Republic of thePhilippinesSupreme CourtManilaEN BANCATTY. TOMAS ONG CABILI,Complainant,- versus -JUDGE RASAD G. BALINDONG,Acting Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 8,MarawiCity,Respondent.A.M. No. RTJ-10-2225(formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 09-3182-RTJ)Present:CORONA,C.J.,CARPIO,VELASCO, JR.,LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,BRION,PERALTA,BERSAMIN,DEL CASTILLO,ABAD,VILLARAMA, JR.,PEREZ,MENDOZA,SERENO,*andREYES,**JJ.Promulgated:September 6, 2011

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------xD E C I S I O NPER CURIAM:We resolve the administrative complaintagainst respondent Acting Presiding Judge Rasad G. Balindong of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marawi City, Branch 8, forGross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority, Abuse of Discretion, and/or Grave Misconduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the Judicial Service.[1]The Factual AntecedentsThe antecedent facts, gathered from the records, are summarized below.Civil Case No. 06-2954[2]is an action for damages inBranch 6 of the Iligan City RTCagainst the Mindanao State University (MSU),et al.,arising from a vehicular accident that caused the death of Jesus Ledesma and physical injuries to several others.OnNovember 29, 1997, the Iligan City RTC rendered a Decision, holding the MSU liable for damages amounting toP2,726,189.90. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the Iligan City RTC decision and the CA decision subsequently lapsed to finality. OnJanuary 19, 2009, Entry of Judgment was made.[3]OnMarch 10, 2009, the Iligan City RTC issued a writ of execution.[4]The MSU, however, failed to comply with the writ; thus, onMarch 24, 2009, Sheriff Gerard Peter Gaje served a Notice of Garnishment on the MSUs depository bank, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), Marawi City Branch.[5]The Office of the Solicitor General opposed the motion for execution, albeit belatedly, in behalf of MSU.[6]TheIligan City RTCdenied the opposition in itsMarch 31, 2009Order.The MSU responded to the denial by filing on April 1, 2009a petition with the Marawi City RTC,for prohibition andmandamuswith an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction against the LBP and Sheriff Gaje.[7]The petition of MSU was raffled to the RTC,MarawiCity, Branch 8, presided by respondent Judge.The respondent Judge set the hearing for the application for the issuance of a TRO onApril 8, 2009.[8]After this hearing, the respondent Judge issued a TRO restraining Sheriff Gaje from garnishingP2,726,189.90 from MSUs LBP-Marawi City Branch account.[9]OnApril 17, 2009, the respondent Judge conducted a hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Thereafter, he required MSU to file a memorandum in support of its application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.[10]OnApril 21, 2009, Sheriff Gaje moved to dismiss the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.[11]The respondent Judge thereafter granted the motion and dismissed the case.[12]On May 8, 2009,complainant Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili, counsel of the private plaintiffs inCivil Case No. 06-2954, filed the complaint charging the respondent Judge withGross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority, Abuse of Discretion, and/or Grave Misconduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the Judicial Servicefor interfering with the order of a co-equal court, Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC, by issuing the TRO to enjoin Sheriff Gaje from garnishingP2,726,189.90 from MSUs LBP-Marawi City Branch account.[13]The respondent Judge denied that he interfered with the order of Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC.[14]He explained that he merely gave the parties the opportunity to be heard and eventually dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.[15]In its December 3, 2009 Report, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found the respondent Judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law for violating the elementary rule of non-interference with the proceedings of a court of co-equal jurisdiction.[16]It recommended a fine ofP40,000.00, noting that this is the respondent Judges second offense.[17]The Court resolved to re-docket the complaint as a regular administrative matter and to require the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings/records on file.[18]Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili complied through his manifestation of April 19, 2010,[19]stating that he learned from reliable sources that the respondent Judge is basically a good Judge, and an admonition will probably sufficeasremindertorespondentnottorepeatthesamemistake in the future.[20]The respondent Judge filed his manifestation onSeptember 28, 2010.[21]The Courts RulingThe Court finds the OCAs recommendation well-taken.The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice:[22]no court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or ordersof another court of concurrent jurisdictionhaving the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction.[23]The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment,to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment.[24]Thus, we have repeatedly held that a case where an execution order has been issued is considered asstill pending, so that all the proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the suit.[25]A court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes.[26]To hold otherwise would be to divide the jurisdiction of the appropriate forum in the resolution of incidents arising in execution proceedings. Splitting of jurisdiction is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.[27]Jurisprudence shows that a violation of this rule warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions.InAquino, Sr. v. Valenciano,[28]the judge committed grave abuse of discretion for issuing a TRO thatinterfered with or frustrated the implementationof an order of another court of co-equal jurisdiction. InYau v. The Manila Banking Corporation,[29]the Court held thatundue interferenceby one in the proceedings and processes of another is prohibited by law.InCoronado v. Rojas,[30]the judge was found liable for gross ignorance of the law when he proceeded to enjoin the final and executory decision of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) on the pretext that the temporary injunction and the writ of injunction he issued were not directed against the HLURBs writ of execution, but only against the manner of its execution. The Court noted that the judgecannot feign ignorance that the effect of the injunctive writ was to freeze the enforcement of the writ of execution, thus frustrating the lawful order of the HLURB, a co-equal body.[31]InHeirs of Simeon Piedad v. Estrera,[32]the Court penalized two judges for issuing a TRO against the execution of a demolition order issued by another co-equal court. The Court stressed that when the respondents-judges acted on the application for the issuance of a TRO,they were aware that they were acting on matters pertaining to a co-equal court, namely, Branch 9 of the Cebu City RTC, which was already exercising jurisdiction over the subject matter in Civil Case No. 435-T. Nonetheless, respondent-judgesstill opted to interfere with the order of a co-equal and coordinate court of concurrent jurisdiction, in blatant disregard of the doctrine of judicial stability, a well-established axiom in adjective law.[33]To be sure, the law and the rules are not unaware that an issuing court may violate the law in issuing a writ of execution and have recognized that there should be a remedy against this violation. The remedy, however, is not the resort to another co-equal body but to a higher court with authority to nullify the action of the issuing court. This is precisely the judicial power that the 1987 Constitution, under Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2,[34]speaks of and which this Court has operationalized through a petition forcertiorari,under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[35]In the present case, the respondent Judge clearly ignored the principle of judicial stability by issuing a TRO to temporarily restrain[36]Sheriff Gaje from enforcing the writ of execution issued by a co-equal court, Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC, and from pursuing the garnishment of the amount ofP2,726,189.90 from MSUs account with the LBP, Marawi City Branch. The respondent Judge was aware that he was acting on matters pertaining to the execution phase of a final decision of a co-equal and coordinate court since he even quoted MSUs allegations in his April 8, 2009 Order.[37]The respondent Judge should have refrained from acting on the petition because Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC retains jurisdiction to rule on any question on the enforcement of the writ of execution. Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (terceria), cited in the course of the Courts deliberations,finds no application to this case since this provision applies to claims made by a third person,other than the judgment obligor or his agent;[38]a third-party claimant of a property under execution may file a claim with another court[39]which, in the exercise of its own jurisdiction, may issue a temporary restraining order.In this case, the petition for injunction before the respondent Judge was filed by MSU itself, the judgment obligor. If Sheriff Gaje committed any irregularity or exceeded his authority in the enforcement of the writ, the proper recourse for MSU was to file a motion with, or an application for relief from, the same court which issued the decision, not from any other court,[40]or to elevate the matter to the CA on a petition forcertiorari.[41]In this case, MSU filed the proper motion with the Iligan City RTC (the issuing court), but, upon denial, proceeded to seek recourse through another co-equal court presided over by the respondent Judge.It is not a viable legal position to claim that a TRO against a writ of execution is issued against an erring sheriff, not against the issuing Judge. A TRO enjoining the enforceability of a writ addresses the writ itself, not merely the executing sheriff. The duty of a sheriff in enforcing writs is ministerial and not discretionary.[42]As already mentioned above, the appropriate action is to assail the implementation of the writ before the issuing court in whose behalf the sheriff acts, and, upon failure, to seek redress through a higher judicial body.Significantly, MSU did file its oppositionbefore the issuing court Iligan City RTC which denied this opposition.That the respondent Judge subsequently rectified his error by eventually dismissing the petition before him for lack of jurisdiction is not a defense that the respondent Judge can use.[43]His lack of familiarity with the rules in interfering with the acts of a co-equal court undermines public confidence in the judiciary through his demonstrated incompetence. In this case, he impressed upon the Iligan public that the kind of interference he exhibited can be done, even if only temporarily,i.e.,that an official act of the Iligan City RTC can be thwarted by going to the Marawi City RTC although they are co-equal courts. That the complaining lawyer, Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili, subsequently reversed course and manifested that the respondent Judge is basically a good Judge,[44]and should only be reprimanded, cannot affect the respondent Judges liability.This liability and the commensurate penalty do not depend on the complainantspersonal opinionbut on the facts he alleged and proved, and on the applicable law and jurisprudence.When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and to simply apply it. Anything less would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law.[45]Under A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC or the Amendment to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court Re: Discipline of Justices and Judges, gross ignorance of the law is a serious charge, punishable by a fine of more thanP20,000.00, but not exceedingP40,000.00, suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months, or dismissal from the service. Considering the attendant circumstances of this case, the Court after prolonged deliberations holds that a fine ofP30,000.00 is the appropriate penalty. This imposition is an act of leniency as we can, if we so hold, rule for the maximum fine ofP40,000.00 or for suspension since this is the respondent Judges second offense.WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Judge Rasad G. Balindong, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Marawi City, is herebyFOUND GUILTYof Gross Ignorance of the Law andFINEDin the amount ofP30,000.00, with a sternWARNINGthat a repetition of the same will be dealt with more severely.SO ORDERED.RENATO C. CORONAChief JusticeANTONIO T. CARPIOPRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.Associate JusticeAssociate JusticeTERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTROARTURO D. BRIONAssociate JusticeAssociate JusticeI join the dissenting opinion of J. AbadDIOSDADO M. PERALTALUCAS P. BERSAMINAssociate JusticeAssociate JusticePlease see dissenting opinionMARIANO C.DELCASTILLOROBERTO A. ABADAssociate JusticeAssociate JusticeNo Part. Acted on matter as CAdm.MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.JOSEPORTUGALPEREZAssociate JusticeAssociate Justice(On Leave)JOSE CATRALMENDOZAMARIALOURDESP. A. SERENOAssociate JusticeAssociate Justice(On Official Leave)BEINVENIDO L. REYESAssociate Justice

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 101041 November 13, 1991HON. JUDGE ADRIANO R. VILLAMOR,petitioner,vs.HON. JUDGE BERNARDO LL. SALAS and GEORGE CARLOS,respondents.G.R. No. 101296 November 13, 1991HON. JUDGE ADRIANO R. VILLAMOR,petitioner,vs.ANTONIO T. GUERRERO and HON. PEARY G. ALEONAR, Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 21, Region VII, Cebu City,respondents.Ramon Ve Salazar for petitioner.Antonio T. Guerrero for private respondent.Henry R. Savellon for respondent.GRIO-AQUINO,J.:pIn 1977, Civil Case No. B-398 (Gloria Naval vs. George Carlos) for recovery of ownership of a parcel of coconut land was filed and subsequently raffled to the sala of the petitioner, Judge Adriano Villamor. While the civil case was pending there, respondent Carlos filed Criminal Cases Nos. N-989, N-990, N-991, N-992 and N-993 for qualified theft against Gloria Naval and her helpers. The criminal cases were also assigned to the sala of Judge Villamor.Due to the pendency of Civil Case No. B-398, the criminal cases were temporarily archived.After trial in Civil Case No. B-398, a decision was rendered in favor of Naval who was declared the lawful owner and possessor of the disputed land. Carlos was ordered to vacate the land.Thereafter, respondent Carlos, through counsel, moved to activate the archived criminal cases. Having declared Naval the lawful owner and possessor of the contested land in Civil Case No. B-398, Judge Villamor dismissed the criminal cases against her and her co-accused.Judge Villamor likewise granted execution pending appeal of his decision in Civil Case No. B-398. This order was challenged by Carlos in the Court of Appeals and in this Court, both without success.Afterwards, Carlos filed an administrative case, A.M. No. RTJ-87-105, against Judge Villamor, charging him with having issued illegal orders and an unjust decision in Civil Case No. B-398. On November 21, 1988, this Court, in anEn Bancresolution, summarily dismissed the administrative case.Dissatisfied with the outcome of the administrative case, respondent Carlos filed a civil action for damages (Civil Case No. CEB-6478) against Judge Villamor for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment when he dismissed the five (5) criminal cases against Naval,et al.The summons in Civil Case No. CEB-6478 was served upon Judge Villamor on December 10, 1987. The next day (December 11, 1987), instead of answering the complaint, Judge Villamor issued in Criminal Cases Nos. N-0989 to 0993 an order of direct contempt against Carlos and his lawyer. Attorney Antonio T. Guerrero, "for degrading the respect and dignity of the court through the use of derogatory and contemptous language before the court," and sentenced each of them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of P500.Carlos immediately filed in this Court a petition forcertiorariwith a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the Judge (G.R. Nos. 82238-42). We promptly restrained Judge Villamor from enforcing his Order of Contempt against Carlos and Attorney Guerrero. On November 13, 1989, we annulled the contempt order. (See pp. 26-34,Rolloof G.R. No. 101041.)Back to Civil Case No. CEB-6478; Judge Villamor filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court granted the motion. The order of dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 20657, June 26, 1990). Carlos appealed to this Court which also denied the petition. (p. 125,Rolloof G.R. No. 101296.)Unfazed by these setbacks, Carlos and his counsel, Attorney Antonio Guerrero, filed separate complaints for damages against Judge Villamor for knowingly rendering an unjust order of contempt.Attorney Guerrero's complaint for damages (Civil Case No. CEB-8802) was raffled to Branch 21, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, presided over by Judge Peary G. Aleonar. Carlos' complaint for damages was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-8823 and raffled to Branch 8, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City presided over by Judge Bernardo LL. Salas.On March 30, 1990, Judge Villamor filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case No. CEB-8802 but it was denied by Judge Aleonar (p. 33,Rolloof G.R. No. 101296).Hence, this petition forcertiorariand prohibition with restraining order docketed as G.R. No. 101296.On September 19, 1991, this Court issued a temporary restraining order against Judge Aleonar to stop him from proceeding in Civil Case No. CEB-8802 (pp. 45-46,Rolloof G.R. No. 101296).On May 20, 1991, a Manifestation was filed by Judge Villamor praying Judge Salas to dismiss Civil Case No. CEB-8823 but the motion was denied by respondent Judge on July 2, 1991 (pp. 13-16,Rolloof G.R. No. 101041).Hence, this second petition forcertiorariand prohibition with restraining order (G.R. No. 101041).On August 21, 1991, a Resolution was issued by this Court: 1) temporarily restraining Judge Salas from further proceeding in Civil Case No. CEB-8823; and 2) granting the petitioner's prayer that this case be consolidated with G.R. No. 101296 (pp. 37-39,Rolloof G.R. No. 101041).The sole issue here is: whether or not Judges Aleonar and Salas may take cognizance of the actions for damages against Judge Villamor for allegedly having rendered an unjust order of direct contempt against Carlos and Attorney Guerrero which this Court subsequently annulled.The answer is no.As very aptly held by this Court in a Resolution it issued in connection with a previous case filed by respondent Carlos against Judge Villamor, over a similar action for "Damages and Attorney's Fees Arising From Rendering an Unjust Judgment," in dismissing the five (5) criminal cases for qualified theft which he (respondent Carlos) had filed against Gloria P. Naval and others Indeed, no Regional Trial Court can pass upon and scrutinize, and much less declare as unjust a judgment of another Regional Trial Court and sentence the judge thereof liable for damages without running afoul with the principle that only the higher appellate courts, namely, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, are vested with authority to review and correct errors of the trial courts. (George D. Carlos vs. CA, G.R. No. 95560, November 5, 1990; p. 125,Rolloof G.R No. 101296.)To allow respondent Judges Aleonar and Salas to proceed with the trial of the actions for damages against the petitioner, a co-equal judge of a co-equal court, would in effect permit a court to review and interfere with the judgment of a co-equal court over which it has no appellate jurisdiction or power of review. The various branches of a Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court) being co-equal, may not interfere with each other's cases, judgments and orders (Parco vs. Court of Appeals, 111 SCRA 262).This Court has already ruled that only after the Appellate Court, in a final judgment, has found that a trial judge's errors were committed deliberately and in bad faith may a charge of knowingly rendering an unjust decision be levelled against the latter (Garcia vs. Alconcel, 111 SCRA 178; Sta. Maria vs. Ubay, 87 SCRA 179; Gahol vs. Riodique, 64 SCRA 494).Nowhere in this Court's decision annulling Judge Villamor's order of direct contempt (G.R. Nos. 82238-42, November 13, 1989) can there be found a declaration that the erroneous order was rendered maliciously or with conscious and deliberate intent to commit an injustice. In fact, a previous order of direct contempt issued by Judge Villamor against Carlos' former counsel was sustained by this Court (Jaynes C. Abarrientos,et al. vs. Judge Villamor, G.R. No. 82237, June 1, 1988).At most, the order of direct contempt which we nullified may only be considered an error of judgment for which Judge Villamor may not be held criminally or civilly liable to the respondents.A judge is not liable for an erroneous decision in the absence of malice or wrongful conduct in rendering it (Barroso vs. Arche, 67 SCRA 161).WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions forcertiorariare GRANTED, Civil Cases Nos. CEB-8802 and CEB-8823, respectively, pending in the salas of respondents Judge Peary G. Aleonar and Judge Bernardo LL. Salas, are hereby dismissed. The temporary restraining orders issued by this Court in these cases are hereby made permanent. No costs.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, CJ., Cruz, Feliciano and Medialdea, JJ., concur.