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DistancingAllAround:Post-MingChinaRealpolitikinSeventeenth-CenturyKorea

JosephJeong-ilLee,NortheastAsianHistoryFoundationLee,JosephJeong-il.2020.“DistancingAllAround:Post-MingChinaRealpolitikinSeventeenth-CenturyKorea.”Cross-Currents:EastAsianHistoryandCultureReview34:24–45.https://crosscurrents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-34/lee.

Abstract

During the Ming-Qing transition period, Chosŏn Korea (1392–1910) tried toarticulategeopoliticalchangeonitsowntermsbyprioritizingstatesecurity.Thewaythe Chosŏn court and ruling elites responded to the Revolt ofWu Sangui (1673–1681)and itsaftereffectsoffersasnapshotof theiraccommodationiststrategy forsurvival. This article explores how the court and elites maintained a policy ofnoninvolvementinassociationwithdomesticstabilityforsocialintegrationandself-strengtheningforborderdefense.TheauthorrevealsthewaytheChosŏncourtandrulingeliteshandled theongoingunexpectedsituationscausedbyQingChina, theanti-Qing force, and the Mongols. This approach helps contextualize the linksbetween the realpolitik of Chosŏn and the longue durée of Pax Manjurica, PaxMongolica, and Pax Sinica and promotes further inquiry into the internationalrelationsofEastAsiafromatranshistoricalperspective.

Keywords:Chosŏn-Mingalliance,Mingloyalism,Mongols,realpolitik,RevoltofWuSangui,statesecurity,QingdynastyIntroductionSince the rise of China’s Yuan dynasty (1271–1368), the maritime and overlandproximity of the imperial capital Peking to the Liaodong and Korean peninsulaspavedthewayforanewparadigmofinternationalrelationsincontinentalEastAsia(Robinson 2009, 15–60). For whoever conquered Peking and North China, thedefense of this imperial citywas directly linked to the security of Chosŏn proper.Thisadjacencyfashionedanimmediate“lipsandteeth”relationshipbetweenMingChina(1368–1644)andChosŏnKorea(1392–1910)duringtheseventeenthcentury.UnderMinghegemony in the fifteenthcentury, theChosŏncourtkept itseyesonthemoves of theManchus andMongols, whose alliancemight be both a pivotalvariable in the shift of power relations and a lethal obstacle to the security ofChosŏn.TheMinghegemonyencounteredtheinescapablechallengeof“Mongolian-Jurchen intruders in the north and Japanese pirates in the south”北虜南倭 (Han2012,189–196)fromthemid-sixteenthcentury.OntopofthecollapseoftheMinginmainlandChina,thepatternofnorth-southturbulencealsoaggravatedChosŏn’ssecurity, which had been seriously challenged during the Japanese invasions ofKoreafrom1592to1598andtheManchuinvasionsin1627and1636.

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How the Chosŏn court and the ruling elites responded to the Revolt of WuSangui吳三桂 (1612–1678),knownas theRevoltof theThreeFeudatories (1673–1681), provides a snapshot of the complex interaction between Chosŏn and itsneighbors, including Qing China (1636–1912), during the second half of theseventeenthcentury.ThisarticlechartsthewaytheChosŏncourtandrulingelitesstarted building action plans against Wu’s rebellion from a more diachronicperspectiveintandemwiththepatternofnorth-southturbulence.Morespecifically,thearticle focusesonhowtheyemployedanoninvolvementpolicybyreferringtothe recurrent pattern of north-south turbulence in the past and collectinginformation, whenever and whatever available, for situation analysis. Drawingheavily on primary sources, the article examines a practical two-tiered strategy inwhich the court and ruling elites disengaged Chosŏn from diplomacy in anyprovocativematterwith itsstalwartneighborsandreengagedthe lateMing intheideologicalfurtheranceofhomefrontdefense.

Taking note of this accommodationist posture complements historian JaHyunKimHaboush’semphasisonanewepistemologicalstrategyinadualresponsetothenewregionalorderbytheformerly“barbarian”Qing,whoseJurchenpasthadlongbeen regarded as militarily and culturally inferior to both the Ming and Chosŏn(Haboush 2005, 115–117). Haboush gives insight into the reconstruction of thediscursivepracticeby theChosŏncourtand rulingeliteswhodeniedQing-Chinesetime,centeringontheuseofQingreigntitles,forthesakeofMingtimeinscriptionandreconceptualizedtheircivilization,claimingitsculturehadbeeninheritedfromthelateMingwhileembracingQinghegemonyintermsofthetraditionalSinocentricworldorder.Thatstudypavedthewaytoprobeintoaconstructiveconvergenceofpragmaticengagement,aswillbeexploredhere,anddiscursivepractice,asrevealedin Haboush’s research, toward a larger momentum of state security. Thisassemblage will enable us to reexamine how the Chosŏn court and ruling elitesarticulated the power relations of the time on their own terms and torecontextualizethedynamicunfoldingofpowerrelationsincontinentalEastAsia.

ASearchforNoninvolvement

DistancingAllAround

Located next to the Liaodong Peninsula, Chosŏn faced a large part ofManchuriafromwhichthemajordefenselines,includingtheShanhaiPass山海關—thebastionat the easternmost point of theGreatWall—were constructed andbeyondwhichthe vast steppes of Mongolia stretched far and wide. Thirty years before Wu’srebellion, the Qing attacks on Chosŏn in 1627 and 1636, accompanied by theformidablemarchoftheJurchen-Mongolcavalry,startedfromthisareaandmovedsouthwardtothenorthwesternpartofChosŏn.Atthesametime,Wu’sstrongholdwasYunnan,andhealliedhimselfwithGeng Jingzhong耿精忠 (d.1682) inFujianandShangZhixin尙之信(d.1680)inGuangdong.1Atthattime,theprovincesunder

1In1655,theShunzhiEmperorbestowedthethreefeudatories—largelythecurrentYunnan,Fujian,andGuangdongprovinces—uponWu,Geng,andShang,respectively.Thesemenhad

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thecontrolofGengandShangwerenotonlygeographicallylinkedtoTaiwanunderZhengChenggong鄭成功 (1624–1662) andhis familybut alsowidelyopen to thesouthwesterncoastofChosŏnandthewestcoastofJapan.

Giventhegeographicalandgeopoliticalcontext,thecourtandtheelitesjudgedthatWu’s rebellionhadestablishedone front line in thenorthandanother in thesouth.Thissituationpromptedthemtoconsiderthepossibilitythattherebelsmightally themselveswith Zheng’s force in the south and theMongols in the north. Inotherwords,theChosŏncourtandelitesdidnotconsiderWu’srebellionmerelyaconfrontation between the Qing hegemony and Ming loyalism but predicted aninterregional entanglement inwhich bothNorth China and South Chinamight fallintogeopoliticalchaosinseparablefromthesecurityofChosŏn.

As a result, the court and ruling elites adopted a transhistorical perspectiveenabling themtoorchestrateactionplansagainstWu’s rebellion in thecontextof“Mongolian-Jurchen intruders in thenorthandJapanesepirates in thesouth”thatruined the northern borders and southern coastlines of Ming China, especiallyduringtheJiajing(1521–1567)andLongqing(1567–1572)reigns.ChosŏnwitnesseditsterritoryturningintoahorriblebattlefieldduringtheJapaneseinvasionsofKoreaand encountered the invincible Jurchen-Mongol cavalry鐵騎 during the ManchuinvasionsofKorea (1627and1636).Thisnorth-south turbulence,which shook theterritorialandmaritimesecurityofitscountry,continuedintotheearlyseventeenthcentury.2

renderedsuperiormeritoriousserviceasHan-Chinesegeneralsinpro-QingmilitaryoperationsbeforeandafterthefalloftheMing.Theimperialintentwastobreakanypost-MingvacuumandsecuretheruleoftheQinginSouthChina.AstheKangxiEmperor(r.1661–1722)decidedtoabolishthethreefeudatoriesin1673,however,theystoodupagainsttheimperialorderandwagedarmedresistanceagainstQingdominance.In1678,Wudiedofanillness.HisgrandsonWuShifan吳世璠(d.1681)discontinuedthemilitarycampaignthreeyearslaterbycommittingsuicideunderattackoftheQingarmy.Shangwasorderedtocommitsuicidein1680,andGengwasexecutedin1682.2SevenyearsaftertheJapaneseinvasions,inhisaudiencewithKingSŏnjo(r.1567–1608),HanHyosun(1543–1621)proposedparallelreinforcementofthenorthernandsouthernfrontlinesbystationing20,000soldierssouthoftheHanRiveragainstJapaneseprovocationand10,000soldiersnorthofthatriveragainstJurchenattack.Hanstatedthenecessityofsecuringmilitarymachinerycomposedoffirearmsandartilleryinpreparationforanynorthernorsouthernbattle(Sŏnjosillok[TheveritablerecordsofKingSŏnjo]191:19a7–20b15).Ayearlater,in1606,YuYŏnggyŏng(1550–1608)deliveredtoKingSŏnjoareportfromaroyalmessengerthattheLotunJurchens,oneoftheneighboringJurchentribesloyaltoChosŏn,hadstartedinteractingwiththeHūlunJurchensaswellastheJianzhouJurchens,adevelopmentthatsurprisedtheking.YuvoicedtothekinghisconcernaboutwhetherMingintelligenceinLiaodongcorrectlyreadthebordersituation.YugavetheexampleofGeneralLiChengliang(1526–1618),whofavorablyreceivedthemissionaryfromNurhaci(1559–1626)withoutknowingofanewalliancebetweentheHūlunJurchens,andtherebysuffereddiversionarytacticsfromboththeMingandNurhaci,andtheJianzhouJurchensunderNurhaci.Atthesametime,YumentionedrumorsofthedeathofSōYoshitoshi(1568–1615),oneofthekeydiplomaticfiguresactivebetweenChosŏnandJapanduringtheJapaneseinvasions.ThekingsharedYu’sdistressbypointingoutunverifiednewsoftheremovalofToyotomiHideyori(1593–1615),thesonofToyotomiHideyoshi(1537–1598),fromthe

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Thesepainfulhistoricalexperiencesshapedthepatternbywhichthecourtandrulingelites,whilecarefullycheckingtherebellion’sdirectbearingonthesecurityofthe Qing, circumspectly watched other variables, such as alliances betweenWu’sforceandotheranti-QingforcesandtherevivalofMongoliandominance.Thecourtand ruling elites saw the internal commotion caused by the rebellion and theexternal threat, disposed to aggravate disorder amidst the rebellion, as equallydangeroustotheirownsecurity.Adefensivemodeofactionledthemtoaneutralpositionnotonly in theirdistance fromtheWuforce, theZheng force, Japan,andtheMongols,butalsointheirnegotiationswiththeQing.

WhenthefirstreportonWu’srebellionwasdeliveredtothecourtinthethirdlunar month of 1674,3 the court was eager to obtain correct and detailedinformationontheevent,specificallythescaleoftherebellionandthereactionofthe Qing court to it. One of the court’s proactive opinions proposed expeditiousmilitarymeasures to allywithother anti-Qing forces andattack theQing viabothmaritimeandoverlandroutes.Forexample,referringtotherecenthistoryofdefeatbytheQing,YunHyu尹鑴 (1617–1680)regrettedtwomistakesmadebyChosŏn.4ThefirstmistakeconcernedtheBattleofSarhūin1619,whenChosŏndidnotsendits best general and collaboratewith theMing army against the Jurchens, whosefierce military potency rose immediately after the construction of the Later Jin(1616–1636) by Nurhaci. The second mistake pertains to the excessively passivetreatment of Chosŏn on its western front line, which should have been closelyassociatedwiththevictoriousmaneuverofGeneralYuanChonghuan袁崇煥(1584–1630)ontheMing’seasternfrontlinein1630,beforethebreakdownofthesecondManchuinvasion in1636.Chosŏnwastedthesetwomilitaryopportunitieswithoutfighting well against the Jurchens. That negligence cost Chosŏn dearly, as it wascompelledtosurrendertotheQinginahumiliatingmanner.

The rise of Wu’s force might have been a great opportunity for Chosŏn towithstandtheQingofJurchenorigin.GiventhepromisingsituationfavorabletoWu’sforce,Chosŏnshouldnothaveclungtoadefensivestrategywithoutanyaction.Withan emphasis on the strategic value of Chosŏn, Yun proposed a three-tiered actionplan.5The first tierwouldbe todispatcha troopof10,000soldiers to theLiaodongPeninsulaconterminouswiththemetropolitanareaofPekingandkeepthe“neck”oftheQing army in check. The second tierwould be to allywith the forces of ZhengChenggonginTaiwanacrosstheseaandkeepthe“belly”oftheQingarmyatbay.ThethirdwouldbetosendinvitationstothosewillingtostandupagainsttheQingalongthesoutheasterncoast,includingJapan,andthenortheasternborderlandswithaviewtostirringuptheMingroyalistmovementintofulloperation.

politicalcenter.Intheprocess,moreinformationgatheringwaspropoundedatcourt.ThekingorderedYuandotherofficialstodispatchanenvoytoTsushimaforthepurposeofconfirmingwhetherthesereportscamefromreliablesources(Sŏnjosillok195:18b2–20b15).RegardingtheconflictbetweentheHūlunconfederation—theYehe,Hada,Hoifa,andUla—andNurhaciuptotheearlyseventeenthcentury,refertoCrossley(2002a,205–209)andWakeman(1985,48–53).3Hyŏnjongsillok[VeritablerecordsofKingHyŏnjong]22:8a14–b5.4Paekhochip[CollectedworksofYunHyu]14:10a5–11a5.5Hyŏnjongsillok22:23a4–7.

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YunHyu’sproposalwasnotaccepted.Instead,thecourttookgreatinterestinfindingoutwhetherWuplannedtoclaimanewdynastybyhimselforenthroneaZhu descendant from the deposedMing imperial family. In his audiencewith theking after his diplomatic mission, Yu Ch’ang 兪瑒 (1614–1690) very cautiouslymentioned a rumor about the enthronement of a Zhu prince byWu.6 In fact, theChosŏn court and ruling elites, eager to learn of any existence of the late Mingimperial family,hadconcentratedonwhatwashappeningtoPekingandmainlandChinaafterthefalloftheMing,especiallyonananti-QingmovementfortherevivalofthedeceasedMing. Intheeighthlunarmonthof1650,thecourt learnedoftheroyalistregimeofZhuYoulang朱由榔(r.1646–1662)nearGuangdongandGuangxiprovinces under the reign title of Yongli永曆.7 In 1662, receiving the informationthatZhuhadbeenkilledby theQingarmy,KingHyŏnjong (r.1659–1674)and thecourtacknowledgedthecompletedemiseoftheMing.8

Still,someelitesremainedopentonewsregardingtheMingroyalistmovementafter 1662. In 1668, five years before the outbreak ofWu’s rebellion, Yi Tansang李端相 (1629–1669) intimated the survival of a Ming interim regime led by acollaterallineofthebygoneMingimperialhouse,withtheeranameofYongliafterthebygonereignoftheZhuimperiallineageinthewesternprovinces.9ReferringtoMongols coming under the banner of the royalist regime, Yi also emphasized acontinuousefforttoremainabreastofcurrentevents.

Whatshouldnotgounnoticedwithrespecttoupdatedreportsonthesituationinmainland China is the frequent overlap between thewhereabouts of theMingroyalistregimeandtheanti-MingoperationundertheQinggeneralWuSangui.TheChosŏncourt knew thatWu,himself aMinggeneralbefore1644,was thepersonwhousheredtheQingarmyintoPekingandbecameoneofthemostpowerfulQinggenerals during the reign of the Shunzhi Emperor (r. 1644–1661).10 The negativeimage ofWu Sangui,who as aHan Chinese general stood at the forefront of thesuppressionagainsttheMingroyalistmovement,hadbeeninevitablyimprintedonthememoryoftheChosŏncourt.

Consequently, irrespective of the success ofWu’s rebellion the Chosŏn courtandrulingelitespaidgreatattentiontotherelationshipbetweentheSouthernMingcourtandWu,or,moreprecisely,thelegitimacyofWu’srebellionwhosecausewasexpectedtobeboundtoarevivalofthelateMing.Aconstructivecollaborationofthe court with Wu’s force was predicated upon the premise that Wu’s rebellionshouldexpeditetheMingloyalism.OnlyinthecontextoftherevivaloftheerstwhileMing couldWu’s rebellion be accorded thewarm support of the court and rulingeliteswhowerenotpersuadedheadlongbyananti-Qingmovement.Aconditionalandreservedattitudetowardtherebellionand,conversely,adiscerningandmodestapproachtodiplomacywiththeQingwereneverdiscardedbutexploitedasamajorstandardbywhichtoappraiseWu’spastcareerasapro-Qingcollaborator.Although

6Hyŏnjongsillok28:43a7–11.7Hyŏnjongsillok5:3b10–11.8Hyŏnjongkaesusillok[RevisedveritablerecordofKingHyŏnjong]8:3a2–7.9Chŏnggwanjaechip[CollectedworksofYiTansang]12:33a2–5.10Hyŏnjongsillok14:15a10–14.

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concedingQing hegemony in public, the court and elites still in noway admittedtheirvoluntarycollaborationwith theQing.They firmlybelieved themselves tobeentitledtodefineandhandleanti-Qingactivism,andthisconvictionmotivatedthemtodisplayanantipatheticposture toward the rebellion.That ishowthecourtandelites distanced themselves fromWu’s force and kept their stance objective andanalyticalforthedevelopmentoftherebellion.

What should also be further taken into consideration here is the additionalattentionof theChosŏncourt toanycooperationbetween theanti-Qing forces inSouthChinaandJapanduringtherebellion.Inthesixthlunarmonthof1675,Japan(viatheTsushimadaimyo)informedChosŏnoftherebellionandtheenthronementof a youth from the late Ming imperial lineage, and asked if Chosŏn had anyproblemswiththisdevelopmentduetoitsgeographicalproximity.11Sevenmonthslater, in1676,newinformation,collectedfromTsushima,arrived.ItconcernedtheroleoftheZhengforceinassumingfullchargeofmaritimepowerafterallyingwithWuSangui.12ItalsorecountedtheconnectionbetweentheZhengforceandJapan;about ten years earlier, Zheng’s father, Zheng Zhilong鄭芝龍 (1604–1661), hadaskedSatsumaProvinceformilitaryaid,buttherequestwasrejected.ThedaimyoofSatsumaProvincewasseverelyreprovedbytheBakufu,whichstoppedanyfurtherconnectionwiththeZhengforce.13

BytracingthestepsoftheZhengfamily,whofoughtagainsttheQingarmyfortwo generations, the Chosŏn court continued to entertain the possibility that theZheng group, active across several southern provinces of the Qing, could wagecertaincombinedoperationswithJapanagainsttheQing.Nonetheless,ChosŏndidnotallywiththeZhengforceorJapan,eventhoughtheformerfoughtananti-Qingfight.AswithWu’srebellion,theZhengforcelackedanygreatanti-Qingcause,suchas the restoration of the Han-Chinese dynasty or Ming loyalism, except for itsmilitary action in South China. The court and elites desperately sought adiversificationofinformationsourcesinordertohaveaclearerandmoreobjectiveunderstanding ofWu’s rebellion. Therefore, although information and news fromJapanwere considerably restricted and censored, the Chosŏn court and elites satresilientandopentointelligencecollectedthere.

More importantly, in view of the unforgettable experience of the Japaneseinvasions(1592–1598),theChosŏncourtandrulingeliteshadbeencarefullywatchingTokugawa Japan (1603–1863) with suspicion and mistrust. What if Japan were toinvadeagain?EvenwhenthehardlinerYunHuheardofpossiblecollaborationbetweenZhengChenggongandTokugawa Japan,hedisplayedgreat vigilance toward Japan.14Likewise,theapproachoftheZhengforcetoJapangaverisetosomedistrustwithaconsiderabledegreeofapprehension.Intheeleventhlunarmonthof1675,theChosŏncourtnotifiedtheQingofthefactthatJapanwaspayingattentiontotherebellionandthatJapanhadofficiallyaskedtheChosŏncourtwhetheritknewofthematter.15 11Sukchongsillok[VeritablerecordsofKingSukchong]4:16a11–15.12Sukchongsillok5:3a15–b11.13Theauthenticityofthisstorymustbeexaminedcarefully,becauseZhengZhilongwasexecutedbytheQingarmyin1661.14Paekhochip14:12a6–7.15Sukchongsillok4:59b3–8.

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Herewe can locate the pattern of Chosŏn’s response toWu’s rebellion. ThecauseofMing loyalismwasat the fore;yet,when it cametoanysensitivematterwithrespecttoChosŏn’sbordersecurityorthestabilityofmainlandChinainalargersense,thecourtdidnothesitatetosharethatmatterwiththeQing.Thatistosay,the anti-Qing action of the Zheng force did not instantly spur on anymeasure ofcoalition from the court and ruling elites who had a self-referential standard ofjudgmentregardingtheproperwaytoresisttheQing.Thissecurity-focuseddoctrineprovided themwitha somewhatwiderview thatwasnot limited toadownfalloftheQing.With circumspection, the court and ruling eliteswatchedother externalelements surrounding Chosŏn, such as the activities of the Zheng force and thepossiblealliancebetweenitandJapanasagravemaritimethreattotheirsouthernprovinces and coasts. They would then calculate the ensuing impact of foreignfactorsonacollapseoftheQingorevenontheentiredisarrayofcontinentalEastAsia.

Weshould recognize that the courtandelitesgraspedawayof thinking thatidentifiedbothWu’srebellionandotheraccompanyingeventsasanobstacletothenewly established regional order, if controlled by theQing, aswell as the fate ofChosŏn.Thisdefensiveyetforesightfulstanceinspiredthecourtandelitestotakeaneutral position in response to the Wu force, the Zheng force, and Japan; tocommunicate, if necessary, evenwith the Qing; and to distance Chosŏnmilitarilyfrom its neighbors. At this juncture the cause of Ming loyalism was adjusted toprioritizethesecurityofChosŏnamidandbeyondWu’srebellion.

At the same time, the movement of the Mongols, considered the mostpowerful of Chosŏn’s neighbors, also distressed the court whose indelibly vividmemoryoftheManchuinvasionin1636includedtheunstoppableonslaughtoftheMongolian cavalry under the command of the Qing army. That recent pastengendered a heightened sensitivity toward a return of the Mongols amid therebellion or in lieu of the Qing in mainland China. The court and elites saw thepotentialoftheMongolsasadeterminingfactorinplayingaprimaryroleinafuturecollapse of the Qing in addition to the future path of Wu’s rebellion. Thus, theMongolshadturnedouttobeChosŏn’sworstadversaryandweretobedistancedbyanymeans.Forthatreason,theinformationabouttherelationshipbetweentheQingcourtandtheMongolsthroughoutWu’srebellionwasofimmensesignificance.

Inthetenthlunarmonthof1669,thecourtreceivedthelatestnewsregardingtensionsbetweentheQingandtheMongols,specificallyconcerningtheaggravatedrelationship between the Qing imperial family and the Chahars, a powerfulMongolian confederation.16 The report described the oppositional attitude of aMongolian prince, the brother-in-law of the Shunzhi Emperor, to the imperialauthorityof theQingcourt.Hewasnotsatisfiedwithhis statusof feudal lordshipundertheQing,anduponthedemiseoftheemperorhedidnotparticipate intheimperial funeralofhisbrother-in-law inPeking.Accordingly,hewasorderedtobedetainedatShenyangandhissonwasenfeoffedasthenextprince.

MinChŏngjung閔鼎重 (1628–1692),whoreturnedfromPeking inthesecondintercalarymonthof1670,identifiedtheMongolianprinceasAbunai(1635–1675),

16Hyŏnjongsillok17:36b4–13.

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thePrinceoftheChaharsmarriedtoMakata(1625–1663)―theseconddaughterofHong Taiji (r. 1626–1636).Makatawas the elder sister of the Shunzhi Emperor.17Min also described the present relationship between the Qing court and theMongols,stressingthepowerfulandtoughcharacteroftheMongols.TheQinghadtriedtokeepatightreinontheMongolsoverwhomfullcontrolwasnotexercisedyet.18

Duringtherebellion,thecourtandtherulingelitessuspectedthatthemoveofthe Mongols correlated with how the Qing handled Wu’s rebellion and that theMongols were waiting for a chance to attack the Qing. At the beginning of therebellion,supportersofan immediatemeasureagainst theQing,suchasYunHyu,pointedouttherecalcitrantstanceoftheMongolstotheQingcourtandforetoldanoffensiveof the formeragainst the latter. In theeighth lunarmonthof 1674, fivemonthsafterthefirstreportontherebellion,YuCh’angreportedtoKingHyŏnjongwhathehadheard inPeking: theemperorhimselfwas going tomarshal an armyagainst the rebellion by mobilizing 110,000 Qing soldiers and 15,000 Mongolsoldiers.19

In the fifth lunarmonthof1675,an investigative reportwasdelivered to thecourt. The report concerned five Qing people who had relocated to Ningguta寧古塔—thecurrentNing’anofHeilongjiangProvince—andwerecomingacrosstheTuman River begging for food.20 Claiming to be Han Chinese, they described thesituation of the region where a total of 1,500 heavily armed soldiers weretransferredforthefirstthreemonthsandtheremaining300oldandinfirmsoldierswereonguard.Accordingtothesedeserters, theMongolsturnedawayfromtheirprevious loyaltytotheQingandapproachedthevictoriousWuforce,whichwouldaccelerateacollapseoftheQingbeforelong.Incaseofaretreattotheirhometown,thedesertersreported,theQingauthoritiesdeployedarmedforcestoaplacecalledBixian栢峴, locatedaday’s journeyfromNingguta,againstanyunexpectedattackbytheperfidiousChosŏn,whomtheQingwouldinnowayaskformilitarysupport.Actually, theChahars raisedanarmy in the sameyearbut suffereda catastrophicdefeat by the Qing. In the fourth lunarmonth of 1675 the Chosŏn court learned(albeitthroughareportnotofficiallyverified)thatthearmedconflictbetweentheQingand theChaharsand theensuingmilitarymovements—inwhich thedefensecorpsat Shenyangwaspositioned inPekingand the troops stationed inDandong,LiaoningProvince—weretransferredtoShenyang.21

As explained earlier, without solely fixing their eyes on the confrontationbetweentheQingandtheWuforce,theChosŏncourtandrulingelitesinvestigatedthedevelopmentoftherelationshipbetweentheQingcourtandtheMongols.TheydeemedtheallianceordisassociationofthetwosidestobeadecisivewatershedforthefateofWu’srebellionorevenawayofcreatinganunsafeconditionintheQing’snortheasternborder intheLiaodongPeninsula.Hence,as inthecaseoftheZheng

17Nobongchip[CollectedworksofMinChŏngjung]10:33b4–34a2.18Nobongchip10:34b5–10.19Hyŏnjongkaesusillok28:43a8–9.20Sukchongsillok3:53b8–54a3.21Sukchongsillok3:25b8–26a9.

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force and Japan, the Mongols were thought to be a crucial external factor,immediately relevant to the border-security status of Chosŏn and even a possiblehegemonoverthecontinentinplaceoftheQing,whichmadecleartheAmnokRiverastheborderlinewithChosŏn.Accordingtothecourtandelites,anappearanceofthe Mongols in the Liaodong Peninsula might presage another phase of PaxMongolicaafter theYuandynastywhenNorthChinaandManchuriawitnessedanunprecedented level of Mongolian dominance, towering over the rule ofcontemporary Qing in the region. On no account could Chosŏn guarantee itsnorthwesternborderunderaMongolianinvasion.Thisurgencyandalertness,ontheonehand,servedasafootholdforthecountermeasuresfortheirdefensestrategyagainstthelikelihoodofcollaborationbetweenWu’sforceandtheMongols,and,onthe other hand, offered to the Chosŏn court and ruling elites an objective andobservantstancethatsidesteppedaprecipitousanti-Qingaction.

Underthesecircumstances,theChosŏn-Qingrelationshipwassocomplexthatboth sides tended to distance themselves from each other (see figure 1). TheChosŏncourtandeliteshadnotedastandoffattitudefromtheQingthatstrovenottoleakanyspecific,concrete,oraccurateinformationregardingtheMongols,tosaynothingof the rebellion.As for theQing, anynegativeorunfavorable informationcouldstimulateabreakawayofChosŏn fromManchudominanceor turnmilitarilyagainst Peking along with other anti-Qing forces. What we can detect here is amistrustbetweenQingandChosŏninthemiddleofWu’srebellion.

Cautious of border-security matters, controlled in large part by thegovernmentalorgansinShenyangandNingguta,theQingcourtmadepreparationsagainst any unexpected incident with Chosŏn. According to a report in the thirdlunarmonthof1677,Songgotu(1636–1703),apowerfulministerattheQingcourt,announced before the Chosŏn delegation his unwillingness to receive anyinformation from Chosŏn.22 The Qing translators expressed their deep concernabout the large recruitment of military candidates for the state (military service)examination and the current reconstructionof fortresses in Chosŏn.On theirwayback,thedelegatesexperiencedaharshsecuritycheckattheShanhaiPass,whereallofthemweresubjectedtofullbodysearches.23TheseeventsexemplifytheQingmistrust of Chosŏn and indicate the Qing’s tight control of information to testChosŏn’sintentionbeyonditsyieldingtoexpedientrhetoricindiplomacy.

Theunveiled tensionbetweenChosŏnandQing legitimized theChosŏn courtand ruling elites for strategic responses that were more sensibly and gingerlycalculated. For example, Im Yŏng林泳 (1649–1696) believed that as of 1678 therecent update on the state of the rebellion was not different from that receivedthreeyearsago;theWuforcehadbeenroaming,inonewayoranother,forfourorfive years in the far western regions, especially in Hubei, Henan, and Zhejiangprovinces, without securing a bridgehead, once available near Taiyuan of Shanxi,toward Peking.24 Plus, the news of intermittent victories over the Qing army in

22Sukchongsillok6:19a2–6.Songgontu,anuncleofEmpressXiaochengrenwhopredeceasedherhusbandtheKangxiEmperor,wasaninfluentialministerattheQingcourt.23Sukchongsillok6:19a13–15.24Ch’anggyechip[CollectedworksofImYŏng]13:6a1–7a8.

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placeslocatedinwesternGuangdongorFujian,mightindicateasteadyshrinkageofWu’sforce.Moreover,theoversensitivebehavioroftheQingcourttowardChosŏnofficialsa yearearlierand thehasty returnof theQingdiplomats to their countryalso propelled Im to think of certain untold yet unfavorable events that theQingwould not share with Chosŏn and to conjecture a deterioration of Qing militaryreadiness.Finally,byofferingthepossibilityofawarofattritionbetweentheQingandWu’sforce,ImforecastagloomychanceofaformidableMongolianappearancefromthenorthinthedaystocome.

Figure1.Chosŏn-Jurchenbordermap朝鮮女眞分界圖,c.1740sorlater.ThemapshowsthemajormilitarypostsofthenorthwesternandnortheasternareasinChosŏnaswellassomeimportantgeographicalandsecurityinformationinManchuria.Source:KyuganggakInstituteforKoreanStudies,SeoulNationalUniversity.

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Consequently,theChosŏncourtandrulingelitesexertedthemselvesgatheringasmany different types of relevant information as possible–albeit controlled andlimitedstrictlybyeithertheQingortheJapaneseauthorities—andputallthepuzzlepiecestogethertofigureoutwhatwasoccurring.Whatmatteredtothemwashowand how far the wavelength of the rebellion linked directly to state security.Notwithstanding the low degree of accuracy and reliability of the informationconveyed,theyprioritizedstatesecurityasthemostessentialcriterionfordecision-making. With this priority, they read between the lines of overflowing andinconsistent information from the Qing or Japan, scrutinized the unspoken yetconsiderabletensionbeneaththeManchu-Mongolalliance,andstrategizedagainstthechangingnatureoftherebellion.

In the fourth lunar month of 1678, the Chosŏn delegation, having returnedfrom Peking, related an upturn of the Wu force winning over the Qing army inGuangdong, Guangxi, and Fujian provinces.25 An interesting addition to this newdevelopmentwas thenamingofWuhimself asemperor.KingSukchong (r. 1674–1720)intimatedthatthereal intentionofWuwastogaintheheartsofthepeoplefor himself and not for a revival of the erstwhile Ming dynasty.26 Wu’s potentialattempttobecomeaself-proclaimedemperor,immaterialtoMingloyalism,didnotconvincethecourtandrulingelitestosupportWu’srebellionasaformofanti-Qingmovement.

Thenewsconcerningothermajorfigures,suchasGengJingzhong,ShangZhixin,andWangBuchen王輔臣 (d. 1681), confirmed for the court and ruling elites thebleak picture of the rebellion. Observing where these generals moved wassignificant,becausetheQingcourttriedtodrawthemovertoitssidebyreasonofstrategic necessity to disperse the power ofWu and Zheng.As late as the endof1676, theChosŏn court acquired a report thatGenghad surrendered to theQingarmyandWanghadattemptedsuicide.27Fromthattimeforward,thecourtrealizedthatthesegeneralswerekilledorcapturedbytheQingarmyand,mostofall,Wu’sstrugglemight take the formof a local disturbance far fromanationwide royalistcampaign,ratherthancorneringtheQingcourt inafatalsituation.28Thereportofthe Chosŏn delegation on the imperial hunting for a few months in 1681, injuxtaposition with some information indicating a weaker position of Wu’s force,gaveaninklingoftheindisputablepredominanceoftheQing.29

In the seventh lunar month of 1681, the court heard unverified informationregarding the death of Wu and the chaotic aftermath generating a tug-of-warbetween the rebels and the Qing army.30Without any immediate and large-scaleaction, almost identical to the response pattern before the rebellion, the Chosŏncourt kept updating itself on what was occurring via numerous, if not alwaystrustworthy, sources of intelligence by the delegates dispatched to Peking. In theprocess,themainattentionofthecourtshiftedtoastalemateinwhichneitherthe 25Sukchongsillok7:27b7–11.26Sukchongsillok7:27b1–3.27Sukchongsillok5:35b7–10,5:49b3–9.28Sukchongsillok8:9b4–13,12:8a5–b9.29Sukchongsillok12:46b3–7.30Sukchongsillok8:9b4–13.

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QingnortheremainingWuforcesheldanyoverwhelmingpoweragainsteachother.In the second lunarmonth of 1682, the Qing officially informed Chosŏn that therebellionhadbeencompletelyquelled.31

Takenaltogether,inadditiontothenorth-southturbulenceoftheMinginthemid-sixteenthcentury,thelessonsfromthedevastatingforeignattacksvialandandseafromthelatesixteenthcenturytotheearlyseventeenthcenturyentrenchedtheChosŏncourtandrulingelitesinadefensivestrategyofnoninterventionagainstthecomplex and unpredictable situation of Northeast Asia in the late seventeenthcentury.ThewaythecourtandelitesrespondedtoWu’srebellionexemplifiesthisself-protective neutralism. As demonstrated in this section, the court and elitesexhausted all possibilities for carefully locating the movements of Wu’s force,Zheng’sforce,theMongols,andJapanenmasseandadoptedawait-and-seepolicy.They took into serious account theMongols as a stronghegemonic competitor totheQing in thenorth, including theGreatWall and the LiaodongPeninsula,whiletreatingJapanastheotherpotentialplayerbasedonawiderrangeof informationregardingWu’srebellionandZheng’sforce,bothpivotaltochangesoftheanti-Qingsituationalongthesoutherncoasts.32WithoutfullconfidenceinadefinitevictoryofWu’sforceortheMongols,theyalsokeptfightingthemistrustanddoubtofananti-Qing conspiracy, questioned by the Qing, and proving their commitment to anongoingamicablerelationshipwiththeQing.Inasimilarmanner,Chosŏndistanceditselffromitsneighborsandchosenoninvolvementinthefrontrankofitsactionsasthemost practical solution to handlingWu’s rebellion.Aswill be discussed in thenextsection, thisstrategicoperationofdistancingallaroundalsoemboldenedtheChosŏncourtandrulingelitestoprepareanotherstageofengagementindomesticsecuritythroughoutandevenaftertheendoftherebellion.

InwardTurn

DomesticStability內修intheAbsenceoftheMing

Even if many elites agreed with Yun Hyu on account of their sympathy forMingloyalism, theyopposedhis hastyprowar approach toWu’s rebellion. Twomonthsafter the official report on the rebellion, Na Sŏkchwa (1652–1698) outlined in amemorialaplanthatadvancedcollaborationwiththeanti-Qingforcewithaviewtoenthroningan imperial successorof the lateMing.33Throughmilitarycooperation,Na contended, Chosŏn should be able to express gratitude for the immeasurablesupportofthelateMing,whichhadsentrelieftroopstoChosŏnduringtheJapaneseinvasions, and to break free from the boundless humiliation caused by its defeatduringtheManchuinvasions. 31Sukchongsillok13:15a7–11.32Inthisvein,weneedtoappreciatethehistoricityofwhattheMongolianempireleftwithrespecttotheinternationalrelationsofNortheastAsiawhere“Jurchen,Mongol,Chinese,Korean,andJapaneseinterestsintersected(andwouldcontinuetointersectuntilthelastdaysofimperialEastAsia)”(Robinson2009,7).33Samyŏnchip[CollectedworksofKimCh’anghŭp]29:18b8–19a3.

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However,NaactivelypropoundedtheConfuciansecuritystrategyof“internalcultivation—domestic stability—and external repulsive force—internationalcompetence”內修外攘withaviewtosupportingMing loyalism.Accordingtothistheory, the fundamental and ultimate solution to outside aggression or exteriorconflictistoensureinternalstability,basedonthetreatmentofpublicwelfare,andtoachieveahighdegreeofsocialcohesionandnationwideunity,namely,domesticstability against foreign threats. Along these lines,Naproposed some cooperativeactivitiesabroad.

GiventhecontextofcontemporaryChosŏn,NaSŏkchwa’sthesisprovidedthecourt and ruling elites with a rationale for home front defense as the mostfundamentaland realistic countermeasure toWu’s rebellion.ThewayKimSuhang金壽恒 (1629–1689) warned against any side effect of the rebellion reflects thetypicalframeworkfordomesticstability,too.Kiminsistedontherecruitmentofthetalented, the removal of public harm, and the provision of military implementsincludingthefortificationoftheborders.34Inthefaceofanunpredictablesituationin mainland China, Kim’s tone, akin to that of Na, was heightened for domesticstability.

Significantly, the inward turn to domestic stability had tacitly spread widelythrough themainstreamof central politics, inspiring the court and ruling elites toadoptamore refinedandneutralattitude towardanti-Qingmovements, includingMing loyalism, and to arm themselves in a more self-motivated version ofnoninvolvement. One example can be seen in the way that Song Siyŏl 宋時烈 (1607–1689) subsumed the meaning of Wu’s rebellion from a noninterventionistperspective. With great reservations against Wu’s motivation, Song evinced themeaningoftherebellionasamatterofchoiceattheindividuallevel.Why?

Song Siyŏl expresseddeepdoubts regarding the success ofWu’s rebellionbyreviewingthepoliticalvicissitudesofChina.35Dynasticreplacementiswidelyknownas a normal historical phenomenon among Han Chinese dynasties, whereas theconquest of mainland China by barbarians is regarded as a great mishap. Song’spremise was open to the interpretation that the rebellion of Li Zhicheng李自成(1606–1645),wholedthepeasantarmyagainsttheMing,tookplaceinthedynamicvicissitudeofHanChinesepolities.Songasked:WhataboutWu?WuwastheworsttraitorbyreasonofusheringtheJurcheninvaderspasttheGreatWallandreceivingafeudatoryfromthebarbariandynastyQinginadditiontoamerit-basedranktitle.Hence,Songargued,anyabuseofthegrandcause,theMingrevivalinparticular,forthesakeofWu’sownpersonaldesiresforimperialpowermustbedenigratedasanunforgivable offense. Song’s focus here was mainly on how Wu should haveconductedhimself as a general of the lateMingandatone forhis past treachery.This exposition tended to delimit the nature of Wu’s rebellion down to his ownprivate choice. This approach freed Song from becoming obsessed with how toconnectWu’srebellionandMingloyalism.WecanapprehendthemannerinwhichSongmadevigorouseffortstocouchWu’srebellioninConfucianterminologyandtojustifyaself-defensivenoninvolvement.

34Chich’onchip[CollectedworksofYiHijo]26:27b2–4.35Songjadaejŏnpurok[AppendedworksofSongSiyŏl]18:33b6–34a5.

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Kim Suhang carefully reexamined Wu’s rebellion by problematizing theinsincerity thatWu showed for years and reaffirming the importance of domesticstability in theConfucian sense.According toKim,how toevaluate the successorthefailureofaleaderinstateaffairsshouldrest,asarule, lessonexternalfactorsthanoninternalcapacitythatfullyhandlesdomesticstability.Kimprioritizeduprightleadershipsothatpeoplewillsubmitthemselvestotheauthorityofatrueleader.36In Kim’s view, the leader is supposed to make up his mind by emptying anytemporizing thoughts, recruit men of ability, uphold public discipline, encourageofficials to fulfill their public duties, and pay full attention to the welfare of thepeople. This being the case, the people would wholeheartedly follow the leader.RegardingWu,Kimgreatlydoubtedtheconductofamanwhosesurrender to theQingdirectlycausedthedownfalloftheMingandwhosebetrayalagaininducedthecurrentcrisisoftheQing.Withoutgreatcauseandrighteousness名義,Wuwasnotentitled to take the lead in a movement to restore the bygone Ming.37 Thus,reaffirmingthesignificanceofdomesticstability,KimchallengedWu’sopportunisticbehaviorasunbefittingofatrueleader.

Although politically opposed to Song Siyŏl and Kim Suhang, Yi Chae 李栽 (1657–1730)confirmeddomesticstabilityasthecoreofforeignpolicies.Accordingto Yi, there is no doubt thatMing loyalismwas the foremost cause for Chosŏn’sdiplomaticagenda;thus,anypro-Qingmovedeservesnotevenpassingnotice.Still,thisdoesnotmeanthatpromptanti-QingmeasuresshouldbetakeninthenameofMingloyalism.Nowthat,accordingtoYi,theinternalsecuritymetastateofoverallcrisis in which the government was gravely crumpled and the livelihood of thepeoplewasalreadyimpaired,anyindiscreetandshallowanti-Qingplansweretobeavoided.38 Inotherwords,thecredoofMingloyalismshouldneverbeabandoned,yet domestic stability needed to be appreciated as an essential requisite for theactivationofMingloyalism.

Yi Chae also disagreed with those who offered a counterargument to anymilitarymeasureagainsttheQing.39AccordingtoYi,theircontentiontendedtobeoverdependent on the strength or weakness of the Qing, or on its changingcondition; this response to Wu’s rebellion pinpointed their opportunisticoverrelianceonthedriftofpowerrelations.DespitethefactthattheareaoccupiedbyWu’sforcewasalmosthalfofQingterritory,therebellioneventuallyfailed,andtheQingproveditselfadynastyofmightandfortune;hence,anyrecklessattempttodefytheQingshouldberescinded.YiwarnedthatthisseeminglyantiwaropinionsoundedplausiblebutdeviatedseriouslyfromthegreatcauseofMingloyalismandmade an opportunistic turn. Chosŏn should not lay down but rathermaintain itsretaliatory spirit against theQing irrespectiveof the strengthor impotenceof theQing. That is how the success or failure of Wu’s rebellion was not supposed toinfluencetheanti-QingstrategyofChosŏn,includingMingloyalism.

36Nong’amchip[CollectedworksofKimCh’anghyŏp]25:29b7–10.37Nong’amchip25:23a1–24a2.38Miramchip[CollectedworksofYiChae]12:7a1–4.39Miramchip12:6a1–8.

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YicontestedthatChosŏnshouldinsteadembodytheroyalforefathers’tenacityfornationaldefense,graspthesuitableorderofpriorityingovernment,employmenofwisdomandtalent,stopself-interestedfactionalism,andtraintroopsalongwiththereserveofcombatrations.40Thisagendaconstitutedthefundamentalformatofdomestic stabilitywhile generatinga force to conductanti-Qingoperations induecourse. Thus, regardless of the result of the operations, Chosŏn could do its bestwithout regrets and, accordingly, its neighbors would not denounce how Chosŏnhandled theQing. According to Yi, this self-reliant and self-referential initiative inresponse toexternalpressure, suchasWu’s rebellion, shouldbegroundedon thestrenuousperformanceofdomesticstability.

Overall, the court and ruling elites withheld an indiscreet support for Mingloyalism.BeforeandthroughoutWu’srebellion,theywerelessconcernedabouttherelevancyoftherebelliontoarevivalofthebygoneMingthanaboutthesafetyoftheir own state, specifically domestic stability predicated uponpublicwelfare andnational defense. For example, notwithstanding their political differences, whatSongSiyŏl,KimCh’anghyŏp,andYiChaehadincommonwashomefrontdefenseasakeycodeofconductfornoninvolvementinwhichChosŏnwasnottobeswayedbyan external situation. Even Song and Kim distinguish Ming loyalism from Wu’srebellion by reason of the misbehavior of Wu himself, as he betrayed the Mingdynasty. Yiwent so far as to advocate for full attention todomestic stabilitywithcomplete disregard for how the rebellion unfolded. Hence, the discourse ondomestic stability played a crucial role in vesting Chosŏn with an objective andobservantposture,restrainingthecourt fromtakinganyspeedyactionagainsttheWuforce,andgivingthemostpragmaticresponsetotheuseofMingloyalism.Asaresult, the court and ruling elites promoted an inward motif as the indisputablefulcrumofChosŏn’sdecision-makingforforeignpolicyandlegitimizedtheprincipleofnoninvolvementinthemaelstromofWu’srebellion.

Self-Strengthening自强inthePresenceoftheQing

In retrospect, the Qing remained imperturbable during the late seventeenth andeighteenth centuries. Still, taking a closer look at the historical context,unpredictableaffairsceaselesslyunfoldedbeforetheeyesoftheChosŏncourtandruling eliteswho estimated that any vacuumof power afterWu’s rebellionmightinvoke an unstoppable return of theMongols. For example, Kim Suhang worriedthat theMongols,whohad longawaitedanotheropportunity tooccupymainlandChina,mightmarchover the Shanhai PassduringandevenafterWu’s rebellion.41AlthoughtheywouldfailtoconquerPeking,Kimsurmised,theMongolscouldstartinvadingitsnortheasternenvironsandplaguingChosŏnwithpertinaciousdemandsforanewhierarchytotheneglectoftheQing.

Furthermore,whileholdingto thepositionofnoninvolvement in thenameofdomesticstability,theChosŏncourtcouldnotmerelyrejecttheQing’sdemandforcollaborationagainsttherebellion.TheQinghadenougharmedpowertocommand

40Miramchip12:7a4–8.41Nong’amchip25:27b4–7.

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adherence to its hegemony. As for theQing court,which distrusted Chosŏn evenbeforeWu’srebellion,militarycooperationcouldbeoneefficientwayoftestingtheresponse of Chosŏn to the unstable situation of mainland China. The court andrulingelitesstroveforarealistic,two-prongedschemetodiverttheQing’srequestformilitaryassistanceduringtherebellion.

First,NamKuman南九萬 (1629–1711)askedthecourtnottobroachmilitaryaidasadiplomaticagenda itembeforetheQing,becausesendingweaponswouldescalatetheQing’sdemandformanpowerorforadispatchoftroops.42Still,evadingthe issue of military support might foster thoughts that Chosŏn was doingsomethingtraitorousbehindthescenes.Howwouldthecourtandrulingelitesavoidthis predicament? Nam suggested that Chosŏn propound in public the rule ofdemilitarizationthatChosŏnwasexpectedtoobserveafteritssurrendertotheQingin1637;eversince then,weaponsandmilitaryequipmenthadnotbeenpreparedwithoutmilitary training in the Chosŏn army. Nam asserted that this principle ofdisarmament,agreeduponbybothsides,wouldbethemosteffectiverationaleformakingChosŏnunavailableforanymilitaryassistance.

Nonetheless,thecourtandrulingelitesdidnotabandonthemilitary.AccordingtoNamKuman,aquietyetexhaustivepreparationforthereconditioningofmilitaryfacilitiesandtheperformanceofmilitarytrainingwastobemadeunderthefacadeofthedemilitarization.43Putanotherway,Chosŏnshouldbeequippedwithahighlevel of self-reliant defense capacity, or self-strengthening, apart from domesticstability, in order to concretize the noninvolvement policy. Particularly,reconstructingthedefensesystemofthenorthwesternborderacrosstheLiaodongPeninsulaandalongside theAmnokRiverbecamemore important thananyothermatterintermsofborderdefense.

In this context, the defense of Pyŏng’an Province, which formed a naturalborderwiththeQingalongtheAmnokRiver,wasreorganizedintothreepositions:(1)borderguardonthefrontline,(2)mainroadguardalongtheintermediateline,and(3)inlandstrongpointline(Kang2004,176–189).InthemiddleofWu’srebellionin1678,KingSukchongorderedthereinforcementofbordersecuritybasedmainlyon thesevencounties―Kanggye,Wiwŏn, Isan,Pyŏktong,Ch’angsŏng,Sakchu,andŬijo―south of theAmnok. Since then, approximately 230 observation postswerealsorebuiltinthesecounties.Intwoyears,thesecondandthethirdlinesofdefensewere also strengthenedwith the realignment of troop deployments, a process bywhich the military training period was extended (Roh 2004, 243–244). The courtendeavoredtonotonlyblunttheedgeoftheenemy,specificallytheQing’sironcladcavalryforakindofblitzkrieg,butalsoblockitsfastmarchsouthwardintoHansŏng,thecapitalearlyinthecombat.ThisstrategycouldgiveChosŏnmoretimetolineupfor counterattacks and to reinforce the viable offensive capacities of the Chosŏntroops.

The strategy posed a question: What should be done if the invaders brokethrough the three-layereddefense lines of P’yŏng’anProvince and simultaneouslymoved southward into Hwanghae, a province south of P’yŏng’an Province and

42Yakch’ŏnchip[CollectedworksofNamKuman]5:4b5–5a1.43Yakch’ŏnchip5:5b6–8.

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conterminouswiththeenvironsofthecapital?Iftheenemyadvancedfarthertotheattack after P’yŏng’an Province, Hwanghae Province would become the premierbattle zone that Chosŏn should secure by allmeans. The governor of Hwanghae,Kwŏn Su權脩 (?–?), proposed a plan against an intrusion by the enemy passingthroughP’yong’yanProvince,whichextendsmore than200kilometers (about125miles) from north to south.44 First, Kwŏn paid attention to the environmentalfeaturesofthesixmainroutestoP’yŏng’anProvince.Allofthemwerecomposedofsteepandnarrowpaths.Thus,threemethodswererequiredinaccordancewiththelevel of accessibility determined by these geographic factors.Onemethodwas toreforest certain wooded areas to camouflage weaponry and deploy troops forclearing away brush. The secondmethodwas to construct bastionswithwoodenbarricades, and the thirdwas to constructor reconstructhigh-walled fortresses inpreparationforalarge-scalecampaign.

In 1680, when the second and the third defense lines of P’yŏng’an Provincewererearranged,thekingconfirmedanewplanfortheBorderDefenseCommand備邊司 that combined regular combat personnel, readied reserve personnel todifferent strategic points, and reestablished the chain of command over theprovince so as to increase the maneuverability of the defense manpower.45 Thebureau also asked the court to prohibit slash-and-burn fields and logging inHwanghae Province and take maximum advantage of the local terrain’sconfiguration. In terms of logistics, combat units were required to join togetherunderaself-sustainingsystemoftransportationanddistributionforprovisionsandarmaments. Consequently, in keeping with the second and the third lines ofP’yŏng’an Province, the court also rehabilitated a defense system in HwanghaeProvince whose uttermost strategic parts were fortified with the objective ofinflictinggreatdamageonenemyforcesheadingforthecapital.

There was a possibility that this type of positional warfare would leave theenemyexposedtoanattackfromtherearbyChosŏntroopseven ifsomeunitsoftheenemy couldmove to the vicinity ofHansŏng. The reasonwas that rearguardunitsoftheenemymuststaybehindinordertofindanddestroythestrongholdsofthe Chosŏn army one by one throughout the province. This operation of theenemy’s rearguard units would divide the enemy’s invasion into forward andrearward lines, a situation in which the aggressors might lose its first-strikecapabilityandeventually findthemselvesenteringaprolongedwar.Whatbroughttheenemyindangerofretreatwasanongoingexpansionofsupplylinesaswellaslines of communication across battlefields extending more than 300 kilometers(186.4miles) fromPyŏng’anProvincetoHwanghaeProvince.ThatispreciselywhathadhappenedtotheMingarmydispatchedtoChosŏnduringtheJapaneseinvasions.In1593, themain forces,mostly cavalry regiments, stormed through the northwesternfront and in almost twoweeks recapturedKaesŏng, a city about 55 kilometers (34.1miles)northofHansŏng.Ironically,fromthatmomenttheMingarmystartedtofacetheawfulquagmireofhow toprovidemanpower,weaponry, and food suppliesover thevastoperationareadistantfromitseasternmostborderwiththeLiaodongPeninsula.

44Sukchongsillok7:43a14–44a11.45Sukchongsillok9:1a5–2a7.

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Furthermore, theChosŏncourtandrulingelitessurveyedthepossible retreatroutesoftheQingintheeventofaninterregnumfollowingadownfalloftheQingdue to Wu’s rebellion. They monitored the northern, specifically northwestern,territory,which could be used as a geographical detour for a defeatedQing fromPeking back toManchuria. In addition, the court and elites discussed themilitarystrategiesoftotalwarandlimitedwarfarewiththeQing(Pae1997,307–313).Thecourt also constantly updated information on the borderlands; recorded roadnetworks,military facilities, and relay/supply stations inManchuria; identified thestrategicpointsbetweenManchuriaandMongolia;andboostedthedevelopmentofmilitarycartographyforthesepurposes.

Nam Kuman recalled a border-security issue, presented in court during thereign of King Hyŏnjong, regarding an unwanted entanglement in Chosŏn’snorthwesternfrontierwitharetreatoftheQingfromPekingtoNingguta―itsbasecampbefore the conquest of theMing―in the case of an emergency.46Making adesperate returnhome,a fleeingQingwouldbreak into thenorthwesternareaofChosŏnforashortcutalongthesouthernpartofMountPaektueastwardandthenturn northward into Ningguta instead of a distant and rugged road vulnerable toMongolian raids between Shenyang―the pivot of the Qing administration inManchuria―andNingguta.

KimSuhangwasawareofdisarraythatcouldfollowthecollapseoftheQing.Itwas the historical geopolitical nexus tying the security of Chosŏn to that of theregionalhegemon,whosecapitalwasPeking.Thus,disorderon thecontinentwasliabletobringforthdirectaftereffectsonthesecurityofChosŏn.Kimanticipatedthefall of the Qing by discussing its retreat route: a faltering Qing would first passShenyang close to the territory of Chosŏn.47 These circumstances would catalyzeendlesspillagingbytheretreatingQingacrossthenorthwesternborderofChosŏn.Asarequiredresponse,heavilyarmedtroopswouldbedeployedalongthefrontier,crossovertheborderifnecessary,andstrikeablowtothefleeingQing.48

In the eleventh lunar month of 1691, a decade after the cessation of Wu’srebellion, an official reportwas brought up to the court apropos of a presumablyimperial request that Chosŏn agree to cooperate on a cartographic project for anofficial government map by the Qing court.49 Several high-ranking officials fromPekingwerestaying inNingguta toview theshapeofMt.Paektu.50After the fieldsurvey fromNingguta, theyweregoingtoenter intoChosŏn’s territorytoconductanother field survey from Ŭiju, one of the seven major military bases along theAmnokRiver,allthewayuptoMt.Paektuunderthewell-informedguidanceoflocalpeoplefromChosŏn,andobservethetopographyofthatarea.

46Sukchongsillok31:30a10–12.47Nong’amchip25:27a9–b4.48Nong’amchip25:28b4–9.49Nong’amchip23:37b10–38a1.50ThePekingbureaucratswerenotidentified.FourcentralgovernmentofficialsarerecordedinSukchongsillok.Twoofthem,MinisterofJustice刑部尙書andoneAttendantCenter侍御史,canbeclarifiedwiththeirtitles.However,therestofthem,printedas內大臣and翰苑官,canonlybeassumedtobeasonepersonfromtheGrandSecretariatandonepersonfromtheHanlinAcademy,respectively.

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Whatdisturbed the courtwas the fact thathigh-rankingofficials fromPekingweredispatched toNinggutaand its surroundingarea for topologicaldata, terrainanalysis, and regional intelligence. For what purpose were they conducting thissurvey? Entering the northernmost territory of Chosŏn, includingMt. Paektu,wasregarded as an aggressive step against the security of Chosŏn. Additionally, thesouthwestern part of themountain across theAmnokRiverwas the birthplace oftheJianzhouJurchens建州女眞whereNurhaciandthefoundingfathersoftheQingcame from. All the information provided in the 1691 report indicated a strongpossibilitythattheQingwaspreparingsomethingassociatedwithitsoldbasepriortotheconquestoftheMingandwiththeborderareainseparablefromthesecurityofChosŏn.Thecourtand rulingeliteswereencouraged topresume that theQingmightbeplanningaprojectdesignedforawithdrawalbacktoitshomelandviathenorthernareaofChosŏnatsometimeoranother.EventhoughthecourtreceivedthenewsthattheQinghaddecidedtocanceltheŬiju-to-Mt.Paektuschedulethreemonths later in the second lunarmonth of 1692,51 the Chosŏn court’s doubt andapprehensionneverwithered.Theotherpartofthispost-QingscenarioconcernedaMongolian intervention in concurrence with a retreat route via inland areas ofChosŏn.AftertheofficialmessagefromtheQingin1682regardingtheendofWu’srebellion,thecourtandrulingelitessensedanewMongolianthreattotheQingbythosewhowereputativelycalledtheOyirods-DzungarsinWesternMongolia.52Thatlatest news rendered both inadequate the security of the Qing—especiallyconcerningthenorthoftheShanhaiPass—andexcessivetheobsessionoftheQingcourttowardShenyangandNingguta.

In the second lunarmonth of 1691,Minister of State DefenseMin Chongdo閔宗道 (1633–?) had expressed to King Sukchong his concern regarding bordercrossings that might be vulnerable to a Qing runaway back to Ningguta viaShenyang.53 Interestingly,Minpointedout two featuresofShenyang in relation tothepossiblecomebackof theQing.The first,asalreadyaddressedbyhispreviousgeneration, was the geographical difficulty of the Shenyang-Ningguta road. Thesecond was the geopolitical factor whereby Shenyang joined Mongolia andManchuria together. This discussion implied the unobtrusive yet well-known factthat theMongols, one of theworst threats for a collapse of theQing,would notleave theQingaloneafter catching sightof its stumble. Inotherwords, Shenyangwas highly exposed to theMongolswhose assault against the Shenyang-Ninggutacorridorintimesofchaosmightnotbeunthinkableatall.

With a fundamental platformof geopolitical strategy basedon the long-termperspective of “Mongolian-Jurchen intruders in the north and Japanese pirates inthe south,” the Chosŏn court revitalized the policy of domestic stability and self-

51Sukchongsillok24:7a14–15.52Sukchongsillok13:9b1–3,28a14–b2.EvenafterthedefeatoftheChaharsbytheQingarmyin1675,thepowerfulOyirods,headedbyGaldan(1632–1697or1644–1697)andhissuccessors,inWesternMongolia,vehementlyresistedQing’sexpansionintoTurkestanandTibetinthelateseventeenthcentury(Crossley2002a,311–320).TheintensetensionandconflictcontinuedintotheeighteenthcenturyuntiltheendoftheDzungar-QingWarsin1757(Crossley2002b,350–355).53Sukchongsillok23:9b7–10.

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strengthening toward any change after the end of Wu’s rebellion. The inwardinitiatives,whichwere not simply confined to internal unity, always came in stepwith external relations, centering on the Chosŏn-Qing relationship and borderdefenseinpreparationforcontingencies, includingtheintrusionofafalteringQinginto its territory or a revival ofMongolian dominance overManchuria and NorthChinaacrosstheAmnokRiver.GiventhatapossibleshiftfromPaxManjuricatoPaxMongolicawasamply forecastby theChosŏncourtandrulingelites,wecanchartthedegree towhich themodusoperandi of their pragmatist foreign strategywasgearedtowardhowtotreatthetwonorthernpowersoftheQingandtheMongolsincontinentalEastAsiauptothelateseventeenthcentury.WhatwastheplaceofMingloyalism?ThereturnofaHanChineseempireservedastheoreticalnourishmentfor a self-defensive program under the motto of domestic stability and self-strengthening and constituted the core of anti-Qing discourse. This deliberatecalculationofMingloyalisminthepast,Qingdominanceatpresent,andaMongolianreturninthefuturecharacterizedtheinwardturntowardthegoalof livingwiththemightyQingpastWu’srebellionandtheMongolianthreatduringthatperiod.

ConcludingRemarks

Throughout Wu’s rebellion, the Chosŏn court and ruling elites prioritized statesecurityoveranythingelsebytakinganobservantandobjectivestanceinwhichthemovements of the Qing court, anti-Qing forces, Mongols, and Japan became themainobjectsoftheircounterstrategy. Intheprocess,thecourtandelitesaffirmednoninvolvementasthemostpracticalsolutiontothechaoticsituation inmainlandChinawhileforgoingbothall-outsubmissiontotheQingandafull-fledgedanti-QingcampaignincludingMingloyalism.TheChosŏngovernmentalsocultivateddomesticstabilityforsocialintegrationandself-strengtheningforborderdefensesufficienttohandle diplomatic difficulties, such as Qing military requests. Even after therebellion,thecourtandelitespreparedforcertainpost-Qingscenarioscenteredona withdrawal of the Qing back to its homeland in Manchuria and a return ofMongolian dominance over a crumblingQing.Ming loyalism,whichwas farmoredistantfromthegeopoliticalrealityalongwiththefailureoftherebellion,blendedinto the self-defensive discourse of domestic stability and self-strengthening andinternalizedintoideologicalcommitmentstoaself-sustainingstateofChosŏn.

As we have seen, the practical and resilient position of the court and rulingelites demonstrates a Chosŏn-focused perspective in which thelongue duréeof“Mongolian-JurchenintrudersinthenorthandJapanesepiratesinthesouth”neverended,andexhibitsamodalityofrealpolitikthatcoupledgeopoliticalschemeswithideologicalwarfarevis-à-visQingdominance.Thispatternofnorth-southturbulencesheds light on diplomatically and culturally multilayered “interactions” amongdifferentstatesorhistoricalagenciesinthesecondhalfoftheseventeenthcentury,especiallyduringtheMing-Qingtransition(Rawski2015,4–10).Furthermore,Wu’srebellion could have prefigured a possible divide betweenNorth China and SouthChina—thelatterbeingopentocompetitivemaritimepartnersagainsttheQing—inan interregionalconflict (Hang2015).Still, themaritimeforcesof thetimedidnotplayadecisiveroleinthefateoftheQing.SeenfromtheperspectiveoftheChosŏn

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government, thesecurityofPekingandNorthChina formedthe linchpinofpowerrelations; the normal Chosŏn-Qing relationship and the uneasy prediction of theChosŏn court regarding a Mongolian return evidenced where the regionalhegemonyof seventeenth-centuryNortheastAsia stood. In this sense, consideringChosŏn’sstrategiesduring therebellionhelps toenliven thecontextsof interstatepowerpracticeoncontinentalEastAsiabeforethefull-fledgedinfluxoftheWesternpowersinthenineteenthcentury.

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AbouttheAuthor

JosephJeong-ilLeeisaResearchFellowintheInstituteofPremodernKoreanHistoryattheNortheastAsianHistoryFoundationinSeoul,Korea.