COMPILATION OF CASE DOCTRINES (DISINI OUTLINE, PAGE 2&3)

Disclaimer: I may not have identified the issue/doctrine properly. When in doubt, go orig Chadd C.

Collegio de San Juan de Letran v. Assn. Of Employees, etc. 340 SCRA

587 (00)

Admittedly, management has the prerogative to discipline its employees for insubordination. But when the exercise of such management right tends to interfere with the employees' right to self-organization, it amounts to union-busting and is therefore a prohibited act. The dismissal of Ms. Ambas was clearly designed to frustrate the Union in its desire to forge a new CBA with the College that is reflective of the true wishes and aspirations of the Union members. Her dismissal was merely a subterfuge to get rid of her, which smacks of a pre-conceived plan to oust her from the premises of the College. It has the effect of busting the Union, stripping it of its strong-willed leadership. When management refused to treat the charge of insubordination as a grievance within the scope of the Grievance Machinery, the action of the College in finally dismissing her from the service became arbitrary, capricious and whimsical, and therefore violated Ms. Ambas' right to due process.

San Miguel Brewery etc. v. Ople, 170 SCRA 25 (89)

Every business enterprise endeavors to increase its profits. In the process, it may adopt or devise means designed towards that goal. In Abott Laboratories vs. NLRC, 164 SCRA 713, We ruled:"x x x Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of the employsee, it must also protect the right of an employer to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives. The free will of management to conduct its own business affairs to achieve its purpose cannot be denied."So long as a company's management prerogatives are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements, this Court will uphold them (LVN Pictures Workers vs. LVN, 35 SCRA 147; Phil. American Embroideries vs. Embroidery and Garment Workers, 26 SCRA 634; Phil. Refining Co. vs. Garcia, 18 SCRA 110). San Miguel Corporation's offer to compensate the members of its sales force who will be adversely affected by the implementation of the CDS, by paying them a so-called" back adjustment commission" to make up for the commissions they might lose as a result of the CDS, proves the company's good faith and lack of intention to bust their union.

Central Pangasinan Electric Corp. Inc. v. NLRC, 528 SCRA 146 (07)

[citing Central Pang. V. Macaraeg] It is not material that they did not “misappropriate any amount of money, nor incur any shortage relative to the funds in their possession.” The basic premise for dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence is that the employees concerned hold positions of trust.  The betrayal of this trust is the essence of the offence for which an employee is penalized.

Marival Trading Inc. v. NLRC, 525 SCRA 208 (07)

However, as discussed above, in order to consider it a serious misconduct that would justify dismissal under the law, it must have been done in relation to the performance of her duties as would show her unfit to continue working for her employer.  The acts complained of, under the circumstances they were done, did not in any way pertain to her duties as chemist/quality controller.

Associated Labor Union v. NLRC, 302 SCRA 708 (99) 714-716

There is no question that the employer has the inherent right to discipline, including that of dismissing its employees for just causes.  This right is, however, subject to reasonable regulation by the State in the exercise of its police power. The finding of the NLRC that an employee violated the company rules and regulations is subject to scrutiny by the Court to determine if the dismissal is justified and, if so, whether the penalty imposed is commensurate to the gravity of his offense.In this case, we agree with the Labor Arbiter that dismissal would not be proportionate to the gravity of the offense committed by petitioner considering the value of the articles he pilfered  and the fact that he had no previous derogatory record during his two (2) years of employment in the company.  The Labor Arbiter is certainly mistaken in regarding the articles taken to be mere scraps and hence without value to the company.  They were of some value but not enough to warrant dismissal.

Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. Inc. v. NLRC, 303 SCRA 9 (99)

Dismissal is the ultimate penalty that can be meted to an employee. Where a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may have been committed by the worker ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe such as dismissal from employment. For, the Constitution guarantees the right of workers to “security of tenure.” The misery and pain attendant to the loss of jobs then could be avoided if there be acceptance of the view that under certain circumstances of the case the workers should not be deprived of their means of livelihood.

Philips Semiconductors etc., Fadriquela, 427 SCRA 408 (04)(Doctrinal case, cites PLDT v. NLRC doctrin above, among other points)

Central Pangasinan Elec. Corp. v. Macaraeg, 395 SCRA 720 (03)It is not material that they did not “misappropriate any amount of money, nor incur any shortage relative to the funds in their possession.” The basic premise for dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence is that the employees concerned hold positions of trust.  The betrayal of this trust is the essence of the offence for which an employee is penalized. In the case at bar, the respondents held positions of utmost trust and confidence.  As teller and cashier, respectively, they are expected to possess a high degree of fidelity.  They are entrusted with a considerable amount of cash.  Respondent de Vera accepted payments from petitioner’s consumers while respondent Macaraeg received remittances for deposit at petitioner’s bank.  They did not live up to their duties and obligations.

Golden Thread Knitting Industries, Inc. v. NLRC, 304 SeRA 568 (99)Dismissal is the ultimate penalty that can be meted to an employee.   It must therefore be based on a clear and not on an ambiguous or ambivalent ground. From our assessment of the records, we find that petitioners exercised their authority to  dismiss without due regard to the

pertinent exacting provisions of the Labor Code.   The right to terminate should be utilized with extreme caution because its immediate effect is to put an end to an employee's present means of livelihood while its distant effect, upon a subsequent finding of illegal dismissal, is just as pernicious to the employer who will most likely  be  required  to  reinstate  the  subject employee and grant him full back wages and other benefits.

Cebu Filveneer Corp. v. NLRC, 286 SCRA 556 (98)In labor-management relations, there can be no higher penalty than dismissal from employment.   Dismissal severs employment ties and could well be the economic  death sentence of an employee.  Dismissal prejudices the socio-economic well being of the employee's family and threatens the industrial peace.  Due to its far reaching implications, our Labor Code decrees that an employee cannot be dismissed, except for the most serious causes.   The overly concern of our laws for the welfare of employees is in accord with the social justice philosophy of our Constitution.

Salvador v. Phil. Mining Service Corp., 395 SCRA 729 (03)To be sure, length of service is taken into consideration in imposing the penalty to be meted an erring employee.  However, the case at bar involves dishonesty and pilferage by petitioner which resulted in respondent’s loss of confidence in him.  Unlike other just causes for dismissal, trust in an employee, once lost is difficult, if not impossible, to regain.  Moreover, petitioner was not an ordinary rank-and-file employee.  He occupied a high position of responsibility. As foreman and shift boss, he had over-all control of the care, supervision and operations of respondent’s entire plant.  It cannot be over-emphasized that there is no substitute for honesty for sensitive positions which call for utmost trust.  Fairness dictates that respondent should not be allowed to continue with the employment of petitioner who has breached the confidence reposed on him.  As a general rule, employers are allowed wider latitude of discretion in terminating the employment of managerial employees as they perform functions which require the employer’s full trust and confidence.

Caoile v. NLRC, 299 SCRA 76 (98)Now it must be noted the recent decisions of this Court has distinguished the treatment of managerial employees from that of rank-and-file personnel, insofar as the application of the doctrine of loss of trust and confidence is concerned.  Thus with respect to rank-and-file personnel, loss of trust and confidence as ground for valid dismissal requires proof of involvement in the alleged events in question, and that mere uncorroborated assertion and accusations by the employer will not be sufficient. But, as regards as a managerial employee, mere existence of a basis for believing that such employee has breached the trust of his employer would suffice for his dismissal. Hence, in the case of managerial employees, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required, it being sufficient that there is some basis for such loss of confidence, such as when the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee concerned is responsible for the purported misconduct, and the nature of his participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position.

Habana v. NLRC, 298 SCRA 537 (98)Voluntary resignation is defined as the voluntary act of an employee who "finds himself in a situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service and he has no

other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment." 35 In this case, as indicated in the various memoranda he received from his superiors, petitioner was clearly having trouble performing his job, one which undeniably carries immense responsibilities. Notable too was petitioner's failure to see eye with his immediate bosses, first, Mr. Yokoo and then Mr. Okawa. Because of these difficulties, it was quite reasonable for petitioner to think of, and eventually, relinquishing his position voluntarily (and get a fat sum as severance pay in the bargain) instead of waiting to be fired.

BMG Records (Phil.) Inc. v. Aparecio, 532 SCRA 300 (07)Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and one has no other choice but to dissociate oneself from employment. It is a formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an office, with the intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by the act of relinquishment. As the intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment, the acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered in determining whether in fact, he or she intended to sever from his or her employment.

Azcor Manufacturing Inc. v. NLRC, 303 SCRA 26 (99)To constitute a resignation, it must be unconditional and with the intent to operate as such.  There must be an intention to relinquish a portion of the term of office accompanied by an act of relinquishment.

Metro Transit Organization Inc. v. NRLC, 284 SCRA 308 (98)Evidently the complainant was asked to make a choice whether to tender his resignation or be terminated for his absences which to our mind is anchored on justifiable grounds. Such compulsion to make an unnecessary choice placed undue and unjustifiable pressure on the employee who otherwise would not have thought of leaving his position as Station Teller if he had not been induced to do so. This being the case, the resignation filed by the complainant did not become effective.

Globe Telecom v. Crisologo, 329 SCRA 811 (07)Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who finds herself in a situation where she believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service and that she has no other choice but to disassociate herself from employment.49 Employees resign for various reasons. A big salary is certainly no hindrance to a voluntary cessation of employment. Human resource studies reveal that various factors (in and out of the workplace) affect an employee�s employment decision.50 In this instance, respondent would have suffered a miscarriage had she continued to work. She obviously resigned for the sake of her child's well-being, motherhood clearly taking precedence over her job.

Vicente v. CA 531 SCRA 244 (07) In voluntary resignation, the employee is compelled by personal reason(s) to disassociate himself from employment.  It is done with the intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act of abandonment.  To determine whether the employee indeed intended to relinquish such employment, the act of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered.

Phil. Wireless Inc. v. NLRC, 310 SCRA 653 (99)

The Court has held that constructive dismissal is “an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank and/or a diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee.” In this particular case, respondent voluntarily resigned from his employment.  He was not pressured into resigning.Voluntary resignation is defined as the  act of an employee who “finds himself  in  a  situation  where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service and he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment.

Pascua v. NLRC, 287 SCRA 554 (98)Basic is the doctrine that resignation must be voluntary and made with the intention of relinquishing the office, accompanied with an act of relinquishment. 30 Based on the evidence on record, we are more than convinced that Petitioners Lilia Pascua, Mimi Macanlalay, Susan C. De Castro and Violeta Soriano did not voluntarily quit their jobs. Rather, they were forced to resign or were summarily dismissed without just cause. Petitioners � except Victoria L. Santos � forthwith took steps to protest their layoff and thus cannot, by any logic, be said to have abandoned their work.

Azcor Manufacturing Inc. v. NLRC, 303 SCRA 26 (99) [supra]

Valdez v. NLRC, 286 SCRA 87 (98)Resignation is defined as the voluntary act of an employee who finds himself in a situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and, that he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment. Resignation is a formal pronouncement of relinquishment of an office. It must be made with the intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by an act of relinquishment. 10 The cardinal rule in termination cases is that the employer bears the burden of proof to show that the dismissal is for just cause, failing in which it would mean that the dismissal is not justified. 11 This rule applies adversely against herein respondent company since it has utterly failed to discharge that onus by the requisite quantum of evidence.

BMG Records Phil. Inc. v. Aparecio, 532 SCRA 300 (07)[supra] … the acceptance by petitioners of Aparecio's resignation rendered the same effective.[31] Upon such acceptance, it may not be unilaterally withdrawn without the consent of petitioners.[32] When the employee later signified the intention of continuing his or her work, it was already up to the employer to accept the withdrawal of his or her resignation. The mere fact that the withdrawal was not accepted does not constitute illegal dismissal, the acceptance of the withdrawal of the resignation being the employer's sole prerogative.

Manila Broadcasting Co. v. NLRC, 294 SCRA 486 (98)What is involved in this case is an unwritten company policy considering any employee who files a certificate of candidacy for any elective or local office as resigned from the company. Although §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 does not require mass media commentators and announcers such as

private respondent to resign from their radio or TV stations but only to go on leave for the duration of the campaign period, we think that the company may nevertheless validly require them to resign as a matter of policy. In this case, the policy is justified on the following grounds:Working for the government and the company at the same time is clearly disadvantageous and prejudicial to the rights and interest not only of the company but the public as well. In the event an employee wins in an election, he cannot fully serve, as he is expected to do, the interest of his employer. The employee has to serve two (2) employers, obviously detrimental to the interest of both the government and the private employer.In the event the employee loses in the election, the impartiality and cold neutrality of an employee as broadcast personality is suspect, thus readily eroding and adversely affecting the confidence and trust of the listening public to employer's station.

Phil. Long Distance Telephone Co. Inc. v. Balbastro, 519 SCRA 233 (07)As petitioner stated in its pleadings, it is a telecommunication service company which provides the country with various telecommunication services and facilities. Its operations are a vital part to many transactions all over the country and abroad, and private respondent was one of its telephone operators who used to connect all these calls. Thus, her patent abuse of her sick leave privileges is detrimental to petitioner�s business.While it is true that compassion and human consideration should guide the disposition of cases involving termination of employment since it affects one's source or means of livelihood, it should not be overlooked that the benefits accorded to labor do not include compelling an employer to retain the services of an employee who has been shown to be a gross liability to the employer. The law in protecting the rights of the employees authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer.33 It should be made clear that when the law tilts the scale of justice in favor of labor, it is but a recognition of the inherent economic inequality between labor and management. The intent is to balance the scale of justice; to put the two parties on relatively equal positions. There may be cases where the circumstances warrant favoring labor over the interests of management but never should the scale be so tilted if the result is an injustice to the employer. Justitia nemini neganda est (Justice is to be denied to none).

Gutierrez v. Singer Sewing Machine Co./ 411 SCRA 512 (03)The penalty imposed on the erring employee ought to be proportionate to the offense, taking into account its nature and surrounding circumstances.  In the application of labor laws, the courts and other agencies of the government are guided by the social justice mandate in our fundamental law.  To be lawful, the cause for termination must be a serious and grave malfeasance to justify the deprivation of a means of livelihood. This is merely in keeping with the spirit of our Constitution and laws which lean over backwards in favor of the working class, and mandate that every doubt must be resolved in their favor.

Manila Trading and Supply Co./ Inc. v. Zulueta, 69 Phil. 485 (40) 486-487an employer cannot legally be compelled to continue with employment of a person who admittedly was guilty of misfeasance or malfeasance towards his employer, and whose continuance in the service of the latter is patently inimical to his interests. The law, in protecting the rights of the

laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. There may, of course, be cases where the suspension or dismissal of an employee is whimsical or unjustified or otherwise illegal in which case he will be protected. Each case will be scrutinized carefully and the proper authorities will go to the core of the controversy and not close their eyes to the real situation. This is not however the case here.

Agabon v. NLRC, 442 SCRA 573 (04)An employee who is clearly guilty of conduct violative of Article 282 should not be protected by the Social Justice Clause of the Constitution. Social justice, as the term suggests, should be used only to correct an injustice. As the eminent Justice Jose P. Laurel observed, social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.”

PLDT v. Tolentino, 438 SCRA 555 (04)Well-entrenched is the rule that an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement as a matter of right.  Over the years, however, the case law developed that where reinstatement is not feasible, expedient or practical, as where reinstatement would only exacerbate the tension and strained relations between the parties, or where relationship between the employer and employee has been unduly strained by reason of their irreconcilable differences, particularly where the illegally dismissed employee held a managerial or key position in the company, it would be more prudent to order payment of separation pay instead of reinstatement.  Some unscrupulous employers, however, have taken advantage of the overgrowth of this doctrine of “strained relations” by using it as a cover to get rid of its employees and thus defeat their right to job security.To protect labor’s security of tenure, we emphasize that the doctrine of “strained relations” should be strictly applied so as not to deprive an illegally dismissed employee of his right to reinstatement.  Every labor dispute almost always results in “strained relations” and the phrase cannot be given an overarching interpretation, otherwise, an unjustly dismissed employee can never be reinstated.

Perez v. Medical City General Hospital, 484 SCRA 138 (06)The power to dismiss an employee is a recognized prerogative that is inherent in the employer�s right to freely manage and regulate his business. An employer cannot be expected to retain an employee whose lack of morals, respect and loyalty to his employer or regard for his employer�s rules and appreciation of the dignity and responsibility of his office has so plainly and completely been bared. An employer may not be compelled to continue to employ a person whose continuance in service will patently be inimical to his interest. The dismissal of an employee, in a way, is a measure of self-protection. Nevertheless, whatever acknowledged right the employer has to discipline his employee, it is still subject to reasonable regulation by the State in the exercise of its police power.11 Thus, it is within the power of this Court not only to scrutinize the basis for dismissal but also to determine if the penalty is commensurate to the offense, notwithstanding the company rules.

Steel Pipe Corp. v. Bardaje, 522 SCRA (07)

[Citing Almira v. B.F. Goodrich 58 SCRA 120] [W]here a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed by labor ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe. It is not only because of the law's concern for the workingman. There is, in addition, his family to consider. Unemployment brings untold hardships and sorrows on those dependent on the wage-earner. The misery and pain attendant on the loss of jobs then could be avoided if there be acceptance of the view that under all circumstances of this case, petitioners should not be deprived of their means of livelihood. Nor is this to condone what had been done by them For all this while, since private respondent considered them separated from the service, they had not been paid. From the strictly juridical standpoint, it cannot be too strongly stressed, to follow Davis in his masterly work, Discretionary Justice, that where a decision may be made to rest [on] informed judgment rather than rigid rules, all the equities of the case must be accorded their due weight. Finally, labor law determinations, to quote from Bultmann, should be not only secundum rationem but also secundum caritatem.

Fujitsu Computer Products Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 454 SCRA 737 (05)The Court is wont to reiterate that while an employer has its own interest to protect, and pursuant thereto, it may terminate a managerial employee for a just cause, such prerogative to dismiss or lay-off an employee must be exercised without abuse of discretion.  Its implementation should be tempered with compassion and understanding.  The employer should bear in mind that, in the execution of the said prerogative, what is at stake is not only the employee’s position, but his very livelihood.[65] The Constitution does not condone wrongdoing by the employee; nevertheless, it urges a moderation of the sanction that may be applied to him.[66] Where a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may have been committed by the worker ought not be visited with a consequence so severe as dismissal from employment.[67] Indeed, the consistent rule is that if doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.  The employer must affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for justifiable cause.

Ariola v. Philex Mining Corp., 446 SCRA 152 (05)When the defect is procedural, the dismissal remains valid because the basis of the dismissal is not in any way affected by such defect.  The dismissal of an employee who commits a crime against an employer cannot be invalidated because of lack of notice of dismissal to the employee.  The lack of notice does not in any way erase or mitigate the crime.

Phil. National Bank v. Cabansag, 460 SCRA 514 (05)As a regular employee, respondent was entitled to all rights, benefits and privileges provided under our labor laws.  One of her fundamental rights is that she may not be dismissed without due process of law.  The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of procedural due process, and neither of these elements can be eliminated without running afoul of the constitutional guarantee.[22]In dismissing employees, the employer must furnish them two written notices:  1) one to apprise them of the particular acts or omissions for which their dismissal is sought; and 2) the other to inform them of the decision to dismiss them.  As to the requirement of a hearing, its essence lies simply in the opportunity to be heard.

Truly, the contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they want, and their agreement would have the force of law between them.  However, petitioner overlooks the qualification that those terms and conditions agreed upon must not be contrary to law, morals, customs, public policy or public order.[30] As explained earlier, the employment Contract between petitioner and respondent is governed by Philippine labor laws.  Hence, the stipulations, clauses, and terms and conditions of the Contract must not contravene our labor law provisions.Moreover, a contract of employment is imbued with public interest.  The Court has time and time again reminded parties that they “are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other.”[31] Also, while a contract is the law between the parties, the provisions of positive law that regulate such contracts are deemed included and shall limit and govern the relations between the parties.[32]Basic in our jurisprudence is the principle that when there is no showing of any clear, valid, and legal cause for the termination of employment, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal.

Genuino Ice Co. Inc. v. Magpantay, 493 SCRA 195 (06)) Simply stated, the employer must furnish the employee a written notice containing a statement of the cause for termination and to afford said employee ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires, and the employee must be notified in writing of the decision dismissing him, stating clearly the reasons therefor.

Suico v. NLRC, 513 SCRA 325 (07) Art. 277 (b) in relation to Art. 264 (a) and (e) recognizes the right to due process of all workers, without distinction as to the cause of their termination.  Where no distinction is given, none is construed.  Hence, the foregoing standards of due process apply to the termination of employment of Suico, et al. even if the cause therefor was their supposed involvement  in  strike-related  violence  prohibited  under  Art.  264 (a) and (e).            Moreover, the procedure for termination prescribed under Art. 277(b) and Rule XXII of the Implementing Rules of Book V is supplemented by existing company policy.  Art. 277(b)  provides that the procedure for termination prescribed therein is without prejudice to the adoption by the employer of company policy on the matter, provided this conforms with the guidelines set by the DOLE such as Rule XXII of the Implementing Rules of Book V.  This is consistent with the established principle that employers are allowed, under the broad concept of management prerogative, to adopt company policies that regulate all aspects of personnel administration including the dismissal and recall of workers. Company policies or practices are binding on the parties.  Some can ripen into an obligation on the part of the employer, such as those which confer benefits on employees or regulate the procedures and requirements for their termination.