Dissertation Personal Copy

A Resurgent Russia? An Analysis of the

Western Role and Actors in Strained East-West

Relations, 1991-2015

Ewen R Dymott

Academic Year: 2015/2016

Word Count: 14,977

Dissertation Supervisor: Dr Magnus Feldmann

A dissertation submitted to the University of Bristol in accordance with the requirements for

the award of the degree of MSc in Development and Security in the Faculty of Social

Sciences and Law.

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Dedications

I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my grandfather, without whom I would not have

been able to finance this MSc. In addition, I would like to thank Dr Magnus Feldmann for

helping me to finalise my topic, and for answering any queries that arose promptly and

effectively. Furthermore, thanks are owed to Dr Egle Cesnulyte, Professor Timothy

Edmunds, Dr Winnie King, Dr Anna Maria Friis Kristensen, and Dr Elspeth Van Veeren for

providing me with the knowledge and skills I needed to complete this degree.

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Abstract

This dissertation will examine three questions. Is Russia resurgent? What role has the West

played in Russia’s resurgence? And which actor has been the determinant in Russia’s

resurgent policies? These questions will be answered through a thorough chronological review

of the key moments in East-West relations between the end of the Cold War in 1991 and the

end of 2015, broken down into three main chapters: Russia in the 1990s; Putin’s first terms as

president; and Russia from 2008 to 2015. Each chapter shall focus on three specific features

that define resurgence, geopolitics, economics, and defence policy, and in turn analyse the role

of the West in Russia’s resurgence and the key actors driving resurgent policies. In summary,

this dissertation argues the following: in the 1990s, the West contributed to feelings of

isolation, marginalisation, and inferiority felt within Moscow’s leadership; during Putin’s first

terms, this trend continued but Putin began to transform Russia economically, signalling the

start of Russia’s resurgence; and from 2008, Russia was able to utilise its re-acquired

economic might and diplomatic freedom to pursue assertive foreign, economic, and military

policies, indicating a fully resurgent Russia. A lack of understanding and appreciation of

Russia’s foreign policy objectives on the part of the West is a consistent feature, which helped

to create the Kremlin’s strategic aims of returning Russia to the top international stage, and

creating a multipolar world. If the West had chosen to integrate and understand Russia from

the outset, it is likely that the contemporary strain in relations could have been avoided.

Finally, throughout the period examined, the key foreign policy decision maker was the

president, but more specifically, it was Putin. From his election in 2000 until the end of 2015,

he has centralised control over foreign policy and called the shots, even whilst he was prime

minister to Medvedev between 2008 and 2012. Putin’s perspective has become Russia’s

perspective.

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Contents

1.0 Introduction Page 5

2.0 Methodology Page 9

3.0 Theoretical Perspective Page 10

4.0 Russia in the 1990s Page 13

4.1 Geopolitical Environment Page 14

4.2 Economic Situation Page 21

4.3 Military and Defence Policy Page 23

4.4 Summary Page 26

5.0 Putin’s First Terms as President Page 28




5.4 Summary Page 38

6.0 Russia from 2008 to 2015 0




6.4 Summary Page 51

7.0 Conclusion Page 53

8.0 Acronyms Page 55

9.0 Bibliography Page 57

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List of Figures

Figure 1 Graph showing the GDP of the Russian Federation in current

US$ from 1991-1999.

Page 23

Figure 2 Graph showing the military expenditure of the Russian

Federation in rubles from 1992-1999.

Page 25


US$ from 2000-2008.

Page 33



Page 37


Federation as a percentage of total government spending

from 1997-2008.

Page 38


US$ from 2008-2015.

Page 47



Page 49


Federation as a percentage of total government spending

from 2008-2014.

0


Federation as a percentage of GDP from 2008-2013.

Page 51

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1.0 Introduction

The foundations of the Russian Federation were laid during the 15th and 16th centuries by Ivan

III and his son Vassili. Between them, they fought off the Mongols, and gathered the medieval

principalities of Pskov, Smolensk, and Ryzan, to create a centralised ethnic Russian state

(Trenin, 2009). With the additions of Kazan and Astrakhan by Ivan IV, Russia became a multi-

ethnic empire, and just 70 years after the death of Ivan IV, Russia had expanded to include

Siberia, and as far east as the Pacific (Trenin, 2009). These 17th Century borders are remarkably

similar to those of post-Cold War Russia. However, they have not remained static over the past

four centuries. Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, Russia has contested ownership of

Finland, the Baltic States, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Poland, the Balkans, Mongolia, and

Manchuria with other great powers in Europe and Asia (Trenin, 2009). It is clear therefore that,

historically, Russia has been a major geopolitical actor with significant global influence. The

height of Russia’s power came during its Soviet period following World War Two. The Russian

Empire, then named the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), became engaged in an

ideological conflict with the West, namely the US and the EU, which was aligned militarily

under the banner of NATO. This battle of communism vs capitalism, brought the world to the

brink of what could have been a truly devastating nuclear war until, on the 25th December 1991,

the USSR was disbanded, and the Cold War was ended.

From this rather broad and over-simplified account of Russian nationhood, one key point stands

clear: throughout history Russia has been a major world power competing for geopolitical

influence amongst rival empires, often those originating in the West. It is a long held belief

amongst the Russian people that their country is to be respected, and listened to at the very

least. However, during most of the 20th Century, Russia was “disqualified from full social

acceptance” (Goffman, 1963: 1). This was partly due to the classification of Russia as an

‘enemy’ during the Cold War, and a ‘loser’ in the aftermath, by a geopolitical system

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dominated by the ideology and values of the West. The Russian viewpoint on the end of the

Cold War is that the USSR chose to dissolve the empire following a groundswell of the Russian

populace that created opportunities for regional separatism (Trenin, 2009). Conversely, the end

of the Cold War was portrayed as a triumph of the West over the USSR by the ‘victorious’

NATO and EU countries (Baker, 2002). Needless to say, the Russian Federation has very little

in common with its Soviet predecessor – it is not autocratic, nor is it communist, but most

importantly for this dissertation, contemporary Russian foreign policy is not the same as was

practised in its communist and imperialist past. During the Cold War, one of the main foreign

policy priorities of the USSR was to facilitate the international growth of communism, whilst

post-Soviet Russia’s primary foreign policy objective is to re-establish Russia’s historic

identity as a great power that exerts global influence and commands international respect within

a new multi-polar world, as evidenced by Boris Yeltsin’s press secretary’s statement in January

1994: “the role played by the great powers in the world will steadily grow … the world needs

a strong new order, and Russia will play the role of a great power in it” (SWB, 1994). Russia’s

identity has been tarnished by its reputation as the defeated party of the Cold War (Trenin,

2007). In post-Soviet Russia, the guiding foreign policy principle revolves around national

interest, not political ideology, and it could be argued that Russia is one of the most pragmatic

and least ideological countries in the world (Trenin 2007).

In 1990, Manfred Wӧrner became the first NATO Secretary General to visit Moscow. His

presence in the Russian capital was designed to symbolise a turning point in East-West

relations: “the time for confrontation is over. The hostility and mistrust of the past must be

buried. We (NATO) see your country, and other countries of the former Warsaw Treaty

Organisation (USSR), no longer as adversaries but as partners” (NATO, 1990). Yet, just

twenty-five years later, the NATO Deputy Secretary General, Alexander Vershbow, said “the

choices made by Moscow have taken our relations with Russia to their lowest point in decades.

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We are not back to the Cold War, but we are far from a strategic partnership” (Vershbow,

2015). The question then is how and why, after such promising words in the early 1990s, have

Russia’s relations with Western countries and its near neighbours deteriorated to such an extent

that a senior NATO official has to reassure the world that a new Cold War is not around the

corner? In the last eight years Russia has invaded both Georgia and Ukraine, and annexed

Crimea. By March 2015, reports suggested that there were 12,000 Russian troops operating in

Ukraine, and in June 2015, plans for NATO to deploy 40,000 troops near the Russian border

in Eastern Europe were being discussed (Urban, 2015; Mukhopadhyay, 2015). Recent actions

have contributed to the tense atmosphere between Russia, its nearest neighbours, Europe, and

America, that the international community was so keen to avoid. Indeed, East-West relations

have never been so strained in contemporary history (Trenin, 2009a). Western media often

reports that these actions are indicative of a Russian resurgence (Adelman, 2015; Stratfor,

2016).

This dissertation will focus on three specific questions: Is Russia resurgent? What role has the

West played in causing this resurgence? And how have resurgent policies been decided upon?

For the purposes of this dissertation, resurgence will be defined as an increase in internationally

assertive political, economic, and military action after a period of relative quiet. The structure

of this dissertation will be centred around a three-chapter chronological exploration of Russian

foreign policy ranging from the end of the USSR in 1991 through to December 2015, with each

chapter focusing on the geopolitical environment, the Russian economic situation, and the

Russian military in order to compare policy against preceding years. In the 1990s, under Boris

Yeltsin, the foundations for Russian resurgence were lain (chapter 4); during Putin’s first terms

as president he oversaw an increasing capability to enact resurgence (chapter 5); and from

2008-2015 Russian resurgence can be observed (chapter 6). In turn this will provide a complete

picture and comparison of each of the defined requirements for resurgence throughout

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contemporary Russian history, leading to the conclusion that present day Russia can be defined

as resurgent due to the increase in the levels of assertive foreign and economic policy since

1991 and the near constant rise in Russian military expenditure (SIPRI, 2015). The second

question to be answered is arguably the most important for the international community: What

role has the West played in Russia’s resurgence? This dissertation will argue that a lack of

understanding, and a failure to accommodate the Russian desire to regain its great power

identity on the part of the West, namely NATO and the EU, is the predominant reason for

Russian resurgence. Had the West chosen to integrate, rather than isolate Russia, the chances

of an assertive and aggressive Russian resurgence would have been greatly reduced. By

analysing three distinct periods in Russian foreign policy, it can be seen that Western oversight

is a long running theme in East-West relations, and was present right from the start of the post-

Cold War era. It is important to note that Moscow’s desire to re-obtain a great power identity

can explain the aims of a resurgent policy, but it does not explain why a resurgent policy is

deemed necessary. The final question will explore the actors involved in Russia’s resurgent

policies in an attempt to understand foreign policy decision making in terms of the

agency/structure debate. This shall also be analysed within the three chronological chapters

(4,5 and 6) to establish whether there has been continuity or change in Russian foreign policy

decision making since 1991. Ultimately, this dissertation will conclude that the most significant

actor in the Russian foreign policy decision making process is the Russian president, although

this has not been constant since the fall of the USSR. A conclusion of the arguments in this

dissertation will be presented in chapter 7.

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2.0 Methodology

The primary method of researching this dissertation involved conducting a thorough review of

the existing literature covering Russia foreign policy, including journal articles, books, news

articles, and speeches. This form of research comes with certain advantages in that it allows

one to draw upon a variety of peer-reviewed academic work covering a plethora of differing

perspectives, and enables the gathering of a large amount of respected opinions, and quotes

from influential actors. However, it is worth noting that bias can be prevalent throughout

scholarly work and other published literature, especially in speeches and news articles.

Therefore, a reflexive attitude and consideration of the author’s motives was essential when

analysing sources. In addition to the empirical research conducted from news articles and

speeches, this dissertation also includes the presentation of publically available data in graph

form. This method of research is useful for representing complex data in an easily identifiable

form. Moreover, generally speaking, data does not come attached with similar levels of bias

that can be present in published work.

Conversely, this dissertation does not include any research from primary sources. The use of

secondary data in the form of news articles, speeches, and publically available data is, in some

sense, a disadvantage because I had no control over which questions were asked to whom.

Therefore, I could not influence the answers given or data collected. This can increase the

amount of bias present in the source material used for this dissertation.

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3.0 Theoretical Perspective

There are a number of theoretical perspectives that the questions raised in this dissertation

could be viewed from. However, in order to address the question of which actor has the most

influence over Russian resurgence, foreign policy analysis is the most appropriate.

Foreign policy analysis is a unique discipline in that it aims to bridge the gap between

international relations theory and policy making through attempting to understand the

processes by which an actor makes policy choices (Garrison, 2003; Kaarbo, 2003; Foyle,

2003). As with most theories in international relations, there are many different levels to

foreign policy analysis, each combining to shape foreign policy as a whole (Garrison, 2003).

In other words, there is no singular factor that controls output, in fact foreign policy is a

convergence of individual, structural, cultural, and societal factors with neither one more

influential than another. It is often the domestic political system that that empowers certain

factors over others.

To simplify this somewhat, one can say that foreign policy analysis is centred around the

agency-structure debate. That is, do individuals (agency) or collectives (structure) most affect

foreign policy output? Within this debate, arguments can be broken down further. Those that

prefer agency over structure face the epistemological question of whether individuals act

objectively (using rational choice theory) or subjectively (individual choice theory) (Carlsnaes,

1992). In both examples, it is implied that the individual is the source of social order, and the

actor that has the most control and influence over foreign policy: “all social phenomena, and

especially the functioning of all social institutions, should always be understood as resulting

from the decisions, actions, attitudes, etc. of human individuals”, (Popper, 1966: 98). In

practice, the choice of epistemology for scholars that prefer agency over structure, can

drastically affect policy outcomes. If one assumes that foreign policy is controlled mostly by

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individuals that act rationally, then it can be expected that all individual actors will chose the

same foreign policy decisions when faced by the same problems, regardless of cultural,

societal, or ideological backgrounds. For example, when faced with the decision to launch a

retaliatory nuclear strike, scholars that subscribe to the objective individual agency argument

will suggest that all leaders will opt in favour of a retaliatory nuclear strike, because it is the

‘rational’ option. This line of thinking is useful when attempting to understand strategic

decisions that could be taken in certain situations. However, human nature is rarely this neat.

Rationality can be subjective, that is to say, one leader may in fact deem the launching of a

retaliatory nuclear strike to be irrational based on that particular leader’s ideological or even

cultural beliefs. The subjective approach is the more mainstream school of thought in foreign

policy analysis, although it also suffers problems when it comes to practical application

(Carlsnaes, 1992). Whilst it certainly seems more appropriate to conceive of individual actors

that take decisions based upon their own subjective preferences, this approach can limit the

effectiveness of foreign policy analysis as a tool for predicting policy. It would be impossible

to build a complete picture of a leader’s individual values and beliefs, and, without full

consideration of all variables, it is hard to understand why a certain foreign policy was actioned,

or the way in which a leader might act in the future.

The other side of the agency-structure debate consists of scholars that believe in the power of

the collective. This position postulates that individual action is a function of social order

(Carlsnaes, 1992). In other words, collective values and interests determine individual

behaviour, and people are what society has made them. For example, all citizens of the United

States would be expected to choose policy options that satisfy every other citizen, because they

each, in theory, share a common set of values as dictated by being part of the same society. In

practice however, it is obvious that this argument does not hold up. The process of socialisation

is not universal. Not all citizens of the same country subscribe to the same beliefs and values,

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as is plainly evident by the presence of multiple political parties within democratic countries.

Treating actors as a homogenous collective ignores the nuances of individual preferences

which can drastically change the nature of the international system.

The agency-structure debate cuts right to the heart of the question of who is in control of

Russia’s resurgent policies. Across the time periods covered in this research, it can be argued

that the most significant determinant on foreign policy is the individual, rather than the

collective. Although this question will be explored further in the subsequent chapters, this

dissertation will argue that subjective agency is the most applicable means of analysing Russian

foreign policy due to the significant power of the Russian president in decision making, even

if the relative power and the subjective foreign policy aims of the leader have not remained

constant.

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4.0 Russia in the 1990s

December 1991 represented a seismic shift within Russia, and over the following nine years

the Russian Federation had to adjust to a significant loss of power – both internationally and

economically – and come to terms with the break-up of the USSR. These events triggered a

change in the attitudes of the Russian elite towards foreign policy, and opened up a period that

can be characterised by an identity crisis – was Russia still seen as a great power, could the

West be seen as an inclusive partner, and how does Russia perceive the international

environment? With the loss of the Soviet Union, questions around Russia’s new role in the

international system had to be answered although not only by Russia. Following the Cold War,

the US and the EU member states became the most dominant international actors with their

shared ideals and values infiltrating the international system to a greater extent than ever before.

Russia, under President Boris Yeltsin (1991-1999) faced a challenging and, in many ways,

defining period of Russian history.

Following the Cold War, Russia suffered both politically and economically, and so it cannot

be argued that Russian resurgence began during the 1990s, although Western attitudes and

actions towards Russia created feelings of isolation and inferiority that would, in later years,

drive resurgent policies. Throughout this period Russia was run by President Yeltsin, but,

unlike subsequent decades, he shared a great deal of foreign policy decision making with his

foreign ministers Andrei Kozyrev (1990-1996) and Yevgenny Primakov (1996-1998), who had

very different views on Russia’s role in the international system (Rahr, 1992; Petro &

Rubinstein, 1997; Khrushcheva & Hancox, 2006). For the first time in the nation’s long history,

Russian society could no longer be described as ‘totalitarian’ or ‘autocratic’ (Tsygankov &

Tsygankov, 2004).

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4.1 Geopolitical Environment

The initial stance in post-Soviet Russia, as favoured by then foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev,

with regards to its undefined international role was to seek a close relationship with the US and

the EU, and undergo the process of westernisation – characterised by closer integration with

Western countries, involving improved political ties and adopting a more Western outlook and

value system (Smith, 1997a; Tsygankov & Tsygankov, 2004). Yeltsin envisaged a ‘grand

partnership’ in 1991 seeking to build a post-Cold War international system with the West, and

in return for Russia’s westernisation, he expected recognition for transforming Russia into a

democracy, ending the Cold War, and recognising the independence of the former USSR

satellites in Eastern Europe (Smith, 1997a; Trenin, 2009). In suggesting and seeking a

partnership with the West, Yeltsin was effectively offering Russian co-operation and support

to the very countries it had been at ‘war’ with for the last few decades. This change in Russia’s

outlook could have been a real turning point in East-West relations, opening up the possibility

for greater collaboration and understanding between Russia and its potential Western partners

and helping to heal the wounds created during the Cold War. Unfortunately, Yeltsin’s offer

towards the West was received in rather different light than it was intended. Whilst Russia

believed that it should be praised for ending the Cold War after the Russian people and elites

toppled the communist regime, the West, and particularly the US under President George Bush,

saw the Russian concessions as little more than a starting point in repairing the damage caused

by the Soviets, and thus deserved no special measures in return (Trenin, 2009). Furthermore,

due to the decline of the Russian economy and military in the wake of the end of the Cold War,

America did not believe that they could partner with Russia on an equal basis (Smith, 1997a).

Kozyrev’s and Yeltsin’s idea of a meaningful alliance with the West was scuppered. This

pointed to a fundamental difference in perspective: the West viewed Russia as a defeated party

of the Cold War that was required to grant reparations in the form of political reform, whilst

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Russia, on the other hand, did not believe that communism was defeated, but rather ‘kicked

out’ by an unhappy population. The Western perspective did not sit well with Russia’s identity

as a great power – an alliance with Russia was something to be desired, not spurned. The

Western political elite failed to grasp the fact that a former adversary’s continued economic

and political weakness can instigate revanchist tendencies and create a desire for greater

strength (Arbatova & Dynkin, 2016). Right from the start of the post-Soviet era, a fundamental

misunderstanding was evident and the seeds of Russian inferiority and isolation were sown.

The rejection by the West began to create feelings in Russia that it needed to be more assertive

to be taken seriously on the international stage. It is worth noting however, that not everyone

in Russia was happy with Yeltsin and Kozyrev’s ambitions. The success of the Liberal

Democratic and Communist parties in the 1996 parliamentary elections was evidence of

opposition to Western integration, and, to many observers, westernisation was seen as a

symptom of a lack of strategy rather than a viable strategy in itself (Mankoff, 2007). To further

compound the problem, Russia’s informal bid to join NATO, included in the offering of an

alliance with the West, was rejected outright (Trenin, 2009). This built upon a feeling that

Russia would not be accepted into the Western fold, but instead managed by it. Russia was to

be classified as something other than Western, a trend that continued from 1991.

Throughout 1992 and 1993, Moscow hosted heated internal debates around Russia’s national

interest (Trenin, 2009). The lack of clarity around post-Soviet aims and objectives was

demonstrated nicely by Kozyrev during an exchange with the former US president Richard

Nixon in which Kozyrev said, “if you … can advise us on how to define our national interest,

I will be very grateful to you” (Simes, 1998). During these discussions, close relations with the

West continued to feature prominently however the decision was made that Russia should

instead focus on the newly independent, former Soviet states – otherwise known as the ‘near

abroad’ (Trenin, 2009). In December 1991, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

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was established, consisting of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine. In

1992, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan joined, in 1993 Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and Georgia

followed suit, and in 1994 Moldova also joined the CIS (Trenin, 2009). By April 1994, all

countries had ratified the Creation Agreement with the exception of Turkmenistan and Ukraine,

which became an Associate in 1993. The only former Soviet countries that weren’t included in

the CIS were Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The concept of membership of the CIS was

formalised in the CIS Charter in January 1993 to contain nine members, and proved to be a

smooth mechanism of transition from empire to individual statehood, although the model was

only half-heartedly accepted by the former Soviet states (International Legal Materials, 1995;

Trenin, 2009; Arbatova & Dynkin, 2016). Ultimately, the promise of cheap gas prices that

came with the formation of the CIS, proved hard to reject (Arbatova & Dynkin, 2016).

Although considered imperialistic by some in the West, Russia became the newly independent

republics’ main donor, and pursued policies of integration as outlined in the decree entitled the

‘Strategic course of Russia with participant states of the Commonwealth of Independent States’

(Smith, 1997; Arbatova & Dynkin, 2016; Diplomatic Herald, 1995). Issued in September 1995,

the decree outlined the main goals of Russian foreign policy towards the CIS to be to create a

political and economic union able to play a role in the international system, and to strengthen

Russia’s position as a leading political and economic force in the former Soviet territories

(Smith, 1997). This clarifies that CIS integration was a key component of Russia’s foreign

policy and was reiterated when Yevgenny Primakov became Russian foreign minister in 1996

(Gornostayev & Karpov, 1996). Russia’s dominance and ‘neo-imperialism’ in its

neighbourhood meant it had become the target of many CIS member states’ suspicions and

problems which lead to the creation of the GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan,

Azerbaijan, and Moldova) coalition in 1997 in an attempt to counter balance Russian influence

(Kosolapov, 2001; Arbatova & Dynkin, 2016). The underlying implication of Russia’s turn

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towards the CIS is that, from very early on in the 1990s, Russia established its ‘sphere of

interest’, an area in which Moscow expected to be able to exert significant influence free from

the political ambitions of the West. The relevance of this will become clearer in subsequent

chapters, but put simply, any attempts by Western institutions to limit Russian influence would

be seen as an attempt to further weaken Russia and hinder its ambitions to create a multi-polar

world.

Throughout the 1990s, the attention of NATO, the USA and the EU was focused primarily on

the former communist states in Central Europe, the Balkans, and the Baltic States, and so

allowed Russia to pursue, what they saw as, heavy-handed non-Western policies in the CIS

(Arbatova & Dynkin, 2016). The fundamental reason for this was that the West saw Moscow’s

recognition of the former Soviet republic’s sovereignty as a guarantee that a new Soviet Union

would not be established. In fact, the desire for a permanent end to the USSR was placed at the

centre of NATO and EU regional strategies, but had the knock on effect of creating fear

amongst Russia’s political elite that the West would attempt to force Moscow’s influence from

its areas of interest (Arbatova & Dynkin, 2016). In 1999, NATO dealt a major setback to

Russian ambitions to be seen as a great power. In March, following years of conflict and after

over 300,00 people had been forced to flee their homes, NATO embarked on a 72-day bombing

campaign over the Yugoslavian province of Kosovo (Trenin, 2009; NATO, 2016). The

implications for Russia were clear. Kosovo told the Russian leadership that democracies could

chose to wage war against a former Soviet state on the basis of, what they viewed as, political

ambition disguised by human rights rhetoric (Trenin, 2009). This was catastrophic for East-

West relations because it signalled that NATO was willing to launch military action against the

will of Russia without any direct threat to its territorial integrity, and without the UN Security

Council. This increased Russia’s sense of vulnerability, particularly when considering the fact

that Russia was undergoing a period of domestic upheaval and weakness (Cross, 2015;

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Zimmerman, 2002; Hopf, 2002). By the end of 1999, 77% of Russians either agreed or totally

agreed with the statement “there is nothing stopping NATO from getting involved in Russia as

it did in Yugoslavia” (Russian Election Watch, 1999: 3). Furthermore, Russian wishes for

NATO not to launch an air campaign in Kosovo were largely ignored by the West which left

the perception in Moscow that their concerns would not be taken seriously on the international

stage (Cross, 2015). As Dmitri Trenin so adequately puts it “Russia, for the first time in 250

years, had ceased to be a power in Europe” (Trenin, 2009: 9). The reduced significance of

Russia in the international system was simply untenable for Moscow’s foreign policy

community (Cross, 2015). NATO’s actions in 1999 set a dangerous precedent because it

became clear to Russia that despite territorial integrity and non-interference being cornerstones

of international law, these principles did not apply to regions that the West deemed in need of

reform (Arbatova & Dynkin, 2016). When it came to a rival state, priority was not given to the

established government, but to the rights of minorities and humanitarian action (Arbatov,

2014). Furthermore, Kosovo signalled to the Russian elite that unipolarity was alive and well

– Russia needed to do more to establish a multi-polar world and get its voice heard. The

unilateral actions of NATO, and its failure to consider how these actions would be perceived

by Russia, significantly contributed to the idea in Moscow that Russia needed resurgence to re-

establish its historic position as an influential global power.

When the air campaign of 1999 was concluded, NATO had already swelled its ranks with the

addition of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland as member states (NATO, 2016a).

During Kozyrev’s period in office, Yeltsin expressed little concern over NATO expansionism,

but this prompted considerable criticism from the political class and military establishment –

mostly because NATO had refused a Russian fast-track accession, and they were unwilling to

see former Soviet territory turned into, as they perceived it to be, an advanced position against

post-Soviet Russia (Trenin, 2009). The Kremlin had argued strongly against any NATO

19

expansion that did not include Russia since 1992, but Russia was not left completely out of the

loop. In 1994 the ‘Partnership for Peace’ (PfP) became NATO policy, and was offered to all

the former Soviet and neutral European states, including Russia (Smith, 1997a). The purpose

of this policy was to encourage closer military and political co-operation with NATO, develop

Western concepts of civil-military relations, calm fears in Moscow surrounding NATO

expansion, and signal to the former Soviet states that NATO remained aware of their security

concerns (Smith, 1997a). Russia joined in June amidst concern from the Russian political class

that PfP would simply accelerate NATO widening, bring the Russian military-industrial

complex under NATO control, and eventually facilitate membership for the former USSR

member states, but it was granted a special relationship on the basis of it being the only nuclear

weapon state, and possessing the most advanced military (Smith, 1997). After the publication

in September 1995 of a NATO study on enlargement that confirmed Russia’s fear that NATO

widening was a desired outcome, Anatoly Chubays (the First Deputy Prime Minister of Russia)

warned that enlargement would be the greatest mistake in 50 years, and would force Russia to

revise its political, military, and economic relationship with the West (Gornostayev, 1997;

Kennan, 1997). In an attempt to further ameliorate Russia’s concerns, the ‘Founding Act of

Basic Relations between NATO and the Russian Federation’ was signed in May 1997 (Smith,

1997a). The Founding Act intended to institutionalise cooperation and consultation in East-

West relations through the creation of a Permanent Joint Council (PJC) (Smith, 1997a). The

PJC was to serve as a means for NATO and Russia to communicate directly during times of

crisis, inform each other of their strategic policies, and develop joint decisions on a case-by-

case basis (Smith, 1997a; NATO, 2009). Rather than inviting Russia to NATO meetings,

NATO members discussed issues amongst themselves and then presented their united position

to Russia (Smith, 2002). A crucial part of the Founding Act agreement was that NATO agreed

not to deploy or base nuclear and military forces in Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic

20

(Smith, 1997a; NATO, 2009). Whilst the PJC and PfP calmed some of the Kremlin’s security

concerns in the event of the 1999 NATO enlargement (even though many Russian politicians

feared NATO involvement in Chechnya (Lynch, 2016)), expansion continued to demonstrate

that NATO preferred security against Russia rather than with Russia – after all, George H.W

Bush and Margaret Thatcher has assured Gorbachev that NATO would not advance “one inch

forward” (Kramer, 2009). In addition, NATO expansion eroded a geographical ‘buffer’

between Russia and the West, which further reinforced the idea in Moscow that Russia was

seen as the loser in the Cold War (Trenin, 2009). Thus, the NATO action in Kosovo and its

policy of enlargement, contributed to a sense of Russian isolation, marginalisation, and

inferiority which, as Moscow believed, could only be addressed by a more aggressive and

resurgent foreign policy.

Throughout this decade, Russia was ruled by President Boris Yeltsin. However, his foreign

policy was not consistent, and a clear division between desires for westernisation and

nationalism can be drawn at the point in which Primakov took over from Kozyrev to become

the Russian foreign minister in 1996. This suggests that rather than the Russian president being

the most influential actor in foreign policy decision making, it was in fact the Russian foreign

minister. Naturally, the Russian Duma and played an important role, but so too did the Russian

oligarchs. The business elite has had considerable influence over Russian policy since 1991,

although the height of their power came during the 1996 presidential election, during which

their public backing of Yeltsin helped to ensure his return to office (Smith, 2003). It is possible

then, that Yeltsin and Primakov partly adapted their foreign policy to suit business interests,

however this does not detract from the fact that foreign policy was devised mostly by the

foreign minister (Mankoff, 2007). The relative inconsistency in Russia’s foreign policy

throughout the 1990s is one of the main reasons why Russia cannot be considered resurgent.

Without a guiding strategy, and following the political upheaval that was the end of the Cold

21

War, Russia needed time to reorganise itself and reconsider its place in the world – Moscow

simply didn’t have the knowledge of its own priorities, or the resources needed to enact

resurgence.

4.2 Economic Situation

Aside from the political turmoil in Russia, its reduced economic power was another reason why

Russia cannot be considered resurgent in the 1990s. With the establishment of the CIS it was

decided that all the debt accrued by the USSR, somewhere between $45bn and $60bn, would

be inherited by Russia (Trenin, 2009; Conway, 2006; Pravda, 2006). For obvious reasons, such

significant debt limited Russia’s ability to enact resurgence. The Kremlin could not finance

aggressive foreign policy nor could it afford military modernisation. In order to try and boost

Russia’s economic prospects, the political elite turned to the CIS. In 1993, nine CIS members

signed the ‘Treaty of Economic Union’, and in 1994 they created a ‘Commission of Economic

Union’ (known as the MEK), and decided to reduce customs duties to advance the cause of a

free trade and customs area (Smith, 1997). Unfortunately for the Russian economy, trade with

the former Soviet Union declined following the Cold War: in 1988 Russia exported $51bn to

the CIS and imported $74.2bn, but by 1995, these figures were just $30bn and $16.5bn

respectively (Smith, 1997). In 1996, Aman Tuleyev (1996) stated that in 1995, Russia’s GDP

was just 62.2% of GDP in 1990 (in 1985 Russia had the 6th largest GDP in the world but in

1995 it was just 14th highest (San’ko, 1997)), and attributed this decline to a disruption of trade

ties with the former USSR. Although trade between the CIS increased in 1996, this did little to

solve Russia’s economic problems (Serov, 1997). To put things into perspective, the USA’s

GDP in 1995 was $6.95 trillion and Russia’s was just $344.71 billion (World Bank, 1997).

Aside from the CIS, Russia had an important trade partner in the EU. In 1995, the EU’s share

of Russian trade was 35%, however Russia’s only represented 3.5% of the EU’s total trade,

22

highlighting the massive differences in terms of trade between Russia and the closest economic

power (Borko, 1997).

In 1998, Russia suffered a serious financial crisis. On August 13th the Russian stock, currency,

and bond markets collapsed amid fears of devaluation of the ruble and a default on the debt

owed from the days of the USSR (Van de Wiel, 2013). During the same year the Russian

economy shrank by 5.3% and GDP per capita was at its lowest point since 1991 (Pinto &

Ulatov, 2010). The effect of this crisis on GDP can be seen in figure 1. By this time Russia had

firmly shifted its foreign policy towards the CIS, but the financial crisis demonstrated that

Russia had no economic power to support its foreign policy objectives there – further evidence

that Russia cannot be described as resurgent during the 1990s (Trenin, 2009). However, 1998

did bring some good news with regards to Russia achieving great power status. It was admitted

to the G8, the IMF, and the World Bank and applied to join the World Trade Organisation

(Smith, 1997a).

Despite Russia’s inclusion within some Western financial institutions (which undoubtedly

helped to alleviate feelings of isolation within Russia), the West made a fundamental error,

from a Russian perspective, in the spread of Western oil companies into the Caspian Sea – an

area in which Russia enjoyed a monopoly on oil and gas transit (Trenin, 2009). Furthermore,

the US offered official support to the creation of multiple oil and gas pipelines from the Caspian

that would bypass Russia (Trenin, 2009). Energy exports were, and still are, vital to the Russian

economy (between 1995 and 1999, Russia exported between $10.3bn and $15.6bn of oil

annually, and between $10.8bn and $16.4bn, annually of natural gas (Bush, 2002)) and the fact

that pipelines from the Caspian and beyond passed through Russia was a source of great

leverage. This attempted removal of Russian power whilst it faced economic difficulty

exacerbated the notion that the West was seeking to limit Russian influence, and the fact that

Western companies were now operating on Russia’s border was a source of insecurity in the

23

Kremlin. Western actions expanded East-West tensions to include economics, as well as

politics (Trenin, 2009). With this in mind, it is clear why Russia sought more aggressive energy

and economic policies in the subsequent years – a defining characteristic of resurgence.

4.3 Military & Defence Policy

Towards the end of the Cold War, the Russian armed forces numbered 3 million and was one

of the most feared in the world (Barany, 2008; Global Security, 2015). Russia inherited a great

deal of military hardware left over from the days of the USSR, some of which included: 635

ICBMs, 22,800 main battle tanks, 30,000 artillery pieces, 14 strategic and 37 tactical

submarines, 600 bombers, 7,800 operational nuclear warheads, and 900 fighter jets (IISS,

2004). Clearly Russia was not in need of new armaments. Conversely, Yeltsin ordered drastic

reductions in military manpower and the rapid withdrawal of Russian troops stationed in

Eastern and Central Europe, and the former Soviet Republics (Barany, 2008). With reductions

in the size of the Russian military and no real plans for military modernisation, Russia in the

1990s cannot be considered resurgent.

Figure 1: Graph showing Russia’s GDP from 1991 – 1999 (World Bank, 2016). It demonstrates Russia’s

economic problems following the Cold War, and highlights the effect of the 1998 financial crisis.

$0

$100,000,000,000

$200,000,000,000

$300,000,000,000

$400,000,000,000

$500,000,000,000

$600,000,000,000

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

GD

P (

US$

)

YEAR

GDP of the Russian Federation in Current US$, 1991-1999

24

In line with Russia’s foreign and economic policies of this decade, Moscow turned to the CIS

to improve Russian security. A CIS collective security agreement (CSTO) was signed in

Tashkent, Uzbekistan in May 1992 with the intention of creating a military counterweight to

NATO on Russia’s borders, and deepen military integration (Smith, 1997). The concept ran

into difficulties for several reasons: the break-up of Soviet forces made the prospect of

integration and synchronisation more difficult, Russian military leaders were resistant to

military reform, and the CIS members adopted differing geo-political interests with only

Belarus supporting Russia’s anti-NATO expansion position (Smith 1997). Nevertheless,

Russia did manage to stabilise the CIS through the deployment of troops in Transdniester,

Tajikistan, Armenia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia (Arbatova & Dynkin, 2016). The Russian

notion of collective security within the CIS demonstrates the importance of the ‘near abroad’

to post-Soviet policy. Russia made it very plain that it saw the CIS as its territory, as evidenced

by the presence of Russian border forces on the external borders of the several CIS countries.

This sense of responsibility, felt within the Kremlin towards the CIS, indicates that Russia still

believed in the notion of a strong Ethnic-Russian buffer against the West. The implications of

this will be discussed in later chapters but the main point is that Russia felt it needed influence

in the CIS to provide a sense of security from NATO.

In 1994, Russian armed forces entered Chechnya to try and prevent the region separating from

the Russian Federation, but partly as a result of the financial crisis, by 1998 Russian tanks were

low on fuel, vital aircraft were missing parts, and ships were rusting in their docks (Mirovalev,

2014; Global Security, 2015). Throughout the 1990s, Russia’s total military expenditure rose

from 0.9 billion in 1992 to 159 billion in 1999 (figure 2) (SIPRI, 2015a). Most interestingly,

there is a constant rise in total military expenditure since the early 1990s when Russia was

turned away from an alliance with the West until the financial crisis hit in 1998, and a sharp

rise following the crisis – the same time as NATO expansion (SIPRI, 2015a). Whilst the data

25

implies a Russian resurgence, it is worth noting that 159 billion rubles equates to roughly

$6.4bn (SIPRI, 2015b). To put this in perspective, US military expenditure at that time was

$281bn (SIPRI, 2015b). Therefore, the increase in Russian military spending would have had

little practical effect. The correlation between increases in military spending and the Western

actions of denying an alliance with Russia and stating NATO’s expansion policy, strongly

indicates that it was Western actions that were responsible for the early signs of resurgence.

In 1993, Presidents Yeltsin and Bush signed START-2 (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty),

which aimed to reduce the number of Russian and US strategic warheads down to a maximum

of 3,500 each by January 2007 – roughly one third of the size of their arsenals before START-

1 was signed in 1991 (Smith, 1997a). The treaty was extremely successful: in September 1990

the USA had 12,718 strategic warheads compared to 10,779 owned by Russia, but after

START-2 these numbers had reduced to 3,500 and 3,296 respectively (Kile et al., 1997).

However, the picture was more complicated than it appeared on the surface. The treaty banned

ICBM MIRV systems which were the bulk of Russia’s strategic forces, but only a small section

Figure 2: Graph showing the increase in Russian Military expenditure from 1992-1999 (SIPRI, 2015a).

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

MIL

ITA

RY

EXP

END

ITU

RE

(BIL

LIO

N R

UB

LES)

YEAR

Military Expenditure of the Russian Federation in Rubles, 1992-1999

26

of the USA’s forces, which meant that Russia would need to invest in a large number of single

warhead ICBMs to compensate for its strategic losses – something that was economically

impossible at the time (Smith, 1997a). For this reason, START-2 received a hostile reception

within the Duma, which believed that it would put Russia in a position of weakness (Kile et

al., 1997). Whilst the MIRV ban might have been clever politics from an American perspective,

in Russia it was seen as further evidence of Western attempts to undermine Russia’s great

power status, and weaken their strategic capability. Once again, Western political actions

created insecurity and a feeling of inferiority within Moscow, which contributed to a desire to

pursue a more aggressive foreign, economic, and military policy in later years.

4.4 Summary

The rejection of Russia’s proposed westernisation by the US pushed Moscow away from a

more co-operative phase in its foreign policy and returned East-West relations to dynamics of

mistrust and suspicion. Russia was left feeling marginalised and under the impression that, if

its foreign policy objective of being seen as a great power within a multipolar world was to be

achieved, Moscow would have to do so through assertive policies. NATO expansion and its

actions in Kosovo went directly against assurances given during the Cold War and gave the

Kremlin reason to believe NATO had transformed into an aggressive alliance aiming to limit

Russia’s influence globally and in its neighbourhood, and that it was an organisation Russia

needed to counter-balance in the form of the CIS. The military expenditure data highlights the

anxiety felt in the Kremlin. The infiltration of Western oil companies into the Caspian Sea

during the financial crisis of 1998 reduced Russian power and increased their vulnerability.

Little consideration was given towards how these actions would be perceived in Russia which

further deepened the suspicion between Russia and the West. An aggressive, national interest

27

focused and resurgent economic policy was required to protect Russian interests – Moscow did

not feel it could rely on the West to look after them. Furthermore, START-2 limited Russia’s

strategic capabilities more than it did the USA’s, and was seen as further evidence of a Western

plot to diminish Russian power. From a holistic view of the actions taken in the 1990s, it is

evident that the foundations for a Russian resurgence were lain, even if Russia lacked the

political direction and economic resources to enact assertive policies. Yeltsin and his foreign

ministers were instrumental to Russian foreign policy during this period, although the change

in attitude following the appointment of Primakov to foreign minister indicates that foreign

policy was driven more by the subjective agency of the foreign minister than the president.

28

5.0 Putin’s First Terms as President

Vladimir Putin’s first terms as president (2000 – 2008) were, in many ways, a continuation of

the principles laid out towards the end of Yeltsin’s time in office. Putin continued to focus on

Russian national interest and returning Russia to the top table, but he was more pragmatic in

his approach and as a result, gained real freedom on the international stage (Gomart, 2006).

However, similarly to Yeltsin, Putin did flirt with the West following the 9/11 attacks in the

USA. Putin himself cites his three main achievements are strengthening the Russian state,

paying off foreign debts whilst enabling economic growth, and restoring Russia’s international

status (Putin, 2006). Russia’s economic growth under Putin allowed Russia to begin to pursue

resurgent policies, and prepare for more assertive action – again the West played a decisive

role in Putin’s desire to do so. Furthermore, there was a general trend of centralisation of

political power, particularly within the foreign policy realm, that consolidated the power

around the office of the president. This suggests that Putin became the most influential foreign

policy actor during the early 2000s.


Putin started his reign by adopting the Foreign Policy Concept devised under Yeltsin which

stated that “a unipolar world structure dominated by the United States” was one of the major

threats to Russian national interest, and that Russia’s first priority was “ensuring reliable

security of the country and preserving and strengthening its sovereignty and territorial integrity

and its strong and authoritative position in the world community” – indicating that Putin

sympathised with Primakov’s mistrust of the West and wished to continue a Eurasianist foreign

policy based on the re-establishment of Russia as a great power (Ivanov, 2002). However, in

the early 2000s, Putin showed little evidence of this. Whilst Yeltsin initially sought to integrate

29

into the West, Putin appeared to want to work alongside it (Trenin, 2009). Following the 9/11

attacks in the US, Putin and his inner circle promoted the idea of a strategic partnership between

Russia and the US to combat global terrorism, amidst much opposition from Moscow’s broader

foreign policy community (Trenin, 2009; Mankoff, 2007). This implies that the Russian

political class as a whole did not change their perspectives following 9/11 (Yavlinsky, 2002).

Nevertheless, Putin ignored his critics but did ask for concessions in return for Russia’s help:

Washington had to recognise Moscow’s leadership in the CIS and vow not to undermine

Russia’s interests there (Trenin, 2009). In return, Russia offered to accept Central Europe’s

westernisation, allow the entry of the Baltic States into NATO and the EU, and tolerate a US

military training programme in Georgia (Trenin, 2009). These concessions identified Russia’s

main interests, and offered a pragmatic division so as to avoid encroachment into each other’s

‘territory’. As with Yeltsin, the US rejected this deal, with what it saw as a lesser power,

refusing to accept any new ‘spheres of influence’ (Trenin, 2009). The rejection of this deal on

similar grounds to those in the 1990s, reconfirmed Putin’s suspicions and contributed further

to feelings of isolation, marginalisation, and mistrust. Russia would first have to act like a great

power to be seen as one.

Furthermore, in October 2001, with reference to NATO’s planned enlargement (which would

include Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia), Putin said that

Russia would adopt a more positive attitude if it was included in this process (Jones, 2001).

Moscow was given no coherent response and the new round of NATO enlargement went ahead

without them (Arbatova & Dynkin, 2016). Excluding Russia from NATO increased the

likelihood of resurgent sentiments in Moscow, whereas offering to include Russia, on the basis

that it managed to satisfy the entry criteria, would have reduced that risk (Baker, 2002). In

some sense this demonstrates a self-fulfilling prophecy, by treating Russia as an enemy, it

becomes an enemy. Yet, NATO did make efforts to nullify Russia’s fears. In May 2002, NATO

30

and the Russian Federation signed the declaration entitled ‘NATO-Russia Relations: A New

Quality’ in Rome which established the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) (NATO, 2016b). The

NRC built upon the PJC but focused heavily on joint action and decision making, consultation,

consensus building, and co-operation (NATO, 2010). The most significant change between the

PJC and NRC is that NATO and Russia would discuss issues together to reach a common

position rather than NATO presenting their position to Moscow (Smith, 2002). The

establishment of the NRC can only be seen as a positive step towards improved East-West

relations, even if Russia, in the early 2000s, would have preferred to be a NATO member. Up

until 2003, Putin’s foreign policy was centred around rapprochement with the West (Trenin,

2009a).

The EU has also taken steps to marginalise Russia. In March 2003, the EU released the first

draft of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) which was designed to increase political

and economic association between the EU and its nearest neighbours (EEAS, 2016). There was

considerable debate about whether to include Russia, but a solution was found through inviting

Russia in such a manner that it had to refuse (Arbatova & Dynkin, 2016). The EU decided to

classify its neighbours as a single entity meaning that Russia (the closest and largest neighbour)

was seen as having equal standing to the most distant countries (Arbatova & Dynkin, 2016).

Given Russia’s obsession with its great power status, this offended the Kremlin and Russia

refused to participate (Arbatova & Dynkin, 2016). If Russia had been included within the ENP,

levels of mistrust and isolation would have been reduced and Russia would have not have felt

such a strong need to pursue resurgent policies to re-establish its great power identity.

Between 2003-2005, Russia’s near abroad saw a series of ‘colour revolutions’. Whilst the

causes are too numerous to discuss in detail in this dissertation, it is worth studying the impact

of the Ukrainian ‘orange’ revolution which occurred during 2004-2005. Putin had campaigned

on behalf of the Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma and Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych

31

in an effort to defeat pro-Western Viktor Yuschenko and preserve Russia’s influence in the

country, but following a popular revolt, the election was re-run and won by Yuschenko (Trenin,

2009). Moscow had come to rely on the support of Ukraine’s political leadership, and their

failure to win re-election caused concern in the Kremlin. Putin’s fear was that the US was trying

to project its influence on Russia’s borders and undermine their political system – although this

concern was largely conspiratorial (Trenin, 2009). Rather than recognising the revolution as an

expression of popular anger against corrupt authorities, made possible by splits within

Ukrainian elites, Putin saw it as a US planned and led conspiracy against Russia aimed at

reducing Russian influence and possibly as a ‘dry run’ for a revolution in Russia itself (Trenin,

2009). At the same time, the US and UK granted asylum to Chechen separatist leaders that had

been accused of terrorism by Moscow which Putin saw as support for their separatist cause

(Trenin, 2009). Putin even blamed the West for being behind terrorist attacks in Russian

controlled North Ossetia (Putin, 2004; Putin, 2007). Putin’s beliefs are largely unfounded, but

they demonstrate the level of mistrust and insecurity that had accrued between Russia and the

West by this time.

The principle factor in shaping Russian foreign policy has been the return of power to the state,

which, under Putin’s more authoritarian rule, essentially means a returning of power to the

office of the president (Lynch, 2016). Right from the start of his reign, he introduced a concept

known as ‘strengthening the power vertical’ which enabled him to centralize foreign policy

decision making, and remove these discussions from the pressures of domestic politics

(Mankoff, 2007). Furthermore, since Putin came to power, opposition journalists have been

under some considerable danger, with the murder of Anna Politkovskaya as just one example

(Lynch, 2016). Further evidence of Putin’s autocratic tendencies can be found in the fact that

all Russian channels broadcasting political news nationally became either directly or indirectly

32

controlled by the state very early on in his time in office and used to cultivate anti-Americanism

(Pomerantsev, 2014; Lynch, 2016).


In the early 2000s, Russia was beginning to recover from the financial crisis, and rising oil

prices meant that Moscow had greater economic resources to direct towards its strategic

interests in the CIS (Trenin, 2009). As early as 2000, Putin recognised the potential of energy

in foreign policy, and established an institute for the Fuel and Energy Complex at the MGIMO

(Moscow State Institute of International Relations) to train specialists in international law,

economics, management, and finance to help protect Russian oil companies’ interests in OPEC,

the IOGP, and the IEA (Torkunov, 2001). The Kremlin’s turn towards the CIS is as much about

geopolitics as it is economics because the Russian leadership believes that economic

dependency leads to political dependency, and ultimately privileges (Trenin, 2007). In 2005,

Moscow began to use its vast energy reserves as a weapon directed towards Ukraine. Gazprom,

a largely state owned Russian energy company, drastically increased the price of gas exported

to Kiev which ultimately resulted in cutting Ukraine’s energy supply on 1st January, 2006,

when Ukraine was unable to pay its bills (Trenin, 2007). The timing of this event is particularly

important because Ukraine had just elected a pro-Western president, and so Russia’s aggressive

actions must be seen through the light of a nation that was concerned about Ukraine’s growing

interest in NATO membership and Western integration. This provides a clear example of

Russia using economics to influence another states’ foreign policy (Mankoff, 2007; Wallander,

2007). This is the first indication of a resurgent Russian foreign policy designed to promote

Russia’s role as a great power, against a backdrop of fear surrounding the West’s growing

interests and influence in what Moscow believes to be ‘its territory’. Had Ukraine not elected

a pro-Western president, and had the West shown restraint in its ambitions in the CIS, it is

highly likely that such an aggressive foreign economic policy would not have been needed.

33

Such ‘negotiations’ with Ukraine have borne agreements for Russian control over strategic

pipelines, and exclusive contracts for Russian energy companies (Wallander, 2007). Pipelines

are essential to Russia’s economic leverage, particularly with the EU – 44% of Europe’s natural

gas comes from Russia (Trenin, 2007). With 6% of global oil reserves, and 31% of global gas

reserves, Putin found a means to reassert Russia’s historic status as a leading player in its

neighbourhood by pursuing assertive economic policies, indicative of resurgence (Grace, 2005;

Stern, 2005).

Putin’s domestic focus on strengthening the Russian state through economic growth, helped by

the rise in oil prices, and spending on strategic initiatives such as reducing foreign debt, has

freed Russia from dependence on international financial institutions and granted the Kremlin

leverage that it could only have dreamt of under Yeltsin (Putin, 2001; Mankoff, 2007). In 2000,

debt was equivalent to 61.3% of Russia’s GDP, but by 2006, Russia had paid off its entire

Soviet debt through the use of oil revenue windfalls (MinFin, 2005; Pravda, 2006). According

to the World Bank (2016), Russia’s GDP rose from $259.7bn to $1.67tn during Putin’s first

terms as president (see figure 3), indicating the enormous steps taken towards economic

development that offered Russia such freedom on the international stage. Mankoff (2007)

argues that this improvement of the Russian economy is the reason for an increase in Russia’s

assertive foreign policy. However, this perspective only explains how Putin was able to fund

it, not the underlying causes. The feelings of isolation, marginalisation, mistrust, and inferiority

felt in the Kremlin as a result of Western policy towards Russia in the 1990s and early 2000s

drove the need for Moscow to pursue aggressive economic policies in the CIS.

34

Whilst the business elite played important roles in foreign policy decision making under

Yeltsin, Putin oversaw the reduction of the oligarchs’ power, and the strengthening of state

control over them (Lo, 2003). However, Smith (2003), argues that business interests, and

therefore the business elite, exert considerable influence over policy in the ‘near abroad’. This

perspective does not take the power of the president’s office into account. Most negotiations,

transactions, and business relationships are overseen by Putin, and the state’s significant

control over major economic sectors further cements Putin’s power (Wallander, 2007). For

example, Russia’s largest energy company Gazprom is mostly owned by the state. The Russian

government owned 38.37% of Gazprom’s shares, whilst 13% were controlled by Gazprom and

its subsidiaries, which, when combined, granted the state and company a controlling 51% stake,

which meant that Gazprom was effectively a tool of the Putin (Gubenko, 2003; Komarov,

2001). Furthermore, Russia’s second major gas company, Itera, was until 2013, connected to

Gazprom (Smith, 2003). Dmitri Trenin (2007: 95), suggests that “private and corporate

interests are behind most of Moscow’s major policy decisions, as Russia is ruled by people

$0

$200,000,000,000

$400,000,000,000

$600,000,000,000

$800,000,000,000

$1,000,000,000,000

$1,200,000,000,000

$1,400,000,000,000

$1,600,000,000,000

$1,800,000,000,000

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

GD

P (

US$

)

YEAR


Figure 3: Graph showing the GDP growth of the Russian Federation during Putin’s first terms as

president (World Bank, 2016).

35

who largely own it”. Whilst this is certainly true, the presence of Kremlin staff and senior

ministers on corporate boards provides Putin with a direct link to many of Russia’s largest

companies. With Putin’s firm control of the state, and the state’s influence in Russian business,

it is evident that Russia’s foreign economic policies are directed by the president.

5.3 Military and Defence Policy

At the start of the 21st Century, Primakov’s (1996) statement that “Russia has always been, is,

and will be a great power” returned as a central principle to Russian foreign policy. However,

success would require more than just economic expansion. Once again the CIS was in

Moscow’s sights as Putin sought to keep the Commonwealth from expanding Western

political-military alliances like NATO, however this required Russia to show real political

leadership, and to mediate and manage conflicts (Trenin, 2009). With the US and key NATO

members involved in Iraq (2003) and Afghanistan (2001), Russia streamlined the CSTO into a

more effective organisation; undertook crisis management operations in Georgia to stabilise

Tbilisi during the Rose Revolution, and even extend its governance to include the separatist

Adjara region; established an airbase at Kant, Kyrgyzstan, close to an American facility at

Manas; and attempted to mediate conflict in Moldova (Trenin, 2009). This broad brush attempt

to improve Russian influence was largely successful, and demonstrates a period of active and

assertive foreign policy, indicative of resurgence. However, although the West was focused

elsewhere, they still kept half an eye on Russian actions, and in November 2005, they forced

the Moldovan president not to sign a Russian brokered peace agreement designed to stop the

conflict between Chisinau and Tiraspol at what was virtually the last minute (Trenin, 2009).

The peace agreement permitted a continuation of the Russian military presence in Moldova,

and the West’s successful attempt to stop this from happening was seen by the Kremlin as

36

further evidence of efforts to weaken Russian influence in the region (Trenin, 2009). The hard

work done by the Kremlin to improve Russia’s standing in its neighbourhood suffered another

setback with the colour revolutions (Trenin, 2009).

Russia’s increasingly assertive foreign policies have been supported by military improvement

and reform (Barany, 2008). Putin identified defence reform as a top priority when he came to

power (see figure 5), in part due to Russia’s poor military performance in Chechnya, “The

Russian armed forces need to be of a new quality, and that quality has to manifest itself in

everything” (Putin, 2003). He appointed Sergey Ivanov as defence minister (indicating a desire

to limit the power of military leaders) to create a more modern, streamlined, and effective force

(Barany, 2008; Facon, 2005). Initially, Putin wanted a manpower reduction of around 365,000

troops and 120,000 defence ministry employees, but Ivanov failed to implement the levels of

reform desired, and so in terms of manpower, the Russian military was the 4th largest in the

world with roughly 1.2 million soldiers (organised into over 20 divisions and hundreds of

regiments), and 875,000 civilians by the end of Putin’s second term as president (Barany, 2008;

Golts, 2006). But it would be wrong the say that Ivanov failed completely. Spending on new

weapons increased significantly due to Putin’s 2003 military reform programme, fulfilling part

of Putin’s modernisation ambitions (Facon, 2005). Some of the most important purchases were:

the S-400 (an air defence rocket system); 36 SS-27 ICBMs; an Iskander tactical theatre missile

system; several diesel submarines and anti-submarine ships; and the new Mi-28N helicopter

(Barany, 2008). Furthermore, in 2007 building of newly designed ships, aircraft carriers, and

nuclear submarines had begun and Moscow announced the development of an aviation vacuum

bomb (Barany, 2008). The 2006 defence budget was 22% higher than 2005, which in turn was

27% higher than 2004, but these funds were being used to increase troop’s pay alongside

weapons development (Korchagina, 2005; Mankoff, 2007). Between 2000-2008 Russian total

military expenditure had increased by just over 500% (see figure 4) from 260bn rubles to

37

1,396bn rubles (SIPRI, 2015a). This is strongly indicative of a Russian resurgence. Figure 5

demonstrates the importance of military expenditure in relation to government spending. It is

clear to see that Putin believed that defence spending should occupy a higher percentage than

Yeltsin, in order to fund his military reform programmes – highlighting the considerable

difference in the two leaders’ ambitions.

Further evidence of Russia’s resurgence can be seen during 2006, when Putin announced a

major $200bn 7-year rearmament programme designed to give Russia the capability to fight

one global war, a regional war, and several localised wars simultaneously (Barany, 2008). The

majority of the funds were spent on 1,400 tanks, heavy artillery pieces, new generations of

planes and missiles, and thousands of infantry vehicles (Barany, 2008). Furthermore, in 2007,

after a 16-year pause Russia resumed long-range bomber missions, conducted a large scale

military exercise with the SCO, and planned the reclamation of a former Soviet naval base in

Syria that would give the Russian navy access to the Mediterranean (Barany, 2008; Gomart,

Figure 4: Graph showing the increase in Russian total military expenditure under Putin’s first two terms

as president (SIPRI, 2015a).

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38

2006). Whilst it is true that Moscow has been able to pursue these policies as a result of rapid

economic growth, the motivation behind the military resurgence is a sense of insecurity over

its leadership position within the CIS – caused by increasingly intrusive Western policies.

5.4 Summary

During Putin’s first terms as president, Russia began to pursue an independent and national

interest centred foreign policy, despite an attempt to work alongside the West at the start of his

presidency. His increasingly assertive foreign policies are indications of the beginning of

Russia’s resurgent phase. Following the USA’s rejection of Russia, NATO expansion,

Moscow’s exclusion from the ENP, and the colour revolutions, Russia’s sense of

marginalisation and insecurity reached levels not seen since the Cold War. Putin’s aggressive

economic policies in the CIS, and the rising cost of oil, led to an increase in Russia’s relative

power and saw a period whereby the Kremlin began to reassert control over former Soviet

0.0%

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1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

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Russian Federation Military Expenditure as Percentage of Total Government Spending, 1997-2008

Figure 5: Graph showing the percentage of total government spending on defence between 1997-2008

(SIPRI, 2015c). It demonstrates the marked difference in military priority between Yeltsin and Putin.

39

states – particularly Ukraine – which had been adopting a more favourable approach to

westernisation. If NATO and the EU had taken account of Russia’s desire to remain the

dominant power in the CIS, it is likely that Russia would not have adopted such assertive

policies. This demonstrates a real lack of understanding in East-West relations which in turn

had fuelled Russia’s perception that it needs to be more active on the international stage to

protect its policy interests. By taking into account the Kremlin’s increased military expenditure

and modernisation programmes, we can clearly see that Russia can start to be classified as

resurgent. Due to Putin’s autocratic tendencies such as the centralisation of foreign policy, and

control over major Russian companies, it is fair to argue that the main actor behind Russia’s

resurgent policies is Vladimir Putin. Furthermore, the differences between Putin’s foreign

policies and Yeltsin’s demonstrate that there is a considerable degree of subjectivity in Russian

foreign policy decision making.

40

6.0 Russia from 2008 to 2015

The tandem leadership of Dmitri Medvedev (May 2008-May 2012) and Vladimir Putin (prime

minister under Medvedev and president from May 2012), represented more continuity, in terms

of Russia’s foreign policy objectives and the decision making structures, than it did change.

However, during this period, Russia did pursue more aggressive foreign policies, and for the

first time since the end of the Cold War, this included using military power to maintain control

over its CIS neighbours. Russia is indeed resurgent, aided by the continuing economic growth

and increasing room for manoeuvre on the international stage, and many of the key events that

indicate resurgence are linked to Western actions that seek to undermine Russia’s long term

goals of becoming a global power, maintaining control of its neighbourhood, and creating a

multipolar world.


The issue of NATO expansion re-appeared during 2008 following a referendum on NATO

membership in Georgia (in which 77% voted in favour of NATO), and plans to introduce

MAPs (Membership Action Plans) to Georgia and Ukraine at the NATO summit in Bucharest

(Trenin, 2009a; NATO, 2011). In April, President Putin travelled to Bucharest to personally

warn against issuing MAPs, which are intended to speed up a state’s accession to NATO,

referring to an unstable Ukraine and a warring Georgia as reasons for Moscow’s objections

(Trenin, 2009a). Russia has long sought to freeze conflicts in its neighbourhood, rather than

end them, to provide evidence of a country’s instability to NATO. Putin’s plea was heard, and

NATO decided not to issue MAPs, but did approve eventual admission for Ukraine and

Georgia (Trenin, 2009a). In Georgia, the outcome led to an attempt to settle the Ossetia conflict

through the use of force, and in Kiev, President Yushchenko began his pro-Western re-election

41

campaign in earnest (Trenin, 2009a). Furthermore, this decision set the stage for Russian

resurgence which lead to Moscow’s involvement in both Georgia and Ukraine. Once again, it

appeared to Moscow that NATO was seeking to encircle and weaken Russia (Georgia and

Ukraine’s justification for membership stated they sought a means of protection from Russia

which strengthened that perception), and now that Russia was in a stronger position than it had

been over the past 17 years, it was time to take action (Cross, 2015).

From 2008 it became clear that Russia was continuing the isolationist and Eurasianist foreign

policy that had emerged under Putin (Trenin, 2009a). A prime example of this was Russia’s

actions in the 2008 Georgian War (see chapter 6.3), which was essentially a manifestation of

Moscow’s insecurities surrounding NATO expansion, and a desire to remain the dominant

power in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. In the aftermath of the war, whilst explaining

Russia’s foreign policy principles, President Medvedev spoke of Russia’s sphere of ‘privileged

interests’ and its obligation to defend ethnic Russians abroad (Medvedev, 2008). This phrasing

harkened back to the Soviet Union’s ‘spheres of influence’ concept and indicated that Russia

was willing to intervene in other states that harboured significant Russian populations (Trenin,

2009). The public suggestion was that Russia would seek to defend its people, but taking into

account the Georgian War, the warning that Russia could become more militarily active

seemed to be aimed towards NATO – a message warning that Moscow was opposed to

westernisation projects, and confident enough to support those objections with the use of force.

Russia had clearly outlined its areas of strategic interest since the 1990s with the creation of

the CIS and subsequent integration attempts, but Medvedev’s ‘spheres of privileged interests’

concept brought matters to a head and many in the West viewed this as a reclamation of

imperial and Soviet principles (Trenin, 2009). Russia was now an independent and important

foreign policy actor that was willing and capable of using military action to achieve its goals.

In 2009, Georgia formally withdrew from the CIS, which expressed their extreme

42

dissatisfaction and lack of confidence in the Kremlin following the Georgian War and

Medvedev’s statement (Coalson, 2009; Trenin, 2009a; RFE/RL, 2009a).

When Barack Obama replaced George Bush as president of the United States, he sought a

‘strategic reset’ in US-Russian relations to calm the heightened tensions that had built up

through NATO expansionism, Russia’s marginalisation from the Western political set-up,

American unilateralism, and Russia’s military actions in Georgia. Moscow was willing to

‘reset’ relations if the US adhered to several conditions: respect for Russia’s international role

and interests; recognition of Russia’s opposition to the anti-missile shield to be deployed in

Poland and the Czech Republic; recognition of Russia’s objections to further NATO

enlargement; and acceptance of Russia’s leadership role within the CIS (Tsygankov, 2009). In

March 2009, foreign ministers Hillary Clinton and Sergei Lavrov pushed the ‘reset’ button,

and a few months later, in July, Medvedev allowed US weapons and military personnel to use

Russian airspace on route to Afghanistan (Shuster, 2010). Further evidence of thawing tensions

appeared in September, when Obama announced that the planned missile defence shield in

Eastern Europe would be scrapped (Shuster, 2010). Whilst pleasing Russian liberals like

Medvedev, a number of Central and Eastern European politicians wrote to Obama asking him

to stop Russia “defending a sphere of influence on its borders”, and so the US Vice-President,

Joe Biden, travelled to Kiev and Tbilisi to calm their concerns (RFE/RL, 2009; Trenin, 2009).

Significantly, this ‘reset’ did not mean a return to relations before the Georgian War, but rather

an acknowledgement by America that its unilateral actions since the 1990s had harmed

international relations, and a recognition of Russia’s re-discovered status as a European and

world power (Rachwald, 2011). However, whilst politicians like Medvedev were happy to trust

that Obama represented real change in US foreign policy, there were conservatives, like Putin,

who were not so comfortable with the new friendship (Shuster, 2010). In the end, conservative

values won the argument, with Putin declaring that the reset was over following the 2011 Libya

43

intervention (Putin, 2014). The strategic reset demonstrated two things. The first is that Russia

was now seen as an equal partner by the US who had refused similar arrangements in previous

years, which illustrated to Russia the success of its resurgent policies. The second is that,

following the failure of the reset in 2011, Putin – although just the prime minster – still wielded

considerable influence in Russia’s international relations. The internal power dynamic had

changed from presidential power, to prime ministerial, but Putin remained a constant.

Putin returned to the presidential office in 2012, and oversaw the development of the greatest

rift in East-West relation since the end of the Cold War (Wolff, 2015). In 2014, the long-

standing rivalry between pro-Western and pro-Russian politics in Ukraine came to a head with

the removal of pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych, nationwide protests, Russian

attempts to separate eastern regions of Ukraine, and the abandonment of an EU agreement

designed to increase economic ties with Ukraine (Bagheri & Akbarpour, 2016; BBC, 2014;

Mohammadi, 2014). However, the real issue was Putin’s decision to annex Crimea in March,

citing Medvedev’s commitment to defend Russian people abroad (Bagheri & Akbarpour, 2016;

BBC, 2014). Following a swift Russian military take-over of the province, a referendum was

held in Crimea on whether it wished to succeed from Ukraine and become a federal member

of Russia. 97% of the Crimean population voted in favour Russian accession (Koldunova,

2015). Moscow’s actions have been heavily criticised by both Ukraine and the West and are

seen as an indication of an imperialistic and aggressive Russia (Zamani, 2013). But to Moscow,

its assertive foreign policy towards Ukraine is a symptom of repeated Western betrayal,

disrespect for Russian foreign policy objectives, and ignorance of Russian security concerns

(Wolff, 2015). In 2015, Putin admitted that fear of Ukraine joining NATO had partly motivated

his decision to annex Crimea, and said “we were promised that after Germany’s unification,

NATO wouldn’t spread eastward” (Putin, 2014a). The EU’s proposals to integrate Ukraine into

the West were seen by Moscow as a path that would lead to NATO membership and reduce

44

Russia’s influence in its long stated area of strategic importance (Haukkala, 2015; MacFarlane

& Menon, 2014). As far back as 1991, Yeltsin had declared that Russia retained the right to

make territorial claims against states with a large Russian population, making specific reference

to Crimea, and throughout post-Soviet Russian history, the Kremlin has made plain Russia’s

interest in retaining influence in Ukraine (Remnick, 1991; Plokhiy, 2014). If Russia had been

invited to participate in the ENP, it is likely that the perception of insecurity regarding Russia’s

status in Ukraine would have been reduced, and Russia would have felt less need to use

aggressive tactics to prevent Ukraine’s westernisation (Arbatova & Dynkin, 2016:). The West

severely underestimated Ukraine’s geopolitical importance to Russia, and stoked fears of

isolation and marginalisation within Moscow as a result. Rather than evidence of Russian

imperialism, the Ukraine crisis demonstrates how EU member states and the US have failed to

consider Russia’s foreign policy interests and inadvertently created a resurgent Russia

(Arbatova & Dynkin, 2016).


The 2008 global financial crisis hit the Russian economy hard, but it remained an economic

powerhouse compared to the CIS countries which were much more negatively affected (Trenin,

2009; Wieclawski, 2011). Moscow saw the economic crisis as an opportunity to strengthen its

influence in the ‘near abroad’ through provision of financial support: a $2bn loan to Belarus;

$2bn in stabilisation credits and investment to Kyrgyzstan; $500m for Armenia; $300m for

Mongolia; and $5bn for Ukraine (who refused the offer) (Trenin, 2009; Wieclawski, 2011). In

addition, Russia established a $10bn special assistance fund within EurAsEC (Euro-Asian

Economic Community), which was Moscow’s platform for economic integration with the

participating states (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) until it was

45

replaced by the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015 (Trenin, 2009; Sputnik, 2014). However,

Moscow expected political concessions in return for its assistance (Kononczuk, 2009). This

indicates a resurgent and assertive Russia using its relative economic strength for political gain.

The best example of this was Kyrgyz president Kumanbek Bakiyev’s decision in February

2009 to close the US airbase in Manas, but his decision was overturned by US influence who

managed to prolong their presence there (Pannier, 2009). Because this was not successful, some

analysts believe that Russia ousted Bakiyev in the 2010 riots for his lack of cooperation

(Karmanau, 2010). This is a clear example of Russian resurgence because 15 years ago

Moscow would not have had the financial resources or diplomatic freedom to offer such

‘assistance’ or topple unfavourable leaders.

However, Russia’s economic strong-arm tactics did not end with the allocation of financial

assistance to the CIS. The idea of using the Russian ruble as a regional reserve currency was

officially announced as an objective by Medvedev at the 2008 World Economic Forum, and

even after the global financial crisis, the concept persisted (Medvedev, 2008a; Medvedev,

2009; Pronina, 2009). Concurrently, Russia and Belarus were belligerents in the so called ‘milk

war’, which was a Russian ban on the imports of Belarussian dairy products after Minsk began

talks with the EU on the certification of Belarussian milk standards (Trenin, 2009). With 10%

of Belarus’ population employed in the agricultural sector, and with dairy potentially worth 7%

of their foreign trade revenue, Russia’s ban was a powerful political tool in preventing Belarus

from creeping towards the EU (Associated Press, 2009; Trenin, 2009). Another example of

Russia using economics to force CIS members to fall in line, is the gas ‘cold war’ of January

2009. Ukraine was unable to settle a $2.4bn gas bill to Gazprom from 2008 and unwilling to

accept an increase in the cost of Russian gas, this quickly turned into a dispute and resulted in

Russia turning off the gas supply to Ukraine on the 1st January, which consequently meant that

16 EU member states and Moldova were left without gas for weeks in the middle of winter

46

(Trenin, 2009a; McLaughlin & Mock, 2009; Pirani et al., 2009). Economics aside, Russia also

had a political aim to weaken the credibility of the pro-Western President Yushchenko (Trenin,

2009a). Both cases highlight the continued use of economic power as a weapon, and support

the claim that Russia had become resurgent by this stage due to the levels of assertive foreign

economic policy prevalent when compared to Russia in the 1990s.

The Russian economy continued to grow under Medvedev and Putin, but their actions in

Georgia and Ukraine were reflected in Russia’s GDP (see figure 6). Medvedev’s war in

Georgia led to huge outflow of capital from Russian markets which depreciated the ruble and

led to a drop in the Moscow Stock Exchange (Wieclawski, 2011). By the end of 2008, $130bn

had been lost through outflow and attempts to stabilise the ruble failed (Sindelar, 2009).

Between 2008 and 2009, Russia’s GDP fell from $1.67tn to $1.22tn (World Bank, 2016).

Moscow’s actions in Ukraine led to several rounds of Western imposed sanctions on Russian

businesses and individuals. The assets of 18 people involved in the violence in Ukraine were

frozen by the EU; the G8 suspended Russia; and the US sanctioned Gazprom Bank, Novatek,

and Rosneft (Radio Zamaneh, 2015; Bagheri & Akbarpour, 2016). All of the Western sanctions

were focused on Russian oil and banking sectors – all major banks with more than 50%

ownership by the state were sanctioned (Bagheri & Akbarpour, 2016). In response to these

sanctions, Russia imposed their own on Western states. In August Moscow imposed a food

embargo on the EU, US, Albania, Montenegro, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Ukraine – between

them, Russia had spent $26bn on food imports in 2013 (Fazli, 2015; Khordad News, 2015).

Furthermore, Russia imposed sanctions on US and EU member state officials such as Senator

John McCain, John Boehner, Nick Clegg, General Nick Houghton, and Andrew Parker

(Bagheri & Akbarpour, 2016). From the start of the sanctions in 2014, Russian GDP fell from

$2tn to $1.3tn (World Bank, 2016). To Russia, it seemed they were being punished for doing

little more than defending their interests against an aggressive NATO.

47

6.3 Military and Defence Policy

Following the decision at the NATO Bucharest summit to eventually approve Georgian and

Ukrainian accession to NATO, Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili, took the decision to

try and end the conflict with the separatist region of South Ossetia, and demonstrate that

Georgia was ready for NATO membership (Trenin, 2009a). On the 8th August 2008, following

a night of Georgian attacks in South Ossetia, Russia launched an armed campaign to remove

the Georgian military (BBC, 2009). Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, blamed the war

on the US and declared that they had “decided to test the strength of Russian authority” using

Saakashvili as a proxy, and forced Russia “to embark on the path of militarisation and abandon

modernisation” (Lavrov, 2008). Whilst the Bush administration was probably responsible for

not halting Saakashvili’s attack on Tskhinvali, due to his ambiguous signals to Tbilisi, it is

obvious that Moscow’s allegations of an attempt to militarise Russia and stop its modernisation

were simply untrue (Trenin, 2009a). Although Georgia sought to use its military to speed up

NATO enlargement, Russia used its military for the exact opposite. Moscow had three main

$0

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Figure 6: Graph showing the GDP of the Russian Federation from 2008-2015 (World Bank, 2016).

48

aims when they engaged in South Ossetia. The first was to put a stop to the eastward expansion

of NATO (Asmus, 2010; Dyomkin, 2011; Allison, 2008). Every Russian president has

expressed dislike of NATO expansion believing that the organisation is an aggressive alliance

that aims to weaken Russian influence, and it is highly likely that if Russia had been included,

or at least accepted and understood by NATO, the Georgian War would not have happened

(Arbatova & Dynkin, 2016). NATO’s decision to approve Georgian accession was the final

straw. Too long had the Kremlin lost ‘territory’ to the West, and a border with NATO was not

something Russia was willing to tolerate. The second aim was to demonstrate Russian primacy

in the post-Soviet CIS and highlight the inability of the West to limit Moscow’s influence

(Cornell et al., 2008). It has been evident since 1991 that the CIS is Russia’s primary foreign

policy concern, and any attempts to limit the Kremlin’s influence there would be perceived as

a threat to Russia’s global power ambitions and an attempt to hinder the progress of a multipolar

world order. The Russian invasion of Georgia was not only a message to NATO, but also to

other CIS states – if their allegiance is not to Russia, then they can expect Moscow to force

their allegiance (Muzalevsky, 2009). The third aim of Russia’s intervention was to support the

ethnic Russian minority in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as demonstrated by Moscow’s

recognition of their independence following the war, and Medvedev’s statement in 2008

proclaiming Russia’s right to defend its citizens abroad (BBC, 2015; Medvedev, 2008).

According to Rachwald (2011), the war with Georgia signalled the re-birth of a successful and

assertive Russia. However, in the West’s condemnation of Russian activity in Georgia,

Moscow saw a glaring hypocrisy. Whilst territorial integrity and non-interference are

cornerstones of international law, the West was happy to break the rules and support succession

for minorities in Eritrea, and East Timor, to name just two examples – yet when Russia invaded

and later recognised South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the West condemned this action (Arbatova

& Dynkin, 2016). The US explained the need for Kosovan independence by claiming that the

49

people of Kosovo simply didn’t want to live with Albanians, yet when Moscow saw that

Ossetians didn’t want to live with Georgians, the US was critical. This suggested to Moscow

that NATO was allowed to play by one set of rules, but Russia, for no better reason than it

being Russia, was not allowed to apply similar principles. This cemented the sense of

inferiority perpetuated by the West since the end of the Cold War. Whilst Russia was already

resurgent by this point, the West’s response to Georgia did little to quell the desire for

resurgence, and suggested that the West still fundamentally misunderstood the Kremlin’s

mind-set of perceived inferiority and a desire to restore Russia’s historical status.

In February 2009, the CSTO announced the creation of the Collective Operational Reaction

Force (CORF) which would establish a new rapid-reaction unit to mirror NATO (Wieclawski,

2011; Bugajski, 2010). Plans were altered slightly in June at the CSTO summit in Moscow,

changing CORF from ‘rapid response’ to ‘operational response’, reflecting Moscow’s desire

for a larger number of troops with greater capability – the operational response force planned

to include up to 20,000 soldiers, an airborne division, and Russia’s Caspian naval fleet

(Bugajski, 2010). However, due to resistance from within the CSTO, mainly from Belarus and

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50

Uzbekistan, CORF troops will have to remain on national territory, there will be no permanent

joint staff, and the force will only be assembled when missions are approved by CSTO

presidents at an emergency summit, reflecting the CIS members mistrust of a resurgent Russia

(Bugajski, 2010).

Under Medvedev and Putin, Russia’s total military expenditure has risen consistently from

1.4tn rubles, to 4tn rubles between 2008-2015, as displayed by figure 7 (SIPRI, 2015a).

Interestingly, military and defence spending has increased in priority since 2009 rising from

10.2% of the government’s total spending, to 13.7% in 2014 (data unavailable after 2014, see

figure 8), suggesting that Russia prioritised the military over other sectors (SIPRI, 2015c).

Although Russia’s GDP has fluctuated following its actions in Georgia, Ukraine, and the global

financial crisis, military expenditure as a percentage of GDP has risen (aside from a 0.1% drop

between 2008-2009) from 3.8% to 5.4% in 2013 (data unavailable after 2013, see figure 9)

(SIPRI, 2015). This shows that despite Russia’s economic problems, military expenditure

remained important to both Medvedev and Putin. High levels of military spending go hand in

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Military Expenditure of the Russian Federation as Percentage of Total Government Spending, 2008-2014

Figure 8: Graph showing Russian military expenditure as a percentage of the total government spending

(SIPRI, 2015c). This illustrates an increased priority in the Russian military.

51

hand with the increasing assertiveness of Russia’s foreign policy, with a notable increase after

Russia annexed Crimea (figure 7). This data, combined, shows that Russia is continuing the

increase in military spending since 1998, lending support to the claim that Russia is resurgent.

6.4 Summary

Between 2008-2015, Russia became fully resurgent. Talk of ‘privileged interests’, a desire to

defend ethnic Russians abroad, the Georgian war, and the Ukraine crisis shows Moscow’s

continued domination of the post-Soviet republics and willingness to defend its citizens. This

level of assertive foreign policy is unprecedented since the end of the Cold War and serves to

illustrate how far Moscow has come since the 1990s in terms of international power and

economic freedom. Both major military actions however, were caused by a deep rooted fear of

NATO enlargement that had built up since the 1990s. It seems that the West continued to

miscalculate Russia’s intentions and misunderstand their aspirations well into 2014, and

provoked aggressive military action as a result. The trend of using Russia’s relative economic

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Military Expenditure of the Russian Federation as Percentage of GDP, 2008-2013

Figure 9: Graph showing Russia’s increased military expenditure against GDP despite experiencing

economic problems (SIPRI, 2015).

52

might to subordinate its neighbours, set during Putin’s first terms as president, continued to

dominate the Kremlin’s foreign economic policies, as demonstrated by the ‘milk war’ and gas

cold war in 2009. Again, this reflects Russia’s resurgence, in that it has gained more economic

freedom and confidence in its international relations, although it is highly probable that without

Western (mainly EU) attempts to integrate some former Soviet republics, like Ukraine and

Belarus, Russia would have felt less of a need to force the CIS states’ allegiance. Despite

Russia’s economic woes caused by the global economic crisis, its actions in Georgia, and the

sanctions imposed after the annexation of Crimea, Russia continued to increase its military

expenditure which enabled Moscow to act so decisively and effectively defend its ‘buffer’

against NATO, and the ethnic Russians in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and eastern Ukraine. The

first military confrontations between Russia and the CIS over westernisation reveals the

increased capability of the Russian military that struggled to end the Chechnya conflict in 1998.

Despite this period seeing two different presidents, Russia’s foreign policy remained

remarkably consistent. Instead of this being a result of similar leaders, it reflects the power of

Vladimir Putin, who managed to end the ‘reset’ with the United States even whilst prime

minister. Furthermore, his return to power in 2012 suggests that Medvedev was little more than

a placeholder to do Putin’s bidding until he was eligible for re-election. This supports the

argument that Russian foreign policy is formulated by the subjectivity of an individual, rather

than rationality or a collective.

53

7.0 Conclusion

This dissertation has focused on three questions: Is Russia resurgent? What role has the West

played in Russia’s resurgence? What has controlled Russia’s resurgent policies? In answer to

the first question, a comprehensive look at the assertiveness of Russian foreign policy, Russian

economic policy, and Russian military spending is all that is required. At the start of the post-

Soviet era, Russia sought to maintain its influence in its neighbourhood through political

integration projects like the CIS, and the associated economic union. Between 2000-2008, the

method changed from political control, to economic control through the use of energy exports

as a weapon. But with the outbreak of the Georgian War, the method evolved to incorporate

military action. The progression from peaceful political means of controlling its ‘near abroad’

to the use of military force to subordinate these countries, clearly shows a resurgent Russia. In

terms of economics alone, Russia’s GDP has grown from $517bn in 1991 to $1.3tn in 2015,

experiencing rapid levels of economic growth along the way. The economic freedom enjoyed

by the current Russian government could only have been dreamt of by Boris Yeltsin. Finally,

the growing Russian military expenditure (which has been near constant) is a product of

Russia’s economic growth and need to pursue assertive foreign policies. In 1998, Russia was

struggling to finance a war in Chechnya, but by 2015, Russia had invaded Georgia and Ukraine,

and annexed Crimea, which in itself validates the claim that Russia is resurgent. During the

1990s, the foundations of resurgence were lain; during Putin’s first terms, Russia began its

resurgence through a dominant economic strategy and saw a dramatic increase in diplomatic

capability; and finally, from 2008, Russia has continued its resurgence with aggressive military

action.

The second question for this dissertation explored the role the West has played in Russia’s

resurgence. Right from the end of the Cold War in 1991, the West has treated Russia as an

inferior nation, snubbed chances to integrate Moscow into key Western institutions such as

54

NATO, broken Cold War promises to respect Russia’s influence in its neighbourhood, and

caused insecurity through NATO expansion. These themes are common to every period studied

in this dissertation and suggest a high degree of mistrust, and a lack of understanding of

Russia’s foreign policy objectives. This dissertation demonstrates how this played a crucial

role in Russia’s desire for security, international recognition, and a multipolar world order that

led it to become resurgent.

In conclusion to the question over who controls Russia’s resurgent policies, this dissertation

has argued in favour of the individual subjectivity side of the agency/structure debate. Through

the differing approaches between Yeltsin and Medvedev on one hand, and Primakov and Putin

on the other, the influence of individual subjectivity on foreign policy decision making can be

clearly seen. Both Yeltsin and Medvedev preferred to pursue pro-Western policies whilst

Primakov and Putin adopted more eurasianist and nationalistic policies. The variating world

views of these key actors clearly shows the degree of subjectivity in Russian foreign policy.

Furthermore, the semi-autocratic Russian political structure, strengthened by Putin, indicates

the individual is responsible for Moscow’s resurgent policies, not the collective.

It is important to mention that this dissertation does not condone Russia’s aggressive responses

to Western actions, but merely tries to explain why Russia has sought to use them. In addition,

the West cannot solely be blamed for the increased East-West tensions since 1991 and Russia

must recognise the part it has played. If the world is to avoid another Cold War scenario, two

things need to happen. The first is that Russia and the West need to improve their understanding

of each other’s objectives; primarily through clear communication. Secondly, Russia needs to

try to integrate into the current international system rather than oppose it, and the West needs

to help facilitate this integration. Without these two basic measures, further conflict, whether

direct or through a proxy is highly likely.

55

8.0 Acronyms

CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States.

CORF – Collective Operational Reaction Force.

CSTO – Collective Security Treaty Organisation.

ENP – European Neighbourhood Policy.

EU – European Union.

EurAsEC – Euro-Asian Economic Community.

GDP – Gross Domestic Product.

GUUAM – Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova.

ICBMs – Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles.

IEA – International Energy Agency.

IMF – International Monetary Fund.

IOGP – International Association of Oil and Gas Producers.

MAPs – Membership Action Plans.

MEK – Mezhgosudarstvennaya Ekonomicheskaya Kommissiya (Interstate Economic

Commission).

MGIMO – Moscow State Institute of International Relations.

MIRV – Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle.

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

NRC – NATO-Russia Council.

56

NRF – NATO Response Force.

OPEC – Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries.

PfP – Partnership for Peace.

PJC – Permanent Joint Council.

SCO – Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.

START – Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

UK – United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

US(A) – United States of America.

USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

WTO – World Trade Organisation.

57

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