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EU-CIVCAPPreventingandRespondingtoConflict:DevelopingEU

CIVilianCAPabilitiesforasustainablepeace

EUCapabilitiesforConflictPreventionandPeacebuilding:

ACapabilities-BasedAssessment

Deliverable2.6

(Version1.6;23May2017)

UniversityofBristol

Thisprojecthas received funding from theEuropeanUnion’sHorizon2020 researchandinnovationprogrammeundergrantagreementNo653227.

DL2.6EUCapabilitiesforConflictPreventionandPeacebuilding:ACapabilities-BasedAssessment

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HOWTOCITETHISDOCUMENT

Ana E. Juncos and Gilberto Algar-Faria (2017), ‘EU Capabilities for Conflict Prevention andPeacebuilding: A Capabilities-Based Assessment’, EU-CIVCAP Deliverable, DL 2.6, available from:https://eu-civcap.net/portfolio/deliverables/.SUMMARYOFTHEDOCUMENT

Title DL 2.6 EU Capabilities for Conflict Prevention

and Peacebuilding: A Capabilities-BasedAssessment

LastmodificationState

23May2017Final

Version

1.6

LeadingPartnerOtherParticipantPartnersAuthors

UBRISN/AAnaE.Juncos,GilbertoAlgar-Faria

Audience ☒Public☐Restricted☐Internal

Abstract This paper presents a conceptual andmethodological framework to support theimplementationof theEU-CIVCAPproject, anddefinesthekeyconceptsofconflictprevention,peacebuilding, resources and capabilities toensure consistency across different workpackagesanddeliverables.

Keywords • Capability• Conflictprevention• Peacebuilding• Capability-basedassessment• Methodology• Fieldwork• Ethics


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TABLEOFCONTENTS

Executivesummary………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………4

1.Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..5

2.Keyconcepts…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….5

3.Acapabilities-basedapproach………………………………………………………………………………………………….9

4.Methodologyanddatacollection…………………………………………………………………………………………….16

5.Concludingremarks………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….20

Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………21

AnnexI.EU-CIVCAPobjectives…………………………………………………………………………………………………….25

AnnexII.Thelifecycleofconflict…………………………………………………………………………………………………27


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EXECUTIVESUMMARY

This paper presents a conceptual and methodological framework to support theimplementation of the EU-CIVCAP project, and defines the key concepts of conflictprevention,peacebuilding,resources,andcapabilitiestoensureconsistencyacrossdifferentwork packages and deliverables. The paper draws on a range of literatures (strategicmanagement,developmentandmilitarystudies, forexample)anddevelopsacapabilities-based assessment approach (CBA). This CBAwill be used by eachWP to identify gaps incapabilities in each of the phases of the conflict cycle. This framework allows for theidentificationofexistingandrequiredcapabilitiesinorderfortheEUtoachieveitsgoalsinconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding.ThisframeworkmovesfrompreviousassessmentsofEU capabilities that have focused on short-term requirements to a more strategic andholisticapproachtocapabilitydevelopment,bylinkinggoalstocapabilities.Thepaperalsosummarises theproject’smethodologyanddatacollectionmethods, includingethicalandrisk-related issues to be considered by those conducting empirical fieldwork, especiallywherethatfieldworkiscarriedoutinconflictareas.


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1.INTRODUCTION The EU-CIVCAP proposal states that the key aim of the project is to “provide acomprehensive,comparativeandmultidisciplinaryanalysisoftheEU’sciviliancapabilitiesinconflict prevention and peacebuilding in order to identify existing shortfall” (emphasis inoriginal).Morespecifically,Objective1seeks“toassessEUciviliancapabilitiesforexternalconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding”coveringtwokeydimensions:firstly,thelifecycleofaconflictandsecondly,fourcross-cuttingchallenges(theearlywarning/earlyresponsegap,civil-military coordination, short-term vs long-termapproaches, and local ownership) (seeAnnexI,IIandDoA).

In order to conduct an assessment of EU capabilities for conflict prevention andpeacebuilding, a number of conceptual andmethodological clarifications are required toguide empirical research and ensure consistency across the results of the different EU-CIVCAPdeliverables(DLs)andworkpackages(WPs).Inotherwords,wefirstneedtoclarifywhat we mean by capabilities, what capabilities are for and what a capability gap (orshortfall) might be. To that end, this paper will help to develop a framework for theassessmentofEUcapabilitiesforconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding(aCapabilities-BasedAssessment or CBA). It will also provide some methodological pointers for theoperationalisationofthisproject.Butbeforedoingthis,itisimportanttodefinethetermsof‘conflictprevention’and‘peacebuilding’.

2.KEYCONCEPTS

2.1.CONFLICTPREVENTIONANDPEACEBUILDINGThereisanextensiveliteraturethathassoughttoexploreindetailthemeaningsrelatedtoconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding.Itisnotthepurposeofthispapertopursuethislineofresearch;insteadwewillrefertothedefinitionsusedintheEU-CIVCAPproposal.Thesearebroadenough tobeapplied to theactivitiesof theEUandother international actorsexaminedinthisproject.Conflictpreventionisthusdefinedhereasanyattempttoreducetensions and stop the escalation or outbreak of violent and non-violent conflict. Conflictprevention is a multifaceted process, ranging from long-term policy to promote stability(structural conflict prevention) to short-term intensive diplomacy to resolve disputes(operationalconflictprevention).Meanwhile,peacebuildingcanbeunderstoodasarangeofactivitiesthataimtoaddresstherootsofconflictandpromotesustainablepeaceinthemediumand long term.Thesedefinitionsecho thoseemployedby theEU,UNandOECDand the broader literature (Boutros-Ghali 1992; Council of the EU 2011; EuropeanUnion2001;OECD2012;ParisandSisk2009;Ramsbothanetal.2011;UN2001).


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In order to achieve the objective of promoting a sustainable peace through conflictpreventionandpeacebuilding,theEUhasawidesetofinstrumentsandtoolsatitsdisposal,ranging from humanitarian and development aid; diplomacy (for example, statements,démarches,mediation and participation in relevant international fora); political dialogueswith third countries and international organisations; restrictive measures (such assanctions); the employment anddeploymentof EU Special Representatives; disarmamentand non-proliferation activities; security sector reform and civilian and military crisismanagementmissionsundertheCommonSecurityandDefencePolicy(CSDP).Conflict prevention and peacebuilding are not isolated initiatives. Rather, they are bestconceptualised as a continuum of activities covering various stages of the life cycle ofconflict(fromrisingtensionstotheoutbreakofconflicttopost-crisisstabilisation)anditisforthisreasonthatEU-CIVCAPwillexaminetheentireconflictcycle(seeAnnexII).2.2RESOURCESANDCAPABILITIES

Theconceptofcapabilitiesrequiresamoredetaileddiscussion,notleastbecauseithasnotreceivedmuchattention inthe literature,especially intheareaofconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding studies and in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and CSDPliterature.Thelatterhasbeen,andremains,focusedonthedevelopmentofBrussels-basedinstitutions,proceduresandpolicies (seeSmith2003;Vanhoonackeretal. 2010),but lessattention has been paid to the capabilities required to implement the EU’s objectives.Where this has been studied, the focus has predominantly been on CSDP rather than onotherareasoftheEU’sexternalaction,withtheterm‘capabilities’beingusedasshorthandformilitaryhardwareandpersonnel(seeChivvis,2010;Giegerich,2010;Grecoetal.,2010;Menon,2009).In the area of civilian crisismanagement,most of the discussions about capabilities alsorevolvearoundissuesofrecruitment,traininganddeploymentofcivilianpersonnel(Korskiand Gowan 2009). In fact, it is interesting to note that the use of the term ‘civiliancapabilities’isverymuchuniquetotheEU(see,forinstance,theEUHeadlineGoals),whileother international organisations (e.g., UN, AU) or actors (e.g., US, UK)would favour theterm‘capacity’1orsimply‘civilianpersonnel’or‘expertise’torefertocivilianpersonnelorstaff involved in peace operations. To some extent, this results from the historical andidiosyncraticdevelopmentof theCSDP.The launchof theEuropeanSecurityandDefencePolicy(ESDP)–asitwasknownatthetime–wasseenasawaytodevelopamilitaryrolefortheEU;thedevelopmentofaciviliandimensionwasonlyanafterthoughtandameansbywhichtheNordiccountrieshopedtopreventthemilitarisationoftheEU.Inpracticethisled1 See for instance theproject andonline resource: http://www.civcap.info/ [accessed18April 2016],whichfocusesspecificallyonciviliancapacityforpeaceoperations.


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to theparallel developmentof amilitary anda civilianCSDP– anddifficulties integratingthese two dimensions that were particularly evident in the early years of the ESDP andCSDP.CivilianCSDPalsodevelopedintheshadowofitsmilitarycounterpart.The EU-CIVCAP project introduces three crucial correctives to the literature and the EU’sunderstandingof‘capabilities’.First,thisprojectgoesbeyondthecurrentfocusonCSDPtoincludeotherareasofexternalactionsuchasCFSPmorebroadly,aswellasdevelopmentandtrade.Second,itassessesinaholisticmannertheactualandpotentialcontributionoftheEU to thepreventionand resolutionof conflictsbyexaminingEUcapabilities throughthe lifecycleofconflict.Third,andmore importantly,wemove fromanunderstandingof‘capabilities’ as a list of resource requirements (and in particular, staffing resources) tolinking resources with objectives. To do this, we need to take account of the centralconceptualcategoriesthathavebeendevelopedforinvestigatingandevaluatingcapabilitiesin the literature on organisations, strategic management and business, and in militarystudies.Thesecategoriescanbesummarisedasfollows:Thefirst relevantconcepthere is thatofresources.Resourcesareconsideredtomakeupthe key assets of an organisation, to the point that the resource-based view of the firm(RBV) considers that “simultaneously valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutableresources can be a source of superior performance, andmay enable the firm to achievesustainedcompetitiveadvantage”(BarneycitedinAmbrosinietal.2009).ForRaphaelAmitandPaulSchoemaker(1993)resourcesarethestocksoftangibleandintangibleassetsthatare available to the organisation. As discussed, the EU tends to use the term capabilitiesessentially as shorthand for resources and, in particular, when referring to ‘civiliancapabilities’,theemphasisisoncivilianpersonnel.ThisisthecaseintheEUHeadlineGoalsof2001,2008and2010,wheretheEUdevelopedalistofresourcerequirements,includingtargetsfortherequiredpersonnelforvariousciviliancrisismanagementmissions.There are a number of different categorisations of resources and these might includehumanresources,financialresources,physicalresources(suchasbuildings,equipment,etc.)andorganisationalresources(procedures,organisationalculture,structures,andsoon). Inmilitarydoctrine,resources(alsoknownas‘capabilitysolutions’)areusuallydividedintothefollowingcategories(abbreviatedasDOTMLPF):

• Doctrine:thevision,guidingprinciples,waysofdoingthings,andpolicies.• Organisation: the internal structure and institutions, internal communication

practices,andsoon.• Training:educationandprofessionaldevelopment.• Material:equipment,toolsandinfrastructure(includingITsystemsandsoftware).


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• Leadership:theabilitytoleadagroupofpeopleand/ortheorganisationbysettingclear,well-definedobjectives.

• Personnel:staff(includingknowledgeandskills).• Facilities:buildings(e.g.headquarters).

To these categories we need to add Finances, which refers to the financial resources,programmes and techniquesof theorganisation. Theprojectwill use the resultant set ofcategorisations (DOTMLPFF) when examining the EU’s resources in the area of conflictprevention.For its part, capability can be defined as the ability to combine the abovementionedresourcestoachieveanobjective.Thisunderstandingofcapabilityisclosertothecolloquialunderstandingofcapability.Forinstance,theOxfordDictionarydefinesacapabilityas“thepower or ability to do something” (Oxford Dictionaries n.d.). It also draws on similardefinitionsinthestrategicmanagementliteratureandmilitarydoctrine.Forinstance,Amitand Schoemaker (1993) define capabilities as “the capacity to deploy a combination ofresources through collective organizational routines to achieve goals.” In this and otherelements of strategic management literature, organisational capabilities are seen as avaluable source of competitive advantage (Teece et al. 1997). The US Army also definescapability as “the ability to achieve a desired effect under specified standards andconditions through combinations ofmeans andways to perform a set of tasks” ormoresimplyas“theabilitytoachieveanobjectiveinamilitaryoperation”(JCSJ-8,2009:6).2Anotherimportantdistinctionintheliteratureisbetweenordinaryanddynamiccapabilities.According to David Teece (2016: 204), the former type of capability involves “theperformance of administrative, operational, and governance-related functions that arenecessary to the execution of current plans.” SydneyWinter (2003: 991) also calls these“‘zero-level’ capabilitieswhichare those thatpermita firm to ‘makea living’ in the shortterm.” By contrast, dynamic capabilities (also known as ‘higher-order’ capabilities) are“higher-levelactivitiesthatcanenableanenterprisetodirectitsordinaryactivitiestowardhigh-demand uses, develop new capabilities, and effectively coordinate (or ‘orchestrate’)internalandexternal resourcestoaddress…shapeshiftingbusinessenvironments” (Teece2016: 3; see also Winter 2003). However, Winter (2003) distinguishes ‘ad hoc problemsolving’(whenthechangeistheresultofforcemajeureoranimpositionfromabove)fromthedynamiccapabilitiesofanorganisationtolearnandadapt,whichinvolvepatternedand

2 The CBA UserManual provides the following example: “youmay be assessing integrated air andmissiledefense,andyouarecontemplatingatypicalregionalconflict.Theoverarchingobjectiveistowinthewar,andasubordinateobjectivewouldbetowinthegroundbattle.Towinthegroundbattle,wemaychoosetodeployground forces, and those forces have to be protected from enemy air andmissile attack at their ports ofdebarkation.Providingthatprotectionisthecapabilitythatyouareassessing”(JCSJ-8,2009:39).


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routine activities todealwithpotential change (for example a newproduct developmentprocessora lessons learnedsystem).Weshouldalsonote that there isnoautomatic linkbetween thedevelopment of dynamic capabilities and increased effectiveness. AsWinter(2003:4)argues:

That investing in dynamic capabilities (ofwhatever order) can be a partial hedgeagainst theobsolescenceofexistingcapability,andcansometimesyield relativelysustainable advantage, is obvious from the nature of ‘dynamic capability,’ asdefinedhere. That this cannotbeuniformlyor inevitably advantageous is equallyobvious[…].

Dynamic capabilities are thus intrinsically connected with the ability to learn of anorganisation.Forinstance,MaurizioZolloandSydneyWinter(2002)suggestthatlearningisnot only at the base of dynamic capabilities, but can also be considered as a dynamiccapability itself. As such, they argue that “dynamic capabilities are shaped by the co-evolution of learning mechanisms” (Zollo and Winter, 2002: 339). By studying dynamiccapabilities, we seek to better understand whether the EU has the capabilities to learn,sensetheenvironmentandadapttoittomoreeasilyandeffectivelyachieveitsgoals.33.ACAPABILITY-BASEDASSESSMENT

Thedefinitionof capabilitiesadoptedby thispaperhas theadvantageofmoving fromanunderstandingofcapabilitiesasresourcestocloselylinkingresourcestoobjectives.Fromamilitaryperspective,forinstance,thismoveseekstoavoidsomeearlierpitfalls:

Oneof themajor frustrationsof thepreviousrequirementsprocesseswas thatsolutionswereintroducedtothesystemwithoutanyrationalizationintermsofmilitary objectives. The intent was to replace statements such as “we need amore advanced fighter,” with “we need the capability to defeat enemy airdefenses.” The latter statementnotonly justifies theneed,but alsoallows forcompetitionamongsolutions(JCSJ-82009:5).

It was for this reason that the US Department of Defense (DoD) established the JointCapabilitiesIntegrationandDevelopmentSystem(JCIDS)in2003,whichwasresponsiblefor introducing the idea of Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA). The CBA sought “to linkstrategic ends to warfighting means. Furthermore, these documents would have to go

3Ontheconceptof learningand itsapplicationtoEU-CIVCAP,seeSmith,M.E.(2017), ‘InstitutionalLearningandLessons Identified inEUCivilianConflictPrevention:AFramework forAnalysis’,EU-CIVCAPDL7.4,May[accessed10May2017],availablefrom:https://eu-civcap.net/portfolio/deliverables/.


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Identifyobjective(s)

•WhattheEUmustdo•Strategy(ESS,EUGS)•Policydocuments(ImplementationPlan)•Operationaldocuments(mandate,CONOPS)

Determinecurrentcapabilities

•WhattheEUcandowithexistingcapabilities•Primaryandsecondarysources•Interviews•Workshops

Identifygapsincapabilities

•WhattheEUcannotdo•Primaryandsecondaryliterature•Interviews•Workshops

Recommendations

•Identifysolutionstosolveormitigatecapabilitygaps(e.g.materialandnon-materialresources)

beyonddoctrine,whicharebeliefsaboutthebestwaytodothingswithexistingresources.The joint conceptswould have to challenge existing approaches and provide impetus forimprovement”(JCSJ-82009:5).ThebasicmethodologyforconductingaCBAisasfollows:

TheCBAmust firstsynthesizeexistingguidancetospecify themilitaryproblemstobe studied. TheCBA thenexamines that problem, assesses howwell theDoD canaddress the problem given its current program, and recommends needs the DoDshouldaddress.Finally,theCBAconsideredcosts,andpresentedalternativesolutionportfolios[orcoursesofaction].(JCSJ-82009:9)

Again, this is not different from the way capability gap assessments are conducted inbusinesses. First, one would determine the capabilities that are needed for a particularbusiness need (or objective); then the current state of each capabilitywould need to bedocumented,aswellas futureprojectionsofthesecapabilities; finally,onewouldhavetoidentifywhatgapsexistbetweenthecurrentandfuturestate.Byassessingcapabilitygaps,one can determine whether the enterprise can meet its business needs using existingcapabilitiesandusingitsexistingorganisationalresourcesorwhethernewcapabilitiesneedtobedeveloped.InthecaseofEUconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding,themethodologyforcapabilities-basedassessmentscanbesummarisedbytheflowchartbelow,inFigure1.

Figure1.Capabilities-basedassessment

Ifwe examine thismodel inmore detail, the initial stage consists of identifying the EU’sobjectivesasafirststepindeterminingthecapabilitiesrequiredtoachievethoseobjectives.Thisisnotwithoutitsproblems,however.TheEUhastraditionallyexperienceddifficultiesindefining clear foreign and security policy goals because of disagreements between thememberstatesanddiversestrategiccultures.TheclosestithascometodefiningsuchgoalsisrepresentedbytheEuropeanSecurityStrategy,adoptedbytheDecember2003EuropeanCouncil.AccordingtoHoworth (2007:202), theESS“inevitablyconstitutessomethingofacompromisebetweendifferentculturesandapproachesamong theEU’smember states.”ThedocumentidentifiesthekeythreatsandchallengesfacingtheEU,namelyterrorism,theproliferationofweaponsofmassdestruction,regionalconflicts,statefailureandorganised


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crime.ThreestrategicobjectiveswerealsooutlinedintheESS.Thefirstwastotacklethesethreats and challenges. The second stipulated that the EU should seek to build a secureneighbourhood in Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The thirdobjectivewastobuildaglobalorderbasedoneffectivemultilateralismandtherespectofinternational law. To achieve these objectives, the document notes that “the first line ofdefencewill often be abroad” and stresses the need for a “comprehensive approach” tosecurity,bringingtogethercivilianandmilitarytools,asnoneofthesethreatscanbetackledby“purelymilitarymeans.”TheESScallsontheEUtobeamoreactive,morecoherentandmore capable international actor and to develop a “strategic culture that fosters early,rapid,andwhennecessary,robustintervention.”

Although the ESS provides a framework for how the EU does security, it does not rankthreats according to priority so it is difficult to allocate resources effectively and todeterminehow to achieve the goals identified in theESS. InDecember2008, theCounciladopted a report on the implementation of the ESS, in which new threats were alsoidentified–cybersecurity,energysecurity,climatechangeandpiracy.ThenewEUGlobalStrategy (EUGS) (2016) alsoprovides guidance as towhat theobjectivesof the EU in thearea of conflict prevention and peacebuilding are. The EUGS identifies the followingpriorities:protectingthesecurityoftheUnion;fosteringstateandsocietalresilienceintheneighbourhood; developing an integrated approach to conflict and crises; investing incooperative regional orders, and promoting a reformed global governance fit for the 21stcentury. Inorderto identifymorespecificobjectives,onewill thenhavetohavea lookatthe relevantpolicydocuments, namely the ImplementationPlanon Security andDefence(2016) and other relevant Council Conclusions and declarations, High Representativestatementsandreports,Commissionreports,etc.Finally,otheroperationaldocuments(forexample, in the case of civilian crisismanagement operations, Council Decision, CONOPSandOPLAN)willalsoneedtobeincorporatedintotheanalysis.

OncewehaveidentifiedwhattheEUmustdo,weneedtodeterminewhethertheEUhasthecapabilitiestoachievetheseobjectives(whattheEUcando).Acapabilityisanabilitytodo something. To identify existing capabilities,we could start at amore abstract level bylooking at the EU’s international roles. For instance, Christopher Hill has identified thefollowing EU roles: a key actor in the global balance of power; a regional pacifier; globalintervenor; a mediator of conflicts; and a bridge between rich and poor and as a jointsupervisor of theworld economy.4 These roles or tasks are linked to capabilities that hedefines as the EU’s “ability to agree, its resources, and the instruments at its disposal”(1992:315).ForHill,whenitcomestocapabilities,theimportantthingisnotjustresources,but“theabilitytotakeondecisionsandholdtothem”(1992:318).Inbothregards,Hillseesan increasing void between the capabilities of the EU and expectations, the so-called‘capability-expectationgap’.Hearguesthat“theCommunitydoesnothavetheresourcesorthe political structure to be able to respond to the demands […] The consequential gap

4OntheEU’sinternationalroles,seealsoElgströmandSmith2006.


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whichhasopenedupbetweencapabilitiesandexpectations isdangerous”(Hill1992:315,emphasisinoriginal).

AlthoughHill’s definition of capabilities is different from the one used by EU-CIVCAP, hispoint about the impact of internal and external demands is an important one as thesedemandsarelikelytoshapetheambitionsandthus,theobjectivesoftheEU.Moreover,theEU’s international roles as envisaged by the EU itself are not that different from thoseidentified by Hill a quarter of a century ago. According to the European External ActionService (EEAS), the “EU’s many international roles” include the following: contributor topeace; a responsibleneighbour; developmentpartner; human rightsdefender; partner tothe United Nations, force for global security; crisis response and humanitarian aid (EEASn.d.). The official descriptions of these roles (see EEAS n.d.) might suggest that the EUalreadyhascapabilitiesintheseareas.TheobjectiveofEU-CIVCAP,however,istoprovideacriticalexaminationofwhetherornottheEUdoesinfactpossessthesecapabilities.

Capabilities can be subdivided into different functional tasks. In the military context,capability is divided into the following functions: command and control, inform, engage,protect, deploy and sustain (see e.g. EDA 2008).More specifically, in the area of civiliancrisismanagementonecanrefertothe‘listofgenericcivilianCSDPtasks’ofcivilianmissionsthatwas developed by the CrisisManagement and Planning Directorate (CMPD) and theCivilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) in 2015 as a way to support capabilitydevelopmentprocesses(EEAS2015). InthepasttheEUviewedtheconceptofcapabilitiesassynonymouswithresourcesanddevelopedalonglistofresourcerequirements.Instead,thelistofgenerictasksputstheemphasisonfunctionsandtasksthatneedtobedeliveredby civilian CSDP missions, thereby allowing for the identification of capability gaps.According to the list of generic tasks, one of the objectiveswill be to “identify capabilityrequirements related to planning, conduct and overall support of civilian CSDPmissions”(EEAS2015:2).Thegenericciviliantasksaregroupedintofive‘capabilityclusters’asfollows(seealsoFigure2):

• Under command and control fall generic tasks of initiating, conceiving, enabling,monitoringanddirectingmissionsacrossthechainofcommand.

• Theengageand implement clusterencompassesaspectsofmandatedelivery, andengagementwithlocalauthoritiesandotherrelevantstakeholders.

• The inform cluster encompasses gathering, analysing and transmitting informationforthepurposeofbeingwellinformedandinformingothers.

• Theset-upandsustainstrandcontainsgenerictasksenablingacivilianCSDPmissionfromapracticalpointofview,inparticularformissionstart-up,aswellasaidingthesustainabilityofsucheffortsduringthemissionlifetime.

• Underdutyofcaretherearegenerictasksrelatedtosecurity,safetyandwellbeing.


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Figure2.GenericcivilianCSDPtasks

Each of these subtasks is then described in Annex I of the document (see EEAS 2015);capabilities are described in this document as functions or tasks, rather than resources,whichisclosertoourdefinition.Notallofthesetasksareapplicabletoallareasofconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding(dutyofcare,forexample),however,althoughsomecouldbeeasilyadapted.Forthisreason,wemightwanttoapplyanotherbroadersetofcategoriesinstead.

Another useful framework to assess existing EU capabilities in conflict prevention andpeacebuilding is the five core capabilities (‘5Cs’) framework,which has been used by thedevelopment community for the purposes of capacity development (see, for instance,Keijzeretal.2011).Here,capabilityorcapacityisdefinedas“theabilityofahumansystemto perform, sustain itself, and self-renew” (Ubels et al. 2010: 4). The 5Cs framework


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understands organisational capacity as a combination of five core functional capabilities(IPAT2015):

1) thecapabilitiesto‘commitandact’,i.e.toplan,totakedecisionsandtoactonthesedecisionscollectively;

2) to‘relateandattract’:theabilitytocreateandsustainlinkswithexternalactorsandstakeholders;

3) to ‘balance diversity and coherence’ refers to the ability to achieve coherencebetweendifferentobjectives,activitiesandactorswithintheorganisation;

4) to‘createresults’:theabilitytodeliveronitsobjectives;5) to ‘adaptandself-renew’: theabilityofanorganisationto learn fromexternaland

internal developments and to adjust to these changes. This capabilitywould thenlinktotheconceptof‘dynamiccapabilities’discussedearlier.

This frameworkhelps toassess theabilityofanorganisation todeliveronobjectives,butalsotosustainitselfandadapttochallenges.Inotherwords,itunderstandscapabilitiesnotjust as static, but also dynamic (see the earlier section of this paper on Capabilities).Moreover, intermsofcategories, this isabroader frameworkthantheoneappliedtoEUcivilian crisis management missions (see above) and could thus be used to assess otherconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingactivitiesexaminedbytheEU-CIVCAPproject.Figure3 provides a number of indicators that can be used to assess each of these functionalcapabilities.


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Figure3.The5CsFramework:SomeIndicators

Source:Keijzeretal.2011:61.


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Insum,thepreviousmodels/frameworksshouldprovideusefulguidancewhenconductingCBAsinthefieldofconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding.Ratherthanbeingappliedrigidly,eachoftheseisbroadenoughtoallowvariationandadaptation,dependingontheconflictphaseandtopicsunderreview.

Oncewehaveestablishedthelevelofcurrentcapabilities,thefinalstepintheCapabilities-BasedAssessmentwouldbetodetermineanygapsincapabilities,inotherwordswhattheEU cannot do, by comparing current and required capabilities. The identification of gapsshould then lead to recommendations for capability development, including specificresource requirements. Insum, theEU-CIVCAPproject startsby identifyingobjectivesandthenidentifiesresourcerequirements,ratherthantheotherwayround.

4.METHODOLOGYANDDATACOLLECTION Thisprojectconductsacomparativestudyofciviliancapabilitiesinconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding.Problemsregarding thedevelopmentofoptimalciviliancapabilities for thepreventionofandresponsetoconflictarenotexclusivetotheEU.SincetheendoftheColdWar, conflict prevention and peacebuilding have risen to prominence on the agendas ofgovernments and international organisations (Boutros-Ghali 1992; OSCE 2011; UN 2001,2004). These actors have been faced with similar problems regarding the selection,recruitment and deployment of civilian personnel, for instance (see UN 2009, 2011).However, despite efforts to improve and reform existing organisational capabilities andprocedures,therehasbeenamultitudeofisolated,sometimescompetinginitiatives,butnoattempttodevelopcommonbestpractice.ThisprojectwillcomparetheeffortsoftheEU,UN and the OSCE in conflict prevention and peacebuilding with a view to identify keylessons learned and common best practices (see WP4). By comparing European andinternational efforts in this area, the project will be able to gather relevant insightsregarding the coherence and effectiveness of these efforts and the potential forstrengtheningcapabilities.

EU-CIVCAPwill alsodrawon theempirical findings from two case studies, comparing theEU’sengagementintwokeyregions:theWesternBalkansandtheHornofAfrica(seeWP5andWP6).TheWesternBalkanshasbeenandremainsakeyareaofengagementfortheEUsince thedissolutionof theYugoslavianFederation in the1990s (Blockmans2007; Juncos2013). It has also become a test-bed for CSDP capabilities and the EU’s comprehensiveapproach. The Horn of Africa has become a focus of activity for the EU more recently,especiallygiventheriseinmaritimepiracyandterrorismintheregion(GermondandSmith2009; Olsen 2014). By analysing and comparing the EU’s implementation of conflictprevention and crisismanagement activities in these two regions, important insights intothedevelopmentofciviliancapabilitiesforconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding,aswellaskeyoperationalchallenges,willbegenerated.


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In order to collect robust evidence, EU-CIVCAP’s empirical research will simultaneouslymakeuseofvariousmethodsofdatacollection.First,documentaryanalysiswillprovideabasis todetermineexistingcapabilitiesandrecentchanges introducedwith theentry intoforceof theLisbonTreaty.Thedocumentarymaterialswill consistofprimarydocuments,secondary literature and other documentary sources. Regarding primary sources, thedocuments will include EU official documents (EU Treaties, Council Declarations, CouncilConclusions, etc.) and legislative and official documents from other internationalorganisationsandEUmemberstates(e.g.resolutions,statementsanddebates).Allofthesedocumentsarepubliclyaccessibleonthewebpagesoftherelevantinstitutions.Inthecaseofdatanotpubliclyavailable,therelevantauthorisationswillbeobtainedandprovidedtotheResearchExecutiveAgencypriortotheuseofconfidentialdata(seeDL1.6).Secondaryliterature will include academic books, articles, newspaper articles, media reports, thinktanksandNGOpublications.

EU-CIVCAP’sdocumentaryanalysiswillbesupplementedbysemi-structuredinterviewswithaselectednumberofactorsinvolvedinconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingactivities.Theaimofthequalitative interviewswillbetocontextualisethedocumentarymaterialandtoprovideanin-depthinsightintotheprocessesofcapabilitydevelopment,existingshortfallsandbestpracticesinthisarea.Thesemi-structurednatureoftheseinterviewsmeansthatalistofopen-endedquestionswillbepreparedbeforetheinterviews,buttheirsequencemayvary and other questions might be asked in response to interviewees’ replies (Bryman2008).Whenpreparingtheinterviews,researcherswillpayparticularattentiontoissuesofaccessandthesafetyofboththe intervieweeandtheresearcher(seeEthicsRequirement14),consent,andanonymity(seethenextsectiononethicalissuesandinterviews).

In parallel with these activities, the project team will hold a series of workshops andseminarscomprisingarangeofstakeholdersfromthepublicandinstitutionalsectoraswellasfromlocalcommunities,theprivateandbusinesssector,theaimofwhichistofacilitatediscussion and scrutiny of our emergent research findings by the conflict prevention andpeacebuildingcommunityitself.Whererelevant,theinsightsgainedatthesemeetingswillthenbeincorporatedintothefinalversionsofthedeliverables.

4.1FIELDWORK:ETHICALISSUESANDRISKS

Thereareanumberofethicalissuesthatarisefromconductingfieldworkinanenvironmentwherethereisconflictatanylevel,andwhereaccusationsofinjusticeareongoing.5Firstly,byspeakingwithusandmakingcertainclaims,someintervieweesnaturallyputthemselvesat a certain level of risk.While it is our responsibility tominimise this risk, it cannot becompletely eliminated (British Sociological Association 2004: 4; ESRC 2015: 27), and thenecessity of obtaining the informed consent of these individuals is compounded by this

5ThissectiononethicalissuesandrisksrelatedtofieldworkisadaptedfromGilbertoAlgar-Faria’sPhDthesis.


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ever-present element of risk.6 As a result, we will brief interviewees fully regarding thenature of the study and the risks involved in their participation, allowing them time toconsiderhowtheyfeelabouttakingpartandtoaskusanyquestionsthatwishaboutourstudy.

Whilesomeintervieweesmaydeclinetoparticipateinthestudyasaresultoflearningmoreabout it (aspredictedbyRoseWilesandher colleagues (2005a)), it isourbelief that it ismore important that all participating candidates are fully aware of these risks. However,there are multiple issues associated with gaining genuine consent, some of which aresummarisedbelowbyWilesandcolleagues:

Itis…difficulttoassesswhetherconsentis‘really’informed.Dilemmasinclude:thevalueofsignedconsentforms;howtoassesstheability(or‘competence’)ofindividuals to give informed consent, especially for groups characterised as‘vulnerable’; how to recognise that people want to withdraw from theirinvolvementinaresearchstudy;howtoavoidgatekeepersdenyingconsentforpeople to participate or include people who have not truly consented; andwhetherconsentshouldberestrictedtodatacollectionorincludethewaysthatdataareinterpretedandpresented.(Wilesetal.2005a)

The above list seems a reasonably good benchmark against which to assess one’sprecautions.MostintervieweesintheregionscoveredbyEU-CIVCAP,beingfromtheNGOsphereoranotherprofessionthatbringsthemintofrequentcontactwithresearchers,arelikelytounderstandthevalueand implicationsofsigningaconsent form. In fact, insomecases we may have to ensure that the most internationally engaged individuals are notcomplacent when reading through the information sheet and consent form. Conversely,some intervieweesmay express concerns about various aspects of the study and/or theconsentformbeforedecidingeithertoconsentortodecline.

Wheneverweconductparticipatoryresearch,itwillbemadecleartotheintervieweesthatthey do not have to sign a form, and that in that case we would not use any of theinformationtheymayormaynotchoosetoprovide.Accordingtotheirpreferences,someindividualsmaybeemaileda copyof the information sheetandconsent formbefore theinterviewwhile otherswill be presented a paper copy at the beginning of the interview.Someoftheseindividualsmaybehappytosignbutfirsthavequestionsabouttheform.

Someindividualsrequiremoreexplanationoftheconsentprocedurethanothers.Assomeinterviewerswill beworkingwithin culturesquiteunlike theirown,wewill payparticularattentiontoensuringaconsistentunderstandingoftheconsentprocess(seeMarshallandBatten2004).WhereaprospectiveparticipantdoesnotspeaktherequiredlevelofEnglish,itwill be necessary to have the formorally translated for and explained to them in theirnative languagebya friendor colleague theynominate, forexample.On theotherhand,

6ThesearecontainedwithintheEU-CIVCAPGrantAgreementonEthicalrequirementsandtheEU-CIVCAPConsentForm.


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some individuals may be overly confident in their ability to avoid retribution for theircomments (orarewilling tobearwhateverconsequences theircommentsmighthave). Insuchcases,ourownjudgementabouttheirabilitytogiveconsentwillberequiredandwemayaccepttheirsignedconsent forms,butomitelementsof the interviewthatwedeemoverlyriskytotranscribeand/orpublish(thisdecisionwillbebasedonourawarenessofthetypesofinformationthatthemajorityofintervieweesinagivencontextarenotwillingtodivulge).

Wewilldoeverythingwecan toprotect the information that intervieweesprovide tous.Informantswillbemadeawareofthewaysinwhichtheycanwithdrawfromtheresearchstudyeitherduringtheintervieworafterwards,priortogivingfinalconsentinwriting.Wewillanonymisealldatacollectedandtrytoensurethatourparticipantsperceiveanonymityin the same way as we do. Data collected will be anonymous from the note-taking orrecording stage.Wewillomitanynamesofpeople,organisations,programmesoreventsthatcouldreveal the identityof the individualswemeet.Thissystemwillbeexplainedtotheintervieweespriortoeachinterview.

Thereisaninherenttensionforeveryresearcherbetweentheimperativeofattainingusefulresearch findings and the requirement for informants to be protected. We are aware,however,thatwehavetheresponsibilitytoremoveparticipantsfromthestudywherewebelievethattheydonotunderstandtheimplicationsoftheirinvolvement,wheretheyareindanger, where we do not believe that they consented properly or where they appearuncomfortableorhavewithdrawntheirconsent.Thissituationcanbeavoidedbybuildingup trust and consent with interviewees over an extended period of time rather thanrequiringthemtosignaformthefirsttimewemeet.Thisisnotalwayspossible,however.Althoughtherewillalwaysbesituationswhereconsentcannotbeobtained(Spicker2007:3),undernocircumstanceswouldweeverconductcovertresearch,whichwouldbetraythetrustofourparticipants(Wilesetal.2005b).Individualswillalwaysbefullyawareofwhentheyarebeinginterviewedandwewillalwaystrytoavoidmakingthemfeeluncomfortablewhenspeakingtous.

Thereareissuesinvolvedinconductingfieldwork–notonlywiththenatureofconsentandthe risks arising from the informants’ association with us and our research project, butbeyond that, there is also the risk of upsetting or damaging participants throughretraumatisation during the interviews. Retraumatisation can occur when a person isreminded of a traumatic event in their lives. In order to minimise the chance of thishappening, we will avoid mentioning potentially upsetting events relevant to theinterviewee’s given context, and from each individual’s past, andwill be considerate andrelaxed in our interview styles and structures, prioritising their wellbeing above theimperative toobtain information.Thosewhogive information thatcouldbeupsetting forthemmaydosooftheirownfreewill,unprompted.Wearealsoaware,ofcourse,thatwemustbecarefulnot to (re)traumatiseourselves in thecourseofour fieldwork.Suchrisks,takentogether,addtotheoveralllimitationsofthisstudy.


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Asfarassafetyissuesareconcerned,themeasuresaredetailedintheEthicsRequirement14.AspartoftheUniversityofBristol,theprojectisrequiredtocomplywiththeFacultyofSocial Science and Law and University policies for health and safety in research. Thesedemand that the appropriate fieldwork and travel risk assessment documentation iscompleted prior to the commencement of fieldwork by the Principal Investigator andresearchers,andthatappropriateinsurancecoverhasbeenarrangedforallresearchersontheproject.

For thepurposesof EU-CIVCAP fieldwork research, risk assessmentswill be conducted tounderstand and mitigate risks, and to ensure the safety of the researchers undertakinginterviews and conducting workshops in the field. This will entail, where required, thatrespectiveinstitutionalLoneWorkerpoliciesarefollowed,providingguidanceonsafetyforresearchersworkingalone.Thisentailstheestablishmentofproceduresforchecking-inondeparture and return, regular check-ins whilst away, plus the agreement of emergencyprocedures, including those to engage in cases of non-contact.Where fieldwork is to beconductedinspaceswithaheightenedsecurityrisk,suchasCambodiaortheHornofAfrica,pre-departure security checks of the conditions on the ground will be conducted inconjunction with the respective foreign office of the country in which that researcher isbased(forexampletheForeignandCommonwealthOfficeforUKresearchers).Ininstanceswhere fieldwork is conducted abroad, researchers will need to establish procedures forevacuationincaseofabreakdownincivilorder,orforpersonalhealthorsecurityreasons.Insurancewillalsobe required,andspecialist covermaybeneeded (this isassessedonacase-by-casebasis).TheseprocedureswillbeheldwiththeConsortiumCoordinatorattheUniversityofBristol,andwiththerelevantresearchersattheirowninstitution.

5.CONCLUDINGREMARKS

This paper has presented a conceptual and methodological framework to support theimplementation of the EU-CIVCAP project and defined the key concepts of conflictprevention,peacebuilding,resourcesandcapabilitiestoensureconsistencyacrossdifferentworkpackages anddeliverables. Thepaperhasdrawnona rangeof literatures (strategicmanagement,developmentandmilitarystudies,forexample)anddevelopedacapabilities-basedassessmentapproach.TheCBAwillbeusedbytheWPstoidentifygapsincapabilitiesin different phases of the conflict cycle. This framework allows for the identification ofexisting and required capabilities in order for the EU to achieve its goals in conflictprevention and peacebuilding. This framework moves from previous assessments of EUcapabilitieswhichhavefocusedonshort-termrequirementstoamorestrategicandholisticapproach to capability development by linking goals to capabilities. The paper alsosummarises theproject’smethodologyanddatacollectionmethods, includingethicalandrisk-related issues, to be considered by those conducting empirical fieldwork, especiallywherethatfieldworkiscarriedoutinconflictareas.


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ANNEXI.EU-CIVCAPOBJECTIVES

(1) ToassessEUciviliancapabilitiesforexternalconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding

EU-CIVCAP will analyse and synthesise existing research in order to generate a clearassessmentofEUcapabilitiesforcivilianconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding.Theanalysiswillcovertwokeydimensions:

i. EU-CIVCAPwillexamineEUconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingthroughoutthe ‘lifecycleofconflict’.WorkPackages(WPs)3to6willcarryoutacapabilities-basedanalysisin different phases of the EU’s engagement in conflict areas: fromearlywarning andconflictanalysistoearlyresponse,theexecutionofEUcivilianandmilitarymissionsandsupportforlocalcapacity-building.Bydoingso,EU-CIVCAPwillnotonlyincludeshort-termstabilisationandconflictprevention initiatives,butalso long-termpeacebuildingmeasures,inaccordancewiththescopeofthiscall.

ii. WPs2to6willfocusonthefollowingcross-cuttingchallengesinEUconflictpreventionand peacebuilding: filling the early warning/response gap; combining short-term vslong-termapproachestoconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding;enhancingcivil-militarycoordinationinconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding;andensuringlocalownership.

To achieve this objective, the project will apply a comprehensive, comparative andmultidisciplinaryapproachtoEUconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding.Fromacomparativeperspective,EU-CIVCAPwillevaluatetheEU’srecordtodateandcompareittothatofotherinternationalactors(theUNandtheOSCE,forexample).Moreover,byevaluatingtheEU’sengagement in twokey regions (theWesternBalkansand theHornofAfrica), EU-CIVCAPwillgeneratesignificantinsightsintooperationalchallenges.

(2) To identify and document lessons learned and best practices in EU conflictpreventionandpeacebuilding

Drawing on the assessment of the EU’s past and ongoing civilian and military efforts(Objective 1), this project will identify and document empirically grounded lessons, bestpractices and solutions to better address key challenges in EU conflict prevention andpeacebuilding. Lessons learned gathered byWPs 2 to 6 will be compiled byWP7 into acatalogueoflessonslearnedandbestpracticesreports.LessonslearnedandbestpracticesgatheredbyEU-CIVCAPwilladdressthefollowingissues:

• Taking into account the fact that ‘conflicts cannot be overcome solely bymilitary orcivilianmeansalone’,thisprojectwilladdressthequestionofhowcivilianandmilitary


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instrumentscanbebettercoordinatedand integrated.Thefocuswillbeonhowcivil-military synergies can be better exploited to develop enhanced capabilities, newanddual-usetechnologies,andsolutionstopreventandrespondtointernationalconflicts.

• Lessonslearnedandbestpracticeswillalsobegatheredregardingthepotentialforthepoolingandsharingofcapabilitiesandtechnologiesforcivilianconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding.

• ThecomparativeanalysisbetweentheEU,theUNandtheOSCEwillalsofeedintotheenhancementofEUcivilianconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingcapabilities.

• ThecomparativeanalysisoftheEU’sroleintheWesternBalkansandtheHornofAfricawillmakeavailablevaluable lessonsonthe implementationofconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingtopolicymakersandexpertsinthefield.

(3) To enhance future policy practice and research on EU conflict prevention andpeacebuilding

Based on the assessment of EU activities (Objective 1) and the identification of lessonslearnedandbestpracticesinthisarea(Objective2),theprojectwillprovideresearch-basedpolicy recommendations to guide the EU’s future priorities and research in conflictprevention and peacebuilding. This objective will be addressed by WPs 7 and 8. Morespecifically:

• ThefindingsofEU-CIVCAPwillenhancepolicy-relevantknowledgeandpractice in theareaofEUcivilianconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding.Theconsortiumwillproduceaset of policy recommendations for the improvement and development of civiliancapabilities.Theprojectwillidentify:thebestciviliancapabilitiestoensuresustainablepeace in conflict-affected zones; key shortfalls in EU civilian capabilities andtechnologies andhow to address them; recommendations for pooling and sharing ofcapabilities;and,finally,asetofpolicyprioritiesfortheexploitationofcivilian-militarysynergies.

• The findings of this project will contribute to the identification of key priorities forfuture H2020 calls in the area of civilian conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Inparticular, by identifying key conceptual, theoretical and empirical gaps in theunderstandingofEUconflictpreventioncapabilities,EU-CIVCAPwillprovide thebasisforthedevelopmentoffutureresearchprioritiesforH2020calls.


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ANNEXII.THELIFECYCLEOFCONFLICT

EU-CIVCAPadoptsan innovativeconceptualframework.Therearetwodimensionstothis.The first is temporal or longitudinal. This is the life cycle of a conflict, orwhat it is alsoknownasthe‘conflictcycle’.IndividualworkpackageslinktodifferentstagesoftheconflictcycletoprovideacomprehensiveanalysisofEUciviliancapabilitiesforconflictpreventionand peacebuilding (see Figure 4). The second dimension is a horizontal one. Each workpackage examines a number of cross-cutting issues, which have been identified in theliterature as critical to civilian capabilities (see Annex III). Before turning to these twodimensions,however,itisimportanttodefinethekeyterms.

Conflict prevention and peacebuilding are not isolated initiatives. Rather, they are bestconceptualised as a continuum of activities covering various stages of the life cycle ofconflict (from rising tensions to the outbreak of conflict to post-crisis stabilisation). Thus,EU-CIVCAP will examine conflict prevention and peacebuilding through the entire conflictcycleinordertoprovideaholisticassessmentofexistingcapabilitiesandpotentialcapabilityshortfalls(seeFigure4).

Morespecifically,theprojectwillexaminethefollowingphases:

•Conflictprevention:Thisincludespreventativemeasuressuchasconflictanalysis,earlywarning, conflict sensitive development programming (CSDP), political dialogue andmediationactivities.ThesepoliciesextendbeyondthescopeoftheCSDPtootherpolicyareas, including trade and development. These activities, including the integration ofgenderinconflictpreventioninitiatives,willbethefocusofWP3.

•Earlyresponse:Thisphaseincludesthosemeasureslaunchedbyinternationalactorsinresponse to the outbreak of violence, including shuttle diplomacy and mediationbetween conflict parties.WP4 places particular emphasis on how the EU, itsmemberstates,theUNandtheOSCEreacttotheoutbreakofviolenceandhowtheycoordinate(ordonotcoordinate)theireffortsduringthisphase.

• Execution of civilian and military missions: This refers to the implementation ofmeasures aimedat stopping violence andpreventing the recurrenceof future conflict.WP5willexaminetheexecutionofcivilianandmilitarymissions,withaspecificemphasison the implementation of the comprehensive approach and the potential synergiesbetweencivilianandmilitaryinstrumentsinspecificconflictareas.

• Support for local capacity-building: This entails supporting the emergence ofinstitutionsandpracticeswithinthetargetsocietytosupportpeacefulconflictresolution.Local capacity building can be effectively divided into two sets of policy. The first set


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encompassesmeasurestoimprovethecapacityofthestateinconflictmanagementandresolution. These efforts include security sector reform, democratisation, training inlegislation, and professional training for bureaucrats. The second set is aimed at thegrassroots of society, emphasising the empowerment of local communities over theimportanceof the state. This has entailed the implementationofmeasures to supportthedevelopmentofarobustcivilsociety,whichinturnisassumedtoprovidethebasisforasustainabledemocraticgovernment.WP6willexaminebothsetsofpoliciesinordertoidentifycapabilityshortfallsincapacity-buildingactivities.

Figure4:Lifecycleofconflictandworkpackages

Foritspart,WP2providesanoverviewoftheEUandmemberstatecapabilitiesinconflictprevention and peacebuilding, focusing specifically on the technology, personnel andprocedures available. Finally,WP7will gather the empirical findings fromall of the otherworkpackagestocompileacatalogueoflessonslearnedandbestpracticesreports.

•CONFLICTMANAGEMENT&MITIGATION

•CRISISMANAGEMENTOPERATIONS

•WP5

•CONFLICTRESOLUTION&PEACEBUILDING

• LOCALCAPACITY-BUILDING

•WP6

•CRISISRESPONSE• EARLYRESPONSES(MEDIATION,NEGOTIATION)

•WP4

•CONFLICTPREVENTION

•CONFLICTANALYSIS,EARLYWARNINGMEASURES

•WP3

IMPENDINGCRISIS

OUTBREAKOF

VIOLENCE

WARPOST-CRISIS

WP2:PREPARE

WP7:LEARN

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