Dodds Putting Maps in Their Place Faulkland

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Cultural Geographies

DOI: 10.1177/0967460800007002032000; 7; 176Cultural Geographies

Klaus DoddsSurvey and the mapping of Antarctica, 1945-1962Putting maps in their place: the demise of the Falkland Islands Dependency

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t a time when globalization appears to be in vogue, it is prudent to remem-ber that human knowledge of a part of the earths continental surface

remains highly fragmented.1 Many parts of the Antarctic continent have neverexperienced the presence of human beings and their machines. Until quiterecently, widespread cloud cover around ice shelves of the Antarctic Peninsulaprevented the acquisition of satellite imagery of the entire coastline. In 1993,after several decades of multinational endeavour, a seamless digitial map of thepolar continent was produced by the British Antarctic Survey based inCambridge.2 For man y scientists an d po licy-makers, an accura te an d d eta iled

map was essential to establish whether the Antarctic was disappearing, as icecapsthe size of English counties dissolved in the shifting currents of the South

Ecumene 2000 7 (2) 0967-4608(00)EU188OA 2000 Arnold

PUTTING MAPS IN THEIR PLACE:THE DEMISE OF THEFALKLANDISLANDSDEPENDENCYSURVEY

AND THE MAPPING OFANTARCTICA , 19451962

Klaus Dodds

This paper explores the political an d scientific justifi cation for th e ma pping o f Antarctica

by the Falkland Islands Dependency Survey (FIDS). As with the Great Game of the nine-

teenth century, cartography was politics by another means. Thereafter, consideration is givento how the maps and surveys of Antarctica reflected British anxieties concerning Argentina

in the immediate postwar world. As a rival claimant state in the South Atlantic, Argentinesurveyors and ad ministrators were a source of con siderable concern to th e FIDS. In th e fi eld,

however, the FIDS surveyors were expected to concentrate on surveying while at the sametime plotting these foreign incursions in Antarctica. The methods and processes involved

in collating information into map form are considered. Ironically, the greatest geopolitical

challenge to these aspirations came from the United States rather than Argentina or evenChile. Finally, the pa per concludes with the chan ging political and ca rtograph ic remit of th e

FIDS in the era of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty.

A

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Atlantic.3 Ironically, this cartographic achievement revealed that Antarctica had

actually expanded in size as previous rounds of mapping have consistently under-estimated the geographical extent of polar ice shelves and outcrops of rock.

Some 50 years ago, these remaining gaps in the southern polar map pro-

vided a political an d scientifi c justifi cation for an extensive cartograph ic projectin the Falkland Islands Dependencies.4 The British governments employmentof surveyors, scientists and administrators in the 1940s and 1950s was designedto provide geographical information and to bolster an earlier claim to the ter-

ritory. The Falkland Islands Dependency Survey (FIDS) had a staggering remit;2030 surveyors were expected to map, survey and administer thousands of

square miles of ice, sea and rock often in the midst of appalling weather andlimited logistical support (Figure 1). The vague outline of the Antarctic penin-

sula on th e offi cial maps of the FIDS conveyed th e geographical challenges tha tlay before these government appointed surveyors. To compound matters still

further, however, successive British governments were deeply implicated in atournament of shadows as territorial competition from South American states

cast doubts over exclusive British claims.5 As with th e G reat G ame o f the n ine-teenth century, cartography was politics by another means.6 The map provided

a powerful resource for the rhetoric of territorial control; spurred on by thepromise of mineral wealth and improved access to strategic islands, Britain wascompeting with Argentina and Chile for the administrative control of theAntarctic peninsula and surrounding island chains such as the South Shetlandsand South Orkneys. By 1943, the overlapping claims to polar territory by Britain,Argentina an d C hile had ensured tha t tension, intrigue and confl ict would d om-

inate the working ambiance of the FIDS.The struggles of the British surveyors to record the shifting geographies of

the Antarctic form the backbone of this investigation into the various contex-tual frames which determined their cartographic endeavours. While it has been

recognized that the map is not an innocent political tool, the practices associ-ated with mapping and fieldwork need to be considered carefully because the

construction of polar maps did not materialize in a smooth or inevitable scien-tific manner.7 Despite their claims to scientifi c rigour, the FIDS staff o ften h ad

to compromise and adapt as the physical conditions changed. Mapping wasnever geographically uniform, as surveyors were often made to abandon either

their theodolites or their aspirations to walk over the unpredictable landscapesof the peninsula. Any subsequent desire to leave their geopolitical mark on the

land scape freq uently clashed with their capacity to trace, record, sketch and plotthe Antarctics topography.8

This paper is a contribution to the expanding critical corpus of literature onmapping but also an appeal for a movement towards rewriting the histories andgeographies of Anta rctica. Most accounts of British polar exploration have either

overemphasized the heroic struggles of particular explorers or assumed thatevents connected to exploration and surveying were part of a grander process

of scientifi c colonization .9 As a consequence, less attention has been given to

the fractured nature of mapping and how knowledge of the Antarctic emergedthro ugh a n umber of geopo litical, scientifi c an d cultural contexts. While the

Putting maps in their place 177

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178 Klaus Dodds

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Figure 1 ~ Bases of the Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey

British bases in theFalkland Islands

Dependencies



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maps tha t emerged from FIDS could offer reassuran ce to Lon don-based polarauth orities about the accessibility of th ese remote corn ers of the British empire,they could also function as cultural goods capable of defining diplomatic dra-mas and generating considerable prestige for the relevant mapping organiza-tions. As with recent trends associated with new western history, this accountcombines archival material with narrative in order to reveal and expose the his-torical possibilities in using the FIDS as a case in point.10

Initial consideration in this account is given to the importance of contextu-alizing the motivations and processes attached to mapping. Nestled withinBritish claims to scient ifi c rigour lay a virile form o f orienta lism which effec-tively represented Argentina as irrational, backward and incapable of mappingAntarctica. These orientalist or, more precisely, Latin Americanist discourseswere to play an important role in providing legitimacy to the cartographic andscientifi c programes of the FIDS.11 On ce in the fi eld, the FIDS surveyors oftenhad to adapt their practices in the face of either inclement weather or geopo-litical demands which insisted that they travelled around the ice armed withprotest notes in case they encountered any trespassers. Once basic geographi-cal information had been collected, it then had to be processed; the role of theAntarctic Place-Names Committee an d th e Directorate o f Overseas Survey (D OS,previously the Directorate of Colonial Surveys) in assisting FIDS to transformsketches into maps is considered. Thereafter, attention is given to the FIDS andthe geopolitical rationale for their operations in the Antarctic peninsula in the1940s and 1950s. The overlapping territorial claims with South American statesand the problematic relationship with the United States shapes this discussion.Finally, the growing internationalization of science and politics in the Antarcticin the late 1950s is examined because (alongside the awkward relationship withthe United States) it effectively ended the overtly nationalistic interests of FIDSand their political administrators.

FIDS and British representations of Argentina

There are many accounts of AngloArgentine relations which trace patterns ofcommercial relationships, colonization and exploration and geopolitical con-flict.12 During the 1940s and 1950s, AngloArgentine relations were to undergo

painful readjustment as new political forces and leaders negotiated a decliningtrade relationship and growing geopolitical conflict over the Antarctic and theFalklands/Malvinas. The rise of Colonel Juan Peron in 1943 had transformedArgentine politics, and his subsequent elevation to President of the Republicushered in a new phase of AngloArgentine confrontation. Determined to cutties with British commercial capital and political influence, Peron ordered thena tiona lization of Br itish-owned compan ies an d sought to n egotiate betterreturns for Argen tine meat exports to ra tion-hit Br itain. U nsurprisingly, Br itishelite representations of Argentina changed from familiar to hostile in tone andsubstance. Angered by Argentinas neutrality during the Second World War, the

then British ambassador to Argentina, Sir David Kelly, captured the mood in1943:


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Their policy of liberal neutrality is an indication that the people of Argentina, for-getting their past glorious history, have not fully appreciated the true nature of theconfl ict now being waged by the forces of tyrann y . . . Latin Americans are tempera-mental creatures, in d ealing with them, effects are often out of all proportion . . . theyexperience little hesitation in acting contrary to common sense.13

Since Edward Saids Orientalism, few segments of the humanities and social sci-ences would be insensitive to the undertones of ethnocentrism and racism thatwere synonymous with British elite representations of Argentina.14 Sir Davidsobservations were no t unusual, an d h is memoran dum to the Foreign O ffi ce inFebruary 1943 attracted no critical commentary within Whitehall.15 It seemedself-evident to mand ar ins an d th eir ministers that Argen tina was popula ted withirrational, unpredictable and hysterical characters. These representations wereundoubtedly fuelled by a sense of frustration and betrayal that a part of Britainsinformal empire in Latin America had not only sought to strengthen their owneconomic position but also challenged British claims in the South Atlantic andAntarctic.16 Tense AngloArgen tine n egot iation s over the export of mea t inAugust 1949 had confirmed to a seasoned British Foreign Office official, SirJohn Balfour, that:

The Argentines seem incapable of drafting an agreement [over exports of meat toBritain ] th emselves but th ey are fi nished experts at twisting con tractua l terms insuch a way to deprive the other side of their share of the advantage as far aspossible.17

While Argentina was apparently populated by irrational and childish individu-als, it clearly had th e wherewithal to d rive a h ard bargain with British o ffi cials

over agreed exports of meat in the 1940s. 18 Moreover, the wartime governmen tof Winston Ch urchill had b een forced to sanction a secret naval operation calledTabarin which sent surveyors and naval of fi cers to th e Anta rctic for the purpo seof restoring British claims and for mapping local areas (close to newly estab-lished bases) in the FID.19

These confl icting senses of Argentina were to be brough t to the fo re whenthe mapping and exploration of Antarctica was considered within British gov-ernment departments. In the detailed discussions over map scales and projec-tions, a Latin Americanist discourse on Argentina shaped the motivations andfunding of FIDS. Several strands within this discourse deserve some elaboration

because they reveal the complex and contradictory ways in which FIDS con-structed its responsibilities for British Antarctic territories. Underwriting the cre-ation of the FIDS in 1945 was a belief that Argentine claims to the polarcontinent were compromising British claims to the region.20 Accordingly, theColonial Office, which had been placed in charge of the FIDS issued robustinstructions to the FIDS staff in November 1948:

You should restore any British ma rks of occupa tion which a re foun d ob literated an dyou should obliterate any foreign emblems or marks of occupation or claims.Obliteration should not, however, be effected while the parties responsible for settingup the emblems are still in the locality.21

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Dr Vivian Fuchs, the fi rst leader of the FIDS Scientifi c Bureau, was instructedto carry his military uniform in his knapsack and assume the rank of Major

when dealing with South American intruders.22 Later proposals to splashArgentine invaders with cold water if they approached too close to BritishAntarctic bases were judged to be ineffective rather than childish.23

These proposals to ob literate Argentine a nd Chilean tra ces in th e polar land -scape were rooted in a fear that these South American challengers had demon-

strated a considerable investment in expeditions and panache for publicizingtheir achievements. In November 1948, for instance, the Canadian ambassadorto Argentina noted to the Secretary of State for External Affairs in Ottawa that

the Canadian air attach had been given a souvenir by the Argentine authori-ties at the 4th Pan American Conference on Cartography:

It is a map of the Argentine Antarctic, printed on cloth. The map is published by the

Institute of Military Geography [IGM] of the Argentine army, and is an interesting

record of Argentine claims.24

The Argentine claims to the Antarctic had already excited considerable passionswith in Whiteh all as British o ffi cials strugg led to project th emselves as carto-graphic pioneers in contrast to opportunistic and militaristic Argentina.

However, the appearance of an IGM map of the Argentine Antarctic claimsmerely confi rmed the powerful symbo lic effect of such a presenta tion to the

wider world. Pern had ordered the IGM to produce new maps and photo-graphic representations which displayed the Argentine Antarctic sector, and in1948 a presidential decree declared that it was a federal offence to produce a

map of Argentina which did not depict the Argentine Antarctic (Figure 2).25

The reaction of the British o ffi cials charged with protecting British territorialclaims was to declare:

Examples of Argentinas attack on HMGs sovereignty in the Falklands and Antarcticathemselves have been frequent during the past ten years . . . . diffi culties have been

raised over postage stamps and th rough th e publication of ma ps . . . . if the Argentinesbehave childishly then it seems to me no reason for us to do so.26

As a consequence of these developments in Argentina, FIDS was instructed toexpand its activities an d ad ditiona l fund s were won from the Treasury in ord erto build a network of permanent bases at Port Lockroy, Hope Bay, Deception

Island and Stonington Island in the late 1940s (Figures 3 and 4). Despite thislogistical investment, the Attlee government approved the dispatch of HMSNigeria and HMS Sheffield to the Antarctic in 1948 in a classic display of gunboatdiplomacy. The motivation for this deployment of heavy cruisers lay in the con-tinued provocative actions of the two countries (i.e. Argentina and Chile).27

Their crime, according to B ritish o ffi cials conn ected with FIDS, was to threatenan d even un dermine British claims to the Anta rctic by their mapping and explo-ration programmes. As Brian Roberts of the Foreign Of fi ce belatedly no ted in1952:

The hydrographer told me last week that he thought it was most unsatisfactory

that the Admirality should have to correct their charts of the Falkland IslandsDependencies from Argentine and Chilean surveys and have to acknowledge this in


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182 Klaus Dodds

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print . . . We must act no w if there is any hope of stepping up FIDS activity. . . . Weare alread y outclassed by Argentina in the Anta rctic . . . We have on ly on e obsoles-cent vessel . . . We have no aircraft in the region . . . . 28


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Figure 3 ~ The remains of John Biscoe House, Deception Island (photograph by KlausDodds)

Figure 4 ~ Port Lockroy, near Anvers Island, Antarctica. This base has recently beenrestored by the British authorities (photograph by Klaus Dodds)



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One positive development to emerge from the deployment of the British naval

forces was an agreement with Argentina and Chile in November 1948 that eachparty would keep the other two states informed as to their intentions regarding

the movements of warships below 60 S. The so-called Naval Agreement of 1948

paved the way for the eventual demilitarization of the Antarctic under ArticlesI and V of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty.29

British elite representations of Argentina between 1945 and 1962 reveal howgeopolitics, law and science were beginning to interact with o ne ano ther in in ter-

governmental discussions over the future of British claims in the Antarctic. A

significant dimension in this interaction was the citation of science and map-ping in defence of British territorial claims in the southern polar region.

Ironically, British polar authorities such as Brian Roberts (connected to the

Foreign O ffi ce), whilst acknowledging the scientifi c ach ievements of Argentina

an d Ch ile, agreed with offi cials in the Admirality an d Co lonial Offi ce that British

warships had to be deployed in order to intimidate Argentine and Chilean sur-veyors and military staff. Ultimately, the situation was draining in terms of timeand resources, as a memorandum on future UK policy in the Antarctic from

Roberts acknowledged in 1954:

This rejection of our soundings, coupled with the increasing weight of the Argentine

challenge, has mad e the Antarctic problem more pressing than ever . . . and we are

now advised that it would be better to concentrate on making our title to selected

areas secure . . . We therefore propose that we sho uld increase our activity over the

next fo ur or fi ve years with th e object of discovering q uickly which pa rts of the

Depend encies would be worth retaining in the event of partition. . . . it would be

extremely valuab le if we could un tertake an a erial survey of th e Dependen cies . . . Weare advised that the best contribution to this would be to obtain maps by an air sur-

vey . . . We are dwarfed by those of the Argentine Airforce . . . There is no alterna-

tive open to us if adequate maps are to be available in time. 30

For d ifferent reason s, British po licy-makers an d surveyors need ed a ccurate an d

widespread maps of the Falkland Islands Dependencies. On the one hand, offi-cials such as Brian Roberts recognized that new sheet maps of the region would

not only demonstrate British achievement in the FID but would also illustrate a

sovereign capacity for effective action in these icy territories.31 On the otherhand, administrators and surveyors needed to produce modern maps in order

to fulfi l the ration ale for the creation of FIDS. Occasiona lly, the strategic prior-ities of FIDS would also stretch to cover commercial opportunities as the

Colon ial Of fi ce (who ad ministered FIDS for much o f its 17-year history) sought

minerals in the Antarctic ice.32 The Secretary of State for the Colonies orderedFIDS in 1948 to concentrate on:

Deriving an ultimate view to the economic development of resources of the

Depend encies, and thus particular attention should be paid to th e chances of fi nd-

ing minerals. 33

Notwithstanding the logisitical and methodological difficulties regarding the

prod uction of Anta rctic maps an d the h unt for mineral resources, the ch ief polit-ical obstacle facing British administrators in London and surveyors on the ice

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was the ambivalent role of the United States, and the substantial impact of theUS on the international politics of the Antarctic in the 1940s and 1950s.

In the field with FIDS: linking fieldwork to mapping

The task awa iting th e FIDS surveyors in the mid - to late 1940s was staggering.Notwithstanding the limited surveying achievements of Operation Tabarin, the

first men attached to Hope Bay and Port Lockroy had to combine the con-struction of new bases with a detailed programme of surveying, meteorological

observation and geological research.34 During the summer season, there wereonly four or fi ve surveyors on the ice at an y one time, and thus the actual amountof time spent surveying was often limited due to bad weather and incompletesupplies. Despite th ese limitations, Br ian Roberts of th e Foreign Offi ce remind edthe then summer season leader, E. W. Bingham, in December 1946:

Always remember th at you ha ve entirely fulfi lled all th e essential political requ ire-ments and that everything else achieved is sheer gain. I am not nearly so pleased with

our achievements this end [ i.e. in Lon don ] . . . In the long run this has largely beena matter of lobbying in the right quarters and keeping up interest and educating

civil servants in Antarctic matters.35

In his recollections for the St Thomas Hospital Gazette, a FIDS doctor, Surgeon

Commander Dalglish, acknowledged the physical challenges facing the FIDSteam:

On the whole the weather was predominantly bad. Our lowest temperatures were in

the m inus 40s. But rather th an the inten se cold, the most unpleasant cond itions werethe blizzard s. . . . . The ob ject of the FIDS were for us, the meteo rological observa-

tions, geological and biological survey of th e west G raha mland coast. . . . We all hadan Englishmans outlook to life. Everyone would occasionally blow his top and be

allowed to do so. But we were all agreed that the one man who could be tempera-mental was the cook.36

After completing h is two-year second men t to H ope Bay base in th e Antarct icpeninsula, Dalglish returned to England, where he resumed his naval duties.

But his public testimony bears witness to the fact that FIDS staff had to keep asense of perspective in the face of the physical and political challenges residing

in Antarctica.Frank Elliot, who was later to be the FIDS Secretary between 1946 and 1958,

joined FIDS in 1945 largely on account of his mountaineering skills.37 As leaderof th e H ope Ba y base, Elliot had the ta sk of organ izing sledging parties for travel

from Hope Bay to Marguerite Bay in the southern part of the Antarctic penin-sula for the purpose of carrying out survey and geological research of theunmapped snow fi elds. Closer to the base, a weather station was created, and

every three hours information on the conditions was sent to Stanley in theFalklan d Islan ds. When no t involved in d og sledging or scientifi c activity, Elliot

was expected to visit neighbouring Chilean and Argentine bases in order to

deliver by hand no tes of pro test con cerning their illegal presence in the FalklandIsland s Depend encies.38


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This combination of mapping the Antarctic peninsula while plottingforeign incursions into the Falkland Islands Dependencies was time con-suming and weather dependent. In these testing circumstances, goodplanning was essential. Before the start of any dog sledging trip, the FIDS sur-veyors went through a series of steps to ensure that they were equipped for any(reasonable) climatic and political eventuality.39 Every surveyor (and not just Dr

Fuchs) had to carry a series of protest notes in their pockets just in case theyencoun tered an y South American competitors on the shifting ice sheets, as well

as critical items of eq uipmen t such a s the theo do lite, sketch-book, half-chronometer, wireless set, tobacco and cigarettes, aircraft compass, and protec-tive clothing such as goggles which were acknowledged to be his mosttreasured possessions and with every sledging party there was always a spare pairof goggles.40

On ce in th e fi eld, the FIDS surveyors had strict instructions governing their

surveying beh aviour. Every 40 or 50 miles, the team were expected to take b ear-ings and sketches as you go along , and so the topogra phy of the coun try is grad-

ually built up on the surveyors fi eld sheets, and to en sure that properrecordings were taken in the fi eld notebooks. The D OS ha d instructed the FIDS

staff to gath er astronomical fi xes an d to use light plywood board s as plan e tablesin order to help compass bearings and heights to be taken by clinometers.41

Survey chains were gradually constructed over the Antarctic landscapes, and all

FIDS staff h ad to h ave considerable confi den ce in their navigation, surveyingand mountaineering skills as they traversed ice and rocks. The Directorate of

Overseas Survey (D OS) had issued guidelines for fi eld tech niq ues in 1954 which

covered the steps that had to be taken in order to transform those triangula-tion ch ains into so-called reliability diagrams by selecting con tro l stat ions, fi xingmeasurements and then sketching and photographing in detail the landscapes

covered by the surveyor. The grounding of th ese fi eld ob servat ions was essen-tial in terms of ensuring that the surveying data collected in conjunction with

any aerial photography could be codifi ed a nd geographically controlled in termsof location.42 U ltimately, most surveyors aspired to prod uce so-called G rade A

reliability diagrams which highlighted the fact that the surveyed terrain in ques-

tion had been travelled over and drawn and photographed with the assistanceof at least two triangulation stations.43 When the weather was fair, confidence in

these techniques grew accordingly, as Duncan Carse noted in 195152: Usedwell a ph oto -theod olite sho uld en ab le a surveyor to tra nsport the country-sideinto the o ffi ce . . . yet as he later admitted, in poor visibility we had to travel

blind . . . weather was our single biggest obstacle, and diffi culty and dan ger oftravel slowed work considerably. 44

On a good day in the fi eld, therefore, FIDS surveyors would boast thatth e map grew each nigh t we travelled. It was new country an d we were the fi rstto put it on the map.45 The FIDS teams often travelled at night over glaciersan d ice packs because the ice was considered to be more stable and cloud coverwas frequently reduced during the short polar nights of the austral summer. On

bad days, the dangers of fog, the instability of ice and the contrariness of equip-ment took their toll on the FIDS teams and tested the humour of even the most

186 Klaus Dodds

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experienced operatives. As the geologist E W K Walton noted in his account ofthe South Georgia Survey of 195152:

Up to this stage, both the surveyors (Heaney and Smillie) had been talking ratherairily of a triangulation scheme working from the south to the north, just like

travelling around the English countryside and it was very hard to say tactfullythat such ideas were quite impossible . . . I wanted in black and white a general direc-tive about the aims of any journey and hated the airy way we were just sent out toexp lore . . .46

When surveying an d pho tography was impo ssible, the FIDS teams were expectedto sketch the landscapes they encountered on their journeys.47 From an admin-istrative point of view, sketches were considered to be the least useful in termsof producing accurate sheet maps. Detailed triangulation diagrams of islandsand mountain ranges were considered more rigorous and easier to transfer ontodetailed contour relief maps. By the 1940s, geometeric representations had

undoubtedly replaced drawing and painting as the principle means for record-ing Antarcticas landscapes. Nonetheless, there were moments when it was con-sidered desirable to record the landscapes via drawings as the men attached toDuncan Carses surveying expedition in South Georgia acknowledged:

Even with the aid of photographs, there is much to be said for getting the topogra-phy drawn while the country is still fresh in the draughtmanss eye and preferablybefore he has travelled new country.48 [See Figure 5.]

Painting and sketching were, however, never simple tasks in the Antarctic, as theFIDS team ra n th e risk of frostbite to exposed fi ng ers, even if the sketch-padand paints were considerably lighter to carry than the theodolite and geologi-

cal specimen bags.49 Most of the private reports of the FIDS surveying teamsrecord time and again that the weather was the largest obstacle to their opera-tions: time loss in the fi eld could b e approxima tely 35% of to ta l expeditiontime.50 Such losses in the field often had an overall detrimental effect on thesuccess of a particular expedition, as FIDS staff were under considerable pres-sure to maximize their time on the ice during the short summer season (Figure6). Inevitably, in times of poor weather or mishap, other research too, such asgeological sampling in the Antarctic, suffered much, to the general chagrin ofgeologists attached to FIDS. As Alan Trendall, a geologist attached to the SouthGeorgia Survey expeditions 195152 and 195354 complained, movements are

controlled mainly by the demands of topographical survey as opposed to geol-ogy or biology.51

These pressures in th e fi eld too k their toll on th e orga nization o f paperwork,an d offi cials in Lond on o ften complained tha t FIDS surveyors had either beensloppy or incomplete in their writing up of research and results.52 Occasionally,disagreements over work routines and schedules for writing up research resultedin arguments in the field. Duncan Carses South Georgia Survey expedition isa case in point: Carse fell out with the surveyor, George Smillie, over workingconditions and the maintenance of field notebooks.53 In a letter to ColinBertram, the Director of the Scott P olar Research Institute, in March 1954, Carse

noted:


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I have had a hell of a time this season, all of it quite unnecessary, but despite repeatedattempts to get the work off the ground, Smillie wouldnt work until it was too late. . . There is surely enough dirt in South G eorgia without m y fast add ing to it.54

In o rder to ensure that these distant eruptions in th e fi eld d id not migrate from

the margins to the centre of the public geographical imagination, FIDS with theappproval of th e Foreign O ffi ce was instructed to en sure tha t good pub licity wassecured within the UK. In 1948, negotiations with the BBC led to a radio broad-casting agreement which en sured that 12 weekly 15-minute pro grammes weretransmitted from Base E in Stonnington Island. Duncan Carse later secured per-mission to produce Antarctic venture: the story of the FIDS, which recountedthe rationale and achievements of FIDS in March 1950. With the background

188 Klaus Dodds

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Figure 5 ~ Field sketch from the South Georgia Survey, 19517



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music of Ralph Vaughan Williamss Antarctica Sinfoni a, Carse noted that his lis-teners should n ot think that youre going to hear a programme only about th edaredevil feats and hairbreadth escapes. Work in the FIDS is adventurous rightenough, but its someth ing more than th at a s well. Im here merely because longbefore I or anyone else had heard of Dick Barton, I was down in the ice andonce you h ave been there you are a part, h owever small, of th e British Anta rctictradition.;55 Unsurprisingly, FIDS staff on return to the UK were actively encour-aged to g ive slide-illustrated presentat ions which d emonstrated th at th e work ofFIDS was leading to new maps as well as giving value for money.56 As DouglasMason noted in his address to the Royal Geographical Society in May 1950:Ladies and Gentleman, as you paid for the expedition as taxpayers, I hopeyou feel from those words and also from what you have heard and seen tonightthat you are getting good value for your money.57 Maps and photographswere greatly valued by FIDS, as they were testimony to the movements of thesurveyors and their capacity to trample over remote and hostile parts of theAntarctic.

Producing the maps: FIDS, the Directorate of Overseas Surveys andthe Antarctic Place-Names Committee

Despite the widespread usage of aerial surveying and air photography, the needfor on-the-ground observations in remote places remained ( Figure 7). The fl ightpath an d th e aerial camera ha d n ot yet replaced the land -based surveyor an d

his theodolite. As Vivian Fuchs implictly acknowledged in 1950 in the Listenermagazine:


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Figure 6 ~ Surveyors working in the Antarctic peninsula during the 195557 FalklandIslands Dependency Aerial Survey Expedition (photo reproduced with the permission

of Peter Mott, leader of the FIDASE)



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which led to their production) were valuable artefacts, and were the evidenceof British endeavour on the ice. Surveys in the Falkland Islands Dependencies

was completed in the mid-1950s and was intend ed to pro vide a record for admin-

istrators of the cartographic achievements of FIDS personnel (Figure 8). While

most of the northern tip of the Antarctic peninsula had been covered by aerialan d land -based survey, knowledge o f the southern pa rt of the pen insula an doutlying island s was fragmen tar y, refl ecting the diffi culties in covering such a

massive area of polar ice and sea. The map of Scotland in the corner of the dia-

gram was intended to provide a sense of scale for readers and a reminder thatwork was being carried out on a wild and untamed landscape (hence the depic-

tion of Scotland rather than England). It would be unrealistic, as Fuchs fre-

quently argued, to expect the FIDS team to survey and map such a large areaof British territory in a comprehensive manner. Adaption and concession were

often the order of the day as was reflected in the official guidelines from the

DOS for polar surveying. As the Director of Colonial Surveys acknowledged inJune 1952:

The object of this meeting [with FIDS staff] is to suggest that the standard of accu-

racy required is no t so high as has been assumed to be necessary . . . We recogn ize

that the standard of accuracy of these surveys cannot compare with that necessary for

inh abited B ritish colon ial possessions . . . We wish to empha size the d ifference of accu-

racy that exists between the requirements for non polar territories and those that

would serve areas such as the Falkland Islands Dependencies.60

These apparen t con cessions over surveying were refl ected in the fi na l produc-tion of maps and their scales. The DOS also approved a sliding scale for map

projection with 1:500 000 being judged suffi cient for a dministrative and politi-cal purpo ses an d 1:200 000 or even 1:100 000 being req uired fo r pra ctical assis-tance in developing awareness of the detailed topographies of the Antarctic

peninsula and surrounding seas. Mapping scales performed different political

and administrative tasks: the more detailed the map, the greater the sense ofownership and control. While British civil servants were inclined to romanticize

about imperial surveying, they also expected results:

The scientifi c fi eldwork which is carried out in th e Dependen cies is no t research fo r

the benefi t of colonial peoples. It is don e to maintain an U K interest . . . It is U K,

no t FIDS policy tha t the activity sho uld be ma intain ed a t a suffi cient level to enab leus to compete with our South American rivals, and it is inescapable that the receipt,

coord ination, working up, an d publication o f results of fi eldwork at the bases must

be regarded as integral to these activities.61

The relationship with the DOS (the official producer of all UK state maps) wascrucial for FIDS collective political and scientifi c legitimacy. Vivian Fuchs, the

head of the Scientific Bureau attached to FIDS, acknowledged that theDirectorate provided advice and training for FIDS surveyors during and after

their voyages to the Anta rctic. H owever, the co-ord ination between th e DOS

and FIDS could be problematic, as correspondance between Frank Elliot

and Colonel Wiggins of the DOS confirmed in February 1957. After severalmonths of complaints from FIDS personnel in Antarctica, new instructions on


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192 Klaus Dodds

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Figure 8 ~ Surveys in the Falkland Islands Dependencies



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surveying and information exchange were prepared after Elliot had noted:

With the appointment of Sir Raymond Priestly and the reorganization of FIDSLondon Office and the Scientific Bureau under one roof, this impression that wehave too many cooks should disappear.62

The complaint regarding interference had been prompted when Elliot wrote toWiggins in November 1956 noting that polar surveying guidelines for the FIDSsurveyors had been amend ed by FIDS without th e professiona l input of th e DO S.

This inability to co-ord inate information co llection an d pro cessing was a con-

stant problem for the FIDS management. Brian Roberts and Vivian Fuchs wereonly too a ware of the pressing need for g reater co-ord ination an d con sistencyin authorizing particular research programmes. A constant thorn in the side ofthe administrators responsible for FIDS was the marked reticence of surveyorsto write up their research notes into a form useful to the DOS for the pro-duction of the final sheet maps. In February 1949, the Colonial Office had

already warned FIDS of this danger:Durin g the th ree seasons 1946-1948 . . . a considerab le amoun t of work was do ne, theresults of which were sent to L ond on in the form of scientifi c notes, da ta an d col-lection s. This material ha s accumulated but it ha s no t unt il now been po ssible to makecomprehensive arran gements for it to be a nalysed . . . This must be clearly done ifthe fi eldwork is no t to be largely wasted a nd H MG th ereby incurs justifi able criticism

both internationa lly and in the scientifi c world.63

The crea tion o f the FIDS Scient ifi c Bureau in 1952 was inten ded to assist in theprocess of generating reliable survey information from the notes, sketches andreports submitted by returning FIDS surveyors. Limited monies had been setaside by the FIDS in o rder to support th ese surveyors dur ing the writing-upprocess.64 However, as the FIDS geologist, Raymond Adie, acknowledged:

It was a con stan t problem to en courage fi eld workers to complete their work. Someof them sought places in universities with a view to obtaining a higher degree, butunfortunately much of the fieldwork remained unpublished.65

The reasons for this tardiness lay in a combination of factors including a desireto seek paid employment on return from Antarctica and a reluctance to com-

mit oneself to writing up research without suitable remuneration. In recogni-tion of this intellectual wastage, the veteran polar explorer Raymond Priestly

negotiated in 1956 an exchange with the Geology Department of the Universityof Birmingham so that FIDS staff could write up their results in Edgbaston.66

However, the take up of this exchange scheme did not save the FIDS ScientificBureau from being subjected to political pressures concerning the optimal uti-lization of this fi eld research.67

This desire to maximize research output was most clearly witnessed in themeetings of the Antarctic Place-Names Committee, which was respon sible forapproving newly named features on the sheet maps. Formed in June 1932, thesubcommittee on Names in the Antarctic was created by the interdepartmentalPolar Committee, and by 1934 it had issued the first guidelines for naming

Antarctic features. In 1948, Brian Roberts was appointed Secretary of therenamed Anta rctic Place-Names Committee, an d he was responsible for


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coordinating changes, since new surveys are effecting very substantial correc-tions to the shape and location of even the largest features.68 New names wereto be regraded on the basis of 5 variants: accepted names, rejected names, pro-posed alterations, temporarily discarded names, proposed new names and pro-posed o ffi cial acceptan ce of existing n ames. Before th at stage, however, theCommittee also enforced strict rules for the naming of features and the sub-mission of eviden ce regard ing the identifi cation o f new features. For a place tobe a n ame on the ma p, evidence had to be provided of where and wha t it was.69

The published accounts of FIDS and related expeditions such as DuncanCarses South G eorg ia Survey expeditions of 195157 record the d iffi culties ineither confirming location or leaving their trace (such as a cairn) on the land-scape. D uring a particularly nasty season , two surveyors, Bomford an d Pa terson ,admitted that some places could not be seen:

Inevitably, on a survey of this sort, some odd patches of ground on the offshore side

of the long peninsulas remain obstinately hidd en from surveyors . . . . These mayamount to 5% of the Island of South Georgia. On a further 20%, it must be admit-ted that the future traveller with the map in his hand will be at once aware that themap lacks perfection. But on the remaining 75%, it is hoped that he wont.70

Roberts and the Anta rctic Place-Names Committee were hoping for rath er bet-ter assessments than those of the other surveyors in South Georgia. In this par-ticular case, the leader of the South Georgia survey was instructed to close theremaining gaps on th e map armed with sextant, compass, camera and commonsense.71 Duncan Carse returned to South Georgia in 19567 to complete thetask concentrating on the inhospitable Fortuna Bay and Hound Bay areas. If

successful, leaders of expeditions such as Duncan Carses South Georgia Surveycould be rewarded with one o f the most important tributes imaginab le in B ritishpolar administration: a personally named feature on the map (Mount Carse inhis case).

The Antarct ic Place-Names Committee was no t on ly cha rged with a pprovingnew names on defi nitive maps of the Anta rctic but was also concerned to pro-tect British in terests in the FID. In this context, th e act of n aming was an impor-tant geopolitical strategy which served to highlight British endeavours andoccupation of the southern polar region. The agreed guidelines for naming newfeatures reflected the Committees desire to ensure that no names in any for-

eign language including Scottish, Welsh and Irish would be approved.72

Whilethe FIDS teams could and did propose descriptive names for the physical fea-tures they named and photographed, the final decision on their inclusion inthe sheet maps lay with the Committee composed of individuals from theForeign Office, the Colonial Office and the DOS based in London.Notwithstanding these naming endeavours, the remit of the Antarctic Place-Names Committee was increasingly being challenged from the late 1940sonwards by Britain s erstwhile Co ld War a lly, the U nited States, an d the U S Boardof Geographical Names.

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The limits of power: FIDS and Anglo-American geopolitical interestsin Antarctica

The role of the United States in the immediate postwar history of the Antarcticwas substantive in terms not only of shaping the exploration of the continent

but also of the accompanying international political ramifications.73 In terms ofexploration and research, the United States was simply in a class above its west-ern allies such as Britain, New Zealand and Australia.74 Since the 1920s, explor-ers an d aviators such as Richard Byrd h ad pioneered modern techn iques in polarexploration.75 While Britain had a considerable store of polar experience, theAmericans established a widely emulated model of exploration through theirwidespread usage of aerial fl ights, overland dog sledging and base camps.Whereas British expeditions such as the 193437 Grahamland Expedition andthe FIDS staff were neither hapless amateurs nor inexperienced in dogsledging or polar flight, the real contrast was in the scale of the US operations,

which dwarfed British endeavours on the ice.76 In some cases this was to be asource of considerable tension as the Americans demonstrated a supremecapacity to produce countless maps and aerial photographs of territory alreadylegally incorporated into the FID. A case in point was the 194748 AmericanExpedition organized by Commander Finn Ronne of the US Navy. In hisrecollections of the expedition , Ronne recalled th at a $50 000 gran t from th efederal government had assisted an exploration programme which generated14 000 trimetrogon ph otograph s an d pho tographic coverage of 750 000 squaremiles of the polar continent.77

Despite these impressive aerial achievements, the well known geographer,

Isaiah Bowman noted in the foreword of Ronnes Antarctic Conquests that thereremained considerable opportunities for new discoveries:

The unexplored reaches of Antarctica still exercise their spell over the imaginationand still excite the ambitions of young men. The irresistible call is still heard fromthat vast wilderness of ice and rock that n o eye has yet seen . . . explorers sho uld con-tinue to beam the light of scientific inquiry on Antarctica.78

These worthy sentiments were not exactly replicated on the ground, and theAngloAmerican special relationship was tested rather than validated duringthe 194748 season. In the midst of his expedition, Ronne recalled an incident

with th e FIDS surveyor, P ierce-But ler, who h ad complained that th e Americanfl ag fl ying over Stonn ington base in th e Anta rctic peninsula effectively chal-lenged British sovereignty in the FID.79 This seemingly banal expression ofnationalism encouraged British officials in London to dispatch the Antarctic-based Pierce-Butler to deposit a protest n ote with Ron ne. Ron ne s recorded reac-tion revealed a great deal about American frustrations with the British desire toprotect territorial sovereignty:

It was ridiculous that such a situation could arise on a continent of six million squaremiles, two thirds of which is still unkno wn . . . The ma in interests of th e British wereto ma intain settlement for th e purposes of colon ization an d claims, scientifi c studies

and local triangulation surveys.80


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Earlier in 1946, however, Ronne had actually been approached by a British del-egate, Neil Macintosh, at the International Whaling Commissions inauguralmeeting in Washington DC, and urged to conduct his exploration outside the

FID.81 This desire to exclude Finn Ronnes expedition team was the product ofintense British uncertainty over the intention of the US administration towardseither pressing a claim to territory or seeking an international settlement to the

Antarctic which would unquestionably touch upon British sovereign interests.Worse still, the subsequent prod uction of maps of the Antarct ic peninsula bythe American expedition were usually interpreted as threatening to B ritish inter-ests even though it was admitted that FIDS had been slow to translate geo-

graphical information into sheet maps. As Brian Beves, a FIDS surveyor, notedin 1948:

The ma ss of un -cord inated scientifi c dat a which h as been collected has no t been fullysifted or worked up into a readable whole. . . . These British achievements have, how-

ever, unfortunately received only a fragment of the publicity they deserve, due to thetraditional British reticence and to the highly coloured but unfortunately also highlybiased reports on the progress of the sledging parties sent out by Commander FinnRonne.82

In modern parlance, Beves was effectively admitting that FIDS and the Britishgovernment needed to employ spin doctors in order to ensure that the workof the Survey was duly recognized in the wider public domain.

This inability to ma tch American end eavours mattered to B ritish offi cialsbecause of the con cern th at th eir claims could be comprom ised by this researchoutput an d by offi cial publications such as the U S Board of G eographical Names

The geographical names of Antarctica, produced in May 1948.83

This almanacof acknowledged placenames not only listed the confirmed geographies of the

Antarctic peninsula but also explicitly acknowledged the achievements of par-ticular surveying teams. At th e same time, however, the Departmen t of State hadapproached eight nations including Britain with a proposal to internationalizethe political management of the Antarctic through a condominium of sharedsovereignty. The British government under Prime Minister Attlee had expresseda willingness to explore this possibility even though some American commen-tators recognized that Unofficial observers suggested that Britain, highly sensi-

tive to postwar losses of British imperial territory and to recent affronts to British

sovereignty [in British Honduras] and dignity by small powers, probably wouldscrutinize th e American proposals most carefully before agreeing to an ything .84

Privately, British offi cials such as Brian Roberts were ad aman t th at this American

plan for a sovereignty condominium was unworkable because Britain couldnever secure exclusive control over the FID without Argentine and Chilean with-drawal from the region. 85 The uncertainty over whether the United States woulddeclare an Antarctic claim also contributed to a feverish atmosphere in the late1940s and early 1950s.

The implications for this geopolitical reticence on the part of the UnitedStates had implications for British officials and the polar survey. While succes-

sive British governments had funded numerous FIDS expeditions and the195557 Falkland Islands Dependency Aerial Survey Expedition (FIDASE), and

196 Klaus Dodds

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assisted the 195157 South G eorg ia Survey, the scient ifi c an d political results ofthese endeavours were ambivalent. On the one hand, there remained manygaps on the sheet maps as terrible weather and poor logistical support hadprevented access to the troublesome eastern margins of the Antarctic penin-sula.86 H igh-altitude aero planes deployed in the FIDASE could n ot reach th efearsome Larsen ice shelf and helicopters had crashed in the Antarctic penin-sula. On the oth er han d, th e Americans had not been persuaded to support theBritish claim to the FID. The Truman an d Eisenh ower ad ministration s showeda marked reluctance either to acknowledge the cartographic achievements ofthe FIDS or to refrain from surveying and mapping the FID. One implicationof th ese circumstan ces was to lead to the questioning of the value of survey andsubsequent map generation. In a discussion paper produced by Brian Robertsin August 1954 on Future UK policy in the Antarctic (which was circulated tomajor government departments and interested Commonwealth parties such asAustralia and New Zealand), it was acknowledged that Britain would inter aliahave to approach the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to seek a judgementon the confl icting claims to th e Anta rctic. The most striking o mission from thispaper is any acknowledgement that the Argentine surveying activities matchedthe achievements of FIDS; not surprisingly, the Pern government had shownlittle inclina tion to d iscuss the confl icting sovereignty claim. As Roberts thennoted, This rejection of our soundings, coupled with the increasing weight ofthe Argentine challenge, has made the Antarctic problem more pressing thanever. In the event, the ICJ was not able to deliver a verdict on the overlappingterritorial claims because Argentina refused to submit evidence, claiming thatthese areas were already incorporated into the Republics national territory. Itwas then acknowledged that the best route for the British would be to concen-trate mapping and surveying in particular places with the object of discoveringquickly which parts of th e Falkland Island s Dependencies would be worth retain-ing in the event of partition.87 Robertss aspiration to produce a complete andaccurate map of the entire FID was effectively jettisoned by the Falkland IslandsDependen cies Scientifi c Committee in th e face o f geopo litical pressures fromArgentina and the United States.88

America s unwillingn ess either to press a cla im to the so-called P acifi c sectorof the Antarctic or to actively support Britain in its exclusive claim to the FIDpersuaded London officials that its Commonwealth partners would have to beapproached for moral and practical support. Sensitive to the charges of neo-colonialism, B ritish offi cials sought from the mid 1950s to devise schem es suchas the Trans Antarctic Expedition (TAE), which would appear to present oppor-tunities for Commonwealth claimant states such as Australia and New Zealandto improve their legal and geopolitical presence in Antarctica rather than sim-ply act as a call for the mutual defence of B ritish claims in the FID.89 This geopo-litical sleight of hand was revealed in a Foreign Office memorandum toCommonwealth partners in August 1954:

We believe tha t a project of this nature [th e Tran s Anta rctic Expedition] could pro-

vide a valuable demonstration of Co mmon wealth solidarity in the Antarctic . . . itcould demonstrate to the world our leadership in the area.90


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The TAE was eventually organized by Britain and New Zealand in 195556 andinspired the fi rst mechan ized crossing of Antarct ica in 195758 by Vivian Fuchs

of FIDS and the New Zealand moun taineer Sir Edmund H illary. While the TAE

could boast the participation of South African, Australian a nd New Zealand per-

sonnel alon gside their British colleagues, few offi cials in the south ern hemi-sphere doubted that the primary motivation for the venture was to bolster the

weakened British position in Antarctica. As the Canadian Department of

External Affairs had noted in a private response to a British request for helpwith the organization of the TAE:

The d ead horse of British imperialism can still be fl ogged if the occasion arises . . .

even for Com mon wealth solidarity we will not trud ge the wastes of Antarctica . . . If

they wanted to buy some huskies or something of that sort we could do what we

could.91

By the mid-1950s, the diplomat ic atm osphere surr oun ding the territoria l claims

to th e Anta rctic had chan ged from the unsubtle territorial politics of fl ag-wav-ing and base construction to co-operative ventures an d joint agreemen ts on sci-ence and exploration. The geopolitics of claimant states such as Britain

increasingly revolved around the apparent paradox of making good a particu-lar territorial claim whilst at the same time avoiding blatant strategies such as

destroying th e occupationa l evidence of oth er claimant states such a s fl ags, bases

and plaques.92 The British government could not rely on the support of theUnited States in the mid- to late 1950s, an d therefore d ecided tha t their polar

endeavours needed greater publicity within the UK and the Commonwealth.This change of emphasis was also inspired by a recognition that the achieve-

ments of Argentine and Chilean surveyors were compromising those of FIDS.

The position was summarized in a Memorandum produced by Brian Roberts inFebruary 1954:

The FIDS Scientific Committee cannot but be acutely aware that the expanding

occupational an d scientifi c work of oth er powers in th e Antarctic threaten to forestall

FIDS work in some fi elds and restrict it in o thers. Argent ine occupa tiona l activities

are restricting FIDS areas of operations . . . In these circumstances, there is a d anger

that FIDS may be robbed of the fruits of its work already done at great effort

and considerable cost. To prevent this FIDS must aim to produce an expanded

programme.93

Mapping and surveying were, therefore, having to be deployed in an increas-

ingly sophisticated man ner which recognized th at the activities of th e Co ld Warsuperpowers could ultimately determine the international politics of Antarctica.

Br itish activities in th e mid -1950s such as th e Trans Antarctic Expedition coin-cided with preparations for an International Geophysical Year (IGY 195758)

and with feverish AmericanCommonwealth negotiations over the role andintention of the Soviet Union in Antarctica.94 The IGY was intended to be a

global scientifi c programme which would h ave a special emphasis on the

Anta rctic. Scientifi c research was to be carried out thro ugho ut the Anta rctic

regardless of the sensitivities of claimant states. The Soviet Union had confirmedtha t a large scientifi c programme would be assembled fo r the IG Y, an d Soviet

198 Klaus Dodds

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bases were later constructed in the so-called Australian Antarctic Territory. AsIvor Pink of the Foreign Office acknowledged in July 1957 to a Commonwealth

meeting: It is quite unrealistic to think that the Soviet Union could be kept outof the Antarctic. They are on the spot and clearly intend to stay after the

Geophysical Year ends.Moreover, Pink said, the Soviet claim was just as sound as most of the west-

ern claims.95 The politics of territorial claims and exclusive sovereignty coexisteduneasily with th e interna tiona l scientifi c rheto ric of the I G Y.96

Throughout the 1950s, American geopolitical movements regarding the inter-national politics of Antarctica could have imperilled the activities of FIDS andthe British claim to the FID. The key element in this drama was the ambiguousattitude of American officials towards any US claim to the polar continent. Hadthe Americans pressed a claim, then it is doubtful whether the British wouldhave been in a position to mount an effective legal and political challenge if

that claim had encompassed the FID. The Canadian Department of ExternalAffairs, which attended many Commonwealth meetings over common Antarcticpolicies, recorded in March 1957 that the British delegation at a recent meet-ing ha d recogn ized th at th e United States was a potential rival claimant but alsoan obstacle to a concerted effort by existing claimants against Soviet encroach-ment in the Antarctic.97 The dilemma confronting British offi cials responsiblefor FIDS and its mapping programme were wider than simply negotiating the

AngloArgentine relationship. This view had been cemented in March 1956when the U S Secretary of State, J. F. Dulles, had con fi rmed to th e Foreign Of fi ce

tha t th e bogey of comm unist penetra tion a s a mean s of en listing American sup-

port in your [i.e., British] dispute with Argentina and Chile had backfired.98

The Americans rejected th e no tion tha t th e growing scientifi c interests of theSoviet Union had to be stopped, and Dulles had expressed open reluctance tointervene in the UKs dispute with Argentina and Chile.

For much of FIDS 17-year histor y, the wider geopolitical currents sha ping th emapping a nd surveying pro grammes were rarely favourab le. The British no t only

had to endure the indignity of being outclassed in the field by Argentine andCh ilean surveyors, but were also dismayed tha t tra ditiona l pattern s of Cold War

support were overturned in the Antarctic.99 The American governments ofEisenh ower an d Truman showed no inclination either to support B ritain aga inst

South American territorial intrusion or actively to press a claim to the Antarcticcontinent. Moreover, Dulles and the D epartment of State were adama nt th at n o

attempt should be be made to prevent the Soviet Union from participating inthe IG Y an d from collecting scientifi c informat ion from their stations.100

Successive British governments recognized that the activities of FIDS would have

to be supported thro ugh higher research gran ts, high-profi le events designedto supplement the mapping programme and greater Commonwealth co-

operation. As Harold Macmillan acknowledged in the House of Commons inMay 1957:

HMGs policy in regard to Antarctica is to continue the tasks of surveying and

exploring the FID with a particular view to ascertaining their value, particularlyfrom th e economic an d scientifi c point of view, and by the establishmen t of o ur


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administration of the necessary bases in our area and in consultation with otherCommonwealth governments concerned.101

Maintaining this complex balance of priorities was to climax in 195758, as thewider political an d scientifi c currents of the Anta rctic an d th e Cold War meant

that the work of the FIDS was about to be subsumed under the wider appara-tus of the Cold War.

Internationalizing science and politics: the IGY and theend of FIDS?

The scientifi c motivation for the In tern at iona l Geoph ysical Year , 195758, lay ina number of directions, and included: a recognition that the last multinationalscientifi c progra mme involving th e polar regions had occurred over 30 yearsago; a belief that research had to be directed towards the upper atmosphere

because of a prediction th at there would be a high ly unusual sunspot activity in195758; and a growing interest in the Antarctic as a focal point for researchinto the earths surface and interplanetary space.102 By the mid-1950s, therefore,it had been widely appreciated that Antarctica was but one component of aninforma tion-collecting campa ign sponsored by leading industrialized n ationssuch as the United States, equipped with aeroplanes, tractors and satellites andinspired by cybernetics, system theory and geomagnetism.

The fi rst movement towards the IG Y had b een mad e in 1951, when a pro-posal from the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) was acceptedby the executive board of the ICSU. As a consequence, the ICSU created a

Comit Spciale de lAnnee Geophysique Internationale (CSAGI) for the pur-pose of co-ord inating scientifi c programmes and research priorities. In the con-text of the Antarctic, it was proposed that a ring of research stations should becreated so that maximum coverage of the continent could be obtained. Withthe help of the new maps being created by the American, British and Sovietauthorities, it was possible to specify particular sites for these new bases withconsiderably more confi den ce. While the C SAG I established the principle offree exchange of movement and unimpeded access in the Antarctic, the IGYwas shot through with geopolitical tensions over geophysical research and map-ping.103

The intern ationalization of scientifi c endeavour ha d con siderable conse-quences for the administrators of FIDS. August institutions such as the RoyalSociety replaced the FIDS Scientifi c Bureau as the premier representative ofBritish Antarctic endeavours. In part, this reflected the fact that FIDS had beenindelibly implicated in n ationalistic endeavours and paroch ial scientifi c concernfor the FID rather than for the entire Antarctic continent. New bodies such asthe British National Committee for the IGY were staffed with Royal Society rep-resentat ives. More wor r yingly, the Royal Societys ad hoc Committee on Anta rcticResearch had argued in February 1958 that FIDS research was inadequately sci-entifi cally supported :

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It was agreed tha t the best d evelopment of scientifi c research in the U K sector of

Antarctica would depend on a fl ow of scientists from establishmen ts in the U K andnot, as at present, scientists recruited by the FIDS performing tasks on the

Grahamland penisula of Antarctica, without necessarily having strong links with UKexperts . . .104

In short, the British National Committee for the IGY concluded that FIDS map-

ping research was inad equately linked to other scientifi c expertise on theAntarctic, and later also inferred that FIDS geopolitical rationale was an obsta-

cle to further scientifi c work in th e context of th e IG Y.105

In his review of the Royal Societys contribution to the International

G eophysical Year, Sir David Brun t n oted tha t th e construction o f H alley Base in

1956 was the culmina tion of fi ve years preparat ion b y British polar scientists an dadministrators.106 In response to a request from the Special Committee for theIGY (CSAGI), the Royal Society had agreed to sponsor a research station in the

Vahsel Bay region of the Ronne Ice Shelf. By December 1952, the BritishNationa l Committee for the IG Y had b een established by the Royal Society und er

the chairmanship of Sir James Wordie. In complete contrast to the nationalisticaspirations of the FIDS, Halley Bay was intended to be a showcase for inter-

national scientific cooperation, even though Sir David admitted: the CSAGIresolution did not name any particular nation: but Vahsel Bay lies within the

area of the Falkland Islands Dependencies and it was therefore natural that theresolution aroused particular interest in Britain.107 As if to reinforce this newdisposition towards collective end eavour, Sir Da vid B runt also recorded tha t th eUnion Jack flag fluttering above the roof of the new base had to be taken down

again because it interfered with solar radiation readings.108

The removal of the Union Jack from the Halley base came at a time whenthe British government, through FIDS and the TAE, sought to maximize its pres-

ence on the ice. Given the activities of the IGY, the nationalistic aspirations of

FIDS were beginning to appear at best anachronistic and at worst renderingFIDS incapa ble of fulfi lling its mand ate, which was to produce comprehensive

mapping of the Antarctic peninsula. This does not mean (contrary to StephenPayne s recent claim) that fi eldwork was being subsumed b y labora tories an d

libraries as the major centres of knowledge accumulation in the 1950s.Througho ut th e 1950s and 1960s, fi eld-based an d aeria l surveys were widely used

techniques in polar exploration, paleontological research and nuclear engi-neering.109 However, it is fair to note that the intellectual, logistical and politi-cal power of the United States was superior to that of the seven claimant states

including the United Kingdom.110 By the end of th e IG Y, the U nited States

Antarctic scientific community had generated 13 tons of information and spon-sored countless numbers of experiments and activities above and below theAntarctics surface.111 A decade later, of course, American endeavours inAnta rctica had been eclipsed by some spectacular fi eldwork on the moon .112

More broadly, the ending of the IGY precipitated further political movementtowards a final settlement on the Antarctic question. Fearful of a return to the

geopolitical competition between Argentina and Britain, the American govern-ment , led by Department of State representative Pa ul Dan iels, called the 12 par-


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ticipants of the IGY Antarctic programme to a special meeting on the future ofAnta rctica in D ecember 1959. After mo nth s of prepara tion an d secret meetings,the parties agreed to sign the Antarctic Treaty, which in ter ali a determined thatcompeting territorial claims should be suspended in favour of international sci-entifi c cooperation . This was a part icular priority for th e British delegation, an x-ious to secure a treaty which would relieve them of their historical obligationand embarrassments in the Antarctic without injuring their national pride.113

In 1962, within two years of the signing of the Antarctic Treaty, FIDS wasrenamed the British Antarctic Survey, with new research priorities stressing col-laborative research rather than mapping in the Antarctic peninsula for purelygeopolitical gain. Information which was once considered privileged was now

being shared via the Scientifi c Committee on Anta rctic Research ( created b y theIGY parties) rather than hoarded by the Royal Navy, the FIDS or the ForeignOffice.114 After 15 years of toil and sometimes heroic struggle, the FIDS mensuccumbed to a combination of political expedience and changing technologiessuch as satellites and rockets.

Conclusions

This paper has used the archival details of FIDS in order to elucidate issues cur-rently of interest to cultural and historical geography. While it is well appreci-ated that the map is not an innocent representational tool, it is imperative thatthe specifi c values invested in m apping are acknowledged . This paper ha s sho wnhow Antarctic mapping was often considered to be an invaluable form of

defence against the irrational and childish ambitions of South American com-petitors such as Argentina and Chile. However, these Latin Americanist repre-sentations of Argentina frequently failed to confront the ironies andinconsistencies inherent within the strategies of FIDS administrators. As geopo-litical circumstances chan ged , the scient ifi c value of mapping was re-evalua ted ,an d b y the mid-1950s ad ministra tors had conclud ed tha t a well-publicised expe-dition such a s the crossing o f Anta rctica was of g reater value to Brita ins profi lein Antarctica than the painstaking practices relating to fieldwork and the con-struction of maps. The record s of FIDS also bear testimon y to the fa ct tha t map-ping was greatly infl uenced by a d esire to mainta in territorial control in a remote

part of the British empire, rather than being part of a seamless tradition of polarexploration dating back to the voyages of Captain James Cook in the eighteenthcentury.

The diffi culties an d contra dictions inh erent within the activities of FIDS reveal

a broader contemporary relevance concerning AngloArgentine relations anddisputes over the Antarctic and the Falklands/Malvinas. The endeavours of FIDSand subsequently the British Antarctic Survey are often cited by British policy-makers and scientists who draw favourable comparisons with Argentine andChilean surveyors in order to point to Britains long and productive traditionof polar research.115 This account should caution those who seek to make such

a claim, as the records of the FIDS reveal an organization determined to pro-tect (in a rather haphazard manner) British imperial interests, even if the sur-

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tions. On the role of sketching in shaping British geographical knowledge, see L.

Martinss excellent essay Navigating in tropical waters: British maritime views of Rio

de Janeiro, Imago Mundi 50 (1998), pp. 14155.8 The recent collection of essays edited by H. Kuklick and R. Kohler, Science in the field

(C hicago , Chicago U niversity Press, 1996), highligh ts the sign ifi cance of examining

ho w fi eldwork skills helped to construct particular bodies of scientifi c kno wledge.9 See e.g. G. Fogg, History of Antarcti c science (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,

1992).10 See D. Mitchell, Writing the western: new western historys encounter with land-

scape, Ecumene5 (1998), pp. 729.11 For further consideration of La tin American ist discourses with specifi c reference to

Argentina, see A. Hennessy and J. King, eds, The land that England lost (London,

British Academic Press, 1992) and K. Dod ds, G eopolitics in th e Foreign Offi ce:

British representations of Argentina 19451961 Transactions of the Institute of Bri ti shGeographers 19 (1994), pp. 27390.

12 See e.g., H. Ferns, Britains informal empire in Argentina 18061914, Past and

Present 4 (1953), pp. 6075, D. Ro ck, ed ., Argent ina i n the Twent ieth Centur y(London,Duckworth, 1975), A. Graham-Yooll, The forgotten colony: a history of the Engli sh-speak-ing communiti es in Argentina (London, Hutchinson, 1981), E. Milensky, Argentinas for-

eign policies (Boulder, Westview Press, 1978), and A. Thompson, Informal empire?

An exploration in the history of AngloArgentine relations 18101914, Journal ofLatin American Studies 24 (1992), pp. 41936.

13 FO 371 33518, Sir David Kelly to the Foreign Offi ce in Lo nd on , letter da ted 21 July

1943.14 See E. Said, Orientalism (London, Penguin, 1978). It was very common in the 1940s

for B ritish Foreign O ffi ce offi cials to com plain of Argentinas neutality during th e

Second World War. Perons reluctance to condemn Nazism by formally entering thewar again st German y led to many unfl attering assessments of the Argentine Republic.

Perons democratic electoral victories in 1946 and 1951 provided further sources ofconcern for th ose same offi cials, who claimed th at Peron refl ected the Argentine

assumption of superiority. See FO 371 90475, Notes on Argentina prepared by the

British Emba ssy in Buen os Aires for the Foreign O ffi ce in No vember 1951.15 This representa tiona l consensus regard ing Argentina was also widely replicated in th e

newspaper media, especially after the election of President Peron in 1945. See G.

Howells, The British press and the Perons, in Hennessy and King, eds, The land that

England lost, pp. 21326).16 See C. MacDonald, End of empire, the decline of the AngloArgentine connection

1918-1951, in Hennessy and King, The land that England lost, pp. 11430.17 FO 371/74375, letter fro m Sir John B alfo ur to the Foreign Offi ce, 14 August 1949.18 CAB 66 (1944) ( 21). This was noted by the Foreign O ffi ce minute which remind ed

members of the Cabinet that 30% of Britains meat supply came from Argentina. See

also T 162/1013 which contains a fi le from the Ministry of Info rma tion deta iling

plans to produce strip cartoons which conveyed the dangers of Nazism for Argentinean d oth er La tin American aud iences. In August 1944, the B ritish Treasury appro ved

a grant of 3400 for the production of a series of 24 pictures detailing the exploits

of HMS Tartar, super-spy Bob Stan ton , and the a miable to ff Lord Wavell of

Winchester and Cyrenaica. Cartoons were considered to be an important visualsource which could be used to persuade Argentine public opinion to declare war on

Nazi Germany.19 ADM /1/19509 contains th e ra tiona le for Operation Taba rin, which was secretly orga-

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nized by the Royal Navy with the advice of the Colonial Office for the purpose of

rebuilding Anta rctic bases an d for restoring British claims to th e Anta rctic. The n ame

Tabarin was derived from a Parisian night club which was apparently renowned forits mysterious atmosphere.

20 BAS AD3/1/A5/183/1/A Pa rt 1, letter from P . Ca rter o f the Co lon ial Offi ce to V.

Fuchs of FIDS dated 28 September 1951, which noted that Argentine and Chileanmaps and surveys would have to be acknowledged in any new British maps of the

Antarctic.21 CO 537/4010, telegram from the Secretary of State for the C olon ies to th e Offi ce

of the Government of the Falkland Islands, 4 November 1948.22 CO 537 4946, interna l correspon den ce from the military staff at th e Colon ial Offi ce,

13 November 1947. Ironically, the trade section of the Foreign Office was actively

encouraging arms sales to Argentina even though the American section of the

Foreign Of fi ce was concerned that th ese weapon s and plan es might be used a gainstBritish personnel in Antarctica a nd or the Falkland Islan ds. See FO 371 68122, Notes

on Argentina prepared by the South American Department of the Foreign O ffi ce,

which noted that in 1947 the UK was proposing to sell 100 Meteor jet planes and 30Lincoln bombers to Argentina. The sale was later reviewed and cancelled.

23 CO 537/4010, letter from P . Carter of th e Colon ial Offi ce to C Shuckburgh of th e

Foreign Office, dated 26 October 1948.24 Natio na l Archives of C an ad a RG 25 vol 4765 50070-40 par t 2 This was contain ed within

a telegram from Warwick Chipman, Canadian Ambassador to Argentina to the

Secretary of State for External Affairs, dated 4 November 1948.25 See J. Peron, Peron expounds his doctr ine (New York, AMS Press, 1948; repr. 1973). For

further details on Argentine Antarctic activities and the geopolitical rationale forPerons polar vision, see K. Dodds, Geopoli ti cs in An tarcti ca: views from the southern

oceanic rim (Chichester, John Wiley, 1997).26 ADM 1 25082, lLetter from the Lo

Dodds Putting Maps in Their Place Faulkland

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