Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa: Results from 17 Country Studies
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Transcript of Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa: Results from 17 Country Studies
Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa: Results from 17 Country Studies
Will MastersPurdue University
www.agecon.purdue.edu/staff/masters
CSAE Conference on Economic Development in Africa March 20, 2007
Views expressed are the authors’ alone and not necessarily those of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or its Trust Funders (esp. UK and Dutch)
Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa
• A project led by Kym Anderson at the World Bank– to estimate incidence on farmers, processors & consumers– for >70 countries, all major farm products, 1955-2005– with country specialists using a common methodology – of all policies potentially subject to “stroke of the pen”
reform:• taxes/subsidies and other trade restrictions• parastatal firms and protected monopolies• not infrastructure, technology or institutions
• Project staff: – Kym Anderson (WB Project Director)– Ernesto Valenzuela, Marianne Kurzweil (WB staff)– Jo Swinnen (coordinator/editor for Eur. Transition Econs) – Alberto Valdes (coordinator/editor for Latin America)– Will Masters (coordinator/editor for Africa)
Authors of the African country studies
Cameroon:E. Bamou & W.A. Masters Cote d’Ivoire:P. AbbottEgypt: J.H. Cassing, S. Nassar & G. SiamEthiopia: S. Rashid M. Assefa & G. Ayele Ghana: J. Brooks and A. CroppenstedtKenya: A. Winter-Nelson & G. Argwings-KodhekMadagascar:F.M. RakotondrazakaMorocco: T. Roe & M.R. Doukkali
Mozambique: C. Arndt, X. Cicera & A. AlfieriNigeria: P. WalkenhorstSenegal: W.A. MastersSouth Africa: L. Edwards, J. Kirsten & N. VinkSudan: H. Faki & A. Taha AhmedTanzania: O. Morrissey & V. LeyaroUganda:A. Matthews & J. OpolotZambia: D. Ndlela & P. RobinsonZimbabwe: P. Robinson & D. Ndlela
Motivation: Trade policies have changed but still costly
Import-weighted average applied tariffs by level of processing and national income
1988-90 1995-97 2002-04
Reproduced from K. Anderson et al., “Methodology for Measuring Distortions to Agricultural Incentives,” revised 13 September 2006, available online at www.worldbank.edu/agdistortions.
0.38
0.68
0.75
1.89
Ag./Other
2.86
8.59
Motivation: Exchange reforms have had a large effect
Reproduced from K. Anderson et al., “Methodology for Measuring Distortions to Agricultural Incentives,” revised 13 September 2006, available online at www.worldbank.edu/agdistortions.
Black market exchange rate premia, weighted average across 59 developing and transition countries, by region, 1960 to 1993 (percent)
Motivation: Opportunity costs have changed
Source: K. Anderson (2006), “Reducing Distortions to Agricultural Incentives: Progress, Pitfalls and Prospects.” <www.worldbank.org/agdistortions>. Data shown are an index of export prices in US dollars for all major traded agricultural products, deflated by the MUV index which is the unit value of manufactures exported from France, Germany, Japan, UK and US, with weights based on those countries’ exports to developing countries.
Index of real international food prices, 1900 to 2005 (1977-79 =100)
Methodology: Calculating tariff-equivalent distortions
• trade distortions– infer the value of NTBs from price comparisons, between
• domestic prices (farmgate, retail or wholesale), and• border prices (unit values or price observations), minus• competitive margins (after “stroke of the pen” reforms)
– or, use observed value of tariffs, taxes and subsidies
• other subsidies/taxes (default is zero)– taxes/subsidies on production, marketing or consumption– taxes/subsidies on inputs, weighted by cost share at undistorted
prices
• exchange rate effects – official exchange rate– parallel exchange rate plus share of transactions in parallel market – or product-specific exchange rate if a multiple rate system is used
Methodology: Aggregation for policy analysis
• Within countries, all aggregates are value-weighted• Across countries, will see:
– simple averages (for political economy analyses)– value-weighted averages (for economic analyses)
• Key measures are:– NRAA = Nominal Rate of Assistance for primary agric (farming)
– NRAP = Nominal Rate of Assistance for agric processing
– CTE = Consumer Tax Equivalent for purchasers
– NRAM = Nominal Rate of Assistance on all importables
– NRAX = Nominal Rate of Assistance on all exportables
• For this summary, will focus on:– anti-farm bias as measured by aggregate NRAA
– anti-trade bias as measured by NRAM relative to NRAX
Methodology: Price transmission along marketing chain
• To what degree would policy reform change farm prices?– previous studies usually assume full transmission to farm prices
(= marketing services are elastically supplied at a fixed margin)
– at the other extreme, there could be no price transmission to farms
(= farm production is elastically supplied at a fixed reservation price)
• We allow country authors to specify their own estimates, for:– transmission from wholesale to farmgate (θ), and also
– tax incidence between sellers (λ) and buyers (1 – λ)
• Default value is equi-proportional transmission– some authors use their own judgment or econometric estimates
Methodology: Examples of price transmission
Influence of price transmission on the incidence of a 33% import tariff for a processed good whose primary product is nontradable
Full(all margins are fixed)
None(farm price is fixed)
(distribution cost is fixed)
(all sectors)Equi-proportionalPrice transmission:
Tax/subsidy measures: NRAA =farmer, NRAP =processor, CTE =consumer
Preliminary Results:Anti-farm* and anti-trade** bias in Africa
Average Protection (Taxation) of Agricultural Production for 16 African Countries, by Trade Status, 1961-2005
-1.00
-0.75
-0.50
-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1961
1963
1965
1967
1969
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
Importables
All Products
Exportables
Source: Preliminary results from K. Anderson and W.A. Masters (2007), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa. Washington, DC: The World Bank. (Online at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions.)
*Anti-farm bias is measured by the “All Products” line** Anti-trade bias is the gap between “Importables” and “Exportables”
Ad-
valo
rem
tar
iff e
quiv
alen
t
Average Protection (Taxation) of Agricultural Production in Africa, 1961-2005
-1.00
-0.75
-0.50
-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1961
1963
1965
1967
1969
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
Simple Ave. of 16 countries*
Weighted Ave. excl. Nigeria
Weighted Ave. excl. South Afr.
* with error bars showing the standard deviation in each
Africa’s anti-farm bias varies, but clearly worsens then improves over time
Source: Preliminary results from K. Anderson and W.A. Masters (2007), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa. Washington, DC: The World Bank. (Online at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions.)
Ad-
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t
Average Protection (Taxation) of Exportable Agriculture in Africa, 1961-2005
-1.00
-0.75
-0.50
-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1961
1963
1965
1967
1969
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
Simple Ave. of 16 countries*
Weighted Ave. excl. Nigeria
Weighted Ave. excl. South Afr.
* with error bars showing the standard deviation in each
Africa’s export taxes account for mostof the level and trend in its anti-farm bias
Source: Preliminary results from K. Anderson and W.A. Masters (2007), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa. Washington, DC: The World Bank. (Online at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions.)
Ad-
valo
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t
Average Protection (Taxation) of Importable Agriculture in Africa, 1961-2005
-1.00
-0.75
-0.50
-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1961
1963
1965
1967
1969
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
Simple Ave. of 16 countries*
Weighted Ave. excl. Nigeria
Weighted Ave. excl. South Afr.
* with error bars showing the standard deviation in each
(1.48 in 1987)
Africa’s import policies vary widely
Source: Preliminary results from K. Anderson and W.A. Masters (2007), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa. Washington, DC: The World Bank. (Online at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions.)
Ad-
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Summary of the evidence
• Agricultural trade policy has taxed farmers
– increasingly from 1961 to 1977 period, from 15 up to 40%;
– then at a reduced rate after 1987, back down to 15-20%
• Taxation increased sharply over 1960s and 1970s
– a doubling of export taxation, from 25 to 50%
– elimination of import protection, from 20% to <0
• Taxation has since been reduced just as much
– much lower export taxes, to well below 25%
– a period of high import protection in the 1980s
Summary of the evidence (continued)
• Import policy varies more than export taxes– across countries
• suggesting political-economy differences
– over time within countries • possibly stabilizing domestic prices
– across crops within countries• so welfare cost of distortion may have fallen by less
than the decrease in average protection
Behind these data, stories from the country case studies
• Real policies and the reform process– Reforms had large effect, but slowly and with reversals
• Export taxes– often set a fixed local price; taxes vary with world price– taxation may be needed for revenue and redistribution– have been reduced but not eliminated over time
• Import restrictions– sometimes stabilize some prices, but…– rarely stabilize prices for remote rural producers– have sometimes been significant revenue sources
Implications for policy
• Successful reforms typically switch instruments– away from state trading, QRs and specific tariffs
– towards more transparent taxes (ad-valorem and VAT)
• Border reforms leave weak domestic markets– High transport costs and lack of spatial integration
– High credit costs and lack of temporal integration
– Thin input markets and limited flow of new technology
– Demographic and health constraints on human capital
• After policy reform, a big agenda for project aid– to raise agricultural productivity, education and health
Further information:
• www.worldbank.org/agdistortions
Annex of country datafor 16 African Countries
• Chapter drafts will be available soon
www.worldbank.org/agdistortions• Results shown here are:
– for primary products (not processed)– by country, in alphabetical order:
Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Cameroon: an early reformer?
Average Protection (Taxation) of Agricultural Production in Cameroon, 1961-2004
-1.00
-0.75
-0.50
-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
Importables
Total
Exportables
Source: Preliminary results from K. Anderson and W.A. Masters (2007), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa. Washington, DC: The World Bank. (Online at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions.)
Importables: noneExportables: cocoa, coffee, wood, bananas
Cote d’Ivoire: consistent export taxesAverage Protection (Taxation) of Agricultural Production in
Cote d'Ivoire, 1961-2004
-1.00
-0.75
-0.50
-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
Importables
Total
Exportables
Source: Preliminary results from K. Anderson and W.A. Masters (2007), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa. Washington, DC: The World Bank. (Online at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions.)
Importables: riceExportables: cocoa, coffee, cotton
Egypt: episodes of import protectionAverage Protection (Taxation) of Agricultural Production in
Egypt, 1960-2005
-1.00
-0.75
-0.50
-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
1.50
1.75
2.00
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
Importables
Total
Exportables
(2.04 in 1987)
Source: Preliminary results from K. Anderson and W.A. Masters (2007), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa. Washington, DC: The World Bank. (Online at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions.)
Importables: maize, wheat, sugarExportables: cotton, rice
Average Protection (Taxation) of Agricultural Production in Ethiopia, 1981-2005
-1.00
-0.75
-0.50
-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
Importables
Total
Exportables
Source: Preliminary results from K. Anderson and W.A. Masters (2007), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa. Washington, DC: The World Bank. (Online at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions.)
Ethiopia: steady reformer?
Importables: noneExportables: coffee, hides and skins,
chat, oilseeds and pulses
Ghana: an extreme caseAverage Protection (Taxation) of Agricultural Production in
Ghana, 1961-2004
-1.00
-0.75
-0.50
-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
1.50
1.75
2.00
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
Importables
Total
Exportables
(6.9 in 1983)
Source: Preliminary results from K. Anderson and W.A. Masters (2007), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa. Washington, DC: The World Bank. (Online at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions.)
Importables: rice, maize Exportables: cocoa,
groundnuts
Average Protection (Taxation) of Agricultural Production inKenya, 1960-2004
-1.00
-0.75
-0.50
-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
Importables
Total
Exportables
Kenya: episodic reformer?
Source: Preliminary results from K. Anderson and W.A. Masters (2007), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa. Washington, DC: The World Bank. (Online at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions.)
Importables: rice, maize Exportables: cocoa, groundnuts
Madagascar: now pro-ag. but still anti-tradeAverage Protection (Taxation) of Agricultural Production in
Madagascar, 1960-2005
-1.00
-0.75
-0.50
-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
Importables
Total
Exportables
Source: Preliminary results from K. Anderson and W.A. Masters (2007), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa. Washington, DC: The World Bank. (Online at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions.)
Importables: rice, sugar Exportables: vanilla, coffee,
cocoa, cloves, pepper, sugar
Mozambique: from anti-agriculture to anti-trade?Average Protection (Taxation) of Agricultural Production in
Mozambique, 1975-2004
-1.00
-0.75
-0.50
-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
Importables
Total
Exportables
Source: Preliminary results from K. Anderson and W.A. Masters (2007), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa. Washington, DC: The World Bank. (Online at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions.)
Importables: maize (in South), beans, groundnuts, rice, sugar (to 1982)
Exportables: maize (in North), tobacco, cotton, cashew, sugar (after 1982)
Nigeria: now neutral?Average Protection (Taxation) of Agricultural Production in
Nigeria, 1961-2004
-1.00
-0.75
-0.50
-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
1.50
1.75
2.00
2.25
2.50
2.75
3.00
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
Importables
Total
Exportables
Source: Preliminary results from K. Anderson and W.A. Masters (2007), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa. Washington, DC: The World Bank. (Online at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions.)
Importables: maize, rice, sorghum, cassava millet, yams
Exportables: cocoa, groundnuts, palm oil
Average Protection (Taxation) of Agricultural Production in South Africa, 1960-2005
-1.00
-0.75
-0.50
-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
Importables
Total
Exportables
Source: Preliminary results from K. Anderson and W.A. Masters (2007), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa. Washington, DC: The World Bank. (Online at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions.)
South Africa: from anti-trade to neutral?
Importables: poultry, mutton, beefExportables: maize, wheat, grapes,
apples, oranges, sugar
Senegal: successful reforms?Average Protection (Taxation) of Agricultural Production in
Senegal, 1961-2004
-1.00
-0.75
-0.50
-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
1.50
1.75
2.00
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
Importables
Total
Exportables
Source: Preliminary results from K. Anderson and W.A. Masters (2007), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa. Washington, DC: The World Bank. (Online at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions.)
Importable: riceExportable: groundnuts
Sudan: a recent reformerAverage Protection (Taxation) of Agricultural Production in
Sudan, 1961-2004
-1.00
-0.75
-0.50
-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
Importables
Total
Exportables
Source: Preliminary results from K. Anderson and W.A. Masters (2007), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa. Washington, DC: The World Bank. (Online at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions.)
Importables: wheat, sugarExportables: cotton, sorghum, millet,
groundnut, gum arabic, livestock
Average Protection (Taxation) of Agricultural Production in Tanzania, 1976-2004
-1.00
-0.75
-0.50
-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
Importables
Total
Exportables
Source: Preliminary results from K. Anderson and W.A. Masters (2007), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa. Washington, DC: The World Bank. (Online at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions.)
Tanzania: consistently anti-agriculture?
Importables: maize, rice, wheat, sugarExportables: coffee, tea, cotton, tobacco,
beans, cashews, sisal, pyrethrum
Uganda: still protecting importables?Average Protection (Taxation) of Agricultural Production in
Uganda, 1961-2004
-1.00
-0.75
-0.50
-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
1.50
1.75
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
Importables
Total
Exportables
Source: Preliminary results from K. Anderson and W.A. Masters (2007), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa. Washington, DC: The World Bank. (Online at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions.)
Importables: rice plus maize (some years)
Exportables: coffee, cotton +maize (some years)
Average Protection (Taxation) of Agricultural Production inZambia, 1960-2005
-1.00
-0.75
-0.50
-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
Importables
Total
Exportables
Source: Preliminary results from K. Anderson and W.A. Masters (2007), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa. Washington, DC: The World Bank. (Online at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions.)
Zambia: episodic reformer?
Importables: wheat, rice plus maize, sorghum and soybeans (in some years)
Exportables: tobacco, cotton, groundnuts plus maize, sorghum and soybeans (some years)
Average Protection (Taxation) of Agricultural Production in Zimbabwe, 1960-2005
-1.00
-0.75
-0.50
-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
Importables
Total
Exportables
Source: Preliminary results from K. Anderson and W.A. Masters (2007), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa. Washington, DC: The World Bank. (Online at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions.)
Zimbabwe: increasingly anti-agriculture?
Importables: wheat plus maize, soyabeans, and sorghum (some years)
Exportables: tobacco, cotton, groundnuts plus maize, soyabeans and sorghum (some years)
Cameroon, crop by crop
-1.00
-0.80
-0.60
-0.40
-0.20
0.00
0.20
0.40
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
Cocoa
Coffee
Wood
Protection (Taxation) of Agricultural Production By Crop in Cameroon, 1961-2004
Source: Preliminary results from K. Anderson and W.A. Masters (2007), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa. Washington, DC: The World Bank. (Online at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions.)
Cote d’Ivoire, crop by crop
-1.00
-0.80
-0.60
-0.40
-0.20
0.00
0.20
0.40
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
Cocoa
Coffee
Rice
Protection (Taxation) of Agricultural Production By Crop in Cote d'Ivoire, 1961-2004
Source: Preliminary results from K. Anderson and W.A. Masters (2007), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa. Washington, DC: The World Bank. (Online at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions.)
Egypt, crop by crop
-1.00
-0.50
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
Cotton
Rice
Maize
Wheat
Sugar
Milk
Meat
Protection (Taxation) of Agricultural Production By Crop in Egypt, 1960-2005
Source: Preliminary results from K. Anderson and W.A. Masters (2007), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa. Washington, DC: The World Bank. (Online at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions.)
-1.00
-0.80
-0.60
-0.40
-0.20
0.00
0.20
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
Chat
Coffee
Hides and Skins
Oilseeds
Pulses
Protection (Taxation) of Agricultural Production By Crop in Ethiopia, 1981-2004
Source: Preliminary results from K. Anderson and W.A. Masters (2007), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa. Washington, DC: The World Bank. (Online at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions.)
Ethiopia, crop by crop
Ghana, crop by crop
-1.00
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
Groundnuts
Cocoa
Maize
Rice
Protection (Taxation) of Agricultural Production By Crop in Ghana, 1960-2005
Source: Preliminary results from K. Anderson and W.A. Masters (2007), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa. Washington, DC: The World Bank. (Online at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions.)
-1.00
-0.50
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
MaizeWheatCoffeeTeaSugarVegetables (tradable)
Protection (Taxation) of Agricultural Production By Crop in Kenya, 1960-2004
Source: Preliminary results from K. Anderson and W.A. Masters (2007), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa. Washington, DC: The World Bank. (Online at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions.)
Kenya, crop by crop
Madagascar, crop by crop
-1.00
-0.80
-0.60
-0.40
-0.20
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
Cocoa Pepper
Cloves Vanilla
Coffee Sugar
Maize Rice
Protection (Taxation) of Agricultural Production By Crop in Madagascar, 1960-2005
Source: Preliminary results from K. Anderson and W.A. Masters (2007), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa. Washington, DC: The World Bank. (Online at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions.)
-1.00
-0.50
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
BeansSugarCashewnutsCottonMaize SouthMaize CentreMaize NorthTobacco (V)Rice
Protection (Taxation) of Agricultural Production By Crop in Mozambique, 1975-2004
Source: Preliminary results from K. Anderson and W.A. Masters (2007), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa. Washington, DC: The World Bank. (Online at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions.)
Mozambique, crop by crop
Nigeria, crop by crop
-1.00
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
Cassava CocoaGroundnuts MaizeMillet PalmoilRice SorghumYams Cotton
Protection (Taxation) of Agricultural Production By Crop in Nigeria, 1961-2004
Source: Preliminary results from K. Anderson and W.A. Masters (2007), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa. Washington, DC: The World Bank. (Online at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions.)
-1.00
-0.50
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
Beef Poultry
Mutton Apples
Oranges Sugar
Wheat Yellow Maize
White Maize Sunflowers
Protection (Taxation) of Agricultural Production By Crop in S.Africa, 1960-2005
Source: Preliminary results from K. Anderson and W.A. Masters (2007), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa. Washington, DC: The World Bank. (Online at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions.)
South Africa, crop by crop
Sudan, crop by crop
-1.00
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
SorghumSesameGroundnutsCottonSheepCattleGoatsMilletWheatSugar
Protection (Taxation) of Agricultural Production By Crop in Sudan, 1960-2004
Source: Preliminary results from K. Anderson and W.A. Masters (2007), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa. Washington, DC: The World Bank. (Online at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions.)
-1.00
-0.50
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
Wheat
Sugar
Rice
Maize
Tobacco
Cotton
Coffee
Protection (Taxation) of Agricultural Production By Crop in Tanzania, 1976-2004
Source: Preliminary results from K. Anderson and W.A. Masters (2007), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa. Washington, DC: The World Bank. (Online at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions.)
Tanzania, crop by crop
Uganda, crop by crop
-1.00
-0.50
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
Coffee
Cotton
Maize
Rice
Protection (Taxation) of Agricultural Production By Crop in Uganda, 1961-2004
Source: Preliminary results from K. Anderson and W.A. Masters (2007), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa. Washington, DC: The World Bank. (Online at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions.)
-1.00
-0.80
-0.60
-0.40
-0.20
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
Maize Sorghum
Wheat Rice
Groundnuts Soybeans
Cotton Tobacco
Protection (Taxation) of Agricultural Production By Crop in Zambia, 1960-2005
Source: Preliminary results from K. Anderson and W.A. Masters (2007), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa. Washington, DC: The World Bank. (Online at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions.)
Zambia, crop by crop
-1.00
-0.50
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
Maize
Sorghum
Wheat
Groundnuts
Soybeans
Cotton
Tobacco
Protection (Taxation) of Agricultural Production By Crop in Zimbabwe, 1960-2005
Source: Preliminary results from K. Anderson and W.A. Masters (2007), Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa. Washington, DC: The World Bank. (Online at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions.)
Zimbabwe, crop by crop