to *829 Community law. He relied on the judgment of the Court of Justice in the Kreil case. [FN5] The application was refused. The authority gave as reasons that that judgment related only to voluntary service in the armed forces by women, not to compulsory military service. Questions of national defence such as compulsory military service were outside Community law. Following an unsuccessful appeal to the competent appellate body, Mr Dory brought an action before the court which has made the reference. The defendant in the main proceedings is Germany. FN5 Case C-285/98: [2000] E.C.R I-69; [2002] 1 C.M.L.R. 36.

AG8 In the proceedings before the National Court, Mr Dory again relied on the Kreil judgment. He put forward the view that following that judgment there were no longer any objective reasons which could justify excluding women from compulsory military service on sex-specific grounds. The obligation of military service laid down in Art.12a(1) of the Grundgesetz for men only constituted unlawful discrimination against men, since women now have the right to serve and bear arms but not the duty to perform military service. AG9 Germany contended in particular that the Grundgesetz contains the "constitutional mandate for a peaceable State capable of defence", which is implemented by the introduction of compulsory military service for men. This is part of the "organisational power over the armed forces", to which Community law does not relate. AG10 Germany further submitted inter alia that the equality article of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union was binding only on the institutions and bodies of the EU and applied to the Member States only when they implement Community law. Directive 76/207 was not applicable, because it covers occupational activities only. Compulsory military service is a service obligation, however, and must thus be distinguished from access to the military profession. AG11 The National Court entertains doubts as to the correctness of the position taken by Germany. It observes that compulsory military service results in any event in delayed access for men to employment or vocational training. Citing the Court's judgment in Schnorbus, [FN6] the National Court considers it possible that this is a case of discrimination caught by Directive 76/207. Referring to Art.2(4) of Directive 76/207, according to which "positive discrimination" is permitted in the interests of actual equal treatment of the sexes, it considers that compulsory military service for men only may be justified. It observes here that "the statistically substantiated fact that in the course of their lives German women nowadays give birth to an average of 1.3 children ... gives rise, on average, to a period of professional absence exceeding the duration of military service" FN6 Case C-79/99: [2000] E.C.R. I-10997; [2001] 1 C.M.L.R. 40 *830 .

IV --The question referred and the further course of the proceedings AG12 By order of April 4, 2001, the Verwaltungsgericht Stuttgart referred the following question to the Court for a preliminary ruling: Does German military service for men only conflict with European law? AG13 On September 26, 2001 Mr Dory received a call-up order requiring him to start his military service on November 15, 2001. AG14 By letters of September 28, 2001, Mr Dory applied to the National Court to grant suspensive effect to his appeal against the call-up order and, on the same date, made an application to the Court of Justice for interim relief against Germany. That relief was to consist of a suspension of enforcement of the call-up order pending the Court's decision in the present proceedings. The application to the National Court was granted by order of October 19, 2001. The application to

the Court of Justice was dismissed as inadmissible by order of October 24, 2001. [FN7] FN7 Dory (C-186/01 R): [2001] E.C.R. I-7823.

V --The question referred for a preliminary ruling

A --Admissibility of the question AG15 The National Court asks as to the compatibility of German compulsory military service, in other words German law, with "European law". AG16 For the Court of Justice to be able to give the National Court an answer which will be of use in the main proceedings, the question must be reformulated. AG17 Thus the Court has no power in the context of Art.234 EC to rule either on the interpretation of provisions of national laws or regulations or on their conformity with Community law. It may, however, supply the National Court with an interpretation of Community law that will enable that court to resolve the legal problem before it. [FN8] FN8 Teckal (C-107/98): [1999] E.C.R. I-8121, para.[34]; and Distribuidores Cinematográficos (C-17/92): [1993] E.C.R. I-2239, para.[8]. AG18 Finally, according to settled case law, it is for the Court alone, where questions are formulated imprecisely, to extract from all the information provided by the National Court and from the documents in the main proceedings the points of Community law which require interpretation, having regard to the subject matter of those proceedings. [FN9] FN9 Teckal, cited above, para.[34]; Haug-Adrion (C 251/83): [1984] E.C.R. 4277; [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 266, para.[9]; Arcaro (C-168/95): [1996] E.C.R. I-4705; [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 179, para.[21]; and Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer (C-162/00): [2002] E.C.R. I-1049; [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 1. AG19 It may be seen from the information in the order for reference that *831 the National Court puts the question exclusively with respect to Community law on the equal treatment of men and women. [FN10] FN10 The question does not relate in this context to other areas of Community law, e.g. the right to freedom of movement for workers (Art.39 EC) or the freedom to provide services (Arts 49 et seq. EC). AG20 It therefore makes sense to reformulate the question as follows: Must Arts 3(2) EC, 13 EC and 141 EC and Directive 76/207 be interpreted as precluding a national provision such as German compulsory military service which applies to men only?

B --Essential submissions of the parties

AG21 Mr Dory did not comment in the written procedure before the Court. At the hearing he opposed the view that compulsory military service is excluded generally from the application of Community law because it is a measure for guaranteeing external security. He argued that it is (also) a measure which interferes with the freedom to pursue an occupation. That is covered by Community law in the shape of Directive 76/207. AG22 Mr Dory takes the view that compulsory military service for men only is incompatible with Directive 76/207. It follows from Art.1 of the directive that it is applicable to national measures concerning access to employment. What he is concerned about is his access to general civilian employment. Whether compulsory military service may itself be regarded as "employment" within the meaning of Directive 76/207 is therefore immaterial for the answer to the question. AG23 During performance of compulsory military service there is an absolute prohibition of employment for men. Furthermore, after performance of military service, access to employment exists only in delayed form. Even though military service currently lasts for only nine months, its effect on access to employment is obvious if one imagines that a Member State were to take it into its head, e.g., to enact a law (for reasons of population policy, for instance) that women were admitted to vocational training only from the age of 25. With compulsory military service, admittedly, there was no intent to affect men's access to employment, but it nevertheless directly affects that access and is therefore "occupation-orientated". Employers also hesitate to employ men of that age, because of the risk of absence as a result of the obligation to perform military service. AG24 To counter the argument that compulsory military service for men only has other purposes than regulating access to the labour market, Mr Dory refers to the Marshall judgment. [FN11] That case concerned an automatic termination of service on reaching the age of eligibility for an old-age pension, which differed for men and women. The Court held that that was within the scope of Directive 76/207, although the national provision was based on grounds of social insurance law. FN11 Case 152/84: [1986] E.C.R. 723; [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 688 *832 . AG25 Furthermore, since the Treaty of Amsterdam, primary law contains in Art.3(2) EC a general duty of equal treatment of men and women. Directive 76/207 may thus no longer be understood as being applicable only where a national measure is deliberately targeted at sex-specific access to employment. AG26 The German Government refers to the importance of general compulsory military service in Germany. It is intended to create close contact between the armed forces and the population, thereby ensuring the democratic transparency of the military apparatus. The general obligation to perform military service is moreover the centrepiece of national defence in Germany: the increase in numbers of troops from peacetime to a state of defence cannot be done without the corresponding number of reserves recruited from the category of persons

subject to compulsory military service. AG27 The extent and structure of compulsory military service are part of the organisation of the armed forces, which remains within the competence of the Member States as an essential part of public security. That position was acknowledged by the Court in the Kreil and Sirdar [FN12] judgments. FN12 Kreil, cited above, and Sirdar (C-273/97): [1999] E.C.R. I-7403; [1999] 3 C.M.L.R. 559. AG28 As follows from the first paragraph of Art.5 EC and the second subparagraph of Art.7(1) EC, the principle of limited individual competence of the Community applies with respect to the relationship between Community competence and national competence. The organisation of national defence as such is not within the competence of the Community. AG29 The limitation of compulsory military service to men is also, however, not covered by Community law with respect to its indirect consequences for access to employment. AG30 Article 3(2) EC, which states that the Community aims to promote equality between men and women, is applicable only to specific measures taken by the Community on the basis of other powers. AG31 The same conclusion is reached with respect to Art.13. That article only empowers the Council to take measures to combat discrimination on grounds of sex "within the limits of the powers conferred by [the Treaty] upon the Community". AG32 Article 141 EC and Directive 76/207 for their part merely regulate employment or service relationships voluntarily entered into, and consequently do not apply to a general obligation of service such as compulsory military service, which is clearly distinguished from the - always voluntarily chosen-- profession of soldier, which was the sole subject matter of the Kreil judgment. AG33 Directive 76/207, which concerns the elimination of barriers to access to employment and vocational training, is not material in the present case. The pay given to persons performing military service, simply because of its small amount, is not a remuneration for work with *833 which one can earn one's living. A "certain superficial resemblance" between a military service relationship and an employment relationship is not enough to make the directive applicable. AG34 The particular quality of compulsory military service as a civic duty is the decisive reason why it does not constitute employment within the meaning of Directive 76/207. International law too, as a matter of settled practice, evaluates a call-up to perform military service as an act of the exercise of State power, which is also reflected in the fact that foreigners, including those from other Member States of the EU, must be exempt from it because of the conflict of loyalties. The special quality of that civic duty also follows from the fact that military service is expressly excepted under Art.4(3)(b) of the European Convention on Human Rights from the prohibition of forced labour. This is also laid down, in almost the same words, in Art.8(3)(c)(ii) of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

AG35 In contrast to that is Art.6(1) of the UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which lays down the right of everyone "to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts" without any restriction as regards military service. From that it may be concluded that that Covenant does not regard the performance of compulsory military service as work in the usual meaning of the word. AG36 The German Government emphasises, moreover, that the Court itself held in Schnorbus [FN13] that a provision to counterbalance the career delays resulting from compulsory military service is compatible with Community law. It thereby implicitly acknowledged the lawfulness of compulsory military service for men only. FN13 Cited above. AG37 The French Government takes the view that the performance of compulsory military service cannot be equated with the exercise of an occupational activity and therefore falls neither under the social provisions of the EC Treaty nor under Directive 76/207. Military service is a measure of national defence which falls within the exclusive competence of the Member States. The national decision to impose compulsory military service on men only does not fall as such within the scope of Community law. AG38 The Court indeed ruled in the Kreil and Sirdar judgments that national decisions on the organisation of the armed forces are not completely excluded from the application of Community law. It also held in Sirdar, however, that only such national measures as affect access to employment or vocational training or working conditions in the armed forces are subject to the Community law principle of equal treatment of men and women. AG39 That approach cannot be applied here, however, since compulsory military service is performed by persons who are not comparable with employees within the meaning of the provisions of Community law on equal treatment of the sexes. A person subject to military service does *834 not provide services for a third party in return for which he receives remuneration, but fulfils a civic duty in connection with which compensation is paid. AG40 Further, in Schnorbus the Court ruled on the compatibility with Community law of provisions which concerned not compulsory military service as such but its consequences for the potential service relationship between candidates for practical legal training and the administration offering that training. It is significant, moreover, that the Court did not answer the sixth question referred in that case, which related to the discriminatory character of the limitation of compulsory military service to men. AG41 The Finnish Government points out that under Art.127 of the Finnish Constitution men and women are obliged to take part in national defence. The duty to serve under arms is however laid down by law only for men. It is possible, however, for women to perform military service on a voluntary basis. AG42 Decisions of principle in the field of defence policy fall, as the Court decided in Kreil, within the competence of the Member States, and Community

law is thus not applicable in the main proceedings. AG43 Compulsory military service does not at any rate affect the conditions of access to the profession of soldier and so does not fall within the scope of Directive 76/207. The circumstance that compulsory military service is limited to men does not, moreover, lead in Finland to women's careers in the armed forces being adversely affected, since women may perform military service voluntarily. AG44 The Commission submits that it follows from Art.12a of the German Grundgesetz and para.1 of the WPflG that compulsory military service, as it developed in the traditions of many European States from the end of the 18th century, constitutes a unilateral public law service obligation and does not give rise to an employment relationship. The person performing military service provides services--perhaps even against his will--while the State merely grants him a certain financial support, but not a wage. Military service is not therefore part of the labour market. AG45 As the Court held in the Kreil and Schnorbus judgments, the mere fact that military interests are concerned is not relevant for the inapplicability of Community law. What is decisive is rather whether the service relationship is outside the scope of Community law on the basis of its purpose and structure. AG46 That is the case with compulsory military service. Just as national defence is not a task of the Community, military service is not part of the labour market or training with a view to the requirements of the labour market. The main proceedings thus differ substantially from the cases previously decided by the Court. AG47 The Commission emphasises, citing the judgment in Lawrie-Blum, [FN14] *835 that, while the public law nature of an activity does not in itself exclude in principle the application of Directive 76/207, certain public law duties of service which have developed historically, examples of which, besides military service, include national particularities such as the German dike maintenance duty of island or coastal residents, cannot, however, be covered by Community provisions aimed at working life. It would be different if for reasons of social and health policy a Member State were to introduce a general duty to care for old and sick people. FN14 Case 66/85: [1986] E.C.R. 2121; [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 389. AG48 Accordingly, neither Arts 13 EC and 141 EC nor Directive 76/207, which was adopted on the basis of Art.235 of the EC Treaty (now Art.308 EC), applies to compulsory military service. AG49 The Member States may thus rely on Art.6(3) EU and Art.5 EC to exercise their defence sovereignty in traditional national style. AG50 Nor would taking into account the consequences of military service for access to employment lead to a different conclusion. Compulsory military service does not restrict the scope of Community law any more than is inherent in its nature. There is no need to discuss whether military service for men could be justified in the context of Directive 76/207. The Court, in Schnorbus, could only uphold the compatibility of the national provisions with that directive, since it did

not regard the restrictions inherent in compulsory military service as a breach of Community law. AG51 At the hearing the Commission submitted additionally that, since compulsory military service is outside the jurisdiction of the Community, consequences which arise for Community law must be accepted. It cannot be the case that it is always only Community law which displaces national law; national law asserts its own sphere of validity to a certain extent. AG52 On the Charter of the European Union, the Commission submits that Arts 20, 21 and 23 of the Charter concerning the principle of equality and the prohibition of discrimination between men and women apply, in accordance with Art.51(1) of the Charter, to legal acts of the Member States only where they implement the law of the Union, which is not the case here.

C --Assessment AG53 Compulsory military service in Germany is, according to the unchallenged submissions of the German Government, an essential part of the national provisions for guaranteeing the external security of Germany. AG54 The heart of the National Court's question is whether the question of compulsory military service and hence of its structure is completely outside the scope of Community law because it is for the Member States to take suitable measures to guarantee their external security, and hence to make decisions on the organisation of their armed forces. *836 Should that not be the case, the question would arise of what Community law could be applicable and whether it precluded compulsory military service for men only.

1. Basic principles of the applicability of Community law to national measures

for guaranteeing external security AG55 It follows from the principle of limited individual powers (Art.5 EC) that the Member States have sole competence where no powers have been conferred on the Community legislature or--apart from the case of exclusive competence-- where despite Community competence there are no Community rules. AG56 The Court has, however, stated on numerous occasions, as settled case law, that there are certain areas in which, even though they fall in principle within the exclusive normative power of the Member States, Community law sets limits to that power. [FN15] FN15 E.g., concerning criminal law and criminal procedure law, Bickel (C-274/96): [1998] E.C.R. I-7637; [1999] 1 C.M.L.R. 348, para.[17]; concerning further: the organisation of the educational system and educational policy, Casagrande (9/74): [1974] E.C.R. 773; [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 423; and Gravier (293/83): [1985] E.C.R. 593; [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 1; the structure of social security systems, Commission v Belgium (C-229/89): [1991] E.C.R. I-2205; [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 403; Nolte (C-317/93): [1995] E.C.R. I-4625 and Decker (C-120/95): [1998] E.C.R. I-1831; [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. 879; direct taxes, Asscher (C-107/94):

[1996] E.C.R. I-3089; [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. 61; membership of religious or philosophical associations, Steymann (196/87): [1988] E.C.R. 6159; [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. 449; or rules of administrative and judicial procedure, Rewe Zentralfinanz (33/76): [1976] E.C.R. 1989; [1977] 1 C.M.L.R. 533; Peterbroeck (C-312/93): [1995] E.C.R. I-4599; [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 793; and Van Schijndel and Van Veen (C 430-431/93): [1995] E.C.R. I-4705; [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 801. AG57 The Court has also examined in this respect, inter alia, national measures in the field of public security, which includes external as well as internal security. [FN16] In the Court's view, it is initially "the Member States, which retain exclusive competence as regards the maintenance of public order and the safeguarding of internal security, [which] unquestionably enjoy a margin of discretion in determining what measures are most appropriate". [FN17] FN16 E.g., Richardt and "Les Accessoires Scientifiques" (C-367/89): [1991] E.C.R. I-4621; [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 61; Leifer (C-83/94): [1995] E.C.R. I-3231 and Johnston (222/84): [1986] E.C.R. 1651; [1986] 3 C.M.L.R. 240. FN17 Commission v France (C-265/95): [1997] E.C.R. I-6959, para.[33]. AG58 In the Sirdar judgment, [FN18] in which the Court had to consider restrictions on access by women to certain posts for professional soldiers, it further stated: It is for the Member States, which have to adopt appropriate measures to ensure their internal and external security, to take decisions on the organisation of their armed forces. It does not follow, however, that such decisions must fall entirely outside the scope of Community law. FN18 Cited above, paras [15] et seq. As the Court has already held, the only articles in which the Treaty provides for derogations applicable in situations which may affect public security are Arts 36, 48, 56, 223 (now, after amendment, Arts 30 EC, 39 *837 EC, 46 EC and 296 EC) and 224, which deal with exceptional and clearly defined cases. It is not possible to infer from those articles that there is inherent in the Treaty a general exception covering all measures taken for reasons of public security. To recognise the existence of such an exception, regardless of the specific requirements laid down by the Treaty, might impair the binding nature of Community law and its uniform application ... Furthermore, some of the derogations provided for by the Treaty concern only the rules relating to the free movement of goods, persons and services, and not the social provisions of the Treaty, of which the principle of equal treatment of men and women ... forms part ... It follows that application of the principle of equal treatment for men and women is not subject to any general reservation as regards measures for the organisation of the armed forces taken on grounds of the protection of public

security ... AG59 Those observations may be found in almost identical terms in the Court's judgment in Kreil. [FN19] While Sirdar and Kreil concerned access to posts in a professional army, classification as a "measure for the organisation of the armed forces" can in principle have no different results for a professional army and compulsory military service. FN19 Cited above, paras [15] et seq. AG60 In judgments in other cases too which concerned national measures of external security or foreign policy, the Court indicated that it is not possible to derive from Community law an inherent reservation excluding all measures taken in the interest of public security from the scope of Community law. [FN20] FN20 Albore (C-423/98)--area of military importance--[2000] E.C.R. I-5965; [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. 10, paras [19] et seq.; Werner (C-70/94): [1995] E.C.R. I-3189, para.[10]; Leifer--disturbance of external relations--cited above; Commission v Italy (C-283/99)--private security services--[2001] E.C.R. I-4363; and Commission v France--public disorder--cited above. AG61 Finally, Advocate General Jacobs dealt in his Opinion in Commission v Greece [FN21] with a unilateral national embargo on trade which was motivated exclusively by security policy. External trade policy falls within the exclusive competence of the Community. It was therefore doubtful whether Greece's action was to be tested for compatibility with Art.113 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Art.133 EC) or fell outside Community law as a measure of national security policy. Advocate General Jacobs said: In my view, the decisive element is not the purpose of the embargo but its effects. A measure which has the effect of directly preventing or restricting trade with a non-member country comes within the scope of Art.113, regardless of its purpose. [FN22] FN21 Case C-120/94: [1996] E.C.R. I-1513. FN22 Cited above, point 42. AG62 To sum up, then, national measures for guaranteeing public security are not completely outside Community law. The organisation of the armed forces as an essential part of guaranteeing external security admittedly falls as such within the exclusive competence of the Member States. If, however, the national measures adopted for that *838 purpose produce effects in areas regulated by Community law, so that the scope of Community law is affected, those effects are to be tested by reference to Community law (which takes precedence [FN23]). [FN24] FN23 The Court's judgment in Costa v Enel (6/64): [1964] E.C.R. 585; [1964]

C.M.L.R. 425 is fundamental. FN24 On the comprehensive discussion in relation to women in the armed forces, inter alia, in the German-speaking world, see e.g. von Wilmowsky, "Ausnahmebereiche gegenüber EG-Grundfreiheiten" (1996) Europarecht at p.362; Streinz, "Frauen an die Front" (2000) Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt at p.585; Tobler, "Kompetenzanmaβung der EG via den EuGH?--Zur Rechtsprechung des EuGH über Anwendbarkeit des EG-Gleichstellungsrechtes auf Arbeitsverhältnisse in den Streitkräften der Mitgliedstaaten" (2000) Aktuelle juristische Praxis at p.577; Stahn, "Streitkräfte im Wandel--Zu den Auswirkungen der EuGH-Urteile Sirdar und Kreil auf das deutsche Recht" (2000) Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift at p.121; Hühn, "Die Waffen der Frauen: Der Fall Kreil--erneuter Anlass zum Konflikt zwischen europäischer und deutscher Gerichtsbarkeit?" (2000) Schriften zur europäischen Integration Nr. 51 at p.5; Zuleeg, "Fällt die Wehrpflicht in Deutschland durch Richterspruch?" (2002) Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht at p.545; see also Ellis, "Can Public Safety Provide An Excuse For Sex Discrimination?" (1986) The Law Quarterly Review at p.496; Müller-Graff/Bulst, "New Issues in A Sensitive Relationship--Tanja Kreil between secondary EC law and national constitutional law" (2000) Europarättslig tidskrift at p.295; for a critical view, Scholz, "Frauen an die Waffe kraft Europarecht" (2000) Die öffentliche Verwaltung at p.417; Rupp, "Bemerkungen zum europarechtlichen Schutz der nationalen Identität der EU-Mitgliedstaaten " (2001) Völkerrecht und deutsches Recht: Festschrift für Walter Rudolf zum 70. Geburtstag at p.173; Köster/Schröder, "Eine bemerkenswerte Kompetenzüberschreitung--Frauen an die Waffe" (2001) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift at p.273; Stein, "Über Amazonen, Europa und das Grundgesetz" (2001) Die Macht des Geistes: Festschrift für Hartmut Schiedermair at p.737. AG63 Applied to the present case, that means that the introduction of a general national obligation to perform military service is and remains, as a measure of organisation of external security, a political decision of the Member State which introduces it. It is for the Member States to decide whether and how to organise national armed forces to guarantee their external security. AG64 But that does not mean that the specific form taken by national measures adopted in this context is not to be examined with respect to their effects on other legal positions protected under Community law. AG65 It may be seen from the order for reference that the present case concerns the Community law requirement of equal treatment of men and women in connection with access to employment. AG66 It should therefore first be ascertained below what requirements Community law contains as to equal treatment of the sexes and what fields of application they define in each case. If the form taken by a general military service obligation such as that in Germany falls as regards its effects within the scope of a provision of Community law thus ascertained and if those effects are contrary to Community law, it should then further be examined whether the breach of equal treatment is perhaps covered by a derogation provided for in the

provision of Community law itself and might thus be permissible, or could finally - in the case of indirect discrimination--be justified. AG67 In accordance with the National Court's question as reformulated, [FN25] *839 Arts 3(2) EC, 13 EC and 141 EC and Directive 76/207 should be examined in this respect in the present case. FN25 See point 20 above.

2. Provisions of the EC Treaty AG68 The requirement laid down in Art.3(2) EC of eliminating inequalities between men and women and promoting equal treatment of the sexes is to be observed only in connection with actions of the Community. However, compulsory military service is a national measure. Since the national legislature is not an addressee of this provision, Art.3(2) EC is not in itself a criterion of assessment. [FN26] FN26 That does not, however, exclude reference to it in the interpretation of secondary law; see in particular point 105 below. AG69 Article 13 EC merely contains a basis of competence for the Community legislature, and that only "within the limits of the powers conferred by [the Treaty] upon the Community". This mere basis of competence cannot thus in itself give rise to any rights to equal treatment of men and women beyond the existing secondary law. AG70 Article 141(1) EC (formerly Art.119(1) of the EC Treaty), according to settled case law of the Court, [FN27] gives a direct entitlement to equal treatment of men and women. However, it is applicable only in questions of equal "pay", not where equal access to paid employment is concerned. From Art.141(2) EC, which contains a definition of "pay", it is apparent that the discrimination alleged in the present case in connection with access to the civilian labour market is not covered by Art.141. Article 141(4) EC admittedly relates generally to "ensuring full equality ... between men and women in working life". That provision, however, contains merely a clarification as regards the possibility of maintaining or adopting sex-specific advantages in the legal systems of the Member States. As regards Art.141(3) EC, what was said above in relation to Art.13 EC applies by analogy. That provision too merely contains a basis of competence for the creation of Community law measures concerning equal treatment for men and women in matters of employment and occupation. [FN28] FN27 Defrenne (43/75): [1976] E.C.R. 455; [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 98. FN28 The amendment to Directive 76/207 which has recently come into force is therefore based on Art.141(3) EC. AG71 The conclusion must therefore be that neither Art.3(2) EC nor Art.13 EC nor Art.141 EC precludes a national obligation of military service for men only.

3. Directive 76/207 AG72 It must first be examined whether the form taken by compulsory military service or its effects fall within the material scope of Directive 76/207. Only if that is the case will the question of discrimination on grounds of sex have to be considered.

*840 (a) Whether compulsory military service must itself be regarded as "employment" within the meaning of Art.3(1) of Directive 76/207

AG73 Several parties raised the question whether Directive 76/207 is applicable to compulsory military service at all. It was doubted whether activities in connection with military service could be regarded as "employment" within the meaning of Art.3(1) of Directive 76/207. Since compulsory military service is a unilateral civic duty imposed by authority with no entitlement to pay, this could indeed be doubtful. AG74 It may be observed to begin with that the Court has already ruled that the public law nature of a service relationship does not in itself constitute a ground for not applying Directive 76/207. [FN29] In my opinion, however, that is not the problem. FN29 Sirdar, cited above, para.[17]; Kreil, cited above, para.[18]; and Schnorbus, cited above, para.[28]; Commission v Germany (248/83): [1985] E.C.R. 1459; [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 588, para.[16]; and Gerster (C-1/95) : [1997] E.C.R. I-5253; [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 303, para.[18]. AG75 That is because the context in which Directive 76/207 speaks of "jobs" and "posts" should be borne in mind. Article 3 is intended as protection against discrimination on grounds of sex in connection with "access" to employment. Mr Dory's submissions do not concern an allegation of discrimination on grounds of sex in access to military service. According to the order for reference, the proceedings are also not concerned with whether the lack of access of women to military service may be a disadvantage to them if they wish, for instance, to pursue a career as a professional soldier. [FN30] FN30 Probably for this reason, Finland created the possibility of voluntary military service for women; see point 41 above. AG76 Mr Dory's argument relates, rather, to the alleged effects of compulsory military service on access by men to the civilian labour market after they have completed their military service. In relation to aspects of access to the civilian labour market, however, the material scope of Directive 76/207 is undoubtedly engaged in principle.

(b) Whether the effects of compulsory military service on access by men to the

civilian labour market are covered by the material scope of Directive 76/207

AG77 It must first be ascertained what consequences compulsory military service has or may have for access of men to the civilian labour market. During the performance of military service, access to the labour market is prohibited altogether in practice, simply because of the duty of attendance. It cannot therefore be doubted that during that period men - unlike women of the same age--in principle have no "access to employment" at all, in the sense of civilian employment. After military service, access to the labour market exists without restriction, but *841 access for men who have performed military service is delayed compared to equivalent women of the same age. [FN31] FN31 This general conclusion applies regardless of any national measures which compensate or are intended to compensate for such delays (e.g., in the field of social security). AG78 Before examining whether those positions, different from that of women, as regards access to the civilian labour market are "discrimination" within the meaning of Directive 76/207, the general question first arises of whether Art.3(1) of Directive 76/207 covers only national measures which are aimed at regulating access to employment, or also those which merely have or may have an effect on access to employment without being aimed at regulating access. The temporarily prohibited and subsequently delayed access of men to the civilian labour market complained of in this case is not the content of the WPflG but rather a consequence of it. (i) The Court's case law in relation to national measures aimed at regulating access to the labour market AG79 In its case law on Directive 76/207 the Court has so far mainly examined national measures whose content was a - directly sex-specific--regulation of access to particular employment. [FN32] FN32 E.g., Stoeckel (C-345/89): [1991] E.C.R. I-4047; [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. 673, concerning a prohibition of night work for women only. AG80 In the Kreil and Sirdar judgments [FN33] too, a corresponding relationship may be seen between the measure to be assessed in the light of the directive and the situation in relation to which an instance of unequal treatment manifests itself, different from the one in the present case. Those two cases concerned access to service in the armed forces, in other words specific prohibitions of employment, and in both cases measures whose content directly regulated access to that service had to be assessed by reference to the directive. FN33 Cited above. Sirdar concerned decisions preventing access of women to certain marine commando units and Kreil statutory provisions by which women were excluded generally from armed service in the armed forces. AG81 In the case of direct sex-specific prohibitions of access, however, the

material scope of Directive 76/207 is beyond doubt. AG82 The Court has also recognised sex-specific quotas [FN34] for admittance to certain fields of employment as falling within the scope of Directive 76/207. These too, however, were national measures which were clearly directed to regulating access to a particular labour market in each case, so that the material scope of Directive 76/207 was beyond doubt here too. FN34 Commission v France (318/86): [1988] E.C.R. 3559; [1989] 3 C.M.L.R. 663. AG83 In Schnorbus [FN35] the Court had to deal with unequal treatment with respect to access to vocational training (Art.4 of Directive 76/207). In that case the unequal treatment consisted in the fact that men who had *842 completed military or substitute service had preference over other candidates or were admitted to vocational training more quickly. Since the regulation of admittance to vocational training was the national measure which had to be tested for discrimination, as it was the basis of the unequal treatment, the material scope of Directive 76/207 was again beyond doubt in view of the content of the national measure. [FN36] FN35 Cited above. FN36 One could also mention: Hofmann (184/83): [1984] E.C.R. 3047; [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 242, which concerned maternity leave which only women were entitled to. Since this was a measure aimed directly at the regulation of "working conditions" under Art.5 of Directive 76/207, the applicability of the directive was equally obvious. The national provision which was the subject of the Marshall case (cited above)--on which Mr Dory also, inter alia, relies-- concerned the automatic termination of employment relationships when the age threshold, which differed between the sexes, for an old-age pension was reached. There too the national measure was thus directed at the regulation of "working conditions" under Art.5 of Directive 76/207. (ii) The Court's case law relating to national measures whose effect is differences of access to the labour market AG84 I should like to base my discussion of whether a national measure also falls within the material scope of Directive 76/207 if it is not directed to regulating access to the labour market, but nevertheless has or may have the effect of differences of access, on the Court's judgments in three cases. These are the judgments in Jackson and Cresswell [FN37] and Meyers [FN38] on the one hand, and the Schnorbus [FN39] judgment on the other. Although these cases differ in content, they appear to me to share a common point of view as regards the scope of Directive 76/207. FN37 Case C 63-64/91: [1992] E.C.R. I-4737; [1992] 3 C.M.L.R. 389.

FN38 Case C-116/94: [1995] E.C.R. I-2131; [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 461. FN39 Cited above. The Jackson and Cresswell and Meyers cases AG85 In both cases the women applicants in the main proceedings were concerned as to the conditions for entitlement to State social benefits in favour of persons who did not belong to the regular labour market. It was claimed that those conditions for entitlement had the consequence that single parents (who are generally mothers) were disadvantaged as regards access to the regular labour market. AG86 The Court held in para.[28] of the Jackson and Cresswell judgment: [FN40] Nevertheless, such a scheme will fall within the scope of that directive only if its subject matter is access to employment, including vocational training and promotion, or working conditions. FN40 Cited above. In para.[30] the Court then concluded: Consequently, the assertion that the method of calculating claimants' actual earnings, which are used as the basis for determining the amount of the benefits, might affect sole mothers' ability to take up access to vocational training or part-time employment, is not sufficient to bring such schemes within the scope of Directive 76/207. AG87 *843 In para.[13] of Meyers [FN41] the Court held, referring to the above judgment: ... the directive is not rendered applicable simply because the conditions of entitlement for receipt of benefits may be such as to affect the ability of a single parent to take up employment.... FN41 Cited above. The Court then went on to examine the characteristics of the social benefit at issue, and came to the conclusion in para.[21]: That being so, family credit is concerned with access to employment, as referred to in Art.3 of the directive. AG88 It might then be thought that the Court interpreted the material scope of Directive 76/207 narrowly in those two judgments, and ruled that it is not applicable in the case of - certain--national measures which are merely capable of producing restrictions on access to employment without having such access as their content ("subject matter"). In this respect there are obvious parallels with the national obligation of military service for men only--that too results in sex-specific differences in access to the labour market, but its "subject matter" is quite different, however, namely the guaranteeing of external security. AG89 It appears doubtful, however, whether the Court in fact laid down a general

principle in that comprehensive sense in Jackson and Cresswell. AG90 The contrary is suggested, first, by the fact that that interpretation of the material scope of Directive 76/207 in those cases was connected with the fact that the main proceedings concerned social security benefits which were alleged to take a form which resulted in discrimination against women in connection with access to the labour market. Benefits which originate in the field of social security are, however, according to the Court's case law, [FN42] excluded from the scope of Directive 76/207 under Art.1(2) of the directive. [FN43] That exclusion is in turn interpreted strictly by the Court, in accordance with general principles. The result is that the Court starts by giving a broad interpretation to the scope of Directive 76/207, seen in this way. Thus it concludes that a national measure which as regards its origin is a social security benefit nevertheless--but only then--falls within the scope of Directive 76/207 if its "subject matter" is one of the areas covered by the directive, that is to say, access to employment, including vocational training and promotion, or working conditions. Ultimately, therefore, the Court adopted a narrow interpretation not only of the exception but also of the rule, namely which measures are in fact covered by the scope of the directive. FN42 Newstead (C 192/85): [1987] E.C.R. 4753; [1988] 1 C.M.L.R. 219 *844 . FN43 "With a view to ensuring the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment in matters of social security, the Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission, will adopt provisions defining its substance, its scope and the arrangements for its application." AG91 What the Court did not formally examine in those judgments is the general question - to be kept separate from the question of a measure's origin in the field of social security--whether national measures which have the effect of making access to employment different and hence more difficult according to sex, although access to employment is not their "subject matter", fall within the scope of the directive. AG92 Although the cited case law of the Court does not compel an (ultimately) narrow interpretation of the material scope of Directive 76/207, I nevertheless consider that such an interpretation may be justified. The Court makes it clear, conversely, that for a national measure to be outside the scope of the directive, regardless of its (formally) belonging to a social security system, only the content of the national measure is relevant. It delimits equally clearly, however, the content of the measure which it reserves for examination by reference to the directive. Precisely because it proceeds, in accordance with its case law, from a narrow interpretation of an exception, a national measure cannot be tested against Directive 76/207 only if falls within none of the fields mentioned in Arts 3 to 5 of the directive. AG93 Directive 76/207 focuses on the "classic" sex-specific restrictions of those fields. Thus Art.3(2)(c) evidently concerns the abolition of national provisions which regulate (in a sex-specific way) access to "typical" women's or men's occupations (the same is true of Art.5(2)(c) with respect to working conditions).

The list of exceptions in Art.2(2) to (4) also shows that the directive is in principle directed to eliminating national measures which are aimed at regulating access to employment, vocational training or working conditions. There is no indication in the directive, on the other hand, that national measures which are not aimed at regulating the fields covered but merely have the effect of creating differences there are also to be subject to examination. The Schnorbus case AG94 It seems to me that the Court also adopted a comparable approach - regardless of the other conditions--in its judgment in Schnorbus. [FN44] The subject of its examination by reference to the directive with respect to access to practical legal training was not the provisions on compulsory military service as such but rather the provisions which "govern the circumstances in which the admission of applicants to practical legal training may ... be delayed...". [FN45] FN44 Cited above. FN45 Ibid., para.[28]. AG95 At the level of access to practical legal training, that is, in the particular case the level of access to civilian employment, [FN46] the Court examined the measure which directly regulated the conditions of the *845 access in question, since only that measure regulated "access to employment" within the meaning of the directive. At the level of "access to employment" the measure whose subject matter was the regulation of access referred to compulsory military service, however, only as an example of the "completion of compulsory service". Compulsory military service was thus clearly a condition for the measure, but was not itself subject to examination by reference to the directive, since it did not itself regulate "access to employment" within the meaning of Directive 76/207. The Court thus did not even have to consider the sixth question referred in Schnorbus. [FN47] FN46 Ibid., para.[29]. FN47 See point 40 above. AG96 Here too the Court clearly proceeded - albeit not expressly--in this respect from a concept of the scope of Directive 76/207 according to which national measures which merely have the effect of restricting access to vocational training but do not regulate it as their "subject matter" are outside the scope of the directive. AG97 This appears logical, in the light of the above considerations, since the unequal treatment to be examined was a consequence of compulsory military service, not its "subject matter". Preliminary conclusion AG98 I am therefore of the opinion that the material scope of Directive 76/207 must for the above reasons be limited in principle to national measures whose

"subject matter" is the regulation of working conditions or access to employment or to vocational training. AG99 In my opinion, therefore, in connection with compulsory military service from the point of view of access to the normal labour market, where Mr Dory considers himself discriminated against in the present case, the only provisions to be tested against Directive 76/207 are those which have the conditions of access to civilian employment as their "subject matter", such as compensatory measures, as in Schnorbus, which use the completion of compulsory military service as an (objective) distinguishing criterion. AG100 Compulsory military service as such, on the other hand, is in a sufficiently direct relationship to the question of equal treatment to raise a question of discrimination under Directive 76/207 only with respect to access to posts in a professional army. [FN48] In other words, compulsory military service can enter the scope of the directive only in so far as discrimination on grounds of sex is concerned in connection with access to employment in the armed forces, not to employment in the ordinary labour market. FN48 See point 75 above. *846 (iii) The possible relevance of Art.3(2) EC in the interpretation of the material scope of Directive 76/207 in relation to national measures which have sex-specific effects on access to the labour market AG101 The above considerations do not, however, justify the conclusion that any purported "subject matter" of a national measure would be capable of removing altogether from review by reference to Directive 76/207 a measure which merely has the effect of thus producing sex-specific disadvantages in access to the labour market. AG102 That is because, in my opinion, in interpreting the scope of Directive 76/207, Art.3(2) EC must now also be taken into account. That provision of primary law was not yet in force at the time when the directive was drawn up. However, the Community is now expressly required by that provision actively to promote equality between men and women. AG103 As regards the scope of Art.3(2) EC, it may be seen that it applies to the Community's "activities referred to" in Art.3(1) EC. Community law concerning the equal treatment of men and women in access to employment may be regarded as "social policy" within the meaning of Art.3(1)(j) EC. [FN49] As regards the "activities referred to", Art.3(2) EC imposes an obligation on "the Community". That presumably includes the Court when dealing, in connection with a reference for a preliminary ruling, with the interpretation of secondary law in the field of social policy. FN49 Directive 76/207 was adopted on the basis of Art.235 of the EC Treaty. The directive which has just entered into force (October 5, 2002), Directive 2002/73: [2002] O.J. L269/15, was adopted on the basis of Art.141(3) EC. That article is part of Title XI, Chapter 1, "Social provisions".

AG104 As to content, Art.3(2) EC obliges the Community to "promote" equality of men and women. It appears scarcely compatible with that requirement of promotion to interpret the material scope of Directive 76/207 so that national measures (with sex-specific consequences for access to the labour market) were always exempted from review by reference to the directive if the Member State could simply put forward any - other--"subject matter" to justify them. AG105 In my view, it follows from the requirement to promote equality in Art.3(2) EC that an interpretation of the material scope of Directive 76/207 such as that put forward above [FN50] requires the following clarification: These national measures should initially be excluded from the scope of the directive only if they are shown to have exclusively a "subject matter" other than access to employment, including vocational training and promotion, or working conditions. National measures of the kind referred to which, e.g., pursue as it were as a secondary aim a sex-specific regulation of access to the labour market would thus indeed be covered by the scope of Directive 76/207. In addition, it could be considered whether the alleged "subject *847 matter" of the national measure in question ought not also to be made amenable to some extent to a review of content by reference to the aims of Art.3(2) EC, at least where that "subject matter" concerns one of the fields referred to in Art.3(1) EC. [FN51] It might have to be examined here whether and to what extent the "subject matter" was consistent with the promotion requirement in Art.3(2) EC. Review of the content of the alleged "subject matter" would be ruled out, however, if it as such were not covered by Community law at all. FN50 See point 98 above. FN51 For clarity, I point out again that this is not intended to assert that the requirement of promotion in Art.3(2) EC is aimed at national measures. The above considerations relate to the "subject matter" of national measures only in so far as it is the relevant criterion for the applicability of secondary law on equal treatment of the sexes. (iv) Application of the above considerations on the material scope of Directive 76/207 to national compulsory military service for men only AG106 Applied to the present case, that means the following. The national obligation of military service for men only produces the effect of access to the labour market which differs according to sex. AG107 Since, according to submissions which are not in dispute in this respect, national compulsory military service for men only has a subject matter other than access to employment, including vocational training and promotion, or working conditions - namely the guaranteeing of the external security of Germany by means of a specific form of organisation of the armed forces--this national measure is in principle outside the material scope of Directive 76/207. AG108 National compulsory military service for men only serves, according to submissions which are not in dispute in this respect either, exclusively for guaranteeing external security. Guaranteeing national external security is--as

described above [FN52] --as such not covered by Community law, so that the narrow interpretation of Directive 76/207 is compatible in the present case with Art. 3(2) EC. FN52 See point 63 above.

(c) Conclusion AG109 If a national obligation of military service for men only does not therefore fall within the material scope of Directive 76/207 despite its effects on the access of men to the labour market, there is no need for any further examination by reference to the directive with respect to whether there is discrimination or whether it may be justified. AG110 In conclusion, it must therefore be stated that Directive 76/207 does not preclude a national obligation of military service for men only, such as that at issue in the main proceedings.

VI --Conclusion AG111 In the light of the foregoing, I propose that the Court give the following answer to the question as reformulated: *848 Articles 3(2) EC, 13 EC and 141 EC and Council Directive 76/207 are to be interpreted, as Community law now stands, as not precluding a national provision such as the German obligation of military service which applies to men only. JUDGMENT 1 By order of April 4, 2001, received at the Court on April 30, 2001, the Verwaltungsgericht Stuttgart (Administrative Court, Stuttgart) referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling under Art.234 EC a question on the interpretation of Art.2 of Council Directive 76/207 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions [FN53] and, more generally, on the compatibility with Community law of limiting compulsory military service in Germany to men. FN53 [1976] O.J. L39/40. 2 That question was raised in proceedings between Mr Dory and Germany concerning a decision of the Kreiswehrersatzamt Schwäbisch Gmünd (District Recruiting Office, Schwäbisch Gmünd, "the KSG") refusing to exempt him from call-up by the army and compulsory military service. Legal background Community law

3 Under Art.2 EC: The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and an economic and monetary union and by implementing common policies or activities referred to in Arts 3 and 4, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic activities, a high level of employment and of social protection, equality between men and women, sustainable and non-inflationary growth, a high degree of competitiveness and convergence of economic performance, a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States. 4 Article 3(2) EC states that, in the context of the activities referred to in Art.3(1) EC carried on for the purposes set out in Art.2 EC, "the Community shall aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality, between men and women". 5 Under Art.13 EC: Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and within the limits of the powers conferred by it upon the Community, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. 6 *849 Under Art.141(1) EC: Each Member State shall ensure that the principle of equal pay for male and female workers for equal work or work of equal value is applied. 7 Article 141(3) EC states: The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Art.251, and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, shall adopt measures to ensure the application of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation, including the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value. 8 Article 1(1) of Directive 76/207 provides: The purpose of this Directive is to put into effect in the Member States the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, including promotion, and to vocational training and as regards working conditions and, on the conditions referred to in para.2, social security. ... 9 Article 2(1) to (3) of that directive reads as follows: 1. For the purposes of the following provisions, the principle of equal treatment shall mean that there shall be no discrimination whatsoever on grounds of sex either directly or indirectly by reference in particular to marital or family status. 2. This Directive shall be without prejudice to the right of Member States to exclude from its field of application those occupational activities and, where appropriate, the training leading thereto, for which, by reason of their nature or the context in which they are carried out, the sex of the worker constitutes a determining factor. 3. This Directive shall be without prejudice to provisions concerning the protection of women, particularly as regards pregnancy and maternity. 10 Under Art.3(1) of Directive 76/207:

Application of the principle of equal treatment means that there shall be no discrimination whatsoever on grounds of sex in the conditions, including selection criteria, for access to all jobs or posts, whatever the sector or branch of activity, and to all levels of the occupational hierarchy. National legislation 11 Under Art.12a of the Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Basic Law of Germany), in the version published in BGBl. 2000 I, p.1755 ("the Grundgesetz"): 1. Men who have attained the age of 18 years may be required to serve in the armed forces, in the Federal Border Guard, or in a civil defence organisation. ... 4. If, during a state of defence, civilian service requirements in the civilian public health and medical system and in the stationary military hospital organisation cannot be met on a voluntary basis, women between 18 and 55 years of age may be assigned to such services by or pursuant to a law. They may on no account be required to bear arms. 12 The Wehrpflichtgesetz (Federal law on military service), in the *850 version of December 15, 1995, applicable from January 1, 1996, [FN54] provides in para.1(1), headed "Law on compulsory military service: General obligation to perform military service": All men who have attained the age of 18 years and are Germans within the meaning of the Grundgesetz are obliged to perform military service ... FN54 BGBl. 1995 I, p.1756. 13 Under para.3(1) of that law, "[t]he obligation to perform military service is satisfied by military service or, in the case referred to in para.1 of the Kriegsdienstverweigerungsgesetz (Law on refusal to perform war service) of February 28, 1983, [FN55] by civilian service ...". FN55 BGBl. I, p.203. The main proceedings and the question referred for a preliminary ruling 14 Mr Dory was born on June 15, 1982. After receiving a questionnaire in September 1999 as a preliminary to the medical examination to determine his fitness for military service, he requested the KSG to be exempted from call-up by the army and compulsory military service. In support of that request, he submitted that the Wehrpflichtgesetz was contrary to Community law, citing Case C-285/98 Kreil, [FN56] in which the Court held that women were not to be excluded from access to all posts in the German armed forces. FN56 [2000] E.C.R I-69; [2002] 1 C.M.L.R. 36. 15 By decision of February 3, 2000, the KSG rejected his request, stating that the

judgment in Kreil concerned only the voluntary access of women to careers in the armed forces, not the question of compulsory military service, and that the obligation to perform such service remained within the sole competence of the Member States. 16 Mr Dory's appeal against that decision was dismissed by the Wehrbereichsverwaltung (Military Area Administration). He thereupon brought an action in the Verwaltungsgericht Stuttgart, in which he argued that the fact that women have a right of access to military posts in accordance with Kreil but are exempted from the obligation to perform military service, while that obligation is imposed on men, is contrary to the principle of equality and constitutes unlawful discrimination against men. 17 The defendant in the main proceedings submitted that no provision of the EC Treaty allows compulsory military service to be regarded as an activity falling under Community law. The organisation of that service is within the competence of each Member State. Neither Arts 3(2) EC and 13 EC, which do not as such provide a basis of competence for the Community but merely define the conditions of exercise of powers conferred by other provisions, nor Art.141 EC and Directive 76/207, which relate solely to occupational activities, are capable of application in the main proceedings. 18 *851 The Verwaltungsgericht Stuttgart expressed doubts as to the latter arguments. On the one hand, referring to Case C-79/99 Schnorbus, [FN57] it observed that performance of military service delayed access by men to employment and vocational training and could therefore constitute discrimination on grounds of sex within the meaning of Art.2(1) of Directive 76/207. On the other hand, it considered that that difference in treatment could nevertheless be justified as specific preferential treatment for women, compensating in part for the periods of interruption of work due to maternity and child-rearing. FN57 [2000] E.C.R. I-10997; [2001] 1 C.M.L.R. 40. 19 In those circumstances, the Verwaltungsgericht Stuttgart considered it necessary for the Court to define the scope of Community law in this respect. It therefore decided to stay the proceedings and refer the following question to the Court for a preliminary ruling: Having regard in particular to the interpretation of Art.2 of Directive 76/207 ..., is the fact that in Germany military service is compulsory only for men contrary to Community law? 20 On September 26, 2001 Mr Dory received call-up papers requiring him to commence his military service between November 1 and 5, 2001. 21 By letters of September 28, 2001, Mr Dory made an application to the National Court and an application for interim measures to the Court, seeking suspension of enforcement of the call-up. By order of October 19, 2001, the National Court granted the application. By order of October 24, 2001 in Case C-186/01 R Dory, [FN58] the Court declared the application for interim measures inadmissible.

FN58 [2001] E.C.R. I-7823. The question referred for a preliminary ruling Observations submitted to the Court 22 Mr Dory submits that compulsory military service has the effect of prohibiting the exercise of an occupation during the period of that service and of delaying access to employment. It therefore falls under Directive 76/207 and constitutes discrimination prohibited by that directive. It is contrary in any event to the general principle of equality of men and women set out in Art.3(2) EC. 23 The German Government observes, first, that compulsory military service is of fundamental importance in Germany. It is intended to ensure close contact between the armed forces and the population and so to guarantee the democratic transparency of the military, and it is a factor of national integration especially between the young generations of the old and new Länder. The manpower needed to defend the country in time of war is not sufficient without the reserves provided by those called up for military service. 24 *852 The German Government submits, secondly, that military service comes within the field of organisation of the armed forces, an essential field of public authority which remains within the competence of the Member States. It considers that that analysis was accepted by the Court in Case C-273/97 Sirdar, [FN59] and Kreil [FN60]. FN59 [1999] E.C.R. I-7403; [1999] 3 C.M.L.R. 559, para.[15]. FN60 Cited above, para.[15]. 25 In any event, it submits that limiting compulsory military service to men - even on the assumption that that service may fall within the scope of the Treaty and Directive 76/207--is not contrary to Community law. First, Art.3(2) EC, which states that it is a Community aim to promote equality between men and women, applies only to specific measures taken by the Community for that purpose on other legal bases. Next, Art.13 EC has no direct effect and empowers the Council to take measures against discrimination on grounds of sex only within the areas of competence given it by the Treaty. Finally, Art.141 EC and Directive 76/207 only govern employment relationships resulting from a contract between an employer and an employee, so that they are not applicable to the general obligation of service which military service constitutes for those called upon to perform it. 26 The French Government considers that performance of compulsory military service cannot be equated with the occupation of a post and consequently does not come under the social provisions of the Treaty or under Directive 76/207. The organisation of such service constitutes a measure relating to national defence, within the exclusive competence of the Member States. 27 The Finnish Government submits that fundamental choices of defence policy

are for the Member States to make, as the Court held in Kreil, and that Community law is not applicable to the main proceedings. In any event, the obligation to perform military service does not concern the conditions of access to the military profession and is therefore not within the scope of Directive 76/207. Moreover, the fact that the obligation is limited to men does not compromise the progress of women's careers in the armed forces, since they still have the possibility of voluntary military service and thus being placed in the same position as men called up for military service. 28 The Commission considers that compulsory military service is a service obligation under public law which is unilateral and does not place the persons concerned in an employment relationship with an employer. So that service does not form part of the employment market, and is therefore outside the scope of Community law. It does not restrict the scope of that law beyond what is inherent in its nature. It is therefore unnecessary to examine whether limitation to men of the obligation to perform such service can be justified under Directive 76/207. The dispute in the main proceedings is thus very different from the previous cases in which the Court has given judgment. The *853 Commission submits that the Member States may consequently rely in this connection on Art.6(3) EU and Art.5 EC for their sovereignty in defence matters to be respected in accordance with the forms developed in their national traditions. Findings of the Court 29 To determine whether or not limitation of compulsory military service to men is compatible with the principle of equal treatment of men and women in Community law, the conditions for applying that law to activities relating to the organisation of the armed forces must first be determined. 30 Measures taken by the Member States in this domain are not excluded in their entirety from the application of Community law solely because they are taken in the interests of public security or national defence. 31 As the Court has already held, the only articles in which the Treaty provides for derogations applicable in situations which may affect public security are Arts 30 EC, 39 EC, 46 EC, 58 EC, 64 EC, 296 EC and 297 EC, which deal with exceptional and clearly defined cases. It cannot be inferred from those articles that the Treaty contains an inherent general exception excluding all measures taken for reasons of public security from the scope of Community law. To recognise the existence of such an exception, regardless of the specific requirements laid down by the Treaty, might impair the binding nature of Community law and its uniform application. [FN61] FN61 See, to that effect, Johnston (222/84): [1986] E.C.R. 1651; [1986] 3 C.M.L.R. 240, para.[26]; Sirdar, cited above, para.[16]; and Kreil, cited above, para.[16]. 32 The concept of public security, within the meaning of the Treaty articles cited in the preceding paragraph, covers both a Member State's internal security, as in

the Johnston case, and its external security, as in the Sirdar case. [FN62] FN62 See, to that effect, Richardt and "Les Accessoires Scientifiques" (C-367/89): [1991] E.C.R. I-4621; [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 61, para.[22]; Leifer (C-83/94): [1995] E.C.R. I-3231, para.[26]; Sirdar, cited above, para.[17]; and Kreil, cited above, para.[17]. 33 Furthermore, some of the derogations provided for by the Treaty concern only the rules relating to free movement of persons, goods, capital and services, and not the social provisions of the Treaty, of which the principle of equal treatment for men and women forms part. In accordance with settled case law, that principle is of general application and Directive 76/207 applies to employment in the public service. [FN63] FN63 See, to that effect, Commission v Germany (248/83): [1985] E.C.R. 1459; [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 588, para.[16]; Gerster (C-1/95): [1997] E.C.R. I-5253; [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 303, para.[18]; Sirdar, cited above, para.[18]; and Kreil, cited above, para.[18]. 34 Thus the Court held that Directive 76/207 was applicable to access to posts in the armed forces and that it was for the Court to verify whether the measures taken by the national authorities, in the exercise of their recognised discretion, did in fact have the purpose of guaranteeing *854 public security and whether they were appropriate and necessary to achieve that aim. [FN64] FN64 See Sirdar, cited above, para.[28]; and Kreil, cited above, para. [25]. 35 Certainly, decisions of the Member States concerning the organisation of their armed forces cannot be completely excluded from the application of Community law, particularly where observance of the principle of equal treatment of men and women in connection with employment, including access to military posts, is concerned. But it does not follow that Community law governs the Member States' choices of military organisation for the defence of their territory or of their essential interests. 36 It is for the Member States, which have to adopt appropriate measures to ensure their internal and external security, to take decisions on the organisation of their armed forces, as the Court observed in Sirdar, [FN65] and Kreil. [FN66] FN65 Para.[15]. FN66 Para.[15]. 37 The German Government submits that compulsory military service is of great importance in Germany, both politically and in terms of the organisation of the armed forces. It stated, in its written observations and at the hearing, that the institution of such service makes a contribution to the democratic transparency of

the military, national integration, the link between the armed forces and the population, and the mobilisation of the manpower needed by the armed forces in the event of a conflict. 38 Such a choice, enshrined in the Grundgesetz, consists in imposing an obligation to serve the interests of territorial security, albeit in many cases to the detriment of access of young people to the labour market. It thus takes precedence over the objectives of policies aimed at the work prospects of young people. 39 The decision of Germany to ensure its defence in part by compulsory military service is the expression of such a choice of military organisation to which Community law is consequently not applicable. 40 It is true that limitation of compulsory military service to men will generally entail a delay in the progress of the careers of those concerned, even if military service allows some of them to acquire further vocational training or subsequently to take up a military career. 41 Nevertheless, the delay in the careers of persons called up for military service is an inevitable consequence of the choice made by the Member State regarding military organisation and does not mean that that choice comes within the scope of Community law. The existence of adverse consequences for access to employment cannot, without encroaching on the competences of the Member States, have the effect of compelling the Member State in question either to extend the obligation of military service to women, thus imposing on them the same disadvantages with regard to access to employment, or to abolish compulsory military service. 42 *855 In the light of all the foregoing, the answer to the National Court's question must be that Community law does not preclude compulsory military service being reserved to men. Costs 43 The costs incurred by the German, French and Finnish Governments and by the Commission, which have submitted observations to the Court, are not recoverable. Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the proceedings pending before the National Court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. R1 Order On those grounds, THE COURT, in answer to the question referred to it by the Verwaltungsgericht Stuttgart by order of April 4, 2001, HEREBY RULES: Community law does not preclude compulsory military service being reserved to men.

(c) Sweet & Maxwell Limited [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 26

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