Document of The World Bank of The World Bank Report No: ICR0000282 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND...

Document of

The World Bank

Report No: ICR0000282

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

(IDA-31000 IDA-31001 IDA-31002 IDA-31003)

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 167.8 MILLION

(US$238.8 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF COTE D’IVOIRE

FOR A

TRANSPORT SECTOR ADJUSTMENT/INVESTMENT PROGRAM

March 29, 2012

Transport Sector

Country Department AFCF2

Africa Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective as of August 31, 2011)

Currency Unit = FCFA

SDR1.00 = US$1.61

US$ 1.00 = 454 FCFA

FISCAL YEAR

[January 1 – December 31]

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AERIA Concessionaire managing the extension and modernization of Abidjan

airport

AFDB African Development Bank

AFD French Development Agency (Agence Française de Développement)

AGEROUTE Road Agency (Agence de Gestion des Routes)

AGETU Urban Transport Agency (Agence des Transports Urbains)

AM Aide Mémoire

ANAC National Civil Aviation Agency (Agence Nationale de l'Aviation Civile)

ANAM National Airport Management and Meteorology Agency (Agence

Nationale des Aérodromes et de la Météorologie)

BNETD National Bureau of Technical Studies and Development (Bureau National

d'Etudes Techniques et de Développement)

BOAD West African Development Bank (Banque Ouest Africaine de

Développement)

CAS Country Assistance Strategy

CFA Franc of African Financial Community

CIAPOL Antipollution Center (Centre Ivoirien Anti-pollution)

CIF Cost, Insurance and Freight

CNS National Security Council (Conseil National de Sécurité)

COMARCO Ivoirian Shipping Company (Compagnie Maritime de Côte d'Ivoire)

DCGTx Directorate for Management and Supervision of Large Works (Direction

et Contrôle des Grands Travaux)

DGTTC Directorate for Land Transport

DMTP Directorate of Public Works Equipment (Direction du Matériel des

Travaux Publics)

DRV Directorate of Highways and Urban Roads (Direction des Routes et

Voiries)

DTT Directorate of Land Transport

ERR Economic Rate of Return

EU European Union

FAC French Aid and Cooperation Fund (Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation)

FER Road Maintenance Fund (Fond d’Entretien Routier)

FHB Felix Houphouet Boigny International Airport

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GOCI Government of Cote d'Ivoire

IBDR International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

ICB International Competitive Bidding

ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report

IDA International Development Association

IMO International Maritime Organization

IRR Internal Rate of Return

ISR Implementation Status and results Report

KFW German Development Agency (Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau)

KPI Key Performance Indicators

MARPOL International Convention for Actions against Pollution through Ship

Wastes

MET Ministry of Transport (Ministère des Transports)

MIE Ministry of Economic Infrastructure (Ministère des Infrastructures

Economiques)

MTR Midterm Review

NCB National Competitive Bidding

OCAB Banana-Pineapple Exporters Association (Organisation Centrale Ananas

Bananes)

OIC Ivorian Shippers’ Council (Office Ivoirien des Chargeurs)

OPRC International Convention for Actions against Hydrocarbon Spill Pollution

OSER Road Safety Office (Office de Sécurité Routière)

PAA Abidjan Autonomous Port (Port Autonome d’Abidjan)

PASP San Pedro Autonomous Port (Port Autonome de San Pedro)

PCU Program Coordination Unit

PDO Program/Project Development Objective

PFP Policy Framework Paper

PME Small and Medium Enterprises (Petites et Moyennes Entreprises)

PNAE National Environmental Action Program (Programme National d’Action

Environnementale)

PPF Project Preparation Facility

PSD Private Sector Development Project

RITO Reflows, Investment Income, IBRD Net Transfers and Others Resources

SAD Sector Adjustment Loan

SAL Structural Adjustment Lending

SGS Preshipment Inspection Company (Société Générale de Surveillance)

SGMTP Civil Works Equipment Management Company (Société de Gestion du

Matériel des travaux Publics)

SIGFIP Integrated Public Finance Management System

SITARAIL Private Concessionaire Operating Rail Transport on the Abidjan-

Ouagadougou-Kaya Line

SITRAM Ivorian Maritime Transport Company (Société Ivoirienne de Transports

Maritimes)

SME Small and Medium Entreprises

SODEXAM Airport Management and Meteorology Company (Société d’Exploitation

des Aérodromes ct de la Météorologie)

SONATT National Land Transport Agency (Société Nationale des Transports

Terrestres)

SOTRA Abidjan Public Bus Company (Société des Transports d’Abidjan)

SOTU Urban Transport Society (Société des Transports Urbains)

TA Technical Assistance

TSIAP Transport Sector Adjustment/Investment Program

UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

VAT Value-Added Tax

Vice President: Obiageli K.Ezekwesili

Country Director: Madani M. Tall

Sector Manager: Supee Teravaninthorn

Project Team Leader: Ibou Diouf

ICR Team Leader: Ibou Diouf

COTE D’IVOIRE

CI-TRANSPORT SECTOR ADJUSTMENT (FY98)

CONTENTS

Data Sheet ....................................................................................................................... 1

A. Basic Information ....................................................................................................... 1

B. Key Dates ................................................................................................................... 1

C. Ratings Summary ....................................................................................................... 1

D. Sector and Theme Codes ........................................................................................... 2

E. Bank Staff ................................................................................................................... 3

F. Results Framework Analysis ...................................................................................... 3

G. Ratings of Program Performance in ISRs .................................................................. 5

H. Restructuring .............................................................................................................. 7

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ...................................... 8

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .................................... 19

3. Assessment of Outcomes .................................................................................. 25

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ................................................ 30

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ............................................. 30

6. Lessons Learned ............................................................................................... 32

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners .......... 33

Annex 1: Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............ 34

Annex 2: Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................... 37

Annex 3: Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results .................................................. 38

Annex 4: Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ..................... 39

Annex 5: Comments of Co-financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ..................... 42

Annex 6: List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................... 43

Annex 7: Status of KPI by August 2011 ....................................................................... 44

Annex 8: Implementation Timeline .............................................................................. 48

Annex 9: Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................... 52

Annex 10: Map IBRD No. 33393 ................................................................................. 56

1

Data Sheet

A. Basic Information

Country: Cote d’Ivoire Program Name: CI-Transp Sec Adj

Program ID: P001177 L/C/TF Number(s):

IDA-31000,IDA-

31001,IDA-

31002,IDA-31003

ICR Date: 03/29/2012 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument: SAD Borrower: Government of Cote

d’Ivoire

Original Total

Commitment: SDR 130.6M Disbursed Amount: SDR 166.28M

Revised Amount: SDR 167.8M

Implementing Agencies: Project Coordination Unit (PCU)

Co financiers and Other External Partners:

European Commission (EC)

French Development Agency (AFD)

Government of Japan

Germany (KFW)

B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual

Date(s)

Concept Review: 04/11/1988 Effectiveness: 12/16/1998 11/09/1998

Appraisal: 04/28/1997 Restructuring(s):

11/08/1999

12/20/2001

12/17/2002

06/26/2003

09/02/2008

07/03/2009

08/31/2010

06/27/2011

Approval: 06/23/1998 Mid-term Review: 06/30/2001

Closing: 06/30/2001 08/31/2011

C. Ratings Summary

C.1 Performance Rating by ICR

Outcomes: Unsatisfactory

Risk to Development Outcome: Substantial

Bank Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory

Borrower Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory

2

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)

Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: MU Government: MU

Quality of Supervision: MS Implementing

Agency/Agencies: MS

Overall Bank

Performance: MU

Overall Borrower

Performance: MU

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators

Implementation

Performance Indicators

QAG Assessments

(if any) Rating:

Potential Problem

Program at any time

(Yes/No):

Yes Quality at Entry

(QEA): Satisfactory

Problem Program at any

time (Yes/No): Yes

Quality of

Supervision (QSA): None

DO rating before

Closing/Inactive status: Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes

Original Actual

Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Central government administration 41 66

General transportation sector 18 1

Ports, waterways and shipping 5

Roads and highways 36 33

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Infrastructure services for private sector development 24 33

Macroeconomic management 25 32

Pollution management and environmental health 13 1

Public expenditure, financial management and

procurement 25 33

Regulation and competition policy 13 1

3

E. Bank Staff

Positions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Obiageli K. Ezekwesili Jean-Louis Sarbib

Country Director: Madani M. Tall Shigeo Katsu

Sector Manager: Supee Teravaninthorn Maryvonne Plessis-Fraissard

Program Team Leader: Ibou Diouf Jean-Noel Guillossou

ICR Team Leader: Ibou Diouf

ICR Primary Author: Alain L. Labeau, Papa M. Fall

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from the Development Credit Agreement)

The initial Project Development Objectives (PDOs) of the project were to: (a) improve

the condition and efficiency of the Borrower’s transport infrastructure; (b) build capacity

for planning, programming and mobilizing funding required for the execution of

investments in the Borrower’s transport sector; and (c) strengthen the legal and regulatory

framework of the Borrower’s transport sector.

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by the original approving

authority on September 2, 2008)

The revised PDO is to re-establish and improve road access and safeguard road

infrastructure assets across the country, notably in Northern Regions.

The PDO indicators were revised on September 2, 2008 but neither targets nor baseline

values were explicitly mentioned in the official letter to the Minister of Finance. The

below targets were mutually agreed and documented in aide-memoires.

(a)Revised PDO Indicators

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target

Values (from

approval

documents)

Formally

Revised

Target

Values

Actual Value

Achieved at

Completion or

Target Years

Indicator 1 : Number of bridges rehabilitated in the Northern region

Value

(quantitative or

Qualitative)

0 60 76

Date achieved 09/02/2008 08/31/2010 08/31/2011

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

127% achievement.

Indicator 2 : Number of representatives from road enterprises trained.

Value

(quantitative or

Qualitative)

0 300 1200

4

Date achieved 09/02/2008 08/31/2010 08/31/2011

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Achieved beyond target.

Indicator 3 : Number of bridges studies completed in the Northern region

Value

(quantitative or

Qualitative)

0 10 3

Date achieved 09/02/2008 08/31/2010 08/31/2011

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

30% achieved.3 bridges studies completed.

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target

Values (from

approval

documents)

Formally

Revised

Target Values

Actual Value

Achieved at

Completion or

Target Years

Indicator 1 : Environmental mitigation clauses are included in all bridges contracts

Value

(quantitative or

Qualitative)

no yes yes

Date achieved 09/02/2008 08/31/2010 08/31/2011

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Fully achieved. Environmental clauses are now included in all Cote d'Ivoire

contracts.

Indicator 2 : The payments due to contractors are made within 15 days

Value

(quantitative or

Qualitative)

no yes yes

Date achieved 09/02/2008 08/31/2010 08/31/2011

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Fully achieved. 4 days average.

Indicator 3 : Number of pedestrian accidents reduced to 15 at Grand Bassam bus station at

end 2009

Value

(quantitative or

Qualitative)

n.a 15 Not measured

Date achieved 09/02/2008 12/31/2009 08/31/2011

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

The annual reduction of accident rates at the Grand Bassam bus station could

not be measured as the rehabilitation works were only completed by the project

closing date.

Indicator 4 : The road safety training center is rehabilitated

Value

(quantitative or

Qualitative)

no yes yes

5

Date achieved 09/02/2008 08/31/2010 08/31/2011

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Fully achieved.

Indicator 5 : Bus station rehabilitated in Grand Bassam

Value

(quantitative or

Qualitative)

no yes yes

Date achieved 09/02/2008 08/31/2010 08/31/2011

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Fully achieved.

G. Ratings of Program Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR

Archived DO IP

Actual

Disbursements

(USD millions)

1 11/19/1998 Highly Satisfactory Satisfactory 50.23

2 12/22/1998 Satisfactory Satisfactory 50.23




6 12/01/1999 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 79.55



9 10/17/2000 Satisfactory Unsatisfactory 121.58

10 05/30/2001 Satisfactory Unsatisfactory 121.57




14 12/23/2002 Unsatisfactory Satisfactory 163.44






20 05/12/2005 Moderately

Unsatisfactory

Moderately

Unsatisfactory 205.38

21 09/24/2005 Moderately

Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 205.38

22 12/03/2008 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 210.41



6




7

H. Restructuring

Restructuring

Date(s)

Board

Approved

PDO Change

ISR Ratings at

Restructuring

Amount

Disbursed at

Restructuring

in USD

millions

Reason for Restructuring &

Key Changes Made DO IP

11/08/1999 No S S 79.55

Operating costs and artificial

reef added & Project Closing

date extended by 18 months

12/20/2001 No U U 121.57

Corrective restructuring

designed to accelerate

implementation based on Mid

Term Review (MTR)

recommendations; rural roads,

civil aviation, HIV/AIDS and

poverty components added,

artificial reef removed,

disbursement percentage for

civil works increased from 70%

to 80%

01/30/2002 U U 150.91

12/17/2002 No U S 163.44

Extension of project closing

date by six months to June 30,

2003

06/26/2003 No U S 172.71

Adaptive restructuring in

response to urgent post-conflict

infrastructure needs and part of

a wider portfolio restructuring;

all components but A are closed

07/01/2003 U S 172.89

09/02/2008 Yes MU U 205.38

Adaptive restructuring part of a

wider portfolio restructuring to

once again refocus the project

on post-conflict infrastructure

reconstruction needs;

Component A restructured, road

safety component added,

disbursement percentage for

civil works increased from 80%

to 100%

07/03/2009 No S S 211.22 Reallocation of Credit Funds

08/31/2010 No S S 220.61 Reallocation and Extension of

project closing date

06/27/2011 No S S 221.33

Adaptive restructuring to repair

and replace equipment and

building looted during the post-

election crisis; purchase of

goods and hiring of TA services

added.

8

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

1. Since early 1994, following more than ten years of economic stagnation and the

subsequent devaluation of the CFA franc (Franc of African Financial Community), Cote

d’Ivoire successfully implemented a multi-year program of economic recovery and

reform. All external payments arrears to official bilateral and multilateral creditors and

most domestic arrears were cleared by end-1996. Notwithstanding the positive results of

the comprehensive adjustment strategy, the fiscal situation remained fragile, and the

heavy dependency on external budgetary support continued. Further fiscal consolidation

was needed to achieve external viability and the deepening of structural reforms was

necessary to promote the private sector regarded as the engine of growth.1

2. The program was consistent with the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) dated

September 11, 1997 (IDA/17007-IVC), which aimed at achieving sustained economic

growth, reducing poverty and restoring financial viability, and more specifically,

supported institutional capacity building and governance and investment in basic

infrastructure in rural areas. The steep cost of transportation had been hampering the

functioning of internal markets, the efficient delivery of social services, and hurting

economic growth as a whole. Consequently, a program of remedial reforms targeting

protectionist or monopolistic practices and loss-making public enterprises was initiated

by the government in the maritime, civil aviation, rail and urban transport sub-sectors.

However, the road sub-sector responsible for 90 percent of transport movements

remained behind in terms of: (a) the poor condition of the infrastructure and the weak

management and maintenance of the same resulting in high vehicle operating costs; and

(b) the efficient organization of transport services.

3. The purpose of the program and the contributing project was to complete the

reform agenda in the various non-road sub-sectors, carry out additional road specific

reforms coupled to some physical investments to turn around the declining condition of

the road network. The International Development Association’s (IDA) involvement was

also perceived as a critical catalyst to sustain a coherent framework for donor

involvement and coordination in the transport sector. A follow up operation was already

contemplated to assist with the completion of the road maintenance and rehabilitation

program which could only be partially executed during the implementation of the project.

1 From the March 6, 1998 Final Document on the Initiative for HIPC jointly prepared by the International

Monetary Fund (IMF) and IDA.

9

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as

approved)

4. The PDO. The objectives2 of the project were to: (a) improve the condition and

efficiency of the Borrower’s transport infrastructure; (b) build capacity for planning,

programming and mobilizing funding required for the execution of investments in the

Borrower’s transport sector; and (c) strengthen the legal and regulatory framework of the

Borrower’s transport sector. The PDOs were consistent with the CAS dated September

11, 1997.

5. Key Indicators of Performance. The key performance indicators are

summarized in the table below.

Table 1: Key Indicators of Performance Road Maintenance

Transparency of budgetary allocations and their actual use

More cost-effective road maintenance using greater share of local inputs

Correctly maintained road network

Improving road condition

A lean and effective road administration working with clear and transparent procedures,

taking corrective actions with reasonable speed, disposing of modern management tools and

competent staff.

o date of finalization of annual maintenance program

o date of annual update of data bank

o average number of days for contract award

o percentage exceeding 30 days

o average number of days for contract payment

o percentage exceeding 30 days

o equipment provision to DRV

A robust and competent local contracting industry has developed offering steady employment

to a significant local work force

Private equipment rental and leasing activity develop in response to small contractor demand,

easing their constraints for equipment acquisition and equipment management capacity

Road Transport

Restructuring of DTT by end of 1998

Elimination of all existing temporary transport titles six months after establishment of new

structure, and progressive reduction of validity period of temporary titles thereafter

Improved knowledge of essential rules and their correct enforcement

Reduction of illegal ―tolling‖ through suppression of informal road blocks

Improvement of road passengers and freight services through more functional bus stations

Annual increase in number of drivers receiving specialized training

More efficient vehicle operation (annual mileage per truck/bus increased)

2 As per the Development Credit Agreement (DCA), September 16, 1998.

10

Increased transport enterprises efficiency

Road Safety

Children trained

Monitors trained

Accident rate decreased

Increased ratio of inspected vehicles

Urban Transport

Percent of passengers using public transport

Amount of subsidies to operators

6. Some of the above performance indicators and a few additional ones were used to

frame the conditions authorizing the release of four structural adjustment tranches as

explained in the tables below. The additional indicators, specific to the structural

adjustment tranches, are underscored.

Table 2: Additional Indicators Tranche Number Amount in

SDR

Expected

Release Date

Release

Date

Comments

1 36,300,000 Before Dec 15,

1998

Nov 16,

1998

Tranche 1 was to be released as

soon as the conditions for

effectiveness had been met

Supplemental

amount from Fifth

Dimension:

Reflows, Investment

Income, IBRD Net

Transfers and

Others Resources

(RITO)

19,200,000 Before Dec 15,

1999

Dec 21,

1998

2 14,500,000 n.a. Apr 4,

2000

Until October 1999 (cf. Aide

memoire Oct 99) progress on

conditions was dismal.

Supplemental

amount from Fifth

Dimension (RITO)

15,800,000 Before Mar 22,

2001

Apr 4,

2000

3 14,500,000 n.a. Jan 30,

2002

The release conditions were

changed in the Dec 20, 2001

project restructuring

Supplemental

amount from Fifth

Dimension (RITO)

9,190,000 Before Jan 30,

2003

Jan 30,

2002

Floating Tranche 7,000,000 n.a. This tranche was cancelled on June

26, 2003

Table 3: Structural Adjustment Tranches Tranche 1

Conditions from Legal Agreement Status

(a) Satisfactory FY 1998 road rehabilitation and

maintenance program.

See Declaration of Credit Effectiveness dated Nov.

9, 1998 on which basis the tranche was released.

(b) At least (i) US$23,600,000 for routine

maintenance; (ii) US$15,200,000 for periodic

Idem. In 1998, US$83 million (including IDA’s

contribution of US$32 million) were allocated to

11

maintenance; and (iii) US$8,400,000 for DRV

operating costs and required equipment.

road works (Restructuring memo Dec 2001).

(c) Satisfactory accounting and auditing system Manual transmitted (Aide memoire Dec 2-4, 1998)

(d) All Civil works Equipment Management

Company’s (SGMTP ) heavy road maintenance

equipment is liquidated

Document transmitted (Aide memoire Dec 2-4,

1998)

(e) Program launching seminars carried out Yamoussoukro Sep 21-28 seminars. Confirmation

transmitted (AM Dec 2-4, 1998).

Tranche 2


(1) Satisfactory FY 99 transport sector investment

and expenditures program.

Tranche release authorized by Memo of the

President dated March 17, 2000.

(2) Adequate funding in FY99 budget for road

rehabilitation and maintenance program agreed

upon with IDA.

In 1999, CFAF 48 billion, i.e. US$83 million

(including IDA’s contribution of US$32 million)

were allocated to road maintenance (Restructuring

memo Dec 2001).

(3) Evidence that all funds allocated for road

maintenance in FY98 budget have been committed

for road maintenance purposes under a program of

works agreed upon with IDA.

The condition was not yet formally met and a

waiver was requested and accepted. Reason was that

the 1998 budget was executed until Nov 1999 and

therefore the audit of 1998, carried out in April

1999, supposed to certify that the condition was met

could not cover it. It was expected to be covered in

the audit of FY99 to be carried out in April 2000.

However, this latter audit was still not available in

June 2000.

(4) Evidence that (a) Borrower has ceased to

undertake road maintenance works by force account

and (b) arrears to private contractors do not exceed

one month.

The 1999 mid-year review carried out by the

auditors showed that all works had been undertaken

by private contractors.

(5) Audit report showing that informal road check

points are found only exceptionally.

The auditor confirmed that informal check points

were found only exceptionally. Illegal road barriers

removed in March 2000 reappeared progressively,

were removed again in Mar 2001 and kept on

reappearing. (Restructuring memo Dec 2001).

(6) Evidence that vehicle inspection rates have been

increased to levels acceptable to IDA (in relation to

paragraph 2.3 of the Letter of Sector Policy).

The Tranche release memo certifies that the rates

were attained. However, no progress was noted in

2001 on the February 2000 Action Plan to improve

technical inspections Mid-Term Review (MTR)

Aide memoire (AM.

(7) DTT has been restructured SONATT was created by the decrees of February

23, 2000. However, the restructuring was still

incomplete in June 2002 (key staff of SONATT not

yet recruited). This condition was thus half met as

evidenced by the Memo of the President for the

release of the Tranche: Boards being appointed,

decree to dismantle DTT being revised, plan being

prepared.

(8) Submission of an action plan and

implementation timetable to set and collect the

optimum level of taxes and user charges against

road users.

This condition was not met. A waiver was requested

and accepted. The study was stopped by the

previous government without informing the Bank.

The new government re-launched it. The final report

was expected in May 2000 including the

Implementation Plan. In reality the plan was never

made available.

12

Tranche 3


(1) Original: satisfactory FY00 transport sector

investment and expenditures program; Amended on

Dec 20, 2001: The Borrower has adopted and

published the legislative and regulatory documents

pursuant to which the Road Maintenance Fund has

been established and will operate with functions,

responsibilities and resources satisfactory to IDA,

and the Director General of said Fund has been

appointed.

An inadequate institutional framework, i.e. DRV

and Ministry of Finances, was identified at the MTR

as the root cause of the insufficient mobilization of

resources for road maintenance and the inefficient

road maintenance management. Two legs of the

reform consisted in creating a Road Maintenance

Fund and a National Road Agency. Four road

projects included in the FY00 program did not meet

the 12% minimum Internal Rate of Return (IRR)

and were to be removed (cf. Paragraph 18 of Memo

of the President for the release of 2nd

Tranche). As

quoted from the AM of June 2000: ―The 2000

investment program is highly questionable: amounts

budgeted are way too small (one tenth in some

cases), works are overdesigned and expensive so

budget allocation means ridiculously low output and

at such pace works would last more than 10 years.

Worse, the selection of the road is weird because it

doubles an existing road with more traffic.

Conclusion, the investment program requires a

detailed review by IDA.‖

(2) Original: Adequate funding in FY00 budget for

road rehabilitation and maintenance program agreed

upon with IDA; Amended on Dec 20, 2001: The

Borrower has adopted and published the legislative

and regulatory documents pursuant to which the

National Road Agency has been established and

will operate with functions, responsibilities and

resources satisfactory to IDA, and the Director-

General of the said Agency has been appointed.

In 2000 and 2001 the budget for road maintenance

was reduced to about US$29 million with a local

contribution of about US$12 million in 2000 and

US$19 million in 2001, down from US$43 million

in 1998 and 1999 (Restructuring memo Dec 2001).

(3) Original: evidence that all funds allocated for

road maintenance in FY99 budget have been

committed for road maintenance purposes under a

program of works agreed upon with IDA; Amended

on Dec 20, 2001: As a result of the establishment of

the Road Maintenance Fund and the National Road

Agency, the Borrower has revised as appropriate the

legislative and regulatory documents defining the

functions and responsibilities of the Highway

Department of its Ministry of Economic

Infrastructure.

Only a small portion of the FY99 and FY00 road

maintenance programs was executed (53 percent of

routine maintenance, 37 percent of light grading 36

percent of reopening of earth roads, 2 percent of

paved roads rehabilitation, and 0 percent for both

patching on paved roads and regravelling

respectively), AGEROUTE and FER key personnel

were still not recruited in June 2002.

(4) Original: action plan under (8) above was

implemented in accordance with the timetable;

removed and transferred to the Floating Tranche

with the Dec 20, 2001 Amendment.

Condition (4) was shifted to the Floating Tranche to

―keep the focus of the 3rd

Tranche on Road

Maintenance and concentrate the floating tranche on

Transport Sector policy issues‖. This reasoning was

absurd because this condition was paramount to the

financing of Road Maintenance and as such had a

better fit with the 3rd

Tranche than with the Floating

Tranche. The double shift from Tranche 2 to 3 and

3 to floating has permitted the release of Tranche 2

and 3 while the condition was never fulfilled until

the end of the project.

Floating Tranche

13


(1) (a) Satisfactory enactment of the law governing

road passengers and freight transport activities and ,

(b) Publication of updated regulations governing

land transport activities

The law governing road passengers and freight

transport activities was enacted on Feb 16, 2000; the

four implementation decrees were signed on Feb 23,

2000; five additional legal orders remain to be

adopted (Restructuring memo Dec 2001).

(2) (a) Satisfactory enactment of the Maritime Code

and, (b) satisfactory amendment of port regulations

The draft Maritime Code was available in Sep 2001;

port regulations were amended in the (Abidjan

Autonomous Port (PAA), a draft was available for

San Pedro Autonomous Port (PASP) but not signed

yet in 2003.

(3) Establishment of a satisfactory Urban Transport

Agency and appointment of its senior officials

AGETU was created on Feb 23, 2000

(Restructuring memo Dec 2001). Still not

operational in June 2002.

(4) The Borrower has concluded with a qualified

and experienced operator, selected on the basis of

procedures satisfactory to IDA, an arrangement

satisfactory to IDA for the operation and

management of the PAA’s ship-to-shore gantry

cranes

Bidding aborted because of no responses to

prequalification. Retendering was deliberately

aborted by the Government and a sole source

contract signed with Bollore in 2003.

(5) Satisfactory restructuring of OSER Still not done in June 2002

(6) The Borrower has concluded with qualified and

experienced private operators contractual

arrangements satisfactory to IDA for the provision

of bus transport services for Abobo and Yopougon

suburbs

A concessioning agreement was signed with SOTU

on Sep 18, 1998 (paragraph 22 AM Sep-Oct 1998)

however, operational prerequisites are unclear (AM

Dec 2-4, 1998) in particular Memorandum of

Understanding between SOTU and SOTRA

(paragraph 6 (h) AM June-July 1999). The operator

was unable to mobilize funds to purchase the buses

and start operations (Restructuring memo Dec

2001). Decision of the Government on the future of

the concession was still not available in June 2002

and the whole operation was abandoned later.

(7) Transferred from Tranche 3 as per Amendment

of Dec 20, 2001: action plan under condition (8) for

Tranche 2 was implemented in accordance with the

timetable

In June 2000, the study from BENETD did not

contain an action plan; in June the Ministry of

Transport had not received a copy for comments yet

(AM June 2000). The action plan was yet to be

defined in 2003 and in reality was never started.

1.3 Revised PDO and Key Indicators, and Reasons/Justification

7. The project was restructured eight times (including reallocation of funds and

extension of closing dates), although the PDO and Key Performance Indicators (KPI)

were formally revised only once on September 2, 2008.

(a) November 8, 1999: The closing date was extended from June 30, 2001 until

December 31, 2002 (cf. paragraph 8). An artificial reef pilot was added to the

Port Component. The withdrawal categories were adjusted: small reductions of

allocation under Category 4 - Consultants; two new categories added - Operating

Costs and Artificial Reef; SDR 19.2 million added to the first tranche. The PDO

and key indicators remained unchanged.

(b) December 20, 2001: This ―corrective‖ restructuring, designed to accelerate

implementation, reflected the recommendations of the July 2001 Mid-Term

14

Review (MTR) and the Bank’s re-engagement strategy (Cote d’Ivoire slipped into

non-accrual status in October 2000). Rural roads, civil aviation, Human

Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS)

and poverty components were added, the artificial reef pilot was removed; the

disbursement percentage for civil works were increased from 70 percent to 80

percent; some withdrawal category allocations were adjusted; and the release

conditions for the third and floating tranches were modified. The PDO and KPI

remained unchanged (no additional indicators were proposed to monitor the

performance of the new components).

(c) December 17, 2002: Extension of project closing date by six months to June 30,

2003.

(d) June 26, 2003: This ―adaptive‖ restructuring was part of a wider portfolio

restructuring and responded to urgent post-conflict infrastructure needs, it

embodied as a key element of the emergency phase of the new Bank re-

engagement strategy. The restructuring was also ―corrective‖ to some extent in

that it sought to improve project performance by restricting the institutional

support to road management and maintenance and lessening project implementing

arrangements. This was in response to the lack of traction on the non-road related

institutional reforms. All components were closed except Component A (Roads);

the closing date was extended until June 30, 2004; the floating tranche was

canceled (as conditions were not met by the deadline of January 30, 2003); and

withdrawal category allocations were adjusted. The restructuring of Component A

was meant to be made in two stages: the first stage set the rules to

complete/terminate ongoing works and the second stage followed the assessment

of the additional work program. The assessment was completed in November

2003; however, the project could not be formally restructured (i.e. revised PDO

and KPI) before June 15, 2004 when it was once again suspended for more than

four years.

(e) September 2, 2008: This ―adaptive‖ restructuring was part of a wider portfolio

restructuring/reactivation following the clearance of arrears by the Borrower and

the preparation of a new Bank Interim Strategy for fiscal year 08-09; it was meant

to: (i) adjust the project objectives to the country’s new post-conflict realities; (ii)

focus on urgent country reconstruction and reunification activities; (iii) extend the

closing dates to allow the completion of the new activities. Component A was

finally restructured and a Component B - Road Safety was added; some

withdrawal category allocations were adjusted; the disbursement percentage for

civil works was raised to 100 percent thanks to new country parameters; and the

closing date was extended until August 31, 2010. The PDO was revised to read

―the objective of the project is to reestablish and improve road access and

safeguard road infrastructure assets across the country, notably in the

Northern Regions‖. The revised KPI are

number of bridges rehabilitated in the Northern region;

number of bridges studies completed for the Northern region;

Road safety training center is rehabilitated;

15

Bus station rehabilitated in Grand Bassam;

Number of pedestrian accidents reduced by 60 percent at Grand

Bassam bus station at end 2009;

Number of representatives from road enterprises trained;

Environmental mitigation clauses are included in all bridges contracts;

and

The payments due to contractors are made within 15 days.

(f) July 3, 2009: Reallocation of Credit Proceeds.

(g) August 31, 2010: Reallocation of Credit Proceeds and extension of project

closing date.

(h) June 27, 2011: The purpose of this ―adaptive‖ restructuring was to: (i) repair and

replace office buildings and furniture, IT equipment and vehicles of the Ministry

of Economic Infrastructure (MIE) and the project implementing agencies which

were looted during the post-election crisis and the ensuing civil war, and (ii)

update the transport sector strategy. Acquisition of goods and consulting services

were added to Component A and withdrawal category allocations adjusted

accordingly. KPI and PDO remained unchanged.

8. The initial closing date of June 30, 2001 was extended five times as shown in the

table immediately below. In December 2004, the Bank decided that all operations in Cote

d’Ivoire would be retroactively extended once the suspension3 that started in June 2004

would be lifted, which happened in April 2008 only.

Table 4: Extension Dates Date granted Closing date Reasons

Sep 16, 1998 Jun 30, 2001 Initial closing date

Nov 8, 1999 Dec 31, 2002 Difficulties related to the October 1999 coup that affected the project

implementation

Dec 17, 2002 Jun 30, 2003 Difficulties related to the September 19, 2002 second coup attempt, brief

armed conflict leading to the country’s divide and a deep political crisis.

Give the Borrower some additional time for preparing a meaningful

action plan to address the new country’s context. The Bank had become

the coordinator of all donors and it was important to keep its

engagement in an increasingly sensitive dialogue with the government.

Jun 26, 2003 Jun 30, 2004 Portfolio restructuring strategy and project restructuring.

Sep 2, 2008 Aug 31, 2010 Portfolio reactivation and project restructuring.

Aug 31, 2010 Aug 31, 2011 Give the Borrower the means to complete ongoing activities and achieve

the PDO.

3 Because of debt service arrears, the project was suspended for six years (71.5 months exactly) over three

distinct periods: October 31, 2000 to January 30, 2002; June 15, 2004 to April 2, 2008; and December 4,

2010 to May 31, 2011.

16

9. Main Beneficiaries. There is no reference to beneficiaries in the Report and

Recommendation of the President of the IDA to the Executive Directors.4 The items

Beneficiaries and Poverty read ―Not Applicable‖ in the Credit and Project Summary of

the same document. However, from the description of the components, the main

beneficiaries would be the national road construction industry, the road users,

professional transporters, and farmers.

1.4 Original Components (as approved)

10. There were two components, an investment component and an adjustment

component. The latter consisted of four credit tranches with release conditions (cf.

paragraph 6) for a total amount of SDR 72.3 million later increased to SDR 116.49

million. The former, for an amount of SDR 58.3 million consisted of five components.5

Component A - Road Construction, Rehabilitation and Maintenance; Component B -

Road Transport; Component C - Urban Transport; Component D - Port; and Component

E - Transport Sector Administration. Each component contained sub-components as

shown in the table below.

Table 5: Original Components

Component Activities

I. Component A

Road Construction,

Rehabilitation and

Maintenance

1 (a) Routine maintenance 5,300 km paved roads, 62,750

km unpaved roads

(b) Periodic maintenance unpaved roads:

(i) full or spot regravelling 14,800 km

(ii) Spot improvement 59,700 km

(iii)construction/rehabilitation 1,600 small bridges &

culverts

(c) Rehabilitation 470 km paved roads

(d) Construction 175 km paved roads

2 (a) Strengthening capacity of agency responsible for

management and maintenance operations

(b) Developing/ strengthening capacity of Small and

Medium Enterprises (SME) to carry out maintenance

works

3 Work Supervision and engineering studies for

construction roads and bridges, rehabilitation paved roads

and annual road maintenance program

4 Report No. P-7250-IVC dated May 28, 1998.

5 From the DCA.

17

I. Component B

Road Transport

1

(a) Updating of legal, regulatory and institutional

transport framework

(b) Dissemination of revised legislation regulations

among staff responsible for transport matters

(c) Dissemination of revised legislation regulations

among public

2

(a) Streamlining of road control procedures for

improving traffic flow

(b) Carrying out sensitization and media campaigns to

enhance transparency of road control procedures

(c) Rehabilitation and equipping both control posts and

security corridors

3

(a) Provision of (Technical Assistance) TA services and

training to professional organizations of road

transporters to improve their performance

(b) Rehabilitation of:

(i) Driver training center

(ii) Training center for driving schools teachers

4

(a) Carrying out a study on technical specs for

construction and equipping of road transport stations

(b) Study for preparing bidding documents for

concessioning of transport stations to private

operators

5 Carrying study on optimum level of taxes and user

charges for road users.

1.5 Revised Components

11. In October 1999, a fifth sub-component ―artificial reef pilot‖ was added to

Component E and removed in December 2001 while the following components/sub-

components were added at the same time:

Table 6: Revised Components Activities


I. Component A

Road Construction,

Rehabilitation and

Maintenance

4 (a) Formulating a rural road maintenance strategy

involving local communities.

(b) Rehabilitation, periodic and routine maintenance on

400 km of rural road.

(c) Preparing, coordinating and implementing this

subcomponent through the rural road unit of

Directorate of Highways and Urban Roads (Direction

des Routes et Voiries DRV)

V. Component E

Transport Sector

Administration

5 Studies and seminars on linkages between transport and

poverty, establish an action plan to reduce poverty

[(contribution to Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

(PRSP)].

18

VI. Component F

Poverty and HIV-

AIDS

1 Study of the impact of HIV/AIDS in the transport sector,

sensitization activities to mitigate impact through

trainings, seminars and condoms distribution.

2 Strengthening of the Coordinating Unit for Implementing

this component through purchase of equipment.

VII. Component G

Civil Aviation

1 Rehabilitation of Sub-regional Center for Aviation

Medicine (ANAC), 6 km fencing and rehabilitation fire

engines parks at Felix Houphouet Boigny International

Airport (FHB) International Airport.

2 Draft new code of civil aviation, establish new financing

mechanisms of the sector, restructure ANAC and Airport

Management and Meteorology Company (Société

d’Exploitation des Aérodromes et de la Météorologie

SODEXAM), evaluate progress achieved in safety,

security, train staff on security issues, dissemination of

safety concepts, and organize publicity campaign for

users.

3 Purchase equipment for crisis command center at FHB

and Accident Investigation Bureau, purchase equipment

for secondary airports.

12. In June 2003, all components but Component A were closed. Component A was

revised to reflect the country’s situation, essentially the fact that the northern area was out

of the control of the government and therefore inaccessible for the project. In September

2008, Component A was restructured and a Component B Transport Sector

administration which focused on Road Safety was added as presented in the table below.

Component A (1) was divided into a firm tranche of 50 bridges and a conditional tranche

of 10 bridges pending available resources—this point was specified in aide-memoires but

not in the formal restructuring letter sent to the Minister of Finance.

Table 7: Revised Components A and B


Component A

Road Construction,

Rehabilitation and

Maintenance

(AGEROUTE)

(a) Construction of about 60 bridges across the country

(b) DES for 10 bridges notably in Northern and Western regions

(c) supervision of bridge construction

(d) Strengthening capacity of Road Agency (Agence de Gestion

des Routes AGEROUTE) through TA and equipment

(e) Strengthening capacity of local contractors to carry out road

maintenance works

(f) Coordination of project activities

Component B

Transport Sector

Administration

(OSER)

(a) Rehabilitation of the OSER Road Safety Training Center

(b) Rehabilitation of the Grand Bassam bus station

(c) Creation of a road accident database

(d) Capacity building of Road Safety Office (Office de Sécurité

Routière OSER)

19

1.6 Other significant changes

13. In 2000, the donors who committed to fund the program in 1998 canceled their

support because of the country deep political crisis [French Development Agency (AFD),

European Union (EU) and Japan]. The German Development Agency (KFW) however,

maintained its support but it was not used as originally intended.

14. In June 2003, the SDR 7 million floating tranche of the adjustment component

was canceled. In June 2011, the proceeds of the investment component were reallocated

to fund the acquisition of equipment and the carrying out of an updated transport sector

strategy.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design, and Quality at Entry

15. The background analysis was thorough and involved numerous experts and field

missions over a 10-year preparation period. Still project design was overambitious; it

exceeded the financial and human capacity available in the country and prescribed a

project implementation period that was too short to meaningfully achieve the institutional

reforms which were contemplated. Yet these points were noted during appraisal,

concerns were raised about the absorptive capacity of the Small and Medium Enterprises

(SME) in terms of qualified labor, equipment and access to credit; about the time

necessary for the Directorate of Highways and Urban Roads (DRV) to successfully

complete its profound restructuring; and about the financing gap in the road investment

component. Because of the short implementation period, too many results were expected

to materialize almost at the same time whereas in reality the change process is more

sequential. For example, a more effective road administration, leads to a more reliable

database, which leads to a tighter monitoring, in turn leading to more efficient works

management, which leads to better road condition.

16. A series of reform initiatives were launched during project preparation, but the

hard ones did not progress far enough for the project to be successfully implemented.

Therefore, a long list of conditions was imposed before negotiations, board presentation,

and effectiveness. Some of these conditions were postponed or were dropped after

negotiations - the completion of the lay-off plan for DRV, the effective privatization of

the Public Works Equipment Directorate (DMTP), the strengthening program of DRV,

and the advance funding mechanism from the Treasury to secure a fast payment of

contractors’ invoices. Inasmuch as the technical preparation was thorough, the

macroeconomic and fiscal analysis did not adequately flag the severe budget constraints

and liquidity problems that made the government incapable of fulfilling its funding

commitments right from the project start. Furthermore, the Integrated Public Finance

Management System (SIGFIP) start-up problems which affected the budget flow appear

to have been overlooked or underestimated.

20

17. Although the Government’s commitment seemed to be strong during the

preparation period, once project implementation started it waned. The project team

should have been more candid in its assessment of the real ownership of government of

the reform agenda that the project was supporting and could have been more realistic in

the objectives that the project was supposed to achieve. Furthermore, the team could have

done a more thorough assessment of the quality of governance in the sector to ensure

successful implementation of the investment component. The risk analysis identified the

right potential risks, most of which did materialize. The mitigation factors were

essentially the conditions attached to the release of the adjustment tranches, an instrument

that had been widely used by the Bank at the time to promote reforms. In reality, it did

not work as expected since the tranches, other than the floating tranche, were then

released with conditions partially fulfilled or changed altogether.

18. Nevertheless, Quality at Entry was rated Satisfactory (S) after a detailed review

undertaken by the Quality Assurance Group (QAG /QEA).

2.2 Major Factors Affecting Implementation

19. Project implementation got off to a slow start due to budget management issues

and the unresponsiveness of DRV. In December 1999, one year after the project was

declared effective, a military coup was staged, the harbinger of a socio-political crisis that

would negatively affect the country for more than ten years (cf. Timeline in Annex 8).

The country then defaulted on its debt service commitment and the project was

suspended from October 2001 through January 2002. In September 2002, a second coup

attempt followed by a civil war cut the country in two leaving only the southern half of

the national territory under government control. From June 2004 until April 2008, the

country fell again into non-accrual status and the project was suspended. It was

reactivated and restructured in September 2008 and experienced a new suspension from

December 2010 until May 2011 following a post election crisis and civil war upheaval.

Altogether the project was suspended for six years. Thirteen different governments were

sworn in over the project period which saw the rotation of six Finance Ministers, six

Infrastructure Ministers and eleven Transport Ministers.

20. Within the above cited context, the implementation of the project can be broken

down into three key periods: the first period until the major restructuring of 2003, the

second until the restructuring/reactivation of 2008, and the third until project closing in

August 2011. The review of the first period can be further divided into the investment

part and the adjustment part—there was no more adjustment part after the 2003

restructuring. Details of performance per component can be found in the project’s

implementation status reports and Aide memoires.

21. September 1998 to June 2003 – Investment Part

(a) Context. Economic and financial crises followed the political crisis of

December 1999 and October 2000, they were marked by decline in

21

investment, drop in public expenditure and household consumption and

increase of internal budgetary arrears, and they led to slowdown in

implementation; by December 2001 four different ministers of transport had

been appointed; disbursements were suspended from October 2000 until

January 2002; implementation picked up in 2002 although with some

serious disruption due to the civil war and the ensuing split of the country in

September 2002.

(b) Poor financial management system. The public financial management

system was slow and complex and counterpart funds were inadequate. There

was uncertainty in the release of funds allocated to road maintenance as they

were combined to the counterpart funds and as such managed by a Public

Debt officer. The approval process of contractors’ monthly payment

certificates was lengthy and generated arrears; there were inconsistency

issues between SIGFIP and CI-PAST budgeting.

(c) Weak road construction industry. Contractors were reluctant to sign a

contract in an uncertain political and budgetary situation and growing

payment arrears, the quality of works executed by SMEs was poor and the

training program and access to credit were limited.

(d) Unresponsiveness of DRV. The DRV balked at executing its new

mandate/mission resulting from its restructuring; by June 2002.

(e) Unsatisfactory road works program. The execution of the program was

about three years behind schedule. By December 2001 only 1.5 percent of

the project funds allocated to road works had been disbursed, however this

number increased to 37 percent by June 2003. The contracts in the northern

area out of government control since September 2002 had to be

reprogrammed in the south, and the government had to remove from the

work program the construction of new roads that did not meet the minimum

12 percent IRR.

(f) Actions taken to resolve problems. An advance funding mechanism (régie

d’avance) was set up in October 2003 and successfully speeds up

disbursements. The defective financial management software was replaced

in 2000.

22. Mid Term Review (MTR) (June 2001). The MTR was carried out at the end of

June 2001. It found that the project objectives were still relevant and recommended to:

(a) simplify the logical framework; (b) create a second generation Road Maintenance

Fund to generate sustained resources for road maintenance without transiting through the

national budget, and a Road Authority to manage the road work program; (c) include a

social assessment in the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA); and (d) recruit an

environmental/social expert in the PCU. Upon request from the government, the project

was restructured to add a rural transport, a transport and poverty, an HIV/AIDS, and a

22

civil aviation components (or subcomponents as the case may be) and to increase the

disbursement percentages for civil works from 70 to 80 percent to address a systemic lack

of counterpart funds.

23. September 1998 to June 2003 – Adjustment part. The fulfillment of the

conditions of effectiveness ipso facto authorized the release of the first tranche in

November 1998 (cf. tables in paragraph 6). It must be noted that the most critical

condition, i.e. the liquidation of all the heavy civil engineering equipment of the

Directorate of Public Works Equipment (DMTP), was barely met despite the fact that this

condition had been watered down after appraisal. The second tranche was released in

April 2000 with two conditions (No. 3 and 8) waived and not met later on, and one

condition (No. 7) was partially met. The third tranche was released in January 2002 after

conditions No. 1 to 3 had been modified in December 2001 (the original conditions were

not met), and condition No. 4 had been waived and transferred to the floating tranche.

The floating tranche was canceled by June 2003 restructuring, consistent with the closing

of all the reform related components of the investment part. At that time, out of seven

conditions, only condition No. 2 had been met. The Bank granted additional funding from

the so-called Fifth Dimension6, to adjustment tranches 1 to 3 raising their combined

disbursed amount to SDR 109,490,000 compared to SDR 58,300,000 available for the

investment part (a 65/35 percentage ratio). However, since the country economic

situation was poor that the additional budget support was mostly used for general

expenditures without any contribution to road maintenance which saw its funding dip

well below the minimum amount prescribed at project negotiations.

24. June 2003 to September 2008.

(a) Context. The project was completely restructured in June 2003 and was then

suspended for more than four years from June 2004 until September 2008.

(b) Restructuring. All components but component A were closed; however it

could not be formally revised before the project was suspended in June 2004.

(c) Project implementation over the period. The project was consistently rated

Satisfactory until May 2005. During this period the investment part

experienced its highest disbursement rate (US$42 million in 17 months)—

eligible disbursements made during the suspension period were reimbursed

after the project was reactivated. The rating was downgraded to Moderately

6 The economic performance of Côte d’Ivoire, a former International Bank for Reconstruction and

Development (IBRD) borrower, was downgraded soon before project start allowing the country to qualify

for IDA lending. As a result, it benefited from a partial reimbursement of its IBRD interest payments as did

other countries in the same situation at the time. This mechanism was called the Fifth Dimension and

adjustment tranches were the preferred instruments to channel these reimbursements.

23

Unsatisfactory in May 2005 and to Unsatisfactory in September 2005

reflecting the inability of the Ministry of Finance to fund the Road

Maintenance Fund and the standstill of physical progress due to the

compounded effect of the political crisis and the project suspension.

(d) Actions taken to resolve project implementation matters. The project team

kept the lines of communication open with the counterparts open at all times

and updated an action plan for the disbursement of the credit balance to

make it readily available for implementation as soon as the suspension

would be lifted.

25. September 2008 to August 2011.

(a) Context. The project was reactivated and restructured in September 2008

after the political crisis reached a positive outcome and the country was

reunited in a run up to new presidential elections. However, those elections

were delayed until November 2010 and followed by a new crisis and a

violent armed conflict which was finally resolved in April 2011. The project

was again suspended from December 2010 through May 2011.

(b) Restructuring. The road investment component was updated in September

2008 to reflect the pressing post-conflict infrastructure needs of the country

and a road safety component with an institutional dimension was added.

Disbursements made during the previous suspension period were reviewed

and only eligible expenditures were reimbursed. Another minor

restructuring was made in June 2011 to fund the replacement of looted

equipment and office buildings of the executing agencies.

(c) Project implementation ratings over the period. The ratings improved

consistently from Moderately Satisfactory to Satisfactory.

(d) Actions taken to resolve problems. The project was extended for one year in

August 2010 and was slightly restructured in June 2011 to give the

executing agencies the means for successfully completing the infrastructure

works critical for post-conflict recovery.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

26. M&E Design. Whereas the indicators and the targets were appropriate and

relevant although missing base line figures, there was little concern about which

executing agency would be responsible for their monitoring and whether they had the

capacity and the willingness to do so. Yet, in a context of reforms and potential

discontent and resistance, this aspect was even more critical. The actual expenditures for

road works were tracked under the adjustment part until 1999. However, this should have

been monitored under the investment part for the whole project duration as it is much

more telling than budget entries. Some targets were optimistic because improvements

24

come in sequence and not at the same time (DRV and road condition). The tranche

release conditions for the adjustment part were unequivocal and relevant.

27. M&E Implementation. The M&E framework was not systematically

implemented and is absent from the ISRs until sequence 26 when the new format was

introduced. It mostly served as a guide to assess the PDO ratings over the project life.

Pieces of the framework have been used in a few aide memoires to build up a remedial

action plan. It appears that some information required in the M&E framework were not

readily available and proved difficult to obtain, in particular the annual budget allocations

for various types of road works and the corresponding expenditures. To this date, it is

close to impossible to find meaningful detailed public finance data at the Ministry of

Finance. Some were obtained from the executing agencies but are fragmentary. The

M&E framework was not updated following the successive restructurings except for the

last one in September 2008. The monitoring framework of the adjustment part was

partially waived and substantially modified for the second and third tranches.

28. M&E Utilization. Until the June 2003 restructuring, the M&E framework was

more used to monitor the project implementation pace than the attainment of the

development objectives. This was especially the case for the adjustment part. Following

the September 2008 restructuring, the M&E framework was updated to reflect the drastic

change in project scope. Subsequently, great efforts were committed by PCU to measure

and monitor the indicators, and data were collected for all indicators.

2.4 Safeguards and Fiduciary Compliance

29. Safeguards. The Environment Category was rated B at appraisal. Safeguards

compliance was moderately satisfactory. By MTR in June 2001, most environmental and

social safeguard activities were lagging behind due to weak safeguard capacity of PCU

and implementing agencies. It took more than three years to complete a Sectoral

Environmental Assessment7 (SEA) that was due by the end of the first year of project

implementation. Nonetheless by the end of the project and in spite of numerous

interruptions (cf. paragraph 19), the social and environmental management capacity was

significantly strengthened in all implementing agencies: The PCU was staffed with a

socio-environmental expert, an environmental unit was established within DRV and

progressively staffed and equipped, and the Port of Abidjan created a well-staffed

environmental unit in compliance with the MARPOL8 convention. A major outcome of

the project is the general mainstreaming of safeguards in road contracts in Cote d’Ivoire.

7 Some environmental assessment work was done during project preparation in May 1998, but that was

clearly not enough to be in compliance with the World Bank Safeguard Policies and with the EA regulation

in force in Cote d'Ivoire. AFTES management at the time requested a SEA to be done in the first year of

project.

8 International Convention for Actions against Pollution through Ship Wastes.

25

30. Financial Management. During the first leg of project implementation, i.e.

before the June 2003 restructuring, the financial management was inadequate and failed

to accurately capture the disbursements by components – the numerous changes in

components had a compounding effect. During the second leg of implementation,

financial management was rated satisfactory. The Coordination Unit (CI-PAST) acted

effectively and the quarterly Financial Monitoring Reports were received regularly and in

compliance with the agreed format.

31. Procurement. The overall procurement performance under the project was

moderately satisfactory. Until 2003, the weak procurement capacity generated delays in

the execution of the investment part of the program and significantly hampered project

implementation. However, by project closing, the capacity of the staff of the executing

agencies was considerably strengthened thanks to intensive training in procurement for

works and consultant services. As a result, procurement performance improved

significantly.

2.5 Expected Next Phase/Follow-up Operation

32. A follow up operation is under preparation. The proposed project concept aims at

addressing short term emergency infrastructure needs that will directly support the peace

process through the provision of basic infrastructure services. Furthermore, the new

government is now considering adopting a more aggressive investment policy and

launching a large investment program to repair and upgrade the road network to support

agricultural exports and to reconnect communities affected by a decade of civil war. This

large investment program will require the financing support of the donor community

including the Bank. It will succeed if the road maintenance reform is completed, road

transport regulations are implemented, illegal roadblocks are eradicated, arrears are paid

to the construction industry, and above all it is championed by a government decision

maker. In other words, a follow up investment program would run significant risks of

failure if the fragile reforms initiated under the CI-PAST were not strengthened. Thus

Bank should incorporate the completion of a few of these reforms in the new operation if

it chooses to assist the new government in its investment program.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

33. The original PDO remained relevant at the closing date. However, in retrospect

the project design was overly complex and beyond the reach of the implementing

agencies while the counterpart financial requirements were unrealistic. The revised PDO

and restructured design remained relevant at the closing date as the need to reconnect

isolated rural communities continued to increase after 2008 following a long period of

neglect of road maintenance resulting in cut off land communications. The road safety

component logically completed the upgrading of road infrastructure to improve a critical

downside of road transport services in Cote d’Ivoire. These activities were aligned with

the post-conflict recovery strategy developed by the Borrower with the support of the

26

Bank, and the implementation arrangements capitalized upon the demonstrated capacity

of the AGEROUTE and the PCU under MIE.

3.2 Achievement of Program Development Objectives

34. The PDO revised in September 2008 was substantially achieved as evidenced by

the status of the following eight KPI at the closing date; the outcome is rated Satisfactory:

(a) 76 bridges completed out of an initial target of 60 (although not formally

specified in the restructuring letter, the target of 60 was mutually agreed and

specified in the aide memoires );

(b) three large bridges studies completed out of 10 (same comment as under (a)

above);

(c) The rehabilitation of the road safety training center is completed;

(d) The rehabilitation of the bus station in Grand Bassam is completed;

(e) No representatives of SMEs have been trained;

(f) The annual reduction of accident rates at the Grand Bassam bus station

could not be measured as the rehabilitation works were only completed by

the project closing date;

(g) Environmental safeguards mitigation measures have been incorporated in

the bridge contracts; and

(h) Contractors’ payments have been made within four days on average (from

the receipt of the approved monthly payment certificate by AGEROUTE).

35. In contrast the original PDO had not been achieved in September 2008 when the

project was deeply restructured and the PDO revised. The status of the KPI is split

between the investment component which remained in force until 2008 and the

institutional components which were formally closed in 2003. Details can be found in the

attached ―Status of the KPI in August 2011‖.

36. Investment component. Government expenditures on routine road maintenance

were well below target. Very little was spent until 2004 and compared to the target

amount of CFAF 12,495 million in 2002, the amounts spent were respectively CFAF 350

million in 2004; CFAF 3,500 million in 2005; CFAF 2,900 million in 2006; CFAF

14,300 million in 2007; and CFAF 7,400 million in 2008. It is difficult to figure out how

much was spent on the other type of works specified in the M&E framework because

such budgetary details are not available9. As far as the project itself is concerned (as

9

Whereas the 1998 and 1999 allocations for road maintenance and rehabilitation works met the

requirements, the actual spending was way below. One condition related to the actual spending was indeed

waived and the other was removed and replaced.

27

opposed to the program monitored in the M&E framework), the overall achievements

under the investment component are much lower than the planned quantities as shown in

the Table 8.

37. No new paved roads were constructed, the combined routine and periodic

maintenance planned quantities were only 1.5 percent achieved (2,080 km), the

construction of bridges was three percent achieved (1), the construction of culverts was

about 69 percent achieved (10,667) after conversion of the installed drainage pipes into

culverts (10 ml of drainage pipe per one culvert), while the rehabilitation of paved roads

was not achieved. As a matter of fact, for rehabilitation of paved roads, the achievement

indicated in the table below is misleading because the nature of the works which were

executed where not really road rehabilitation but simply emergency pothole patching.

The maintenance works undertaken on unpaved roads did not last nor contributed to

improving roads condition in the long run because they were not supported by annual

routine maintenance funding nor repeated at regular intervals. The interventions carried

out on paved roads were lightweight and most likely 50 percent of these interventions did

not last as they were not followed by routine or periodic maintenance. As a result of the

above, the overall outcome of the investment component under the original PDO is rated

Unsatisfactory (U).

Table 8: Investment Component Results

38. Adjustment components. Based on the June 2003 status of the institutional

reforms and the fulfillment of the conditions for release of the adjustment tranches (cf.

paragraph 6), the outcome of the adjustment components is rated Moderately

Unsatisfactory, if one takes into account the fulfillment of a few key conditions of the

floating tranche [Urban Transport Agency (AGETU)], Road Safety Office (OSER),

Maritime Code, and law governing passengers and freight transportation) and the fact

that the restructuring of the civil aviation sector was successfully completed including the

continued satisfactory management of Felix Houphouet Boigny (FHB) airport through a

concession signed before the project. In contrast to the investment component, the

Investment Component as of September 2008

Type of works Unit Planned Achieved Rate%

Routine

maintenance

Paved Km 5,300 - -

Unpaved Km 62,750 - -

Periodic

Maintenance

unpaved

Regravelling Km 14,800

2,080 3 Spot

improvement

Km 59,700

Culverts Nbr 1,600 27 2

Drain pipes Ml - 10,650 67

Rehabilitation Unpaved Km - 454

Paved Km 470 (4,144)

New Construction Paved Roads Km 175 - -

Bridges Nbr 30 1 3

28

institutional reforms which were achieved under the project are expected to last. As a

matter of fact, they were still in force at project closing and are likely to be sustained

provided they are fully completed; i.e. the funding mechanism of the Road Fund needs to

be improved to ensure a better match between road maintenance needs and resources and

a retrenchment plan of redundant DRV staff should be elaborated and executed.

39. The combined outcome rating (investment and adjustment) for the original PDO

is Unsatisfactory.

3.3 Efficiency

40. Improved operational efficiencies. Efficiency improvements caused by the

implementation of institutional reforms supported by the project have not been measured

in economic terms (cost-effectiveness/least cost), but in terms of gains in procedural,

process and service efficiency. With the creation of AGEROUTE, efficiency increases10

have been achieved in the awarding, supervision, and payment of Road Fund contracts, in

the programming of Annual Road Maintenance and in the production of technical and

financial audits. Although its funding is largely insufficient to meet overall maintenance

needs, the newly created Road Fund is improving its financing and control mechanisms.

This is expected to lead to the strengthening of the institution’s financial viability and

long-term sustainability. For land transport services, the creation of SONATT has

improved the quality of services for end users. As a matter of fact, modernization of

drivers’ licenses and vehicles’ registration are now more effective, reliable and secured.

41. Economic analysis. At appraisal, the Economic Internal Rate of Return was

calculated for the roads rehabilitation and construction component. However, this

component was entirely changed by the September 2008 restructuring while the expected

road rehabilitation and construction works had never started, making it impossible to

calculate an ex-post economic analysis of the same. The investment component first

concentrated on hot spot removal and cross drainage structures along paved and unpaved

roads and then, after the restructuring, on the construction/reconstruction of critical small

bridges in rural areas to unlock agricultural production zones. No ex-ante economic

evaluation had been calculated for these investments. This is why, at completion, the best

alternative to an economic analysis is a socio-economic impact analysis to measure the

benefits for local communities and farmers in the area of influence of the project. Data on

social impacts and economic benefits were collected.

42. On one hand, with the construction of 76 small bridges, 12,000 concrete culverts

and 5,000 steel culverts, the project helped connect 20 rural districts with all-season

access roads, covering an area of influence where more than 650,000 people have seen

10

Thanks to European assistance program, AGEROUTE was able to improve its capacity in planning,

procurement and supervision of road maintenance contracts. However, the country’s past political

instability and financial constraints were not conducive of an environment that could reinforce its

autonomy.

29

their mobility improve significantly giving them increased access to employment,

education and social services.

43. On the other hand, the benefits resulting from connecting agricultural production

zones are substantial, both in terms of product distribution and financial revenues. The

reopened rural roads have allowed the movement of over 430,000 tons of agricultural

products per year with higher farm prices because improved accessibility has generated

more competition and increased demand. The corresponding additional revenues to the

farmers are estimated around CFAF 5 billion annually (US$10 million). This amount

represents: (a) the value of the additional production that can now be shipped and

commercialized plus (b) the incremental value of crops thanks to a higher farmer’s price.

Assuming that these roads will continue to be maintained, a conservative 20-year life

cycle of the structures built, and a continued agriculture production, the net present value

(NPV) over 20 years discounted at 8 percent is around US$150 million or about three

times the cost of the investment.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

44. In September 2008, when the PDO was revised, US$205 million had been

disbursed of which US$60 million on the investment part. This means that 85 percent

was disbursed before the PDO was revised. When applying the guidelines for outcome

rating of projects with formally revised PDO, the overall outcome scores 2.5, which is

equivalent to Unsatisfactory/Moderately Unsatisfactory. This rating is negatively affected

by the heavy relative weight of the adjustment part (US$145.6 million versus US$95

million for the investment part). If one restricts the calculation of the overall outcome to

the investment part only, the resulting rating slightly increases to Moderately

Unsatisfactory.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts11

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

45. The project completed the construction or the rehabilitation of a total of 76

bridges which have lifted out of isolation about 650,000 people from poor rural

communities and opened access to productive agricultural areas. The aggregate quantity

of agricultural products shipped on roads made accessible was about 430,000 tons in

2011.

11

The ISR rating for the DO at ICR stage is Unsatisfactory different from the rating in the Datasheet.

The system generates the Satisfactory rating as per last ISR archived before the closing date of the project

on August 31, 2011. Since the last ISR was done after the closing date, the system did not pick it up.

(Refers to section 3.4 in main document page 22 and section C3 in data sheet)

30

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

46. Numbers of institutional changes have been initiated by the project, namely: the

Road Maintenance Fund (FER); the Roads Agency (AGEROUTE); the National Land

Transport Agency (SONATT) further to reorganization of Directorate for Land Transport

(DGTTC); and the Urban Transport Agency (AGETU). Although all these agencies are

operational and are likely to remain, they require further support to ensure their

sustainability. This is particularly the case for AGEROUTE, FER and AGETU.

3.5 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

47. This is a core ICR which does not require a beneficiary survey/stakeholder

workshop.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

Rating: Significant

48. The overall risk to development outcome has been calculated on the basis of the

table below.

Table 9: Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Risk Probability Impact Result

Road Maintenance Fund continues to be underfunded,

road maintenance continues to underperform, and road

network continues to deteriorate.

M H Significant

Road maintenance reform is not completed, overlap

between RMF and AGEROUTE persists, and role and

function of Highway Administration is not clarified.

M M Moderate

Respective roles of SONATT and DGTTC are not

clarified.

H M Significant

OSER is not restructured. H M Significant

Maritime Code and Merchant Navy Code are not voted

by the Parliament.

H M Significant

Government does not settle the arrears to the

construction industry.

H H High

Role and resources of AGEROUTE are not clarified. H M Significant

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

31

49. The technical preparation was thorough and of high quality; however it took about

ten years and in retrospect was not cost effective, misjudged the governments true

commitment to institutional reform, failed to properly assess the severe budget crisis that

impaired implementation from the start, and overestimated the capacity on the ground to

implement an already highly complex and demanding project. Moreover, the M&E

framework was overly complex, lacking base line, aggregated indicators, and

implementation arrangements (cf. paragraph. 15-17).

(b) Quality of Supervision

Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

50. The supervision of the investment part was responsive, proactive and sustained

despite the very difficult context. ―Reverse‖12

supervision missions were organized

during the project suspension periods or during periods when security measures would

prevent Bank staff from traveling to Cote d’Ivoire; the MTR was actually organized in

country during a period of suspension. The frequency of the missions and the thorough

result-oriented aide memoires testify to the quality of the supervision of the investment

part which is rated Satisfactory. The supervision of the adjustment part was carried out

during the same supervision missions with an equal level of scrutiny and detail. However,

the resulting decisions were influenced by political-economy considerations, in particular

the need for the country to rapidly improve its financial situation, which affected the rigor

of the evaluation of the adjustment tranches and somehow discredited the use of an

adjustment instrument to promote sector reforms (cf. paragraph 23). The supervision of

the adjustment part is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory and the overall supervision is rated

Moderately Satisfactory.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance


51. The quality of supervision was mixed (MS) while the quality of preparation was

Moderately Unsatisfactory.

5.2 Borrower Performance

(a) Government Performance


12

A limited government team would come to Washington or both teams would meet halfway in Paris at

the Bank office.

32

52. The government did not either follow up actively on the reform program or fulfill

its financial commitment, was impaired by a political crisis throughout project

implementation, and struggled with budget management. However, this unsatisfactory

performance is tempered by the institutional reforms achievements and the proactive

attitude of MIE to reverse the setbacks of DRV.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance

Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

53. The review is mixed. The PCU performed well after a few start up problems. The

Road Fund and the Road Authority performed as well as they could given the lack of

government counterpart funds and investment budget; and OSER performed well.

However, during the September 1998 to June 2003 period, DRV (the agency in charge

before AGEROUTE was created) performed poorly, and the performance of many other

implementing agencies under the Ministry of Transport was hovering between

Moderately Satisfactory and Moderately Unsatisfactory.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance


54. The relatively good performance (MS) of the implementing agencies (MIE, PCU,

Road Fund, Road Authority and OSER) is undermined by marginal Government’s

performance, thus justifying the Moderately Unsatisfactory rating for overall Borrower

performance.

6. Lessons Learned

55. The following lessons were learned from this project:

(a) The macroeconomic context and the status of public/sectoral finances

should be carefully assessed during the preparation of transformational

projects to ensure adequate funding and financial coverage during

implementation;

(b) The preparation and implementation of a project should be cognizant of the

political economy factors affecting it but at the same should primarily focus

on the objectives, components and activities supported by the project.

(c) Assurance of continued support to institutional reforms in the medium term

should be sought in the form of adequate personnel and funding and

compliance with the legal framework;

(d) The M&E framework should be simple, easily implementable without too

much reliance on project funding, and the Borrower should see a clear

benefit in implementing it;

(e) The government should identify and empower a champion to push through

sectoral reforms through entrenched vested interests;

33

(f) The Bank’s added value is to facilitate the implementation of institutional

reform by leveraging its global experience of reforms;

(g) It is paramount to keep communication lines open with the counterparts

during periods of political crisis or project suspension;

(h) Project design and objectives should be kept simple with a focus on

implementability.

(i) Complex hybrid projects support both investment and ambitious sectoral

reforms should only be used were this strong ownership and strong capacity

to implement.

(j) It is important to quickly restructure a project that is no longer in tune with

the reality on the ground even if it happens early in project implementation;

(k) Careful consideration should be given to keep a project open during difficult

country circumstances to ensure continuity in dialogue with Government

and to allow for quick emergency response needed for reconstruction efforts

versus preparing an emergency operation.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners

(a) Borrower/Implementing agencies

(b) Co financiers

56. All the co-financiers were contacted including KFW, but no comments were received.

(c) Other partners and stakeholders (e.g. NGOs/private sector/civil society)

34

Annex 1: Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

Table 1: Task Team members

Names Title Unit Responsibility/Specialty

Lending

Michel Audige Consultant SASDT

Alexandre Dossou Sr. Transport specialist AFTTR

Patrick Bultynck Sr. Urban Transport

specialist AFTTR

Renee Desclaux Sr. Finance Officer AFCGH

Alaleh Motamedi Sr. Procurement

Analyst OPCR

Isaac Claude De Operations Officer AFTTR

Jocelyne Do

Sacramento Operation Analyst AFTTR

Brigitta Mitchell Sr. Transport

Economist

Jean-Noel Guillossou Program Manager AFTTR

Patrick Fourgeaud Sr. Port Specialist

Pierre Pozzo Di Borgo Principal Investment

Officer CN2SI

Bhanoumatee Ayoung Lead Procurement

Specialist OPCPR

Hubert Nove-Josserand Operations Adviser SACIN

Robert Robelus Consultant AFTWR

Supervision/ICR

Ernestina Aboah-Ndow Program Assistant AFCW1

Jean-Noel Guillossou Sr. Transport Specialist AFTTR

Siele Silue Sr. Transport Specialist EASIN

Ibou Diouf Sr. Transport Specialist AFTTR

Alexandre Dossou Sr. Transport Specialist AFTTR

Alain L. Labeau Consultant SASFP

Marie-France Anet Procurement Assistant AFCF2

Raj Soopramanien Lawyer LEGAF

Africa Eshogba

Olojoba

Senior Environmental

Specialist

AFTFM

Saidou Diop Sr Financial

Management Specialist

AFTFM

Maurice Adoni Senior Procurement

Specialist

AFTPC

Bjoern Stafbom ETWTR

Papa Mamadou Fall Transport Specialist AFTTR

35

Kignopron Coulibaly Program Assistant AFCF2

Mariame Bamba Team Assistant AFCF2

Felly Kaboyo Operations Analyst AFTTR

Daniel M. Sellen Sector Leader LCSSD

Haccandy Yao Alexis Agriculture Economist AFTAR

Lydie Anne Billey Program Assistant AFTTR

Table 2: Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle

Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of staff weeks

USD Thousands

(including travel and

consultant costs)

Lending

FY87 25.44

FY88 30.82

FY89 25.43

FY90 37.18

FY91 39.81

FY92 144.89

FY93 71.25

FY94 7.69

FY95 24.35

FY96 268.95

FY97 397.04

FY98 179.29

FY99 7.83

FY00 1.10

Total: 1261.07

Supervision/ICR

FY98 41.21

FY99 138.11

FY00 221.93

FY01 130.87

FY02 130.54

FY03 83.02

FY04 125.53

FY05 67.94

FY06 27.91

FY07 8.96

FY08 81.06

http://wbsearch.worldbank.org/people?title=Operations+Analyst&bl=Operations+Analyst

36

FY09 135.59

FY10 66.34

FY11 23.52

FY12 53.43

Total: 1335.96

37

Annex 2: Beneficiary Survey Results

(NA)

38

Annex 3: Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results

(NA)

39

Annex 4: Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Overall, the government is more positive than the Bank in regards to the project’s

performance and results. As a matter of fact the government ratings are as follows:

project’s outcomes are Moderately Satisfactory; Bank performance is rated Satisfactory;

and Borrower’s performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory.

1. Project implementation: results and performance

1.1.Project global performance

2. Project global performance is rather average in so far as most project objectives

have not be achieved, despite the extended timeframe of the project’s implementation (13

years instead of three, although the implementation period included a cumulative duration

of 72 months of suspension (six years). In fact, the evaluation of the institutional reforms

related to road maintenance and financing (Component A), which is considered as one of

the key pillars of the program, did not meet expectations, as it did not permit to

significantly improve the quality and efficiency of core national road network , which is

currently in a dire condition. Concerning the institutional reforms under the other

components (B, C, D, E, F and G), results are also overall moderately satisfactory. Those

components were closed in 2003, while the project was in progress, for insufficient

results.

1.2. Bank Performance

3. Overall, Bank performance is rated satisfactory. In fact, in a context of a recurrent

crisis, Bank contribution helped the government to launch/implement major reforms for

transport sector and eventually, to leverage important resources through budget support

(more than US$100 million).

2. Borrower’s Performance

4. Borrower’s overall performance is moderately satisfactory. That’s because the

socioeconomic/political crisis context which prevailed during the project implementation

was not conducive to performance, despite the government’s willingness and

commitment which improved the project implementation status (for example measures

taken to improve project financial management).

5. In fact, initial project implementation timeframe could not be honored,

Government could not comply with Financial Agreement covenants by deadlines,

Government counterpart funds were not always made available on time, and institutional

reforms had not been always implemented as per plan.

40

3. Implementation’s agencies’ performance

6. Program Coordination Unit performance is rated satisfactory

(a) Performance in procurement is rather satisfactory. In fact, the major

delays encountered at the beginning of the project had been absorbed as the

project implementation was underway.

(b) Project financial management is satisfactory. There were neither

outstanding nor qualified audits. Moreover, the disbursement rate of 95

percent at project closure is rather commendable considering that the project

was under suspension for 6 years in aggregate.

4. Investment socioeconomic and environmental impact

7. Project socioeconomic and environmental impacts are positive and valuable,

especially with regards to benefits generated by the project, thanks to the construction of

76 bridges, as well as the installation of 12,000 concrete cross drainage pipes and 5,000

discharge pipes which maintained critical rural roads passable at all seasons.

8. Those works are scattered all over the country and will insure people accessibility

to basic services (schools, health centers, markets, production areas, etc.) and connection

between villages, rural districts, departments or regions. Report of the socioeconomic

analysis reveals the main following points:

(a) The program helped to connect a direct influence zone populated with

more than 650,000 inhabitants;

(b) The roads made accessible allowed the shipping of over 430,000 tons of

agricultural products in 2011;

(c) Benefits due to the implementation of the investment program are

valued to about CFAF 5 billion per year;

(d) The internal rate of return is estimated at 45 percent, although for N’ZI

COMOE and ZANZAN regions, the internal rate of returns is low.

5. Lessons learned

(a) Sector reforms launched through the project to support the government and

the newly created agencies have improved the transport sector efficiency

and the road maintenance management and financing framework;

(b) Despite the recurrent crisis, the government had always confirmed

support for the project and its commitment towards its implementation

with a continuous improvement of the performance status;

41

(c) Thanks to the project, the government has leveraged additional

resources amounting to US$100 million, under a budget support

mechanism; and

(d) The project has supported institutional strengthening and capacity

building in the transport sector and in the road maintenance

management and financing sub-sector.

(e) The project suffered from the complexity due to the sector wide approach,

merging investment and institutional reforms in all sub-sectors;

(f) Road maintenance and the other sub-sectors activities were unbalanced;

(g) Too much attention was paid to obtaining budget support, and not enough

attention was paid to supporting implementing agencies at the very

beginning of project implementation;

(h) The project suffered from a woefully inadequate implementation planning

of the project activities, especially the reform agenda (road maintenance

and land transport reforms); and

(i) The political crisis in Cote d’Ivoire during the past decade, that resulted in

instability at ministerial level and frequent changes of the coordinator of the

project implementation unit.

6. Conclusion and recommendations

9. For future operations similar to TSIAP-CI project, the following is

recommended:

(a) Project Coordination Unit (PCU) should be led by a champion that benefits

from a strong political support, to facilitate implementation, especially in a

context of reforms;

(b) The information and communication flow between all stakeholders is

critical in similar types of programs, in order to ensure the necessary

ownership and commitment that could guarantee achievement of the

program objectives;

(c) Assessment of human resources available to implement the project is also

critical, since qualified experts are key to projects’ implementation if the

government is in the driver seat, which should be the case under normal

circumstances; and

(d) A good communication plan and a prior agreement between the parties on

the means and objectives are necessary to achieve results on the ground.

42

Annex 5: Comments of Co-financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders

No comment received from other Co-financiers and partners/stakeholders.

43

Annex 6: List of Supporting Documents

1. Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), Report No. 17007-IVC , September 11, 1997

2. Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit to the Republic of Cote

d’Ivoire for a Transport Sector Adjustment/Investment Program, May 28, 1998

3. Development Credit Agreement (Transport Sector Adjustment/Investment

Program), September 16, 1998

4. First Agreement Amending Development Credit Agreement, December 15, 1998

5. Second Agreement Amending Development Credit Agreement, March 22, 2000

6. Harmonized Evaluation Criteria for ICR and OED Evaluations

7. Aide-mémoires and Progress Reports

8. Mid-Term Review Report

9. Status of KPI by August 2011

10. Implementation Timeline

11. TCIAP-CI, Project Global Evaluation and Completion Report, Project

Coordination Unit, August 2011

44

Annex 7: Status of KPI by August 2011

Outcomes/Impacts Monitoring Indicators

Status in 2011

2002 targets

All components, except Road Investments were cancelled in June 2003.

Road Maintenance

-Transparency of budgetary

allocations and their actual use

- More cost-effective road

maintenance using greater share of local inputs

-Gov. financed annual routine

maintenance (CFAF million) -total expenditure for backlog

maintenance

-total expenditure periodic maintenance gravel roads

-works by contract

-equipment + operating costs of road maintenance

administration

12495

5107

21124

Yes

Yes

Government funding of road maintenance was practically inexistent until 2008;

since then the annual average allocation to road maintenance is FCFA 10 billion compared to an estimated need of FCFA 40 billion. The overall condition of the

road network has worsened since 1998, today it is estimated that only 30% is in

good to fair condition. Whereas the objective of the project was to strengthen road maintenance and catch up with the maintenance backlog, the reality turned

out differently: the only repair works were funded by the project at a rate largely

below the needs and it is estimated that the country lost about CFAF 800 billion of road assets since 2000 or almost half of its worth. To put things in

perspective, Cote d’Ivoire spent less than 0.4% of its GDP on average on road

infrastructure over the last decade whereas 1.5% was required to simply maintain and slightly upgrade the network.

-Correctly maintained road

network

-Improving road condition

-manual routine maintenance A

and B class of roads (km)

- manual routine maintenance C class of roads (km)

-light grading

-regravelling A and B class of roads

-regravelling C and D class of

roads -spot maintenance C and D

class of roads -percent of paved roads with

ADT>1000 with IRI<2

- percent of paved roads with 1000>ADT>500 with IRI<2

-km w/temporary traffic

interruption on A, B and C class of earth roads with

ADT<50

-km w/temporary traffic interruption on C class of

gravel roads with ADT>50

-km w/traffic interruption > 7 days on C and D class of roads

30550

10100

131000

1345

2630

2900

50%

27%

0

0

0

See comment above and the table immediately after paragraph 36 in the main

text. It should be noted that the 2002 targets refer to the overall program

whereas the table in the main text refers to the project itself.

-A lean and effective road

administration working with clear and transparent

procedures, taking

corrective actions with reasonable speed, disposing

of modern management

tools and competent staff. -Date of finalization of

annual maintenance

program -Date of annual update of

data bank -Average number of days

for contract award

-Percentage exceeding 30

days

-Average number of days

for contract payment

-Percentage exceeding 30

days

-Equipment provision to

DRV

-computerized road

management and evaluation system in place

-percent reached of staffing

levels foreseen in the new organizational chart

-satisfactory results certified by

technical audit -date of transmission to IDA

-date of publication of updated

figures -days between bid submission

and contract signature

-percentage of total number of

contracts

-number of days between

invoice submission and

payment receipt -percentage of total number of

invoices

-deadline for providing planned

equipment

100%

100%

Yes

Oct 31

Oct 31

30

10%

30

10%

Feb 28

1999

In the face of DRV shortcomings, the government decided to create a Road

Authority and a Road Fund in 2001. Starting in 2003 when these agencies were effectively staffed, this move improved the quality of road works management

and road maintenance administration in general. However, their capacity has

remained underused until now because of the sheer lack of investment funding.

A data bank is still in the process of being created.

The number of days between bid submission and contract signature went down

from an average 144 days early into project implementation to 46 days in 2003-

04 but never reached the ambitious target of 30days.

The average number of days between invoice submission and payment receipt was below 30 from 2008 until project closure: about 20 days for technical

review and 4 days for payment.

No more civil engineering equipment was purchased by DRV since all works

had been privatized since project start.

45

A robust and competent

local contracting industry has developed offering

steady employment to a

significant local work force

Number of SME’s submitting

bids and being qualified for different civil works tasks

- The work program led to the creation of about one hundred domestic contractors

between 1998 and 2002, however 16% defaulted. The reason for such high rejection rate is partly due to the difficulties to obtain commercial bank loans, to

rent equipment, and most of all to get paid rapidly or simply get paid (the

current level of arrears to the construction industry is still about CFAF 29 billion).

Private equipment rental and

leasing activity develop in

response to small contractor demand, easing their

constraints for equipment

acquisition and equipment management capacity

Number of equipment rental

companies operational

There was none.

Road Transport

-Restructuring of DTT by

end of 1998 -Elimination of all existing

temporary transport titles six

months after establishment of new structure, and

progressive reduction of

validity period of temporary titles thereafter

-new structure in place

-all existing temporary titles

eliminated

-validity of new temporary transport titles

-number of driving licenses

issued (Abidjan/Rest of the country)

100%

3 days

-

The legal, regulatory and institutional framework for transportation services was

updated in 2000 and liberalized the access to the transport business.

Directorate of Land Transport (DTT) was restructured in 2001 with the creation

of SONATT. However, this restructuring failed to separate the management of public and private interests in land transport. Consequently, the government

created a new DGTTC (General Direction of Land Transport and Traffic) in

2006 but without updating the bylaws creating the SONATT. The overlapping responsibilities between SONATT and DGTTC renew the need for an

institutional adjustment if not a restructuring.

Improved knowledge of

essential rules and their

correct enforcement

This outcome was not monitored.

Reduction of illegal

―tolling‖ through

suppression of informal road blocks

-technical audit monitoring

missions’ reports satisfactory

-number of roadblocks still in use

-infractions for selected road

sections

95%

5

-

A onetime audit report performed in 2000 confirmed that road blocks were

found only exceptionally (condition No. 5 for releasing the second adjustment

tranche). However soon after they started to reappear and since then they remained a distressing hallmark of Cote d’Ivoire. In early December 2011 they

were exposed once again in the media.

Improvement of road passengers and freight

services through more

functional bus stations

Number of passengers using bus stations

- A feasibility study for improving bus stations was completed by the BNETD in 1998 but was shelved thereafter.

-Annual increase in number

of drivers receiving

specialized training -More efficient vehicle

operation (annual mileage

per truck/bus increased)

-number of trained personnel

-number of days of training

-Abidjan region (average km/y)

-country wide (average km/y)

200

750

40000

18000

1101 drivers have been trained in 2009-11.

The other indicators were not monitored.

Increased transport enterprises efficiency

-average number of trucks/buses per enterprise

-number of truck and bus

transport enterprises

8

1000

These indicators were not monitored.

Road Safety

-Children trained

-Monitors trained -Accident rate decreased

-number of schools visited by

OSER -number of children trained by

OSER

-number of trained driving

school monitors

-number of accidents/number

of vehicles

1800

10^6

75

-

The actual restructuring of OSER (condition No.5 of the floating tranche) has

not been undertaken despite the formal adoption by the government of the recommendations of a restructuring study completed by BNETD in 2000.

287 driving school monitors have been trained in 2009-11.

Was not monitored

Increased ratio of inspected vehicles

Abidjan region Country wide -cars % -cars %

-trucks % -trucks %

-buses % -buses %

1 66

6 76

2 76

In 2000, the government launched an action plan to increase the ratio of inspected vehicles; however its implementation was interrupted because the

equipment installed in numbers of inspection centers were looted during the

political turmoil after the coup attempt of 2002. According to the April 2000 release memo of the second adjustment tranche, the 1999 target ratios were met

(i.e., 54%, 64%, and 64%). Today’s ratio is estimated around 50%.

Urban Transport

-Percent of passengers using -SOTRA on new network - Transport services to/from Yopougon and Abobo were concessioned to the

46

August 2011 status of the institutional building conditions for the release of the

adjustment tranches Institutional building conditions Status Comments

Liquidation of SGMTP’s heavy road maintenance equipment.

Completed Tranche Nr.1.

Borrower has ceased to undertake road maintenance

works by force account and arrears to private

contractors do not exceed one month.

Partially

completed

Tranche Nr.2. All road maintenance works are now undertaken by private

contractors. Arrears have crept up during the project implementation period and

have reached now a collective amount of about FCFA 29 billion most probably above one month.

Illegal road blocks are found only exceptionally Not

completed

Tranche Nr.2. See table above

DTT has been restructured Partially completed

Tranche Nr.2. See table above.

Action plan and implementation timetable to set and

collect the optimum level of taxes and user charges against road users

Not

completed

Tranche Nr.2 shifted to Tranche 3 and then to the Floating Tranche.

The Road Maintenance Fund has been established Partially

Completed

Tranche Nr.3 While the RMF operating costs are covered, its resources are

insufficient to adequately fund road maintenance activities. The government must increase the user charges collected by the RMF by a factor of three; this would fully

cover road maintenance costs and would align user charges with the internationally

recommended amount of US 0.10 cent equivalent/liter of fuel.

The Road Authority has been established Completed Tranche Nr.3

The functions and responsibilities of the Highway

Department of the MIE have been appropriately

revised.

Partially

Completed

Tranche Nr. 3. There is a need to better specify the role and mission of the many

civil servants, most of them decentralized, who still belong to the Highway

Department.

Satisfactory enactment of the law governing road passengers and freight transport activities publication

of updated regulations governing land transport

activities

Completed Floating Tranche. See table above

Satisfactory enactment of the Maritime Code and

satisfactory amendment of port regulations

Partially

Completed

Floating Tranche. See table above

Establishment of a satisfactory Urban Transport

Agency and appointment of its senior officials

Partially

completed

Floating Tranche. AGETU was created in 2000 but the law governing its resources

was only passed in 2003 and AGETU became operational in 2004. Since then the

public transport

-Amount of subsidies to

operators

-Private operators in two

suburbs -in CFAF billion

-

-

private operator SOTU in 1998. However, to this date operations have not

started yet as the operator have not been able to mobilize the funds to purchase the buses.

Transport Statistics

-Reliable information on transport supply, demand,

costs, prices, quality;

-Improved basis for investment programming;

-Identification of

bottlenecks and facilitation requirements

Annual data and by month: -vehicle fleet by type and age

-newly registered vehicles by

type and age -truck fleet for hire and own

account

-vehicle fuel consumption -vehicle operating costs by size

-operating cost per ton-km and

passenger-km

-

-

-

- -

-

Little progress if any was accomplished on that front because of some turf battle between the Ministry of Economic Infrastructure and the Ministry of Transport.

Some data on road infrastructure are now available at AGEROUTE and other at

the Ministry of Transport but they do not talk to each other and are not easily retrievable.

Port

-Improved ports’

throughput and reduction of

cargo dwell time -Improved performance for

containerized traffic

(Abidjan) -Port services at lower cost

-Improved port environment

-Enhanced capacity to fight accidental oil spill

-Modernized regulation

-annual and monthly data

provided by PAA and PASP

-annual and monthly data provided by the private

operator of the container

terminal -bi-annual report on financial

and operational indicators for

total ports transit -periodic environmental

assessment made by CIAPOL

-annual oil pollution fighting drills

-new maritime code and port

regulations

Detaile

d

financial

indicat

ors, product

ivity

ratios and

contain

ers handlin

g rates

Port regulations in Abidjan (PAA) and San Pedro (PASP) were successfully

updated. The operation of the container terminal and ship to shore cranes of the

port of Abidjan were concessioned to a private operator; however the process was controversial: the government unilaterally aborted the ongoing international

bidding process to sign a sole source contract with one of the co-bidders.

Pollution fighting equipment has been acquired in PAA and PASP

Annual and monthly data are provided by the two ports. Despite the country went through tumultuous periods and deep political crises, the ports maintained

a healthy activity and competitive productivity ratios.

A new maritime code and a merchant navy code were drafted however none of

them have been voted by the parliament yet, so the old code of 1961 is still

applicable.

47

Institutional building conditions Status Comments

level of its resources has been revised almost every year as a result of differences

between local communities, AGETU and local fiscal administrations about the share of available resources. These disputes have hampered AGETU’s coordination and

regulatory role.

Private operation of the PAA’s container terminal Partially completed

Floating Tranche. See table above.

Satisfactory restructuring of OSER Not

completed

Floating Tranche. See table above.

Privately operated bus transport services to the suburbs in Yopougon and Abobo

Not completed

Floating Tranche. See above

August 2011 Status of the components added as part of the December 2001

restructuring without specific KPI Institutional component Status Comments

Study on the causal linkages between

transport and poverty

Not

Completed

Component E.5

Study on the impact of transport on

HIV/AIDS, sensitization activities to

mitigate impact. Strengthening of the

Coordinating Unit for implementing this component.

Partially

completed

Component F. Sensitization campaigns and distribution of condoms were organized; computer

and audio-visual equipment was provided to the concerned units of the Ministry of Transport,

SITARAIL, SODEXAM and SOTRA. These activities were interrupted in 2003 with the drastic

restructuring of June 2003.

New Code of civil aviation, new financing

mechanism of the sector, restructuring of

ANAC and SODEXAM

Completed Component G. The Code of civil aviation was updated and the sector restructured through the

restructuring of ANAC and SODEXAM. Significant progress has been made in safety and

security. The government extended the concession of FHB airport to the private operator AERIA on condition that the operator would invest in the upgrading of the passengers terminal which

was successfully done.

Strengthening of the crisis command center at FHB airport and Accident

Investigation Bureau.

Completed Component G. Government purchased equipment to strengthen these two entities.

48

Annex 8: Implementation Timeline Date Susp. Crisis Event Evidence Comments

April 11,

1988

PCN review meeting

March 27,

1997

Authorization to

Appraise/Negotiate

Jun 23, 1998 Board Approval

Sep 16, 1998 DCA Signature

English and French Copy +

Report and

Recommendation of the

President

Original Closing Date: June 30, 2001

Nov 9, 1998 Declaration of Effectiveness Find evidence that conditions were met

Nov 16, 1998 Release of Tranche No1 President’s Memo for

Restructuring #1

SDR 36.3 million released because the Project was

declared effective

Dec 15, 1998 First Agreement Amending DCA

related to budgetary support only

Signed Agreement

Amending DCA dated Dec

15, 1998

Provided an additional amount of SDR 19.2 million to

the first tranche. SDR 19.2 million corresponded to the

FY99 RITO (Reflows Investments Transfers and

Others) credit.

Dec 21, 1998 Release of supplemental amount

of SDR 19.2m from Fifth

Dimension (RITO Credit) on the

first tranche

Client connection Loan IDA 31001

Nov 8, 1999 Credit Amendment #1 Letter of Oct 28

countersigned on Nov 8,

1999

Closing date extended from June 30, 2001 until

December 31, 2002 (1st ext). New Part D.5 was added

to Port Component (artificial reef pilot). Table of

withdrawal categories slightly modified: small

reductions of allocation under Category 4 Consultants;

categories Operating Costs and Activities under part

D5 added; additional SDR 19.2 million disbursed

against the first tranche ratified. PDO and key

indicators remain unchanged.

Dec 24, 1999 The President thrown out by a

mutiny which transforms into a

military coup

The President had almost completed his 5-year tenure,

when the military coup took place and one of the

General was appointed Chief of State.

Mar 22, 2000 Second Agreement Amending

DCA related to budgetary support

Signed Agreement

Amending DCA dated


the second tranche raising the total amount of the

49

Date Susp. Crisis Event Evidence Comments

only March 22, 2000 Credit to SDR 165.6 million. This additional amount

came from the FY00 RITO Credit.

Apr 4, 2000 Release of Tranche No.2 and

additional amount of SDR 15.8

million from Fifth Dimension

President’s Memo for

Restructuring #1 and Client

Connection

SDR 14.5 + Loan IDA 31002 15.8 million released, i.e.

SDR 30.3 million.

Oct 2000 Presidential Elections and post

elections crisis

Two presidential elections candidates were disqualified

by the Supreme Court; the General dissolved the

electoral commission; and ministry of interior declared

him the winner although he had only 37% of the votes.

Riots resulted. Finally another candidate was declared

the winner with 59% of the votes. New riots organized

by partisans of one of the disqualified candidates

asking for new elections were brutally repressed.

Oct 31, 2000 Start of 1st Suspension State resources probably used for electoral purposes.

Dec 2000 Legislative Elections

Mar 2001 Municipal Elections

Jul 6, 2001 Mid Term Review No Report Available Information available in paragraphs 15 to 18 and 33 to

35 in Dec 7, 2001 Amendment to the DCA.

Dec 20, 2001 Credit Amendment

Restructuring

Check date of countersigned letter

President’s Memorandum

dated Dec 7, 2001 and non

countersigned letter dated

Dec 20, 2001

Rural roads, civil aviation, HIV/AIDS and poverty

components added, artificial reef pilot removed; civil

works disbursement percentages increased from 70% to

80%; authorized allocations slightly modified; release

conditions for the 3rd

tranche modified

Jan 30, 2002 End of 1st Suspension

Signing and release of 3rd

Tranche

plus SDR 9.19m from the Fifth

Dimension

Kouakou’s report and Client

connection

SDR 14.5 + Loan IDA 31003 9.19 million released, i.e.

SDR 23.69 million.

Jan 30, 2002 Third Agreement Amending the

DCA related to budgetary support

Signed Third Agreement

Amending the DCA dated

Jan 30, 2002.


the third tranche. This amount came from the

Association’s Fifth Dimension Program established in

1998. The total amount of the Credit was raised to SDR

174.79 million.

Jun 2002 Supervision Mission Email JNG Sep 19, PSR

Sequence 13

Sep 19, 2002 Assassination of the General Favorites – Website See military and political crisis in Cote d’Ivoire.

50


(Chief of State), invasion by armed

forces who take the northern half

of the country and later named the

New Forces. Country split in two

under the control of FANCI in the

South and the North FN

Wikipedia.

Nov. 19-20,

2002

Reverse Supervision Mission in

Paris

Minutes, Sequence PSR 14

Déc. 18, 2002 Extension of the Closing Date Execution Report of CI

PAST August 2011 MIE

Closing date extended from Dec 31, 2002 until June 30,

2003 (2nd

ext).

Jan 24, 2003 Signature of the Linas-Marcoussis

Agreement

Mar 31, 2003 Annual Report 2002 Report from Coordination

unit

Jun 26, 2003 Credit Amendment

Restructuring

Cancellation of Floating Tranche

Signed Memo from CD to

VP and signed letter to

GOCI. Kouakou’s report.

Closing date extended from June 30, 2003 until June

30, 2004 (3rd ext). All components but A are closed on

June 30, 2003. Floating Tranche cancelled because

conditions not met yet.

Sep 2003 Start up Report AGEROUTE Inception Report

Feb 24, 2004 Situation Report by Coordination

unit

PPT Presentation (2) and

maps (3) (I VC Feb 4)

Jun 15, 2004 Start of 2nd

Suspension Exceptionally Credit Withdrawals (DRF) received on

Sep 14, 2004 at the latest could be paid, these

withdrawals would cover payments made against

contracts signed before June 14 and executed until

September 14, 2004.

Dec 27, 2004 Extension of Closing Date Signed Memo from CD to

MD through VP

Closing date retroactively extended from June 30, 2004

to June 30, 2005 through a request of extension of ICR

submission deadline b/c one cannot extend a closing

dated during a period of suspension.

Jun 2005 Supervision mission Aide Memoire Elec.

Dec 18, 2006 Meeting with MIE, AGEROUTE,

Coordination unit, FER

BTOR Electr., Reflection on

re-engagement strategy,

elec.

51


Mar 4, 2007 Ouagadougou Political Agreement

April 2, 2008 End of 2nd

Suspension Implementation report of

the CI-PAST November 98

to August 2011 (Unit

Coordination)

Sep 2, 2008 Project Reactivation

Project Restructuring

Signed Letter from CD to

MEF. Elect ―Restructuring

No3 CI PAST‖. Signed

memo from CD to VP.

President Memo. (Elect)

Component A is restructured, component B Road

Safety is added; authorized category allocations are

modified; closing date is extended until August 31,

2010 (4th

extension). PDO and KPI are revised.

Mar 2009 Launch Workshop for restructured

Project

BTOR AL Electronic

March 30,

2009

Amendment to Credit Agreement Execution Report of August

2011 MIE CI PAST

Changes to prior review thresholds.

Feb 25, 2010 Gov. request for one year

extension

July 3, 2009 Amendment to DCA Execution Report of CI

PAST August 2011 MIE

Changes to Credit Proceedings Withdrawal Table.

Aug 31, 2010 Extension of Closing Date Letter from CD to MEF

(Elect)

Closing date extended until August 31, 2011 (5th

ext).

Revised Credit Withdrawal Table and % of

disbursement (100%).

Nov 2010 Start of post-election crisis

Dec 4, 2010 Start of 3rd

suspension

Apr 2011 End of post-election crisis

May 31, 2011 End of 3rd

suspension

Jun 27, 2011 Amendment to DCA Letter from CD to MEF +

Memo to CD (Elect)

Revised amounts of Credit Withdrawal Table.

52

Annex 9: Project Costs and Financing

Table 1: Projects Costs Per Category Categories Initial allocation Allocation to the

amendment of November 8, 1999

Allocation after the mid-term

review (December 20, 2001amendment)

Allocation after the

cancellation of the floating tranche in December 2003

Allowance for restructuring

(Amendment 02 September 2008)

Allocation to the

amendment of June 27, 2011

SDR

% Of

expenditure

financed SDR

% of

expenditures

financed

SDR

% of

expenditures

financed

SDR

% of

expenditures

financed

SDR

% of

expenditures

financed

SDR

% of

expenditures

financed

1.Civil engineering Parts A, B and D 29 700 000 70% 29 700 000 70% 35 460 000 80% 35 460 000 80% 43 850 000 100% 40 451 304 100%

2. Civil works for buildings and facilities Parts B and G

2 200 000 70% 2 200 000 70% 2 400 000 80% 2 400 000 80% 230 000 100% 230 000 100%

3. Equipment and material supplying 1 500 000 80% 1 500 000 80% 2 540 000 80% 2 540 000 80% 1 640 000 100% 4 676 900 100%

(a) Part B 600 000 600 000 100 000 100 000 1 050 000 839 819

(b) Part D.2 140 000 140 000 0 0 0 0

(c) Part D.4 680 000 680 000 200 000 200 000 0 0

(d) Part E 80 000 80 000 120 000 120 000 90 000 296 181

(e Part F 0 0 30 000 30 000 10 000 3 000

(f) Part G 0 0 1 590 000 1 590 000 10 000 3 000

(g) Part A 0 0 500 000 500 000 480 000 3 534 900

4. consultants 19 000 000 80% 18 600 000 80% 10 400 000 80% 10 400 000 80% 11 130 000 100% 10 921 796 100%

(a) Part A 13 000 000 13 600 000 6 140 000 6 140 000 9 100 000 8 909 796

(b) Pat B 1 300 000 1 300 000 60 000 60 000 250 000 250 000

(c) Part C 500 000 500 000 830 000 830 000 150 000 144 000

(d) Part D 2 300 000 2 300 000 1 380 000 1 380 000 660 000 654 000

(e) sub Part E.1 et E.4 400 000 400 000 40 000 40 000 70 000 69 000

(f ) sub Part E.2 et E.3 1 500 000 1 500 000 440 000 440 000 830 000 830 000

(g Part F 0 0 810 000 810 000 50 000 49 000

(h) Part G 0 0 700 000 700 000 20 000 16 000

5. Goods ( budget support) 72 300 000 100% 72 300 000 100% 72 300 000 100% 65 300 000 100% 65 300 000 100% 65 300 000 100%

(a) First Tranche 36 300 000 36 300 000 36 300 000 36 300 000 36 300 000 36 300 000

(b) second Tranche 14 500 000 14 500 000 14 500 000 14 500 000 14 500 000 14 500 000

(c) Third Tranche 14 500 000 14 500 000 14 500 000 14 500 000 14 500 000 14 500 000

(d) Floating tranche 7 000 000 7 000 000 7 000 000 0 0

6. Refund of the amount used for project

preparation (FPP) 900 000

Amount due

under section

2.03( c) of the ’AC

900 000

Amount due

under section

2.03( c of the AC

900 000

Amount due

under section

2.03( c) of the AC

900 000

Amount due

under section

2.03( c) of the AC

810 000

Amount

due under sect

ion 2.03( c) of the AC

810 000

Amount

due under sect

ion2.03( c) of the ’ AC

7. Not allocated 5 000 000 5 000 000 6 300 000 6 300 000 0 0

8. Activities Part D.5 0 100 000 70% 0 0 0 0

9.exploitation charges 0 300 000 80% 300 000 80% 300 000 80% 640 000 100% 1 210 000 100%

TOTAL 130 600 000 130 600 000 130 600 000 123 600 000 123 600 000

000 123 600 000

53

Table 2: Projects Cost by Source of Funding/Donors

Source of Funds Appraisal Estimate

(US$ million)

Actual/Latest estimate

(US$ million)

Percentage of appraisal

IDA 180.00 178.20 98.87

BORROWER 390.40 111.6013

28.58

KFW 16.90 16.90 100

AFD 62.60 43.00 68.69

EU 25.20 0.0014

0

JAPAN 14.50 0.0015

0

AfDB - 30.0016

Total 649.9 379.7 58.42

13 The figures were based on reconciliation of the borrower counterpart funding and the actual costs of road maintenance,

between 2002 and 2011.

14 Cancelled contribution before disbursement

15 Cancelled contribution before disbursement

16 AfDB was not part of the project at the time of appraisal but came in much later

54

Table 3: Project Financing at Closing

Categories Original

Allocation

Revised

Allocation

Actual/Latest

Estimate

Percentage of

Original

Allocation

Percentage of

Revised

Allocation

1.Civil engineering Parts A,

Band D 29,700,000 40,451,304 39,842,671.55 134.15 98.50

2. Civil works for buildings and

facilities Parts B and G 2,200,000 230,000 212,514.70 9.66 92.40

3. Equipment and material

supplying 1,500,000 4,676,900 4,071,172.25 271.41 87.05

(a) Part B 600,000 839,819 839,818.90 139.97 100.00

(b) Part D.2 140,000 0 0 0.00 0.00

(c) Part D.4 680,000 0 0 0.00 0.00

(d) Part E 80,000 296,181 85,215.76 106.52 28.77

(e) Part F - 3,000 2,358.02 - 78.60

(f) Part G - 3,000 2,971.69 - 99.06

(g) Part A - 3,534,900 3,140,807.88 - 88.85

4. consultants 19,000,000 10,921,796 10,806,427.98 56.88 98.94

(a) Part A 13,000,000 8,909,796 8,754,894.58 67.35 98.26

(b) Pat B 1,300,000 250,000 298,064.89 22.93 119.23

(c) Part C 500,000 144,000 143,681.39 28.74 99.78

(d) Part D 2,300,000 654,000 653,643.45 28.42 99.95

(e) sub. Part E.1 et E.4 400,000 69,000 68,949.62 17.24 99.93

(f) sub. Part E.2 et E.3 1,500,000 830,000 822,710.44 54.85 99.12

(g) Part F - 49,000 48,836.57 - 99.67

(h) Part G - 16,000 15,647.04 - 97.79

5. Goods ( budget support) 72,300,000 65,300,000 65,299,973.12 90.32 100.00

(a) First Tranche 36,300,000 36,300,000 36,299,973.12 100.00 100.00

(b) second Tranche 14,500,000 14,500,000 14,500,000 100.00 100.00

(c) Third Tranche 14,500,000 14,500,000 14,500,000 100.00 100.00

55

(d) Floating tranche 7,000,000 0 0 0.00 0.00

6. Refund of the amount used

for project preparation (FPP) 900,000 810,000 801,754.02 89.08 98.98

7. Unallocated 5,000,000 0 0 0.00 0.00

8. Activities Part D.5 0 0 0 0

9.exploitation charges 1,210,000 1,133,230.86 0.00 93.66

Designated Account - A 0 39,841.03 0.00

Designated Account - P 0 -2,875.36

Total 130,600,000 123,600,000 122,204,710 93.57 98.87

Mont NimbaMont Nimba(1,752 m)(1,752 m)

KKoommooéé

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NNzzii

KKoommooéé

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aammaa

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cc

BBaaggoo

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LLoobboo

BBoouu

SSaassssaannddrraa

SSaassssaannddrraa

MMaarraaoouuéé

Lac deLac deKossouKossou

ManMan

DaloaDaloa

BouakéBouaké

KorhogoKorhogoOdienneOdienne FerkessedougouFerkessedougou

DabakalaDabakala

BondoukouBondoukou

AbengourouAbengourou

DaoukroDaoukro

BéoumiBéoumi

SoubréSoubré

BangoloBangolo

BoundialiBoundiali

KatiolaKatiola

SakassouSakassou

ZuenoulaZuenoula

MankonoMankonoSSééguguéélala

ToubaTouba

BiankoumaBiankouma

DananeDanane

DuekoueDuekoue

GuigloGuigloToulepleuToulepleu

VavouaVavoua

IssiaIssia

Grand-LahouGrand-Lahou

AlepeAlepe

DabouDabou

DivoDivoLakotaLakota TiassaleTiassale AgbovilleAgboville

AdzopeAdzopeGagnoaGagnoa

OuméOumé

SinfraSinfra

BouaflBouafléé

ToumodiToumodi

TiebissouTiebissou

DimbokroDimbokro

BocandaBocanda

BongouanouBongouanou

M'BahiakroM'Bahiakro

BounaBouna

TandaTanda

AdiakeAdiake

AboissoAboisso

TengrelTengrel

AgnibilékrouAgnibilékrou

DENGUÉLÉ

BAFING

MARAHOUÉ

LACS

SAVANES

WORODOUGOU ZANZAN

VALLÉE DU BANDAMA

DIX-HUITMONTAGNES

HAUT-SASSANDRA

MOYEN-CAVALLY

N’ZI-COMOÉ

AGNÉBY

FROMAGER

BAS-SASSANDRA

LAGUNESSUD-

BANDAMA

SUD-COMOÉ

MOYEN-COMOÉ

Man

Daloa

Bouaké

KorhogoOdienné Ferkessedougou

Dabakala

Bondoukou

Abengourou

Daoukro

Béoumi

Soubré

Bangolo

Boundiali

Katiola

Sakassou

Zuenoula

MankonoSéguéla

Touba

Biankouma

Danane

Duekoue

GuigloToulepleu

Vavoua

Issia

Tabou

San-Pédro

Sassandra

Grand-Lahou

Jacqueville Grand-Bassam

Alepe

Dabou

DivoLakota Tiassale Agboville

AdzopeGagnoa

Oumé

Sinfra

Bouaflé

Toumodi

Tiebissou

Dimbokro

Bocanda

Bongouanou

M'Bahiakro

Bouna

Tanda

Adiake

Aboisso

Tengrel

Agnibilékrou

Abidjan

YAMOUSSOUKRO

GUINEA

LIBERIA

GHANA

BURKINAFASO

MALI

Komoé

Nzi

Nzi

Komoé

Band

ama

Blan

c

Bago

é

Lobo

Bou

Sassandra

Sassandra

Maraoué

Lac deKossou

Gul f of Guinea

To Beyla

To Bamako To

Sikasso

To Bobo Dioulasso

To Kampti

To Batie

To Bole

To Wenchi

To Sunyani

To Prestea

To Monrovia

To Nzerekore

To Monrovia

Mont Nimba(1,752 m)

8ºW 7ºW 6ºW 5ºW 4ºW 3ºW

8ºW 7ºW 6ºW 5ºW 4ºW 3ºW

5ºN

6ºN

7ºN

8ºN

9ºN

10ºN

5ºN

6ºN

7ºN

8ºN

9ºN

10ºN

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other informationshown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World BankGroup, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or anyendorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.

0 40 80

0 20 40 60 80 Miles

120 Kilometers IBRD 33393R

APRIL 2008

CÔTE D' IVOIRE

CITIES AND TOWNS

REGION CAPITALS

NATIONAL CAPITAL

RIVERS

MAIN ROADS

RAILROADS

REGION BOUNDARIES

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES

Document of The World Bank of The World Bank Report No: ICR0000282 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND...

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Transcript of Document of The World Bank of The World Bank Report No: ICR0000282 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND...