Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) U.S. Government Nuclear Forensics Operations September 16,...
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Transcript of Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) U.S. Government Nuclear Forensics Operations September 16,...
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO)
U.S. Government Nuclear Forensics
Operations
September 16, 2014
Jeffrey MorrisonProgram ManagerNational Technical Nuclear Forensics Center
The Challenge: Nuclear Terrorism is a Persistent Threat
A nuclear attack would change our way of life.
Terrorists have called for a nuclear attack on the US.
The availability of nuclear and radiological material continues to increase as nations develop the capability to produce nuclear power.
Nuclear terrorism remains an enduring risk because of its potential consequences.
“I continue to believe that nuclear terrorism remains one of the greatest threats to global security. That’s why working to prevent nuclear terrorism is going to remain one of my top national security priorities as long as I have the privilege of being President of the United States.” President Obama (NDU, 3 Dec 2012)
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IAEA Illicit Trafficking Data
Source: IAEA Incident &Trafficking Database 3
DHS’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
DNDO was established in DHS as an interagency office in 2005 (NSPD 43/HSPD 14) and authorized by the 2006 SAFE Port Act.
– “To improve the Nation’s capability to detect and report unauthorized attempts to import, possess, store, develop, or transport nuclear or radiological material for use against the Nation, and to further enhance this capability over time.”
DNDO’s National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center was established in 2006 (NSPD 17/HSPD 4) and authorized by the 2010 Nuclear Forensics and Attribution Act (P.L. 111-140).
– “To ensure an enduring national technical nuclear forensics capability to strengthen the collective response of the United States to nuclear terrorism or other nuclear attacks.”
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Nuclear Forensics: from Deterrence to Attribution
Nuclear Defense Spectrum
All-sourceinfo fused}Technical
NuclearForensics
IntelligenceCommunity
LawEnforcement
Materials Device Debris
Trace origin of materials to help identify and close smuggling networks.
Inform national response decisions.
Disrupt follow-on event.
Support prosecution.
Enhance deterrence.
Deter-Dissuade Detect Interdict Render
Safe Post-Det Cons. Mgmt.
Secure AttributionRecovery
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U.S. Policy
“Renewing the U.S. commitment to hold fully accountable any state, terrorist group, or other non-state actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use WMD, whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts.”
Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010
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Interagency Mission
DoD FBI DOE
DOS DHS ODNI
POST-DETLEAD AGENCY INVESTIGATION
PRE- TO POST- DET
INTERNATIONAL PRE-DET MATERIALS
INTELLIGENCE
ANLINL
LANLLLNL
NBLNIST
ORNLPNNL
Y-12DoD Labs
SRNLSNL
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DNDO’s Primary Interlocking Nuclear Forensics Missions
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USG Integration and Readiness
Joint planning– National Strategic Plan, Implementation Plan, Annual Review to Congress
– Executive Council, Steering Committee, Working Groups
– Nuclear Forensics Requirements Center
Joint exercising– “Snowmaggedon” in New York
– “Prominent Hunt” in Indiana
– International (“Iron Koala” & “Galaxy Serpent”)
– Attribution TTX
Joint assessments– National Academy of Sciences: “Nuclear Forensics: A Capability at Risk”
– OSTP “Nuclear Defense R&D Roadmap”
– Pipeline and Workforce studies
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DNDO’s NTNFC leads the integration of the USG interagency through joint
planning, exercising and assessments.
Signature Discovery
Improving Analysis Methods
Certified Reference Materials and Performance Testing
Pattern Recognition and Other Evaluation Tools
Technology Advancement for Materials
Other
K-25
Y-12
Trinity, Hiroshima, & Nagasaki
Major shift from weapons production to LEU production
Calutron Enrichment
HEU Production
0 2 4 6 8
1940s
0 2 4 6 8
1950s
0 2 4 6 8
1960s
0 2 4 6 8
1970s
0 2 4 6 8
1980s
0 2 4 6 8
1990s
0 2 4 6 8
2000s
0
Weapons component production, HEU recycle
1st H-bomb (Eniwetok)
New HEU purification system
LEU Production
Portsmouth
Paducah
Gas
eous
Diff
usio
n P
lant
s
LEU Production
LEU Production
HEU Production VHEU Production (Naval Reactors)
Reprocessed LEU recycle from Hanford blanket material
Period of rapidly increasing capabilities in uranium processing & fabrication
Production Capabilities Restoration Project
Production suspension & process revisions
Zr to Er
New rolling mills & heavy presses Begin work on
new processing facilities
End of all US HEU & Pu Production
Material Production Timelines
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Academic Pathway to a Nuclear Forensics Career
N a t i o n a l L a b M e n t o r i n g
UndergraduateScholarships, Summer
School
GraduateFellowships, Internships
Junior Faculty AwardsPost-doctoralFellowships
University Education Awards
Multi-Year R&D Funding
Relies on Multi-Disciplinary Expertise:
• Radiochemists• Geochemists• Analytical Chemists• Nuclear Engineers• Reactor Engineers• Process Engineers• Physicists• Nuclear Physicists• Statisticians• Metallurgists
National Nuclear Forensics Expertise Development Program
DNDO leading effort to restore the expertise pipeline – back from the brink
Provided support to over 300 students and faculty and 23 universities since 2008, in close partnership with 11 national labs
19 new PhD nuclear forensic scientists in the workforce; on track to meet near-term milestone of 35 new PhDs by 2018
Program now viewed as model – Nuclear Security Summit 2014; future IAEA collaboration
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Nuclear Forensics International Cooperation
Forum Members Focus Key Products
54 Heads-of-State (Invited)
Effective momentum to existing NF efforts
Nuclear Security Summit Work Plan, Communique
85 Partner Nations (Volunteer)
Policy: NF capabilities awareness, best practices, TTXs
NF Fundamentals Document, Iron Koala, NF Information Sharing
162 Member StatesNF guidance and training for member states
Nuclear Security Series Documents, IAEA NF Training
International scientists and law enforcement
(volunteer)
Technical forum and information exchange, analytical exercises
Comparative Lab Analysis Exercises; National NF Libraries TOR
Strengthening international collaboration is essential: Develops nuclear forensics core capabilities, shares best practices and lessons learned, and builds NF community
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Quality Assurance
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“You have to be right – and you have to be able to prove that you’re right”
Michael ChertoffFormer Secretary of Homeland SecurityNTNFC Program Review – 29 July 2013
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QA Systems in Nuclear Forensics Measurements must be scientifically and legally defensible
– ‘Daubert’ Standard Empirical testing: whether the theory or technique is falsifiable, refutable, and/or testable.
Whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication.
The known or potential error rate.
The existence and maintenance of standards and controls concerning its operation.
The degree to which the theory and technique is generally accepted by a relevant scientific community.
QA systems are used to provide a high level of confidence and reliability in nuclear forensics measurements
– ISO 17025 Accreditation
– Annual Proficiency Testing
– Annual Audits
– Certified Reference Materials
– Methodology Benchmarking Studies
– Exercises
BIPM
National Metrology Institutes:(NIST, IRMM, LNHB, NRC, NPL, PTB, etc.)
Reference Laboratory:
DOE/NBL
Measurement Laboratories: National Labs (INL, LLNL, LANL, PNL, SRNL, ORNL, etc.)
Other Nat’l/Int’l Measurement Laboratories: (AWE, IAEA, CEA,
ITU etc.)
Nuclear ForensicsMQO/QC
RequirementsFBI, NMIP, DOE/NNSA,
DoD, DHS
SRMs/CRMsIsotopics/Assay
CCQM/CCRI (Core Competencies)InterLab Comparisons
InterLaboratory ComparisonsLANL Pu ExchangeAWE U Exchange
IRMM NUSIMEP/REIMEP
CRMsMeas Eval Prog(Mass, Isotopics)
Nuclear ForensicsCertified Reference MaterialTraceability ChainANSI N42.23
Measurement Traceability & Evaluations(IRMM NUSIMEP/REIMEP Mass)
CRM Measurements
Bq, g
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Methodology Benchmarking Studies– Methodology Benchmarking Studies Designed to Establish:
– Data on the accuracy and precision of analytical methods used by different laboratories, including variation within and between laboratories.
– The most appropriate analytical methods for determining required TNF conclusions.
– A set of modern baselines and expectations for nuclear measurement performance.
– A compendium of “best practices” and “best standard operating procedures” for TNF.
– Strengths and weaknesses in measurement capability.
– Data for method validation and laboratory quality assurance.
– Uranium Methodology Benchmarking Completed in FY11
– Plutonium Methodology Benchmarking Completed in FY12
– Trace Actinides in Uranium Benchmarking Completed in FY14
– Trace Actinides in Plutonium Benchmarking Underway
Key Points Nuclear forensics supports (does not equal) attribution
Technical conclusions may be crucial to USG’s case
May help to deter the facilitators (not the terrorists themselves)
NTNF is a tightly coordinated multi-agency, cross-disciplinary mission
The expertise pipeline is rebounding – promising career path
QA is critical to ensuring defensible results
– “You have to be right – and you have to be able to prove that you’re right”
Expectation management is crucial: “Substantial capabilities exist today, but much work remains to be done in order for capabilities to match expectations.”
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