Distinguishing Between Rational and Experiential ...

Rational and Experiential Processing 1

Running Head: DISTINGUISHING INFORMATION PROCESSING STYLES

Distinguishing Between Rational and Experiential Information Processing Styles

Monica Karsai

Wittenberg University


Abstract

The purpose of this study was to examine differences in rational and experiential thinking

styles. Eight measures were used in conjunction with the Rational-Experiential Inventory to

determine strengths and weaknesses of each style. The rational style correlated with academic

measures, reasoning ability, self-control, and creativity. Also, the rational group scored

significantly better than the experiential group on academic measures and reasoning skills and

marginally significant on creativity. The experiential style was positively associated with social

skills (emotional support and conflict management). All of the significant results confirmed the

hypotheses, except for the prediction that the rational group would score worse on creativity than

the experiential group. Finally, the variables that discriminated significantly between the rational

and experiential groups were, in descending order, Cognitive Reflection, Grade Point Average,

and ACT/SAT composite scores.


Distinguishing Between Rational and Experiential Information Processing Styles

The way people make decisions depends upon a variety of factors, including how

important the decision is, how much information they have about the situation, and how the

decision affects their lives. Most importantly, decisions are shaped by the way humans think.

Some people rely more on instincts while others rely on weighing options and consequences and

thinking through each problem thoroughly and objectively. The way humans process information

not only affects the way they view the world, but shapes personality as well. For example,

preferring to think objectively and in a step-by-step manner may be associated with stronger

interests and strengths in sciences. Furthermore, thinking intuitively may lead one to be more

superstitious and more likely to believe in the unexplainable (Epstein, 2008). While there are

multiple theories on different processing styles, Epstein’s Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory

focuses on what he calls rational and experiential processing styles (Pacini & Epstein, 1999).

Rational and experiential styles of thinking are quite different. While humans may utilize

both styles, they are independent (Epstein & Pacini, 1999). The rational style is characterized by

concrete rules, reasoning, and conscientiousness. Also, this process is slow, verbal, and non-

emotional components (Epstein & Pacini, 1999). In contrast, experiential processing is

characterized by intuitive, holistic thinking (big picture as opposed to the individual elements)

that is fast, primitive, and is associated with interpersonal relationships, emotionality, and the

ability to think abstractly. Additionally, the experiential system is closely related to creativity

and humor, whereas the rational system is superior in planning and considering long-term

consequences (Epstein, 2008). The rational process develops through actively seeking

knowledge, especially through formalized education, whereas the experiential process develops

through life experiences. (Epstein, 1994).


These two systems have distinct evolutionary histories. The experiential system evolved

first and is used for adaptations by animals other than humans. However, it is stronger for

humans due to the development of the cerebral cortex (Epstein & Pacini, 1999). This system also

has ties to Freudian theory. Freud discussed two types of processes, primary and secondary. The

former (comparable to the experiential system) is unconscious, unrefined, and free of rules while

the latter is conscious, logical, involves realistic reasoning, and delays gratification (Epstein,

1994). The primary process continuously attempts to override the secondary process and

therefore, attempts to suppress rationality. Freud believed that this could be prevented by making

unconscious desires conscious and apparent via psychoanalysis. While the secondary process

evolved out of the primary process, it is necessary for adaptation and survival because humans

cannot survive by relying on the primary process alone (Epstein, 1994). Reasoning by analogy,

Epstein argues that this why it is necessary for humans to have both the rational and experiential

processing styles; they cannot operate on a daily basis with only one style. Having both systems

allows humans to generate their own theory of reality (Epstein, 1994) and in turn, to be able to

function and make sense of daily occurrences.

Because the rational system can consciously trace steps to a conclusion, it seems

reasonable that it is somehow more adaptive than experiential processing. However, there are

several instances that demonstrate situations where the experiential is favored over the rational,

even if the conclusion is irrational. In particular, many people share an irrational fear of flying,

but feel completely comfortable driving every day, even though statistics show that driving is

more dangerous than flying (Epstein, 1994). Though people know that flying is safer, they have a

stronger, irrational, fear of this activity. Also, believing in superstitions proves that though there

is no rational evidence for the phenomena, humans still choose to believe in them. As cited in


Epstein (1994), Gallup indicated that one in four adults believe in ghosts, one in six have

communicated with the deceased, and one in seven believe they have seen a UFO. Another

phenomenon detached from rationality is religion (Epstein, 1994). If humans operated on

rationality alone, religion would not exist; other factors are associated with the belief in religion.

To understand and appreciate religion, the experiential system is necessary. While these

examples reveal how rationality and experientiality exist without being in direct competition

with one another, Denes-Raj and Epstein’s study demonstrated how humans can choose an

irrational conclusion while “knowing” the rational conclusion.

Denes-Raj and Epstein (1994) conducted an experiment to determine factors that would

cause participants to go against their rational judgment. In the experiment, participants had to

decide to draw from one of two bowls to attain a red jelly bean that is among white jelly beans.

The first bowl contained 1 red jelly bean in a bowl of 10 total beans (10%). The second bowl

contained 5 to 9 red jelly beans in a bowl of 100 total beans (5%-9%). Participants chose the

larger bowl instead of the small bowl from which to draw because they ignored the ratio of red

beans to white beans and instead focused on the absolute number of red beans, even though the

probability was lower when the absolute number was larger (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994).

Participants claimed that they knew the probability was lower but felt that choosing the larger

bowl was associated with a larger probability of obtaining a red jelly bean (Denes-Raj & Epstein,

1994). This is an example of the circumstances under which participants will favor an irrational

judgment over a rational judgment. That is, they ignored reason and relied instead on their

emotions, or their experiential style of thinking.

In another example, participants were presented with vignettes and asked (1) how they

would behave in each given situation, (2) how they thought others would behave, and (3) how a


logical person would behave in a given situation (Epstein & Pacini, 1999). Participants indicated

that they knew the logical behavior; however, they believed that they themselves and others

would not act accordingly. Instead, they would act according to the experiential system rather

than the rational system. Similar to the jelly bean experiment, participants predict that they will

behave irrationally even when they are fully aware of the rational route.

To assess an individual’s information processing preference, Epstein developed the

Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI). The earlier version of this measure included the Need for

Cognition (NFC) and Faith in Intuition (FI) subscales (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). Then, a newer

version was created which included the subscales Rational Ability (possessing the ability to think

rationally), Rational Engagement (preferring to think in a rational manner), Experiential Ability

(the ability to interpret and use one’s emotions and intuitions), and Experiential Engagement

(preferring to rely on emotions and intuitions for decision making) (Pacini & Epstein, 1999).

Correlates of rational and experiential thinking include scales from the Big Five (Pacini

& Epstein, 1999). Specifically, rational thinking correlated positively with openness and

conscientiousness, and experiential thinking correlated positively with neuroticism,

agreeableness, and extraversion. Also, rationalism correlated with Ego Strength, responsible

behavior, delaying gratification, and self-control. Correlates of experientialism include emotional

expressivity, agreeableness, and neuroticism (Pacini & Epstein, 1999).

The old version of the REI indicated that men prefer rational processing while women

prefer the experiential style (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996). Moreover, when other

measures were used in relation to the old version, Need for Cognition was associated with

adjustment, self-esteem, dominance, SAT scores, and GPA. Faith in Intuition was associated

with self-esteem and dominance as well. In interpersonal relationships, Faith in Intuition was


related to a relationship security and Need for Cognition was associated with using rational

tactics in dealing with relationship conflict (Epstein et al., 1996).

This study assessed cognitive tasks and personality variables hypothesized to

discriminate between rational and experiential styles of thinking. Specifically, this study

compared rational and experiential thinkers using the newer version of the REI on the following

variables: academic skills, reasoning skills, planning skills, social skills, and creativity.

Hypothesis 1: Rational thinkers will report higher levels of academic achievement than

experiential thinkers as indexed by GPA and ACT/SAT scores. Furthermore, they will also score

higher on cognitive reflection, planning tasks, and self-control. Hypothesis 2: Experiential

thinkers will have higher scores than rational thinkers on measures of social skills (specifically,

conflict management and emotional support) and creativity.

Method

Participants

Participants were 75 Wittenberg University students, 46 females (61.3%) and 29 males

(38.7%). Seventy-one participants were Caucasian (94.7%) and 4 were African American

(5.3%), 8 were freshmen (10.7%), 24 were sophomores (32.0%), 23 were juniors (30.7%), and

20 were seniors (26.6%). Students enrolled in introductory psychology courses received credit or

extra credit for their participation, depending upon the professor’s participation policy.

Materials and Apparatus

Nine measures were included in this study. A demographics sheet (Appendix 1) was

constructed to collect information on the following subject variables: gender, race/ethnicity,

major, class year, GPA, and standardized test scores. The second measure was the Rational-

Experiential Inventory (REI: Pacini & Epstein, 1999), which consists of 40 statements;


participants responded to each statement on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (definitely not

true of myself) to 5 (definitely true of myself). The REI includes four subscales: Rational Ability,

Rational Engagement, Experiential Ability, and Experiential Engagement plus Rational and

Experiential composites (Pacini & Epstein, 1999).

Next, the Emotional Support and Conflict Management subscales of the Interpersonal

Competence Questionnaire (Buhrmaster, Furman, Wittenberg, & Reis, 1988) were utilized to

assess social skills. There were 16 statements on which participants rated their abilities on a 5-

point Likert scale ranging from 1 (I’m poor at this; I’d feel so uncomfortable and unable to

handle this situation, I’d avoid it if possible) to 5 (I’m extremely good at this; I’d feel very

comfortable and could handle this situation very well). Statements referred to a variety of social

situations, such as listening skills, giving advice, and conflict management.

To assess self-control, 20 items were taken from the International Personality Item Pool

(Goldberg et al., 2006). Participants were instructed to rate how well each item described them

using a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (very inaccurate) to 5 (very accurate). Higher scores

reflected higher self-control.

The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) has three, open-ended questions that test

mathematical and reasoning skills. The items are designed to have an intuitively obvious yet

incorrect answer (Frederick, 2005). Determining the correct answer requires some reflection.

Total scores are the number of items answered correctly.

To assess creativity, participants were given a Cartoon Task from Sternberg’s Rainbow

Project (2006). This measure is composed of five pictures. Participants write captions for any

three of them. These captions were scored on four subscales- Originality, Cleverness, Humor,

and Appropriateness. Each subscale was scored on a 5-point scale; higher scores reflect greater


creativity (Sternberg, 2006). A second measure of creative ability was administered: The

Symbols Test from the Kit of Factor-Referenced Cognitive Tests (Ekstrom, French, Harman, &

Dermen, 1976). This was a timed task on which each participant was given five words and

instructed to create up to five symbols representing that word (i.e. for the word “food”, one could

draw a fork and spoon). Participants had five minutes to complete this task. A total score (out of

25) was recorded.

Two reasoning tasks were included: (1) The Map Planning Test from the Kit of Factor-

Referenced Cognitive Tests (Ekstrom et al., 1976), consists of a grid on which participants had to

start at one point and end at another. However, there are blocked paths, making the connections

challenging. Each correct path involves passing the side of one numbered building, which

participants recorded. There were a total of 10 trials for each of two grids (20 for the entire task).

The time limit was 3 minutes. (2) Nonsense Syllogisms Test (Ekstrom et al., 1976). This 4-

minute task involves 15 items each including two statements and a conclusion. The task is to

determine if the conclusion was good or poor reasoning. Correct responses were summed to

compute a final score (out of 15 points).

Procedure

Participants were tested in small groups. After signing a consent form, folders were

distributed to participants containing all materials to be completed. Two different orders of

materials were used. The first order was: Symbols Test, Map Planning Test, Nonsense

Syllogisms Test, Cartoon Task, CRT, Self-Perception Scale (a rating of self-control),

Interpersonal Situations Scale (containing the Emotional Support and Conflict management

subscales), REI, and then the Demographics Sheet. The second order was as follows:

Demographics Sheet, Self-Perception Scale, Interpersonal Situations Scale, REI, Symbols Test,


Map Planning Test, Nonsense Syllogisms Test, Cartoon Task, and then the CRT. Students were

instructed when to pause between materials because some were timed while other questionnaires

were not. When the participants were finished, they were told to contact the experimenter if they

had any questions or wanted more information about the study and the results. The total duration

for each session was approximately 40 minutes.

Results

Reliabilities

Cronbach’s alpha was used to estimate the internal consistency reliabilities of the scales.

Most of the reliabilities were greater than .70, except for the Nonsense Syllogisms Test, Symbols

Test, CRT, and the four subscales of the Cartoons Task. All of the reliability estimates are

displayed in Table 1, which also includes descriptive statistics by gender.

Order Effects

Independent sample t-tests were used to assess order effects (see Table 2). Significant

order effects were found on several measures. Scores were higher for participants who completed

the questionnaires before the tasks for the SPS. Also, for the Emotional Support subscale of the

ISS, scores were higher for those participants who completed the questionnaires first.

Order effects were also detected for the Cartoons task; participants scored higher when

they completed the questionnaires before the tasks. Three of the four subscales also showed

order effects. Participants scored higher when they completed the questionnaires first than the

tasks first for the Cleverness subscale. Moreover, participants scored higher on the Humor

subscale when they completed the questionnaires before the tasks. Lastly, participants scored

higher on the Appropriateness subscale when they completed the questionnaires first instead of

completing the tasks first. No order effects were found for Originality.


Gender Differences

Independent sample t-tests revealed significant gender differences on four measures (see

Table 1). On the Rational composite, both of the Rational subscales (Engagement and Ability),

and the CRT, men scored higher than women.

Correlational Analyses

The correlational analyses provided partial support for Hypothesis 1 (see Table 3). As

predicted, scores on the REI Rational composite correlated significantly (p < .05) and positively

with GPA, SAT, and ACT, as well as with CRT and Self-control scores. However, Rational

scores also correlated positively with scores on the Conflict Management subscale of the ISS,

and with the Cartoon Task subscales. Specifically, Rational scores were positively related to

Originality, Cleverness, Humor, and Appropriateness.

Patterns of correlations of the REI subscales, Rational Engagement and Rational Ability,

were similar to those reported for the Rational composite. Both subscales correlated positively

with both SAT and ACT scores. They were also positively related with CRT scores and Conflict

Management. However, only Ability correlated with Self-Control scores. Scores on the Cartoon

task were also associated with each subscale. Specifically, they were positively related to

Originality, Cleverness, and Humor. However, Appropriateness was correlated only with the

Engagement subscale.

Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the Experiential composite correlated positively with both

the Conflict Management and Emotional Support subscales of the ISS and negatively with GPA

and Nonsense Syllogism scores. Similarly, the Experiential Engagement subscale was negatively

related to GPA, and Experiential Ability and CRT scores were negatively correlated.

Experiential Ability correlated positively with Emotional Support. However, Engagement


correlated with both Emotional Support and Conflict Management. Ability, but not Engagement,

was negatively related to Nonsense Syllogism scores as well. Engagement correlated with the

Appropriateness subscale of the Cartoons task, but there were no other significant correlations

for this scale. Finally, correlations involving measures other than the REI are presented in Table

3.

REI Group Analyses

To increase the sensitivity of the analyses to individual differences in rational and

experiential processing, median splits on the REI composite scales were used to create two

subsets of participants: high experiential/low rational (N = 25) and high rational/low experiential

(N = 21). These groups were then compared on all of the study’s measures using independent

samples t-tests. Participants who scored either high on both scales or low on both scales were

excluded from analyses (N = 29). The rational group had significantly (p < .05) higher GPAs,

reported higher ACT scores, and had higher CRT scores than the experiential group (see Table

4).

A marginally significant difference (p < .10) was found for total scores on the Cartoon

task, where rational participants scored higher than the experiential participants. Marginally

significant differences were found as well for three of the four subscales on the Cartoon task.

Specifically, the rational group scored higher than the experiential group on Originality,

Cleverness, and Humor. There was no significant difference for Appropriateness.

Table 5 reports the distribution of information processing styles by academic major,

which were categorized as follows: Education, Humanities, Natural Sciences, Social Sciences,

and Undeclared. All major types had more experiential processors than rational except for


Natural Sciences, which had more rational processors than experiential (see Table 5). Because of

the small number of non-Social Sciences majors, statistical tests were not performed.

Discriminant Function Analysis

Finally, discriminant function analysis assessed the collective accuracy of the predictor

variables at classifying members of the rational and experiential subgroups, and the contributions

of individual predictors to the classification. The single discriminant function correctly classified

89.5% (17 of 19 participants) of the experiential group members, but was somewhat less accurate

at identifying rational group members, 78.9%, (15 of 19 participants). Significant (p < .05)

contributors to classification accuracy were made by (in descending magnitude) Cognitive

Reflection Test scores, ACT scores, and Grade Point Average. For this collection of measures,

this is consistent with the Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory where Pacini and Epstein (1999)

concluded that reasoning ability and academic skills distinguished rational from experiential

thinking styles.

Discussion

This study was designed to identify personality and ability variables that discriminate

between rational and experiential information processing styles. It was hypothesized that rational

processing would be closely linked to academic achievement, reasoning, planning, and self

control. Additionally, experiential processing was hypothesized to be more associated with

emotionality and creativity. These hypotheses were derived from Epstein and Pacini’s

characterization of the two types of thinking. In their research, rational processing correlated

with (non)-neuroticism, conscientiousness, ego strength, and positive beliefs about the world.

Experientiality was associated with positive relationship beliefs, extraversion, and emotional

expressivity (Pacini & Epstein, 1999).


In the current study, rationality correlated positively with the academic measures of

SAT/ACT scores and GPA, and with CRT scores, self-control, conflict management, and

creativity. The correlations between SAT/ACT scores, GPA, and CRT scores confirm the

hypotheses concerning rationality, and confirm Pacini and Epstein’s work (1999). However, it

was predicted that conflict management and creativity would be more strongly associated with

experientiality. Perhaps since conflict management involves reasoning through problems, this is

why it was correlated with rational processing as opposed to experiential processing. The

independent samples t-tests confirmed these results. However, t-tests concerning REI groups and

creativity were only marginally significant.

Similar to the research of Pacini and Epstein (1999), experiential processing correlated

positively with emotional support and conflict management, but correlated negatively with GPA

and Nonsense Syllogisms (reasoning ability). This is consistent with the hypotheses of this study.

Comparisons of the two groups on emotional support, conflict management, and Nonsense

Syllogisms were not significant. This indicates that while experiential processing is correlated

with these variables, experiential processors do not perform significantly higher on these than do

rational processors.

Map Planning and Symbols did not discriminate significantly between the two groups

although Map Planning scores were higher for rational processing than experiential processing,

which is consistent with the hypothesis. However, in contrast to the hypotheses, rational

processors scored higher than experiential processors on the Symbols test, a creativity task.

It was concluded that since rational processors scored higher than experiential processors

on a majority of the measures, perhaps the rational-type is associated with better strategy in test

taking, independent of the type of test. This may be due to rational thinkers’ reliance on


elemental views of situations as opposed to experiential thinkers’ more holistic approach

(Epstein & Pacini, 1999). Therefore, it is possible that rational processors were more carefully

examining each measure and each question in each measure, whereas experiential processors’

goal was simply to complete the experiment. Moreover, experientiality is associated with the use

of heuristics. Perhaps the measures used in this study are performed more successfully without

the use of heuristics (Epstein et al., 1996). Specifically, using heuristics on the CRT led to lower

scores on this measure. Lastly, the measures seemed more related to formal education-type tasks

than real-world experience, giving the rational type an advantage (Epstein, 1994).

The discriminant function analysis revealed that three measures discriminated

significantly between the two types of processing. These included the CRT, GPA, and

standardized test scores. Interestingly, while many tasks and questionnaires were used in this

study, the only measures that accurately grouped participants into the two types of processing

included a three item task and two self-reported measures.

The gender differences were comparable to those reported by Pacini and Epstein (1999).

In particular, males scored significantly higher on the rational scales than did females. Also,

females scored higher on the experiential scale than did males, except on experiential ability.

This may be explained by the stereotype that females tend to be more emotionally-inclined than

males. Due to the fact that this stereotype is well-known in society, females may feel the need to

fulfill this expectation (Epstein et al., 1996). Furthermore, the connection to emotion may be

associated with women following their intuitions rather than reason.

Two orders of measures were used to detect order effects. Unfortunately, multiple order

effects existed. Specifically, those who completed the questionnaires before the cognitive tasks

scored higher than those who completed the tasks first on the following measures: Self-Control,


Emotional Support, and Cartoons. One possible cause of these effects is practice. Perhaps filling

out questionnaires first allowed participants to adjust to the testing environment before

completing the tasks and in effect enabled them to “warm up” their thinking skills.

There were several limitations of this study. To gain a better understanding of differences

between rational and experiential processors, a larger, more diverse sample of adults should be

tested. Furthermore, non-students should have been included as well. Secondly, perhaps

measures other than self-report should be used to assess academic achievement. While self-

reports are usually quite accurate for academic facts, academic tasks could have confirmed

achievement in case participants were inaccurate in their GPA and score estimates.

Another improvement to this study would be to incorporate a more psychometrically-

sound creativity task. Scoring for the Cartoons task is very subjective. Additionally, the Cartoons

task is a relatively new measure and has yet to be validated. Perhaps this measure would be a

better creativity measure to use after it has been refined. In the meantime, another creativity

measure should be utilized.

While each processing style has its own strengths and weaknesses, one is not superior to

the other. Awareness of the differences between rational and experiential processing is important

to everyday interactions. It allows humans to explain the reasons behind an endless list of

actions. Furthermore, it permits researchers to determine how people may react in many

scenarios, whether the situation is academic, social, or involves creativity. Differences between

rational and experiential processing styles is a relatively unresearched topic in psychology.

Further research should be conducted to better understand these two styles. Possible areas of

interest include: adjustment, aggression, relationship success, and stress management. Though

many of the differences have yet to be examined, it is evident that rational and experiential styles


can determine many other personality characteristics. Only through establishing these differences

will researchers better understand how humans make decisions and interact with one another.


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Appendix 1

Demographic Information

1. Gender (please circle): Male Female

2. Race/Ethnicity (please circle): White (Non-Hispanic) Black (Non-Hispanic)

American Indian or Alaska Native Asian/Pacific Islander Hispanic

3. Major: ____________________________________________________

4. Class Year: __________________

5. Cumulative GPA: _____________

6. Indicate your scores on the following standardized tests (if applicable):

Please breakdown each test score by section if possible (verbal, quantitative, etc.)

a. SAT score : ____________________________

b. ACT score: _____________________________

c. GRE (general) score: _____________________


Table 1 Descriptive Statistics and Reliability Measures Mean SD Subscale Male Female Male Female t α GPA 3.08 3.12 0.52 0.53 -0.30 SAT 1188.08 1172.97 138.04 153.19 0.40 Verbal 633.33 676.67 43.67 37.86 -1.46 Quantitative 663.33 633.33 85.48 46.19 0.56 ACT Score 25.96 25.41 3.34 3.56 0.63 REI Rational 78.52 68.04 9.61 10.49 4.35** 0.89 Engagement 39.14 34.26 6.24 5.53 3.54** 0.84 Ability 39.38 33.78 4.67 6.30 4.12** 0.82 Experiential 69.03 70.37 10.07 11.40 -0.52 0.88 Engagement 34.03 35.78 5.93 7.11 -1.10 0.87 Ability 35.00 34.59 5.58 4.90 0.34 0.70 Cognitive Reflection 1.48 0.85 1.06 1.01 2.60* 0.60 Self-Control 67.97 66.07 7.92 8.04 1.00 0.76 Interpersonal Situations Emotional Support 31.59 32.91 4.08 4.92 -1.21 0.86 Conflict Management 28.83 27.17 5.21 4.98 1.38 0.83 Symbols 13.90 13.54 3.54 3.10 0.46 0.58 Map Planning 10.45 10.41 4.35 4.09 0.04 0.86 Nonsense Syllogisms 8.79 8.04 2.18 2.41 1.36 0.53 Cartoon 31.97 31.41 8.81 6.32 0.32 0.87 Originality 7.62 7.37 2.98 1.97 0.44 0.56 Cleverness 7.62 7.59 2.50 2.00 0.07 0.59 Humor 6.59 5.96 2.32 1.90 1.28 0.58 Appropriateness 10.14 10.50 2.00 1.33 -0.94 0.54

*. Significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed). **. Significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).


Table 2 Order Effects for (A) Tasks First and (B) Questionnaires First Mean SD Subscale A B A B t GPA 3.14 3.06 0.57 0.48 0.64 SAT 1184.52 1174.06 168.58 123.18 0.28 Verbal 672.50 628.00 45.74 37.01 1.62 Quantitative 667.50 642.00 73.66 78.87 0.50 ACT Score 25.71 25.56 3.95 2.96 0.17 REI Rational 69.89 74.24 11.87 10.48 -1.68 Engagement 34.81 37.45 6.72 5.53 -1.86 Ability 35.08 36.79 6.80 5.78 -1.17 Experiential 67.86 71.79 10.86 10.63 -1.58 Engagement 33.92 36.26 6.99 6.27 -1.53 Ability 33.95 35.53 5.08 5.14 -1.34 Cognitive Reflection 1.19 1.00 1.13 1.01 0.77 Self-Control 64.24 69.29 8.74 6.37 -2.86** Interpersonal Situations Emotional Support 31.27 33.50 5.13 3.85 -2.13* Conflict Management 27.11 28.50 5.94 4.09 -1.19 Symbols 13.46 13.89 2.76 3.70 -0.58 Map Planning 10.19 10.66 3.87 4.46 -0.49 Nonsense Syllogisms 8.43 8.24 2.71 1.94 0.36 Cartoon 29.27 33.92 6.91 7.07 -2.88** Originality 7.05 7.87 2.41 2.34 -1.48 Cleverness 6.86 8.32 2.14 2.01 -3.03** Humor 5.59 6.79 1.82 2.17 -2.58* Appropriateness 9.76 10.95 1.75 1.23 -3.41**

*. Significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed). **. Significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).


Table 3 Correlation Matrix for All Measures Used

Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

1. GPA 2. SAT .42** 3. Verbal .50 .69* 4. Quantitative -.08 .90** .30 5. ACT Score .45** .95** .27 .52 REI 6. Rational .23* .33** -.35 .34 .40** 7. Engagement .22 .29* .04 .12 .32* .90** 8. Ability .19 .28* -.50 .39 .38** .90** .62** 9. Experiential -.35** .05 .15 -.02 -.03 -.12 -.11 -.11 10. Engagement -.26* .14 .32 -.16 .08 -.13 -.07 -.17 .94** 11. Ability -.41** -.09 -.12 .16 -.18 -.08 -.15 .00 .89** .68** 12. Cognitive Reflect. .29* .50** -.30 .09 .55** .36** .38** .26* -.19 -.12 -.25* 13. Self-Control .09 .03 -.06 -.21 .08 .27* .20 .29* .15 .12 .15 .14 Interpersonal Sit. 14. Emotion. Spprt. -.09 -.17 .43 .14 -.23 .14 .08 .17 .33** .32** .28* -.21 .35** 15. Confl. Mngmnt. -.05 .02 .46 .12 .00 .36** .38** .27* .26* .27* .20 .09 .34** .42** 16. Symbols .13 -.07 -.13 .15 -.10 .04 .13 -.06 -.02 .01 -.05 -.02 .14 .04 17. Map Planning .04 .39** .22 .60 .39** .08 .09 .06 -.12 -.03 -.20 .28* .04 -.02 18. Nonsense Syll. .24* .34** -.17 -.24 .38** .11 .13 .08 -.25* -.18 -.30** .48** -.13 -.24* 19. Cartoon .13 .12 .08 -.26 .16 .42** .46** .30** .06 .16 -.07 .23 .17 .23* 20. Originality .15 .07 .03 -.30 .12 .34** .36** .26* -.03 .06 -.14 .26* .15 .18 21. Cleverness .19 .15 .29 -.02 .18 .43** .46** .32** .04 .12 -.08 .19 .19 .27* 22. Humor .13 .12 -.01 -.45 .14 .44** .50** .29* .08 .15 -.04 .21 .04 .19 23. Appropriate. -.03 .09 -.05 -.01 .11 .26* .28* .19 .18 .26* .04 .11 .22 .18

*. Correlation significant at the .05 level (two-tailed). **. Correlation significant at the .01 level (two-tailed).


Table 3 Correlation Matrix for All Measures Used

Variable 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

16. Symbols .16 17. Map Planning .03 .11 18. Nonsense Syllogisms -.02 .03 .09 19. Cartoon .17 .10 .19 .03 20. Originality .13 .09 .08 .09 .88** 21. Cleverness .21 .10 .17 .05 .96** .82** 22. Humor .10 .07 .18 .06 .90** .73** .85** 23. Appropriateness .16 .07 .28* -.14 .76** .49** .71** .59**

*. Correlation significant at the .05 level (two-tailed). **. Correlation significant at the .01 level (two-tailed)


Table 4 REI Group Analyses Mean SD Subscale Ration. Exper. Ration. Exper. t GPA 3.36 2.84 0.49 0.47 -3.63** SAT 1246.32 1178.95 114.22 148.51 -1.57 Verbal 656.67 690.00 40.42 42.43 0.89 Quantitative 660.00 620.00 100.00 56.57 -0.50 ACT Score 27.58 25.26 2.85 3.05 -2.42* REI Rational 80.81 63.60 7.08 7.12 -8.18** Engagement 40.43 32.08 4.59 5.42 -5.58** Ability 40.38 31.52 3.72 4.37 -7.32** Experiential 61.33 76.92 6.49 5.48 8.83** Engagement 30.52 39.68 4.41 3.64 7.72** Ability 30.81 37.24 3.74 3.17 6.32** Cognitive Reflection 1.71 0.68 1.06 0.75 -3.88** Self-Control 67.71 66.12 8.33 7.05 -0.70 Interpersonal Situations Emotional Support 31.00 33.20 5.10 3.40 1.75 Conflict Management 27.29 27.72 5.06 4.95 0.29 Symbols 13.52 12.80 2.69 3.16 -0.83 Map Planning 12.19 10.12 4.33 4.34 -1.61 Nonsense Syllogisms 9.00 8.16 2.77 2.12 -1.16 Cartoon 33.81 29.92 7.90 5.49 -1.96 Originality 8.00 6.84 2.74 1.77 -1.73 Cleverness 8.29 7.08 2.33 1.85 -1.96 Humor 6.76 5.76 2.12 1.45 -1.90 Appropriateness 10.76 10.24 1.41 1.42 -1.24

*. Significant at the 0.05 level. **. Significant at the 0.01 level.


Table 5 Crosstabs of Processing-Type by Major-Type

Major Type Rational Experiential Education 1 2Humanities 3 5Natural Sciences 5 1Social Sciences 11 14Undeclared 1 3

Total 21 25

Distinguishing Between Rational and Experiential ...

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