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Cor Oudes, Wim ZwijnenburgMay 2011
Does Unmanned Make Unacceptable? Exploring the Debate on using Drones and Robots in Warfare
1ikv pax christi
Introduction
1 Unmannedsystems:definitionsanddevelopments
1.1 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
1.2 Unmanned Ground Vehicles
1.3 Unmanned Underwater Vehicles and Unmanned Surface Vehicles
1.4 Autonomous versus remote controlled
2 Unmannedsystems:deploymentanduse
2.1 International use of unmanned systems
2.2 Dutch use of unmanned systems at home and abroad
3 Effectsanddangersofunmannedsystemsonabattleground
3.1 Pros and cons of unmanned systems
3.2 Dehumanising warfare
4 Ethicalandlegalissuesandreflections
4.1 Cultural context: risk-free warfare
4.2 Unarmed systems
4.3 Armed systems
4.4 Autonomous systems
4.5 Extrajudicial killings
4.6 Unmanned systems and the strife between public and private
5 Conclusions
Bibliography
ISBN9789070443672
©IKVPaxChristi
March2011
IKVPaxChristiworksforpeace,reconciliationandjusticeintheworld.Wework
togetherwithpeopleinwarzonestobuildapeacefulanddemocraticsociety.We
enlisttheaidofpeopleintheNetherlandswho,likeIKVPaxChristi,wanttowork
forpoliticalsolutionstocrisesandarmedconflicts.IKVPaxChristicombines
knowledge,energyandpeopletoattainonesingleobjective:peacenow!
Ifyouhavequestions,remarksorcommentsonthisreportyoucansendthemto
[email protected]:www.ikvpaxchristi.nl.
WewouldliketothankFrankSlijperforhisvaluablecommentsandexpertise.
Furthermore,wewouldliketothankMerijndeJong,DavidNauta,Lambèr
RoyakkersandMiriamStruyk.
IKVPaxChristihasdoneitsutmosttoretrievethecopyrightholdersoftheimages
usedinthisreport.Ifyouthinkimagesofwhichyouarethecopyrightholderhave
beenusedwronglyinthisreport,[email protected].
WimZwijnenburgandCorOudesareIKVPaxChristipolicyofficersforSecurity
andDisarmament.
Lay-out:HiljeOosterbaanMartinius
Translation:CatherineRomanik
Table of Contents
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2 does unmanned make unacceptable? — exploring the debate on using drones and robots in warfare 3ikv pax christi
Aspeaceorganisation,IKVPaxChristiwantstotakeastandinthediscussionson
technologicaldevelopmentsinthedomainofwarandpeace.Thesedevelopments,
ofwhichtheuseofrobotstowagewarisone,raisenewethical,politicalandlegal
questions.IKVPaxChristiwantstogivethesequestionsaplaceintheirownright
inthisdiscussion.Itgoeswithoutsayingthattheimpactonciviliansplaysalead-
ingroleinourconsiderations.Thisreportfocusesonwhethertheuseofdrones
androbotshelpstoprotectcivilians,orwhetheritputsciviliansinwarzones
ingreaterdanger.Webelievethatpoliticalandpublicdiscussionofthisquestion
isnecessaryforabetterunderstandingofthisissue.Wehopethatthisreportwill
beamodestcontributiontothisobjective.
MiriamStruyk
SecurityandDisarmamentProgrammeTeamLeader
IKVPaxChristi
HumansecurityistheguidingprincipleintheworkandthinkingofIKVPax
Christi.Protectingciviliansisthemainpurposeofourworkinthevarious
areasofconflictinwhichwe–andourpartners–operate.Our’Securityand
Disarmament’teamgivesimpetustothisgoalinareasofconflictviaresearch,
politicalactionandlobbying.ExamplesoftheSecurityandDisarmament
team’sworkincludeexploringthefutureoftheDutcharmedforces,nuclear
disarmament,thecriteriaforexportingarmsandcallingintoquestionthe
useofexplosiveweaponsinpopulousareas.Wealsocampaignforuniversal
implementationoftreatiesprohibitingtheuseofanti-personnelminesand
clustermunitions,aswellasforresearchintotheimpactofweaponswith
depleteduranium.Thisreportfitsinthistradition.
Evermorearmiesaredeployingunmannedsystems–robotsandunmanned
planes–intheiroperations.Insomecases–forexampleusingrobotstosweep
formines–thesesystemscansupporttroops.Inothercases,unmannedsystems
replacemannedsystemsortakecompletechargeofoperationsthattroops
wouldnormallycarryout.Israel,theUS,andrecentlytheUK,haveused
unmannedplanestoattacktargetsinthePalestinianterritories,Afghanistan
andPakistan. Predatorseriesdrones,ontheirown,haverackedupmorethan
amillionflighthours.Operationswithdronesandthecivilianvictimsthat
falltothemhavecalledintoquestionthedeploymentofthistypeofplane
andthelegitimacyofsuchattacks.Thisdiscussionalsohasimplicationsfor
theNetherlands:varioussourceshintthattheDutchMinistryofDefenceis
interestedinacquiringarmeddrones.
Thedeploymentofunmannedsystemsinwarzonesisamatterofhumanlives.
Thatiswhyafirmethicaldiscussionisimportant.Althoughtroopsareunargu-
ablysaferwhenunmannedsystemsdothework,itisnotevidentthatthese
unmannedsystemsarealsosaferforciviliansinwarzones.Sofarrelatively
littlehasbeenpublishedontheimplicationsformilitarystrategy,andthe
political,ethicalandlegaldomainsinusingrobotstowagewar.Thisdiscussion
mustbecarriedoutnow,becauserightnowitisstillpossibletoguideand
focustheinevitabledevelopmentsintheuseofunmannedplanesandrobots.
Thisreportoutlinesthemostrecentdevelopmentsanduseofunmanned
planesandrobots,andthengoesintotheprosandconsformilitarystrategy
andtheethicalandlegalquestionsthattheuseofthistechnologyraises.
TheauthorsofthisreportpublishedanarticleinInternationale Spectatorthat
presentsthesameargumentsincondensedform. 1
1 See:Zwijnenburg,W.andOudes,C.J.(2011)Onbemand maakt onbemind: consequenties van gebruik
van onbemande systemen. In:InternationaleSpectator,Jg.65,no.3,pp.141-145.
Introduction
An American Predator MQ-1 ready for departure. © U.S. Department of Defense
4 does unmanned make unacceptable? — exploring the debate on using drones and robots in warfare 5ikv pax christi
discussiononthelegitimacyandeffectivenessofdrones.2
Thedronechangedfromanunmannedaerialvehicleinto
anunmannedcombataerialvehicle(UCAV).
SincethentherehasbeenastrongincreaseinthenumberofUAV
attacksontargetsinIraq,AfghanistanandPakistan.Nowadays,
moreUAVpilotsarebeingtrainedthanregularpilots.3MQ-14
dronesontheirownhaveaccumulatedmorethan1millionflight
hoursand80,000missionssince2006.85%ofthesewerecombat
missions.5Inthecomingyearsthesenumberswillriseevenmore
sharply,giventhegreaternumberofdronesonbattlefieldsand
theirpopularitywitharmycommanders.6UAVscanbesubdivided
intoseveralcategories.TherearethelargerUAVsthatarecontrol-
ledfromtheUS.Thesearemainlyusedforintelligencegathering,
reconnaissanceandsurveillance,butalsotogivecloseairsupport
(CAS)forgroundtroopsortoeliminateHVAs.Anewhigh-tech
functionforthesedronesiselectronicwarfare:disruptingradar
signalsandattackingelectronicsystemswithelectromagnetic
beamweapons.Inadditiontothis,groundtroopscantakealong
small,portabledronesthattheycancontrolandusetogetaerial
views,orastheyputit,‘tolookbeyondthenexthill’.
Swarmsoraclusterofdronesprogrammedtoworktogetheris
anotherinterestingdevelopment.Theseswarmsconsistofan
2 BBC(2002)CIA ‘killed Al-Qaeda suspects’ in Yemen.http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/2402479.stm(17-03-2011)
3 VandenBrook,T.(2009)More training on UAVs than bombers, fighters.
http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2009/06/gns_airforce_uav_061609w/(04-01-2011)
4 ‘MQ’and‘RQ’aredesignationsfordroneswithintheU.S.armedforces.‘Q’referstoanunmanned
system,‘M’refersto‘multi-role’and‘R’refersto‘reconnaissance’.
5 Jennings,G.(2010)Predator-series UAVs surpass one million flight hours.
http://www.janes.com/news/defence/jdw/jdw100409_1_n.shtml(23-02-2011)
6 Ackerman,S.(2010)Obama: Never Mind Afghanistan, It’s All About The Drones.http://www.wired.com/
dangerroom/2010/12/never-mind-afghanistan-its-all-about-the-drones/(04-01-2011)
Thedifferentnamesusedforavarietyofunmannedsystemscancauseconfu-
sioninthepresentdiscussion.Themostfamiliartermisdrones.Itrefersto
unmannedaerialvehicles(UAVs),whichareunmannedplanes.Theword‘drone’
comesfromthezoomingnoise(droning)thattheplanesmakeduringflight.
BesidesUAVs,therearealsounmannedgroundvehicles(UGVs)usedtoclear
roadsidebombs(alsoknownasIEDsorimprovisedexplosivedevices),forrecon-
naissance,surveillanceorforoffensiveoperations(inthatlattercasetheyare
called‘combatvehicles’,UCAVs,UGCVs,etc.)Thiscategoryissubdividedinto
small,remotecontrolrobotsandentiregroundvehicles.Foroperationsatsea
thereareunmannedunderwater/surfacevehicles(UUVs/USVs)remotecontrol-
ledvesselsforunderwatertasks,likeminesweepingorforreconnaissance.
Earlyexperimentswithunmannedsystems,datingfromWWI,usedradio-
controlledvehicles.Smallrobotswereusedtomovegoodsthroughtrenches.
WWIIsparkedanincreaseinresearchonbothsides.ExamplesareGermany’s
V1andV2,remotecontrolledbombs.AmericaandBritainalsoexperimented
withremotecontrolledsystems.
1.1 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
SmallreconnaissancedroneswereusedduringtheVietnamWar.Droneswere
alsousedforreconnaissance,intelligencegatheringandsightingintheBalkan
wars,butnowonalargerscale.Itappearsthatpriortotheattackson11
September,droneshadobservedOsamaBinLadenseveraltimes,butbecause
theywerenotyetarmed,theycoulddonomorethanobserve.AtthattimeBin
LadenwasalreadywantedforattacksonAmericanembassiesandtheUSSCole.
TheeventsofSeptember11wereonereasonfordecidingtoarmdronessothat
theycouldeliminateimportantpersons,knownashighvalueassets(HVAs),in
enemygroups.Oneofthebestknownfirstattackswastherocketattackin
YemenonacarcontainingAl-Qaedasuspects.Thisattacksparkedanimmediate
1 Unmanned systems: definitions and developments
Duties uav Types uav
Intelligence: eavesdropping rq-4 Global Hawk, rq-1, rq-11
Surveillance rq-4, gnat 750, Sperwer, mq-1 Predator
Reconnaissancemq-1b Predator, rq-4 , rq-170 Sentinel, gnat 750, Sperwer.
Small versions: rq-11 Raven, ScanEagle, wasp ii, emt Aladin
Combat tasks mq-1b Predator, mq-9 Reaper, mq-5 a/b, Hunter, Elbit Hermes 450
Electronic warfare Under development. Probably rq-170 and rq-9 Avenger.
Table 1: uav tasks and types
British BAE Systems Taranis prototype. © BAE Systems
Often used abbreviations for unmanned systems
Air uav
Land ugv
Sea uuv / usv
6 does unmanned make unacceptable? — exploring the debate on using drones and robots in warfare 7ikv pax christi
forsmallerdronesandareabletostayinfloatforseveralyears.Theextentto
whichtheserevolutionaryideaswillbecomerealityremainstobeseen,given
thescalebywhichdefencecostswillhavetobecutintheWest.
1.2 Unmanned Ground Vehicles
Theimportanceofrobotsforgroundwarfarehasincreasedsharplyinrecent
years.ThisdevelopmentstartedduringWWII,whenGermansandRussians
designedanddeployedremotecontrolledtanks.Later,unmannedsystems
focussedonreconnaissanceanddefusinglandminesandbombs.Thewarsin
IraqandAfghanistanhavespurredinvestmentindetectinganddismantling
IEDs.Manufacturersarenowproducingarmedrobotsthatcanlocalisethe
sourceofenemyfireandreturnit,robotsthatcancombouthousesandrobot
patrolcarstouseinsurveillance.
Robotsarebecomingincreasinglypopularwithgroundtroops.Bywayofillus-
tration:in2004,150robotsweredeployed;in2008thisnumberroseto12,000.
Therearevarioustypesofrobots;morethan24areinusetoday.13Themain
advantageofusinggroundrobotsistheabilitytousethemfortasksconsid-
ereddull,dirtyanddangerous.Locatinganddismantlingbooby-trapsand
IEDscannowbedoneinamannerthatismuchsaferforhumans.Theuse
ofrobotsismoreefficientforreconnaissanceinresidentialareas,houses,
androoms.Becausetheycanbeequippedwithhigh-techvideoandaudio
hardware,robotsareefficientinstrumentsforsurveillanceatborderareas
andmilitarybases.Theyareusedinthefieldtoincreasegroundtroops’situa-
tionalawarenessortoserveasmechanicalmuletocarryammunitionand
supplies.Specialistrobotscanbeequippedwithsensorstodetectbiological
andchemicalweapons;researchersarenowstudyingwhetherrobotscanbe
designedtogivefirstaidtothewounded.
Allthesetypesofrobotsareremotecontrolledmachinesthatcan
beoperatedmanually.Rightnowresearchersarelookingintothe
placeofautonomousrobotswithindependentdecision-making
ability.Wewillreturntothislater.MostNATOmembercountries
haveUGVsfordetectingbombsandclearingmines.Themulti-
functionalityofrobot’shasgreatlyincreasedtheirdeployability.
Thegrowinginvestmentintheserobotssuggeststhatthefuture
hasevenmoreapplicationsandoptionsinstore.Worldwide
investmentsin2010probablyapproachedUSD410million.14
TheUSgovernmentforeseesmanyefficientapplications
forUGVsastroopsupportandenvisagesdeployingarmedver-
sions.15Asomewhatdated(2008)reportfromtheInstitutefor
13 Singer,P.(2009)Robots at War, The New Battlefield.http://www.wilsonquarterly.com/article.
cfm?aid=1313(06-01-2011)
14 CompaniesandMarkets(2010)The Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV) Market 2010-2020: Military
Robots for EOD & Counter-IED. http://www.companiesandmarkets.com/Market-Report/the-
unmanned-ground-vehicles-(ugv)-market-2010-2020-military-robots-for-eod-counter-ied-
329174.asp(04-01-2011)
15 USADepartmentofDefense(2006)Report to Congress: Development and Utilization of Robotics and
Unmanned Ground Vehicles.
assignednumberofdronesthatperformamissioninunisonviacoordi-
natedgroundcontrol.Theideatouseswarmsofdronesandrobotsfor
offensiveoperationsorreconnaissancehasstimulatedresearchintothe
possibilityofautonomouscontrol.7Wewilltreatautonomousrobots
somewhatfurtheron.
UAVandUCAVtechnologyismovingrapidly.Everyyear4.9billiondollars
areinvestedintheuseanddevelopmentofUAVs.Thisseemslikelyto
increaseto11.5billionannuallyin10years’time.8Rightnowseveralmanu-
facturersarerunningtestprojectsthatgiveahintofwhat’sinstorefor
UAVs.Itappearsthatstealth(invisibilitytoradar)andarmingwillbecome
moreimportantfordrones.GeneralAtomics,thedesigneroftheMQ-1
Predator,alreadyhasatestversionoftheMQ-9Reaper’ssuccessor.ThisMQ
XAvengerhasstealthabilities,islarger,cancarryagreaterpayload(weight
insensorsorarms)andcanremainaloftlonger.Britain’sBAESystemshas
ambitiousplanstodevelopitsTaranisUCAV9,whiletheNorthropGrumann
X47BshowsthatfutureUCAVswillverylikelybecomeminiatureF117s
(amannedbomber).10Atpresent,LockheedMartin’sRQ-170Sentinelisthe
firstofthistypebeingtestedinAfghanistan.11Therearealsooptionsfor
buildinganunmannedJointStrikeFighterF-35.Accordingtoexpertsthis
wouldrequirearelativelysimplealteration.Theseplanshavenotyetbeen
putintopractice.12
Furthermore,agooddealofresearchisbeingdoneintobothsmalland
verylargeUAVs.OnepersoncancarryandlaunchaminiatureUAVthat
couldactasgroundtroops’eyesandears.ExamplesaretheRavenand
DesertEagle,whicharecurrentlydeployedinIraqandAfghanistan.
Theirusewillprobablybecomeanindispensableelementinintelligence,
surveillanceandreconnaissance(ISR)tasks.Dronesthesizeofaninsectare
alsounderdevelopment.AnumberofverylargeUAVsthatcanremainaloft
forseveraldaysisnowundergoingtests.Whenequippedwithultra-high-
powercamerasandelectroniceavesdroppingequipment,theycanbeground
troops’strategiceyesandears.Therearealsoplansonthedrawingboardto
placeUAVplatformsinthestratospherethatcanserveaslaunchingpads
7 See:Kumar,V.(2011)Scalable Swarms of Autonomous Robots and Mobile Sensors (SWARMS)
project. www.swarms.org(07-03-2011)&DID(2009)SWARMS Project: Swarming Drones to Sting
the Enemy?http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Swarming-Drones-Will-Be-Able-to-Sting-
Enemy-05540/(04-01-2011)
8 TealGroup(2010)Teal Group Predicts Worldwide UAV Market Will Total Over $80 Billion In Its Just
Released 2010 UAV Market Profile and Forecasthttp://www.tealgroup.com/index.
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=62:uav-study-release&catid=3&Itemid=16
(04-01-2011)
9 BAE(2010)Taranis. Informing the future force mix. http://www.baesystems.com/Sites/Taranis/
index.htm(04-01-2011)
10 Marks,W.(2010)X-47B Unmanned Combat Air System Taking Shape On Board Lincoln
http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=51239(04-01-2011)
11 DefenceAviation(2011)New photos of USAF RQ-170 Sentinel released. http://www.
defenceaviation.com/2011/01/new-photos-of-usaf-rq-170-sentinel-released.html(07-03-2011)
12 Flightglobal(2006)Pilotless F35 breaks cover. http://www.flightglobal.com/
articles/2006/08/22/208525/pilotless-f-35-breaks-cover.html(17-03-2011)
German radio mini-tanks with explosives in World War II.
8 does unmanned make unacceptable? — exploring the debate on using drones and robots in warfare 9ikv pax christi
becausewaterisnotagoodconductorforradio
orlasersignals.Thatiswhytheideaofautono-
mousUUVsissoattractive.Thesevesselsare
howeveralsolimitedbythecomplexcircum-
stancesinwhichtheymustoperateunder
water.Thinkofwaterpressure,currentand
theneedtoadjusttoheightdifferencesinthe
seabed.Complexsensorsandguidancesystems
areneededtoanticipatethisaccurately.Whatis
more,saltwateraffectsthevessels.Thishas
consequencesforoperationaltimeandmainte-
nancecosts.
FuturedevelopmentsofUUVs/USVsseemtobe
mostlyaimedatISRtasksandlesstowardoffen-
sivetasks,giventheirlimitedstrikingpower.In
December2010,itwasannouncedthattheNetherlandswouldtakepartin
aEuropeanprojectaimedatdevelopinganunmannedmaritimesystem
(UMS). Thetasksofthisplannedsystemwillliemainlyinmineclearance,
butthisisdependentonthecustomer’spreferences.Developmentcould
alsoturntowardothertasks,likeISRoroffensivetasks.18
18 EDA(2010) Factsheet: European Unmanned Maritime Systems (UMS).
http://www.eda.europa.eu/WebUtils/downloadfile.aspx?FileID=1254(04-01-2011)
DefenseAnalysisshowsthatthereisgrowinginterestininvestinginmil-
itaryapplicationsforrobottechnology.Canada,France,Germanyand
Israel,liketheUS,arelargeinvestors;China,too,hasexpandedits
researchbudgetsbymorethan200%.16FutureUGVapplicationsseemto
revolvemainlyarounddisarmingIEDsandlandminesandaroundISR.
Despitethefactthatarmedrobotsalreadyexist,theyhavenotyetbeen
deployed(oratleastthereisnoevidencethattheyhave).However,theUS
DefenseDepartmentwouldliketobeabletodeployarmedrobots.Given
thespeedofcurrentdevelopments,thatwillprobablynottakelong.
1.3 Unmanned Underwater Vehicles and Unmanned Surface Vehicles
Theroleofunmannedvesselsunderandatseaisgrowing.Thefirst
remotecontrolledvesselsweremainlyminesweepers.Theyweresmall
subswithspecialsonardevicestodetectmines;laterversionscoulduse
varioustechniquestodetonatethem.Theseremotelyoperatedvehicles
(ROVs)havebecomeessentialtounderwateroperations.Thegrowing
interestinremotecontrolledtothedevelopmentanddeploymentof
unmannedsurfacevehicles(USVs). Oneexamplewastheuseofthe
SpartanScoutin2003,duringtheIraqwar.ThisUSVhadaloudspeaker;
itcouldstopsuspectbootsand,viaatranslator,couldquestiontheir
crews.17Besidespatrolling,UUVsandUSVswerealsofrequentlyusedto
trackanddestroyorsometimestolaymines,toguardlargershipsand
portsandtocollectintelligencebyinterceptingenemycommunications
fromthecoastoranenemyfleet.Thepotentialforusingthesevesselsfor
offensiveoperationsisalsobeingexplored.Inadditiontothis,theycan
performlogisticfunctionsandcanaidelectronicwarfarebydisrupting
enemyradar.
However,underwateroperationsareconstrainedsimplybecausethey
takeplaceunderwater.MostUUVsarecontrolledviasmallcables
16 IDA(2008)International Assessment of Unmanned Ground Vehicles.http://www.jointrobotics.
com/documents/studies/International%20Assessment%20of%20Unmanned%20
Ground%20Vehicles.pdf(04-01-2011)
17 Singer,P.(2009)Wired for War.NewYork,2005
Duties ugv Types ugv
Surveillance crusher, mdars, guardium
Reconnaissance Talon, viper, PackBot, marcbot, Dragon Runner, AvantGuard
Combat purposes sword, redowl, maars, Gladiator, acer, viper raas
Detecting and clearing bombs Andros, Talon, PackBot, rons
Detecting chemical and biological weapons PackBot, Scorpion, cugr, guardion
Medical assistance Bloodhound, rex-rev
Logistics crusher, mule, Scorpion
Table 2: ugv tasks and types
The armed USV ‘Protector’, in use with the navies of Singapore and Israel. © Rafael Advanced Defense Systems
Tasks uuv en usv Types uuv and usv
Intelligence Seastar, Silver Marlin, Fleet Class
Surveillance Piraya, Piranha, Protector
Reconnaissance Rafael Protector, Spartan Scout
Offence Piranha, Spartan, Fleetclass
Detecting and clearing mines an-sql-48 Mine Neutralisation, reemus 600
Anti-sub operations Piraya, Silver Marlin, Fleet Class
Special forces support Seastar, Sentinel
Electronic warfare Rafael Protector, Seastar, Harbor Class
Table 3: uuv and usv tasks and types
10 does unmanned make unacceptable? — exploring the debate on using drones and robots in warfare 11ikv pax christi
1.4 Autonomous versus remote controlled
Therapiddevelopmentincomputertechnologyandartificialintelligencehas
createdgreateropportunitiestohavecomputerscontrolsomeoftherobots’
tasks.Thisishappeningonalargescaleandworksliketheautopilotinapas-
sengerplane.Therearevariousreasonsforwantinggreaterautonomyfor
unmannedsystems.Oneismoney.Robotswithincreasedautonomyrequire
fewerpeopletocontrolthem.Operatorsareonlyneededformonitoring.
Technicalreasonsarethatrobotscanrespondmorequicklythanpeoplecan
andcanprocesslargeramountsofdatasimultaneously.Autonomousrobots
alsoreduceoreliminatetheriskofhavingamissionthwartedwhensignals
betweenoperatorandrobotsufferdisruption.Thisisparticularlytrueof
underwaterrobotsthataremoredifficulttocontrolbecauseofthedifficulty
ofunderwatersignalling.Dronesandrobotswillalsohavetorespondtodan-
gerinthefield.Forthetimebeing,unmannedsystemscanuselaserstodesig-
nateatarget,butitisstillahumanbeingthatdecideswhethertofireornot.
Becausearobot’sresponsetimeisfasterthanahuman’s,itseemslogicalto
havetherobotdothis.Therearealreadyrobotsthatcanlocalise,recognise,
followandknockoutthesourceofenemyfireinmilliseconds.19
Greaterautonomydoesnotautomaticallymeanthatrobotswouldbecom-
pletelyautonomous.Fornow,autonomyseemsrestrictedtostandardproce-
dures.Researchonrobotsthatcanchooseandattacktargetsishowever
gainingmomentumasdefenceforcesaremoreinterestedinthisapplication.
TheUSAFassumesthatautonomousarmedplaneswillbeoperationalby
2047.20Someexpertsbelievethatthesewillnotbeself-directedrobotsbut
willentailsomeformofcooperationbetweenrobotsandpeople.21Ahuman
(a‘manintheloop’)willprobablyalwaysbeneededasthelastlinkthatcom-
pletesaprocessandsokeepscontrolovertherobot’sactions,especiallyits
hostileactions.
Althoughcompleteautonomyisstillfaraway,thenumberofautonomous
tasksthatcannowbeperformeddoesraisequestions.Howcananearlycom-
pletelyautomatedsystemdistinguishbetweenfriendandfoe,combatantand
civilian?Peopleseemtobefadingfromsight.Wewilltreatthequestions
aboutthepsychologicalandethicalconsequencesofthisinchapters3and4.
19 Hambling,D.(2009)Army Tests Flying Robo-Sniper.
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/04/army-tests-new/(23-02-2011)
20 USAF(2009)Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan 2009-2047.Washington.pp.165150-51.Via:
http://www.aviationweek.com/media/pdf/UnmannedHorizons/17312080-United-States-Air-
Force-Unmanned-Aircraft-Systems-Flight-Plan-20092047-Unclassified.pdf(04-01-2011)
21 Singer,P.(2009)Wired for War.NewYork,2005pp.132.
2.1 International use of unmanned systems
Thebest-knownusersofdronesaretheUSandIsraeligovernments.TheUS
CentralIntelligenceAgency(CIA–acivilianservice)andvariousunitsofthe
USandIsraeliarmiesusedrones.Table4summarisestheuseofdronesdur-
ingvariousconflicts.Thefirstexperimentsonequippingdroneswithlaser
designatorstoidentifytargetswereconductedintheKosovowar.In2001,a
dronesuccessfullyfiredaHellfirerocket;thismarkedtheeraofthearmed
drone.22PeterW.Singerexplainshowpoliticalsupportforunmannedsys-
temsledtoastrongincreaseintheirdeployment.23TheUSSenatewascon-
vincedthatthepublicopinionwaslessandlesswillingtoacceptmilitary
casualties.Giventhat,moreunmannedsystemswereneededtoensurea
crediblemilitarycomponenttoforeignpolicy.Inthe2001National Defense
Authorization Act,theSenategavethearmythefollowinggoal:“Itshallbea
goaloftheArmedForcestoachievethefieldingofunmanned,remotelycon-
trolledtechnologysuchthat—(1)by2010,one-thirdoftheaircraftinthe
22 GlobalSecurity(2011)Intelligence. MQ-1B Armed Predator.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/systems/armed-predator.htm(23-02-2011)
23 Singer,P.(2009)Wired for War.NewYork,2005pp.60.
2 Unmanned systems: deployment and use
A British mq-9 Reaper, an armed uav. © uk mod Crown Copyright
12 does unmanned make unacceptable? — exploring the debate on using drones and robots in warfare 13ikv pax christi
operationaldeepstrikeforceaircraftfleetareunmanned;and(2)by2015,
one-thirdoftheoperationalgroundcombatvehiclesareunmanned.”24
ArmeddroneswereusedforoffensiveoperationsinAfghanistanin2001.
Sincethen,theyhavealsobeenusedinIraq,Yemen,theGazaStripandLibya.
Insofarasweknow,onlytheUS,UKandIsraelusearmedUAVs.25TheUSalso
usesthePredatorforbordercontrol.26TheUNreporterforextrajudicialkill-
ingsnotesthat40countriesnowhavedrones.Russia,Turkey,China,India,
IranandFrancehaveoraredevelopingarmeddrones,butthereareno
reportsonthesecountries’usingthem.TheUnitedArabEmirates(UAE)have
expressedtheirwillingnesstopurchasearmeddronesfromtheUS.27The
tradeindronesfallsundertheMissileTechnologyControlRegime(MTCR)in
whichmemberstateshavepromisedoneanothertobeveryhesitanttodis-
tributetechnologyforunmannedweaponssystems.Itisunclearwhetherthe
MTCRisadequatetoregulatetradeindronesandUAVtechnology.Israelis
notamemberoftheMTCR.28
In2005,non-stateorganisationHezbollahclaimedtohavelaunchedaUAV
fromLebanontoreconnoitreIsraeliterritory.TheIsraelidefenceministry
confirmedthisandclaimedthatitwasanIranianUAV.Thisistheonly
knowncaseofUAVusebyanon-stateorganisation.29
Armeddronesaregenerallyusedforthreetypesoftasks.Firstisforwhatthe
militarycallscloseairsupport.Thisisgivingsupporttotroopsontheground
byfiringfromtheair.Thesecondtaskistoeliminatespecifictargets.30The
thirdtaskiscontinuoussurveillanceofaspecificareatoallowsuspected
objectstobeattackedimmediately.
Robotsareanothercategoryofunmannedsystem.Byrobotsweunderstand
allremotecontrolgroundsystems.AswithUAVs,thiscategorycanbesubdi-
videdintounarmedUGVsandarmedsystems.Unarmedsystemsareused
fordefusingexplosives.TheUScurrentlyhas6000systemsdeployedinIraq.
TheBritisharmyusesTalismanUGVsANDUAVstoeliminateIEDs.31
24 USADoD(2000)National Defense Authorization, Fiscal year 2001.
http://www.dod.gov/dodgc/olc/docs/2001NDAA.pdf,p.38
25 UKMoD(2008)RAF Reaper fires weapons for first time. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.
uk/+/http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/EquipmentAndLogistics/
RafReaperFiresWeaponsForFirstTime.htm(28-02-2011)
26 Singer,P.(2009)Wired for War.NewYork,2005pp.40.
27 Rawnsley,A.(2010)Wikileaks reveals everybody’s Christmas list: the world wants drones.
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/11/wikileaks-reveals-everybodys-christmas-list-the-
world-wants-drones/
28 MTCR(1987)MTCR Guidelines and the Equipment, Software and Technology Annex.
http://www.mtcr.info/english/guidelines.html(07-02-2011)
29 BBC(2004)Hezbollah drone flies over Israel.http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3990773.stm(04-01-2011)
30 FOR (2010)ConvenientKilling: Armed Drones and the PlayStation Mentality. pp.6.
31 UKMoD(2010)‘Flying robot’ pilot helps find IEDs in Helmand.
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/EquipmentAndLogistics/
flyingRobotPilotHelpsFindIedsInHelmand.htm(04-01-2011)
Deployment area Deploying country Armed or intelligence?
Lebanon (1982) Israel Both i, ii
Bosnia and Herzegovina,
1993-1996
France (Crecerelle), UN (Fox AT), US (Gnat 750, Pioneer,
Predator)Intelligence
Kosovo (1998-1999)Germany (CL-289), France (CL-289, Hunter), UK (Phoenix),
US (Hunter, Pioneer, Predator)Intelligence
Australia (2001) US (Predator) Probably for testing
Afghanistan/Pakistan
(2001-present)
Australia (ScanEagle), Germany (Aladin, LUNA), France
(SIDM, Skorpio), UK (DesertHawk, Herti, Predator B),
Canada (Sperwer, SkyLark, C 170 Heron), Netherlands
(Sperwer, Aladin), US (Dragon Eye, Global Hawk, Pointer,
Predator, Reaper Shadow 200), UAE (S-100)
Intelligence: Netherlands,
Australia, US, France, Canada,
UAE, Italy
Offensive: US, UK
Yemen (2002) US (Predator) Intelligence/Offence
East Timor (2002) Australia (Aerosonde III) Intelligence
Iraq (2003 to present)
Australia (ScanEagle, SkyLark), UK (Desert Hawk, Hermes
450, Phoenix), Italy (Predator), Japan (RMax), Romania
(Shadow 600), US (Desert Hawk, Dragon Eye, Global Hawk,
I.Gnat, Hunter, Pioneer, Predator, Reaper, Puma, Raven,
ScanEagle, Shadow 200, SilverFox, SnowGoose, Tern, Wasp)
Intelligence: UK, Italy, Japan,
Romania, US
Offensive: US
South Korea (2003) US (Shadow 200) Intelligence
Solomon Islands (2003) Australia (Aerosonde III, Avatar) Intelligence
Angola (2003 to present) Israel (Aerostar) Intelligence
Ivory Coast (2004) Israel (Aerostar)
Intelligence (This is moot.
There are no completely reliable
sources that confirm this)
Kosovo (2005) Belgium (Hunter) Intelligence
Congo (2006) Belgium (Hunter) Intelligence
Lebanon (2005) Hezbollah (Iranian drone) and IsraelIntelligence: Hezbollah
Offensiveiii
Lebanon (2006) Belgium (Hunter), France (Sperwer) Intelligence
Ivory Coast (2006) France (Skorpio)iv Intelligence
Gaza Strip (2009) Israel Intelligence/Offencev
Seychelles (2009) US Intelligencevi
Libya US (Global Hawk, Predator) Intelligence/Offencevii
Table 4: Deployment of drones (uavs)
i Economist(2007)Unmanned and Dangerous.
http://www.economist.com/node/10202603(10-01-2011)
ii TheIsraelDefenseForcesusedahighnumberofdronesin1982,todisturb
theradar-andanti-airsystemsofoftheLebaneseArmy.Rightafter,manned
armedaircraftconductedbombardments.
iii LaFranchi,P.(2006)Israel fields armed UAVS in Lebanon.http://www.
flightglobal.com/articles/2006/08/08/208315/israel-fields-armed-uavs-in-
lebanon.html(10-01-2011)
iv Firsttwocolumnsarebasedon:Eick,V.(2009)The Droning of the Drones.http://
www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-106-the-droning-of-drones.pdf(04-01-2011)
v HRW(2009)Precisely wrong, Gaza Civilians Killed by Israeli Drone-Launched
Missiles.http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/06/30/precisely-wrong-0
(04-01-2011)
vi AFRICOM(2009)Seychelles President James Michel Hails Strengthening of
Surveillance Cooperation with the United States.http://www.africom.mil/
getArticle.asp?art=3311&lang=0(04-01-2011)
vii Defensetech(2011)Global Hawk Drone and E-8 JSTARS may be helping the Libya
Fight.http://defensetech.
org/2011/03/22/e-8-jstars-and-global-hawk-drone-may-be-helping-the-libya-
fight/(11-04-2011)
14 does unmanned make unacceptable? — exploring the debate on using drones and robots in warfare 15ikv pax christi
Drones(Packbots)werealsousedafterSeptember11tosearchforvictimsunder
therubbleofthecollapsedTwinTowers.32
TheIsraeliarmyusesarmed,remotecontrolledvehiclestoguardbordercross-
ingsandotherobjects.33TheIsraelimanufactureroftheAvantguardUGCValso
producessemi-autonomousvehiclesthattravelpre-programmedroutes.The
AvantguardUGCVisremotecontrolled,notautonomous.34TheUSisalsodevel-
opingarmedrobots.35AnexampleistheTALON,abasicplatformonwhich
othersystems,liketheSWORDS,canbebuilt.Whilethebasicplatformwas
usedtohelpclearexplosives(e.g.inBosniaandHerzegovinain2000),the
SWORDS,isanarmedtele-operatedrobotthatwasavailableforuseinIraqasof
2007.However,theUSarmyneverusedit.Itultimatelywithdrewtherobots.36
P.W.SingertellshowsoldiersinIraqusedaremotecontrolledrobottoelimi-
naterebels.37Therobotwasnotarmedwithanythingmoredangerousthan
cameras.However,thesoldiersattachedaminetothedevice,rodeittoaspot
whererebelshadbeenseenandthendetonatedthemine.
Theuseofrobotsonorunderwateralsohasamilitaryandciviliancomponent.
CompaniesuseUUVsforsoilsurveysforresourcedevelopmentorresearch.
MilitaryuseofUUVsismainlyorientedtowardclearingseamines.USVshave
mainlymilitaryapplications.IsraeliandSingaporeansailorshavearmed,
remotecontrolledboats.Israelusestheseprimarilyforpatroldutiesalongits
owncoast.In2005,SingaporeusedsuchboatsbeforethecoastofIraqduringa
peacekeepingoperationthere.38
32 Singer,P.(2009)Wired for War.NewYork,2005pp.40.
33 Skinner,T.andWhite,A.(2010)Eurosatory 2010: G-Nius unveils AvantGuard UGCV.
Via:http://www.shephard.co.uk/news/uvonline/eurosatory-2010-g-nius-unveils-avantguard-
ugcv/6540/(14-06-2011)
34 GNIUS(2008)Avantguard UGCV.
http://g-nius.co.il/unmanned-ground-systems/avantguard.html(04-01-2011)
35 LockheedMartin(2011)Multifunction Utility/Logistics and Equipment Vehicle (MULE).
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/products/mule/index.html(04-01-2011)
36 GlobalSecurity(2011)Intelligence. TALON Small Mobile Robot.http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/systems/ground/talon.htm(04-01-2011)&PopularMechanics(2009)The Inside Story of
the SWORDS Armed Robot “Pullout” in Iraq: Update.http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/
gadgets/4258963(04-01-2011)
37 Singer,P.(2009)Wired for War.NewYork,2005pp.32.
38 SingaporeMoD(2010)Unmanned Surface Vehicles. http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/mindef_
websites/atozlistings/navy/assets/unmannedsurfacevehicles.html(04-01-2011)
Drones and the us, some figures 2006 2010
Budget usd 1.7 billion usd 4.2 billion
Number of drones 3000 6500
Drone strikes in Pakistan 9 (from 2004-2007) 53
Source: for (2010) Convenient Killing: Armed drones and the playstation mentality. pp. 7. Table 5: Drones and the us, some figures
2.2 Dutch use of unmanned systems at home and abroad
TheDutcharmyhasseveraldronesthatitusestogatherintelligence.Right
now,theNetherlandshasnoarmeddronescapableofoffensiveaction.The
Dutcharmyusestwotypesofdrones,theSperwerandtheRaven.TheSperwer
(Dutchforsparrowhawk)isatacticalresourceforaerialintelligencegather-
ing.39TheNetherlandsalsohastheAladinsystem,withlowercapacitythanthe
Raven.Theuseofthissystemwasterminatedin2007.40
Upto2007,theNetherlandsinvestedinacquiringaMALE(mediumaltitude
longendurance)UAVsystemthatcouldremainairbornelonger,designedfor
intelligencegathering.41TheMALEUAVwasintendedtoservefourpurposes:
observation,reconnaissance,targetselectionandbattledamageassessment.
TheDutchdefencedepartmentcurtaileditsinvestmentinthisweapondueto
budgetcuts.
InAfghanistan,theDutcharmedforcesusedtheSperwerandAladin.Inearly
2009,DutchpersonnelcouldnolongeroperatetheSperwerduetothefact
themhavingservedtheirmaximumtoursofduty.Afterthatreconnaissance
taskswithUAVswerecontractedouttoanIsraelicompanythatworkedwith
Britishtechnicians.42TheDutchdefencedepartmentalsousedtheRavenforciv-
il-militarycooperationintheNetherlands.Attheturnoftheyear2009-2010,
thepoliceandfiredepartmentsusedRavenUAVstokeepaneyeonareaswhere
therehadbeentroublesearlier.Adronewasalsoemployedwhenevicting
squattersin2008.TheDutchpolicehaveadronewithsensorsforpinpointing
cannabisplantations.43
TheDutcharmyalsohasarobot,calledtheWheelbarrow.44TheExplosives
OrdinanceDisposal(EOD)Unitusesitforreconnaissanceinsituationswhere
explosivescouldbepresentanditisusedtodismantleexplosives.The
Wheelbarrowcanalsobeenequippedwithremotecontrolweapons.TheEOD
Unithasaremotelyoperatedvehicle(ROV)forsimilarpurposesatsea.45Atthe
endof2010theEuropeanDefenceAgency(EDA)announcedthatseveral
Europeancountries,amongwhichtheNetherlands,wouldinvest53million
EURinunmannedmaritimesystems,mainlyforminesweeping,butpossibly
alsotoprotectportsfromsubmarines.46
39 DutchMoD(2008)Kamerbrief onbemande vliegtuigen. KST30806,no.4
40 See:http://www.defensie.nl/onderwerpen/materieel/vliegtuigen_en_helikopters/onbemande_
vliegtuigen/aladin_uav(04-01-2011)
41 DutchMoD(2007)Kamerbrief Defensiebeleid op hoofdlijnen. 2juli2007,kenmerk:HDAB2007018939
42 Derix,S.(2009)Defensie gaat inlichtingenwerk Uruzgan uitbesteden. http://www.nrc.nl/binnenland/
article2129426.ece/Defensie_gaat_inlichtingenwerk_Uruzgan_uitbesteden(04-01-2011)
43 Cannachopper(2009)Cannachopper helps Dutch Police Force in combating illegal growth of cannabis.
http://www.cannachopper.com/(04-01-2011)
44 DutchMoD(2011)Explosievenrobot Wheelbarrow. http://www.defensie.nl/onderwerpen/materieel/
voertuigen/genievoertuigen/explosievenrobot_wheelbarrow(04-01-2011)
45 DutchMoD(2011)Materieel.http://www.defensie.nl/landmacht/eenheden/explosieven_
opruimingsdienst_defensie/materieel(04-01-2011)
46 EDA(2010) Factsheet: European Unmanned Maritime Systems (UMS).http://www.eda.europa.eu/
WebUtils/downloadfile.aspx?FileID=1254(04-01-2011)
The Ministry of Defence was
asked to comment on the
information in this section (2.2),
but declined to do so. The US
embassy in Den Haag was also
asked for clarification. It stated
that it did not comment on
Wikileaks cables.
16 does unmanned make unacceptable? — exploring the debate on using drones and robots in warfare 17ikv pax christi
TheDutchMinistryofDefencehasnootherinvestmentsinresearchondrones
orrobots.TheNetherlandsOrganisationforAppliedScientificResearch(TNO)
hashalteditsstudyofthisfieldduetospendingcutbacks.ADutcharmy’sroad-
mapfordevelopingUGVscametoadeadend.47TheExplorations,astudyofthe
futureoftheDutcharmedforces,doestreattheissueofrobots.Giventheper-
sonnelshortage,thebackgrounddocumentationtotheexplorationstakesinto
accounttheoptionofusingrobotsforsurveillance,transport,reconnaissance
andordinancedisposal.48Althoughwedonotintendtotriptheministrywith
itsuseofwords,ithasnotexcludedthedeploymentofarmedrobots:“Wehave
toreserveuseofourscarcemilitarypersonnelfortheplaceswheretheyare
reallyneeded:notasoperatorandfighter,butasnegotiator,managerand
leader. Othertaskswillbeassignedtorobots”.49
Inthespringof2011,thegovernmentdecidedtoacquireaMALEUAVsystem
withfourUAVs.Theresolutionwaspartofanbudgetcutpackage,butentailed
aninvestmentof100millionEUR.ThattheDutchgovernmentchoseforthis
investmentdespitecutbacksshowedthatthegovernmentwantstotakepartin
developingthetoolsofunmannedwarfare.Accordingtothecurrentgovern-
ment,theemphasisisondevicesthatwillbe
usedtoreinforcetheintelligenceposition.50
However,thereisnoguaranteethat,once
acquired,thesystemswouldnotbearmed.
AccordingtoWikileakscables,theDutch
ministryofdefencehasbeendealingwith
thepurchaseofPredatorB(MQ-9). Lo
Casteleijn,policydirectorattheDutchmin-
istryofdefence,issaidtohavecalledthe
purchaseofthisdrone“vital”,anditsdelay
orcancellation“asetback”.Thesameleaked
messageshowsthatupcomingcutbacks
requireDutchdefenceleaderstoturnto‘cre-
ative’methodstoreserveroominthebudget
topurchasedrones.51Itlaterappearedthat
theNetherlandswantedtopostponethese
plansduetobudgetrestrictions,butthe
planshaveremainedscheduled.52Acable
from2009showsthattheNetherlandswas
47 Seefortheroadmap:DUTCHARMY(2009)Robots beslissen in het gevecht, bouwen aan veiligheid?!
http://afdelingen.kiviniria.net/media-afdelingen/DOM100000140/Activiteiten2009/0414Kooysy
mposium/Bert_Stam_-_Robots_beslissen_het_gevecht.pdf.(28/02/2011)
48 DutchMoD(2010)Deelverkenning III: Aanbodzijde, houvast voor de krijgsmacht van de toekomst. pp.30.-32.
49 Ibid.
50 DutchMoD(2011)Defensie na de kredietcrisis: een kleinere krijgsmacht in een onrustige wereld.
KenmerkBS2011011591.
51 USEmbassyTheHague(2007)Netherlands:harddecisionsonthedefensebudget.
http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/01/07THEHAGUE105.html(01-03-2011)
52 USEmbassyTheHague(2007)Netherlands:Defencebudgetwoes.http://cablesearch.org/cable/
view.php?id=07THEHAGUE63&hl=UAV(01-03-2011)
offeredanopportunitytohavetwopilotstrainwithdronesinNevadasince
theNetherlandswouldbepurchasingMQ-1orMQ-9droneswithin12to18
months.TheNetherlandsissaidtohaveshowninterestinthesetypesgiven
itsexperiencesinAfghanistan.ThisprobablyreferstotheUSresultswith
thesedrones.53TheMQ-9is
speciallydesignedforalargerweaponspayload;MQ-1canalsobearmed.54
ThissuggeststhattheNetherlandswas,andprobablystillis,interestedin
thesearmeddrones.
SeveralcompaniesintheNetherlandsaretakingpartindevelopingrobot
technology.CondorUAVisworkingontheBirdseyeUAVforcivilsurveillance
andsecurityservices.55HeeringUnmannedAerialServices(UAS)isusingthe
EasyStarfor3-Dlandsurveys;56DelftDynamicsisdevelopinganunmanned
helicopterforsurveillance.57GeocopterisworkingwithDSM/Dyneema,
Eonic,Imagem,SiemensNederlandandTenCateAdvancedCompositesto
developunmannedmilitaryhelicopters.58ThalesNetherlandsisalsopart
oftheabovementionedMALEUAVprogramme.Thiscompanyisdeveloping
sensorandradartechnologyforUAVs.59
53 USEmbassyTheHague(2009)Netherlands:
http://cablesearch.org/cable/view.php?id=09THEHAGUE328&hl=UAV(01-03-2011)
54 USAF(2010)MQ-9 Reaper factsheet.
http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=640501-03-2011)
55 Steketee,M.(2006)Robotvliegtuigje ook voor burgerdoeleinden geschikt.
In:TechnischWeekblad(18/06/2006)
56 TechnischWeekblad(2009)3D landmetingen met onbemand vliegtuig.
In:TechnischWeekblad(18/06/2006)
57 Jongeneel,C.(2005)Geen brevet nodig voor miniheli. In:TechnischWeekblad(18/06/2006)
58 NIDV(2009)NIDV-dag over strijd tegen bermbommen. In:NederlandseIndustrievoorDefensie
enVeiligheidMagazineNr.12009(viawww.nidv.eu)
59 Janes(2006)Netherlands’ aerospace companies aim fro stake in RNLAF Male UAV programme.
In:Janes’sInternationalDefenceReview(26/08/2006)
A Raven drone.© U.S. Department of Defense
A British Wheelbarrow dismantling explosives. © uk mod Crown Copyright
18 does unmanned make unacceptable? — exploring the debate on using drones and robots in warfare 19ikv pax christi
Thatrobotscanoperatemoreeffectivelythantheirhumancounterpartsseemsto
beanimportantargumentinthediscussiononthegrowingnumberorrobotson
thebattlefield.Thissectionwillbrieflycompareseveralargumentswithaviewto
arrivingatanoverallpicture.Thisdiscussionwillstartbylookingathowdrones
androbotsareusedinwarfaretoday.Itwillalsobrieflylookintonewtechnologi-
caldevelopments,theirbattlefieldapplications,theirconsequencesforthearmed
forcesasawholeandfortheindividualsoldiersinthefield.
3.1 Pros and cons of unmanned systems
Aswasindicatedearlier,therearevariousreasonsfortheincreaseininvestment
inmilitaryunmannedsystems.Thesereasonscandifferpertypeofrobot.Drones
areabletocircle(loiter)aboveabattlefieldforlonghourstogatherintelligence
betterthanmannedsystems.Betterintelligencecanleadtomoreaccuratesitua-
tionassessmentsthatsoldiers,intheirturn,cantakeintoaccountandsoreduce
avoidableciviliancasualties.60Thiswouldmakedronesaneffectivemeansfor
intelligencegatheringandsurveillancethatwouldcreatebettersituationalaware-
nessforsoldiersinthefield.Dronesalsostandupbettertotheforcesofnature;
highspeed,socalledgravity-orG-forces.Humanpilotscanonlytolerateagiven
G-force,butadronedoesnotsufferfromthis.Moreover,ashot-downdroneis
easilyreplaceable;theykeephumanpilotsoutofharm’sway.Also,dronescan
performsomeriskymanoeuvresthatmannedplanescannot.61Groundrobotsare
knownforperformingworkconsidereddull,dirtyanddangerous,workbetterleft
tomachinesthantohumans.Robotsareindispensablewhenitcomestodetecting
anddismantlingIEDSandtheyhavesavedmanylives.Dronesorrobotscanprove
addedvalueforreconnaissance.
Dronescancircleaboveabattlefieldlonger,allthewhileprovidinggroundtroops
withintelligenceorfiresupport.Thisisanadvantageovermannedaircraftand
helicoptersthataremorelimitedintheircapabilitytocircleoverabattlefield
forlongerperiods.AlthoughF16scanbeusedforphotointelligenceflights,they
cannotremaincirclingaboveaterritorypermanentlywithlivevideosignalslike
60 See:HRW(2009)Precisely wrong, Gaza Civilians Killed by Israeli Drone-Launched Missiles. And:Singer,P.
(2009)Wired for War.NewYork,2005pp.394.
61 See:Graham,A.(2010)Drone operators rise on winds of change in Air Force. http://uavc.mckeon.house.
gov/2010/03/drone-operators-rise-on-winds-of-change-in-air-force.html(04-01-2011)
3 The effect and dangers of unmanned systems on a battleground
dronescan.Dronesandrobotsseemtocomplementthecurrentarsenaleffec-
tivly;manysoldiershaveindicatedthattheyarenotwillingtoparticipatein
operationsthathavenodronesupport.Thatshowstechnology’simpactonthe
conductofwar:theextrainformationthatdronescanprovidehasbecomevital
inpreventingunduerisk.
Nevertheless,wedohavesomereservations.Thereisstilltoolittleobjective
informationontheefficiencyofattackswitharmeddronesinAfghanistanand
Pakistan.Forthetimebeing,theCIA,USArmyandTalibanpropagandaallhave
theirownfiguresonthenumberofvictims.Thismakesitdifficulttoproperly
evaluatetheuseofandneedforarmeddrones.Wewishtodrawattentionto
threeproblemsthathavebeenraised.Theyare(1)theby-productsofattacks,
(2)theweaknessesinmilitarystrategyand(3)technologicalproliferation.
Side effects
DespitethefactthattheCIAoccasionallysucceedsineliminatingafewTaliban
andAl-Qaedaleaders,theseoperationsarenotalwaysperformedwithouta
hitch.Ittook16attacksandbetween204and321victimstoeliminatePakistani
TalibanleaderMehsud.62Obviouslyeveryciviliancasualtyisonetoomany.
ButlargenumbersofciviliancasualtiesalsoerodesupportforthepeacetheUS
strivesfor.EveryciviliankilledmeansincreasedchancesfortheTalibanand
Al-Qaidatorecruittheirfamiliesasfighters.63Deployingunmannedsystems
onthegroundorintheairalsocreatesotherissues.Theenemycaninterpret
failuretodeployhumansoldiersonthegroundduringbattleascowardice.
Thisperceptioncanincreaselocalresistancegroups’willingnesstofight.64Oras
Singerwrites,“Usingrobotsinwarcancreatefear,butalsounintentionally
revealit”.65
Weaknesses in military strategy
Seenfromtheperspectiveofmilitarystrategy,dronesarenotapanaceaforfuture
conflicts.Inalllikelihood,theconductofwarinthefuturewillbeprimarilyasym-
metrical;onesidewillalwaystechnologicallyoutguntheother.Non-stateactors
willplayamoreprominentroleandwillwanttoshowthatneithermilitary
mightnordronesandrobotscanbringthemtotheirknees.Ifanything,theuse
ofdronescoulddrivewarfurtherintourbanareaswherearmedfightersaremore
difficulttolocateandattack.Therealsoisadangerthatfromamilitarystrategy
pointofviews,theexpectationsfromunmannedtechnologywillbetohighand
unrealistic.A2008RANDstudyonterrorismshowsthatmilitaryviolenceisnearly
neverthereasonwhyarmednon-stateactorsendtheirstruggle.66
62 Mayer,J.(2009)The Predator War. What are the risks of the C.I.A.’s covert drone program?
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa_fact_mayer
63 Ghosh,B.andThompson,M.(2009)The CIA’s silent war in Pakistan.
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1900248,00.html(28-02-2011)
64 Kilcullen,D.andExum,A.M.(2009)Death from above, outrage from below.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/opinion/17exum.html(04-01-2011)
65 Singer,P.(2009)Wired for War.NewYork,2005pp.312.
66 Jones,S.GandLibick,M.C.(2008)How terrorist groups end. Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida.RAND.
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf(04-01-2011)
Ali Abu Shahla is an IKV Pax
Christi partner. He lives in the
Gaza Strip. He reports that
unarmed drones were used in
Gaza in 1987 to gather intelli-
gence. As of 2000, drones were
armed at some times and they
operated in combination with
helicopters and fighter jets,
including to eliminate targeted
people. “Civilians in Gaza have
become accustomed to the
presence of drones, despite the
disturbing and terrifying noise
that they produce. They do, how-
ever, make everyone feel unsafe.
You never know whether the car
in front of you or behind you
may be its target. Life goes on;
everyone still has to get to work
and do the shopping. People
have grown accustomed to
always being in danger.”
20 does unmanned make unacceptable? — exploring the debate on using drones and robots in warfare 21ikv pax christi
TheWest’stechnologicaldominationonthebattlefieldisprovidinga
goodoccasiontofield-testnewtechnologies.Currentopponentshavefew,
ifany,adequateresponsestodrones.Thusfartheyhavebeenonlyable
tointerceptvideofeeds.Thesesignalshadbeensenttogroundstations
unencryptedandcouldbemonitoredwithcheapequipment.67Rightnow
specialistsareworkinghardtoencryptthesesignals.Butwhenfighting
againstamoretechnologicallysophisticatedopponentwithbetteranti-
aircraftsystems,droneswillbeinadequate.Becauseoftheirlimmited
speed,dronesarestillveryvulnerableandhencetheiruseinriskymis-
sionswillbeveryexpensive.Inshort,technologicalsupremacywillnot
producevictoryinpresent,complex,cross-borderconflicts.Thereis
greaterneedforastrategythatwillremoveorreducethecausesofthe
conflict.Relyingtooheavilyonthesupremacyofmilitarytechnology
willonlyincreaseresisters’resentment.
Technological proliferation
Finally,wewanttoexaminetheriskofproliferation.Thegrowthinuse
ofdroneshasledtoanenormousinvestmentinrobottechnology.
Around50countriesnowdevelopandusedrones.Thisnumberwill
probablyonlycontinuetogrowinthefutureasthetechnologyspreads.
Thepriceofmanufacturingdronesandrobotsislowcomparedtothat
ofmannedsystems.Smallcommercialdronescanbeboughtoffthe
shelf.Dronesarecurrentlycheaperthanmannedplanesandsupply
moreintelligence.However,aswasthecasewithmannedplanes,the
pricewillprobablygoupasthetechnologydevelops.Despitetheserising
costs,thereisachanceofaspill-overeffect,meaningthatinterestedpar-
tiescanfindearliertechnologyonthemarketatrelativelylowprices.
Inthelong-term,dronesarenotreallyacheaperalternativeformanned
systems.Thenumberofdroneswillgrowmuchmorestronglythanthe
numberofmannedplanes.Eachdroneunitusuallyconsistsofthree
people:apilot,anarmsexpertandasensoranalyst.Drones’sophisti-
catedsurveillancetechnologyalsorequiresmaintenance.Asweshowed
above,thereisagrowinginterestinusingdronesandrobotsformilitary
purposes,buttheirpricesarelikelytorise.Fornow,however,thecostsof
trainingdronepilotsaswellasforfuelarelower.68Becausesomedrone
technologyisbasedonopensourceresearch,non-stateactorsandgovern-
mentsoffragileandrepressivestatescaneasilygainaccesstothischeap
andsimpletechnology.Therapidspreadoftechnologicalknowledge
aboutarmedrobotscouldleadtotheiruseinattacks.Usedattheright
timeinacrowdedplace,anarmedrobotcancausemanycasualtiesand
adronewithexplosivescanbeanefficientmeansforanattack.Thatis
whytheappealtoregulatethistechnologyisgrowing.TheInternational
CommitteeforRobotArmsControl(ICRAC)–consistingofexpertsinthe
67 Gorman,S.,DreazenY.J.,andCole,A.(2009)Insurgents hack U.S. Drones.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126102247889095011.html(28-02-2011)
68 Hoffman,M.(2009)UAV pilot career field could save $1.5B.
http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2009/03/airforce_uav_audit_030109/(04-01-2011)
fieldofartificialintelligence(AI),roboticsandbio-ethics–havelaunched
anappealtoregulaterobottechnologyinuniversallyapplicablearms
control.69
Thereisalsothequestionwhetherpresentlarge-scaleinvestmentindevelop-
ingmilitarytechnologyisjustified.Growthintheuseofdronesandrobots
can(andprobablywill)leadtoanewarmsraceandtheimaginableincrease
intensionthisentails.Notwithstandingtheinevitabledevelopmentofthis
technology,wemustquestiontheextenttowhichwewanttoacquiesceto
this.Anotherproblemthatmightariseisloweringthethresholdfordanger-
ous(spying)operationswhentheriskforpersonnelisloweredthroughthe
useofdrones.However,ifadronehoversorisshotdownoverhostileterri-
torythiscouldexacerbatetensionsbetweennations.Sofar,wedonotknow
howshootingdownadroneaffectstheius ad bellum(righttowagewar),but
itmaywellleadtoconflictescalation.WewillreturntothisinChapter4.
Insummarywecanconcludethatdronesandrobotscandoalottosupport
groundtroopsinspecifictypesofconflict,especiallywhenitcomestodetect-
ingandclearingminesandtoISRoperations.Theirdeploymentwillvery
probablygrow,butitisnotcertainthattheirusewillbedecisivewhenit
comestomilitarystrategy.Humanactiononthegroundismoreimportant
thancamerasintheairandpress-buttonwarfare.Theeasewithwhichthe
technologycanbespreadalsoincreasesthechancethatterroristgroupswill
usearmeddrones.
3.2 Dehumanising warfare
Amuchheardobjectionagainstusingremotecontrolleddronesandrobots
isthatitremoveshumancontactfrom(dehumanises)war.Thenewgenera-
tionofdronepilotsgrewupwithcomputergameslikeMedalofHonorand
CallofDuty.Thesearecalledfirstpersonshooterswheretheplayerassumes
thepersonaofasoldieronabattlefield.Inmorerecenteditionsofthese
games,playerscanalsousedronestolocaliseandeliminateanenemy.
WhentheUSarmygoesouttorecruitdroneoperators,itlooksforpeople
whogrewupplayingthesegames.Thelinebetweenthevirtualworldand
thedestructionthatoperatorscancauseonthegroundbecomesblurry
becausetheirworkisveryfarfromthephysicalexperienceofwar.Thereisa
legitimateconcernaboutwhetheroperatorscandistinguishbetweenagame
andreality. OneillustrationofthisisthecommentbyadronepilotinQatar,
“It’slikeavideogame. Itcangetalittlebloodthirsty. Butit’sfuckingcool”.70
Thedistancetothebattlefieldwherethedronesoperatehasitsprosand
cons.Apartfromthedirectphysicaldangerthatsoldiersfaceonabattle-
field,usingdronesavoidsanotherseriousproblem:physicalpresenceonthe
battlefieldcutsasoldier’sresponsespeedandthushis/herabilitytoreacha
69 ICRAC(2010)The statement of the 2010 Expert Workshop on Limiting Armed Tele-Operated and
Autonomous Systems. http://www.icrac.co.uk/Expert%20Workshop%20Statement.pdf
(28-02-2011)
70 Singer,P.(2009)Wired for War.NewYork,2005pp.332.
22 does unmanned make unacceptable? — exploring the debate on using drones and robots in warfare 23ikv pax christi
correctassessment.Thisincreasesthe
chanceofmakinganincorrectdecision.
Thedroneoperator’sdistancefromthe
battlefieldisonewaytoresolvethis
problem.Droneoperatorscanalsobase
theirdecisionsonarangeofsupporting
datatypes.71
Yetanimpersonalwarwhereoperators
launchcomputer-guidedsmartweapons
fromremotelocationscanleadtopsy-
chologicalnumbinginthoseoperating
theweapons.Becausethedroneopera-
torsarephysicallydistantfromthebat-
tlefield,theyneedfearnophysicalharm.Theydo,however,participatein
thebattle.Theyareindirectvideoandaudiocommunicationwiththe
field.Theydoexperience(onanotherlevel)emotionalstimuliandstress
whentheyseeandheartheirfriendscomeunderfireorwhentheycansee
(oftenindetail)theeffectoftheirownactions.72Creatingmodifiedinter-
facesthatshownodirectimagesisonewaybeingconsideredtoeliminate
thesestressstimuli.Thedownsidetothisisthatresearchshowsthatusing
interfacescanleadtogreateremotionaldistancefromtheenemy.
Replacinganenemywithasymbolcanleadtoafailuretorecognisehim/
herasapersonandthustodehumanisation.Soldiersareintentionally
conditionedtoremainemotionlesswhenseeingtheenemy;thisisto
increasetheirtoleranceforviolencewithoutincreasingtheirstresslevels.
Or,tousethewordsofRoyakkersandVanEst“cubiclewarriorslosesight
ofmeansandtheirethicalimplicationsandstartconcentratingonly
ontheendsoroutcomes”.73RoyakkersandVanEstresearch’showsthat
dehumanisingleadstomoraldetachment.Thetargetisnolongerseen
assubjectinitsownmoralframework.Thismakespilotsmorelikelyto
displaybehaviourthatdeviatesfromtheirownethicalnorms.Reasons
forthisarethedisconnectionbetweentheirownbehaviour,responsibility
forthisbehaviourandtheconsequencesofthisbehaviour.Enlargingthe
distancetotherealbattlefieldandtheactualcontextmakesiteasierfor
soldierstokillbecausetheyarelessawareoftheconsequencesandare
programmedtoconsidertheirownobjectivesasmoreimportant.Singer
quotesresearchbyDavidGrossman,anarmypsychologist,whopositsthat
soldiersdonottendbynaturetokilltheiradversaries.74Accordingto
Grossman,militarytrainingaimstodehumaniseadversaries.Headdsthat
71 SpiegelOnline(2010)It is not a videogame: Interview with a drone pilot.DerSpiegel.
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,682842,00.html
72 Ibid.Andseealso:CultMcCloskey,M.(2009)The war room: daily transition between battle,
home takes toll on drone operators. http://www.stripes.com/news/the-war-room-daily-
transition-between-battle-home-takes-a-toll-on-drone-operators-1.95949.(28/02/2011)
73 Royakkers,L.AndVanEst,R.(2010)The cubicle warrior: the marionette of digitalized warfare.
In:EthicsandInformationTechnology,no.12,pp.289-296.
74 Singer,P.(2009)Wired for War.NewYork,2005pp.395.See:Grossman,D.(1998)On
Killing. BackBayBooks,NewYork. 3,pp.99-133.
The cockpit of drone-pilots in Nevada. © U.S. Department of Defense
distanceisonefactorthatmakeskillingeasier.Thegreaterthephysical
andemotionaldistancetoatarget,theeasieritistokillsomeone.Singer
recountsthatthedroneoperators’armedbattleissoeasythattheysome-
timesseemtoforgetthattherearerealpeopleundertheirdroneandthat
theyarenotgodsthatholdswayoverlifeanddeath.Aredroneoperators
reallyabletomakeanethicallysupportabledecision?
Yetaswenoted,distancedoeshavenegativeconsequencesforpilotsof
unarmeddrones.Somedroneoperatorsnotethattheirimmediateenviron-
mentsgivethemnoopportunitytocometotermswiththeirexperiences
becausetheywerenotpresentonthebattlefield.Whereasinanormalwar
situationsoldiersarecontinuallywithoneanotherwheretheycanshare
andassimilatetheirexperiences,thesecubiclewarriorsmissoutonthis
experience.Attheendoftheday,theygetintheircarsanddriveback
hometotheircivilianlives.Theneedtoprocessthewarexperiencesis
essentialtopsychologicalstability;itsabsencecreatespsychologicalprob-
lems.Inshort,theeffectsofwarwithunmannedsystemsonthehuman
experienceofconflictaretoodiversetomakeanunequivocaljudgement.
24 does unmanned make unacceptable? — exploring the debate on using drones and robots in warfare 25ikv pax christi
Developmentsininternationallawandthelawofwaroccurmainlyasresponses
tonewtechnology.Thatiswhyitisimportanttodevelopethicaljudgementson
unmannedsystemsandtheuseofdronesrightnow,whentheiruseisincreasing
andtheirimplicationsforinternationalhumanlawarenotcertain.Thissection
examinessixseparatesubjectsfromethicalandlegalperspectives.Theyarethe
culturalcontext,theuseofunarmeddrones,theuseofarmeddronesandtheuse
ofautonomousdrones.Finally,thissectionturnsbrieflytousingdronesforextra-
judicialkillingsandthefrictionbetweenpublicandprivate.Thissectionintends
todrawattentiontoethicalquestionsthatneedansweringbeforeusingdrones.
Humandignityisthemainprincipleunderlyingtheseethicalquestions.Fromit
springsthecriterionthatarmedactionmustcontributetohumansecurity.
4.1 Risk-free warfare
C.CokerdescribeshowWesternsocietiesconcentrateincreasinglyonreducing
exposuretodanger,evenwhenwagingwar.75Cokerexplainsthateversincethe
endoftheMiddleAges,stateshavecalledtheircitizenstoserveassoldiersinwars.
Itwasacivicdutytotakepartinthestate’sarmedstruggle.NiccoloMacchiavelli
calledthis‘courage’,Hegela‘vocation’anda‘publicservice’.Intheirdays,cour-
ageandsocialservicewerelinkedtothestate’sobjectives,whichhadtobefought
forordefended,whetherornotbyforceofarms.Clausewitzalsoexplicitlylinked
thestate,civiliansandsoldiers.ForClausewitz,thesoldierservedthecommunity,
thenationstate.Contemporaryauthors,amongwhichPrimoLeviandUlrich
Beck,showthatrisk-aversion,notcourage,istoday’sdrivingprinciple.Thisdevel-
opmentoccurredmainlyinWesterncountries.Theynolongerwagewarbecause
oftheirprinciplesorforwhatis‘right’,buttominimisethechanceofterrorist
attackornuclearproliferation.AccordingtoCoker,courageorsocialservice
arenolongerthefundamentalprinciplesusedinmakingadecisiontodeploy
soldiers;rather,itisbasedontheuncertaintyabouthowitwillaffecttheindivid-
ualsoldier.AlsoClausewitz’linkswiththenationstateareweakenedorgone.76
Publicopiniondemandsthatsoldiersavoiddangeroussituations.Cokerillustrates
thisbyreferringtothechoicetouseairforceinKosovo,whereNATOaircraftwere
forbiddentoflyunder15,000feettoprotectpilots.BecausetheWestisobsessed
bydanger,oursocietiesseewarinthatframe.PeriltoWesternsoldiersisoneof
themostimportantcriteriaindecidingtocalloutarmies.Robotwarfareisan
inseparablepartofthis.Allowingrobotstodothemostdangerousworkhelps
75 Thisparagraphismainlybasedon:Coker,C.(2001)Humane warfare. London,Routledge.pp.44.-66.
76 3,pp.90-94.
4 Ethical and legal issues and reflections
keepWesternsoldiersoutofharm’sway.Thereseemtobefeweranswersto
thequestionwhytodeploysoldiersatall.Thelinkbetweenthenationstateand
thecommongoodhasweakenedandwewanttokeepsoldiersassafeaswecan.
Thatmakesthefollowingquestionsmorepressing:whatdosoldiersreallydo?
Whatarewereallyfightingfor?
Ofcoursewealsohavetolookattherisksforthosewhodonothavethemeans
toletrobotsdothefighting.Webelievethatthemostimportantelementinthe
ethicalassessmentoftheuseofdronesisthesafetyofciviliansinwarzones.Does
usingrobotsenhanceordecreasetheirsafety?Whenitcomestoprotectingcivil-
ians,RANDCorporationandotherthinktanksdrawattentiontohavingsufficient
soldiersandpoliceofficersontheground.77Ofcourse,unmannedsystemscan
providesupport,buttheycannotcreatesafetyforciviliansororderontheground.
Onlyphysicalpresencecandothat.Whenprotectingciviliansservesasguiding
principleonemustinevitablyacceptthatsoldierswillrunrisks.Toputitmildly,
thatdoesnotmeshwithWesternsociety’sneedtoavoidrisks.Unmannedsystems
cannotreplacebootsontheground.
Wealsowishtomentionthatnowadaysthedesiretouseunmannedsystemsto
reducethedangerofwarisdrawingenormousinvestmentsintotechnologyand
research.Financialresourcesthatcouldbeusedforsocio-economicadvancement
arenowbeingusedformilitary-industrialdevelopment.Wewouldalsoliketo
drawattentiontothepossibilitythatthesedevelopmentscouldleadtoanarms
raceofwhichonecouldquestionthedesirability.
4.2 Unarmed systems
Wewouldliketonotefirstthatsomeunmannedsystemscansavelivesandcan
helpincreasehumansecurity.Theuseofrobotstodismantleexplosivesisanobvi-
ousexample.Unmanneddronescanaddsignificantlytointelligencegathering.
Theyallowsoldierstoseearoundcornersandoverhills.Theoretically,thisgreatly
expandstheirabilitytoprotectcivilians.Whenmilitarycommandershavebetter
informationonwhereciviliansandcombatantsarelocated,theycandirect
attacksmoreaccuratelyordecidenottouseit.Intheory,civiliansaremuchsafer
whensoldiersusedronesduringanarmedconflict.Ofcourse,picturesfrom
dronesarenotenough.Oftentheseimagesarewithoutcontext;othersourcesof
informationmustprovidethat.Anotherconcernisthatofinformationoverload.78
AnalysisofaneventthatoccurredinAfghanistanin2010showswhatthisover-
loadcanleadto.UShelicoptersbarragedseveralcarsthattheythoughtcontained
Talibanfighters.Thisconclusionreliedonananalysisofpictures.Adronewasone
sourceofthesepictures.Theconclusionwaswrong.Thepassengerswerecivilians,
includingwomenandchildren.79Theanalysisofthisincidentpointstotoomuch
77 RAND(2008)Establishing law and order after conflict. RAND.pp.19.
78 Shanker,T.andRichtell,M.(2011)In new military, data overload can be deadly. NewYork,2005
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/17/technology/17brain.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1(06-04-2011)
79 Seeforthecompletereport:Cloud,D.S.(2011)Anatomy of an Afghan war tragedy. LosAngelesTimes,
19September2005.http://www.nyu.edu/ccpr/LA%20TImes%20OpEd_9.19.05.pdfhttp://www.
latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-afghanistan-drone-20110410,0,2818134,full.story
(18-04-2011)
Evert-Jan Grit works on IKV Pax
Christi’s Middle East team.
He visited the West Bank and
Gaza during the second intifada.
While there, he had a close-up
view of the impact that drones
had on life on the ground.
“As soon as you hear the drones
coming you know that you are
being watched. Although local
people were indifferent and
complained mainly about dis-
rupted TV reception, I felt mainly
fear and apprehension. I realised
that, theoretically, I could become
a target at any moment, that
maybe someone was watching
me and that I was never really
safe. That is intimidating.”
26 does unmanned make unacceptable? — exploring the debate on using drones and robots in warfare 27ikv pax christi
informationasthecause.Theuseofdronesforintelligencecanonlycon-
tributetohumansecuritywhenusedalongsideothermethodsforgather-
ingintelligenceandwhenthereareadequateresourcesforinterpretingthe
information.
Therearetwoethicalobjectionstousingdronestogatherintelligence.
Thefirstisprivacy.Thisappliesespeciallywhenusingdronestogather
informationforcivilianpurposes,i.e.whenthereisnoarmedconflict.
Insuchsituations,civilianandmilitaryauthoritiescanusedronestopre-
ventorfightcrime.Usingdronesisthencomparabletohangingupcameras.
SinceJanuary12004,thelawrequiresthatthepublicbenotifiedwhen
camerasareusedforsurveillanceinpublicplacesintheNetherlands.80
Thisnotificationismorecomplicatedwhen(small)dronesareusedinstead
ofnormalcameras.InthecasementionedabovewhenaRavenwasused
duringNewYeareve,it’susewasannouncedinthemedia,butthisisnot
anoptionforsystematicuse.Smallerdronesarequieterthanthehelicop-
tersorjets,nowsometimesusedforcivilobservation.
Whendronesareusedtogatherintelligenceduringarmedconflicts,thisis
militaryuse.Insuchsituationsonlythe‘slipperyslope’argumentisvalid.
Thereasoningisthatonceyoustartusingdronestogatherinformation,
itisjustasmallsteptoarmingthem.Fundamentally,thisargumentiseasy
todefend,especiallywhenyouthinkthatarmeddronesarejustgrown-up
versionsofintelligencedrones.
StoriesfromIKVPaxChristi’spartnersfocusonthefearthatdronesevoke
incivilians.Itisimportanttorealisethatcivilianshavenowayofknowing
whetheradroneisarmedornot.Forthem,thesoundofa(larger)drone
meansthatarocketcanstrikeatanymoment.Commanderswhoconsider
usingdronesshouldgiveseriousthoughttothepermanentfearthatthis
arousesincivilianpopulations.Therearestrategic(antipathytowhichthe
useofdronesleads)andethicalgroundsforthis.
4.3 Armed systems
Theuseofarmedsystemsincreasesthedistancebetweenthesoldierand
his/hertarget.Whatnewethicalandlegalquestionsdoesthisraise?
HumanRightsWatch(HRW)investigatedtheuseofarmeddronesbythe
IsraeliarmyintheGazaStripinDecember2008andJanuary2009.
AccordingtotheHRW,dronesfallunderthelawofwarjustlikeotherweap-
onssystems.AccordingtotheHRW,droneoperatorsareboundbythelaw
ofwarinthesamewayasanyothersoldier.Astrikingpointinthereportis
thatHRWextensivelydiscussesthebenefitsofarmeddronesoverfighter
planesorhelicopters.HRWrepeatedlystatesthattheIsraeliarmydidnot
takeadvantageofthesebenefitsduringtheperiodstudied.Itdrawsatten-
tiontodrones’improvedaccuracyandtotheresponsibilitythisplaceson
80 Engelfriet,A.(2010)Cameratoezicht, filmen en fotograferen van mensen. http://www.iusmentis.
com/maatschappij/privacy/filmen-cameratoezicht/#openbareruimte(07-03-2011)
theiruserstoreduceciviliancasualties.Whendronesdocauseciviliancasual-
ties,theusercannothidebehindtheweaponsystem’simperfections.HRWdid
notobjecttodronesasamatterofprinciple.81
Becausedronesareusedforextrajudicialkillingsinsomesituations,theUN
appointedrapporteuronthissubjectaddressedtheethicalimplicationsof
usingunmannedsystems.Therapporteurdrawsattentiontoseveralmatters.
Firstofall,whendronesareusedasarms,theirusemustbejudgedunderinter-
nationalhumanitarianlaw.Furthermore,therapporteurnotedthatbecause
usingdronesiseasyandrisk-free,thereisadangerthatarmedforceswill
stretchtheinterpretationofinternationalhumanitarianlawtoofarsincethe
dangertoone’sownpersonnelisminor.Therapporteurwarnedcommanders
torespecttherulesininternationalhumanitarianlawregardlessoftheweapon
systemsused.Therapporteuralsohighlightedthechanceofcreatingaplay
stationmentalityinwhichdroneoperatorstendtoregardtheiractionsasa
computergame.82Inchapter3,wedescribedtheoperativepsychologicalmecha-
nismhereasdehumanisation.Someexpertsthinkthatincreasingthedistance
betweentargetandthepersonfiringwillmakeiteasierforthelattertousevio-
lence.Tosomeextent,long-rangeartilleryandbombershavethesameproblem,
butinthecaseofdroneoperatorsitistakentoanextremedegree.Thatadds
weighttotheethicalobjectionthatincreasingdistancemakeskillingeasier.
Anotherdrone-relatedethicalissueconcernstheclaimthatusingdronesimproves
theabilitytoprotectcivilians.Inthepast,thesamehasbeensaidofbombs.
DuringtheFirstGulfWar,laser-guided(smart)bombsreplacedfree-fallorgravity
(dumb)bombs.Theselaser-guidedbombsaremuchmoreprecise,canbetter
discriminatebetweenciviliansandcombatantsandcandrasticallyreducethe
numberofciviliancasualties.Inpractice,however,thesebombstendtobeover-
usedsimplybecausetheyarebetterabletodiscriminate.Afterall,therearefewer
risks,right?Forthisreason,precisionbombsareusedinsituationswherefree-fall
bombswouldnotbeusedduetotheriskofciviliandeaths.Thenumberoftargets
isexpandingtoincludesitesclosetocivilianlocations.Yet,themarginoferror
resultingfromincorrectintelligenceremainsthesame.Becasuseofthisthe
numberofciviliancasualtiescouldperhapsincrease.Intheory,dronesincrease
precision,butwedowonderwhethertheymightnotfollowthesamepathaspre-
cisionbombing.Arangeofestimatesonthenumberofdrone-relatedciviliancasu-
altiesaregoingaround. AreportbytheFellowshipofReconciliation(FoR)listssev-
eralofthem.TheNewAmericanFoundation83,aUSthinktank,believesthatone-
thirdofthecasualtiesinPakistanarecivilians.FORdrawsonPakistanisources
(PakistaniBodyCount),thatclaimthat50civiliansdieforeverymilitantkilled.84
81 HumanRightsWatch(2009)Precisely Wrong. Gaza Civilians Killed by Israeli Drone-Launched Missiles.
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/06/30/precisely-wrong-0(04-01-2011)
82 Alston,P.(2010)Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions.
UNno.A/HRC/14/24/Add.6.pp.24.-25.
83 Bergen,P.andTiedemann,K.(2010)The year of the drone: an analysis of U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan,
2004-2010. NewAmericaFoundation
84 FOR (2010)Convenient Killing: Armed Drones and the PlayStation Mentality. pp.6.Seealso:Pakistan
Bodycount(2011)Pakistan Body Count. http://www.pakistanbodycount.org/(07-02-2011)
28 does unmanned make unacceptable? — exploring the debate on using drones and robots in warfare 29ikv pax christi
Asofthiswritingtherehasbeennoexten-
siveanalysisbasedonaccuratedataabout
thenumberofciviliancasualtiesresulting
fromtheuseofdrones.Oncewehavesuch
figures,wewillknowwhetherdrones
causemoreorfewerciviliancasualties
thantheirmannedalternativeswould
cause.Onlywhenwehavethosefigures
willwereallybesurewhetherdroneshelp
orhinderhumansecurity.Itisimportant
thatstatesusingdronessubmitthefigures
toexamination,andundertaketoexam-
ine,whetherdronesreallydoreduceor
whethertheymightnotpossiblyincrease
thechancethatcivilianswillbekilled.
Therearealsolegalissuesalongsidetheethicalones.Singeraskswhether
droneoperatorscouldbeconsideredcombatantsunderinternational
humanlaw.85Underpresentrules,thisisthecase.Thatmeansthattheyand
theirhomebases–inthecaseoftheUS,thereisamajorcontrolcentrefor
dronesnearLasVegas–arelegitimatetargets.Anotherimportantlegal
questionconcernsresponsibility.Thatadegreeofresponsibilitydevolves
upondroneoperatorsisobvious.Butwhataboutseniorhierarchy?Isthe
droneoperator’simmediatecommanderresponsibleorisitthefieldcom-
manderwhorequestedthedrone’sdeployment?RoyakkersandVanEste
poseasimilarquestion.86Theystressthatautomatedsystemsalreadymake
manydecisionsfordroneoperators.Thesesystemscreateanabstractpicture
withinformationthattheoperatorcannotverify.RoyakkersandVanEst
arguethatoperators(cubiclewarriors)cannotreasonablybeheldresponsi-
blefordecisionsonwhetherornottofire,becausetheyhavenocontrolover
theinformation(seealsochapter3).Acleardefinitionofthisresponsibility
isessentialforabidingbythelawofwar.
4.4 Autonomous systems
Autonomousdrones,too,canbearmedornot.Eachtypehasitsownethical
questionsandobjections.Autonomousdronesraiseanimportantnewobjec-
tion.Whoistobeheldresponsibleforanautonomousdrone’sactionswhen
peopleare‘outoftheloop’?Ofcourse,thisquestionisevenmorepressing
whenthedronesarearmed.Whoistobeheldresponsiblewhenanarmed
drone’sactionsresultinciviliandeaths?Thecompanythatmanufacturedit?
Theperson/teamthatprogrammedit?Ordoesresponsibilityremainstuck
somewhereinthemiddle?Theseareimportantquestionsbecausethelawof
warislargelybasedontheideathatsomeonecanbeheldresponsibleforthe
violenceused.
85 Singer,P.(2009)Wired for War.NewYork,2005pp.386.
86 Royakkers,L.andVanEst,R.(2010)The cubicle warrior: the marionette of digitalized warfare.
In:EthicsandInformationTechnology,no.12,pp.289-296.
Protest in Pakistan against attacks with drones.
Theyarealsoimportantbecausethereisneverasimpleanswertothe
questionofwhetherusingviolenceislegitimate.Warsituationsarenever
completelyclear-cut.Thequestionstheyraiseneverhaveyesornoanswers.
Autonomoussystems,programmedinabinarylanguage,arenotableto
actwithrespectforhumandignityduringverycomplicatedwarsituations.
Isitpermissibletotargetanti-aircraftgunslocatedonaschoolroof?Mayan
enemyunitbeattackedwhenithastakencoverinabusymarketplace?
Insuchsituationsonlyhumanjudgementcantakeintoaccountthehuman
dignityofciviliansthatcouldbeindanger.Thereforeautonomousarmssys-
temsseemunsuitableforuseinwarzones.87
ManyauthorsstudyingtheuseofrobotsrefertofictionalworksbyIsaac
Asimov,aUSscientistandsciencefictionauthor.Inhisseriesofbookson
robots,heformulatedthreeethicallawsofrobotics.
1. Arobotmaynotinjureahumanbeingor,throughinaction,allowahuman
beingtocometoharm.
2. Arobotmustobeyanyordersgiventoitbyhumanbeings,exceptwhere
suchorderswouldconflictwiththeFirstLaw.
3. Arobotmustprotectitsownexistenceaslongassuchprotectiondoesnot
conflictwiththeFirstorSecondLaw.
LaterAsimovprefixedlawzero.“Arobotmaynotharmhumanity,or,byinac-
tion,allowhumanitytocometoharm.”Asimovusedtheterm‘robots’torefer
toautonomoussystems.Theselawsforbidrobotsfrombeingusedincombat.
Thisissciencefictionthathasbecomereality.TherestrictionsthatAsimov
placedontheuseofrobotshavebecomeimportantintheethicaldiscussion
ofautonomousarmedsystems.C.HomanreferstoProf.Coker(citedabove)
whosaidthatwhilerobotsmaygatherintelligence,theyhavenoknowledge.88
Autonomoussystemsmaybeabletoanalyse,buttheycannotassessasitua-
tioninamannerthatrespectsreality.Singerofferstheexampleofacomputer
thatcannottellthedifferencebetweenanappleandatomato.Itsdigitalsen-
sorsrespondthesametoboth.Singeralsoquotesamanufacturerofautono-
mousarmyvehicles,“Ifit’sachild,youwanttostop. Ifit’saguywithanRPG-7
[arocket-propelledgrenadelauncher],youwanttorunhimover.”89 Butwhatif
it’sakidwithanRPG?Orawoundedenemysoldier?Canarobottellthedif-
ference?Moreimportantly,canarobotrespondtothissituationasahuman
would?Canarobotcalmachildandconvincehimtohandoverhisweapon?
ApresentationbyanarmyofficerontheroadmapforUGVspositsthatrobots
cannotreplacepeoplebecausetheycannotmeasuretheviolenceusedor
interactwithpeople.90Weconsiderthisavalidreasoning.
87 Singer,P.(2009)Wired for War.NewYork,2005pp.389.
88 Homan,C.(2009)Op weg naar de ethisch geprogrammeerde gevechtsrobot? In:Atlantisch
Perspectiefno.6,pp.4-9.
89 Singer,P.(2009)Wired for War.NewYork,2005pp.80.
90 DutchArmy(2009)Robots beslissen in het gevecht, bouwen aan veiligheid?! http://afdelingen.
kiviniria.net/media-afdelingen/DOM100000140/Activiteiten2009/0414Kooysymposium/Bert_
Stam_-_Robots_beslissen_het_gevecht.pdf.(28/02/2011)
30 does unmanned make unacceptable? — exploring the debate on using drones and robots in warfare 31ikv pax christi
Grey area
Theuseofautonomousrobotscreatesarelativelylargegreyarea.Bywayofexam-
ple:manyarmedandunarmedUAVsflyforlongdistancesonautomaticpilot.
Atsuchmomentsthedronesaremoreorlessautonomous,althoughtheoperator
canalwaysassumecontrol.Isthisanautonomoussystem?
Morepressingisthequestionwhetherarmedsystemsmaytakeautonomous
armedaction.Oneexamplethatclearlybelongstothegreyareaisthesystems
usedtorenderfiredprojectilesharmless.TheNetherlands’Goalkeeper(madeby
Thales)isonesuchsystemdesignedforinstallationonships.Peoplearetooslow
andtooinaccuratetoeliminateallfiredprojectiles.Theautonomousgoalkeeper
systemcandothis.91Othercountriesusesimilarsystems.TheUSandUKusea
modifiedversionofthesystemtoprotectbasesinIraqagainstprojectiles.92In
2007,anerrorwiththistypeofweaponcaused9deathsandwounded14when
SouthAfricansoldierstestedthesystem.93
Moreover,muchofthetechnologyaimedatprocessingintelligencefallsinthe
greyarea.Manyarmssystemsareequippedwithsoftwarethatidentifieselements
inthelineofsightorfireasfriendorfoeandspecifiesthetype.Oftenthedecision
toshootatanelementinthelineofsightorfiredependslargelyoninformation
thatthisautonomoussystemsupplies.ThedestructionofanIraniancivilianair-
craftbyanUSwarshipin1988suggeststhatthesesystemscanalsomakemistakes.
Noconclusiveexplanationwasevergivenforthiserror.Someattributeittothis
kindofsoftware.Itissaidto
havebeenresponsibleforthe
officersresponsibleforfiring
theanti-aircraftgunsmistak-
ingthepassengerplanefora
fighter.94Manynations’armed
forcesusesuchautomated
systems,theforegoingexam-
pleshowstheproblemsto
whichtheycangiverise.The
greyareashowsthatitisessen-
tialtothinkaboutthelimits
ofautomation.Insomecases,
likeGoalkeeper,itisclearthat
automationcontributesto
soldiers’safety.Theothercases
mentionedshowthattheycan
alsobedangerous.
91 Thales(2011)Goalkeeper - close-in weapon system. http://www.thalesgroup.com/goalkeeper/?pid=1568
(04-01-2011)
92 Scott,R.(2007)Raytheon eyes defence at the speed of light.http://www.janes.com/events/exhibitions/
dsei2007/sections/daily/day2/raytheon-eyes-defence-at-.shtml(04-01-2011)
93 Shachtman,N.(2007)Robot Cannon kills 9, wounds 14. http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2007/10/
robot-cannon-ki/(04-01-2011)
94 SeeforinstancethereportintheWashingtonPost,in1988:Wilson,G.C.(1988)Navy Missile Downs
Iranian Jetliner. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/flight801/stories/
july88crash.htm(04-01-2011)
An Israeli armed ugcv. © G-Nius Unmanned Ground Systems
4.5 Extrajudicial killings
Thequestionofusingdronesiscloselylinkedtothatofthe
legitimacy(andlegality)ofextrajudicialkillings.Asother
meanscanalsobeusedforextrajudicialkillingthissubject
mustbetreatedindependentlya.Thediscussiononthesekill-
ingsisnotidenticaltothataboutdrones.Nevertheless,thereis
alink.ThethresholdforextrajudicialkillingsinPakistanseems
tobemuchlowersimplybecauseoftheabilitytouse
unmannedarmssystems.
AmitaiEtzionidefendstheextrajudicialkillingsofcombatants
belongingtoanon-stategroup.95AccordingtoEtzioni,because
thesecombatantsabusetheircivilianstatustheyforfeittheright
tobetreatedasciviliansduringaconflict.Etzioni’sreasoningis
thatbecauseirregularsoldiershideamongthecivilianpopula-
tionwheretheyaredifficulttocapture,theymustbeeliminated
beforetheycanhideamongcivilians.ForEtzioni,dronesare
ideallysuitedforthis.AUSgovernmentofficialexplainedextra-
judicialkillingsinthisway:“Inthisongoingarmedconflict,the
UnitedStateshastheauthorityunderinternationallaw,andthe
responsibilitytoitscitizens,touseforce,includinglethalforce,
todefenditself,includingbytargetingpersonssuchashigh-level
alQaedaleaderswhoareplanningattack.”96
Othersaskwhetherthereisnotariskthatextrajudicialkilling
maybecomethenewnorm.JeffreySmith,aformersenior
CIAofficial,saysthattheseexecutionscansuggestthatthis
isnormalbehaviour.Hewarnsagainstaboomerangeffect
thatcouldmakeUSofficialstargetsofextrajudicialkillings.97
Extrajudicialkillingcanbeanargumentforopponentsto
attackveryspecifictargetsinthecountriesthatperformthese
executions.Thisenlargesthebattlefieldinawaythatcanhave
unforeseeableconsequences.
TheUNrapporteurforextrajudicialkillingsjudgedthatthese
couldbelegalunderstrictconditions.98Therapporteurposited
thatwhenstatesdecidetocarryoutextrajudicialkillings,they
mustclearlymakeknowntheinternationalrulesonwhichthis
actionisbased.Andalsotheciviliancasualtiesmustbecounted.
95 Etzioni,A.(2010)Unmanned Aircraft Systems: the Moral and Legal Case.
In:JointForcesQuarterly,Issue572010.pp.66.-72.
96 Johnson,K.(2010)US defends legality of killing with drones. http://online.wsj.
com/article/SB10001424052702303450704575159864237752180.html
(04-01-2011)
97 Mayer,J.(2009)The Predator war: what are the risks of the CIA’s covert drone
program? http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa_fact_
mayer(10-01-2011)
98 Alston,P.(2010)Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or
arbitrary executions. UNno.A/HRC/14/24/Add.6.pp.27.-29.
Video stills of an attack on armed insurgents in Northern Baghdad, 2008. The attack killed 6 people. Source: Defense Video & Imagery Distribution System
32 does unmanned make unacceptable? — exploring the debate on using drones and robots in warfare 33ikv pax christi
ThereporteralsoaskedtheHighCommissionerforHuman
Rightstojoinstates,theRedCross,andotherorganisationsin
thinkingaboutwhensomeonecanberegardedasparticipat-
inginanarmedstruggle.Tobespecific,therapporteursays
thatitisthedroneoperator’sresponsibilitytoensurethat
thecommanderbaseshis/herdecisiononvisualconfirmation.
Furthermore,thecivilianpopulationintheimmediatevicin-
itymustbewarnedoftheattack.
Inanycase,itisclearthatinternationallawhasaninsuffi-
cientlegalframeworkontheuseofdronesforextrajudicial
killings(andprobablyforanyuseofthem).Thisframework
shouldbeputintoplaceasquicklyaspossible.Whendoing
so,thediscriminationprincipleshouldbecentral:civilians
mustsnotbecomethevictimsofarmedviolence.
4.6 Unmanned systems and friction between public
and private
Civilianeffortinmilitarymattersisbydefinitionamatter
ofdebate.Militaryactionhasitsowncategorywithininter-
nationallaw.Legaluncertaintyarisesassoonascivilians
becomeinvolvedinmilitaryactions.Attheendofthisdocu-
mentwenotethatmorecivilianactorsareinvolvedinthe
armedoperationsofunmannedsystems,thanofmanned
systems.OneclearexampleisthecivilianCIA’suseofdrones
forarmedinterventioninAfghanistanandPakistan.This
raisesthequestionwhetherthisisanactofwar,anddepend-
ingontheanswer,whatlawgovernstheact.Anotherexample
ishiringcivilianactorstooperateunmannedsystems.
TheNetherlandshiredanIsraelicompanytouseUAVsto
collectintelligencefortroopsinUruzgan.Thequestionhere,
ofcourse,isthestatusofthesecivilianactors.99Aretheya
legitimatetarget?Whoisresponsibleiftheymakemistakes?
Dronesarealsousedforcivilianpurposes,usuallytocollect
informationforgovernmentinvestigationsservices.That
raisesquestionsaboutwhomayusethepicturestaken,where
theymaybestoredandwheredronesmaybeused.Shouldit
berequiredtonotifyciviliansthatgovernmentservicesare
usingdronesinthesamewaythattheyarenotifiedabout
cameras?
Thereissome,buttoolittle,internationaldiscussionon
unmannedorautonomouswarfare.Dronemanufacturers
andmilitaryexpertstendtocreateanimaginaryworldin
whichrobotsareatechnologicalsolutionforthepolitical
99 Homan,C.(2009)Op weg naar de ethisch geprogrammeerde gevechtsrobot?
In:AtlantischPerspectiefno.6,pp.1418.
problemoflegitimatingwarandthecasualtiesthiscancause.Thisseemsto
leadtotechno-fetishisminwhicharobotbecomesamagicalobjectonto
whichneedsforarisk-freewarcanbeprojected.Inthisconceptualisation,
unmannedsystemssavelivesandminimiseloss.However,thischaracterisa-
tionignoresthegreaterimpactthatusingarmedrobotshasonthelegiti-
macyofwarfareandthepossibilityofrisk-freeentryontoabattlefield.Will
thisnotmakegoingtowartooeasy?Weneedindependentcriticalanalysis
toexaminetheextenttowhichsuchideascoincidewiththerealbenefitsof
usingdronesandrobots.100
100Roderick,I.(2010)Mil-bot Fetishism: The Pataphysics of Military Robots.In:TOPIA,Issue23-24,
November2010.
A prototype armed swords. © uk mod Crown Copyright
Marjan Lucas is responsible for IKV Pax Christi’s
programme in Pakistan. For her work she often
speaks with Pakistanis about their country.
She says that the public is indignant about the
drone attacks on Pakistani territory. Many consider
it an outrage that the US thinks it can resolve
problems this way. The fact is that the Pakistani
people and army must bear the brunt of the
Taliban’s retaliation for the drones.
However, off the record, military officials and politi-
cal leaders admit that the drones are effective
and that “they must be unmanned”, sais Lucas.
Pakistan would never have permitted manned air-
craft in its own airspace, just like it does not accept
foreign combat troops on its territory. But because
the aircraft are unmanned, there is an essential
psychological difference and Pakistan tolerates
them as necessary evil.” Unmanned means that
the rules of state sovereignty can be side-stepped
because it is nearly impossible to explain to one’s
own population that a foreign intervention is tak-
ing place on Pakistani soil.
She has her doubts about the legitimacy, and
certainly about the effectiveness of using drones.
“The effect seems to be contrary. There are many
civilian casualties and this results in more jihadis.
When drones kill people, this only confirms the
rhetoric of martyrdom that is so essential in
recruitment for the jihad. Because of the drones,
leaders flee to Karachi and other overpopulated
cities. Moreover, because drones are available,
no thought goes to alternatives like ideological
counter-attack based on knowledge of extremist
networks. This knowledge and information can be
extracted when arrests are made. The point should
be uprooting extremism; using drones is only
about uprooting extremists.”
34 does unmanned make unacceptable? — exploring the debate on using drones and robots in warfare 35ikv pax christi
Inrecentdecades,theuseofdroneshasrisensharply.Atthesametime,
onlyafewstatesusearmeddrones.Itiscertain,however,thatfurther
developmentinroboticsformilitaryusewillleadtomorecountriesfacing
thedecisionofwhethertoacquirearmedandevenautonomousrobots.
Thisreporthasarguedthatunmannedsystemscanplayausefulrolein
supportingtroopoperations.Atthesametimeithasdrawnattentionto
thedownsideofunmannedsystems:unmannedsystemscannotwina
war.Basicallyitisalways,andpossiblyevenmoresonow,amatterofboots
ontheground.Moreover,thereareseveralimportantethicalobjections
tousingarmed,unmannedsystems.Doesusingdronesnotmakeittoo
easytokill?Doesadroneoperatorlocatedthousandsofmilesawayfrom
his/hertargethaveadequateinformationtomakelifeordeathdecisions?
Cantheanxietyandantagonismthatdronesarouseinthecivilianpopula-
tionbejustified?
Itisclearthattherehavebeenciviliancasualtiesinoperationsinvolving
armeddrones.Sofarhowever,anextensiveanalysisislacking.Itisalso
unclearwhatthelegalimplicationsofdeployingdronesare.Aredrone
operatorsalegitimatetarget?Doesthisexpandthebattlefield?Whatare
therulesfortheproliferationofrobottechnology?Therearealsomany
questionsaboutextrajudicialkillings.Aretheylegal?Iftheyare,arethey
effective?Inotherwords,dotheycontributetostabilisingaconflict
situation?
TheNetherlandsnowusesmainlysmallrobotsanddroneswithashort
operationaltimespan.Inthespringof2011,thegovernmentdecidedto
acquirefourUAVsforintelligencegathering.Soonerorlaterthequestion
ofacquiringarmeddronesandrobotswillariseintheNetherlandsaswell.
Moreover,theNetherlandstakespartinmissionswithcountriesthatdouse
armeddrones.Whenconsideringusingdrones,itisimportanttotakeinto
accounttheirethicalandlegalimplicationsandnotjusttheirpractical
militaryprosandcons.Thisisnotsimplyaboutintechnologicalprogress,
butaquestionoftheresponsibleuseofnewtechnology.Unmannedwarfare
isnotbydefinitionagoodidea.Responsibledecisionsmustincludeareliable
assessmentoftheobjections.Statescurrentlyusingdronesmustbemore
openaboutdisclosingtheiruseandtheireffectsontheground.Howmany
civiliancasualtiesdotheymake?Howdocivilianslivingintheareaswhere
theyareusedperceivethem?
IKVPaxChristiconsidersitimportantfornewweapontechnologiestobe
validatedagainstethicalandjuridicalprinciplesbeforetheyareputtouse.
5 Conclusions Weareconvincedthatthedecidingfactorandcorevaluemustbewhether
ornotdeploymentofnewtechnologyincombatimproveshumansecurity.
Theremustbearesponsiblebalancebetweenthesafetyofsoldiersandthe
safetyofcivilians.Thedeploymentofrobotsismuchsaferforsoldiers,but
dotheybenefittheciviliansthesesoldiersaresupposedtobeprotecting?
Initialassessmentagainstethicalandjuridicalprinciplesleavesuswith
negativefeelingsaboutthedeploymentofarmedorautonomousrobots.
Armedunmannedsystemssatisfyadesireinoursocietytowagewarwith-
outputtingourownpeopleatrisk.Thisurgeseemstobebasedonthemis-
conceptionthatwarscanbewagedclinically.Deployingrobotsanddrones
canmakeiteasiertouseviolence,andthat,inturn,canresultinescalation
ofviolenceandconflict.Humansmustremainincontroliftheyengagein
warfare.Theyaretheoneswhomustdrafttheinterpretationsandmakethe
decisions.Thismayneverbelefttocomputersorcomputer-generateddata.
Unarmedandunmannedaircraftcanhelpsoldierstodistinguishbetter
betweencombatantsandcivilians.Butthefootageandintelligencegathered
areonlyusefulwhentheycanbeprocessedandinterpreted.Continuous
aerialsurveillancewithoutadequateinterpretationorcorroborationfrom
othersources-canleadtoaone-dimensionalapproachtothecomplexsitua-
tionontheground.Thisapproachalsoleadstomorecivilianapplications
andsurveillancedutiesfordroneswhileside-steppingdiscussionsontheir
desirabilityandeffectiveness.
Obviouslywealsocondemnextrajudicialkillingsasmorallyunacceptable.
Theseexecutionsmayappeartoremoveashort-termthreat,butthereisa
seriouschancethattheywillonlynourishlong-termantipathyto‘Western’
behaviour.Unarmedrobotscanprobablyhelpenhanceciviliansecurity
whentheyareusedtoreinforcebootsontheground.Itisessentialthat
statesnowusingarmedrobotsbemoreopenabouttheireffectiveness.
Dotheyreallymakepeopleonthegroundsafer?
Weaimfordebateontheuseofrobots–internationallyandinDutch
militaryaffairs–beforethedecisionwhetherornottoacquirerobots
becomeshard.Wehopethatthisreportisaconstructivecontribution
tothatdiscussion.
36 does unmanned make unacceptable? — exploring the debate on using drones and robots in warfare 37ikv pax christi
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