DOCTRINE OF IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE

1. MARCIAL T. CAEDO, JUANA SANGALANG CAEDO, and the Minors, EPHRAIM CAEDO, EILEEN CAEDO, ROSE ELAINE CAEDO, suing through their father, MARCIAL T. CAEDO vs. YU KHE THAI and RAFAEL BERNARDO, G.R. No. L-20392, December 18, 1968

Facts:

At about 5:30 in the morning, Marcial Caedo was driving his Mercury car on his way to the airport. With them in the car were Mrs. Caedo and three daughters. Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai, with his driver Rafael Bernardo at the wheel, taking the owner from his Paraaque home to Wack Wack for his regular round of golf.

The two cars were traveling at fairly moderate speeds, considering the condition of the road and the absence of traffic and their headlights were mutually noticeable from a distance. Ahead of the Cadillac, going in the same direction, was a caretella owned by a certain Pedro Bautista. Instead of slowing down, Bernardo, veered to the left to overtake and in so doing the car hit the carratellas left wheel and skidded obliquely hitting the on coming car of Caedo who despite slackened speed to avoid the collision was hit resulting to the injuries of Caedo and his passengers.

Issue:

WON negligence of the driver, Bernardo, may be imputed upon his employer, Yu Khe Thai.

Ruling:

The applicable law is Article 2184 of the Civil Code, which reads:

ART. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.

Under the foregoing provision, if the causative factor was the driver's negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence.

No negligence for having employed him at all may be imputed to his master, since Bernardo had been Yu Khe Thais driver since 1937, during that time, there was no record of violation of traffic laws and regulations. Negligence on the part of the latter, if any, must be sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of the accident, that is, in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. We do not see that such negligence may be imputed.

The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is, to a great degree, necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers.

We hold that the imputation of liability to Yu Khe Thai, solidarily with Rafael Bernardo, is an error.

2. KAPALARAN BUS LINE vs. ANGEL CORONADO, LOPE GRAJERA, DIONISIO SHINYO, and THE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 85331, August 25, 1989

Facts:

The jeepney driven by Lope Grajera was then coming from Pila, Laguna and traversing the old highway towards Sta. Cruz collided with a KAPALARAN BUS LINE (KBL), a bus driven by its regular driver Virgilio Llamoso. As testified to by Atty. Conrado L. Manicad who was driving a Mustang car coming from the direction of Sta. Cruz and proceeding towards the direction of Manila, he stopped at the intersection to give way to the jeepney driven by Grajera. The sketch marked very clearly that the jeepney had already traversed the intersection when it met the KBL bus head-on. It is also obvious that the point of impact was on the right lane of the highway which is the lane properly belonging to the jeepney. Judging from the testimony of Atty. Conrado L. Manicad and the sketch (Exhibit 'E'), the sequence of events shows that the first vehicle to arrive at the intersection was thejeepney. Seeing that the road was clear, the jeepney which had stopped at the intersectionbegan to move forward, and for his part, Atty. Manicad stopped his car at the intersection to give way to the jeepney. The KBL bus had no more room within which to stop without slamming into the rear of the vehicle behind the car of Atty. Manicad. The KBL driverchose to gamble on proceeding on its way, unfortunately, the jeepney driven by Grajera, which had the right-of-way, was about tocross the center of the highway andwas directly on the path of the KBL bus. The impact indicates that the KBL bus was travelling at a fast rate of speed because, after the collision, it did not stop; it travelled for another 50meters and stopped only when ithit an electric post.

Issue:

WON KAPALARAN BUS LINE (KBL) is liable for damages from the collision;

Ruling:

Yes, KBL is liable for the damagesin the collision.

The patent and gross negligence on the part of the petitioner Kapalaran's driver raised the legal presumption that Kapalaran as employer was guilty of negligence either in the selection or in the supervision of its bus driver. Where the employer is held liable for damages, it has of course a right of recourse against its own negligent employee. If petitioner Kapalaran was interested in maintaining its right of recourse against or reimbursement from its own driver,it should have appealled from that portion of the trial court's decision which had failed to hold the bus driver is not "merely subsidiary," and is not limited to cases where the employee "cannot pay his liability" nor are private respondents compelled first to proceed against the bus driver. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee.So far as the record shows, petitioner Kapalaran was unable to rebut the presumption of negligence on its own part. The award of moral damages against petitioner Kapalaran is not only entirely in order; it is also quite modest considering Dionisio Shinyo's death during the pendency of this petition, a death hastened by, if not directly due to, the grievous injuries sustained by him in the violent collision.

The law requires petitioner as common carrier to exercise extraordinary diligence in carrying and transporting their passenger safely "as far as human care and foresight can proved, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all circumstances."In requiring the highest possible degree of diligence from common carriers and creating a presumption of negligence against them, the law compels them to curb the recklessness of their drivers.While the immediate beneficiaries of the standard of extraordinary diligence are, of course, the passengers and owners of cargo carried by a common carrier, they are not only persons that the law seeks to benefit. For if common carriers carefully observed the statutory standard of extraordinary diligence in respect of their own passengers, they cannot help but simultaneously benefit pedestrians and the owners and passengers of other vehicles who are equally entitled to the safe and convenient use of our roads and highways.The law seeks to stop and prevent the slaughter and maiming of people (whether passengers or not) and the destruction of property (whether freight or not) on our highways by buses, the very size and power of which seem often to inflame the minds of their drivers. Article 2231 of the Civil Code explicitly authorizes the imposition of exemplary damages in cases of quasi-delicts "if the defendant acted with gross negligence."

Thus, we believe that the award of exemplary damages by the trial court was quite proper, although granted for the wrong reason, and should not only be restored but augmented in the present case. The Court is aware that respondent Shinyo did not file a separate petition for review to set aside that portion of the Court of Appeals' decision which deleted the grant by the trial court of exemplary damages. It is settled, however, that issues which must be resolved if substantial justice is to be rendered to the parties, may and should be considered and decided by this Court even if those issues had not been explicitly raised by the party affected.

In the instant case, it is not only the demands of substantial justice but also the compelling considerations of public policy noted above, which impel us to the conclusion that the trial court's award of exemplary damages was erroneously deleted and must be restored and brought more nearly to the level which public policy and substantial justice require.

3. JONAS AONUEVO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JEROME VILLAGRACIA, G.R. No. 130003, October 20, 2004

Facts:

As found by the RTC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the accident in question occurred on 8 February 1989, at around nine in the evening, at the intersection of Boni Avenue and Barangka Drive in Mandaluyong (now a city). Villagracia was traveling along Boni Avenue on his bicycle, while Aonuevo, traversing the opposite lane was driving his Lancer car with plate number PJJ 359. The car was owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer of Aonuevos brother, Jonathan. Aonuevo was in the course of making a left turn towards Libertad Street when the collision occurred. Villagracia sustained serious injuries as a result, which necessitated his hospitalization several times in 1989, and forced him to undergo 4 operations.

On 26 October 1989, Villagracia instituted an action for damages against Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc. and Aonuevo before the RTC. He had also filed a criminal complaint against Aonuevo before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong, but the latter was subsequently acquitted of the criminal charge. Trial on the civil action ensued, and in a Decision dated 9 March 1990, the RTC rendered judgment against Procter and Gamble and Aonuevo, ordering them to pay Villagracia the amounts of P150, 000.00 for actual damages, P10,000.00 for moral damages, P20,000.00 for attorneys fees, as well as legal costs. Both defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals.In arriving at the assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the factual findings of the RTC. Among them: that it was Aonuevos vehicle which had struck Villagracia; that Aonuevos vehicle had actually hit Villagracias left mid-thigh, thus causing a comminuted fracture; that as testified by eyewitness Alfredo Sorsano, witness for Villagracia, Aonuevo was umaarangkada, or speeding as he made the left turn into Libertad; that considering Aonuevos claim that a passenger jeepney was obstructing his path as he made the turn. Aonuevo had enough warning to control his speed; and that Aonuevo failed to exercise the ordinary precaution, care and diligence required of him in order that the accident could have been avoided. Notably, Aonuevo, in his current petition, does not dispute the findings of tortious conduct on his part made by the lower courts, hinging his appeal instead on the alleged negligence of Villagracia. Aonuevo proffers no exculpatory version of facts on his part, nor does he dispute the conclusions made by the RTC and the Court of Appeals.

Issue:

WON Article 2185 should apply by analogy to non-motorized vehicles.

Ruling:

The provision was introduced for the first time in this jurisdiction with the adoption in 1950 of the New Civil Code. Its applicability is expressly qualified to motor vehicles only, and there is no ground to presume that the law intended a broader coverage. At the time Article 2185 was formulated, there existed a whole array of non-motorized vehicles ranging from human-powered contraptions on wheels such as bicycles, scooters, and animal-drawn carts such as calesas and carromata. These modes of transport were even more prevalent on the roads of the 1940s and 1950s than they are today, yet the framers of the New Civil Code chose then to exclude these alternative modes from the scope of Article 2185 with the use of the term motorized vehicles. If Aonuevo seriously contends that the application of Article 2185 be expanded due to the greater interaction today of all types of vehicles, such argument contradicts historical experience. The ratio of motorized vehicles as to non-motorized vehicles, as it stood in 1950, was significantly lower than as it stands today. This will be certainly affirmed by statistical data, assuming such has been compiled, much less confirmed by persons over sixty. Aonuevos characterization of a vibrant intra-road dynamic between motorized and non-motorized vehicles is more apropos to the past than to the present.

There is a fundamental flaw in Aonuevos analysis of Art. 2185, as applicable today. He premises that the need for the distinction between motorized and non-motorized vehicles arises from the relative mass of number of these vehicles. The more pertinent basis for the segregate classification is the difference in type of these vehicles. A motorized vehicle operates by reason of a motor engine unlike a non-motorized vehicle, which runs as a result of a direct exertion by man or beast of burden of direct physical force. A motorized vehicle, unimpeded by the limitations in physical exertion is capable of greater speeds and acceleration than non-motorized vehicles. At the same time, motorized vehicles are more capable in inflicting greater injury or damage in the event of an accident or collision. This is due to a combination of factors peculiar to the motor vehicle, such as the greater speed, its relative greater bulk of mass, and greater combustability due to the fuels that they use. There long has been judicial recognition of the peculiar dangers posed by the motor vehicle.

The Code Commission was cognizant of the difference in the natures and attached responsibilities of motorized and non-motorized vehicles. Art. 2185 was not formulated to compel or ensure obeisance by all to traffic rules and regulations. If such were indeed the evil sought to be remedied or guarded against, then the framers of the Code would have expanded the provision to include non-motorized vehicles or for that matter, pedestrians. Yet, that was not the case; thus the need arises to ascertain the peculiarities attaching to a motorized vehicle within the dynamics of road travel. The fact that there has long existed a higher degree of diligence and care imposed on motorized vehicles, arising from the special nature of motor vehicle, leads to the inescapable conclusion that the qualification under Article 2185 exists precisely to recognize such higher standard. Simply put, the standards applicable to motor vehicle are not on equal footing with other types of vehicles.

Thus, we cannot sustain the contention that Art. 2185 should apply to non-motorized vehicles, even if by analogy. There is factual and legal basis that necessitates the distinction under Art. 2185, and to adopt Aonuevos thesis would unwisely obviate this distinction.

The Civil Code characterizes negligence as the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. However, the existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by the personal judgment of the actor in a given situation, but rather, it is the law which determines what would be reckless or negligent. The generally accepted view is that the violation of a statutory duty constitutes negligence, negligence as a matter of law, or negligence per seShould the doctrine of negligence per se apply to Villagracia, resulting from his violation of an ordinance? It cannot be denied that the statutory purpose for requiring bicycles to be equipped with headlights or horns is to promote road safety and to minimize the occurrence of road accidents involving bicycles. At face value, Villagracias mishap was precisely the danger sought to be guarded against by the ordinance he violated. Aonuevo argues that Villagracias violation should bar the latters recovery of damages, and a simplistic interpretation of negligence per se might vindicate such an argument.

But this is by no means a simple case. There is the fact which we consider as proven, that Aonuevo was speeding as he made the left turn, and such negligent act was the proximate cause of the accident. This reckless behavior would have imperiled anyone unlucky enough within the path of Aonuevos car as it turned into the intersection, whether they are fellow motorists, pedestrians, or cyclists. We are hard put to conclude that Villagracia would have avoided injury had his bicycle been up to par with safety regulations, especially considering that Aonuevo was already speeding as he made the turn, or before he had seen Villagracia. Even assuming that Aonuevo had failed to see Villagracia because the bicycle was not equipped with headlights, such lapse on the cyclists part would not have acquitted the driver of his duty to slow down as he proceeded to make the left turn.

The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may arise from the logical consequences of the facts leading to the mishap. The doctrine (and Article 2185, for that matter) is undeniably useful as a judicial guide in adjudging liability, for it seeks to impute culpability arising from the failure of the actor to perform up to a standard established by a legal fiat. But the doctrine should not be rendered inflexible so as to deny relief when in fact there is no causal relation between the statutory violation and the injury sustained. Presumptions in law, while convenient, are not intractable so as to forbid rebuttal rooted in fact. After all, tort law is remunerative in spirit, aiming to provide compensation for the harm suffered by those whose interests have been invaded owing to the conduct of others. The failure of the bicycle owner to comply with accepted safety practices, whether or not imposed by ordinance or statute, is not sufficient to negate or mitigate recovery unless a causal connection is established between such failure and the injury sustained. The principle likewise finds affirmation in Sanitary Steam, wherein we declared that the violation of a traffic statute must be shown as the proximate cause of the injury, or that it substantially contributed thereto. Aonuevo had the burden of clearly proving that the alleged negligence of Villagracia was the proximate or contributory cause of the latters injury. Neither can we can adjudge Villagracia with contributory negligence. The leading case in contributory negligence, Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf clarifies that damages may be mitigated if the claimant in conjunction with the occurrence, [contributes] only to his injury. To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an impending danger to health and body. To prove contributory negligence, it is still necessary to establish a causal link, although not proximate, between the negligence of the party and the succeeding injury. In a legal sense, negligence is contributory only when it contributes proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition for its occurrence.

The petition is denied. CAs decision is affirmed.

4. FLORDELIZA MENDOZA vs. MUTYA SORIANO and Minor JULIE ANN SORIANO duly represented by her natural mother and guardian ad litem MUTYA SORIANO, G.R. No. 164012, June 8, 2007

Facts:

On July 14, 2007, Sonny Soriano, while crossing Commonwealth Avenue, was hit by a speeding FX driven by Lomer Macasasa. Macasasa fled the scene. Soriano was brought by a school bus to East Avenue Medical Center where he later died.

On August 20, 1997, respondents (Sorianos wife and daughter) filed a complaint for damages against Macasasa and petitioner Mendoza, the registered owner of the vehicle. In her answer, petitioner maintained that she was not liable as owner of the vehicle, because she had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family over her employee, Macasasa.

Upon respondents motion, the complaint for damages against Macasasa was dismissed.

After trial, trial court dismissed the complaint. It found Soriano negligent for crossing Commonwealth Avenue by using a gap in the islands fencing rather the pedestrian overpass. Also, the complainants presented no evidence to support their allegation of petitioners negligence.

CA reversed trial courts decision.

Issue:

Was there sufficient legal basis to award damages?

Ruling:

Yes. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, employers are liable for the damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. The liability arises due to the presumed negligence of the employers in supervising their employees unless they prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. In this case, petitioner failed to prove that she exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in supervising Macasasa. However, Soriano was guilty of contributory negligence for not using the pedestrian overpass while crossing Commonwealth Avenue. Hence, the reduction by 20% of the damages awarded, based on Article 2179 of the Civil Code which reads: When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

Petition denied for lack of merit. Decision of CA affirmed.