Document of The World Bank · 2016. 7. 13. · Rural and Inter-Urban Roads and Highways 81 95 ....

Document of The World Bank

Report No: ICR2792

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-37170 IDA-3717A)

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 60.7 MILLION (US$80 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF MADAGASCAR

FOR A

RURAL TRANSPORT PROJECT

November 21, 2013

Transport Sector Country Department AFCS4 Africa Region

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Exchange Rate Effective December 31, 2012

Currency Unit = Malagasy Ariary (MGA) US$1.00 = MGA 2,272.99

US$1.00 = 0.65 SDR

FISCAL YEAR January 1 – December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AGETIPA Agency for the Execution of Public Interest Works (Agence des Travaux d’Intérêt Publique)

APL Adaptable Program Loan CAS Country Assistance Strategy FCE Southern Railway (Fianarantsoa Cote Est) GDP Gross Domestic Product HIV/AID Human Immonodeficiency Virus / Acquired ImmunoDeficiency Syndrome ICR Implementation Completion Report IDA International Development Association IEG Independent Evaluation Group IMT Intermediate Means of Transport ISN Interim Strategy Note ISR Implementation Status Report M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MGA Malagasy Ariary OP/BP Operational Policy / Bank Procedures PAD Project Appraisal Document PDO Project development Objective PES Program Executive Secretariat PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper RAI Rural Access Index RMF Road Maintenance Fund RN National Road (Route Nationale) RRU Rural Road Unit RTP Rural Transport Project RTU Rural Transport Unit SDR Special Drawing Rights TIIP Transport Infrastructure Investment Project TSRRP Transport Sector Reform and Rehabilitation Project

REPUBLIC OF MADAGASCAR

Vice President: Makthar Diop Country Director: Haleh Z. Bridi

Sector Manager / Director: Supee Teravaninthorn / Jamal Saghir Project Team Leader: Noroarisoa Rabefaniraka

ICR Team Leader and Primary Author: Tojoarofenitra Ramanankirahina

Rural Transport Project CONTENTS

Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ............................................................... 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .............................................................. 7 3. Assessment of Outcomes .......................................................................................................... 13 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ......................................................................... 16 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ..................................................................... 17 6. Lessons Learned........................................................................................................................ 19 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners........................... 20 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................................... 21 Annex 2. Outputs by Component.................................................................................................. 22 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ................................................................................. 30 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............................. 33 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................................... 35 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ................................................................... 36 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and Comments on Draft ICR ......................................... 37 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ....................................... 44 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................................... 45 Annex 10: Additional information on safeguards ......................................................................... 46 MAP .............................................................................................................................................. 47

i

A. Basic Information

Country: Madagascar Project Name: Rural Transport Project

Project ID: P073689 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-37170,IDA-3717A

ICR Date: 11/21/2013 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument: APL Borrower: REPUBLIC OF MADAGASCAR

Original Total Commitment: XDR 60.70M Disbursed Amount: XDR 59.88M

Revised Amount: XDR 59.88M Environmental Category: A Implementing Agencies: AGETIPA Cabinet MPANAZAVA Road Authority of Madagascar Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual Date(s)

Concept Review: 05/14/2001 Effectiveness: 03/13/2003 03/13/2003

Appraisal: 02/08/2002 Restructuring(s): 12/03/2004 07/02/2007 09/15/2010

Approval: 11/14/2002 Mid-term Review: 12/03/2004 Closing: 06/30/2009 12/31/2012 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Moderately Unsatisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: High Bank Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory Borrower Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)

Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Moderately Unsatisfactory Government: Unsatisfactory

Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies:

Moderately Unsatisfactory

ii

Overall Bank Performance:


Overall Borrower Performance:


C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators

Implementation Performance Indicators QAG Assessments

(if any) Rating

Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

Yes Quality at Entry (QEA): None

Problem Project at any time (Yes/No): Yes Quality of

Supervision (QSA): None

DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:

Moderately Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes

Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) General transportation sector 7 4 Ports, waterways and shipping 3 0 Railways 9 1 Rural and Inter-Urban Roads and Highways 81 95

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Other rural development 33 Rural services and infrastructure 67 67 Trade facilitation and market access 33 E. Bank Staff

Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Makhtar Diop Callisto E. Madavo Country Director: Haleh Z. Bridi Hafez M. H. Ghanem Sector Manager: Supee Teravaninthorn Maryvonne Plessis-Fraissard Project Team Leader: Noroarisoa Rabefaniraka Dieter E. Schelling ICR Team Leader: Tojoarofenitra Ramanankirahina ICR Primary Author: Tojoarofenitra Ramanankirahina

iii

F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) To sustainably improve the access of rural communities to markets, schools, health centers and other economic and social infrastructure, and to enhance the mobility of the rural population, in order to improve their quality of life and promote economic development. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) Increased use of rural roads by residents of beneficiary rural communes (a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : Traffic (motorized and non-motorized) on the rehabilitated rural road network increases annually by 10 percent

Value quantitative or Qualitative)

0 10 percent more than 10 percent

Date achieved 10/22/2002 12/31/2009 12/31/2008 Comments (incl. % achievement)

More than 100 percent achieved. Daily increase as follows: vehicle: from 15 to 50 (230%), bicycle from 38 to 287 (650%), and cart from 14 to 28 (100%)

Indicator 2 : Six million people who currently do not have reliable access will be provided with reliable access

Value quantitative or Qualitative)

0 6,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000

Date achieved 10/22/2002 12/31/2009 12/31/2010 12/31/2008 Comments (incl. % achievement)

100 percent of revised target achieved

Indicator 3 : 20 percent reduction in travel time on rehabilitated rural roads Value quantitative or Qualitative)

0 20 percent 60 percent


100 percent of target achieved

iv

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : Capacity built to manage the rural road network: set-up for management of the road network implemented under APL1 functions satisfactorily

Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

No capacity

Management of the road network functions satisfactorily

Rural Roads Unit operates satisfactorily

Rural Roads Unit is no longer operational


Not achieved

Indicator 2 : 9000km of rural roads rehabilitated in annual tranches of about 1500 km Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

0 9000 km 1500 km 1346 km


90 percent of revised target for rural roads achieved, and an additional 400 km of National Roads were rehabilitated

Indicator 3 : Rural roads maintained: all rural roads in good and fair condition (rehabilitated or already good) are maintained in this condition


No maintenance

All rural roads in good and fair condition are maintained in this condition

80 percent of rehabilitated rural roads in good and fair conditions.

About 30 percent of the rehabilitated rural roads in good and fair conditions


Not achieved

Indicator 4 : Rural Road maintained: At least 30 percent of the Road Maintenance Fund resources are allocated to rural roads maintenance


at least 30 percent about 24 percent


80 percent achieved

v

Indicator 5 : 10 bridges rehabilitated Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

0 10 12


120 percent achieved

Indicator 6 : 15 jetties built Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

0 15 18


120 percent achieved

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived DO IP

Actual Disbursements (USD millions)

1 12/13/2002 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 04/04/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 3 06/30/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.25 4 11/27/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.81 5 02/24/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 4.87 6 07/12/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 13.93 7 12/28/2004 Satisfactory Unsatisfactory 28.35 8 01/24/2005 Satisfactory Unsatisfactory 29.69 9 05/06/2005 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 38.71 10 07/25/2005 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 38.99 11 12/08/2005 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 40.53 12 03/18/2006 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 45.06 13 10/12/2006 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 53.15 14 03/12/2007 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 55.97 15 10/12/2007 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 56.85 16 01/15/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 58.86

17 07/13/2008 Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 60.70



vi

20 11/30/2009 Moderately Unsatisfactory

Moderately Unsatisfactory 63.09

21 05/17/2010 Moderately Unsatisfactory

Moderately Unsatisfactory 63.09



24 08/22/2011 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 68.72 25 03/11/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 73.92 26 11/10/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 79.54

H. Restructuring (if any)

Restructuring Date(s)

Board Approved

PDO Change

ISR Ratings at Restructuring

Amount Disbursed at

Restructuring in USD millions

Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made DO IP

12/03/2004 N S S 24.31 Amendment to the DCA to increase the procurement thresholds

07/02/2007 Y MS MS 56.38

Major adjustment to PDO and key outcome targets together with revision of components. Extension of closing date to December 31, 2010

09/15/2010 N MU MU 68.34 Revision of components and extension of closing date to December 31, 2012

If PDO and/or Key Outcome Targets were formally revised (approved by the original approving body) enter ratings below: Outcome Ratings Against Original PDO/Targets Unsatisfactory Against Formally Revised PDO/Targets Moderately Satisfactory Overall (weighted) rating Moderately Unsatisfactory

vii

I. Disbursement Profile

1

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal 1. The rural poverty rate rose from 74.5 percent in 1993 to 76.7 percent in 1999 although the overall poverty rate remained broadly stable in the 1990s. The worsening of rural poverty was associated with increased geographical isolation caused by the deterioration of rural transport infrastructure. Incidentally, the higher the percentage of population with reliable transport access was in a given province, the lower the poverty rate. Furthermore, the social and economic impact of the post-election crisis in 2002 was substantial, especially in the rural areas. Farm prices, basically halved, causing an unprecedented drop in rural incomes. 2. The Government and development partners, including the World Bank, pledged about United States Dollars (US$) 300 million to improve rural transport infrastructure. More specifically, what was planned was to finance a comprehensive set of activities including rehabilitation of rural roads, the rehabilitation of the 163 km railway between Fianarantsoa and Manakara, and development of intermediate means of transport1. The contribution of the World Bank to the program was the Rural Transport Project (RTP), which contributed to the interim Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) objectives of improving the accessibility of the rural population to basic services and stimulating rural agricultural production through the enhancement of rural mobility and the reduction of travel time and cost. Rural transport featured prominently in the Government's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). Improved access was identified as a key aspect to improve livelihood and foster economic growth. 3. The project was the second phase on an Adaptable Program Loan (APL) series. The APL series supported the Government strategy and policy in the transport sector which aimed at: (i) focusing the relevant Ministries roles in strategic planning, oversight, and coordination; (ii) creating jointly public-private controlled and user-financed agencies for sub-sector management and regulatory functions; (iii) divesting operational activities to the private sector; (iv) developing the local private sector for works design and execution; and (v) rehabilitating transport infrastructure to appropriate levels. The first phase APL, the Transport Sector Reform and Rehabilitation Project (TSRRP), in the amount of about US$66 million, was approved on June 1, 2000, and closed on July 31, 20052. The outcomes as well as the Bank and Borrower performance were rated satisfactory. The sustainability was rated likely. These ratings were confirmed during the Independent Evaluation Group review of the Implementation Completion Report (ICR). The TSRRP (APL1) focused on critical reforms in the transport sector, and on priority transport infrastructure investments. 4. Originally, the APL series was planned to have four phases: (i) TSRRP-APL1; (ii) an APL2 of about US$20 million planned to focus on strengthening the civil aviation and railway sub-sectors; (iii) an APL3 of about US$34 million to focus on rural transport; and, (iv) an APL4 of about US$100 million to finance investments in the roads and ports sub-sectors. However, the

1 Intermediate Means of Transport include a wide range of devices and vehicles occupying the middle ground between walking and modern four-wheeled motor vehicle. 2 Implementation Completion and Results Report No: 35035 dated January 30, 2006

2

design of the APL was modified. What was supposed to be APL3 became APL2 and its amount was significantly increased. What were supposed to be APL2 and APL4 were merged into APL3 in the amount of about US$150 million. The project (RTP-APL2), subject of the Implementation Completion and Results Report, was approved on November 14, 2002, and the Transport Infrastructure Investment Project (TIIP-APL3) was approved one year later on December 8, 2003. The TIIP-APL3 closed on June 30, 2012 3, six months before the RTP -APL2. The outcomes as well as the Bank and Borrower performance were rated moderately satisfactory. The risk to development outcomes was rated high. 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved) 5. The development objective of the project was to sustainably improve the access of rural communities to markets, schools, health centers and other economic and social infrastructure, and to enhance the mobility of the rural population, in order to improve their quality of life and promote economic development. 6. The key performance indicators were: (i) traffic on the rehabilitated road network increases annually by 10 percent; (ii) six million people who currently do not have reliable access will be provided with reliable access; and (iii) significant improvement of rural well-being indicators such as school attendance and morbidity. 1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification 7. During the restructuring of July 2007, the development objective of the project was significantly simplified as follows - “increased use of rural roads by residents of beneficiary rural communes”. The key performance indicators were adjusted accordingly to: (i) motorized and non-motorized traffic on the rehabilitated road network increases annually by 10 percent; (ii) one million people who currently do not have reliable access will be provided with reliable access; and (iii) 20 percent reduction in travel time on rehabilitated rural roads. The key indicator on rural well-being was dropped. 8. The 2007 restructuring was necessary since the original PDO and the key performance indicators were far too broad and captured key outcomes which could not be attributed entirely to the project activities. Moreover, because of implementation problems, some components and activities were either dropped, reduced, or significantly modified. 9. Although the PDO and the key performance indicators were not changed during the September 2010 adaptive restructuring, the project scope was revised to respond to the emergency transport infrastructure rehabilitation needs as a result of the political crisis starting in early 2009.

3 Implementation Completion and Results Report No: ICR1935 for Transport Infrastructure Investment Project –APL3 dated June 20, 2013.

3

1.4 Main Beneficiaries 10. The primary target group initially was the 6 million people living in partially or completely inaccessible rural areas throughout Madagascar which would benefit from reliable transport access. Moreover, the labor-based construction and the rural infrastructure rehabilitation/maintenance would provide jobs to the rural youth and women. In addition, the Ministries/entities in charge of rural transport infrastructure and the Fianarantsoa – Manakara corridor were expected to receive institutional support. Finally, rural households were expected to benefit from the development of intermediate means of transportation. 11. As a result of the project restructurings, the primary target group was revised substantially downwards to about 1 million people living in rural area which was the expected number of persons benefiting of reliable access as a result of the rural roads improvement directly financed by the project. The original 6 million rural population target was the expected cumulative number of beneficiaries of all projects and investments in rural transport in Madagascar at the time of appraisal. In addition, because of the cancellation of the components on intermediate means of transportation and the Fianarantsoa - Manakara railway corridor due to unsatisfactory implementation, the target groups of these activities were dropped from the list of original beneficiaries. 12. After the September 2010 adaptive restructuring, the project funded the rehabilitation of some sections and bridges on the National Roads network in rural areas, the rural population living in their influence zone was also among the main beneficiaries as well as travelling public, car owners, and transport companies. 1.5 Original Components (as approved) 13. Component 1: Capacity Building for Implementation of Rural Transport Policy and Strategy (about US$1.91 million) Provision of technical advisory services and support services to assist the Rural Transport Unit (RTU) in the implementation of the rural transport policy and strategy, including:

• Development of the capacity of the RTU to facilitate the coordination and implementation of the rural transport policy and strategy, and monitor its progress;

• Provision of support and guidance to decentralized organs of government in the management of their road networks; and

• Implementation of information, education and communication campaign to disseminate information about the rural transport policy and strategy, the Road Charter, the Road Maintenance Fund (RMF), Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) and other social issues.

14. Component 2: Rehabilitation of Rural Transport Infrastructure (about US$62.4 million)

• Implementation of a program of improvement of the rural road network involving 9,000 km of rural roads to be selected on a participatory basis, and in accordance with criteria

4

which included the cost of upgrading each link to basic access standard, served population, social and environmental considerations, and developmental priorities; and

• Implementation of a pilot program to define and propagate appropriate transport infrastructure interventions at community level.

15. Component 3: Maintenance of Rural Road Network (about US$0.5 million)

• Implementation of a program of periodic and routine maintenance of the rural road network, using resources of the RMF and contributory financing provided by the provinces and communes;

• Implementation of a financial and technical audit to provide feedback on the execution of the maintenance program; and

• Provision of technical advisory services and material support to strengthen the RMF and enhance its efficiency.

16. Component 4: Rehabilitation of the Fianarantsoa–Manakara Corridor (about US$9.7 million)

• Rehabilitation of the Southern Railway, including improvement of its infrastructure;

• Rehabilitation of the Port of Manakara, including infrastructure improvements, rehabilitation of the oil pipeline and implementation of environmental protection measures; and

• Implementation of community activities for slope stabilization and community organization.

17. Component 5: Promotion of Intermediate Means of Transport (about US$6 million)

• Provision of advisory services to support: (i) development by private sector institutions, civil society and not-for-profit organizations of small-scale initiatives designed to enhance rural mobility, through greater or more efficient use of cycle-based technologies, human-powered and animal-powered carts, water-based transport or a combination of complementary transport modes; and (ii) implementation, monitoring and evaluation of such initiatives;

• Carrying out of investigations, including participatory surveys, collaborative research and development activities, to identify problem areas and identify solutions in key areas of rural transport mobility;

• Implementation of a program of training, workshops, publications, professional exchanges and networking activities to enhance capacity and expertise in the sector, promote the exchange of information and facilitate collaboration among users, operators and contractors; and

• Carrying out of local spot improvements of waterways and jetties to improve water transport infrastructure.

5

1.6 Revised Components 18. The following table summarizes the revised project components following the two project restructurings:

Table 1: Revised components Original component 1st restructuring

July 2007 2nd restructuring September 2010 Comments

Component 1: Capacity Building for Implementation of Rural Transport Policy and Strategy Development of the capacity of the RTU (Rural Transport Unit)

Development of the capacity of the RRU (Rural Roads Unit)

Development of the capacity of the RRU (Rural Roads Unit)

The RTU was transformed to a RRU during the 1st restructuring

Support and guidance to decentralized organs of government

Support and guidance to decentralized structures of Government

Support and guidance to decentralized structures of Government

No change

Information, education and communication campaign

Information, education and communication campaign

Information, education and communication campaign No change

Component 2: Rehabilitation of Rural Transport Infrastructure

Improvement of 9,000km of rural roads



Only 3,000 km out of the 9,000 km was originally planned to be financed directly by the project. The balance (6,000 km) was expected to be financed by other development partners.

Transport infrastructure at community level Dropped

The implementation of this activity was dropped since it never commenced.

N/A

Rehabilitation of about 91km of RN25, 156km of RN1bis, 119km of RN8a, and 17km of RNS30

Rehabilitation of about 91km of RN25, 156 km of RN1bis, 119km of RN8a, and 17km of RNS30

This activity was added as a result of the 1st restructuring in synergy with other interventions in the National Roads network

N/A N/A

Technical assistance to monitor the impacts of rural roads rehabilitation, including on food price

Component 3: Maintenance of Rural Road Network

Periodic and routine maintenance of the rural road

Dropped

This activity was supposed to be directly funded by the Government via the Road Maintenance Fund.

Financial and technical audit of the maintenance program

no change no change

Technical advisory services and material support to the RMF

no change no change

N/A

Pilot performance based contracts and accompanying capacity building in the province of

Dropped The implementation of the works did not start.

6

Antananarivo. Innovative arrangements for road maintenance in other provinces.

N/A N/A

Adoption of an efficient maintenance program to secure investments made in the rural road sector

Component 4: Rehabilitation of the Fianarantsoa – Manakara Corridor Rehabilitation of the Southern Railway

Rehabilitation of the Southern Railway Dropped The concessionning of the

Southern Railway and the Port of Manakara which was the disbursement condition of these activities did not take place.

Rehabilitation of the Port of Manakara

Rehabilitation of the Port of Manakara Dropped

Community activities Community activities Dropped

N/A Studies on the future operation of the Southern Railway

This activity was realized before the 2nd restructuring.

N/A Support to the social plan Dropped

The adoption of a social plan which was the disbursement condition of this activity did not take place.

Component 5: Promotion of Intermediate Means of Transport Advisory services Dropped

Because of lack of tangible progress, this component was stopped in June 2005

Investigation Dropped Workshops, training, publications Dropped

Spot improvements of waterways and jetties Dropped

Component 6: Emergency works

N/A N/A

Surface treatment of 35km, stabilization of gullies, and rehabilitation of 7 bridges in the RN44South

This component was added during the 2nd restructuring in synergy with other interventions in the National Roads network

N/A N/A Rehabilitation of 3 bridges in the RN13

N/A N/A Construction of jetties for ferries

1.7 Other significant changes 19. Implementation arrangements. At approval, the Program Executive Secretariat (PES) was fully in charge of all aspects of the project. Due to its declining performance, the PES was closed in June 2005. A consortium comprising international and local auditing firms was recruited to ensure the fiduciary functions (financial management and procurement) and the Road Authority took over the project’s technical, social, and environmental implementation. 20. At approval, an RTU was created and attached to the PES. The RTU was in charge of overseeing the implementation of the rural transport policy and strategy. Since the RTU was never made fully operational, in terms of staff and equipment, it was decided in June 2005 to

7

change it into a Rural Road Unit (RRU). When the PES was closed, the RRU was attached to the newly created Road Authority. 21. Financing parameters. The new country financing parameters allowing for 100 percent financing of all project expenditure including taxes and recurrent expenditures was adopted during the July 2007 restructuring. At approval, the percentage of expenditures to be financed by the Project varied from 80 to 100 percent depending on the components. 22. Freeze on disbursements. Due to the political crisis starting in early 2009, Madagascar is still operating under OP/BP7.30 “dealing with de facto government”. Project disbursements were frozen for about 14 months (from March 2009 to May 2010), and no payments were made including for completed activities. Project disbursement resumed in May 2010. 23. Closing date was extended twice. At approval on November 14, 2002, the project was expected to close on December 31, 2009. During the restructuring of July 2007, the project closing date was extended to December 31, 2010. During the restructuring of September 2010, following the lifting of the freeze on disbursement as a result of the 2009 political crisis, the closing date was extended to December 31, 2012. 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 24. Project design did not incorporate all lessons learned from past experiences. The following lesson mentioned in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) did not seem to be taken into account in the project design: “the sustainability of the rural transport infrastructure would not be ensured if a clear institutional and financing arrangement for the management and maintenance of these infrastructures is not effective”. The weak institutional framework for the management of the rural road network had a major negative impact on the implementation of the project, and on the sustainability of the rural road assets that were rehabilitated. Nevertheless, the project adopted the following key lessons: (i) the rehabilitation design of low volume rural road had to focus primarily on drainage works, structures, and critical spots in order to ensure year round access and to ensure cost effectiveness; and (ii) support to intermediate means of transport to complement the improvement in rural transport infrastructure in order to enhance rural mobility. 25. The project was overly complex in its design and ambitious in its objectives. The project, which was supposed to complement the pledged interventions of other development partners, and support the overarching objectives of the World Bank APL transport sectors series in Madagascar, attempted to tackle all of the following critical rural transport issues: (i) institutional framework to manage the rural transport network; (ii) rural transport infrastructure rehabilitation and maintenance; (iii) introduction on a large scale of intermediate means of transportation; and (iv) rehabilitation of the Southern Railway including the Port of Manakara. Furthermore, the all of the project activities and components were not adequately funded. This means that if all project components were fully implemented, a funding gap would have probably arisen.

8

26. The project did not identify all major risks. The risk of a weak implementation capacity of the Borrower as well as the private sector (contractors, design and supervision firms) was not adequately identified and discussed. 27. All the above factors made the project meant that the project had a low quality at entry and consequently was difficult to implement. Nevertheless, the results chain was appropriate. By addressing all the issues identified in the project, the first level objectives, which were the improvement of rural accessibility and mobility, would be attained. Thus, the second level objectives that were the improvement of the quality of life and the promotion of economic development would be achieved since lack of accessibility and rural poverty were linked. However, the improvement of rural accessibility and mobility was necessary but not sufficient to improve the well-being of the rural population and to promote economic development. 2.2 Implementation 28. The implementation of the project can be broken down into three key periods: the first period until the 1st restructuring of 2007; the second period until the suspension of disbursement in 2009; and the third period from the 2nd restructuring of 2010 until project closing. (a) From effectiveness in March 2003 to the restructuring of July 2007 29. The amounts pledged to fund the country’s rural road component did not materialize. For example, 9,000 km of rural roads were planned to be rehabilitated as a result of all the promised financing, of which 3,000 km were expected to be financed by the project. However, many pledges did not materialize from several development partners and Government, leading to a much lower scope of investment. Moreover, no monitoring mechanism was put in place to follow-up on the financing. 30. The institutional arrangements agreed at project approval were not effective leading to a slow implementation. The RTU that was expected to be in charge of overseeing the implementation of the rural transport policy and strategy was not operational when project implementation commenced. The Provincial Road Authorities that were expected to be in charge of the operational implementation of the rural roads rehabilitation works were never created. (The lack of sustainable financial resources to operate the Provincial Road Authorities was the main reason behind their non-creation.) Thus, the PES was made in charge of the implementation of the rural roads rehabilitation works. Furthermore, when the rural roads rehabilitation financed by the project was completed, the Rural Road Unit was closed. 31. Full rehabilitation was undertaken for the rural roads instead of the agreed basic access standard. The fact rural roads were fully rehabilitated meant that: (i) the cost per kilometer was much higher leading to only about 1400 km of rural roads being rehabilitated against an original target of 3000 km; and (ii) fewer labor based works contracts could be funded; less person-days and cash revenue for local laborers were generated by the project. 32. The rehabilitated rural roads were not properly maintained. At approval, it was agreed that the maintenance of the rehabilitated rural roads would be ensured. However, this was

9

not the case. This is because the RMF did not have sufficient budget to ensure the maintenance of the rural road network in good or even fair condition. In addition, the choice of the rural roads to be maintained in a given year was not done based on prioritized objective criteria. Instead, scarce maintenance resources were often allocated on the basis of political pressure or local interests. 33. Poor performance of contractors and consultant firms. In some cases, the realized rural road works were not of a good quality standard. In these cases, the design and supervision consultants did not fully ensure their duties as well. (The issue of poorly constructed road infrastructure, which negatively affected the sustainability of rural roads, is no unique to Madagascar and is very often flagged in the construction sector in developing countries.) To improve the quality of rural road works executed, international individual consultant and some local experts were hired with positive results. 34. Financing rehabilitation of non-rural roads4. At approval, the project was intended to rehabilitate roads among the Temporary or Tertiary National Road, Provincial Road, and Municipal or Community Road. These roads, most of which were not paved (expect in some urban area) were planned to be managed at a decentralized level. However, the project financed the rehabilitation of 366 km of Primary National Road of which 90 km paved, and the rehabilitation of 17 km of Secondary National Road. The reason for including some primary road network roads for rehabilitation was to meet emerging rehabilitation needs or complement other projects in the road sector. The rehabilitation of non-rural roads improved the accessibility of the rural population in the roads influence zone, by providing a network effect between the secondary/tertiary road network and the primary road network. 35. The Intermediate Means of Transport (IMT) component and the transport infrastructure at community level sub-component (footbridge, track for ox-carts, etc.) were inadequately prepared. As a result, these activities were stopped a few years after effectiveness because the corresponding institutional frameworks were never effective. Furthermore, the management of this component by the PES was not appropriate due to the decentralized nature of the activity. 36. Failure to concession the Southern Railway and the Port of Manakara. When the only technically acceptable bidder for the concession put a requirement for financial subsidies in its proposal to operate the Southern Railway, the Government rejected the offer and cancelled the entire concession process. Consequently, the planned rehabilitation works to be financed by the project could not take place because a successful concessionning was a disbursement condition. This has meant both the railway and the Port of Manakara did not benefit from better management and investments which the concession process and the project were supposed to bring.

4 Rural Transport Infrastructure includes the intra and near village transport network, as well as the infrastructure that provides access to higher levels of the road network (World Bank Technical Paper 496 – Design and Appraisal of Rural Transport Infrastructure)

10

37. 1st project restructuring. The PDO and the activities were narrowed into what could be reasonably achieved taking into account slow project implementation, inadequate project implementation framework, and inadequate funding to implement all project activities. A pilot performance based-contract supposed to improve road maintenance was introduced in place of the rehabilitation of rural roads. The Agency for the Execution of Public Interest Works (Agence des Travaux d’Intérêt Publique, AGETIPA) which was not part of the project at approval was made the implementing agency of this new activity. (b) From the restructuring of July 2007 up to the freeze in disbursements of March 2009 38. The 1st restructuring did not improve project implementation because of weak institutional framework and lack of appropriate capacity. Less than 10 percent was disbursed during a period of about 20 months after the 1st restructuring. A second corrective restructuring was prepared but was put on hold due to the political crisis starting in 2009. 39. Failure to adopt a social plan for the Southern Railway and the Port of Manakara. The financing of the implementation of the social plan was added to the project when the concessionning had failed. However, no acceptable social plan was ever submitted by Government. 40. The pilot performance-based road works which were introduced during the 1st restructuring did not start because the required upstream activities such as training, prioritization of the rural roads, took longer time than expected. 41. Protracted political crisis starting from 2009. Violent civil unrest started in late 2008, and a mutiny ousted the President of Madagascar in March 2009. A transitional government has been in place since then and the country remains in political turmoil. The protracted political crisis has affected the implementation of the project in the following manner:

• Field visits were restricted for safety reasons;

• Fuel levy allocated to the RMF substantially decreased from about Malagasy Ariary (MGA) 100 billion (about US$50 million) in 2009 to about MGA16.7 billion (about US$8.35 million) in 2012 severely affecting the quality of the road network;

• The performance of the RMF has deteriorated with the financing of non-road activities, such as levee and dike rehabilitation, as well as the increase in the use of direct contracting and single-source selection;

• No new transport sector project/operation was financed by external donors;

• No tangible progress has been made since the onset of the political crisis on the transport sector reform process supported by the World Bank APL series; and

• The state of the road infrastructure network deteriorated sharply due to a lack of maintenance and investment funding caused by the crisis.

42. Freezing of disbursement and application of OP7.30 to whole Madagascar portfolio: The 2009 political crisis caused the World Bank to apply the OP7.30 (dealing with de facto

11

governments) to its activities in Madagascar, which has not yet been lifted. Disbursements were totally frozen in March 2009 for a period of about 14 months. For about one year, high level discussion with the Borrower was limited. When the disbursement freeze was lifted in May 2010, an adaptive restructuring was prepared as part of the restructuring of the entire World Bank portfolio in Madagascar to mitigate the immediate impacts of the crisis. The project was restructured to focus on emergency works. Although, these emergency works were not part of the rural road network per se, they were selected to directly benefit rural populations. (c) From the adaptive restructuring of September 2010 up until project closing 43. As a result of the adaptive restructuring, project implementation improved because of the following reasons: (i) most of the emergency road works that were added to the project had already initiated by either the TIIP-APL3 or other development partners; (ii) unlike the rural roads, the institutional framework to manage the National Roads network was clearly defined and functioned reasonably well. Furthermore, the implementing unit (the Road Authority) had the required capacity to implement the emergency works that were added to the project. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization (a) M&E design 44. Original PDO indicators were in line with the original PDO. The traffic data and the number of population with reliable rural road access captured respectively the mobility and the accessibility aspects. The rural well-being indicators covered the improvement in life quality. The intermediate outcome indicators were adequate and embraced the outcomes/outputs of each component. However, the target values of some intermediate outcome indicators went far beyond the project activities and included all identified interventions in the corresponding sub-sector. In addition, not all baseline and target values were precisely defined. 45. Outputs and outcomes inadequately captured by the revised M&E framework. When the PDO was narrowed as a result of the project restructuring, the M&E framework was revised to reflect what the project could be held accountable for. However, the remaining PDO indicators captured only the outcomes of the rural roads rehabilitation activities which were already realized by 2008. The outputs and the outcomes of the about 380 km of National Roads added during implementation were not taken into account by the M&E framework of the project. This is because the rehabilitation of National Roads was being monitored by other projects, such as the TIIP (APL-3). (b) M&E framework implementation 46. Data collection particularly on road traffic was weak. There was a lack of periodic reliable data on traffic and road conditions. No regular traffic counting and road surveys were undertaken. The few ad-hoc ones were financed by development partners, including the project itself. Furthermore, the Rural Access Index (RAI) which is a key transport indicator was not adequately monitored. Nevertheless, some indicators such as the length of rehabilitated road, the

12

percentage of road maintenance funds allocated to rural roads were made available and monitored. (c) M&E framework utilization 47. Given the issues mentioned above, the M&E framework was not used as a primary tool for decision-making. In addition, the archiving system was weak making it difficult or even impossible to find some earlier information and documentation which could help in the decision-making process. This factor also hindered the preparation of the ICR since some of the key information on road works implemented early in the project was hard to access. 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance (a) Safeguard 48. The project was classified as a category A project which was quite common for rural transport projects prepared during that period. Three safeguards policies were triggered at approval: (i) Environmental Assessment (OP/BP4.01), (ii) Natural Habitats (OP/BP4.04), and (iii) Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP4.12). There was no significant deviation or waiver from the World Bank safeguards policies and procedures during preparation and implementation. In addition, the Natural Habitats policies and procedures were not finally triggered because of the project scope reduction during implementation (fewer rural roads, cancellation of the rehabilitation of the Fianarantsoa Manakara corridor). More details are provided in annex 10. (b) Fiduciary 49. The fiduciary compliance situation of the project can be divided into two periods: before the closure of the PES in 2005 and after its closure. Before the closure of the PES, the following occurred: (i) poor archiving; (ii) unclear share of responsibilities among the procurement staff; (iii) non-compliance with the procurement rules for certain activities. On the financial management side, there were some weaknesses on internal financial control: (i) purchase order established after the invoice; (ii) absence of the World Bank no-objection for some expenses; (iii) inefficient use of gasoline coupons; (iv) assets not regularly registered; and (v) non-use of the asset management software. 50. However, after the PES’s closure in 2005, the situation improved. The new team that was recruited to be in charge of the financial management and procurement tasks provided qualified and experienced personnel. They complied with the World Bank procurement rules and guidelines, and put in place adequate financial management arrangements over the course of the implementation period. The quarterly financial reports and annual audit reports were submitted to the Bank on a timely basis, and recommendations made subsequent to implementation support missions were appropriately implemented. The internal controls were spelt out in a Procedures Manual, and amendments to the Manual were made on a periodic basis in order to take into account changes in the project’s operations. Despite the absence of the internal audit function, an internal check mechanism was in place to ensure the appropriate use of project resources.

13

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase 51. The main expected post-completion phase of the project was the regular maintenance of the rehabilitated rural roads by the Government via the RMF. The RMF was initially able to finance some rural roads maintenance, but its financial resources have significantly decreased since the beginning of the current political crisis. This situation undermines the sustainability of the rural roads rehabilitated under the project as well as the entire road network. This was one of the reasons why the project had to be restructured in 2010 to focus on emergency rehabilitation, and a new project (the Emergency Infrastructure Preservation and Vulnerability Reduction Project) in the amount of about US$102 million was prepared and approved in end-November 2012. The objective of this multisectoral project is to preserve key lifeline infrastructure including roads and reduce household vulnerability. 3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation 52. Decreasing importance of rural roads/rural transport infrastructure. Since the beginning of the 2009 political crisis, both the Government and development partners have reprioritized investment funding away from rural transport infrastructure. For example, the current World Bank Interim Strategy Note puts little emphasis on rural roads/rural transport even if it recognizes the necessity to address rural poverty. This is understandable as the ISN is focusing on short-term emergency activities with a transitional government while the improvement of rural roads/rural transport in Madagascar requires a medium to long-term vision within a strong institutional context. Thus, the relevance of the project at the time of the ICR has become moderate due to the changed priorities. The introduction of the rehabilitation on the non-rural roads (National Roads) during implementation confirmed this. Nevertheless, the latest available value of the RAI for Madagascar (25 percent) is substantially below the average RAI for Sub-Saharan Africa (34 percent). This means that the development of rural roads/rural transport remains fully relevant for the development of Madagascar. 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives 53. As per the ICR guidelines, split evaluation was done due to that fact that the PDO was substantially revised during implementation. Since one PDO revision took place, the assessment will be broken down into 2 periods: (i) the first period until the first restructuring of 2007 which included a simplification of the PDO; and (ii) the second period until project closing which included the second restructuring of 2010. (a) First period up until the restructuring of July 2007 54. Although the traffic on the rehabilitated rural roads increased and school attendance in its influence zone improved, only about 1 million out of the planned 6 million people living in rural areas were provided with reliable road access. In addition, only about 1400 km out of the

14

planned 9000 km5 rural roads were rehabilitated under the project. Moreover, the following targets were not reached: (i) the setting-up of a clear and performing rural roads institutional framework; (ii) the regular maintenance of all rural roads in good and fair conditions; and (iii) the rehabilitation of the Fianarantsoa Manakara corridor. In addition, the successful implementation of the intermediate means of transportation and the transport infrastructure at community level did not occur. (b) Second period up until project closing and including the restructuring of September

2010 55. The revised target of 1 million people living in rural areas to be provided with reliable road access was reached. In addition, as a direct result of the rural rehabilitation works, travel time was reduced by more than 20 percent and traffic increased by more than 10 percent. 56. About 380 km of National Roads were rehabilitated to a reasonable quality standard. Because of the rehabilitation of the 276 km unpaved National Roads between Morafenobe, Maintirano, and Antsalova (RN1b and RN8a), the accessibility and the travel time in the Middle West (Melaky region) that was one of the most isolated areas of Madagascar also improved. The rehabilitation of the paved 91 km National Road between Vohiparara and Irondro (RN25) ensured permanent accessibility to the South East area of Madagascar and decreased the travel time. The paving of the 17 km National Road between Ambanja and the port of Ankify (RNS30) improved access and decreased travel time to Nosy-Be Island, which is the main international tourist destination of the country. 57. More emergency works than planned were realized due to lower than expected bid prices from contractors. It included the following: (i) the construction of 18 river jetties on National Roads instead of the 16 planned; (ii) the construction of 10 bridges/culverts on the RN44South instead of the 7 bridges/culverts originally planned; (iii) the rehabilitation of 3 bridges on the RN13; (iv) the repair of the cyclone related damages on the RN25; and (v) the resurfacing of about 35 km of RN44South. Without these emergency road works there was a substantial risk that the following would occur: (i) traffic would be interrupted; (ii) bridges/culverts would have collapsed; (iii) the accessibility and the mobility of the rural population in the project influence zone would be further reduced because there would be no affordable alternative way to access them; (iv) the use of rural roads that linked the rural communes to the National Roads would decrease; and (v) the Alaotra region, which is the main rice producer area, and the Anosy region, where is located the only one port of Madagascar would be isolated. 58. However, the following expected targets were not reached: (i) the rehabilitation and maintenance of 200 km of rural roads using a performance-based method which was dropped during the 2nd restructuring; (ii) the allocation of 30 percent of the budget of the Road Maintenance Fund for the maintenance of the rural roads network; and (iii) the staff retrenchment plan for the Southern Railway.

5 The cumulative targets of all rural transport projects inventoried during preparation were about 9,000 km of which 3,000 km by the RTP

15

Table 2: Split evaluation of the efficacy of the PDO Against original PDO Against revised PDO Overall 1 Rating Unsatisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 2 Rating value6 2 4

3 Weight (percentage disbursed before / after PDO change) 0.7 0.3

4 Weighted value 1.4 1.2 2.6

5 Final rating (rounded) Moderately Unsatisfactory

3.3 Efficiency 59. The efficiency of the project is rated modest because of the following: (i) the agreed efficiency measure to do spot improvements in order to provide basic access standard on selected rural roads was not followed. Full rehabilitation was undertaken even though there were no more than 50 vehicles per day on the rural roads selected; (ii) although a cost-effectiveness indicator7 was used to define a set of priority rural roads, some of the rehabilitation works made on rural roads were not in the priority list; and (iii) although the rehabilitation on the National Roads was relevant taking into account their geographical location and level of traffic, no economic analysis was undertaken to support the investment decision. The lack of accurate data on road traffic could explain this. Nevertheless, the added Emergency Works component was efficient since more works than planned were realized without any additional financing. 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory 60. The overall outcome is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory because of the following: (i) the relevance is Moderate; (ii) efficacy was Moderately Unsatisfactory; and, (iii) efficiency was Modest. In addition, sustainability is weak given the lack of appropriate maintenance and the ambiguity on the institutional framework. 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development 61. The Rural Poverty decreased as shown in the table below. The improvement in rural accessibility, which was partly supported by the project contributed to that reduction. However, the poverty rate started increasing again in 2010 due primarily to the political crisis that started in 2009. On the gender aspect, female population constituted more than half of the rural population benefitting from the project. In addition, about 15,000 women- day were employed to realize the crushed stone works on the RN44.

6 Highly Satisfactory = 6; Satisfactory = 5; Moderately Satisfactory = 4; Moderately Unsatisfactory = 3; Unsatisfactory = 2; Highly Unsatisfactory=1 7 Cost of improving a particular link to basic access standard divided by the number of people served by the link

16

Table 3: Evolution of poverty rate from 1993 to 2010 Year 1993 1997 1999 2001 2002 2004 2005 2010

Urban 50.1 63.2 52.1 44.1 61.6 53.5 52.0 54.2 Rural 74.5 76.0 76.7 77.1 86.4 77.3 73.5 82.2 Total 70.0 73.3 71.3 69.6 80.7 72.1 68.7 76.5

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening 62. The institutional strengthening supported by the project was limited to the provision of technical assistance, analytical works, materials, and equipment to the ministries and agencies working in rural transport. Nevertheless, the project contributed in reinforcing the capacity of the ministries and the Road Authority to deal with environmental and social safeguards. The environment units of these institutions got the capacity to manage the requirements of the safeguards policies and procedures. (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) 63. The availability and affordability of transport services improved as a result of the roads improvement works. In addition, the contracts linked to the road infrastructure works provided jobs to different categories of persons ranging from unskilled worker to newly graduated youth technicians. Furthermore, the capacity of small and medium firms in civil engineering was reinforced with the experience gained in roads rehabilitation financed by the project. 64. Road safety on the RN44 improved considerably with the construction of 10 new two-lane bridges and culvert in place of the old one-lane structures. In addition, air quality improved as a result of the paving of the unpaved section of the RN44 going through two populated localities that had major dust problems before the project. 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops Not applicable for a core ICR 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating8: High 65. The overall risk to development outcome has been evaluated on the basis of the table below:

8 Rating scale: (i) Negligible to Low [L]; (ii) Moderate [M]; (iii) Significant [S]; (iv) High [H]

17

Table 3: Overall Risk to Development Outcome Risk Likelihood Impact

Political instability and uncertainty Since early 2009, Madagascar has undergone a deep political crisis without any successful way out so far. The economy has stalled, income per capita has fallen, insecurity has worsened, and poverty has increased. The situation will continue to worsen unless the crisis is resolved.

S H

Lack of clear and performing institutional framework in rural transport There is often some confusion among the different entities involved in rural transport. There is no clear division of responsibilities between the central ministries, the Regional Directorate of Public Works, the Regions, and the Communes. Different implementation arrangements exist in rural transport operations.

H M

Worsening operational and financial situation of the Road Maintenance Fund Since the beginning of the 2009 political crisis, the fuel levy dedicated to road maintenance is not fully recovered. Even before the crisis, maintenance funding was inadequate. Moreover, the use of the road maintenance funds is not always done in a transparent and efficient manner. The impact is that the rehabilitated infrastructure and the road network will not be maintained correctly and could deteriorate prematurely.

H H

Use of the traditional wooden cartwheels with narrow metal rims It is recognized that this kind of ox-cart, extensively used in the highlands of Madagascar, damages roads due to the use of narrow wheels. However, immediate ban is not possible as the cartwheel issue is complex. They are often owned by low income persons who justify their use by its affordability, availability, endurance, low cost maintenance (puncture free), good brakes, and high clearance.

H S

Inability to reinforce rain barrier In order to protect rural roads against damage during the rainy seasons, several rain barriers were put in place to stop heavy trucks from using the roads after rains. However, they are no longer functioning for several reasons: political crisis, trucks owners and drivers refusal to comply with instructions, lack of authority of the persons or entity in charge of the rain barrier, etc.

H S

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory 66. During preparation, strong analytical on rural poverty was done giving a strong rationale to intervene in rural transport. Furthermore, at the time of preparation, the project was in line with the Government strategies, with the World Bank strategy in the country, and with the other development partners’ contribution. Moreover, the project partly recognized the substantial risk rating of the activities it was supporting. 67. However, considering the weak institutional context and inadequate funding available, the design of the project was overly complex and ambitious since it tried to address a wide gamut of critical issues in rural transport in Madagascar. In addition, the project tried to introduce the concept of Performance Based Contracts (PBCs) for rural road maintenance for the first time in Madagascar with inadequate preparation. Furthermore, the implementation arrangements of the project were inadequate and not ready at approval. More specifically, although the PES was already in place and functioning, it was not the case for the RTU, the Provincial Road

18

Authorities, and the entities in charge of the IMT and the transport infrastructure at community level. This was a major project design flaw which hindered project implementation from the start. (b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 68. The World Bank acted proactively during supervision to restructure the project to respond to both exogenous and endogenous shocks that affected the implementation of the project. More specifically, comprehensive action plans were prepared each time major issues affecting implementation arose. If the defined action plan was not satisfactorily implemented, the project was restructured. Three major restructuring were prepared during implementation (the second one was not submitted for final approval because of the 2009 crisis) to improve project performance and to adapt to the changed circumstances on the ground. The World Bank was innovative in introducing the performance-based approach which was an alternative to deal with a lack of regular maintenance although the Borrower was not able to timely implement it. The World Bank was realistic in undertaking an emergency bridge reconstruction program when road rehabilitation and maintenance were not performing. In fact, bridges require less maintenance than roads, yet their role in ensuring permanent accessibility is more critical due to the nature of the terrain in Madagascar. The World Bank was flexible and focused on the overall development impacts by using the project to follow-up on activities initiated under the TIIP (APL-3) and other development partner funded projects. 69. However, the weaknesses of the M&E framework could have been corrected to more effectively capture all the outputs and outcomes of the project. The revised targets for PDO indicators were reached before the 2nd project restructuring. Furthermore, the ratings in the ISR seemed to be rather optimistic and did not fully reflect the difficulties faced by the project during implementation. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory 70. The combination of a Moderately Unsatisfactory rating at Entry and a Moderately Satisfactory rating during supervision is Moderately Unsatisfactory provided that the outcomes are rated Moderately Unsatisfactory. 5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Unsatisfactory 71. Although a strong commitment was shown during preparation, the Government did not take the necessary actions to properly implement the project. Such actions included: (i) the timely staffing of the Rural Transport Unit; (ii) the updating of the rural transport policy and strategy; (iii) the decentralization of the management of the rural roads network; (iv) the implementation of a least-cost methodology for the design of the rural roads; (v) the appropriate maintenance of the rehabilitated roads; and (iv) the retrenchment of the Southern Railway staff. Moreover, the last minute cancellation of the concession process for the Southern Railway and

19

the Port of Manakara was a setback to all the efforts made to save these two critical pieces of transport infrastructures. Furthermore, there was no synergy between the services and departments dealing with roads infrastructure and those dealing with the other transport sub-sectors leading to a difficult coordination during implementation. Moreover, the concept of spot-improvement was not adopted leading to a much decreased length of rural roads rehabilitated under the project. (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory 72. Several implementing agencies were involved in the project. Each one had its own activities and during a certain period of the project life. The PES was closed for unsatisfactory performance. The newly created association in charge of the IMT component as well as the RTU did not perform well and does not exist anymore. The RRU was closed de facto after the completion of the rural roads rehabilitation. The pilot performance-based works implemented by AGETIPA as well as the transport infrastructure at community level were not realized. Nevertheless, the emergency activities as well as the intervention on the National Roads implemented by the Road Authority were achieved in a reasonable quality standard. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory 73. The combination of an Unsatisfactory rating of the Government and the Moderately Unsatisfactory of the implementing agencies is Moderately Unsatisfactory provided that the outcomes are rated Moderately Unsatisfactory. 6. Lessons Learned 74. Complex project design in a low capacity environment leads to poor implementation and non-attainment of objectives. Major risks and adequate mitigations measures should be comprehensively identified during project preparation. In fact, the Borrower appeared to be almost overwhelmed by the scope of reforms and activities supported by the APL series and so focused only on few ones (setting-up of the central Road Authority, staff retrenchment of the ministries, and rehabilitation of National Roads). This meant that the institutional strengthening of rural road management did not occur, making project implementation problematic. 75. Clear and performing institutional framework is required to be put in place before implementing a rural transport operation. This requirement was not fulfilled leading to a difficult implementation. Moreover, the intermediate means of transportation activities and the community transport infrastructure need the presence of the project at local level to continuously involve the end-users. This was not the case with the project because the decentralization aspect did not take place. 76. Project components/activities should be properly funded to achieve PDOs. The project clearly faced a mismatch between the resources provided and the activities to be funded.

20

This means that robust and realistic cost estimates must be provided during the preparation of projects to avoid funding gaps. 77. The selection of monitorable indicators is essential to monitor the results chain. This will avoid the case where the project activities are still in progress while the direct target values are already reached. In addition, the availability of regular and accurate data on traffic is essential to assess the efficiency of transport project. 78. Implementation of spot improvement maintenance concept. The introduction of the spot improvement concept on rural roads requires careful preparation/advocacy/planning for it to work in the field due to the tendency of road administrations, contractors and consultants to want to fully rehabilitate rural roads. This means that without full ownership of the spot improvement maintenance concept and capacity to implement it, it should not be attempted or should be redefined as a bridges/culvert/drainage works rehabilitation/construction approach. 79. Realistic traffic forecasts and assumptions are critical when assessing the viability of railway and port investments. During preparation, assumptions were made that the provision of fuel to the Fianarantsoa–Manakara area would again be done via the Port of Manakara and the Southern Railway. However, during implementation, the provision of fuel to the area by road trucks from the Port of Toamasina via Antananarivo was firmly established. Without the transport of fuel, the Southern Railway and the Port of Manakara were not commercially viable unless subsidized. 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies See Annex 7 for ICR prepared by the borrower (b) Cofinanciers N/A (c) Other partners and stakeholders N/A

21

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing (a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)

Components

Appraisal Estimate

(USD millions)

Revised Estimate

(USD millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate

(USD millions)

Percentage of

Appraisal

Percentage of Revised

Capacity Building 1.91 8.0 2.56 134 32 Rehabilitation of Rural Transport Infrastructure

62.02 51.0 49.14 79.2 96.4

Maintenance of Rural Road Network 0.46 1.0 0.43 93.5 43

Fianarantsoa–Manakara corridor 9.63 0.49 5.1

Intermediate Means of Transport 5.98 0.15 2.5

Emergency works 20.0 24.71 123.5 Total Baseline Cost 80.0 80.0 77.48 97 97

Physical contingencies 0.00 0.00

Price contingencies 0.00 0.00 Total Project Costs 80.0 80.0 77.48 97 97

Front-end fee PPF Front-end fee IBRD Total financing required 80.0 80.0 77.48 97 97

(b) Financing

Source of Funds

Type of co-financing

Appraisal Estimate

(USD millions)

Revised Estimate

(USD millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate

(USD millions)

Percentage of

Appraisal

Percentage of Revised

International Development Association (IDA)

80.00 80.00 77.48 97 97

Borrower 181.60 0.00 5.48 3

22

Annex 2. Outputs by Component 1. Component 1: Capacity Building for Implementation of Rural Transport Policy and Strategy

• Provision of computers, printers, software and hardware materials, office equipment; and

• Various studies, technical assistance and training including traffic survey. 2. Component 2: Rehabilitation of Rural Transport Infrastructure

• Various studies and technical assistance including those on the Pangalane channel and the

Manakarabe Bridge;

• Rehabilitation of 1346 km of rural roads (less than 50 vehicles per day);

• HIV sensitization along the roads rehabilitation; and

• Rehabilitation of 384 km of National Roads (Routes Nationales, RN) of which 108 km paved:

- 91 km paved on the RN25 between Vohiparara and Irondro;

- 157 km non-paved on the RN1bis between Maintirano and Morafenobe;

- 119 km non-paved on the RN8a between Maintirano and Antsalova; and

- 17 km paved on the RNS30 between Ambanja and Ankify. 3. Component 3: Maintenance of Rural Road Network

• Various studies and technical assistance

4. Component 4: Rehabilitation of the Fianarantsoa–Manakara Corridor

• Various studies and technical assistance

5. Component 5: Promotion of Intermediate Means of Transport

• Various studies, technical assistance, and training;

• Provision of vehicle and equipment to the MITA association;

• Provision of canoes; and

• Provision of ox-carts with pneumatic wheels. 6. Component 6: Emergency works

• Various studies and technical assistance;

• Rehabilitation of 3 bridges on the National Road 13:

- Reconstruction of a 414 meters bridge in the district of Amboasary (PK416+700); the one-lane, 12 spans, metallic bridge was replaced by a prestressed concrete bridge;

23

- Upgrading of 1120 meters of roads from earth to gravel in the district of Amboasary;

- Rehabilitation of a 90 meters metallic bridge in Fanjahira (PK478+100); and

- Reconstruction of a 21 meters bridge in Manatantely (PK482+050); the one-lane metallic bridge was replaced by a two-lane concrete bridge.

• Construction of 10 new structures of which 9 bridges and their approach roads on the RN44South; The total length of the seven meters width concrete structures were 178 meters. They replaced old one-lane structures;

• Resurfacing and paving of about 35 km on the RN44South;

• Construction of 18 river jetties (2 on the RNS5, 5 on the RNS11, 1 on the RNT8, 10 on the RNT12A) for the river ferries;

• 13 localized reinforcement works on the RN25 to repair post-cyclonic damages such as breach, road sink, landslide; and

• Supervision of the reconstruction of the 200 meters Mahajamba bridge on the RN6 which is the main road linking to the North part of Madagascar. A two-lane bridge was constructed in place of the former one lane bridge (the works were financed by the European Union).

24

Table 2-1: Status of objectives and indicators Initial project Restructuring of 2007 Restructuring of 2010 Status

PDO indicators

Traffic on the rehabilitated rural road network increases annually

by 10 percent

10 percent per annum increase in motorized and non-motorized trips on the

rehabilitated rural roads

10 percent per annum increase in motorized and non-motorized trips on the rehabilitated rural

roads

Achieved. Surveys showed that motorized and non-motorized traffic increased more than 10 percent per annum. Baseline: 15.5 vehicles, 38.8 bicycles, and 14.6 carts per day 2008: 50.6 vehicles, 287.8 bicycles, and 28.5 carts per day

Not applicable 20 percent reduction in travel time on the rehabilitated rural

roads

20 percent reduction in travel time on the rehabilitated rural

roads

Achieved. Surveys showed that travel time on the rehabilitated rural roads was reduced by an average of 33 percent, from 5.57 km per minute to 3.73 km per minute

6 million people who currently do not have reliable access will be provided with reliable access

1 million people who currently do not have reliable access will be provided with

reliable access

1,000,000 direct project beneficiaries of which 60 percent

female

Achieved. More than 1 million additional people were provided with reliable access with the rehabilitation of rural roads financed by the project. Statistics showed that already about 1,060,000 additional rural population of which about 640,000 female was provided with reliable access with the rehabilitation of only 1,089 km of rural roads.

Rural well-being indicators such as school attendance and

morbidity will have significantly improved

Dropped

Between 2001 and 2008, surveys showed that school attendance in the project influence zone improved from 69.5 percent to 74.2 percent. However, it cannot be linked to the project only, but mainly to the construction of new schools. The rehabilitated rural roads contributed to the availability of a more frequent transport services, thereby reducing the time spent by teachers to collect their salaries and so decreasing the teacher absentia rate. Between 2001 and 2008, morbidity rate varies from 7.4 percent to 11.9 percent (the observation period was not the same). However, this indicator cannot be directly linked to the project impacts.

Intermediate outcome indicators Component 1: Capacity Building for Implementation of Rural Transport Policy and Strategy

Set-up for the management of the road network functions

satisfactorily

Rural roads unit has been created and is functional

Rural roads unit has been created and is functional

Not achieved. A RRU was created and functional to implement the project. The unit was closed afterwards.

Component 2: Rehabilitation of Rural Transport Infrastructure 9,000 km of rural roads 1500 km of rural roads 1400 km of rural roads 1,346km of rural roads and 383 km of National Roads

25

rehabilitated rehabilitated rehabilitated were rehabilitated. Component 3: Maintenance of Rural Road Network

All rural roads in good and fair condition are maintained in this

condition

80 percent of rehabilitated roads maintained in good and

fair condition

Baseline: 12 percent of rural roads are in good and fair conditions 2012: 30 percent of rural roads including those rehabilitated by the project are in good and fair conditions. 57 percent of the total road network are in good and fair condition

Not applicable

30 percent of the Road Maintenance Fund are allocated to rural roads

maintenance

30 percent of the Road Maintenance Fund are allocated

to rural roads maintenance

Not achieved. 25, 26, 24, 20 percent respectively in 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011

200 km of rural roads are

maintained through performance-based contracts

Dropped No roads work started.

Component 4:Rehabilitation of the Fianarantsoa – Manakara Corridor

Annual freight tonnage and passenger transported by FCE increases from 20,000 tons and 103,000 passengers in 2001 to

50,000 tons and 140,000 passengers

Annual freight tonnage and passenger transported by

FCE increases from 20,000 tons and 103,000 passengers to 50,000 tons and 140,000

passengers

Dropped

Almost no activity was implemented in the corresponding component. 18,707 tons and 167,132 passengers in 2004; 19,269 tons and 207,159 passengers in 2005; 16.260 tons and 175,854 passengers in 2006; The passenger target value was reached although there was no intervention showing the importance of this railway for the rural population accessibility.

Component 5: Promotion of Intermediate Means of Transport Ownership of intermediate means of transport per rural

household will have significantly increased

Dropped Almost no activity was implemented in the corresponding component.

Component 6: Emergency works Not applicable Not applicable 10 bridges rehabilitated More than achieved. 12 bridges rehabilitated. 18 jetties

built. Not applicable Not applicable 15 jetties built

26

Some photos of the realized emergency works on the RN44

Photo 1: A new bridge side by side with the old one

Photo 2: A new concrete bridge in place of a wooden one

Photo 3: Crushed stones road surfacing

Photo 4: Double seal road surfacing

27

Some photos of the realized emergency works on the RN13

Photo 5: The 414 meters bridge before the project

Photo 6: The 414 meters bridge after the project





30

Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis 1. This annex compares what were the efficiency assumptions made during project preparation (before project) and what was the situation after project. (a) Rehabilitation of rural roads 2. For the rehabilitation of rural roads, two efficiency assumptions were made during preparation:

• Least-cost investment to improve each road section to basic access standard was adopted as most of the traffic on the rural roads was less than 50 vehicles per day.

• Selection cycle was done during which road links were ranked according to the cost per population served.

3. However, these efficiency measures were not followed during project implementation:

• Full rehabilitation was realized on all the rural roads. • Road links which were not among the priority list were rehabilitated.

4. As a result of the changed approach during implementation, (i) the cost of the works was double than what was estimated (about US$20,000/km instead of US$10,000/km); (ii) fewer rural roads were improved by the project (about 1,400km instead of about 3,000 km planned); and (iii) no more selection cycle was undertaken since the first round of selected rural roads was not even realized. The rural roads rehabilitation component which constituted about 30 percent of the project amount was not efficient. (b) Rehabilitation of the Fianarantsoa–Manakara corridor 5. This is the only project activity having a cost-benefit analysis during preparation. The Net Present Value, with 10 percent discount rate, was estimated at US$12.5 million for the Southern Railway, and at US$2.5 million for the Port of Manakara. The Economic Internal Return Rate was respectively 15.5 and 33 percent for the Southern Railway and the Port of Manakara. However, this analysis was made on the assumption that the provision of fuel for the region of Fianarantsoa–Manakara would use this corridor. But, since it was not the case (see below), the real potential traffic on this corridor was less than expected. In addition, an ex-ante economic analysis took into account the environmental, social, and agricultural benefits. Financial analysis realized during implementation showed the exploitation of railway corridor requires subsidies estimated at about US$500,000 per year. This component which was not implemented constituted about 12 percent of the project amount at approval. 6. The Southern Railway and the Port of Manakara were constructed during the colonization era to be the main transport infrastructure for international traffic to and from the region of Fianarantsoa and Manakara. During the political crisis of 2002, when the Antananarivo Toamasina corridor was blocked for several months, the Port of Manakara was even used to supply the region of Antananarivo in fuel. But, traffic pattern changed because of the construction and rehabilitation of the road linking the main port of Toamasina with Fianarantsoa and Manakara via the capital Antananarivo combined with the deterioration of the Southern

31

Railway and the Port of Manakara infrastructure. Thus, only short haul domestic traffic remained the main user of the Fianarantsoa Manaraka rail corridor. 7. The supply of fuel of the Fianarantsoa–Manakara area by road from the main Port of Toamasina was cheaper and more reliable although it represented more hazards. Since then, the Southern Railway and the Port of Manakara started losing traffic. These two infrastructures could not be profitable unless the provision of fuel to the region of Fianarantsoa and Manakara is shifted to both of them. The Port of Manakara has been out of business since 2009. The annual traffic volume in 2007 and 2008 were respectively about 2,683 and 1,000 tons. In addition, the dock draught of the Port of Manakara was only about 2.5 meters. International vessels had to anchor in harbor and transship its freight using smaller boats. (c) Road Maintenance Fund 8. A financial forecast of the evolution of the Road Maintenance Fund was done during preparation. This financial forecast estimated the total requirement to appropriately maintain the road network. 9. The actual yearly budgets of the Road Maintenance Fund were more or less equal to the forecasted amounts during preparation. However, all roads in good and fair conditions were not maintained correctly. It means that not only the cost for an adequate maintenance of the road network was underestimated during project preparation, but also the use of the funds was not adequate.

Table 3.1: Estimated and Actual budget of the Road Maintenance Fund (in MGA billion)

Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Estimated 37 43 50.6 58 65.6 73.2 Actual 51 39.6 43.5 58.2 78.1 92.8

Source: PAD and Ministry of Public Works

(d) Rehabilitation and emergency works on the National Roads 10. The rehabilitation/construction on the National Roads did not have an ex-ante cost-benefit analysis when introduced during project implementation. This was because of the unavailability of accurate data on road traffic volumes on the selected sections and the emergency scope of the works that were done. Thus, without available ex-ante cost-benefit analysis data available and without accurate traffic data, it was not also possible to do an ex-post cost-benefit analysis. 11. However, the emergency works implemented after the restructuring of 2010 can be considered efficient because it was possible to realize more infrastructure than appraised. Seven bridges were appraised to be rehabilitated on the RN44 whereas nine bridges and one box-culvert were realized. Fifteen river jetties were appraised to be constructed, whereas eighteen were realized. Neither funds reallocation nor additional financing was needed for this particular scope increase. This was possible due to the drop in bids price as a result of the 2009 crisis. Since the supply of works was higher than the demand, works prices decreased. In fact, the number and

32

capacity of contractors increased before the 2009 crisis as a result of the different infrastructure investment in the country. But, since the beginning of the crisis, infrastructure investment sharply dropped leading to a lower works prices.

33

Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team members

Names Title Unit Responsibility/ Specialty

Lending Supervision/ICR Nina Chee Senior Environmental Specialist MIGES Paul-Jean Feno Senior Environmental Specialist AFTN1 Erwan Fischer Consultant AFTTR Pierre Graftieaux Lead Transport Specialist AFTTR Marc H. Juhel Sector Manager, Transport TWITR

Jean Charles Amon Kra Senior Financial Management Specialist AFTME

Alain L. Labeau Consultant SASFP Sandrika Minah Ateifa Temporary AFCS4 Pierre A. Pozzo di Borgo Principal Investment Officer CN2SI Noroarisoa Rabefaniraka Senior Transport. Spec. AFTTR Francois Marie Maurice Rakotoarimanana

Senior Financial Management Specialist AFTME

Tojoarofenitra Ramanankirahina Transport Specialist AFTTR

Sylvain Auguste Rambeloson Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPE Lydie Anne Billey Program Assistant AFTTR Lantoharifera Ramiliarisoa Team Assistant AFCKE Lova Niaina Ravaoarimino Procurement Specialist AFTPE Dieter E. Schelling Consultant AFTTR Hang N. Sundstrom Language Program Assistant AFTTR

34

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)

Lending FY01 12 72.61 FY02 24 142.75 FY03 6 53.09 FY04 0.00 FY05 0.00 FY06 0.00 FY07 0.00 FY08 0.00

Total: 42 268.45 Supervision/ICR

FY01 0.00 FY02 24 0.00 FY03 3 16.39 FY04 24 69.03 FY05 31 113.76 FY06 39 103.38 FY07 36 75.39 FY08 18 59.89

Total: 175 437.84

35

Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results (if any) Not required for a core ICR

36

Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results (if any) Not required for a core ICR

37

Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and Comments on Draft ICR

Ministry of Public Works and Meteorology / Ministry of Transport Madagascar Rural Transport Project (RTP) – APL2 SUMMARY OF THE COMPLETION REPORT

Preface 1. The preparation of the Rural Transport Project (RTP) was initiated during the implementation of the Adaptable Program Loan (APL) series. The APL series preparation started in 1994. Between 1998 and 2000, the discussion between the World Bank and the Government of Madagascar (GoM) established the following:

• A National Transport Policy, April 2000, and its annexes. These documents were updated and integrated in the Poverty Reduction Strategy of 2003.

• The Bank Assistance Strategy of 2003. 1. Description of the project 1.1. Context 2. The start of the RTP occurred within the 2002 post-election crisis. During the first semester of 2002, this crisis disorganized the public services, decreased the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 13 percent, increased the poverty rate from 69.6 percent in 2001 to 80.7 percent in 2002, and deteriorated transport infrastructure. The crisis ended during the second semester of 2002. A new elected Government was in place. They initiated some socioeconomic measures such as the liberalization of the economic sectors comprising transport. Combined with the resumption of external aids, these measures improved the economic situation. 3. In 2003, the GDP increased by 9.6 percent compared to its value in 2002. The inflation rate stabilized at about 2.7 percent. But this growth was limited to certain sectors and did not impact the rural area where live about 75 percent of the population. One third of this rural population did not have access to basic services such as health, education, and market place because of the lack of reliable transport infrastructure. In 2004, Madagascar suffered from external shocks such as cyclones and the drop of the vanilla prices in the international market. 1.2 Objectives 4. The long-term objective of the entire APL series was to accelerate the poverty reduction by reducing transport cost and by improving accessibility mainly in rural area. The objective of the RTP was to sustainably improve the access of rural population to markets, schools, health centers and other economic and social infrastructure, and to enhance the mobility of the rural population, in order to improve their quality of life and promote economic development. This ambitious objective was revised in 2007 as follows: “increased use of rural roads by residents of beneficiary rural communes”.

38

1.3 Components and institutional arrangements 5. The project had 6 components:

• Capacity building for implementation of rural transport policy and strategy

• Rehabilitation of rural transport infrastructure

• Maintenance of rural road network

• Rehabilitation of the Fianarantsoa–Manakara corridor

• Promotion of intermediate means of transport

• Emergency works 6. From 2003 to 2005, the project was managed by the Vice Prime Minister in charge of the transport sector which was supported by the Program Executive Secretariat (PES). From 2005 to 2012, the project was managed by two ministries (the ministry in charge of public works and the ministry in charge of transport) which were supported by a consortium of private audit firms that ensured the fiduciary function. 2. Evaluation of the project 2.1 Design 7. The design of the RTP that was integrated within the other APL transport projects was relevant with regard to the needs in Madagascar. Improving the accessibility and the mobility of the rural population in order to improve their quality of life and to boost economic development was a priority. In 2003, the transport sector reform was in progress and the PES was temporary in charge of the implementation while the capacity of the different technical units and executing agencies was being built. 8. The lack of capacity of the private sector, particularly the contractors and engineering firms, was one of the major risks. In addition, the risk that other donors’ financing of the rural road rehabilitation was not forthcoming did materialize. Furthermore, the assumption that all rehabilitated roads would be regularly maintained by the Government via the Road Maintenance Fund (RMF) was not realistic. The RMF as well as the local collectivities did not have the required financing to ensure the regular maintenance of the roads in good and fair conditions. Finally, the objective to improve the well-being of rural population was too ambitious. This objective was dropped during the 2007 restructuring. 2.2 Achievement 9. The table below summarized the achievements of the project.

39

Table 7.1: Project Achievement Planned Realized

Capacity building for implementation of rural transport policy and strategy

An effective policy and strategy for rural transport is implemented.

An effective policy and strategy for rural transport as well as a functioning mechanism for the management of the rural roads are not in place. This failure originated to some extent outside the project because of the lack of progress in the overall decentralization process in Madagascar

A mechanism for the management of rural roads is in place and well-functioning.

Rehabilitation of rural roads 10 percent annual traffic increase on the rehabilitated roads.

Traffic increased by 10 percent on the rehabilitated roads.

Rehabilitation of 1,500 km (initially 9,000 km) of rural roads.

About 1,350 km rural roads were rehabilitated. This was due to the higher cost than planned as a result of the design change (full rehabilitation instead of the basic access standard) and the poor performance of contractors and engineering firms.

Maintenance of rural roads 80 percent (initially 100 percent) of rural roads in good and fair condition are maintained in this condition.

About 30 percent of rural road network are in good and fair conditions

At least 30 percent of the resources of the Road Maintenance Fund (RMF) are allocated to rural roads.

The resources of the RMF allocated to the rural roads are a little below 30 percent. The fuel levy that should increase from 7 to 10 percent did not change.

Rehabilitation of the Fianarantsoa–Manakara corridor

Successful concessionning of the Southern Railway and the Port of Manakara

The financial terms proposed by the unique bidder having fulfilled the technical requirements were not satisfactory. The concessionning did not take place.

Traffic freight increased from 20,000 to 50,000 Tons

Traffic freight decreased to 14.688 Tons due to the lack of rehabilitation

Passengers traffic increased from 103,000 to 140,000

Passengers traffic increased to 143,015 although no rehabilitation was undertaken and there was less movement of trains than expected

Promotion of intermediate means of transport Increased ownership of intermediate means of transport

Ownership increased as a result of the information and sensitization campaigns financed by the project

Increased use of intermediate means of transport Not realized Emergency works

Preservation of the key transport infrastructure Key transport infrastructure was preserved thanks to the project and the intervention of other on-going projects and development partners

10 bridges rehabilitated Realized 15 river jetties constructed Realized

40

2.3 Coordination and project management 10. The PES, which was the first main implementing agency of the project, had an extended scope of responsibilities. Thus, its accountability was clear, leading to a better institutional coordination. After the closure of the PES, each implementing unit had a limited scope of responsibilities that required a stronger coordination. Because 2 ministries were involved after the division of the Vice Prime Minister in charge of transport, coordination and project management became more difficult. 11. The following lessons can be drawn:

• The capacity of the central ministries should be reinforced so that they are able to properly manage complex projects;

• The adverse impacts of sector reform should be mitigated so that the central ministries always have the required capacity to manage complex projects; and

• The coordination arrangement of a project should be formally structured. 2.4 Other project impacts 12. Although the ministries and the different implementing agencies had at the beginning some difficulties to comply with the Bank safeguards, their capacity finally improved and so they were able to fulfill the requirements of the policies and procedures. 3. Critical analyses of the project stakeholders. 3.1 The Bank 13. The Bank decision to finance 100 percent of all project expenses allowed avoiding the severe issue of counterpart funding. However, the restriction resulting from the application of the OP/BP 7.30 has slowed implementation pace. The procedures and process to interact with the Bank remained unchanged all along the project life despite the different changes of Bank staff. However, the style of leadership and interaction varies from one Bank staff to another. Initially, supervision mission took place twice a year. Later on, supervision mission became more frequent but less heavy. The lesson learned from the collaboration with the Bank is the following: a working relationship based on a mutual trust and a clear share of responsibilities is conducive to better results. 3.2 The Government 14. Because there was no formal interface structure at the highest level of the project management (General Secretaries of the ministries), the project suffered from the frequent change of high-level decision-makers persons. Moreover, the setting-up of certain project structures such as the rural transport unit which became a rural roads unit afterwards was quite slow. It was also the case for the supporting functions such as monitoring and evaluation and safeguards. Finally, the spilt of the Vice Prime Minister into two ministries and the impacts of the crisis of 2002 and 2009 made the project implementation more difficult. The lesson learned

41

from this is as follow: steady strong ownership on the Government side is necessary to appropriately implement a project. 3.3 The private sector 15. The performance of the private sector involved in the project implementation (mainly contractors and engineering firms) was mixed. Some contractors and firms did correctly their jobs whereas other did not. Sometimes, their performance depended on the ability of the Government and the Bank to ensure their role respectively as project owner and project financier. 4. Prospects 16. Reform. The restructuring of the ministries in charge of transport was effective and advanced. Some adjustment might however have to be considered. Nevertheless, the institutional arrangements in the rural transport subsector still required some reorganization and capacity building. 17. Operations. The realized transport infrastructure rehabilitation was generally in a good standard. Nonetheless, some failure was seen in the rural roads rehabilitation. 18. Budget. The lack of funds remained a deep problem. Most of the investment was externally funded. The Government did not have enough resource to invest in transport infrastructure. But, a good intervention planning and programming is critical. A good resource allocation between National Roads and rural roads is necessary. 5. Conclusion 19. The RTP initial design was largely relevant and the project components were comprehensive. However, some pertinent activities were dropped for different reasons. The restructuring of the ministries as part of the transport sector reform had also some adverse consequences that impacted the project implementation. Moreover, there was sometimes some misunderstanding between the Bank and the Government particularly during activity prioritization at project restructuring. Finally, an operational project focal point is essential to coordinate the different institutions and players involved in a project.

42

Ministry of Public Works and Meteorology / Ministry of Transport Madagascar Rural Transport Project (RTP) – APL2

COMMENTS ON THE WORLD BANK ICR OF NOVEMBER 2013 1. General considerations 1.1 Understanding of the report The World Bank Implementation Completion Report (ICR) is in English and follows a formalized template. Although the ICR was largely disclosed, a certain familiarities with the project and the different concepts mentioned in the document are needed to fully understand it. 1.2 Preparation of the report The processes used to prepare the ICR including the Government completion report, were inclusive despite that several persons and entities involved during project preparation could not be reached. The ICR is well-written, concise, and seems objective. 2. Reference and results framework 2.1 Relevance and continuity The ICR indicates the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) and the initial results framework were complex but in line with the Government’ strategy and needs. However, the Government staff and technicians did not get enough exposure during the restructuring of 2007 and particularly of 2010. In addition, the results framework was not considered as management and decision-making tools. 2.2 Project Development Objective (PDO) The three PDO indicators used in the ICR (Datasheet, Section F-a) are different from the ones used in the last five supervision aide-memoires. 3. Description, analysis, and evaluation 3.1 Project Appraisal Document (PAD) The author of the ICR emphasizes the data and studies problems of the PAD which could have supported the situation before project. The attainment of the project objectives and the assumptions made during project implementation were not satisfactory (Datasheet, Section H). 3.2 Explanations of the gaps and modifications The gaps between the targets and actual values are relatively well explained. There are however some exceptions such as the determination of the 1 million beneficiaries during the 2007

43

restructuring, the decision to do a full rehabilitation instead of the least-cost basic access standard (Section 2-2, Paragraph 31), the overarching impacts (Section 3-5-a), etc. 3.3 Restructuring process The different restructurings of the project are well described. However, the ICR could have discussed more the activities which were not retained. These activities which included the Fianarantsoa Manakara corridor as well as the water transport on the Pangalanes channel were relevant to improve the accessibility of isolated rural areas. 3.4 Fianarantsoa Manakara corridor It could have been better to do some hierarchy on the reasons why this component was dropped: Lack of economic viability, concessionning conditions of the Fianarantsoa-Manakara railway and the Port of Manakara, economic context of the fuel transportation, and Internal Rate of Return vis-à-vis of the opportunity cost of capital (Annex 3-b), etc. 3.5 Performance rating The overall Government rating including the implementing agencies is not satisfactory. It could have been more relevant to analyze the performance taking into account the different assumptions and risks which were not appropriately captured since the beginning of the project, particularly on the institutional and budgetary aspects. 4. Lessons and conclusion The lessons are well formulated. But there is no evaluation of the overall Transport Sector Program (Section 1-1). Given that the RTP was the latest project, a brief evaluation of the overall program could have been done to take stock of the actual values of the program indicators such as the accessibility and the transport costs. It could have also indicated the contribution of the overall program to the poverty reduction as well as the sustainability of the sector achievements.

44

Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders No comment has been received.

45

Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents Bank Documents

• Madagascar CAS – January 17, 1997

• Madagascar interim CAS – October 23, 2002

• Madagascar Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper – November 2002

• Madagascar CAS – October 20, 2003

• Madagascar Interim Strategy Note – December 28, 2011

• Project Appraisal Document – October 22, 2002

• Financing agreements

• Restructuring Papers

• Project Papers

• ISR number 1 to 26

• Aide Memoires Other

• Final report on the rehabilitation of the Southern Railway financed by the USAID – 2003

• Southern Railway technical and financial viability analysis – Benoit Allix & Gerard Rigaud – September 2007

• Audit report on the rehabilitation of rural roads – Bernard Fournet – November 2004

• Studies reports on the Intermediate Means of Transport – NGO Lalana

• Promoting Intermediate Means of Transport – SSATP Working Paper 20 – October 1996

• Local Transport Solutions – SSATP Working Paper 56 – May 2001

• Design and Appraisal of Rural Transport Infrastructure – World Bank Technical Paper 496

• Rural Access Index – World Bank Transport Paper 10 – March 2006

46

Annex 10: Additional information on safeguards 1. Initially, the Rural Transport Project (RTP) was designed to finance the rehabilitation of existing rural roads (provincial roads), the Southern Railway (Fianarantsoa Cote Est, FCE), and the Port of Manakara. The environmental category of the RTP was “A”. The list of potential rural roads was defined before appraisal and considered like “first year investments”. For the FCE and the Port of Manakara, the civil works studies and the viability study were in early stage. The activities were considered as “second year investments”. 2. Before appraisal, a Resettlement Policy Framework and full Environmental and social Impact Assessments (ESIA) were carried out for all planned rural roads identified as “first year investments”, and an Environmental and Social Management Framework for any new rural roads identified later. These safeguard instruments were disclosed in the country and to Infoshop before appraisal. 3. An Environmental Audit was conducted two years after project launch to review the implementation of safeguard measures on the rehabilitated rural roads. Mitigation measures were identified to reduce the subprojects impacts and to ensure the compliance with the agreed Environmental Management Plan. These measures were implemented in a satisfactory manner by local Non-Governmental Organizations. 4. An Environmental Audit for the FCE and the Port of Manakara, and the corresponding Resettlement Action Plan were available and disclosed in the country. These safeguard tools were not implemented after the project restructuring that cancelled the Southern Railway and the Port of Manakara component. 5. Environmental and social studies were prepared for the rehabilitation on existing National Roads (Routes Nationales, RN), mainly RN25, RN44South, and bridges on RN13. The studies that were in a satisfactory quality were disclosed in their respective project zones. The environmental and social impacts were mitigated in a satisfactory manner as a result of the developed guidelines and the correct implementation of the environmental and social management plans. 6. Moreover, the project contributed to strengthen the environmental unit of the Road Authority as well as the Ministry of Public Works. These units had an operational environmental and social manual to ensure consideration of safeguard dimensions within the project cycle (design, implementation, and monitoring). Both units were very active in reviewing the subproject safeguard documents and monitoring in an acceptable manner their implementation by the contractors during the works execution. 7. In addition to the environmental and social aspects of the project, an HIV-AIDS program was also carried out by the Government, through a Non-Governmental Organization, to sensitize the contractors’ employees and the local population living along the rehabilitated roads.

VatomandryVatomandry

MahanoroMahanoro

VarikaVarika

MananjaryMananjary

TsivoryTsivory

BeraketeBerakete

BelohaBeloha

BetrokaBetroka

ManjaManja

MandabeMandabe

MorombeMorombe

AnkazoaboAnkazoabo

BerorohaBeroroha

SakarahaSakaraha

BetiokyBetioky

AndrokaAndroka

AmpanihyAmpanihy

Midongy-Midongy-AtsimoAtsimo

AmbohimahasoaAmbohimahasoa

AntalahaAntalaha

MaroantsetraMaroantsetra

MananaraMananara

MoramangaMoramanga

AntanifotsyAntanifotsy

Ambatofinan-Ambatofinan-drahanadrahana

MiandrivazoMiandrivazo

MalaimbandyMalaimbandy

Belo TsiribihinaBelo Tsiribihina

AndilanatobyAndilanatoby

AndilamenaAndilamena Soanierana-IvongoSoanierana-Ivongo

AndriamenaAndriamena

SoalalaSoalala

BesalampyBesalampy

AntsalovaAntsalova

KandrehoKandreho

AnkazobeAnkazobe

VohimarinaVohimarina

AmbilobeAmbilobe

MandritsaraMandritsaraMampikonyMampikony

BefandrianaBefandriana

BealananaBealanana

AmbanjaAmbanja

AmboasaryAmboasary

ToamasinaToamasina

AmbatondrazakaAmbatondrazaka

AntsirananaAntsiranana

MahajangaMahajanga

ToliaraToliara

FianarantsoaFianarantsoa

ManakaraManakara

FarafanganaFarafangana

AntsirabeAntsirabe

MorondavaMorondava

MiarinarivoMiarinarivoTsiroanomandidyTsiroanomandidy

SambavaSambava

AntsohihyAntsohihy

TolanaroTolanaroAmbovombeAmbovombe

IhosyIhosy

MaevatananaMaevatanana

AmbositraAmbositra

MaintiranoMaintirano

Fenoarivo-AtsinananaFenoarivo-Atsinanana

ANTANANARIVOANTANANARIVO

DIANADIANA

SAVASAVA

SOFIASOFIA

ANALANJIROFOANALANJIROFOBOÉNYBOÉNY

BETSIBOKABETSIBOKA

ANALAMANGAANALAMANGABONGOLAVABONGOLAVA

ITASYITASY

MELAKYMELAKYALAOTRAALAOTRA

MANGOROMANGORO

ATSINANANAATSINANANA

AMORON’I MANIAAMORON’I MANIA

HAUTE-MATSIATRAHAUTE-MATSIATRA

IHOROMBEIHOROMBEATSIMO-ATSIMO-

ANDREFANAANDREFANA

ANOSYANOSY

ANDROYANDROY

ATSIMO-ATSIMO-ATSINANANAATSINANANA

MENABEMENABE

VATOVAVY-VATOVAVY-FITOVINANYFITOVINANY

VAKINANKARATRAVAKINANKARATRA

MayotteMayotte(France)(France)

Ank

arat

a

Massi fMassi fTsaratananaTsaratanana

Androy Plateau

Cli

f f o

f A

ng

av

o

Cl i

f f o

f B o n g o l a

v a

MaromokotroMaromokotro(2,876 m)(2,876 m)

Pic BobyPic Boby(2,658 m)(2,658 m)

TsiafajovonaTsiafajovona(2,642 m)(2,642 m) Vatomandry

Mahanoro

Varika

Mananjary

Tsivory

Berakete

Beloha

Betroka

Manja

Mandabe

Morombe

Ankazoabo

Beroroha

Sakaraha

Betioky

Androka

Ampanihy

Midongy-Atsimo

Ambohimahasoa

Antalaha

Maroantsetra

Mananara

Moramanga

Antanifotsy

Ambatofinan-drahana

Miandrivazo

Malaimbandy

Belo Tsiribihina

Andilanatoby

Andilamena Soanierana-Ivongo

Andriamena

Soalala

Besalampy

Antsalova

Kandreho

Ankazobe

Vohimarina

Ambilobe

MandritsaraMampikony

Befandriana

Bealanana

Ambanja

Amboasary

Toamasina

Ambatondrazaka

Antsiranana

Mahajanga

Toliara

Fianarantsoa

Manakara

Farafangana

Antsirabe

Morondava

MiarinarivoTsiroanomandidy

Sambava

Antsohihy

TolanaroAmbovombe

Ihosy

Maevatanana

Ambositra

Maintirano

Fenoarivo-Atsinanana

ANTANANARIVO

DIANA

SAVA

SOFIA

ANALANJIROFOBOÉNY

BETSIBOKA

ANALAMANGABONGOLAVA

ITASY

MELAKYALAOTRA

MANGORO

ATSINANANA

AMORON’I MANIA

HAUTE-MATSIATRA

IHOROMBEATSIMO-

ANDREFANA

ANOSY

ANDROY

ATSIMO-ATSINANANA

MENABE

VATOVAVY-FITOVINANY

VAKINANKARATRA

Mayotte(France)

Mah

avav

y

Betsiboka

Bemarivo Sofia

LakeAlaotra

Mangoro Mania

Tsiribihina

Mananara

Onilahy

Man

drar

e

Mangoky

Fihere

nana

Menarand

ra

Manambaho

Mahajamba

I N D I A N

O C E A N

Mo z a m

b i q u e C

h a n n e l

Ank

arat

a

Massi fTsaratanana

Androy Plateau

Cli

f f o

f A

ng

av

o

Cl i

f f o

f B o n g o l a

v a

Maromokotro(2,876 m)

Pic Boby(2,658 m)

Tsiafajovona(2,642 m)

45°E 50°E

50°E

45°E

25°S

20°S

15°S

20°S

15°S

MADAGASCAR

0 40 80 120 160

0 120 Miles8040

200 Kilometers

IBRD 40365

SEPTEMBER 2013

MADAGASCARRURAL TRANSPORT

APL2CITIES AND TOWNS

REGION CAPITALS

NATIONAL CAPITAL

RIVERS

MAIN ROADS

RAILROADS

REGION BOUNDARIES

This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank.The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other informationshown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World BankGroup, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or anyendorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.

GSDPMMap Design Unit

Document of The World Bank · 2016. 7. 13. · Rural and Inter-Urban Roads and Highways 81 95 ....

Documents

Transcript of Document of The World Bank · 2016. 7. 13. · Rural and Inter-Urban Roads and Highways 81 95 ....