Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE...

Document of The World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No: ICR00002290

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

(IDA-45840, IDA-56330)

ON A

PROPOSED CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 33.5 MILLION (US$50 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

AND

A PROPOSED ADDITIONAL CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 32.7 MILLION

(US$45 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

FOR

SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT OF MINERAL RESOURCES

October 7, 2019

Energy and Extractives Global Practice Africa Region

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective June 30, 2019)

Currency Unit = SDR

SDR 1.4 = 1 U.S. Dollar (US$)

US$0.7 = SDR 1

FISCAL YEAR July 1 - June 30

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAA Analytic and Advisory Activities AF Additional Financing AM Aide Memoire ASM Artisanal and Small-scale Mining BoT Bank of Tanzania CAS Country Assistance Strategy CFAST Catalyzing the Future Agri-Food Systems of Tanzania Project CPF Country Partnership Framework DP Development Partner EITI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative EPP Environmental Protection Plan ESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework FA Financing Agreement FDI Foreign Direct Investment GDP Gross Domestic Product GoT Government of Tanzania GST Geological Survey of Tanzania ICMM International Council on Mining and Metals ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report ISO International Organization for Standardization ISR Implementation Status and Results Report JAST Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania LGA Local Government Authority LSM Large-scale Mining M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MEM Ministry of Energy and Minerals MRI Mineral Resources Institute

MoM Ministry of Minerals MRI Mineral Resources Institute MKUKUTA Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umaskini Tanzania (National Strategy for Growth

and Poverty Reduction in Tanzania) PAD Project Appraisal Document PDO Project Development Objective PML Primary Mining License PMU Project Management Unit PPA Project Preparation Advance RPF Resettlement Policy Framework SESA Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment SGP Small Grants Program SMMRP Sustainable Management of Mineral Resources Project STAMICO State Mining Corporation TAWOMA Tanzania Women Miners Association TDV Tanzania Development Vision TGC Tanzanian Gemological Center TIB TIB Development Bank, formerly known as Tanzania Investment Bank ToC Theory of Change UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

Regional Vice President: Hafez Ghanem

Country Director: Bella Bird

Regional Director: Riccardo Puliti

Practice Manager: Christopher Gilbert Sheldon

Task Team Leader(s): Mamadou Barry

ICR Main Contributors: Mamadou Barry and Cheikh M'Backe Fall

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DATA SHEET .......................................................................................................................... 1

I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES ........................................................... 6

A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL .........................................................................................................6

B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION .............................................................. 14

II. OUTCOME ....................................................................................................................... 17

A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs ............................................................................................................ 17

B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY) ...................................................................................... 18

C. EFFICIENCY ........................................................................................................................... 29

D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING .................................................................... 32

E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY) ............................................................................ 33

III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME .................................. 35

A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION ................................................................................... 35

B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION ............................................................................. 37

IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME .... 39

A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) ............................................................ 39

B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE ..................................................... 40

C. BANK PERFORMANCE ........................................................................................................... 41

D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME ....................................................................................... 42

V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................ 43

ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS ........................................................... 46

ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION ......................... 61

ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT ........................................................................... 63

ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS (IF APPLICABLE) .................................................................. 64

ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNERS/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS . 65

ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS .................................................................................. 66

ANNEX 7. SMMRP INDICATORS ............................................................................................ 69

ANNEX 8. MAP .................................................................................................................... 70

The World Bank Sustainable Management of Mineral Resources (P096302)

Page 1 of 70

DATA SHEET

BASIC INFORMATION Product Information Project ID Project Name

P096302 Sustainable Management of Mineral Resources

Country Financing Instrument

Tanzania Investment Project Financing

Original EA Category Revised EA Category

Partial Assessment (B) Partial Assessment (B)

Organizations

Borrower Implementing Agency

Ministry of Energy and Minerals Tanzania Extractive Industries Transparency Initiave

Project Development Objective (PDO)

Original PDO To strengthen the Governments capacity to manage the mineral sector to improve the socioeconomic impacts of large and small-scale mining for Tanzania and Tanzanians and enhance private local and foreign investment.


Page 2 of 70

FINANCING

Original Amount (US$) Revised Amount (US$) Actual Disbursed (US$) World Bank Financing IDA-45840 50,000,000 49,133,571 50,166,946

IDA-56330 45,000,000 24,015,920 24,836,500

Total 95,000,000 73,149,491 75,003,446

Non-World Bank Financing 0 0 0

Borrower/Recipient 5,000,000 0 0

Total 5,000,000 0 0

Total Project Cost 100,000,000 73,149,491 75,003,446

KEY DATES

Approval Effectiveness MTR Review Original Closing Actual Closing 09-Jun-2009 22-Sep-2009 12-Nov-2012 30-Jun-2014 31-Dec-2018

RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING

Date(s) Amount Disbursed (US$M) Key Revisions 25-Jun-2014 46.00 Change in Loan Closing Date(s) 16-Apr-2015 51.04 Additional Financing 21-Dec-2018 72.65 Change in Components and Cost

Reallocation between Disbursement Categories 28-Dec-2018 72.65 Cancellation of Financing

KEY RATINGS

Outcome Bank Performance M&E Quality

Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Modest


Page 3 of 70

RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived DO Rating IP Rating Actual

Disbursements (US$M)

01 06-Dec-2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.15

02 09-Jun-2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.15

03 07-Jan-2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.15

04 07-Sep-2011 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 5.73

05 26-Dec-2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 5.73

06 24-Jul-2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 9.92

07 26-Feb-2013 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 16.67

08 10-Sep-2013 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 32.11

09 11-Aug-2014 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 46.00

10 03-Nov-2014 Satisfactory Satisfactory 49.46

11 15-Jun-2015 Satisfactory Satisfactory 51.04

12 13-Jan-2016 Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 51.04

13 29-Jul-2016 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 53.05

14 06-Jun-2017 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 62.75

15 08-Feb-2018 Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 62.75

16 26-Dec-2018 Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 72.65

17 27-Jun-2019 Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 75.01


Page 4 of 70

SECTORS AND THEMES

Sectors Major Sector/Sector (%)

Energy and Extractives 100

Mining 26 Public Administration - Energy and Extractives 74

Themes Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3) (%) Private Sector Development 20

Business Enabling Environment 11 Investment and Business Climate 11

Enterprise Development 9

MSME Development 9

Finance 9

Financial Infrastructure and Access 9 MSME Finance 9

Public Sector Management 69

Public Administration 69 Administrative and Civil Service Reform 4

Transparency, Accountability and Good Governance 65

Social Development and Protection 2

Social Inclusion 2 Participation and Civic Engagement 2

ADM STAFF

Role At Approval At ICR

Regional Vice President: Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Hafez M. H. Ghanem

Country Director: John McIntire Bella Deborah Mary Bird


Page 5 of 70

Director: Somit Varma Riccardo Puliti

Practice Manager: Paulo De Sa Christopher Gilbert Sheldon

Task Team Leader(s): Christopher Gilbert Sheldon Mamadou Barry

ICR Contributing Author: Mamadou Barry


Page 6 of 70

I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES

A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL

Policy and Sectoral Context

1. The implementation of Tanzania’s first National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction (Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umaskini Tanzania, MKUKUTA) in 2005–2010 led to a strong economic growth performance. The average annual growth rate over the period hovered around 7 percent. However, rising inflation and a widening current account deficit added pressure to the economy, slowing the growth momentum. Faced with the limited success of the first National Poverty Reduction Strategy, in November 2010, the Government of Tanzania (GoT) adopted a new five-year strategy for 2010–2015 aligned with its development vision known as the Tanzania Development Vision (TDV) 2025 which aims at turning Tanzania into a middle-income country. The strategy sought to sustain high economic growth while making the pattern of growth more inclusive.

2. Tanzania’s rich mineral endowment is a potential driver of economic growth and poverty reduction. Accordingly, the GoT, under the MKUKUTA, harnessed the mineral sector to stimulate poverty reduction. The initial objectives in the mining sector were to attract sustainable large-scale investments to grow the sector, but also to develop a viable artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) sector and maximize socio-economic benefits by strengthening backward and forward linkages for local value addition and employment creation. Prior to Independence, private-led mining development contributed up to 10% to GDP. Following Independence, the shift toward state control of the sector led to divestments and the collapse of the sector. A new mining law was passed in 1979 to reverse the demise of the sector. But It was not until 1998, that a new investor-friendly Mining Act was passed. This is when sizeable investments started flowing into the sector. New FDI inflows enabled the mining sector to become a powerful engine of economic growth. Mining investments represented 100% of total inflows from 1998 to 2000 and stimulated FDI in other sectors like infrastructure, tourism, manufacturing and services. Annual FDI flows grew from $172 million in 1998 to $516 million in 1999 and to nearly $1 billion by 2010. The cities of Geita, Mwanza, Arusha benefited with the opening of five major mines, and Tanzania rose to become the second largest non-oil recipient of FDI and the third producer of gold in Sub-Saharan Africa. Mining became the largest source of export earnings and fueled GDP growth averaging 7% p.a. over the last two decades. As the economy diversified, mining FDI dropped to about 50% of total FDI in the country.

3. Despite its strong growth, the mining sector’s perceived contribution to poverty reduction remained below expectations, prompting frequent popular criticism of foreign mining companies. Accordingly, the emphasis of government policy gradually shifted from attracting large-scale foreign mining investment to improving the socio-economic outcomes of mining development for Tanzanians. As the mining sector matured, the FDI tax incentives provided by the 1998 Mining Law proved obsolete and exacerbated concerns about benefits sharing arrangements.

Project-specific context

4. To improve the socio-economic benefits of mining, the World Bank supported Tanzania in 2009 with a $50 million loan (IDA45840) for the original Sustainable Management of Mineral Resources Project


Page 7 of 70

(SMMRPI, P096302). As part of this original project, the Bank supported the 2010 Mining Act which increased royalty rates, changed the royalty base, and phased out of the tax incentives in the 1998 Mining Act. This led to an increase in fiscal revenues derived from the sector following the end of the tax holiday period granted to several of the first wave of foreign investors in the late 1990s. As part of the Bank’s advice, Mining Development Agreements (MDAs) were made subject to review after every five years and at the renewal of the mineral rights. To promote revenue transparency, the Bank also supported Tanzania’s implementation of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Tanzania became member in February 2009 and achieved compliant status in 2013. Since joining the EITI, Tanzania has produced six reports, which indicate that from July 1, 2008 to June 30, 2014, the government collected $2.6 billion from the extractive companies.

5. SMMRPI helped the Government to significantly upgrade its capacity to manage the mining sector. The Geological Survey of Tanzania, the Tanzania Gemological Center, the Mineral Resources Institute, the Flexi-Cadaster System, the Mining Act of 2010, and the decentralization of mining administration were some of the achievements under the original project. On the heel of these encouraging results, the Government requested Bank support for a follow-on project at the closing of the original project in 2015. This led to the Bank approval of the US$45 million Additional Financing loan (IDA 56330) to support the second phase of the Sustainable Management of Mineral Resources Project (SMMRPII, P1511240).

6. This ICR covers both SMMRPI and SMMRPII, which have separate implementation periods. SMMRPI enjoyed a high-level of ownership and commitment by GoT. It was well-aligned with the liberal approach for promoting large foreign direct investments to stimulate a rapid growth of the mining sector, which in turn fuels overall economic growth and poverty reduction. However, the level of project ownership and commitment shifted dramatically under SMMRPII, which became mired in the inertia of the 2016 election cycle. The 2016 political cycle affected the project performance in two ways: (i) at the time SMMRPII became effective, political campaigning and positioning had taken priority over the management of day-to-day business, leading to decision inertia and significant delays or postponement of agreed-upon activities; (ii) following the elections, the new government asked for time to review the project design and priorities before deciding to move forward with implementation of SMMRPII. Several suggestions were made to restructure the project to reflect the government's new priorities. However, frequent changes of staff at the senior and mid-senior levels delayed decision-making. By the time a decision was made to proceed full force with implementation, in April 2018, the project had only eight months to complete its activities. The GoT unsuccessfully sought from the Bank an extension of closing date to make up for the time lost. In the end, GoT selected SMMRPII activities which were critical to the PDO and implemented these on a fast-track basis, while committing to allocate funds from its own budget to complete activities which could not be completed by the closing date.

7. The Project Appraisal Document (PAD) for SMMRPI (Document No. 47926-TZ) completed in May 2009 noted that Tanzania’s mining industry had experienced a boom in both mineral exploration and mining activities over the past 10 years. Notable developments included the commissioning of six large-scale gold mines at Nzega, Geita, Bulyanhulu, North Mara, Buhemba, and Tulawaka. During this period, more than 15 mineral prospects of gold, nickel, and uranium have also been developed to various stages of exploration. This resulted in an increase in the country’s annual gold production from less than one ton per year in 1998 to about 50 tons in 2008, making Tanzania the third largest gold producer in Africa and turning mining into the second fastest growing sector of Tanzania’s economy after tourism.


Page 8 of 70

8. The PAD also stated that while Tanzania has succeeded in attracting investments in the mining industry, concerns about its local and national development impacts were frequently raised by affected communities and other stakeholders. Criticisms included the lack of adequate institutional capacity to oversee the sector, particularly in auditing investment costs, environmental management costs, and enforcing safety and occupational health standards, inadequate value added in exported minerals, slow pace of transforming and modernizing artisanal and small-scale mining, and insufficient integration of mining into the national economy. These concerns led to in-depth case reviews of the mining sector in Tanzania.1 The reviews resulted in two presidential reports—the Kipokola Report in 2004, and the Report of the Presidential Commission on the Mineral Sector in 2008 (Bomani Report). Both reports underscored the urgent need to strengthen the capacity within Government institutions and agencies to enable the sustainable development of a modern, market-oriented mining sector with enough benefits to the country.

9. The SMMRPII Project Paper (Report No: PAD 1177, April 2015) reiterated the same development goals as SMMRPI with a focus on improving the socio-economic benefits of mining for Tanzania and Tanzanians. Both projects were designed to contribute to the following higher-level objectives: to enhance good governance and transparency in the sector; to support transparency of the mining sector legal and regulatory framework; to support the Government’s objective of ensuring that mining sector development and investment conforms to international good practice, adjusted to the particular conditions of Tanzania; to stimulate local economic development through mineral sector development; to reduce conflict and strengthen management of environmental and social issues related to mineral sector development; and to improve growth and increase competitiveness in the mining sector. The design of the project was aligned with the 2007 Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST) and the World Bank’s program of support within the JAST, which includes a balance of sustainable development and protection of Tanzania’s natural resource base.

Theory of Change (or results chain with underlying assumptions)

10. The results chain illustrated in Figure 1 below shows the full spectrum of the extractive industries value chain. The Sustainable Management of Mineral Resources Project (SMMRP) was to directly cover links 1, 2, 3, and 5 of the value chain (see figure 1) namely access to resources (such as through strengthening of the mineral rights cadaster), monitoring operations (such as through enhanced capacity for inspections), collection of taxes and royalties (for example, through more regular, strengthened audits), and efficient, sustainable utilization of revenue (such as through pilots on local budgeting and planning in mining communities). The project was also to partially cover link 4 on revenue allocation.2

1 Making Mining Count in Tanzania, Resource Endowment Initiative, International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the World Bank, October 2006. 2 Because mining revenue in Tanzania is collected centrally as general revenue, link 4 is covered primarily under the World Bank’s macroeconomic work, including public financial management (FM) as Tanzania has a highly-decentralized public FM system, with centrally collected funds distributed to districts and regions.


Page 9 of 70

Figure 1. The Extractive Industries Value Chain

11. Even though the PAD did not present an explicit Theory of Change (ToC) to guide the project’s design, the Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) team reconstructed the logical connections between the project activities and the intended outcomes, along with the underlying assumptions, based on the PAD and other project documents.

12. A reconstructed ToC that links project activities to intended outcomes shows the relationship between the funded activities, the generated outcomes and achieved goals, and how the latter lead to the ultimate Project Development Objective (PDO). Consistent with the project design to address weak institutional capacity in managing the mineral sector in Tanzania, the lack of good governance and transparency, inadequate value added in exported minerals, slow pace of transforming and modernizing ASM, and insufficient integration of mining into the national economy, this ToC illustrates why and how the project's activities through a series of activities collectively led to the ultimate outcome, which is a mining sector with a strong capacity to improve its socioeconomic impact for Tanzanians and better attract local and foreign private investment.


Page 10 of 70

Figure 2. Theory of Change: Links between Activities, Outcomes, Goals, and PDOs

13. The PDO was reflected in the PDO-level outcome indicators of the PAD, which were: (i) improved socioeconomic impact of mining in the targeted areas; (ii) improved technical and institutional capacity, and (iii) increased attractiveness for private investment in the mining sector.

14. The project sought to achieve the abovementioned indicators through activities and intermediate results, the tiered links and assumptions of which are shown in figure 2. The project consisted of three groups of related activities: (a) ASM, local economic development and skills development which aim to improve the socio-economic benefits of the mineral sector, (b) policy and regulatory enhancements aimed at strengthening governance and transparency in mining, and (c) institutional strengthening to better manage the sector and geological survey to stimulate mineral sector investment.

Project Development Objectives (PDOs)

15. The original PDO, mentioned in the PAD and the official Financing Agreement between Tanzania and IDA, dated July 22, 2009, was as follows: “The objective of the Project is to support the Recipient's efforts to strengthen its capacity to manage the mineral sector to improve the socio-economic impacts of


Page 11 of 70

large and small-scale mining for the Recipient and its citizens and enhance private local and foreign investments.”

Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators

16. The expected outcomes of the project were: (i) improved socioeconomic impact of mining in the targeted areas, (ii) improved technical and institutional capacity, and (iii) increased attractiveness for private investment in the mining sector. At appraisal, there were six core outcome indicators which referred to this three-pronged approach to achieve the PDO, and 20 intermediate outcome indicators (see annexes). The original outcome indicators were the following:

Socioeconomic Impacts

(a) Percent increase of household income levels in selected ASM communities

(b) Percent of citizens in participating communities who consider that their views have been taken into account in the local economic development strategic planning process

Capacity

(a) Time to process mineral rights

(b) Annual publication of mining sector revenue

Investment

(a) Improvement in Tanzania’s ranking as a mining investment destination as evidenced by independent investor survey

(b) Percentage increase in mining revenue

Components

17. As detailed in the initial Financing Agreement (pages 4–7) and the PAD (pages 8–14), the project consisted of the following four components:

Component A. Improving the Benefits of the Mineral Sector: Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining, Local Economic Development and Skills Development

• Subcomponent A.1. Supporting the provision of baseline information for the project and for monitoring and evaluation (M&E), including building on previous studies to (a) conduct assessment, map the extent of ASM activities, and data interpretation and compilation into an ASM database; (b) carry out a study on socioeconomic impacts and benefits of Geita (Geita Gold Mining), Kahama (Bulyanhulu Gold Mine), and Mirerani (TanzaniteOne); (c) assess institutional capacity for acquisition of mining statistics and capacity for data management; and (d) prepare a strategy and framework for the project’s M&E.


Page 12 of 70

• Subcomponent A.2. (a) Strengthening the capacity of MEM to provide extension services through the zonal mines offices and resident mines offices to stimulate legal and responsible mining activity and to provide adequate technical and extension service support to community-based ASM. (b) Supporting MEM’s Minerals Division to (i) strengthen the capacity of the small-scale mining section at the MEM’s headquarters; (ii) strengthen the capacity for provision of extension services in zonal mines offices and resident mines offices; (iii) strengthen the capacity of the Mineral Resource Institute, Vocational Education and Training Authority, Small Industries Development Organization, and Southern and Eastern African Mineral Center to provide short-term training to small-scale miners; (iv) establish small-scale mining centers for extension services and provide demonstration center mines with training manuals, demonstration materials, and training of trainers at Chunya, Mpanda, Morogoro, Manyoni, Geita, Bukombe, Mirerani and Mbinga; (v) strengthen the capacity of zonal mines offices and resident mines offices to support extension services through the provision of training to extension officers to provide extension support, train, and equip extension officers to enhance their capacity for quick response; (vi) prepare standard training manuals and codes of practice for small-scale mining on mining practice, health, safety, basic geology, and mineral processing for specific minerals and on cross-cutting issues such as HIV/AIDS, environment, entrepreneurship, and social responsibility; and (vii) promote initiatives by large-scale mining (LSM) companies for training and extension services for small-scale miners in Geita, Mirerani, Kahama, and Kabanga to capture lessons learned and strategies to manage potential conflict between ASM and LSM.

• Subcomponent A.3. Provision of technical assistance for domestic entrepreneurs to develop the production and marketing of industrial minerals and support value addition in gemstones and semi-precious minerals as well as the establishment of an integrated pilot breeder for downstream products including (a) strengthening the Arusha Carving Center, (b) establishing lapidary and jewelry sections and training programs at the Arusha Carving Center, (c) empowering entrepreneurs to produce and market -specified industrial minerals locally, and (d) supporting fair trade initiatives.

• Subcomponent A.4. Supporting artisanal and small-scale miners’ operations, raising the standards in small-scale mining, and managing self-employment and microenterprises including, among others, working with Regional Miners Associations and other stakeholders to promote (a) training ASM miners in entrepreneurial skills, (b) strengthening and supporting schemes for equipment leasing and local fabrication of tools and equipment in small-scale mining centers, and (c) developing a program to provide Grants to support small-scale miners and community–based mining organizations.

• Subcomponent A.5. Establishing linkages between mining and the local economy through support to selected local government authorities (LGAs) to (a) mainstream mining into strategic planning at the district level, (b) integrate ASM activities into the district administrative structure, and (c) develop mechanisms to empower communities in selected mining areas to invest strategically.

• Subcomponent A.6. Supporting human resource development for the mining industry through the provision of technical advisory services and training to (a) facilitate the formulation of a framework for skills development planning, training, certification, and maintenance of standards to support productivity and occupational health and safety in the mining industry and (b) support


Page 13 of 70

the MEM in (i) conducting a needs assessment for human resource development for the mining industry and (ii) establishing and supporting a framework to administer skills planning, qualifications, apprenticeship, and learning for the mining industry.

Component B: Strengthening Governance and Transparency in Mining

• Subcomponent B.1. Supporting the ongoing review and updating of legal, fiscal, and regulatory frameworks for the mineral sector including (a) strengthening the MEM’s legal services unit; (b) supporting review of the Mineral Policy, the Mining Act, and related laws with emphasis on harmonization of the laws relating to mining; (c) establishing a legal and regulatory framework on value addition activities; (d) creating public awareness on the Mineral Policy and legal and regulatory frameworks, and on the fiscal regime; and (e) supporting activities related to the implementation of an extractive industries transparency initiative (EITI).

• Subcomponent B.2. Building the MEM’s institutional capacity including (a) carrying out a functional review of MEM, (b) strengthening the Mines Inspection Section within MEM, (c) strengthening the Minerals Audit Section within MEM, (d) provision of training to the MEM staff, and (e) improving the working tools and equipment for zonal mines offices and resident mines offices.

• Subcomponent B.3. Improving the mining cadastral information management system including carrying out (a) an assessment of cadastral needs and strategy, hardware, software, and training; (b) system upgrades; (c) staff training in mining cadastral information management system operations; (d) improvement of central registry and sub-registries at zonal mines offices and resident mines offices; (e) field verification of the ASM licenses; and (f) strengthening of the mining cadastral information management system and clearance of the backlog of license applications.

• Subcomponent B.4. Supporting the Environmental Management Unit within the MEM including (a) strengthening the Environmental Management Unit to execute its functions effectively; (b) conducting a Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment (SESA); (c) conducting a poverty and social impact analysis; (d) establishing an environmental database linked to mining cadastral and geological and mineral information system; (e) preparing and updating environmental and social guidelines and codes of practice; (f) carrying out environmental and social awareness programs in small and large-scale mining areas; (g) developing a framework for abandoned mines; and (h) strengthening environmental and social monitoring capacity at the MEM headquarters, resident mines offices, zonal mines offices, and LGAs, all through the provision of technical advisory services, training, and acquisition of goods.

Component C: Stimulating Mineral Sector Investment

• Subcomponent C.1. Strengthening the geologic infrastructure including supporting the Geological Survey of Tanzania (GST) in (a) the completion of high-resolution airborne geophysical survey and conducting ground follow-up in Chunya, Dodoma, Kiomboi, Kondoa, Manyoni, Babati, Handeni, Kilindi, Mvomero, Bahi, Chamwino Districts, and other selected areas; (b) acquiring and updating of geodata and information through geological mapping and geophysical and geochemical surveys


Page 14 of 70

and publish related maps and reports; (c) computerizing, digitizing, and upgrading the existing geological and mineral information system; (d) carrying out laboratory upgrade and staff training to International Organization for Standardization (ISO) accreditation; (e) updating and maintaining the geological map library, rock, and mineral core sample archives; and (f) facilitating the accessibility of geoscientific data and information to potential investors, infrastructure planning authorities, and stakeholders.

• Subcomponent C.2. Conducting a strategic assessment for the future direction of the State Mining Corporation.

• Subcomponent C.3. Strengthening mineral resources promotion, statistics development, and communication, including (a) strengthening the Mineral Economics and Trade Section within the MEM; (b) enhancing the Information, Education, and Communication Unit within the MEM; (c) upgrading the Management Information System Unit within the MEM; (d) improving data capture, preparation, and dissemination of sector statistics and promotional materials; and (e) implementing a communications and promotion strategy to improve communications in the mineral sector.

Component D: Project Coordination and Management

• Day-to-day management of the project;

• Procurement;

• Monitoring and Evaluation;

• project exit studies to evaluate the overall performance of the project, and achievement of the project’s objective, through the provision of technical advisory services and training.

B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION

18. The project underwent a total of four restructurings: (a) The first was for the extension of the closing date by one year from June 30, 2014, to June 30, 2015, to allow for a successful completion of key activities; (b) The second restructuring involved an Additional Financing (AF) Project following the completion of the activities under the original project (this is a separate but related US$45 million project whereby the PDO of the original project was retained but with a greater emphasis on the part which aims to “improve the socioeconomic impact of LSM and small-scale mining for Tanzania and Tanzanians; (c) The third restructuring addressed a Government special request to use SMMRPII project funds to refinance the Project Preparation Advance (PPA) from the dropped Catalyzing the Future Agri-food Systems of Tanzania Project (CFAST); and (d) The fourth restructuring involved the cancellation of project undisbursed funds. The most significant change during the project life was the Additional Financing, which is discussed below.


Page 15 of 70

Additional Financing (SMMRPII)

19. Revision of PDO. There was no change in the original PDO. However, the emphasis of the PDO shifted toward the part of the original PDO which was to improve the socioeconomic impact of Large-Scale Mining (LSM) and small-scale mining for Tanzania and Tanzanians.

20. Revised Results Framework. The additional financing for SMMRPII resulted in substantial additional changes to the Results Framework. The Results Framework was updated to increase some target values and to add new indicators. This was intended to measure results from scaled-up activities, as well as dropping some intermediate indicators for activities that were completed under SMMRP. The revised Result Framework is presented in annex 1.

21. Key changes in the Results Framework were as follows:

(a) Three new PDO indicators were added, (i) “Time taken to transform identified ASM areas into established PML mines”; (ii) “Annual publication of mining sector revenue with an ASM”; and (iii) “Percentage increase in share of royalty from PML holders”.

(b) Intermediate indicators were dropped for some completed activities.

(c) Eleven new intermediate indicators were added, and one was revised (see annexes 1 for details).

22. Revised Components: The AF had three components, compared to the original project, which had four components. The component on stimulating mining investment in the original project (old Component C) was fully completed. For this reason, it was not considered for scale-up under the AF.

23. New activities were added during the AF in May 2015, and to that end, the project expanded activities in two of the original components: (i) Component A - Improving the Benefits of the Mineral Sector for Tanzania (ASM, Local Economic Development Planning, and Skills Development); and (ii) Component B - Strengthening Governance and Transparency in Mining. No new activities were anticipated for Component C. Stimulating Mineral Sector Investment. The project retained the fourth project component (Component D) intended for Project Coordination, Management, and M&E.

Other Changes

24. The details and justifications for key changes during the project are shown in Table 1 below.

Table 1. List of Restructurings and Justifications

Level of Restructuring Date % of Disbursed (US$, millions)

Key Changes Justification

Level II, Country Director approved

June 25, 2014

46 (92%) Cancellation of some activities not yet started and no longer a priority; the reallocating of funds from dropped activities to scale up other activities; the

Enabled the proper implementation of the planned project’s activities and the achievement of the


Page 16 of 70

Level of Restructuring Date % of Disbursed (US$, millions)

Key Changes Justification

extension of activities which have significant effect on achieving the PDOs; amendment of covenants in the Financing Agreement (FA); and extension of the closing date from June 30, 2014, to June 30, 2015.

PDOs.

Level I, Board approved May 7, 2015 0.0 (-%) An additional credit in an amount of US$45 million

Revision of the PDOs improve the socioeconomic aspects of the project; Introduction of a new activity under two of the original components; Changes in the results framework, including new indicators and targets; change in procurement and extension of the closing date

Allowed the completion of key project activities essential to achieving the PDO.


December 21, 2018

SMMRPII project funds used to refinance the Project Preparation Advance (PPA) from the dropped Catalyzing the Future Agri-food Systems of Tanzania Project (CFAST)

Allowed the outstanding PPA from the dropped CFAST, P161764 be refinanced through undisbursed funds of SMMRP.


December 28, 2018

22.49 (48%) Cancellation of expected undisbursed funds.

Allowed undisbursed funds to be reallocated elsewhere in Tanzania portfolio.

Rationale for Changes and their Implication on the Original Theory of Change (ToC)

25. The key restructuring during the life of the project consisted of an Additional Financing Project. The rationale for this project restructuring, as described earlier, was to better reflect the emphasis on the part of the original PDO aimed at “improving the socioeconomic impact of mining”. The restructuring introduced new activities under two of the original components and extended activities that were considered to have a significant impact on the achievement of the project's development objectives. This included expanding the benefits component to give Tanzanians the means to actively participate in mining and to dispel the public perception that the socioeconomic impact of the mining sector has not been adequate.

26. These changes did not modify or alter the project design, and in fact, they strengthened the achievement of the PDOs. Overall, the changes from the restructurings had no impact on the underlying


Page 17 of 70

ToC. However, the changes initiated in the context of the May 2015 AF implied change in Results Framework and change to components and cost.

II. OUTCOME

A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs

Assessment of Relevance of PDOs and Rating

27. The PDO of SMMRPI was highly relevant to the real situation and the needs of the country, as well as to the fiscal and policy context. SMMRPI’s objectives were in line with the country’s strategic orientation, as highlighted in the 2005 MKUKUTA, which aimed to achieve the Millennium Development Goals and focused on growth and governance. The MKUKUTA emphasized on accelerating private sector-led growth by building a competitive economy supported by efficient government. Attention was focused on actions to stimulate the private sector response, including addressing infrastructure and human resource capacity constraints, strengthening the business environment, and encouraging export diversification. The project has contributed to capacity building in the mineral sector and stimulated additional economic growth in line with cluster 1, Economic Growth of the MKUKUTA.

28. The original SMMRPI’s objectives were also consistent with the key pillars of the World Bank’s strategies that overlapped with the project implementation period. The project overlapped with two Country Assistance Strategies (CASs): (a) the Joint Assistance Strategy (JAST) adopted in March 2007, and (b) the CAS for FY2012–2015. The project was aligned with the 2007 JAST and the World Bank’s program of support within the JAST, which included striking the right balance between the need for sustainable development and the protection of Tanzania’s natural resource base. The project also involved giving high priority to small-scale mining and value addition as part of the country's broader focus on poverty reduction and rural economic renewal.

29. The World Bank has been supporting Government reforms in the sector over the past four decades. In the mid-1980s, the support focused on geological infrastructure required to identify the mineral resources of the country. This was followed by a loan in the early 1990s to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) through necessary regulatory changes. In 2009, SMMRP increased the focus on geological knowledge, strengthened the Government's control capacity in the districts, and better supported social and environmental management. Due in part to these sector reforms, Tanzania experienced strong, relatively steady FDI in mining, which in turn fueled a robust sector and macroeconomic performance over the last decade, with GDP growth anchored at an average of 7 percent per year. The original project addressed development constrains identified in the Government’s main policy directions and was consistent with the successive World Bank CASs.

30. The SMMRPI relied on an extended partnership supporting the country’s mining sector. There was a harmonized framework through which several development partners (DPs), directly or indirectly, were supporting the country’s mining sector. The project built on the progress of the Nordic Development Fund mining sector project which closed in 2008, to support implementation of the EITI through the two-year validation process, as well as to establish strong links to the Communities and Artisanal Small-scale Mining initiative (known as ‘CASM’).


Page 18 of 70

31. Throughout project implementation, the project was aligned with the Government’s policy direction in the mining sector and the World Bank’s successive strategies in the country. The project was adjusted, over time, to adapt to new developments in the field, and the underlying objectives remained highly relevant until project closure in June 2015.

32. The follow-on project, SMMRPII, retained the original project PDO but put more emphasis on the part that aims to "improve the socioeconomic impact of large-scale and small-scale mining for Tanzania and Tanzanians." Two factors drove the design of SMMRPII in 2011: (a) to improve the links of LSM with local communities through better integration of corporate social responsibility programs and local development planning in mine affected areas; and (b) to encourage the formalization and sustainable development of ASM as a means of boosting local entrepreneurship and employment in mining.

33. When SMMRPII closed in December 2018, the key objectives of strengthening capacity to manage the mineral sector and improving the socioeconomic impacts of large and small-scale mining were still at the forefront of the priorities of the GoT and the World Bank as highlighted in the Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for the period FY18–FY22.3 The CPF identifies the job-creation effect of past investments in extractive industries but also sustains the need for structural transformation to higher-value manufacturing and for business-climate improvements to generate more investments and jobs. Moreover, managing natural resources for resilient economic growth has become a key objective under the CPF Focus Area 1 to enhance productivity and accelerate equitable and sustainable growth. This objective recognizes how extractive industries can foster the development of local value chains or local content from their investments.

34. The objectives of SMMRPII were also fully aligned with the World Bank's current TA support for managing natural resources for resilient economic growth. The PAD recognized the country's priorities from the outset, and components were revised to focus on improving the socioeconomic impact of LSM and small-scale mining for Tanzania and Tanzanians.

35. The PDO was highly relevant at the time of project preparation and continued to be so throughout the life of the project and at project closing. As noted earlier, this is evidenced by Tanzania’s country strategies, the World Bank’s current CPF, and recent trends in sector investment and mineral discoveries, and the continued government’s request to extend support for a possible third phase of the project with the same PDOs. Therefore, based on this evidence, the PDO relevance is rated High.

B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY)

Assessment of Achievement of Each Objective/Outcome

36. The original project SMMRPI was approved on June 9, 2009, in the amount of US$50 million. Based on satisfactory performance of SMMRPI and the positive trajectory of the sector more broadly, the World Bank Board approved an AF in the amount of US$45 million (SMMRPII) on May 7, 2015. The situation of disbursement at project closing is provided in table 2.

3 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/669801521338458808/pdf/Tanzania-CPF-FY18-22-SECPO-February-14-02212018.pdf


Page 19 of 70

Table 2. Project Disbursement at Closing (US$, millions)

Proj

ect

Loan

Appr

oval

Amou

nt

Canc

elle

d

Revi

sed

Disb

urse

d

Clos

ing

Und

isbu

rsed

Disb

urse

men

t Ra

te

Original Project P096302 SMMRPI

IDA-45840 9-Jun-09 50.00 0.87 49.13 50.17 30-Jun-14 - 100%

Additional Financing P151124 SMMRPII

IDA-56330 7-May-15 45.00 20.98 24.02 24.85* 31-Dec-18 0.05 100%

*Due to delays in project implementation, the bulk of the amount disbursed under SMMRPII was during the period April to December 2018

37. There was no change of the PDO during the restructuring in 2015, but the Results Framework, components, and costs were slightly modified. The PDOs have been disaggregated into three sets of objectives, as presented in table 3.

Table 3. Definition of the Original and AF PDOs (Disaggregated)

PDO Definition PDO1a To strengthen the Recipient’s capacity to manage the mineral sector PDO1b To improve the socioeconomic impacts of large and Small-scale Mining

for the Recipient and its citizens PDO1c To enhance private local and foreign investments

38. As stated earlier, the PDO of SMMRP I is a compound PDO that can be reasonably unpacked into its three constituent PDOs, measured by the following PDO-level outcome indicators which entail improvement in the following targets:

(a) To improve the socioeconomic impacts of large and small-scale mining for Tanzania and Tanzanians:

(i) Percent increase (10%) of household income levels in selected artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) communities

(ii) Percent of citizens in participating communities who consider that their views have been taken into account in the local economic development strategic planning process

(b) To strengthen the Government’s capacity to manage the mineral sector:

(i) Time to process mineral rights

(ii) Annual publication of mining sector revenue


Page 20 of 70

(c) To enhance private local and foreign investment:

(i) Improvement in Tanzania’s ranking as a mining investment destination as evidenced by independent investor survey

(ii) Percentage increase (5%) in mining revenue

B1. Assessment of PDO indicators and specific outcomes for the original project – SMMRPI (6 years of implementation: 2009-2015)

Socioeconomic outcomes

39. This constituent PDO is related to: (a) the increase in household income levels in some ASM communities and is measured by the percentage increase - in household income levels in households in some ASM communities, and (b) citizens increasingly convinced that their views have been incorporated into the local economic development planning process and is measured by the percentage increase of citizens in participating communities.

40. The two core PDO indicators met and exceeded their targets by June 2015.

(a) The baseline value for indicator household income was "0.00", the end target was “100” in June 2015. Thus, the end target was successfully achieved. Moreover, by June 30, 2015, the ASM baseline surveys showed that household income levels in selected ASM communities had quadrupled since 2009 from US$4 per day to US$16 per day in 2015, an increase of 300 percent.

(b) The baseline value for the indicator for citizen engagement was "12.00", and the end target was “60.00” in June-2015. Thus, the end target was successfully achieved. A final perception survey was also completed, reaching the end target of 60 percent of citizens in three participating communities in Geita, Sunya, and Tarime.

41. Beyond the core PDO indicators, the project achieved significant socio-economic outcomes, which are described below.

• The 2010 mining legislation significantly strengthened the socioeconomic benefits of mining development. The project supported the development of a strong legislation with a focus on enhancing the socioeconomic benefits of mining and reducing adverse social and environmental impacts. With support from the project, Tanzania became the most improved mining jurisdiction in Africa in terms of policies and law in 2014. The Mining Act 2010, which replaced the Mining Act of 1998, improved socio-economic outcomes by focusing on ASM regulations with specific ASM provisions including demarcation, decentralization of the permitting process, and more stringent standards on “no child labor,” limitations on mercury use, and general environmental remediation.

• The mining sector experienced faster growth and a greater contribution to the Tanzanian economy. The reforms supported by the project resulted in a dramatic increase of the country’s


Page 21 of 70

annual large-scale gold production, making Tanzania one of the largest gold producers in Africa (third to fourth place). Industrial production from large-scale mines increased rapidly, peaking at 1.4 million ounces, and stabilizing around 1.2 million ounces annually through 2013 despite declining prices and demand. As a result, the percentage share of mineral exports to GDP doubled from 1.5 percent in 2000 to about 3 percent by 2015.

• Grants to small-scale miners helped their formalization, which improved the socio-economic viability of their activities. Two rounds of grants have provided financial support to a wide group of ASM operators across the country, including several women miners. A total of 116 ASM operators received US$3.5 million in technical assistance grants, of which 93 miners transformed their informal mining activities by establishing formal ASM businesses, allowing for job creations where the number of employees has increased from 5 to 30 on average, and in one case, it has increased to 100, according to a survey conducted by the Ministry of Minerals. Grants were complemented by business development and environmental management training, and the use of funds was monitored to ensure that they were in line with business plans. Subsidized activities helped to show Tanzanians how to turn a formalized and capitalized ASM into a viable and successful small business.

• The geological survey increased the availability of land for ASM practice. With the support of the project, there has been an increase in the availability of demarcated land for ASM growth. The GST has delineated numerous geological structures suitable for small-scale gold mining and tanzanite mining. These resulted in an increase in the number of demarcated areas for ASM, from 2 in 2009 to a total of 25 in 2014. Thus, the end target was successfully achieved.

42. Based on these outcomes, the efficacy rating given for the achievement of this constituent PDO is Substantial.

Capacity outcomes

43. This constituent PDO refers to (a) the reduction in the time needed to process mining rights (exploration licenses) and is measured in number of months for the processing of mining rights (exploration licenses) and (b) the annual publication of mining sector revenues and measured by number of reports annually published.

44. The baseline value for the processing time indicator was "18.00 months", and the end target was “2 months” in June 2015. The end target was successfully achieved. The time required for mineral rights processing was reduced from an estimated 18 months to less than 1 month for both prospecting licenses and primary mining licenses (PMLs) once the backlog of previous applications was cleared.

45. Increased transparency in mining sector governance is measured by whether mineral ASM sector revenues were being included in annual sector reports. The baseline for this indicator was ‘1’ in 2014, and the end target was ‘4.00’ in 2018. Thus, the end target was successfully achieved.

46. Significant capacity outcomes achieved by the project include:


Page 22 of 70

• The capacity to manage the mineral sector was significantly improved. Through the project support, the monitoring capacity of the MEM improved considerably, with (a) the development of an online cadaster system providing data in real time and decentralization of the permitting process through the newly established zonal mining offices helped increase the rates of registration substantially while the time for processing titles was reduced significantly. For instance, the backlog of application processing was reduced to zero, the issue of overlapping rights was also addressed, and in the ASM sector, the number of PMLs reached 35,000 in 2015 from a baseline of 11,000 in 2009; (b) PML issuing was decentralized, and the processing time was reduced to one month compared to four months in 2011, which is a model of best practice for the region; (c) furthermore, monitoring of sites increased by 352 percent in the number of audits conducted for the ASM; and (d) the project implementation capacity also improved significantly., as measured by ISR ratings and 100% disbursement rate at closing.

• Mining institutions were strengthened. The project significantly contributed to strengthening the capacity of the GST, making it one of the best on the continent. Through twinning arrangements, GST participated in air-borne geological surveys of high-potential areas representing 12 percent of the country surface at 1:100,000 scale (magnetic, radiometric, gravity, and electromagnetic) and making a total of 16 percent countywide coverage. The survey delineated geophysical anomaly areas even at great depths and areas covered by soils which pinpoints potential areas for hosting mineralization and groundwater. New areas identified by the survey included kimberlites in Singida area, new linear zones hosting polymetalic sulphides, copper, and gold mineralization; graphite in the Mererani area extending southward into Kilindi and Handeni Districts; and polymetallic (gold-copper-silver) mineralization identical to the Luika Shear zone. In addition, the project supported the production of a metalorganic map of Tanzania for mineral promotion (scale 1:2,000,000) and established an integrated online geographic information system-based geodata and information management system (referred to as ‘GMIS’) attached with Advangeo software for integration of multidata for prediction of mineralized zones. Regarding small-scale mining, the GST delineated a number of geological structures suitable for the small-scale mining of gold and tanzanite. These resulted in an increase of demarcated areas for ASM to a total of 25 in 2014 from 2 in 2009.

• Tanzania achieved the status of East Africa’s gem hub. The project facilitated the modernization of the Tanzanian Gemological Center (TGC) by providing lapidary machines, gemological machines, jewelry design and fabrication machines, and providing classrooms, training workshops, and laboratories. The project also contributed to strengthening the capacity of the center's staff. The TGC became a regional center for lapidary, gemology, and jewelry design and manufacturing. With the project’s support, the TGC hosted six well-attended international gem fairs which consolidated the reputation of Tanzania as a regional gem-trading center. Mineral sales during the fairs decreased smuggling and provided opportunities for auctioning seized materials. In 2016, smuggled gemstones worth over US$11.4 million were auctioned at the gem fair.

• ASM reforms resulted in a high rate of miner’s registration. The reforms of the ASM have facilitated the registration of miners and thus to obtain a high rate of registration. The project supported the formalization of ASM by (a) simplifying procedures for acquiring PMLs, (b) decentralizing the MEM licensing, (c) providing inspections and extension services functions to


Page 23 of 70

zonal mines offices and resident mines offices, and (d) providing financial assistance to artisanal miners willing to formalize their operations. Because of these measures, the number of registered ASM license holders increased from about 35 in 1999 to about 35,000 in 2014.

• The capacity to monitor extractive industries revenues was significantly improved. Tanzania joined the EITI in February 2009 and became compliant in 2013. Since joining the EITI, Tanzania has produced seven EITI reports, which indicate that from July 1, 2008, to June 30, 2015, the Government collected US$2.76 billion from the extractive companies.4 The Eighth EITI report covering the period from July 1, 2015, to June 30, 2016, was also completed. Mining revenues were below potential in the early EITI reports. It was not until the 2012 EITI report that fiscal revenues derived from the sector began to reach their potential, following the end of the tax holiday period granted to many of the first foreign investors in the late 1990s. In the 2012 EITI report, annual Government revenues (taxes plus royalties) reached US$410 million, equivalent to 5.9 percent of the annual budget. Registered ASM by Tanzania nationals also grew dramatically. The number of license holders paying royalties grew from about 4,000 in 2009 to over 35,000 in 2015. Tanzania prepared an EITI Law and a Petroleum Revenue Management Law which sought to mainstream and institutionalize mineral revenue transparency into the country’s legal and regulatory framework. .


Mining investment climate outcomes

48. This constituent PDO is linked to (a) the improvement of Tanzania’s ranking as a mining investment destination and is measured by country ranking in independent investor survey for policy ranking and mineral potential by the Fraser Institute Report and (b) the increase in mining revenues, measured on an annual percentage increase.

49. The baseline value for this indicator was a ranking of 48 out of 71 jurisdictions for policy ranking and 22 out 71 jurisdictions for mineral potential, and the end target was an increase of 2–3 points/places or more over baseline in one or both indicators.

50. Significant mining investment climate outcomes achieved by the project include:

• Tanzania’s mining investment attractiveness was significantly improved. Tanzania saw an initial decline in its ranking by the Fraser Institute as a destination for mining due to the introduction of the Mining Act in 2010 that affected investment in the short term; however, this ranking did improve because of geological component activities that facilitated investment promotion. This ranking did not reach full recovery to its baseline score before the 2010 reforms, but Tanzania improved remarkably, and was named “the most improved in Africa” for 2014.

• Tanzania has been able to attract large flows of FDI into its mining sector. When the project was launched in 2009, mining FDI represented 30 percent to 50 percent of total annual FDI flows. The

4 Tanzania EITI Report, March 2018.


Page 24 of 70

project facilitated increased investment in new mining development. As a result of new mines and expansions, annual gold production increased steadily, reaching 50 metric tons per year. Investors also began to consider other minerals. According to estimates from the Tanzania Minerals Audit Agency, planned greenfield and brownfield investments between 2014 and 2023 could enable Tanzania to further increase gold production, and to diversify minerals produced (for instance commissioning of the Mkuju River uranium mine and the Kabanga nickel mine) and generate nearly US$2.5 billion in fiscal revenues). With the discovery of significant natural gas reserves, extractive industries are expected to become the engine of growth in the country. Important activities of exploration and mining development were ongoing. During 2013–2017, the extractive sector represented nearly 40 percent of total FDI. The extractive sector continues to dominate greenfield investment (48 percent of total FDI).5


B2. Assessment of PDO indicators and specific outcomes for additional financing project SMMRPII (3 years of implementation: 2015-2018)

52. SMMRP II maintained the same PDO but had put more emphasis on the part that aims to "improve the socio-economic impact of large- and small-scale mining for Tanzania and Tanzanians." To this end, the project expanded the activities of two of the original components. The Results Framework was revised under SMMRPII and updated to increase certain target values and new indicators were added to measure the scaled-up activities. Original indicators of activities completed under SMMRPI were not reported in the Results Framework for SMMRPII.

53. SMMRPII achieved an effective 50 percent disbursement rate before cancellation and reallocation of funds. The project suffered significant implementation delays due to management changes at the Ministry of Energy and Minerals, policy uncertainty, and major legislative changes which delayed the implementation of many activities. Delayed activities included the establishment of Centers of Excellence, the implementation of geological ground works, the launch of Phase III of the Small Grants Program (SGP), and improvements in value addition. Activities such as the integration of local mining communities in Government planning were dropped because of time constraints.

54. Following the swearing-in of a new Government in early 2016, the GoT took time to reassess the project in relation to its new agenda. As a result, the implementation of SMMRPII was brought to halt for nearly two years as the Government was undecided about restructuring. By midterm, only 39 out of 82 activities were initiated. A few of the project activities were also reduced in scope, such as establishing Centers of Excellence, while others were restructured (such as Component A3. Small Grants to Small-Scale Miners).

55. It was not until the second part of 2018 that the GoT decided to speed up implementation. In view of the limited remaining time, the GoT actively sought World Bank approval for an extension until June 2019 to allow time to complete the key activities. Because it was not possible to extend the project, the Government requested a restructuring to focus on activities that could be completed before the closing

5 Financial Times FDI Markets.


Page 25 of 70

date. Noncritical activities were canceled, and the GoT had to allocate funds from its own budget to continue the implementation of unfinished activities after project closing.

56. Some project activities were only partially completed at project closing date. These activities and the risks associated with their noncompletion have been identified in the ‘risk to development outcomes’ section. While noncompletion of these activities might affect the sustainability of project outcomes on the long term, they did not materially impede the acheievement of the PDO as of project closure. Partially completed activities involved mainly the establishment of ASM demonstration centers and ASM centers of excellence (the physical structures were completed but not yet operational). The activities that were dropped include (a) Integrating Mining Community Development Priorities into Local Government Planning (reallocated toward strengthening the ASM sector); (b) Phase II of the Small Grant Program (reallocated toward geoscientific survey of ASM areas); and (c) reduction in the initial number of Demonstration Centers due to insufficient geological resources for long-term viability. While the partially-completed or dropped activities affected the magnitude of the expected outcome, they did not alter the original development outcomes.

Socioeconomic outcomes

57. These outcomes were captured by the increased in daily production value in the ASM sector. While the PDO indicator for aggregate production value by ASM beneficiary communities had grown greatly from its original US$4 per day, reaching US$20 per day at the end of 2015, but keeping steady at US$23 per day during 2016–2018, leaving the indicator at less than halfway to the final goal of US$50 per day. Another indicator is the percentage of citizens in mining communities who considered their views taken into account in local economic development strategy planning slipped from 60 percent in June 2015 to 42 percent by May 2017, rising again to 55 percent by December 2018 at project closing. Other outcomes achieved by the project are discussed below:

• The contribution of the mining sector to Tanzania’s socioeconomic growth increased markedly, but recent policy reversals threaten to stop the momentum. Mining share of GDP increased from 0.2 percent between 1995 and 1999, when the project started, to 3.4 percent between 2007 and 2008, and to 4.8 percent by 2017. However, in June 2017, the GoT introduced sweeping legislative changes in the country’s natural resources sectors including mining. The key provisions in the new laws were (a) the ‘Permanent Sovereignty’ Act No. 5 on Control of Mineral Resources (introducing bans on mineral exports for beneficiation outside Tanzania, on the use of off-shore accounts by mining companies, and on the use of international arbitration to settle mining investment disputes); (b) the ‘Review and Re-Negotiation of Unconscionable Terms’ Act No. 6 on Contract Review which empowers Parliament to renegotiate what in its view constitutes ‘unconscionable terms’ and conditions for the exploitation of natural resources; and (c) the ‘Written Laws’ Act No. 7 on Mining Act Amendments which provides for the GoT equity participation in mining ventures. Despite these changes, the growth momentum continued through the closing of the project.

• Increased contribution of the mining sector to the GoT's strategy for poverty reduction, but uncertainty of the investment climate may produce unintended results. Even in times of economic and political uncertainty, the mining sector has continued to contribute more to growth and poverty reduction. According to Government statistics, the sector's contribution to GDP in 2018/2019 increased to 5 percent, as well as tax revenues which also increased. For the 2019/20


Page 26 of 70

fiscal year, projected revenues were TZS 310.6 billion (US$134.5 million) for the fiscal year that ended June 30, 2019, compared to TZS 470.9 billion collected by the Government. These results contributed to the poverty reduction goal of GoT. Between 2007 and 2016, the poverty rate decreased from 34.4 percent to 26.8 percent. Although the elasticity of poverty relative to growth is less than 1 percent for Tanzania, it could be higher for ASM, which employs about 1.5 million people in rural areas. For example, a 1 percent increase in ASM could reduce rural poverty by more than 1 percent. Indeed, between 2007 and 2012, the largest decline in poverty occurred in rural areas. During this period, 1.2 million rural people came out of poverty.6

• Regulatory gaps for ASM were addressed, but the new policies create significant uncertainty. The project supported the preparation of missing policy and regulatory instruments needed for the sustainable practice of ASM. These included the Mine Closure Guidelines and the Environmental Protection Plan (EPP) for ASM. Important pieces of legislation such as the Minerals Value Addition Act and the Explosive Act were reviewed.

58. The efficacy rating given for the achievement of this constituent PDO is Modest.

Capacity outcomes

The following capacity-building related outcomes were achieved.

• Institutional capacity to manage ASM at the local level was strengthened, but most of the gains have been wiped out by high turnover of key staff and managers. The project upgraded seven regional mining offices and turned them into ASM Centers of Excellence. Such centers were established in Bukoba, Musoma, Bariadi, Mpanda, Chunya, Songea, and Handeni. At the closing of the project, the refurbishments have a 90 percent completion rate on average. The project also renovated two resident mining offices at Nachingwea and Moshi, bringing the number of ASM centers to nine. In addition, Demonstration Centers were established at Lwamgasa, Itumbi-Chunya, and Katente-Geita sites. However, frequent staffing changes targeting experienced personnel have undermined the institutional capacity to carry on ASM reforms.

• ASM Demonstration Centers were established to provide a model for ASM formalization in Tanzania and around Africa, but the government needs to make them operational. Initially, the project envisaged support for seven Demonstration Centers, but further geological investigations retained four areas: two sites for gold mines at Katente Geita and Itumbi-Chunya, one site at Mkwanyule Kilwa for salt, and the remaining site at Kona Z Tanga for limestone. There were significant delays in starting the Demonstration Centers and the GoT was expecting a project extension. Since the extension could not be granted, the four centers were built but were not fully operationalized by the close of the project. The GoT will use its own funds to operationalize the centers. It has allocated this year a budget of TZS 6 billion to cover the costs of the centers and is seeking donor support for further funding. The project also supported the establishment of a model mine at Lwamgasa in Geita, as well as demonstration of best practices on ASM, with special attention to “no mercury” and “no child labor” policies. The Demonstration Centers have attracted attention from other African countries, namely Ghana, Tanzania, and Mali, which are

6 Tanzania WASH poverty diagnostic, main report, World Bank, June 2017.


Page 27 of 70

seeking to replicate the Tanzanian model. The key to the ASM demonstration centers is to make them operational. The GoT’s budget of TZS 6 billion may not be adequate for the four sites.

• The geological survey provided detailed geoscientific information to support future growth of ASM. After a lengthy and cumbersome selection process for the third phase of the Grant program, the GoT requested restructuring to reallocate the grant funding toward activities which benefit all ASM operators. The geological investigation of ASM areas was implemented in replacement of the grant funding activities. The detailed field studies including identification of mineralized targets and resource estimation were completed for six high-potential areas: Kyerwa (Bukoba); Buhemba (Musoma); D-Reef, Kapanda, and Ibindi (Mpanda); Katente, Kerezi, and Ng’anzo (Ushirombo); Itumbi and Sangambi (Chunya); and Kange, Mkurumuzi, and Kiomoni (Tanga). The geoscientific information collected for these areas will guide future ASM growth in Tanzania.

• TGC provided tailored training programs to position itself as a regional gemology training hub. Through the project, about 100 graduates were trained in the use of lapidary equipment. Some of the graduates from the center are currently self-employed while others are employed by the gem industry in Arusha. The project supported the development of a strategic business plan to consolidate TGC’s position as a regional hub for training and marketing of gemstones. Six gemology experts were brought from India to train future trainers of TGC, and three Tanzanian staff of TGC attended gemology, lapidary, and jewelry design courses in India, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. These trainers are now currently training Tanzanian students and other staff. The project also supported the establishment of a gem library.

• Mining institutions were empowered to become service providers to ASM. Owing to the project, the GST and the State Mining Corporation (STAMICO) were able to (i) conduct detailed geoscientific studies, (ii) establish geological and structural controls of mineralization, (iii) delineate mineralization extension, (iv) establish metallurgical properties of the ores and set up appropriate mineral processing methods, (v) estimate resources in areas that were proposed to house the Minerals Processing Demonstration Centers, and (vi) identify potential areas for mineralization and conduct resource estimation for five potential areas.

• EITI implementation capacity was strengthened. During the implementation of the project, progress in EITI implementation deteriorated, leading to a temporary suspension of Tanzania in October 2016 for noncompliance. With the support of the project, Tanzania was able to avoid the suspension and to produce the 2016 EITI report. Efforts are underway to prepare for the release of the 2017–2018 EITI report. The project promoted the normalization of relations between Tanzania and the EITI International Secretariat and helped revitalize the multi-stakeholder forum on the mining sector, with the involvement of the Government, industry, and civil society.

59. The efficacy rating given for the achievement of this constituent PDO is Modest.

Mining investment climate outcomes

60. Institutional difficulties and stealthy policy changes impeded the achievement of the objectives of strengthening governance and transparency in the mining sector and negatively affected the progress made under SMMRP. The outcomes are assessed below.


Page 28 of 70

• Investment climate deteriorated during the implementation of SMMRPII. Although SMMRPII did not focus on mining investment, major changes in policy and regulations in 2016 increased the risk of Tanzania's profile as a mining destination for FDI. Tanzania’s sovereign rating was downgraded to B2 with a negative outlook, and the FDI flows were threatened with decisions to prohibit access to international arbitration, use of offshore accounts, and free repatriation of funds. According to the 2017 Fraser Institute Annual Survey of mining investor perceptions, Tanzania’s average score of mining investment attractiveness, which was steady at about 60 out of 100 between 2013 and 2016, suddenly plunged to 46.79 in 2017. During the same year, Tanzania’s rank dropped 18 places in the global ranking for mining investment attractiveness. The country’s top two mining investors reacted by taking countermeasures and scaling back investment plans. The share of FDI from the extractive sector has fallen to around 20 percent over the period 2014–2017. During this period, FDI decreased by 12 percent a year, led by investment scale down in extractive industries.7 The project initiated a dialogue between the public authorities and the private sector to address key issues affecting FDI flows. This activity was continued as part of a separate Analytic and Advisory Activities (AAA) to inform further dialogue with GoT.

• Mining sector growth decelerated during the implementation of SMMRPII. Gold production declined significantly in 2017 and 2018 following the enactment of the new Mining Law. The leading producer, Acacia Mining, reported a 55 percent total gold production decline year-on-year during the first quarter of 2018. Its flagship Bulyanhulu gold mine was put under care and maintenance, with its Buzwagi mine considering a 43 percent reduction in production, limiting operations to processing stockpiles rather than continuing mining production. However, mining and quarrying continued to register high growth rates of 10 percent in 2015, declining to 7.4 percent in 2016 and 5.3 percent in 2017.8

• Prospects for domestic investment was significantly improved, but at the expense of foreign investment. As part of the project, support for geological ground work and the establishment of Demonstration Centers have created significant investment opportunities for Tanzanian investors in the ASM sector. With the technical support of the GST, STAMICO and financial support from Tanzania Investment Bank, private entrepreneurs have started to invest in small mechanized mining. Their early success should attract more local capital into the ASM operations.

61. The efficacy rating given for the achievement of this constituent PDO is Modest, even though it was not a specific focus of SMMRPII.

Justification of Overall Efficacy Rating

62. The project met and exceeded almost all core and intermediate indicators under SMMRPI but fell short of meeting some of its core indicators and most of its intermediate indicators under SMMRPII. The most notable outcome of SMMRPI was stimulating sector growth through better knowledge of the mineral potential (geological survey), improved climate for FDI in mining (new laws and regulations), and stronger institutional capacity. Under SMMRPII, the project had some setback due to political factors. The

7 Bank of Tanzania data. 8 Tanzania Economic Update 12th edition, World Bank, May 2019


Page 29 of 70

project was restructured to reflect changes in government priorities, resulting in the abandonment of activities that had not yet started at midterm and which could not have been completed by the closing date of the project. Despite these shortcomings, SMMRPII achieved most PDOs by (a) improving the socioeconomic impact of mining for Tanzania and its citizens ( increased contribution of mining to GDP); (b) fostering an environment more conducive to sustainable growth of the sector, particularly in ASM areas (ASM Centers of Excellence and demonstration centers); (c) enabling Tanzanian miners to better manage the resource while respecting the environment (framework for ASM environmental management); (d) strengthening the institutional capacity of Government agencies to provide assistance and training services to small-scale miners (Tanzania Gemological Institute and Mineral Resources Institute); On balance, the overall efficacity of the project throughout the nine years of implementation is rated Substantial.

63. The rating of overall efficacy of the project as Substantial is justified by the fact that the project helped enhance the knowledge of Tanzania’s geological potential, streamline administrative and legal processes, and establish modern tools for improved sector governance. Furthermore, all but one of the PDO indicators were successfully met. Among the six indicators PDO, five have been met. Of the 19 intermediate project indicators, 14 were successfully completed and no longer requiring monitoring. Overall progress in implementation and progress toward PDOs of SMMRPI were both rated Satisfactory. The PDO has maintained its satisfactory rating. In addition, nearly 100 percent of the funds were disbursed and the PDOs set for SMMRPI were met. SMMRPII efficacy rating was lower, but significant outcomes were achieved in a relatively short period (half of the implementation time of SMMRPI).

C. EFFICIENCY

• Increase in fiscal revenue from the mining sector: Fiscal revenue from the extractive sector swelled from US$102 million in 20099 to US$754 million in 2015, with the number of reporting companies growing from 11 to 31 during that period. Considering the limited amount of IDA funds provided for SMMRP under Phase I and Phase II (US$95 million) and the mining sector revenues collected by the government of US$2.76 billion from July 1, 2008 to June 30, 2015 according to the latest EITI data10, it is clear that the cost of the outputs and time required to complete the

9 2008-2009 Tanzania EITI Report https://eiti.org/document/20082009-tanzania-eiti-report 10 2015-2016 Tanzania EITI Report https://eiti.org/document/2015-2016-tanzania-eiti-report

Operational and administrative efficiency

64. SMMRPI became effective on September 22, 2009. After some implementation delays, the project was restructured and the client buy-in was significantly improved. The Ministry had a capable, well-trained, and highly experienced team, so operational and administrative efficiency increased significantly as measured by a 100% disbursement rate at project closing, and significant development outcomes for each project component.

65. Operational and administrative efficiency were evidenced by the following socio-economic outcomes.


Page 30 of 70

Project were modest compared to the achievements in terms of increased revenues from the mining sector.

• Increase in registration of small-scale mining: During the first phase of the Project, the number

of Primary Mining Licenses (PMLs) rose from a baseline of 11,000 in 2009 to over 30,000 by 2018, and relevant increase in collection of license fees reached 180 percent thanks to the systemization of reporting by the Zonal Mining Offices on a quarterly basis.

• Improvements of performance in ASM communities: This indicator was chosen to monitor how

productivity has a direct impact on miners’ incomes. Activities such as the Small Grants Program (SGP), demonstration centers and extension services, and value addition aimed to promote local entrepreneurship, develop technical skills, and introduce productivity-enhancing techniques and modern equipment. Surveys following the first two phases of the SGP revealed that total aggregate production increased almost six-fold from US$4/day in 2009 to US$23/day in 2017, a valid result, although it missed the US$50/day target under the Additional Financing, partly due to the cancellation of Phase III of the SGP in 2017.

66. SMMRPII became effective in October 2015, as Tanzania was preparing for fresh elections. The political dynamics significantly affected the efficiency of implementation of SMMRPII. Notwithstanding the positive results un SMMRPI, most of the progress achieved lost momentum after a newly-elected Government introduced significant policy changes in early 2016. As a result, political uncertainty, and substitutions in key project management positions caused irremediable implementation delays. In some cases, indicators showed positive trends but significantly missed their end targets, especially those connected to performance improvements in ASM areas. These included the sluggish increase in total aggregate production value, lower-than-expected number of PMLs registered, number of new incorporations of ASM cooperatives, SMEs or associations, and number of ASM operators benefitting from technical capacity building services. Other indicators did not vary from their baseline values, as critical Project sub-components such as Phase III of GSP and the activities for integrating mining community development priorities into local government planning were not implemented.

67. Operational and administrative efficiency were affected by the following factors under SMMRPII:

• The initial assumption that the implementation arrangements in place would be adequate to implement the project with three years did not hold due to unforeseen personnel changes. New staff and managers with less familiarity with managing World Bank projects took over shortly after project effectiveness. This led to significant decision delays as the new personnel grasped with the complexity of the project.

• Significant policy changes led to unforeseen policy reversal which affected Client buy-in and

ownership, further delaying decision making. The resulting change of leadership in top management level meant that more time was needed for the new team learn the project before proceeding with implementation.


Page 31 of 70

• The pollicization or personnel changes in the PIU led to frequent staff turnovers, loss of institutional memory, and project implementation experience.

• As part of the policy changes, the split of the Ministry of Minerals and Ministry of Energy which

before were together necessitated the establishment of a new Ministerial Tender Board (MTB) which took almost five months and hence causing delay in implementation of the project, because this Board approves all procurements.

• The counterpart fund was not remitted by the Government to project hence some activities were

not performed as planned. The project team members were not motivated due to lack of the counterpart fund and so the morale for the project team to work in the project became low.

68. However, event with the implementation delays under SMMRPII, the use of project funds was effective. Total cumulative project expenditure variance was US$1,2 million at the quarter ending December 31, 2018. Component A, which involved minor civil works and construction of centers of excellence, had only a negative variance of US$463,711.48. Component B had a higher cumulative variance of US$778,666.44. The largest variance was with Component C (Training and Project Coordination) with US$901,962.52. Although implementation costs were contained, the geographic diversity of sites for centers of excellence and geological surveys increased the costs of supervision and material delivery.

Economic Efficiency

69. As a technical assistance project, the appraisal of SMMRP did not require the calculation of a net present value, economic internal rate of return, or a financial rate of return, so efficiency is difficult to measure. Nevertheless, the original PAD in 2009 and the Project Paper in 2015 laid out some assumptions and estimated potential benefits indicating the efficiency of the assistance through macroeconomic indicators. Most of them were incorporated in the project Results Framework and regularly monitored.

70. As mentioned earlier, the project appraisal did not require the calculation of a net present value, economic internal rate of return, or financial rate of return. However, the efficiency of the US$95 million IDA loan can be assessed by the returns to the Government. For SMMRP, with an investment of US$50 million, the Government collected US$2.76 billion from the extractive sector according to the EITI report11 covering the period July 1, 2008, to June 30, 2015, which corresponds to the life of the original loan. For SMMRPII, with an investment of US$45 million, the Government collected annually around US$130 million during 2016–2018, according to Bank of Tanzania (BoT) data. In addition to fiscal revenues, the project contributed to significant rise in export earnings. Gold exports rose from US$1.541 billion in 2017 to US$1.549 billion in 2018. The size of the returns to the Government in terms of fiscal revenues and export earnings indicates that the US$95 million IDA loan was highly efficient. Another evidence of project efficiency is the dramatic rise of registered PML holders, which is indicative of the progress toward formalizing ASM. The number of PML holders was steady at less than 50 until project reforms went into effect. By 2013, PML holders were 26,000, rising to 35,000 by 2015. This in turn led to significant increase in royalties collected by the Ministry of Minerals. By 2016, royalties rose to about 40 percent of total

11 2015-2016 Tanzania EITI Report. https://eiti.org/document/2015-2016-tanzania-eiti-report


Page 32 of 70

Government revenues from extractive industries, according to EITI data. The cost of the outputs and time required to complete the project were modest compared to the achievements in terms of increased revenues from the mining sector.

71. The project’s overall efficiency is rated Substantial. This is consistent with the progress of implementation, as captured by the project Implementation Status and Results Reports (ISRs). The rating began with Satisfactory in the ISRs from 2010 up to 2016 and only after this period did implementation begin to deteriorate. However, these hurdles in implementation caused by procurement delays were quickly resolved, allowing the project to regain momentum. Even with the implementation delays of SMMRPII, significant positive economic outcomes were achieved in the ASM sector using 50% of the allocated funds.

D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING

72. Overall project outcome is rated Moderately Satisfactory, based on the weighted ratings of SMMPI (mostly “Substantial”) and SMMRPII (mostly “Modest”) in terms of PDO relevance, efficacy, and efficiency. Although some of the implementation delays prevented SMMRPII to achieve all intended outcomes within the three-year time frame, the project was successful in establishing ASM Centers of Excellence which serve as the basis of the transformation of artisanal mining in Tanzania. The project also strengthened the Government's capacity to better manage artisanal and small-scale mining. The PDOs remained relevant at the end of the project as the project directly addressed the major challenges related to the development of the mining sector in Tanzania, as evidenced by increased efficiency of Government agencies in the management of the mineral sector as well as structural and macroeconomic gains from mining production. These achievements far outweigh the costs of the project. The justification of overall rating considered the following factors:

• Causality: The Theory of Change in Figure 2 shows that the key expected long-term outcomes, is a mining sector with a strong capacity to contribute to socio-economic development of Tanzanians and to better attract local and foreign investment. This is achieved by (i) improving the benefits of the mineral sector for Tanzania; (ii) strengthening governance and transparency in mining; and (iii) stimulating mineral sector investment. The figure illustrates the extent to which the planned interventions generated the expected outputs, how the output translated into expected outcomes, and how these contributed to long term goals and development objectives. With mining contribution to GDP increasing from 0.2 percent between 1995 and 1999, when the project started, to 3.4 percent between 2007 and 2008, and to 4.8 percent by 2017, and 5% by the end of 2018. These results contributed to the goal of the MKUKUTA because between 2007 and 2016, the poverty rate decreased from 34.4 percent to 26.8 percent. Although the elasticity of poverty relative to growth is less than 1 percent for Tanzania, it could be higher for ASM, which employs about 1.5 million people in rural areas. It can be inferred that the reforms supported by the project have contributed to the significant increase in socio-economic benefits.

• Attribution: The key outcomes achieved at project closing are attributable to this project because it supported a number of activities which were critical to achieving the desired goals. These interventions aimed to enhance governance and transparency in the extractive sector as well as its capacity to stimulate investment and additional economic benefits to Tanzania and Tanzanians. SMMRP was designed to contribute to the long-term goals of raising income levels of communities


Page 33 of 70

in ASM areas, improving investors and communities’ confidence in the sector, boosting government revenue for poverty reduction programs and infrastructure spending. For instance, support to the 2010 Mining Law significantly improved benefit sharing arrangements, while institutional strengthening enhanced the ability of the GoT to better manage the sector and generate more revenues from extractive operations.

• Counterfactuals: Without the support provided by the project the Ministry of Minerals would not have been able to manage the significant growth of the sector; ASM would have remained informal and environmentally damaging; the knowledge of the mineral potential would have been too low to attract investment, the investment climate itself would not have been attractive.

E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY)

Gender

73. Several attempts were made to secure greater inclusion of women miners and women’s mining associations in the scope of SMMRP; according to a baseline study presented in Mwanza in March 2011, there was a positive perception by women of mining, but greater women’s participation in the sector was needed.

74. Attempts at inclusions were made primarily through the SGP, Phase III of which was ultimately canceled by the Government in January 2017. In Phase I of the SGP, US$350,000 of the initial US$500,000 in grants to be disbursed were to be awarded to 11 recipients, four of which were women as of July 2014. This kept with the project’s articulated women’s inclusion goal of at least 30 percent of grant funds, although ultimately, 10 recipients were awarded the grants, two of which were either women-owned or a women’s mining association. Besides financial support, grantees received training in fundamentals of FM, methods for minerals identification, existing regulations for small-scale mining, mining management, monitoring and reporting, proper procedures for environmental protection, and taxation. Pursuant to the program’s Phase I success, an additional US$1 million was added, offering further opportunities for women’s inclusion.

75. The SGP grant funds swelled to US$3.85 million for Phase II, with the World Bank allocation reaching US$3 million and the GoT contributing the rest. In Phase II, despite significant slowdowns in grant disbursement due to the 2015 Tanzanian elections and subsequent change in leadership, 111 applications received grants, and the SGP generated between US$2,000 and US$100,000 in benefits per recipient. About 30 percent of grant recipients were women; ergo, women’s inclusion in the amount of grants awarded remained at 30 percent for Phase II.

76. SMMRPII launched Phase III of the SGP, which was expected to build upon the lessons learned from the two previous phases and to include a special window for women involvement in mining value addition. However, implementation issues caused delays, and with a change in GoT policy regarding the use of public grants for privately owned companies, the Government canceled the program before the official announcement of Phase III grant recipients in January 2017.

77. Finally, an open dialogue was established with representatives of women miner’s associations to discuss the challenges of promoting women’s participation in the mineral sector. SMMRPII funded the


Page 34 of 70

upgrade of the existing office facilities at STAMICO to host the Tanzania Women Miners Association (TAWOMA), as well as the upgrade of Mineral Resources Institute (MRI) to support the Mining Association and Federation office. This construction is in its finishing stages at 90 percent completion.

Institutional Strengthening

78. The project had significant positive impacts in terms of institutional strengthening. Improving technical and institutional capacity was a key part of the project PDO and a main project outcome. The project has helped the Tanzanian Government address key policy and institutional challenges to increase the benefits of the minerals sector in a sustainable, efficient, and transparent manner. This was achieved by the following:

(a) Establishing systems such as modern geodata management systems (populated with geodata collected through the project), a modern computerized mining cadaster, and policies and monitoring systems for health, safety, environmental, and social management.

(b) Developing new legislation to improve the socioeconomic benefits of mining and reduce negative social and environmental impacts. The 2010 Mining Act, which replaced the 1998 Mining Act, and its ASM regulations with ASM-specific provisions, including demarcations, a decentralization of the licensing process, as well as stricter standards on nonchild labor, mercury use limitations, and general environmental remedies.

(c) Supporting Tanzania to implement EITI, thereby, increasing transparency in sector governance through the establishment of a tripartite dialogue process (between the civil society, Government, and industry) on sector governance and publication of annual EITI reports that disclose sector data.

(d) Enabling increased investment in the development of new mines. Estimates of the Tanzania Minerals Audit Agency, planned investments in new plants, and brownfield sites between 2014 and 2023 could not only increase the production of gold, but also diversify mineral products and generate tax revenue of nearly US$2.5 billion.

79. Capacity building and streamlining the legal and regulatory regime have strengthened institutional capacity of the Government’s agencies to be able to increase the socioeconomic impact of large- and small-scale mining in Tanzania.

Mobilizing Private Sector Financing

80. The SMMRP PDO identifies enhancing private local and foreign investment as a main objective. Component C Stimulating Mineral Sector Investment of the original project focused on improving Tanzania’s geological infrastructure and strengthening mineral resources promotion, statistics development, and communication to boost the country’s attractiveness as a mining investment destination. Section B discusses how the project succeeded in improving the investment climate in the mining sector. This is evidenced by the increased number of private sector investments expected for mineral exploration and extraction.


Page 35 of 70

Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity

81. The project was designed to have a direct impact on poverty reduction and shared prosperity. Mining is one of the GoT's priority actions in its strategy to reduce poverty and promote local economic development. Exploiting the potential of ASM and promoting value creation is a top priority of the authorities in Tanzania. The original project contributed to poverty reduction by providing financial assistance to small-scale miners to receive entrepreneurship training and assistance in marketing and advisory services, including for equipment leasing, local fabrication of tools and equipment, and development of programs for modernizing, and diversifying small-scale mining projects. Furthermore, it aided in the preparation of strategic plans for local and regional economic development to better integrate the mineral sector into the national economy by strengthening the links between small-scale miners and their LGAs. It also realized a Poverty and Social Impact Analysis and a SESA to improve the environmental and social management of the mining sector. The assessment’s findings highlighted a set of complex social issues that reinforced the need for building capacity in community development at the district level. By facilitating investments in mineral exploration and imminent construction and operation of new mines, the project has indirectly contributed to the potential creation of new jobs and to the potential generation of new economic activities linked to these new investments and projects.

Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts

82. There were no other unintended outcomes and impacts.

III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME

A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION

83. The PDO, as established during project preparation, was realistic and relevant to the country context. Strengthened capacity, improved socioeconomic impacts, and increased investment in the mining sector were the pillars of the PDO. They were prerequisites for the existence of a well-governed mining sector in Tanzania that would attract investment while enabling socially inclusive and environmentally responsible mining development for the benefit of Tanzania and its citizens, thereby, contributing to economic development and poverty reduction.

84. The design of the project was based on the logic that capacity building would lead to better management of the mining sector, which would improve the socioeconomic impacts of large- and small-scale mining for Tanzania and its citizens while stimulating local and foreign investments.

85. The AF’s design was kept in line with the original project. It adopted a two-pronged approach to scaling up activities completed under the original project: (a) improving the links of LSM with local communities through better integration of corporate social responsibility programs and local development planning in mine-affected areas and (b) encouraging the formalization and sustainable development of ASM as a means of boosting local entrepreneurship and employment in mining. The LSM approach focused on establishing links between LSM operations and the local economy to enable the latter to harness mining investment as a catalyst for development.


Page 36 of 70

86. Project indicators captured the desired PDO-level outcomes, as well as intermediate results indicators, comprehensively. However, progress toward achievement of the PDO under SMMRPII was disappointing as only 39 out of 82 activities were launched and not all were completed. The Results Framework under the AF was as ambitious as the goals for scaling up support for ASM activities it was trying to capture. To that end, it introduced new core and intermediate indicators and updated previous ones to continue tracking their trends and results. End targets reflected the high expectations at the onset of the AF that were reinforced by the promising results from SMMRPI. They were set through rigorous economic and financial appraisal, observation of sector and national trends, assimilation of valuable lessons learned from SMMRPI, and case studies of Chile and Ghana in reforming the ASM sector. While Section II B delved into the performance of the main indicators at the end of the project, it is worth reiterating that obstructive delays thwarted the implementation and/or completion of most of the activities from the AF, thereby, affecting the magnitude of the expected development outcomes. The project recognized that with the recurrent staffing changes, the implementing agency remained with relatively weak capacity in the areas of internal controls, oversight functions, and procurement; as a result, the project included a Project Coordination and Management Component under both SMMRP and SMMRPII in its design that supported the agency financially and allowed for technical capacity building where required. The increased capacity of the agency was reflected in the 100 percent disbursement ratio of SMMRP, whereas organizational changes in the PMU and the MEM in 2017 caused important loss of institutional knowledge and weakened capacity that resulted in significant delays in the implementation of key activities of SMMRPII and the low disbursement rate of 50 percent.

87. At appraisal, most risks were correctly identified, but political and institutional capacity risks, particularly policy reversal under the same ruling party, were not anticipated. The policy, regulatory, and institutional introduced shortly after SMMRPII became effective significantly altered the course of project implementation. Mitigation measures became ineffective as the new authorities demanded more time to understand the project and re-orient it to the new priorities. With GoT taking time to decide, project restructuring came too late to rectify the course. The overall risk was rated Moderate at project appraisal but was found Substantial throughout the period of project implementation under SMMRPII. Developments related to the identified risks, and those overlooked, are described in table 4.

Table 4. Developments Related to the Key Risks Identified at Project Approval

Main Risks Identified Main Mitigation Measures or the Consequence of Their Inefficiency Political and Governance (Substantial)

This risk materialized and affected significantly the launch of the implementation of key activities under SMMRPII. The risk was not expected and could not be fully mitigated with the election of a new president and the establishment of a new Government with a different agenda for the sector.

Institutional Capacity for Implementation and Sustainability (Substantial)

Related to political and governance risks, the institutional capacity was affected by frequent staffing changes. This led to delays in implementation due to major weaknesses in procurement and financial management, particularly under SMMRPII.

Sector Strategies and Policies (Substantial)

This risk materialized and affected significantly implementation of key activities, particularly under SMMRPII due to policy and legislative changes, as well as significant institutional challenges that have impeded the achievement of the objectives of strengthening governance and transparency in the mining sector and have negatively affected the progress made under SMMRP.

Fiduciary (Substantial) FM assessment was carried out, the results were that the MEM had adequate FM


Page 37 of 70

Main Risks Identified Main Mitigation Measures or the Consequence of Their Inefficiency arrangements that meets the World Bank’s minimum requirements under OP/BP 10.02 and therefore, the FM risk was assessed Modest. With mitigation measures in place, it would have a low residual risk. It should also be added that the MEM was implementing two other World Bank energy projects, the World Bank team assumed that fiduciary oversight would not be an issue, but in the end, the procurement issues delayed project implementation, and slowed down disbursement, and as part of the World Bank's requirements, the project was audited and according to the auditor's findings the Tanzania Investment Bank (TIB) held project funds without valid justification, in violation of section 1D (1) (e) of Schedule 2 of the FA.

Counterpart funding This risk materialized and significantly affected implementation of key activities, particularly under SMMRPII due to the GoT failing to contribute an additional US$5 million in parallel financing as agreed in the AF Agreement. Unfortunately, the GoT only contributed TZS 200,000,000, or about US$100,000. This amount was far below its commitment of $US$5 million, thus affecting the proper implementation of the project.

B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION

88. Political context. The preparation and implementation of SMMRP spanned six years under policies of the Kikwete Government. The first phase of project implementation went smoothly. Government ownership and political commitment to the project objectives was strong, and the necessary steps to move the project forward were put in place as needed. The AF project was prepared under the same policies, but a shift was not expected after the elections. However, as SMMRPII began to be implemented, the newly elected Government opted for a thorough review of the project's design as part of its fresh program to provide a new direction for the mining sector. The transition period was marked by the change of key personnel involved in the project design. Staff and incoming officials were unfamiliar with the project as designed, leading to significant delays in decision making. In October 2017, the Ministry of Energy and Minerals was split into two ministerial entities citing the need to tighten the oversight of natural resources in Tanzania. The split further weakened the implementation capacity of the Ministry of Minerals.

89. Changes in global commodity market: A key change during project implementation was related to the global commodity prices of minerals—a macroeconomic factor outside the control of both the World Bank and the implementing entity. The project was launched at the height of a commodity boom, when gold prices were edging US$1,800/oz. During implementation, prices dropped to around US$1,000 and have been slowly recovering. While the low mineral prices did not directly affect the project, they affected export earnings. Gold lost its position as the country's leading export earner in 2013/14 but has since recovered. According to the BOT, it currently accounts for 52 percent of Tanzania's nontraditional exports. In this regard, in response to commodity price volatility, the project has strengthened the Government's capacity to better absorb external shocks and mitigate their negative effects. In addition, the project supported the establishment of an adequate regulatory framework for better governance of the minerals sector. With this, Tanzania is in a better position to benefit greatly in the next phase of commodity boom.


Page 38 of 70

Factors under Government and/or Implementing Agency Control

90. Delays in implementing key activities. The project suffered from the fact that the implementing agency had a relatively weak capacity to manage the project and to carry out its implementation. The problem of low capacity was due to frequent and disruptive personnel changes at the operational level and at the management of the project. Reassignment of experienced staff and appointment of new implementation teams for every management change at the Ministry of Minerals resulted in loss of institutional memory and capacity. The high level of turnover undermined the morale of the teams and distracted them from day-to-day implementation. The performance of the implementing agency was therefore deemed Unsatisfactory by the latest ISR.

91. Delays in procurement and contract management. From the outset, the project has undergone significant implementation delays due to major weaknesses in internal procurement processing. The Ministerial Tender Board (MTB), while providing oversight and guidance, has cumbersome procedures which significantly delayed the procurement processes before a formal no-objection request was submitted to the World Bank. In some cases, the project had to hire experienced procurement consultants in order to expedite the process, but administrative delays still persisted. Nonetheless, during the eight final months of SMMRPII, the Government had to speed up the pace of project implementation to catch up with the delay on the project implementation schedule. However, decision inertia resulted in most project activities suffering a two-year delay in implementation. Moreover, the splitting of the MEM into two separate entities (Ministry of Minerals and Ministry of Energy) led to the creation of a new MTB within the new Ministry of Minerals. The new MTB took almost five months to set up, and thus further delayed the implementation of the project, as this board approves all procurements. The MTB became effective only eight months before the closing date of the project. These delays prevented the start of most activities on time, and as a result, several intermediate outcome indicators and some project development indicators were not achieved under SMMRPII. In general, it can safely be said that the entire project since its start date until its closing has experienced serious episodes of insufficiencies in procurement and contract management, as evidenced by the moderately unsatisfactory ratings for both progress toward achievement of PDOs and overall implementation progress in the last three ISRs.

92. Administrative and staffing changes: In October 2017, the MEM was split into two ministerial entities citing the need to tighten the oversight of natural resources in Tanzania. The split further weakened the implementation capacity of the Ministry of Minerals. Moreover, significant delays in appointing a new leadership for the Ministry and trust issues between central decision makers and mining sector officials led to a halt of project implementation for nearly two years. Internal infighting and suspicion resulted in time-consuming probes to try to discredit decisions from previous managers. These repetitive delays exacerbated the procurement problems already observed.

Factors Subject to World Bank Control

93. The project was managed at various times by two task team leaders specialized in the mining sector. While regular supervision missions were effective in addressing implementation challenges, the borrower mentioned the World Bank's considerable delays in its nonobjection approval process. In fact, the delays were due to either insufficient documentation to provide no-objection or the Ministry of Minerals decision not to act on no-objection provided by the Bank. The Bank addressed these deficiencies by reinforcing the oversight, training, and supervision by the Bank procurement specialist in the team.


Page 39 of 70

94. There was effective coordination between the World Bank staff and the PMU, which allowed for close monitoring. Institutional barriers were identified when they occurred, as reflected in the Aide Memoires (AMs) and ISRs, and corrective/mitigation measures were proposed accordingly, particularly during SMMRPII. The World Bank engaged an active policy dialogue to address the issues delaying project implementation. Several high-level meetings were held to understand the new priorities and address them through project restructuring. The dialogue about the project was also caught in wider policy issues that donors, including the World Bank, had placed at the center of discussions for continued engagement.

Factors Subject to Government Control

IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)

M&E Design

95. Annex 3 of the PAD provided a Results Framework with PDO and intermediate indicators, baselines, expected target, the frequency of reporting, the data collection instruments, and the borrower units in charge of data collection. While the overall PDO was clearly stated, the three PDO-level indicators selected for monitoring progress toward that objective did not encompass all the outcomes implied by the PDO statement. The PDO and PDO-level indicators have some weakness, as the selected outcome indicators focused mainly on capacity building and improving transparency. Socio-economic impacts were captured by indicators which were not easily monitorable: improvement in income of ASM households, percentage increase in mining revenue, and citizen’s participation.

M&E Implementation

96. The project management team in the MEM was entrusted with the responsibility of regularly monitoring and evaluating PDO-level and intermediate results indicators based on the Results Framework. The MEM team was also required to compile and report on several performance indicators. The data for M&E were collected and analyzed in a methodological manner. The data for baselines as well as progress were first collected by the implementing agency and subsequently examined by the project team for quality and veracity.

97. Both the PDO and intermediate indicators were revised at restructuring to better reflect the PDO, implementation changes, and adjusted outputs. While some existing indicators were modified, and others were kept from the original project, indicators for Component C under SMMRPI, designed to demonstrate performance of activities for promotion of local private and foreign investment, were dropped under SMMRPII following its completion in the first phase of the project.

M&E Utilization

98. The indicators were reported in the ISRs and used to provide evidence of achievement of outcomes. The M&E data were utilized effectively to inform project management and decision making. Project ISRs were utilized by the project team as an important M&E tool, not only to assess progress against targets for indicators, but also to highlight important issues for action.


Page 40 of 70

Justification of Overall Rating of Quality of M&E

99. Although there were some shortcomings in the design and implementation of M&E system, its design was acceptable. It provided a good basis for monitoring progress in achieving the project's development objectives. However, not all the impact could be captured. Due to a rushed closing, the project was not able to complete a final impact evaluation as originally envisaged. As a result, the overall quality of M&E performance is rated Modest.

B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE

Environmental and Social Safeguards Compliance

100. The project triggered two safeguards policies on Environmental Assessment and Involuntary Resettlement and was a Category ‘B’ project. Compliance with the policies was ensured through implementation of the Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) and the Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF), which explained how impacts would be addressed if they should arise. As a technical assistance operation without direct investment in mining activities, the project could only have indirect environmental and social impacts arising from minor civil works, mining, and mineral processing, and from improvements of the policy and regulatory framework which may lead to future increases in commercial scale mining and ASM activities. In addition, should relocation of people or displacement of livelihoods take place, the RPF would have provided guidance to the Government for developing its future resettlement policies and to ensure that needs of the people potentially affected by the resettlement were met in accordance with the World Bank’s Involuntary Resettlement Policy.

101. At the approval of the AF in June 2015, no new safeguards were triggered, but the ESMF and RPF were updated according to the revised project design. The recommendations and findings from the SESA were also incorporated into the design of activities under the AF. Moreover, as the SESA recognized the daunting issue of child labor in ASM, the AF introduced an ASM inspection checklist emphasizing enforcement of the prohibition of child labor in mining. The revised Results Framework also included an indicator for tracking reduction of child labor. Finally, the AF attempted to address the concerns that the SESA had identified as major barriers to greater women’s involvement in mining, by targeting Tanzania Women Miners Association for capacity building, and setting a 30 percent target for women-owned or operated mining and processing businesses in the SGP.

102. The project under SMMRPII was behind schedule in complying with two safeguards-related project covenants. The project delivered a simplified EPP for small-scale mining, which was a safeguard condition for the SGP, after considerable delays due to the expansion of the work to ensure that the EPP would be recognized by the National Environmental Management Council. Eventually, Phase III of the SGP was cancelled by the GoT in January 2017 due to policy changes in grant-giving to individuals, but the Covenant related to the EPP still had to be satisfied and applied to recipients of previous grants. The MEM was also late in finalizing and sending the environmental audits of the works undertaken under the original project for IDA’s review. However, these covenants were eventually met. Accordingly, the project was rated Moderately Satisfactory on the overall safeguards ratings in the final ISR.


Page 41 of 70

Procurement and Fiduciary Compliance

103. All procurement of the World Bank-financed activities was carried out in accordance with the World Bank’s Procurement Guidelines. Major procurement issues were encountered, particularly under SMMRPII, the procurement issues delayed project implementation and slowed down disbursement. Project procurement was rated Unsatisfactory in the final ISR, largely as the result of slow implementation.

104. On June 30, 2018, as part of the World Bank's requirements, the project was audited and according to the auditor's findings TIB held project funds without valid justification, in violation of section 1D (1) (e) of Schedule 2 of the FA. The Ministry of Minerals (MoM) was asked to provide justifications for allowing TIB to hold the funds for a long time and to return the funds to the project with interest.

C. BANK PERFORMANCE

Quality at Entry

105. The World Bank team considered lessons learned from previous global initiatives and capacity-building operations for sustainable management of the mineral sector in various region. These lessons included (a) the need to establish a sector-specific focus and improvements with clear delineation of authority and responsibility of various ministries and agencies involved in the sector; (b) beneficiary participation in project preparation, organization, implementation, and coordination at the field level; (c) sustainability of project components built around institutional champions for different components; and (d) strong ownership and political commitment to project objectives. The project, at appraisal, was designed such that the development outcomes align closely with the priorities of Tanzania. To that end, consultations with the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, revenue authorities, and LGAs were conducted to ensure alignment with the Government’s development goals and incorporates its vision.

106. The project was built on the foundation laid by the Mineral Sector Development Technical Assistance Project (TZPA2812), successfully completed in 2001. The lessons learned from the old project were reflected in the design of SMMRP, including (a) the Government’s commitment to institutional reform; (b) integrated and phased approaches for mineral sector development; (c) enhanced multi-stakeholders’ participation and consensus on the objectives and results of mineral sector development; (d) regional development initiatives and measures, taking stock of the economic activity being generated by mining nonrenewable mineral resources; (e) improvement and management of the mineral sector information system and databases; (f) close correlation of the programs for institutional capacity building with the specific project activities to be executed by institutions and agencies under the project; and (g) cost-effective and pragmatic approach to the project supervision in a spirit of cooperative partnership between the Government and the World Bank.

107. In hindsight, the PAD’s Critical Risks and Possible Controversial Aspects correctly identified the risks that manifested during implementation. The task team could have mitigated these risks better by anticipating and assuming among the risk mitigation measures that a newly elected president and a new Government team could still question the whole project relevancy, even if that president comes from the same Government and party which sought the project. Even in a context of sustained political stability,


Page 42 of 70

the implementation of projects during an electoral period can be perilous, and therefore represents as such a significant risk to be considered. The quality at entry is rated moderately satisfactory.

Quality of Supervision

108. As evidenced by the series of ISRs produced, the World Bank team conducted regular supervision missions and made efforts to resolve many of the issues leading to implementation delays. For instance, to counter the effects of inadequate procurement processing, a decision was made to hire a procurement specialist to assist the PMU team as soon as it became evident that slow procurement was causing implementation delays.

109. The World Bank's action was also characterized by a proactive approach and flexibility to adapt to changing conditions during project implementation. The successive restructurings of the project made it possible to address the emerging challenges and to realign the activities of the project with new sectoral priorities. During the implementation of SMMRPII, the World Bank team demonstrated a great capacity to adapt to political uncertainties, including the split of the MEM into two ministerial entities and to react to the replacement of key staff members of the PMU by strengthening its technical support to the PMU and organizing workshops and refresher courses for the new staff members to get them familiarized with certain World Bank procedures. The task team responded to this and other challenges in a flexible manner and was able to work with the relevant authorities to adjust the project so that, in the end, physical outputs were delivered on schedule.

110. Supervision of safeguards and other fiduciary aspects were also provided adequately and frequently as the project team was candid about the issues arising and covered them in detail. The project saw two task team leaders over 9 years, with proper handover resulting in no disruption. The quality of supervision is rated satisfactory.

Justification of Overall Rating of Bank Performance

111. Although most of the risks were correctly identified, the mitigation measures did not always work because of unanticipated political events which affected the commitment of the GoT to the project, especially under SMMRPII. The Bank included the project in its high-level dialogue with GoT and the project team provided regular and close monitoring of the project, as well as technical support, and worked with the Government to resolve the issues as they arose. The team operated flexibly in a complex and changing environment.

112. Given the proactive aspects of World Bank performance noted earlier, the continuous and consistent supervision of project implementation, and the role of the task team to stay the course, the World Bank’s overall performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory.

D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

113. Basically, the achievement and sustainability of the development objective depend on three key factors: (a) commitment, (b) resource availability, and (c) capacity to sustain performance over time.

114. The following risk factors and mitigation actions were considered.


Page 43 of 70

Table 5. Risk Factors and Mitigation Actions Considered

Risk Factors Mitigation Political and governance Radical legislative changes: Amendments to Mining Act No. 5, 6, and 7 eroded the credibility and predictability of the Government—arousing investor concern and fear of the GoT backtracking on the reform agenda supported by SMMRP. Going forward, amendments, if not revised, would make it difficult to maintain and attract new FDIs.

Keep open the dialogue with the Government to minimize the extent of the implications of these amendments and their negative impacts on business climate; The GoT to maintain an active and fruitful dialogue with foreign investors to dispel any concerns and preserve the positive aspects of sector reform.

Sustainability The Government does not sustain its commitment to mineral sector reform under SMMRP, including EITI.

To pursue the implementation of all activities that were not yet initiated or achieved under SMMRP AF until they have been fully implemented and sustained efforts to retain, and perhaps even enhance, project outcomes.

Global economic factors The risk of global economic factors and low commodity prices, adversely affecting the performance of the extractives sector resulted in lower financial flows to the sector.

With strengthened capacities and a resilient macroeconomic framework, the country is better prepared to deal with external shocks.

V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

115. The following lessons were learned from the project:

Project design and implementation

116. When preparing projects to support sectoral reforms, it is essential that the design of the project take into account a sudden reversal of policy, especially during an election period. The preparation and implementation of a project during an election period can have a negative impact on its implementation because the new Government resulting from these elections could certainly develop another reform program that does not correspond to the objectives pursued by the current project or could simply have other priorities that could lead to substantial changes in the activities of the project already designed and cause significant delays in its implementation. However, this implies that the project team is sufficiently flexible and ready to adapt to any unforeseen political, institutional, or sectoral changes with direct or indirect implications that may affect the proper implementation of the project by being able to swiftly make the necessary adjustments to quickly align it with the new priorities of the hour. This should be a key lesson in designing future projects, especially when the outputs or outcomes depend on Government ownership and continued commitment.

117. The implementation arrangements should ensure the stability of the PMU staff, as far as possible and throughout the duration of the project. Leaving the PMU vulnerable to political appointments lead to high staff turnover, loss of institutional memory, and deterioration of implementation capacity.


Page 44 of 70

118. A related lesson is that to ensure achievement of project outcomes, components and related activities may need to be realigned to new sector priorities. Specific conditions and priorities during implementation can be subject to sudden changes that the project must adapt to.

119. The formulation of project indicators that can be accurately tracked and monitored is fundamental. At the start of the project, a key indicator was chosen because of its relevance to one of the project's objectives, namely the percentage increase in the household income level in some ASM communities. While a baseline survey of ASM was conducted and provided the necessary information, questions about survey methodology and data interpretation arose as it became difficult to measure the specific contribution of the project to achieve this particular target.

120. The marked differences in the results of implementation between SMMRPI and SMMRPII reinforce the belief that Government ownership is critical to the success of World Bank-funded projects. When this commitment waned during SMMRPII, the World Bank team took a proactive and flexible approach and maintained an active dialogue with Government authorities and explored different options for engaging stakeholders and reviving interest in the project.

Implementing ASM reforms

121. The project yields valuable lessons for ASM reforms. The project has used a holistic approach to create a conducive environment for sustainable ASM development. By combining provision of geological information with decentralization of licensing and technical assistance services and providing financial incentives in the form of loans or small grants, there was significant progress in ASM formalization. This is evidence by a steep rise in registered ASM operations, followed by a commensurate increase in royalty and tax payments from artisanal miners.

122. However, despite good progress to legalize and register artisanal miners, the modernization rate of ASM operations remained very low. The Government realized that challenge in the transformation of ASM was to move beyond legalization and “paper formalization” and tap the entrepreneurial potential of career small-scale miners to encourage the establishment of formal ASM businesses which could provide formal employment opportunities to those miners who are not entrepreneurs or could not otherwise meet the requirements for acquiring a PML. To this end, the Government has established ASM Centers of Excellence (CoE) with a mission to provide technical, financial, and managerial support to PML holders seeking to move from artisanal mining towards small and even medium-scale mining, to become viable small-scale and medium-scale Tanzanian mining enterprises. The CoEs focused on existing, established small-scale mines or on prospecting licenses that were relinquished by large mining companies. To achieve lasting and sustainable results, the CoE concept relied on the conjugated efforts of the following entities:

• Decentralized mining administration (Zonal Mining Offices): as the decentralized licensing authority for ASM, ZMOs were given a mission to host and manage the CoEs, to provide extension services, conduct knowledge exchange, disseminate information on best practices and appropriate technologies, and ensure compliance with laws and regulations, particularly with respect to health, safety, child labor, mercury emission, and environmental protection.

• Geological Survey of Tanzania (GST): the mission of GST was to conduct geological ground works and field verifications to identify mineralization structures that may be suitable for ASM, to


Page 45 of 70

delineate and assess these structures, to coordinate with appropriate local and central authorities (District Government, Ministry of Land, Ministry of Mines) and to designate them to be exclusive areas for ASM. GST would also provide, on a cost recovery basis, detailed exploration and geological modeling to ASM license holders who wish to estimate minable reserves and develop long-term mine development plans.

• State Mining Corporation (STAMICO): the role of STAMICO was to provide, on a cost recovery basis, resource estimation and mining advisory services to ASM license holders and to operate and manage demonstration facilities as part of the umbrella COE structure. In view of the high capital and operating costs of the demonstration facilities, STAMICO will use them both for demonstration of environmentally sound processing technologies, and for toll processing of ores produced by artisanal miners, using mercury-free processes.

• Tanzania Investment Bank (TIB): TIB would provide financial services on a commercial basis to ASM entrepreneurs who introduce viable projects. It would coordinate closely with GST and STAMICO to conduct the geological and technical assessments required for funding consideration.

• Manufacturers’ Associations: The Vocational Education and Training Authority for design and blue prints, and the Small Industries Development Organization for the actual manufacturing were included in the CoE concept to help modernize ASM practices by introducing and adapting appropriate technologies at the exploration, mining, and processing stages.

123. The complexity of ASM issues require sustained reforms to address policy issues and constraints and develop the activity into a vibrant domestic mining sector. The project should include a permanent platform for dialogue between key ASM stakeholders to obtain a consensus on their needs and how they could be addressed through project interventions. Moreover, a sharper focus on governance and revenue transparency issues will require more support to Tanzania EITI to reduce the time lag in EITI reporting, so that EI revenue data is useful to decision makers.

.


Page 46 of 70

ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS

A. RESULTS INDICATORS A.1 PDO Indicators Objective/Outcome: Improving the Benefits of the Mineral Sector for Tanzania: ASM, Local Economic Dev & Skills Dev

Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Formally Revised Target

Actual Achieved at Completion

Percentage increase of household income levels in selected ASM communities

Percentage 0.00 200.00 250.00

31-Dec-2010 20-Nov-2014 31-Dec-2018

Comments (achievements against targets):



Time taken to transform identified ASM areas into established PML mines.

Months 12.00 3.00 6.00

20-Feb-2015 31-Dec-2018 31-Dec-2018



Page 47 of 70



Percentage increase in share of royalty from PML holders.

Percentage 7.00 7.50 7.00

20-Nov-2014 31-Dec-2018 31-Dec-2018

Comments (achievements against targets): This target remained the same as reported due to survey issues. However, shortly after project closing, GoT announced in May 2019 an increase of collected mining royalties to 470.9 billion TZS compared to a projected revenue of 310.6 billion, indicating that the target has been reached.

Objective/Outcome: Strengthening Governance and Transparency in Mining



Percent of citizens in participating communities who consider that their views have been taken into account in the local economic development strategic planning process (perception survey)

Percentage 12.00 35.00 55.00

31-Dec-2010 20-Nov-2014 31-Dec-2018



Page 48 of 70



Annual publication of mining sector revenue

Yes/No N Y Y

30-Jun-2009 20-Nov-2014 31-Dec-2018




Annual publication of mining sector revenue with an ASM annex.

Amount(USD) 1.00 4.00 1.00

20-Nov-2014 31-Dec-2018 31-Dec-2018

Comments (achievements against targets): This target was not reached because of Tanzania's suspension from EITI, and the GoT's delays in implementing the EITI component of the project. By the close of the project, the GoT had addressed EITI Secretariat's concerns and is in the process of completing the required reports to lift the suspension.

Objective/Outcome: Stimulating Mineral Sector Investment




Page 49 of 70

Time to process mineral rights (exploration licenses).

Months 18.00 2.00 1.00

09-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2015 20-Nov-2018

Comments (achievements against targets): Fully achieved with processing time of about 1 month compared to original target of 2 months.



Improvement in Tanzania's ranking as a mining investment destination as evidenced by independent investor survey (Fraser Institute).

Text 48/71 for policy ranking & 22/71 for mineral potential

Increase of 2-3 points/places or more over baseline in one or both indicators

59/104 for policy ranking & 71/104 for mineral potential

30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2015 20-Nov-2018




Percentage increase in mining revenue

Percentage 0.00 5.00 52.00

30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2015 20-Nov-2018


Page 50 of 70


A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators

Component: A. Improving the Benefits of the Mineral Sector for Tanzania: Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining, Local Economic Development and Skills Development



Number of ASM operators benefiting from technical capacity building services provided by the project.

Number 20.00 100000.00 2500.00

12-Feb-2015 31-Dec-2018 31-Dec-2018

Comments (achievements against targets): This objective was not met because of the significant delay in establishing and operationalizing centers of excellence and demonstration centers. However, at project closing, 4 demonstration centers and 9 centers of excellence were established. The GoT has committed to setting up funds from its own budget to operationalize the centers of excellence and the demonstration centers.



Increase in total aggregate production value from ASM beneficiary areas.

Text $4/day $50/day $100/day

09-Jun-2009 31-Dec-2018 31-Dec-2018


Page 51 of 70




Reduction in child labor participation in PML areas benefiting from the project

Text 1.8% of miners 75% reduction 0.2% of miners

12-Feb-2015 31-Dec-2018 31-Dec-2018




Number of new incorporations of ASM cooperatives, SMEs or associations as a result of new initiatives.

Number 250.00 400.00 350.00

07-Oct-2014 31-Dec-2018 31-Dec-2018

Comments (achievements against targets): This objective was below target because it was linked to the completion and launch of the ASM centers of excellence. However, the new initiatives stimulated the incorporation of 350 ASM cooperatives, compared to a target of 400 cooperatives.


Page 52 of 70



Number of PMLs registered Number 14880.00 45000.00 28958.00

07-Oct-2014 31-Dec-2018 31-Dec-2018

Comments (achievements against targets): Although the original target was not reached, the number of PML registration doubled under SMMRPII. The delays in completing geological survey work and establishing centers of excellence contributed to the underperformance in this indicator.



Number of districts with strategic development plans that integrate mining communities.

Number 3.00 6.00 3.00

07-Oct-2014 31-Dec-2018 31-Dec-2018

Comments (achievements against targets): The activity supporting this indicator was not implemented because of the GoT change of focus from linkages with large-scale operations to small-scale mining.


Page 53 of 70



Number of areas suitable for ASM identified and set aside for permitting.

Number 4.00 12.00 11.00

07-Oct-2014 31-Dec-2018 31-Dec-2018

Comments (achievements against targets): The target of 12 areas was reached, but one area proved to have insufficient mineralization, and was therefore not retained.



ASM database established and updated quarterly

Yes/No N Y N

20-Nov-2014 31-Dec-2018 31-Dec-2018

Comments (achievements against targets): This target was not reached because the GoT felt that the database from the improved mining cadaster will provide the same information and function.




Page 54 of 70

Compliance with Minamata Convention on Mercury Reduction Target

Yes/No N Y Y

12-Feb-2015 31-Dec-2018 31-Dec-2018




Number of graduates in value addition from the Tanzania Gemological Centre

Number 0.00 200.00 109.00

07-Oct-2014 31-Dec-2018 31-Dec-2018

Comments (achievements against targets): This target was not achieved due to delays in recruiting the trainers. This was resolved toward the end of the project, but the limited time to closing date did not allow the target to be reached.

Component: B. Strengthening Governance and Transparency in Mining



Revised mineral law and regulations disseminated

Text Revisions ongoing Revisions and disseminations completed

End Target fully achieved. Revised Mineral Law and Regulations


Page 55 of 70

completed and disseminated.

09-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2015 20-Nov-2018




Regulatory gaps addressed (Value Addition Regulations, Explosives Regulations, EITI Bill)

Yes/No N Y N

20-Feb-2015 31-Dec-2018 20-Nov-2018

Comments (achievements against targets): Although the government completed and EITI law, and prepared value addition regulations explosives regulations and the mine closure regulations, some of these were not formally approved at project closing

Component: C. Stimulating Mineral Sector Investment



Number of inspections Number 1000.00 2500.00 1000.00


Page 56 of 70

completed according to the new mines inspection checklist and new environmental protection plan

09-Jun-2009 31-Dec-2018 20-Nov-2018

Comments (achievements against targets): The number of inspections was below target due to the delay in preparing and approving the new environmental protection plan for ASM. The plan has since been approved and is now part of the regular inspections of mine sites.



Percentage of country covered by geophysical airborne surveys at 1:100,000 scale.

Percentage 3.00 14.00 15.70

09-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2015 20-Nov-2018

Comments (achievements against targets): Component: D. Project Coordination and Management



Project monitoring and Text Project start In progress Successful


Page 57 of 70

evaluation. 09-Jun-2009 20-Nov-2014 31-Dec-2018



Page 58 of 70

B. KEY OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT

Objective/Outcome 1: Improving the Benefits of the Mineral Sector for Tanzania: Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining, Local Economic Development and Skills Development

Outcome Indicators

1. Percentage increase of household income levels in selected ASM communities. 2. Time taken to transform identified ASM areas into established PML mines. 3. Percentage increase in share of royalty from PML holders.

Intermediate Results Indicators

1. Number of ASM operators benefiting from technical capacity building services provided by the project. 2. In Increase in total aggregate production value from ASM beneficiary areas. 3. Reduction in child labor participation in PML areas benefiting from the project. 4. Number of new incorporations of ASM cooperatives, SMEs or associations as a result of new initiatives. 5. Number of PMLs registered. 6. Number of districts with strategic development plans that integrate mining communities. 7. Number of areas suitable for ASM identified and set aside for permitting. 8. ASM database established and updated quarterly. 9. Compliance with Minamata Convention on Mercury Reduction Target. 10. Number of graduates in value addition from the Tanzania Gemological Centre.

Key Outputs by Component (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 1)

1. Improved technical and environmental performance of small scale and artisanal miners 2. Increased formalization of ASM 3. Improved services and/or livelihood for local communities in selected mining areas 4. Skills development


Page 59 of 70

Objective/Outcome 2: Strengthening Governance and Transparency in Mining

Outcome Indicators

1. Percent of citizens in participating communities who consider that their views have been taken into account in the local economic development strategic planning process (perception survey) 2. Annual publication of mining sector revenue 3. Annual publication of mining sector revenue with an ASM annex.

Intermediate Results Indicators 1. Revised mineral law and regulations disseminated 2. Regulatory gaps addressed (Value Addition Regulations, Explosives Regulations, EITI Bill)


1. Modern and transparent legal and regulatory framework for the mining sector 2. Enhanced efficiency, quality and reliability of Mineral Rights service delivery 3. Improved technical capacity for mine inspection, exploration verification and mineral audits 4. Developed capacity for management of environmental and social issues in mining

Objective/Outcome 3: Stimulating Mineral Sector Investment

Outcome Indicators

1. Time to process mineral rights (exploration licenses). 2. Improvement in Tanzania's ranking as a mining investment destination as evidenced by independent investor survey (Fraser Institute). 3. Percentage increase in mining revenue.

Intermediate Results Indicators

1. Number of inspections completed according to the new mines inspection checklist and new environmental protection plan. 2. Percentage of country covered by geophysical airborne surveys at 1:100,000 scale.


1. Modern and readily accessible geological data and information 2. Improved investment promotion and statistics 3. Improved education and communication on the mineral sector


Page 60 of 70


Page 61 of 70

ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION

A. TASK TEAM MEMBERS Name Role

Preparation

Supervision/ICR

Mamadou Barry Task Team Leader(s)

Gisbert Joseph Kinyero Procurement Specialist(s)

Michael Eriu Okuny Financial Management Specialist

Mary C.K. Bitekerezo Social Specialist

Ruma Tavorath Team Member

Jane A. N. Kibbassa Environmental Specialist

Faustina Chande Team Member

Rachel Bernice Perks Team Member

Maria Luisa Ana Esteban Meer Team Member

Zainab Usman Team Member


Page 62 of 70

B. STAFF TIME AND COST

Stage of Project Cycle Staff Time and Cost

No. of staff weeks US$ (including travel and consultant costs)

Preparation FY06 12.513 79,976.84

FY07 21.675 140,721.32

FY08 28.173 157,675.42

FY09 55.874 261,723.67

FY10 12.693 54,599.76

Total 130.93 694,697.01

Supervision/ICR

FY10 20.326 102,110.12

FY11 25.683 123,360.61

FY12 21.925 123,486.20

FY13 22.967 157,185.35

FY14 22.475 135,497.13

FY15 21.789 130,240.66

FY16 23.526 153,718.76

FY17 19.813 152,735.58

FY18 28.691 196,832.37

FY19 13.670 127,620.02

FY20 0 98.98

Total 220.87 1,402,885.78


Page 63 of 70

ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT

Components Amount at Approval (US$, millions)

Actual at Project Closing (US$,

millions)

Percentage of Approval (US$, millions)

A. Improving the Benefits of the Mineral Sector for Tanzania: Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining, Local Economic Development and Skills Development

53.40 51.00 95.50

B. Strengthening Governance and Transparency in Mining

14.60 13.33 91.30

C. Stimulating Mineral Sector Investment 25.00 25.00 100.00

D. Project Coordination and Management 6.90 5.81 84.20

Physical and price contingencies 2.30 0 0

PPA Refinancing CFAST (P161764) 0.60 2.40* 400.00

Total 102.0 97.54 95.62

* Project Preparation Advance (PPA) from the dropped Catalyzing the Future Agri-food Systems of Tanzania Project (CFAST, P161764) was refinanced through SMMRP.


Page 64 of 70

ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS (if applicable)

The project did not conduct an Efficiency Analysis at Appraisal.


Page 65 of 70

ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNERS/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS

1. The GoT agrees with the overall project ratings. We particularly agree that although the project had many challenges, it provided the opportunity to enhance principles of good governance and transparency in the sector. The project supported the modernization of the mining sector’s legal and regulatory framework to ensure that development and investment in the mining sector is in line with international best practices, adapted to Tanzanian conditions. The Government has sought to strengthen the capacity of its agencies to better manage the minerals sector to improve the socioeconomic impacts of large- and small-scale mining operations in Tanzania and, to this end, the project helped the Government achieve this goal. The project enabled the implementation of the national ASM development strategy to boost local economic development, strengthened links between the mining sector and the local economy, and with community-based artisanal and small-scale miners, and provided technical support to encourage their formalization.

2. This ICR is very relevant and timely for the current ongoing mining sector strategy of the GoT to take advantage of the enormous mineral resources available to the country and to make it a means of accelerating the economic growth and jobs creation, in addition to helping reduce poverty.

3. SMMRP produced many lessons learned, which the report captures well. A key lesson is that a sudden change in policy could undermine the credibility and predictability of the Government, as well as raise the concern and fear of investors that the Government is reversing the reform agenda supported by SMMRP. Another important lesson was the splitting of the MEM into two ministerial entities. Due to the split, a high turnover rate of the project management unit staff resulted in inefficiencies in the implementation of the key project activities and almost compromised the achievement of project objectives.

4. The Government recognizes that these changes have caused upheavals that have certainly disrupted the normal course of events and has drawn all the necessary lessons. It is important for the Government to put measures in place to avoid a repeat of this in future events.

5. The report is frank in admitting areas where there were shortfalls, particularly in the provision of the counterpart funding under SMMRPII. The GoT was to contribute an additional US$5 million in parallel financing as agreed in the AF Agreement. The Government did not honor its commitment to provide matching funds for the project. Unfortunately, it only contributed US$100,000. This amount was far below its commitment of US$5 million, thus affecting the proper implementation of the project. In addition, the reallocation of undisbursed funds under SMMRPII to finance other World Bank projects in the country, while the MEM would have preferred to use these undisbursed funds to carry out the unfinished activities under SMMRPII.


Page 66 of 70

ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

Project-related Documents

• Project Information Document, P096302, Report Number: 36720, July 28, 2006.

• Project Appraisal Document, P096302, Report Number: 47926-TZ, May 13,2009.

• Restructuring Paper, P096302, Report Number: 89080, June 25, 2014.

• Restructuring Paper, P096302, Report Number: RES32525, December 2018.

• Project Paper, Additional Financing (AF), Report Number: PAD 1177, April 16, 2015.

• Financing Agreement for Credit 4584-TA, July 22, 2009.

• Financing Agreement for Credit 5633-TZ (Additional Financing), June 3, 2015.

• AM SMMRP P096302 – SP October 18–29, 2011.

• AM SMMRP P096302 – SP April 23–May 09, 2012.

• AM SMMRP P096302 – SP - Report Number: 97482, February 2–22, 2015.

• AM SMMRP P096302 – SP - Report Number: 102927, December 11–18, 2015.

• AM SMMRP P096302 – SP - Report Number: 107566, April 18–3 May 2016.

• AM SMMRP P096302 – SP - Report Number: 123337, November 16–21, 2017.

• AM SMMRP P096302 – SP - Report Number: 133434, March 4–11, 2018.

• Disbursement Letter for Credit 5633-TZ (Closing Package) (English), June 3, 2015.

• Integrated Safeguards Data Sheet - Report Number: AC2015, February 3, 2009.

• Integrated Safeguards Data Sheet - Report Number: AC4087, April 16, 2009.

• Integrated Safeguards Data Sheet - Report Number: 48431, May 4, 2009.

• ISR SMMRP P096302 – No: 3.

• ISR SMMRP P096302 – No: 4.

• ISR SMMRP P096302 – No: 4.

• ISR SMMRP P096302 – No: 6.


Page 67 of 70

• ISR SMMRP P096302 – No: 7.

• ISR SMMRP P096302 – No: 8.

• ISR SMMRP P096302 – No: 9.

• ISR SMMRP P096302 – No: 10.

• ISR SMMRP P096302 – No: 11.

• ISR SMMRP P096302 – No: 12.

• ISR SMMRP P096302 – No: 13.

• ISR SMMRP P096302 – No: 16.

• ISR SMMRP P096302 – No: 15

• ISR SMMRP P096302 – No: 16

Project Outputs

• Tanzania/Ministry of Minerals, Implementation Completion Result Report, May 2019.

Other References

• Bank of Tanzania - data.

• Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for the period FY18–FY22.

• Financial Times FDI Markets.

• Herbert Smith Freehills, 2019, Tanzania’s Future: The Need for Foreign Investors.

• ICMM, UNCTAD, and the World Bank, Making Mining Count in Tanzania, Resource Endowment Initiative, October 2006.

• Magai, Petro S., and Alejandro Márquez-Velázquez. 2011. Tanzania’s Mining Sector and Its Implications for the Country’s Development, WP No. 04/2011, Competence Center “Money, Finance, Trade and Development “, HTW-Berlin.

• Society for International Development. 2009. The Extractive Resource Industry in Tanzania: Status and Challenges of the Mining Sector. Heinrich Böll Foundation, Regional Office for East and Horn of Africa.

• Tanzania Development Vision (TDV) 2025.


Page 68 of 70

• Tanzania EITI Report, March 2018.

• Tanzania WASH poverty diagnostic, main report, World Bank, June 2017.

• Tanzania Economic Update 12th edition, World Bank, May 2019.

• Tanzania EITI Report 2015–2016, https://eiti.org/document/2015-2016-tanzania-eiti-report.

• World Bank, Country Partnership Framework (CPF) FY18–FY22, Report No. 121790-TZ, February 14, 2018.

• World Bank, Tanzania Economic Update, 8TH Edition, May 2016.

• World Bank, Tanzania’s first National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction 2005–2010 (MKUKUTA), Report No. 35568-TZ, March 24, 2006.

• World Bank, Joint Assistance Strategy FY07–FY10, Report No. 38625-TZ, March 1, 2007.


Page 69 of 70

ANNEX 7. SMMRP INDICATORS


Page 70 of 70

ANNEX 8. MAP

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE...

Documents

Transcript of Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE...