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Glenny, Lyman A.State Coordination of Higher Education: The ModernConcept.State Higher Education Executive OfficersAssociation.Ford Foundation, New York, N.Y,8527p.State Higher Education Executive Officers, 1860Lincoln Street Suite 310, Denver, CO 80295($7.00).Viewpoints (120)

MF01/PCO2 Plus Postage.Advisory Committees; Board of Education Role;*Budgeting; College Planning; *Coordination;Educational Cooperation; Governance; 'HigherEducation; *Program Evaluation; Public Policy; StateAgencies; *State Boards of Education; *StatewidePlanning

ABSTRACTCoordination of higher education as practiced in

three similar organizational forms is assessed: the statewidegoverning board, the regulatory cooreinating board, aid the advisoryboard. Attention is directed to why coordination is important,criticism of coordination, kinds of organizations used, theaixompiishments and weaknesses of the agencies, and pending issuesfor coordination. Two broad categories of agences are common: asingle statewide governing board for all public colleges anduniversities (eliminating all the individual institutional boards);and a coordinating board juxtaposed between the governor/legislatureand the institutional governing boards that embraces all of highereducation, public and private. Both categories of agencies are headedby boards consisting primarily or exclusively of lay personsappointed by the governor for overlapping terms. The strengths ofstate coordination for the following major functions are addressed:planning, budgeting, program review, and policy analysis. Issues forthe 1980s and beyond are considered, including attracting the mostable to the teaching profession, competition for students and fundsbetween public and private institutions, and the consequences of thepopularity of large public research universities. (SW)

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I

State

Coordination

of Higher Education

The Modern Concept

by Lyman A. GlennyProfessor EmeritusUniversity of California, Berkeley

1985

State Higher Education Executive Officers1860 Lincoln Street, Suite 310Denver, Colorado 80295

$7.00

Contents

v Foreword

State Coordination of Higher Education:The Modern ConLept

1 Why Coordination?4 Who Questions the Need for Coordination?7 Forms of Coordination

11 The Strengths of State Coordination14 Weaknesses in Coordinating Practice16 Issues for the 80s and Beyond18 Conclusior

23 Footnotes

ForewordINNIlliNNIIIIIMMM=1111

IN 1959, Lyman Glenny, in a bookentitled Autonomy of Public Colleges,suggested that a new organizationalform just emerging in the states thestate coordinating board held thekey to protecting autonomy and i nsur-ing public accountability.

NOW after nearly three decades,len ny assesses the "modern concept"

f coordination as practiced in threeimilar organizational forms thetatewide governing board, the reg-latory coordinating board, and thedvisory board. In the essay whichollows, he candidly describes theuccesses and shortcomings of thisnique enterprise.

YMAN'S essay was prepared with thentention that it would serve primarilyo orient new board members to the

ncepts and tools of coordination. Astturns out, he has provided us all withaluable insights into the nature of ourndeavoi.

WEgratefully acknowledge the supportprovided by The Frost Foundation forthe publication and distribution of thisessay, which was provided as part oftheir 1984-85 grant for the InserviceEducation Program of SHEEO.

JAMES R. MINGLEEXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

5v

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

StateCoordinationof HigherEducation:The ModernConcept

COORDINATION of state higher educa-tion is alive and well in the greatmajority of states. Governors, legis-lators, and most public and privateheads of colleges and universities viewit favorably. In a few states the goinghas been rough at times, with agenciesbeing attacked, reorganized, orabolished, only to have new ones ariseout of felt necessity. In sociologicalterms the coordinating agency is now"institutionalized" as a part of stategovernment. This essay deals with thewhys and hows of coordination, thekinds of organizations used, the powersexercised, the accomplishments andweaknesses of the agencies and pend-ing issues for coordination.

Why Coordination?

OVER time, the critics, primarily thestate research universities, have op-posed state coordination, claiming thatit "lays on them the dead hand ofbureaucracy," "averages down tomediocrity the best institutions," "stiflesinitiative," and "frustrates the exerciseof autonomy." Despite these criticisms,some of which continue today, thestates continue to strengthen the agen-cies or to make way for new ones. Thestates do not do so capriciously nor dotiey r. Irposef u I ly design the impair-ment of their highly valued researchuniversities. Rather, state law makersreact to what they see as unseemlycompetition among the colleges anduniversities for students, for new pro-grams, ani for funds. They try to bringorder to the inevitable chaos of institu-tional parochialism in pursuing self-in-terests.

ALL state leaders want outstandinginstitutions, thoroughly educated stu-dents, well-conducted research, andcontinued development of new knowl-edge. They believe these ends arebetter achieved through coordinationand planning than by allowing eachinstitution, at will, to create new cen-ters, add new programs, and adjustcdlissiun standards and tuition as ifsuch independent actions in the aggre-gate promote the best interests of thestate. Today some agencies include intheir planning the private colleges anduniversities, proprietary technical andtrade schools, industrial training cen-

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ters, and other organizations, thusencompassir.g the whole of postsecon-dary education.

THE initial thrust toward statewidecoordination came at the beginning ofthis century in Iowa, Florida, and ak. w other statesand gained impetusat the beginning of the Great Depres-sion in 1929. In 1933 the CarnegieFoundation cited this situation in Mon-tana:

Vigorous and hostile lobbies soughtappropriations for each educationalinstitution. Educational lobbyingbecame so intense during the earlysessions ... that it was difficult forthe legislators to consider importantState matters in other divisions ofgovernment. This educational com-petition and head-on collision ofState teaching units . .. interferedwith the development of service andthe building of State consciousness.Effort, energy, and money whichshoulai have been employed con-structNely for the enrichment ofinstitutional life and the improvement of public service were wastedin legislative and statewide rival-ries.'

IT was common for an institution in thedistrict of the chairman of the appro-priations committee to be well-funded,while institutions in districts fromwhich legislators had little politicalinfluence were poorly funded.

STATE policy makers, motivated by aneed for economy and efficiency, usedstrong legal language to empower thenew boards "to consolidate, suspend,and/or discontinue institutions, mergedepartments, inaugurate or discon-

2

tinue courses, and abolish or adddegrees."2

AI-(ER World War II, the states con-fronted the results of the "baby boom"

the "tidal wave" of students andinstitutional requests for vast, almostunlimited, expansions of programs,faculties, and facilities. The new cas-cade of students almost immediatelyraised the asairations of virtually allfaculties and administrators. Juniorcolleges tried to become four-yearinstitutions; state colleges wanted to beuniversities with doctorate and ad-vanced professional degrees; second-tier universities sought to emulate theleading state research university inbreadth of instructional program andin research; and the research universitysought new medical, veterinary, andother professional schools along withbranch campuses in favorable loca-tions in the state. All of them wantednew classrooms, laboratories, dor-mitories, and support facilities.

"The question is no longerwhether coordinationshould be attempted butwhat form of organiza-tion and which set ofpowers will do the job."

THE leading state university, the do-minant power in almost every state,found the lesser institutions challeng-ing its "lion's share" of the state re-sources for higher education while

7

squabbling among themselves for theremainder. Institutional aggrandise-ments occurred on an ad hoc, expedientbasis not guided by a state plan or setof goals for higher education, andseldom under a campus developmentplan. The private colleges, while ex-panding, did so more slowly than thepublicc nes, and they expressed strongfears for their existence if each publicinstitution wcrz.- to spread out as itwished. The traditional coordinators ofhigher education, the elected politi-cians, were frustrated in making judg-ments on programs, funds, andfacilities for each of the aspiring institu-tions and the dollar total to assignhigher education versus other stateservices.

THE need for improved coordinationbecame recognized in state after state."It only needed to be determinedwhether it would proceed in the tuy of-war of legislative process and institu-tional log-rolling or be regularizedunder an agency of the executivebranch."3

THE coordinating boards created duringthese years also came about for reasonsof economy and efficiency, which grewout of continued institutional competi-tions. As the Carnegie Foundationstated in 1976, "Much more money isnow spent on higher educa-tion . . . public interest, as a result, hasbeen heightened ... more intercom-pus rivalry exists community col-leges versus comprehensive collegesand universities versus research uni-versities; public campuses versus pri-vate campuses."

LAW makers concluded that an agencyother than themselves could betterunderstand and protect the fundamen-tal values of higher education whilealso preserving state interests. Theybelieved in the autonomy of institutionsas a

. . . "way of preserving and en-couraging diversity, elasticity, andflexibility of edu-mtion programs andof stimulating managerial ingenuityand creative drive . [making)overall planning and coordinatingabsolutely necessary, for without it,the aggressive management ex-pected of autonomously governedinstitutions will result in a competi-tive duplication . . . of programs anda multiplication of services, facilities,and campuses throughout the statethat will tend to destroy the effective-ness of all higher education."5

IF colleges and universities have au-tonomy and the state has ultimatepower over their very existence, tensionbetween the two forces is inevitable.Through coordination, the state "seeksnot to eliminate tensions but to main-tain them in a healthy balance."6These relationships are seldom har-monious, and coordinators now standin the no-man's land k etween the twoparties.

IN states with any more than a halfdozen public colleges and universities,the coordinating agency, in one formor another, is here to stay an i mpera-tive statement not credible a mere tenyears ago. During the fifties and sixties,when many new statewide governingboards were added and the vast major-ity of coordinating boards were first

3

authorized, a good deal of skepticismprevailed about their usefulness. Thedynamics of change in organizationalform and powers in the interveningyears continue today, but coordinationas a concept is thoroughly in-stitutionalized in the states. The ques-tion is no longer whether coordinationshould be attempted but what form oforganization and which set of powerswill do the job. Coordination grew outof felt necessity by governors andlegislators in settling funding andprogram issues among competingcolleges and universities. Today, thatcompetition remains intense and thepostsecond ry education policy issuesconfronting the state are far morecomplex than 20 years ago.

Who Questionsthe Need forCoordination?

JOHN Mi I lett observes that criticism ofcoordination continues today at aboutthe same level of emotionalism as 40years ago during its nascen, state.'That level was high but the needs ofthe state for the management of orderlygrowth were too great, and coordina-tion has grown ever since. Earliercriticisms of the entire concept of astatewide coordinating agency havediminished to continuing criticism ofgeneral state intrusions and activitiesof particular coordinating agencies. Forthe most part, coordination's present

4

day critics accept statewide planningand policy groups as inevitable, butmay take exception to particular out-comes of their operations.

"Complaints aboutdetailed regulation prob-ably should be directed tothe legislature or to stateagencies other than thecoordinating agency."

INSTITUTIONAL spokesmen theheads of the major state researchuniversities, primarily were themost vocal critics of coordination 30 or40 years ago. Today, their ranks stillproduce critics. Their original concernwas understandable. The history ofhigher education in the United Statesuntil after World War II was almosttotally one of highly independentcampuses subject to sporadic statecontrols or specific legislative opera-tional decisions. Resistance to arbitrarygovernmental interference led to thedevelopment of concepts of institu-tional autonomy and academic free-dom in a known organizational con-text. Coordinating agencies, unknownactors on the stage, upset settled con-cepts of academic governance. Wenow know that effective coordinationframes the protection of institutionalindependence and academic freedomin an increasingly interrelated andcrowded educational world. Therhetoric of the early opposition re-mains, however, and is applied to

9

complaints that seem more directed toineffective coordination than to theconcept of coordination itself. Thereappear to be two categories of com-plaints:

1. Chronic complaints about detailedstate (and federal) rules and regula-tions relating to accounting andreporting; and

2. Acute or situational complaintsfounded on coordinating agencyregulation concerning new programsand buildings, and more recently,modification or termination of existingacademic programs.

COMPLAINTS about detailed regula-tion probably should be directed to thelegislature or to state agencies otherthan the coordinating agency. Ad-ministrative procedures imposed di-redly by state law and applied to allstate agencies, such as uniform ac-counting, controls on bidding andcentral purchasing, investment regula-tion of appropriated funds, and report-ing of data on affirmative action, aretruly burdensome on the time of ad-ministrators and staff. Federal lawsand rules complicate the situationimmensely. Most of these laws or rulesare administered by the state executiveagencies. Even before widespreadcoordination, Moos and Rourke as-serted that these administrative con-trols "represent a grave threat to theTradition of the free college." Furtherthey claimed that "at its worst, a tightlycoordinated system of higher educationcon leach quality and originality"andthat "the tendency of all topside con-trols is to squeeze the sovereijnty of

the college in the conduct of its vitalresponsibilities. "8 Recent critics aremore temperate and also less specific.A colloquium of a New York consultingfirm reported in 1978,

Some of us believe that there is apresent and substantial threat to theindependence of our institutions byexisting governmental .ctions andattitudes; others of vs think that, onbalance, governmental action hasbeen constructive and reasonable todate but are concerned about thepotentiality for future abuses."9

IN 1980, a national corm ission wrote,

There has been a general and perva-sive erosion in the autonomy ofpublic governing boards and theirpresidents to manage interal affairsas a result of governmental regulat-ory initiatives."10

PROCEDURAL minutiae, bothersome toadministrators, do not affect a utonomy;state interventions in substantive af-fairs closely tied to the role and missionof institutions do.

ACUTE or situational complaints ariseout of operational decisions growingfrom policy. Who makes policy? To-ward what objectives? To be achievedby what educational means? Theanswers to these questions are at theheart of the disagreements. Shouldeach institution have absolute inde-pendence in answering the questions

without regard to answers of otherautonomous institutions? Equallyimportant, even if all institutionsshould agree, does the state (the soci-ety) have goals that might rightfully

105

exceed the collective desires and in-terests of the institutions? Should thesegoals be recognized and provided for?Should the state allow institutions towastefully duplica:e programs, rules,and functions? Should the state worktoward optimum service from scarceresources? The answers to these ques-tions favor the interests of societyrather than the interests of the institu-tions, whether public or nonp"Legislatures, having reached thiscr3nclusion, establish coordinatingagencies for the purpose of makinghigher education more reflective of thepublic interest, more rational in itsdevelopment, and more careful inhusbanding rsources."41

UNQUESTIONABLY, institutional au-tonomy violated when a highlydesired program, school, center, orbuilding, after long faculty planningand compromising, is not approved bythe coordinating agency. However,such infringements are gauged againstthe needs and priorities of the stateitself as well as those of other institu-tions of higher education. State coord i-nation aimed at overall rational plan-ning and decision making, rather thanfostering individual institutional ambi-tions and unbridled expansions, fulfillsthe state public inlerest in the orderlydevelopment of higher education. The

"Voluntary coordinationbroke down when issues ofgreat import to the presi-dents were raised."

6

legislatures, the J It i mate coordinators,choose to establish an agency thatunderstands the benefits of protectingand promoting institutional autonomyin as many situations as possible whileconcurrently attempting to achieverather specific state goals.

AS noted above, some critics fear thegeneral specter of the state withoutidentifying particular offices or agen-cies that interfere with institutionalfreedoms. Perhaps more culpable. thanthe coordinators are the state budgetoffice of the governor and the variousanalytic and budget staffs of legislativecommittees. These agencies are newerand can be much more powerful thanthe coordinating ones because on aday-to-day basis their analyses andrecommendations on proposed legisla-tion go directly to the law makers. Theyare increasingly staffed by well-trained professionals, who, in dealingwith budgetary and policy matters,may infringe on autonomy by servinga particular state interest. These staffsare formidable opponents when theydiffer with the coordinating agencystaff over policy. In most states, allthree staffs executive, legislative,and coordinativetry to work togetheron data, budgets, and policy, but bythe very nature of the persons theyrepresent, frequent differences occurand political settlements ensue.

THE state also may have a buildingauthority that designs and constructsall public facilities, a student-aidagency that administers Ertil state andfederal financial-aid programs, andother agencies that have policy and

administrative relationships with thecolleges and universities.

IN the aggregate, state influence overthe substance of higher educationcould be as bad as the critics claim.Over the years, and in every state,unwarranted interventions by somestate office, usually the legislature,have been identified. However, thecritics rarely seem to fear currentepisodes, but rather some possiblecatastrophe in the future. No doubt, adisaster could occur but, after 40 years,no state has been cited for having"leveled institutions to mediocrity" orstilled the imaginations and innovativespirit of the faculties. Perhaps therepeated warnings of impendingdanger have in fact prevented stateof ticia Is and coordination boards frommore witoward interventions thanmanifested to -late. Or, perhaps somecritics have found their pleadingsobviated by state adoption of a singlegoverning boarda board which theresearch university tends to dominate.Under voluntnry coordination, ofcourse, this power arrangement wasstrongly resisted by the other stateinstitutions.

SOME quite vocal critics have becomeadvocates of coordination. The presi-dent of a small public university in amidwestern industrial state stoppedcriticizing the concept of coordinationwhen he was named the head of thenew state coordinated system. When avery critical president of a university ina southeastern state became the execu-tive of a consolidated state system, allcriticism of coordination waned away.One successful corporate leader said

after a session with some college anduniversity presidents, "The politics ofbig business is like dealing with BoyScouts compared to higher education!"The perchant for power permeates allorganizational life and often the criti-cism of state coorlination is no morethan, "If I (or my institution) had thepower you have, all would be well."

Forms ofCoordination

THE specific organizational form andthe powers and duties conferred bylaw to coordinating agencies varywidely from state to state. Indeed, notwo states are alike in their form ofcoordination. However, one can iden-tify two broad categories of agencies:

1. A single statewide governing boardtor Gil public colleges and universities(eliminating all the individual institu-tional boards) and

2. A coord;nating board juxtaposedbetween the governor/legislature andthe institutional governing boardsthat embraces all of higher education,public and private.

TODAY, both categories of agencies areheaded by boards consisting primarilyor exclusively of lay persons appointedby the governor for overlapping termsranging from 4 to 12 years. The differ-

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ences between the categories rest onthe powers of the agency and itsposition in relation to the governor anc.legislature.

BOTH the laws establishing coordinat-ing agencies and their actual opera-tions depend on a variety of social,economic, and political factors in thehistorical development of the state.This great diversity in factors influenc-ing higher education and its gover-nance forecloses a standard pattern ofcoordination: the conditions in eachstate determine form and powers.

"Coordinating boards mustcajole, importune, andpersuade with data andlogic to achieve manygoals."

INITIALLY, in a number of states, thepresidents of the public colleges anduniversities joined together in a volun-tary organization when legislaturesresisted institutional lobbying forfunds and programs and asked theseeducational leaders to agree amongthemselves on distribution. But volun-tary coordination broke down whenissues of great import to the presidentswere raised admission standards,new professional schools, new levelsof degrees, or new branch campuses.they quickly gave way to statutorilyestablished agencies, usually com-posed of presidents a.-d governingboard members along with somepublic at-large members. These, too,failed to arrive at equitable settle-

ments, and the major issues continuedto go to the legislature. Eventual ly thelegislature reduced or removed institu-tional board representation and gavethe new agency broader advisorypowers or, more likely, regulator/powers.

THIS sequence of events occurred inmany states and at different t*depending on a particular state's needand readiness for stranger coordina-rion. Often, a distance exists betweenthe legal provisions binding the agencyand its actual undertakings in state/higher education relationships. Overtime, even though statutes formaloperating procedures rerr in Ilealtered, the normal expert nce anycentral agency is that objet, ves, re-lationships, and methods will,.. ge.

The Single StatewideGoverning Boards

Of the two categories, the oldest andmost powerful is the single statewidegoverning board for all the publicsenior colleges and universities (andsometimes the community colleges inthe state). This board applies the tra-ditional panoply of powers and dutiesof a governing board to the wholepublic system. In the most centralizedand strongest systems, the chief officersof the individual campuses must reportTO the chief executive officer (a chancel-lor or president) of the system. In moredecentralized systems, campus presi-dents individually report directly to the

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board, and a board-employed secret-ary maintains the agenda for thebocrd but has no line authority overthe presidents.

ADVANTAGES. The advantages of thisform of coordination lie in the govern-ing powers of the board. The boardmay initiate new programs, newcampuses, and new services or discon-tinue existing programs or services. Ithires and fires presidents of institu-tions, sets admission standards andtuition rates, establishes personnelpolicies and develops the budgets foreach campus in the system. It maycoordinate every activity of everycampus, howe- u3r important or obscure.

DiSADVANTAGES. The chief disadvan-tage of a statewide governing board isthat the governor and the legislaturesee it as speaking only for the aggre-gate interests of public colleges anduniversities, not for all po:tseccndaryeducation. It is not able to objectivelyadvise the state of budget require-ments, program needs or appropriaterelationships with pi ;vote institutionsand other organizations of postsecon-dary education. Evidence suggests thapolitically powerful research univer-sities often control governing boardpolicy. These boards generally cannotact a- the public policy advisors tostates. Nere were 14 statewide gov-erning boards in 1960 and 22 in 1985.

"Every state has accruedmajor benefits throughplanning."

The StatewideCoordinating Board

THE second category is the cm,rdi notingboard situated between the institu-tional governing boards and the polit-ical law makers. This less-drastic formof coordination leaves in place thegoverning boards of each institution orsystem to carry out the normalacademic personnel and managementfunctions while circumscribing ac-tivities that cause conflict among theinstitutions or fail to work towardbroader state goals. This category takestwo distinct forms, one with regulatorypowers and the other with only advis-ory powers. Those with advisory pow-ers generally perform at least two cndoften three of the four major functionsof the regulatory boards planning,policy analyses, and program review;they do not develop campus budgets.

REGULATORY boards have the powerto approve new programs, new centers,new schools, and new services, and inmost cases, to discontinue instructionalprograms. They also suggest publicpol icies and review (and mayconsoli-date) the budgets of the public i nstitu-tions or systems of institutions, andmake budget and fiscal recommenda-tions to the governor and legislature.

THE legislatures have gradually givenup much of their own coordinativepower to such boards, and now &le-gate some authority formerly veste'the institutional governing boards. T,role of regulatory coordinating boards

149

in the budgeting process helps tosecure planning and program goalsand tc maintain the interest and respectof the institutions. It is primarily thisenforcement and implementing abilitythat distinguishes the regulatory coor-dinating board from the advisory type.

ADVISORY boards' chief difficulty ingaining the respect and confidence ofthe college and university leadershipis their frequent powerlessness tofollow through in implementing theirrecommendations, whether on policy,planning, programs, or budgets. Often,the institutions continue tc deal eirectlywith the legislature, where, as previ-ously, the competitive issues are foughtout. Now, however, legislators areinformed through the data, studies,and recommendations of the advisoryagency.

ALL advisory boards are not weak.Some build high confidence, exceedingthat of some agencies with regulatorypowers, with the political arms ofgovernment. Conversely, a few agen-cies with regulatory powers fail toexercise them, becoming, de facto, aweak advisory council. In 1960, therewere 5 regulatory cnd 5 advisoryboards, and in 1985, 7 advisory and20 regulatory boards.

ADVANTAGES. Both regulatory andadvisory coordinating boards p ofectand promote the broad state irowestsas against the more pr-och ia I interestsof the public institutions; provide auniform, comprehensive, availabledata base for the significant activitiesof the colleges and universities; recom-mend public policy and plans encom-

1 0

passing both public and private post-secondary education; provide an um-brella agency for administration ofcertain state and federal programsaffecting the several types of post-secondary institutions; and conductstatewide planning and policy respon-sibilities without undertaking theburdensome, attention-consumingtask of managing the affairs of one ormore ind:vidual campuses.

THE regulatory be and also can imple-ment much of the policy it recomm....odsto the institutions and to the stategovernmer t, and can objectively regu-late he development of instructionaland service pray-cons without partisan-ship.

DISADVANTAGES. Coordinatingboards must use the budget, programapproval, the cooperation of rivalinstitutions, and governmental supportto enforw policy rather than "ordering"presidents of campuses to comply withpolicy, us statewide governing boardsare empowered to do. These coordinat-ing boards must cajole, importune,and persuade with data and logic toachieve many goals. Some scholarsalso consider the lack of a supportiveconstituency a disadvantage. 2 This isso, if the coordinating board does nothave the respect of Vie governor or thelegislature or both. But if the board actsas designed, the leaders can be moreinfluenticl on general state highereducation policy than even the mostpowerful statewide governing boards.While statewide governing boardsgarner support from students, faculty,alumni, and sporting and culturalactivities, their leadership is limited to

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public institutions only, and does notextend to the welfare of al I postsecon-dary education.

The Strengths ofState Coordination

HAVE the two basic forms of coord:na-tion discussed statewide governingboards and ccordinaTing boardsbeen effective? Or are some of thecritics correct in asserting that stateboards are just another layer ofbureaucracy standing between theinstitutions and the politicians butproviding no real service?

COORDINATION has been effective. Itsaccomplishments vary, of course,among states, from one organizationaltype to another, and from one functionto another, and not all will be foundin every state. But os one examines thefou, major functions of coordinationplanning, budgeting, program review,and policy analysis the record isclear.

Planning

PLANNING was not a function of thefirst coordinating boards and has notbeen highly salient for the state gov-ern i ng boards, yet virtually every state

has accrued major benefits throughplanning. The roles and missions ofinstitutions are being remolded from"all things to all men" to statementsthat distinguish one institution fromanother and that are specific enoughto provide guidelines to the state forthe allocation of funds, programs,branch campuses, and buildings; forsetting admission standards and tuitionlevels; and promoting affirmativeaction and open access Without over-arching coordination through roles,missions and plans, the decision oneach of these items for each institutionprobably would be made ad hoc, onfragmented traditional or politicallyexpedient grounds.

PLANNING has preserved diversityamong four-year institutions thatseemed determined on becomingreplicas of the leading state university,and has restrained the efforts of two-year colleges to become four-yearinstitutions. Sound planning hasavoided, in most instances, institu-tional averbuilting of classrooms,laboratories, and dormitories for over-zealous projections of enrollment. Thecontrasts in overbuilding between thepublic and the private sector can becredited to coordinated planning forthe public institutions. Statewide per-spectiven, applied in planning, havemet state objectives of creating diver-sity while conserving resources.

INTENSIVE planning studies have alsohelped to assess need for expensivemedical, dental, and veterinary schoolsto meet shortages of professionals Inthese fields.

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Budgeting

NEW practices adopted by the coor-dinating agencies for developing andmanaging budgets have contributedmuch to equitable funding whilerecognizing differences among sys-tems, types of institutions, and level ofprograms. Institutional squabblingover "fair shares" of state appropria-tions was greatly reduced by suchpractices. More accurate enrollmentfigures, unit costing, better programdefinition, and formula funding re-sulted from intensive joint efforts bythe central agencies and the collegesand universities. These activities pro-vided greater accountability throughquantitative measures while furtheringunderstanding of arca,ie budget prac-tices forms :y the preserve of businessofficers and technicians. Formulafunding greatly reduced income fluctu-ations, gave institutions a basis forsound academic planning from onebudget cycle to the next, and affordedthe stare a measure for adequacy ofstate funding.13

"Funding Bran institutionis now determined by ob-jective measures andanalyses rather than bypolitical tilting in legisla-tive halls."

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DURING budget cutbacks and drops inenrollments, coordinating boards havehad the unrewarding task of applyingto institutions the decisions made bythe legislature and governor. In gen-eral, they have done so being cogniz-ant of marginal costs, essential coreprograms, and service activities whileavoiding partisanship and bias. Veryfew states have reduced funds toindividual institutions by the percen-tage drop in enrollment.

PERHAPS more than anything e..1e,funding for an institution is now deter-mined by objective measures andanalyses rather than by political tiltingin legislative halls. Through formulas,a good measure of fairness sone equitynow prevails in funding. Gi /en thissuccess, supplementing fo, mulabudgeting with "quality tunding"s'-..ould be done cautiously to preventpolitical power rather than academicmerit from again becoming determina-tive.

Program Review

NEW programs have been approvedand disapproved under guidelines ofthe state master plan (or rolling plan)and of the role and mission statementsof each institution. Tc prevent bias orfavoritism among institutions, specificcriteria, developed in conjunction withthe colleges and universities, areemployed in reviewing each newprogram application and each pro-

17

gram considered for termination. The"unnecessary overlap and duplication"so despised by the legislators haslargely been avoided, especially withexpensive and esoteric programs.Advanced-degree programs receiveexceptionally attentive scrutiny and, topreserve diversity, are awarded onlyto those institutions previously iden-tified in plans with the particular leveland kind of degree. Program approvalsgo to institutions only after carefulre"ew of financial, faculty, and phys-ical resources. Most coordinating andstate governing agencies have outrig htpower over programs, have exercisedlaudatory judgment in new approvals,and rarely have been overridden byappeals to the legislature.

REVIEWS of existing programs haveeliminated those of marginal qualityor productivity and limited or abolishedadvanced-degree programs in theless-capable institutions. These actionshave redirected resources towardimproving quality in the better pro-grams and have increased the confi-dence of the legislature and governorin the whale state system. Reviews alsoprovide presidents and deans with "theoutside leverage to do what they haveknown for years should be done."Often, public documents summarizingthe data and argumentation for reviewdecisions assure equity treatmentand outside knowledge of the result.

IN a few states, coordinating boardshave been instrumental in obtainingfunds for competitive incentive grantsfor institutions promoting excellence ina subject area or developing an excit-ing innovative program."

Policy Analysis

THE role of state coordinating andgoverning boards as analysts forhigher education policy began about30 years ago. It has become the mostimportant function of advisory boardsand is equal to budgeting and plan-ning for the regulatory and governingones. Politicians and their staffs seekstudies, analyses, and recommenda-tions on a variety of subjects of concernto them and their coneituents. Suchstudies abound; they deal, amongothers, with the effects of tuition oncollege-going rates of various eth nic orincome groups, on retention of studentsin the several different institutions andprograms, on the effects of differentadmission standaras, on student-aidfunding levels, on caps on enrollment,and on student flow among the institu-tions. Farsighted board staffs, on theirown initiative, forestall some requestsfor narrowly conceived studies byinitiating their own broader studies ofemerging issues ha "ing state policyimplications.

ANALYSES conducted in a scholarly,objective manner can sometimes leadto friction between the coordinatorsand the legislators or their staffs,especially if the legislators have pre-conceived ideas about what results thestudy should show. Over time, how-ever, these policy-analysis activitieshave earned coordinating agencies areputation fc,r fairness, thoroughnessand objectivity much prized by Shepoliticians as a group even though a

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few individual legislators may adhereta their biases on particular issues. Souseful are policy studies that politicianshave steadily increased the scope ofactivities of the regulatory andstatewide governing boards or con-verted an advisory board into a reg-ulatory one as important new issuesand prablems ..aise. A valued by-prod-uct of objective policy analysis is thatlegislators are far less likely to engagein partisan politics on hight r educationmatters.

Weaknesses inCoordinatingPractice

COORDINATION is not without prob-lems. Some of these are quite specificta particular states: ambiguouslydrawn statutes authorizing agencyfunctions; politically powerful institu-tions; legislative reluctance to delegatecontrols, or more disturbing, to refrainfrom parochial, i nstitutiana I favoritism;and gubernatorial agendas that con-flict with plans. Within the agencies,coordination can be ineffective becauseof the poor quality of board member-ship or of a weak executive afficer orboth. Weaknesses appear also in thebroader perspective of activities com-man to all coordinating agencies.Several merit discussion here.

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"Boards should recognizethe continuing worth andunderstanding of demo-cratic processes."

Failure of the board and staff tadevelop a thoughtful, well-con-ceived philosophy and role for theirrelationships with the institutionsand with the state. Over and aboveauthorizing statutes, a value andattitudinal framewark can guide theagency in its activities. In theiractivities, boards should recognizethe continuing worth and under-standing of democratic processes;the invaluable and difficult role ofthe state politicians in gauging therequirements of higher educationagainst the priorities of other even-tial state services; and the real needfor strong coordination while leav-ing, as much as possible, autonomyand local decision making at theinstitutional level. Such aframework, whether in writing ornot, provides a reassuring degree ofpredictability of agency decisions,both for politicians and institutions.

Unwillingness to involve facu:tymembers and administrators fromthe institutions in a full and openmanner that leads to better andmore acceptable policy recommen-dations. Sporadic or no invalvementof such people assuredly hindersreal coordination, that is, the har-monious relationships that lead toaccuracy, acceptability, and persua-

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siveness without the outright use ofpower.

lock of heavy involvement of expertsfrom outside its control citizenspeciolists and community ondeducotionol leaders. If these ore notinvolved, the ogency stonds isoloted,not creating o temporory or perma-nent constituency, ond not copableof leading. Isolation encourages theimpression thot all decisions rest onboard power rather thon on a con-sensus of not only the higher educo-tion community, but of the largersociety.

Too little recognition in progrom ondbudget decisions of nationol andinternational developments thatoffect directly the state economy,politics, manpower needs, ondinstitutionol resources ond direction.Becouse of this lack of attention,some agencies fail to onticipateevents bearing on th,ir responsibil-ity for stote higher education, thusdelaying proper responses of thislevel to trends criginoting out ofstate.

For those agencies with regulatorypower, the tendency to ma noge toomuch detoi I, to become bureoucrotic"data massagers" in operations ond,in so doing, foil to meet state needsfor oggressive alarming ond leader-ship.

Inability to creote conditions leadingto a common, well-monitored dotabase occeptable to the institutionsond to the legislative ond guber-natolial staffs. Such a base reduces

conflict ond encourages focus onpolicy issues rather than the accuracyof competing sets of dota.

Poor continuing contacts with legis-lotors and their stoffs on matters ofimportance, both during sessionsand between them, thus failing toovercome the legislative view of theogency as one closely tied to thegovernor and his budget office.

Not reminding the world of theroison d'etre of the agency by period-ically calling attention to how theagency accomplishes state objec-tives, to the continuing competitionamong the colleges and universities,and to the ever-expanding universeof postsecondory educotion, all inneed of coordination. Experienceindicates that the legislative andpublic memory needs periodic rein-forcement because the more success-ful the agency is in achieving effec-tive coordination the more the worldsees a harmonious, well-monapedsystem and questions the need for acoordinating agency. That sameword looking at quarreling, openlycompetitive colleges and universitiesseeks means of improving coordina-tion.

Not making particulor consciousefforts to review operoting proce-dures, budget formulas, progrom-approval criteria, ond other practicesfor obsolescence or appropriatenessgiven changing circumstances. Atosk force of in- or out-of-state con-sultants could aid in this endeovor.

Failure to take initiotive in odvisingthe gove, nor to appoint persons with

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particular attributes or skills to thecoordinating board, thus attractingmembers with broad visirn andexperience and avoidirg member-sh i p of persons with narrow perspec-tives.

Inability of boards to attract out-standing persons for executiveleadership. Boards in some slatesfail to search for and employ execu-tive officers with a thorough under-standing of the purposes and func-tions of coordination, with aphilosophy of fairness and impar-tiality, and with dedication to pro-moting the interests of the statewhile understanding and maximiz-ing local governing board au-tonomy. Superb political andnegotiating skills are necessary indealing with the leaders of collegesand universities, with the politicalarms of government, with theirincreasingly well-trained profes-sional staffs, and with the otherorganizations contributing to post-secondary education. Some boardsearches for executive officers oreparochial rather than national ingeographic scope. They ore notwell-publicized, the position ispoorly described, and the candidatesare amateurishly interviewed. Of allboard func! ions, this is the mostimportant and ore in need of sub-stantial improvement.

"Superb political negotiat-ing skills are necessary" THE consequences of the popularity of

large public research universities.

Issues for the80s and Beyond

ISSUES in coordination, like those ingoverning the larger society, rarely getfully resolved. 'Resolved" issues oftenappear later in a new guise under newcircumstances. Any listing depends onone's perspective, age, and knowledgeof the history of American highereducation. To some, all things may benew, to others, there is nothing new,only changed form. The following listof issues neither tries to be exhaustivenor presumes to be prescient. Eachissue, I believe, will challenge coor-dinating agencies for the foreseeablefuture.

ATTRACTING the most able to theteaching profession. Our inability toattract very able students into.theteaching profession at all levels ofeducation, K through Ph.D., has poten-tially the most serious and long-lastingconsequences for societal welfare.National commissions can make re-commendations on this problem, butthe coordinating agencies and thecolleges and universities must takepositive, practical steps to improveteacher education programs and tofind ways to attract students into them.Similar steps are needed for preporo-tion of college-level teachers. Initia-tives must start now, to prevent graveimpairment of the teacher corps.

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"The need for remedialeducation is unlikely tofade away for a dozen ormore years, if ever."

More and more qualified studentscontinue to apply for enrollment atthese institutions, while enrollments atthe regional, less prestigious statecolleges and universities remain staticor fall. Should the state increase thephysical and faculty resources at theuniversity even as space becomesavailable elsewhere? Or should itmake the other public institutions moreattractive? Should enrollment caps beplaced on growing institutions, ortuitions raised, or student flow other-wise regulated? Most probably, stateswill seek ways to limit additionalexpenditure., for new enrollments atgrowing universities while exploringways to fill or tr compensate for theempty classrooms of other institutions.

THE tendency for regional state collegesand universities to reclassify upper-division technical and professionalcourses to lower-division status and tomove core liberal arts course require-ments to the upper division to competewith community colleges. These ac-tions, accompanied by severe drops inenrollment in graduate-level coursesin the same institution, foretell pro-nounced de facto changes in the roleand mission of such institutions withoutde jure decisions. Coordination calls forattention to such trends and for reviewof the purposes of these universities.

RESPONDING to a new wave of immi-gration in some industrialized states(e.g., California, Illinois, New York,Texas, and Florida). What state initia-tives will help to overcome languagedeficiencies and provide access tohigher education? (Access remains aserious problem or Black and Hispaniccitizens as well .) Often the cultures andfamily relationships of these newimmigrants do not encourage educa-tional participation. Yet up to half ormore of the populations of some statesare or will be minority. For the futurewelfare of the society and of the eco-nomy, states must assure a participa-tion rate in higher education for thesecitizens and potential citizens equal tothat of the Caucasian population.

COMPETITION for students and fundsbetween public and private institu-tions. Roughly one-third of the fundsof nonpublic colleges and universitiescomes from public support and thepressure is to obtain more. Studentfinancial-aid programs, federal andstate, have generally encouragedstudents to enroll in private institutions.With static or falling enrollments, andwith federal funds decreasing, tensionbetween the two sectors will continueto increase, especially if enrollment inthe public sector falls, leaving vacantfacilitiesand little-used faculties whilepublic monies support students inprivate colleges. Policies put in placenow could prevent future harsh wordsand charges damaging to the welfareof both segments of education.

THE measurement of educationalprogress. Testing has recently beset thepublic schools of the nation. Now some

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states hove adopted assessment examsat the postsecondary level. Some Oatesapply similar tests to students and evento the instructors in teacher educationprograms. Demands are also made forthe national certificatio:i of teachers.Though the results of applying suchdevices are mixed, the pressure willincreasingly be on higher education tomeasure educational progress forcollege programs of all kinds. This isan area of public policy requiringcoordination, at least among all thepublic institutions.

REMEDIAL education poses questions tocoordinators about which institutionsshould provide remedial classes, atwhat level of competence, and for howmany dollars above budgeted amountsfor regular students. The need forremedial education is unlikely to fadeaway for a dozen or more years, ifever, and state coordinating agencieswill abrogate their responsibilities ifthey leave such decisions to the playof market forces. This confused arealiterally begs for coordination andlegislatures wonder why it is not beingdone.

REPLACEMENT of obsolete equipmentand physical plants. Some coordinatingagencies, but all too few of them, havethoroughly studied the many technicalissues involved and have developedcategories, set priorities, and maderecommendations on or adoptedschedules permitting phased, orderlyreplacement of buildings and equip-ment. Without such actions by thecoordinators, the pleas of the institu-tions for help from the legisluture will

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be responded to like the cry of "wolf!"a reflection of bad coordination.

COORDINATION of the vast array ofadult and technical training. Continu-ing education and vocational traininginvolves virtually every type of post-secondary education from the highschool or YMCA to the large universitywith extension programs throughoutthe state. And this wide array is nowaugmented by rapidly developingindustrial training programs. Coordi-nation between high schools andcolleges and between private andpublic colleges has a long history offailure and frustration. State boardsshould begin with inventories of whatis being offered, by whom, for whatprice, for what period of time, in whatlocations. The immerliate need is togather more accurate data, determinethe merit and quality of the manyofferings, and make the informationavailable to the public. No otheragency in the state could reliablyundertake such an effort and no otht.,one has the responsibility.

Conclusion

ORGANIZATIONS and procedures forconducting coordination continue in adynamic state. The less power theagency has, the more dynamic theoperational milieu. The acceleratingtrend in the nation is fnr more centrali-zation of public higher education.

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"Should the state increasethe physical and facultyresources at the universityeven as space becomesavailable elsewhere?"

NO state adopting l statewide govern-ing board has changed this form to oneless powerful. Most of these states fallbelow the median in personal incomeand i n the number of institutions to becoordinated, and most of them havestrong legislatures rather than stronggovernors.

THE advisory agencies, successful ornot, give .may to regulatory ones withconsiderable power to plan, budget,and control program development. Thesuccessful boards, by the very natureof their persuasive, confidence-build-ing activities, stimulate the politicalarms to assign regulatory power. Anadvisory board that fails to satisfylegislators and the governor soon findsitself abolis:,ed to make way for Clmore formidable coordinating struc-ture. A few advisory boards seemdestined to survive primarily becauseof the difficulty of legally placing aregulatory agency over one or moreuniversities with constitutional status.

THE regulatory boards, like thestctewide governing ones, have steod-ily increased in numbers with theirgreatest growth during the 1960s.These agencies are most often foundin states with strong governors, above-

median personal income, with manypostsecondary institutions of greatvariety, and a diverse set of politicalforces working on higher education.Because of this complexity, they seemunlikely to be replaced by a singlegoverning board.

POWERS of regulatory boards increasealmost as often as the legislaturemeets. Some boards resist taking onadministrative functions such as thoseover student aid, licensure of profes-sions, accreditation of institutions, orveterans' affairs, pleading that ad-ministrative duties draw attention,leadership, and resources away fromcritical, direct, coordinating activities.A majority of these boards are able tohandle their coordinating duties alongwith a few important administrativefunctions. Other boards bog down inthe shelter of administrative routinesonly to find themselves unable todetect trends, foresee emerging issuesor conduct vigorous coordination, thuslaying themselves open to statut'ryreorganization a new board andnr w staff leadership. Powers, of reg-ulatory boards make them almostgoverning in practice although veryfew have any influence on the selectionof presidents, governing board mem-bership, or the personnel and account-ing policies of the institutions.

PRIVATE colleges and universities havelargely escaped regulatory coordina-tion, although they often cooperate instate master planning efforts andfurnish data on operations and capitalexpenditures to the coordinating board.By doing so, they can control the expan-

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sion of the public sector and can seekincreases in student aid and otherfunding help from the state. The statein turn embraces another large seg-ment of postsecondary education incoordinative planning. The states withregulatory boards rather than stategoverning or advisory boards are themost liberal in funding private /4..duca-tion. They are also the states with thegreatest number of private institutions.

COORDINATION of other postsecon-dary education -- programs andcourses of the proprietary schools,charitable organizations, and businessand industry has received littleattention by the state boards for coordi-nation, either in planning or data-gathering. Yet these organizationsnow spend more money for postsecon-dary education than do all thecollegesand universities in the nation. Studentchoices for obtaining training and eve.,liberal education have never beengreater, but coordinating agencieshave been slow to understand andtake into account this "peripheral"education.

BY whatever agency performed, themost successful coordination involveswidespread participation by facultyand administrators of the coordinatedorganizations, experts and lay peoplefrom the public and representatives oforganizations interested in educationThe governor's budget office and thelegislative staffs should be involveddirectly when possible, and kept in-formed. Involvement means active,full participation in planning, and indeveloping major procedures for re-

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view of programs, institutional expan-sions, and budget formulas.

COORDINATION remains a fast-risingstar in the constellation of state agen-cies, valued by all concerned parties.It has accomplished much, and muchremains a challenge. Its critics arefewer and adherents more numerous.Institutional leaders, especially thosein the state research universities, willno doubt continue to warn againstundue incursion and violation of in-stitutional autonomy. Coordinationshould heed this fulsome praise andmoderate obtrusive activities whilerecognizing that, after decades ofcoordination, research universitieshave gained vigor and productivity.They have become more valued bytheir states than at any other time intheir history. Coordination has helpedthese institutions by protecting themcgainst inroads on graduate andprofessional programs and on researchfrom regional state colleges and uni-versities, and from the remainder ofhigher education on their funding.Coordinators, through orderly, objec-tive mean:;, appear to have providedall types of institutions with greaterfunding equity and more security intheir roles and missions than they everwould have obtained through un-bridled competition in political arenas.

HOWEVER well coordination works,tensions between higher educationand the state can never be entirelyeliminated, and thoughtful peopleunderstand this. The late StephenBailey sums up the relationship:

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O

Today, as we perceive this elementalparadox in the tensions between theacademy and the state, it is useful tokeep in mind its generic quality. Forat heart we are dealing, I submit,with a dilemma we cannot rationallywish to resolve. The public interestwould not .. . be served if theacademy were to enjoy pn untrou-bled immunity. Nor could the publicinterest be served by the academy'sbeing subjected to an intimatesurveillance. ... Whatever ourcurrent discomforts, because of asense that the state is crowding us abit, the underlying tension is be-nign . . . the academy is for the state

a benign antibody and the state isthe academy's legitimator, benefac-tor, and protector. Both perspectivesare valid. May they remain in ten-sion.'5

'The most successfulcoordination involveswidespread participationby faculty and administra-tors of the coordinatedorganizations."

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Footnotes

I. F.J. Kelly and I.H. McNeely, The Stareand Higher t-ducation (NE' v YorkCarnegie Foundation for the Ad-vancement of Teaching, 1933), pp199-200.

2. Georgia Code, Title 32, paragraphs101 - 124,1931.

3. Southern Regional Education Board,"Federal Aid and CoordinatingBoards," No. 23, 1969.

4. Carnegie Foundation for the Ad-vancement of Teaching, The Statesand Higher Education (San Francisco:Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1976).

5. Michigan Citizens Committee onHigher Education, "A Consolidatedand Summary Statement of Findingsand Recommends tions" (March 12,1965), p.33.

6. Patrick Callan, "State Level Gov-ernance Issues," paperfor Idahostudy (December 1982), p.5.

7. John Mi I left, Conflict in HigherEducation (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1984), pp. x and xi

8. Malcolm Moos and Francis Rourke,The Campus and the Sta;o(BaltimoreJohns Hopkins University Press,1959), pp. 3 and 4.

9 "A Cull to College and UniversityTrustees," ;tatement from a Col-loquium of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell &Company, November 21-22, 1977(published March 1978).

10 Association of Governing Boards,"Recomnendationsfor ImprovingTrustee Selection in PublicCollegeiand Universities," a report from theNatiorol Cc mmission on College andUniversitiy Trustee Selection (1980),p.14

11 Lyman Glet my, "InstitutionalAJtonomy for Whom?" in TheTroubled Campus, G. Kerry Smith, ed.(Washington, D.C. AmericanAssociation of Higher Education,1970), p. 155.

12. Jonn Mi I lett, Conflict in HigherEducation (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1984).

13. Larry L. Leslie and Paul -. Brinkman,R,-.tes of Return to Higher Education:An Intensive Examination (Boulder,Colorado: National Center for HigherEducation Management Systems,May 1985). Also, Lyman A. Glennyand Frank M. Bowen, Toward a NewBeginning: Balancing Local Controlwith State Coordination and Gov-ernance. A report to the Committeeon Educational Polity, Structure, and(Aanagement of the State of Wash-ington (Olympia: 1984).

14. John Folger and Aims McGuinness,Jr , Catalog of Changes: Incentivesfor Quality and Management Flex-ibility in Higher Education (Denver:Education Commission of the States,1984).

15 Stephen K Bailey, "Education and theState," Educational Record (Winter1974), pp. 5-6.

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