Does Diversity Drive Down Does Diversity Drive Down Trust?Trust?

Eric M. UslanerEric M. UslanerProfessor of Government and PoliticsProfessor of Government and Politics

University of MarylandUniversity of MarylandCollege Park, MD 20742College Park, MD 20742

http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/uslanerhttp://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/uslaner

There is a controversy about the effect of diversity on trust. There is a controversy about the effect of diversity on trust. SomeSome(esp. Marschall and Stolle, 2004) argue that diversity (esp. Marschall and Stolle, 2004) argue that diversity promotes trust bypromotes trust byputting people into contact with others not like themselves.putting people into contact with others not like themselves.

Others suggest that diversity leads to lower trust. Alesina Others suggest that diversity leads to lower trust. Alesina

and Putnam argue that racial diversity and and Putnam argue that racial diversity and fractionalization leads to lower levels of trust -- because fractionalization leads to lower levels of trust -- because minorities are less trusting. The more diverse a society is, minorities are less trusting. The more diverse a society is, the more minorities it obviously has. the more minorities it obviously has.

We know that it is easier to trust people like yourself: From We know that it is easier to trust people like yourself: From social identity theory, we are predisposed to trust in-social identity theory, we are predisposed to trust in-groups more than out-groups (see various works by groups more than out-groups (see various works by Brewer & Messick and Tajfel). Brewer & Messick and Tajfel).

This literature on trust follows from an older literature on This literature on trust follows from an older literature on racialracialcontact and threat.  Some contact literature says that contact and threat.  Some contact literature says that interaction withinteraction withpeople of different backgrounds leads to greater tolerance people of different backgrounds leads to greater tolerance and out-group trust. and out-group trust.

Other literature argues that racial contact, especially when Other literature argues that racial contact, especially when thetheshare of minorities is high, may lead to increased levels of share of minorities is high, may lead to increased levels of racialracialdiscord--this is the "racial threat" argument made in the discord--this is the "racial threat" argument made in the 1940s by V.O. Key, Jr. about racialized politics in the 1940s by V.O. Key, Jr. about racialized politics in the American South, which were most vehement and nasty in American South, which were most vehement and nasty in areas with high shares of African-Americans--the "racial areas with high shares of African-Americans--the "racial threat" argument, which has been confirmed by more recent threat" argument, which has been confirmed by more recent work on voting for racist candidate David Duke in Louisiana work on voting for racist candidate David Duke in Louisiana in the 1990s).in the 1990s).

Overall, there is less than overwhelming support Overall, there is less than overwhelming support for either argument. Nor is it clear that these two for either argument. Nor is it clear that these two perspectives are contradictory.perspectives are contradictory.

First, the racial threat hypothesis does not First, the racial threat hypothesis does not contradict the racial contact (more positive) contradict the racial contact (more positive) argument because we rarely control for context.argument because we rarely control for context.

Racial threat seems rarely accompanied by actual Racial threat seems rarely accompanied by actual sustained contact between members of the sustained contact between members of the majority and minority groups. The effects of majority and minority groups. The effects of context depend upon context: Are there real context depend upon context: Are there real opportunities for minorities and majorities to opportunities for minorities and majorities to interact?interact?

There are not powerful effects of diversity on trust at either the There are not powerful effects of diversity on trust at either the individual or aggregate levels. individual or aggregate levels.

At the individual level, there are at best modest relationships with At the individual level, there are at best modest relationships with the diversity of friendship networks and the diversity of the diversity of friendship networks and the diversity of memberships in clubs and trust in Putnam's Social Capital memberships in clubs and trust in Putnam's Social Capital Benchmark Study. I examine both generalized trust and trust in Benchmark Study. I examine both generalized trust and trust in racial and ethnic groups. racial and ethnic groups.

Does having a friend from a different background to your own Does having a friend from a different background to your own lead to more trust overall or to trust in other ethnic or racial lead to more trust overall or to trust in other ethnic or racial groups? There is little support for this thesis. Only a handful of groups? There is little support for this thesis. Only a handful of correlations exceed .10 and none exceed .14, as shown in the correlations exceed .10 and none exceed .14, as shown in the following table. Of course, these measures tell us little about the following table. Of course, these measures tell us little about the frequency of contact with people of different backgrounds.frequency of contact with people of different backgrounds.

These findings are consistent with Marschall and Stolle (2004)—These findings are consistent with Marschall and Stolle (2004)—who find that interracial contact alone is insignificant in who find that interracial contact alone is insignificant in predicting social trust in two Detroit Area Studies.predicting social trust in two Detroit Area Studies.

Dependent VariableDependent Variable Independent VariableIndependent Variable tau-b / tau-ctau-b / tau-c Generalized trustGeneralized trust Have black friendHave black friend .015.015 Have Hispanic friendHave Hispanic friend .037.037 Have Asian friendHave Asian friend .. .072.072 Have white friendHave white friend .122.122 Number friends different backgroundNumber friends different background .046.046 Trust own ethnic groupTrust own ethnic group Have black f riendHave black f riend -.022 -.022 Have Hispanic friendHave Hispanic friend -.017 -.017 Have Asian friendHave Asian friend .045.045 Have white friendHave white friend .044.044 Number friends different backgroundNumber friends different background .008.008 Trust blacks relativeTrust blacks relative to own groupto own group Have black f riendHave black f riend .094.094 Have Hispanic friendHave Hispanic friend .042.042 Have Asian friendHave Asian friend .054.054 Trust whites relative Trust whites relative

to own groupto own group Have Hispanic friendHave Hispanic friend .085.085 Have Asian friendHave Asian friend .066.066 Have white friendHave white friend .073.073 Number friends different backgroundNumber friends different background .087.087 Trust Asians relative Trust Asians relative

to own groupto own group Have black f riendHave black f riend .111.111 Have Hispanic friendHave Hispanic friend .077.077 Have Asian friendHave Asian friend .133.133 Have white friendHave white friend .102.102 Number friends different backgroundNumber friends different background .138.138 Trust Hispanics relative Trust Hispanics relative

to own groupto own group Have black f riendHave black f riend .112.112 Have Hispanic friendHave Hispanic friend .120.120 Have Asian friend Have Asian friend  .105.105 Have white friendHave white friend .044.044 Number friends different backgroundNumber friends different background .113.113

Each of the measures of friendship refer to friends outside one’s own ethnic/racial group.Each of the measures of friendship refer to friends outside one’s own ethnic/racial group.

In cross-national aggregate analyses, In cross-national aggregate analyses, virtually every measure of virtually every measure of fractionalization (diversity) hasfractionalization (diversity) hasat best modest relations (negative) with at best modest relations (negative) with trust. This holds for the traditional trust. This holds for the traditional Eastery-Levine measure (avelf in the Eastery-Levine measure (avelf in the literature) and newerliterature) and newermeasures by Fearon and Alesina.measures by Fearon and Alesina.

Even these miniscule relationships Even these miniscule relationships vanish in multivariate analyses.vanish in multivariate analyses.

The measure of trust is an aggregate estimate from the World Values Surveys of 1990 and 1995. To increase the sample size, I imputed values for countries not included in these surveys. The variables used to impute trust are: gross national product per capital; the value of imports of goods and services; legislative effectiveness; head of state type; tenure of executive (all from the State Failure Data Set); distance from the equator (from Jong-sung You of Harvard University); and openness of the economy (from Sachs and Warner, 1997; data available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html ).

R2 = .657, standard error of the estimate = .087, N = 63.

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0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1Ethnic Fractionalization (Alesina)

r2 = .102 N = 84

Generalized Trust (Imputed) by Ethnic Fractionalization (Alesina)

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0 .2 .4 .6 .8Cultural Diversity (Fearon)

r2 = .006 N = 82

by Cultural Diversity (Fearon)Generalized Trust (Imputed)

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0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1Linguistic Fractionalization (Alesina)

r2 = .009 N = 83

Generalized Trust (Imputed) by Linguistic Fractionalization (Alesina)

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0 .2 .4 .6 .8Religious Fractionalization (Alesina)

r2 = .009 N = 84

Generalized Trust (Imputed) by Religious Fractionalization (Alesina)

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0 .2 .4 .6 .8Ethnic Fractionalization (Easterly-Levine)

r2 = .047 N = 68

Generalized Trust (Imputed) by Ethnic Fractionalization (Easterly-Levine)

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0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1Ethnic Fractionalization (Fearon)

r2 = .090 N = 82

by Ethnic Fractionalization (Fearon)

Generalized Trust (Imputed)

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0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1Ethnic Fractionalization (Fearon Soviet Atlas)

r2 = .038 N = 62

by Ethnic Fractionalization (Fearon Soviet Atlas)

Generalized Trust (Imputed)

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.2 .4 .6 .8 1Share of Largest Group (Fearon)

r2 = .090 N = 82

by Share of Largest GroupGeneralized Trust (Imputed)

Trust and Ethnic Homogeneity in the American StatesTrust and Ethnic Homogeneity in the American States

An aggregated trust score (from national surveys in the 1990s) for the American An aggregated trust score (from national surveys in the 1990s) for the American states is uncorrelated with a measure of ethnic homogeneity (fractionalization) states is uncorrelated with a measure of ethnic homogeneity (fractionalization) constructed by Richard Winters.constructed by Richard Winters.

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.2 .3 .4 .5Ethnic Homogeneity

r2 = .007 N = 44

Generalized Trust by Ethnic Homogeneity

Generalized Trust and State Minority Generalized Trust and State Minority Population in the United StatesPopulation in the United States

The share of minorities in a state is more strongly related to the level of The share of minorities in a state is more strongly related to the level of generalized trust (though even here the relationship is not strong).generalized trust (though even here the relationship is not strong).

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.2 .3 .4 .5Minority Percentage in a State

r2 = .173 N = 44

by State Minority Population Share (Hero)Generalized Trust

Ethnic Homogeneity and Minority Population ShareEthnic Homogeneity and Minority Population Share

Minority population and ethnic heterogeneity in a state Minority population and ethnic heterogeneity in a state areare strongly related. Even strongly related. Even a measure of fractionalization (a Herfindahl index) cannot distinguish between a measure of fractionalization (a Herfindahl index) cannot distinguish between segregated and integrated neighborhoods at high levels of integration such as the segregated and integrated neighborhoods at high levels of integration such as the state or the nation. If some states/nations have large minority populations, they state or the nation. If some states/nations have large minority populations, they will have higher scores on fractionalization indices regardless of whether the will have higher scores on fractionalization indices regardless of whether the minorities are integrated or segregated.minorities are integrated or segregated.

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0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5Minority Percentage in a State

r2 = .510 N = 49

by State Minority Population Share (Hero)Ethnic Homogeneity (Winters)

There is one national measure, the relative segregation There is one national measure, the relative segregation of minority groups within a country (estimated by the of minority groups within a country (estimated by the Minorities at Risk project), that matters mightily. Minorities at Risk project), that matters mightily.

It is not ethnic diversity that matters by itself--but It is not ethnic diversity that matters by itself--but where people live within a society. When a minority where people live within a society. When a minority group is segregated within a society, the opportunities group is segregated within a society, the opportunities for contact with members of the majority are limited—for contact with members of the majority are limited—and hence building of generalized trust becomes more and hence building of generalized trust becomes more difficult. Concentrated minorities are more likely to difficult. Concentrated minorities are more likely to develop a strong identity that supercedes a national develop a strong identity that supercedes a national sense of identification—and to build local institutions sense of identification—and to build local institutions and political bodies that enhance this sense of and political bodies that enhance this sense of separateness.separateness.

Unfortunately, obtaining this sort of data for a large Unfortunately, obtaining this sort of data for a large number of jurisdictions (more countries, the American number of jurisdictions (more countries, the American states) seems impossible at this time.states) seems impossible at this time.

Marschall and Stolle (2004) do have data on Marschall and Stolle (2004) do have data on neighborhood ethnic heterogeneityneighborhood ethnic heterogeneity in Detroit—and in Detroit—and they show that contact across racial lines they show that contact across racial lines doesdoes lead to lead to greater trust, greater trust, but only in racially heterogeneous but only in racially heterogeneous neighborhoods. neighborhoods. My findings are broadly consistent My findings are broadly consistent with theirs—the distribution of racial and ethnic with theirs—the distribution of racial and ethnic groups, not their sheer numbers, is the key factor in groups, not their sheer numbers, is the key factor in mediating how ethnic and racial fractionalization mediating how ethnic and racial fractionalization shapes trust. shapes trust.

Ethnic or racial segregation seems to be a strong Ethnic or racial segregation seems to be a strong barrier to the development of generalized trust—and barrier to the development of generalized trust—and the effects may be particularly pronounced for the the effects may be particularly pronounced for the ethnic or racial minority that is likely to feel excluded ethnic or racial minority that is likely to feel excluded from power and greater resources.from power and greater resources.

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0 1 2 3Segregation of Minority Groups (Minorities at Risk)

r2 = .182 N = 68

by Segregation of Minority Groups (Minorities at Risk)Generalized Trust (Imputed)

Generalized trust is lower in former and present Generalized trust is lower in former and present Communist nations regardless of any other factor leading Communist nations regardless of any other factor leading to trust. to trust.

The relationships with the various measures of The relationships with the various measures of

fractionalization and diversity are all slightly higher when fractionalization and diversity are all slightly higher when we eliminate present and former Communist countries we eliminate present and former Communist countries from the analysis, but the differences are generally small. from the analysis, but the differences are generally small. For Alesina’s ethnic fractionalization index, the correlation For Alesina’s ethnic fractionalization index, the correlation with trust rises only from r = -.320 (N = 84) to r = -.370 with trust rises only from r = -.320 (N = 84) to r = -.370 (N = 63).(N = 63).

For the residential segregation measure, the effects are For the residential segregation measure, the effects are much more pronounced: The correlation rises from r = much more pronounced: The correlation rises from r = -.427 (N = 68) to r = -.585 (N = 49) as in the graph in the -.427 (N = 68) to r = -.585 (N = 49) as in the graph in the next slide. In multivariate regressions excluding the next slide. In multivariate regressions excluding the former and present Communist countries, the impact of former and present Communist countries, the impact of residential segregation on trust is significant and large.residential segregation on trust is significant and large.

Part of the reason why the ethnic segregation measure Part of the reason why the ethnic segregation measure may shape trust more than the other indicators of may shape trust more than the other indicators of fractionalization or diversity might lie in the fact that there fractionalization or diversity might lie in the fact that there is at least a moderate relationship between ethnic is at least a moderate relationship between ethnic segregation and inequality—and inequality is the strongest segregation and inequality—and inequality is the strongest determinant of generalized trust. determinant of generalized trust.

Using the Galbraith estimates for economic inequality for Using the Galbraith estimates for economic inequality for 1994 (the year with the largest number of cases), we find a 1994 (the year with the largest number of cases), we find a moderate relationship with generalized trust—which is moderate relationship with generalized trust—which is strengthened when we exclude the countries with the strengthened when we exclude the countries with the lowest levels of minority segregation (Austria, Singapore, lowest levels of minority segregation (Austria, Singapore, and Jordan). The relationship is not powerful. and Jordan). The relationship is not powerful.

The logic here is that ethnic residential segregation is The logic here is that ethnic residential segregation is likely to be compounded by a lower economic status for likely to be compounded by a lower economic status for the minority group, breeding resentment toward the the minority group, breeding resentment toward the majority and a low level of generalized trust.majority and a low level of generalized trust.

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30 40 50 60Economic Inequality (Galbraith Gini for 1994)

r2 = .151 N = 56 r2 = .216 N = 52 for minority segregation > 0

by Economic Inequality (Galbraith Gini for 1994)Segregation of Minority Groups (Minorities at Risk)

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0 1 2 3Segregation of Minority Groups (Minorities at Risk)

r2 = .342 N = 49

Former and Present Communist Countries ExcludedGeneralized Trust (Imputed) by Segregation of Minority Groups (Minorities at Risk)

However, there is little support for this proposed However, there is little support for this proposed explanation. Of the various measures of population explanation. Of the various measures of population diversity, the group concentration measure has one of diversity, the group concentration measure has one of the the lowerlower correlations with economic inequality. The correlations with economic inequality. The simple correlation is .388, compared to .465 for Alesina’s simple correlation is .388, compared to .465 for Alesina’s ethnic fractionalization, .456 for Fearon’s ethnic ethnic fractionalization, .456 for Fearon’s ethnic fractionalization measure, .507 for Fearon’s measure of fractionalization measure, .507 for Fearon’s measure of the population share of the largest group, and .434 for the population share of the largest group, and .434 for the Easterly-Levine index of fractionalization.the Easterly-Levine index of fractionalization.

Most measures of population diversity are related to Most measures of population diversity are related to economic inequality. Countries with a large share of economic inequality. Countries with a large share of minorities have less equal distributions of wealth, minorities have less equal distributions of wealth, regardless of whether the minorities are isolated or live regardless of whether the minorities are isolated or live alongside majority groups.alongside majority groups.

Group Isolation and CorruptionGroup Isolation and Corruption

There is one key area in which the group There is one key area in which the group concentration measure of ethnic concentration measure of ethnic fractionalization is distinctive: Nations with fractionalization is distinctive: Nations with high levels of group concentration are more high levels of group concentration are more likely to have a weak rule of law and greater likely to have a weak rule of law and greater corruption. The following figures show the corruption. The following figures show the relationships between group concentration relationships between group concentration and the Transparency International and the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index for 2004 and Corruption Perceptions Index for 2004 and the index of legal and property rights from the index of legal and property rights from freetheworld.comfreetheworld.com

ALG

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2 4 6 8 10TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2004

r2 = .236 N = 74

by TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2004Segregation of Minority Grouos (Minorities at Risk)

These relationships are moderate, but they are much These relationships are moderate, but they are much stronger than we find for any of the other measures of stronger than we find for any of the other measures of ethnic fractionalization. ethnic fractionalization.

For the TI 2004 Corruption Perceptions Index, For the TI 2004 Corruption Perceptions Index, representative correlations are: representative correlations are:

Group concentration: -.485 (N = 74)Group concentration: -.485 (N = 74) Alesina ethnic fractionalization: -.386 (N = 91)Alesina ethnic fractionalization: -.386 (N = 91) Fearon ethnic fractionalization: -.372 (N = 88)Fearon ethnic fractionalization: -.372 (N = 88)

For legal and property rights from freetheworld.com, For legal and property rights from freetheworld.com, representative correlations are:representative correlations are:

Group concentration: -.568 (N = 65)Group concentration: -.568 (N = 65) Alesina ethnic fractionalization: -.420 (N = 81)Alesina ethnic fractionalization: -.420 (N = 81) Fearon ethnic fractionalization: -.376 (N = 78)Fearon ethnic fractionalization: -.376 (N = 78)

For a wide range of measures of corruption and For a wide range of measures of corruption and legal fairness, including several measures of legal fairness, including several measures of contract enforcement from Alesina’s contract contract enforcement from Alesina’s contract enforcement data set, the World Bank enforcement data set, the World Bank Governance measure of corruption in 2004, and Governance measure of corruption in 2004, and perceptions of corruption aggregated from the perceptions of corruption aggregated from the Transparency International Global Corruption Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer surveys of 2004 for grand corruption, Barometer surveys of 2004 for grand corruption, petty corruption, and corruption in education, petty corruption, and corruption in education, the parliament, the police, political parties, the the parliament, the police, political parties, the registry office, utilities, and tax collection, the registry office, utilities, and tax collection, the group concentration index had far stronger group concentration index had far stronger correlations than any other fractionalization or correlations than any other fractionalization or diversity measure.diversity measure.

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BOTBRZ

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INS IRN ISR

ITA

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tion

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at R

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2 4 6 8 10TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2004

r2 = .236 N = 74

by TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2004Segregation of Minority Groups (Minorities at Risk)

Does Diversity Shape Does Diversity Shape Trust?Trust?

The evidence is hardly conclusive, but it seems that The evidence is hardly conclusive, but it seems that when contact occurs between people of different when contact occurs between people of different backgrounds, trust may grow. However, it is unclear backgrounds, trust may grow. However, it is unclear that contact among adults matters as much as that contact among adults matters as much as contact among children. Uslaner (2002) finds that contact among children. Uslaner (2002) finds that having a friend of an opposite race as a young person having a friend of an opposite race as a young person leads to lower levels of in-group trust among adults. leads to lower levels of in-group trust among adults. However, there is no strong effect for adults.However, there is no strong effect for adults.

When ethnic and racial groups live in separate areas, When ethnic and racial groups live in separate areas, there is a lower probability of interaction between there is a lower probability of interaction between people (either young or older) of different people (either young or older) of different backgrounds. This is where racial (ethnic) threat backgrounds. This is where racial (ethnic) threat may overwhelm any positive aspects of contact—and, may overwhelm any positive aspects of contact—and, indeed, contact across ethnic or racial boundaries indeed, contact across ethnic or racial boundaries may itself be viewed as unacceptable.may itself be viewed as unacceptable.

When group concentration is high, this When group concentration is high, this may lead to strong in-group trust and may lead to strong in-group trust and low-out group trust. Gambetta (1993) low-out group trust. Gambetta (1993) and Uslaner (2005) have both linked and Uslaner (2005) have both linked high in-group trust and low out-group high in-group trust and low out-group trust to corruption. Ethnic group trust to corruption. Ethnic group leaders may play on fears of outsiders to leaders may play on fears of outsiders to justify their own corruption—and this justify their own corruption—and this will lead to clientelistic politics and will will lead to clientelistic politics and will in turn lower generalized trust.in turn lower generalized trust.