Et Tu Caesar?

Julius Caesar: Another traditional republican aristocrat or a genuine political innovator?

Contents

Acknowledgments P.1

Introduction P.2-3

Chapter 1: Caesar as a man: Does Caesar present a new personality to Rome? P.3-5

Chapter 2: Caesar’s political dealings and manoeuvres P.5-7

Chapter 3: Are Caesar’s reforms innovative? P.7-9

Chapter 4: Caesar’s Ideology: Popularis, traditionalist or something different? P.9-12

Chapter 5: Did Caesar aim for sole power from an early age? P.12-14

Conclusion P.14-15

Bibliography P.16-17

Acknowledgments

For Granddad: Thank you for making History fun for me and inspiring me to carry on learning. I would not have been here without you!

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Introduction

“There are individuals whose lives burn through the mists of history like the path of a comet” (Griffin, 2009, 1). Julius Caesar is undoubtedly one of these individuals. Born around the turn of the first century BC to a patrician family that had not been recently distinguished (Badian, 2009, 14), Caesar proceeded to become a constant figure of fascination even in the present day and perhaps one of the most famous men to have ever lived. Regardless of what one may think of Caesar’s politics and rulings, he undoubtedly was a great man, though not necessarily a good one.

When one considers his fabled skill in the areas of military leadership, soldiery, oratory, politics and literacy (Suet. Jul. 55-60; Goldsworthy, 2006, 1), one begins to understand why and how Tatum credited him with having achieved more than most fictional heroes could ever hope to (Tatum, 2008, 21). Harnessing these talents and coupling them with a keen mind and a magnetic personality, Caesar carved a legendary but controversial path through the fabric of the Roman Republic which culminated in a victorious civil war and what some may call a despotic dictatorship (Cic. Phil. 2.114). Whilst said dictatorship was cut short by his historic murder in the senate house, Caesar undoubtedly started the republic on a path that led to a firmly entrenched monarchy that changed the face of Rome and thus, Europe permanently. Naturally, Caesar’s life has attracted a considerable amount of attention in the proceeding millennia since his death. Caesar’s commentaries have been read the world over by leaders and generals looking to learn from his political style, such as Charles V, King Louis XVI and the two Napoleons (Canfora, 2009, 431; Nicolet, 2009, 411-416). The awe and respect that emanates from Caesar’s legacy could be seen in Europe as late as the twentieth century with figures such as Kaisers and Tsars still using a derivative of his name, something that was universally identified as being synonymous with excellency and power.

Although he is considered an awe-inspiring figure who lived in a well-documented age there are considerable gaps in knowledge concerning Caesar. Specific details of his early years, for example, remain shrouded in mystery. That which we do know has been regularly contested which serves to intensify interest in Caesar and feed the seemingly endless supply of literature that hopes to encapsulate his extraordinary life.

Caesar’s legacy attracts controversy and debate in spite of the fact that his era is often regarded as one of the best recorded in Roman History (Goldsworthy, 2006, 6). However, when studying the ancient sources, one must always consider a number of issues. Even if one has a wealth of material to hand, as one may think they do with Caesar, generally only a fraction of one percent of ancient material survives today (Goldsworthy, 2006, 6). One must also remember that no ancient writer ever started writing without his own biases, trepidations and motives and their work, in turn, was likely based on other biased and potentially unreliable sources (Goldsworthy, 2006, 8).

Those sources which specifically pertain to Caesar harbour these difficulties and more besides. Caesar’s Commentaries, for example, aside from obvious concerns about its biased author are reported to have been said to have been incomplete rough drafts from which others could draw a more elegant prose by Caesar himself (Cic. Brut. 262). Other contemporary sources are somewhat sparse. The writings of Oppius and Pollio, which are lost to us now, are said to have been used in both Suetonius and Plutarch but even they aren’t without their problems (Pelling, 2009, 252-3). Plutarch notes in his life of Pompey that Oppius was not to be trusted when talking about Caesar’s friends and enemies, likely because of his extensive patronage under Caesar (Plut. Pomp. 10.7-9; Gelzer, 1968, 273). There are the extensive writings of Cicero to consult, but as a lifelong opponent to Caesar and an admirer of the optimates, one must interpret his works with caution (Mitchell, 1991, 1-2). Sallust presents a fairly balanced view of Caesar in spite of being a client of his. Even his

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works, however, are hindered with a view that all that ailed the republic was the fault of the increasingly amoral nobilitas (Goldsworthy, 2006, 7). Moving on from contemporary sources, later sources find themselves tainted by the godly legacy of Caesar. After deification no mortal could be expected to re-write the works of a god which allowed the blatant propaganda in the various works of Caesar (much of which are either lost or only fragmentary today) to perpetuate (Evans, 2003, 67-8). This critique can be intensified when one considers that his successors, regardless of their opinions of the dictator, were forced to honour him in certain ways such as the annual games celebrating the Victoria Caesaris which could not be feasibly cut out of the people’s calendars (Levick, 2009, 209). Whilst it has been argued that Augustus’ attitude towards Caesar is ambiguous at best, Cicero records that, as Octavian, he owed everything to his name (Cic. Phil. 13.11.24). One can theorise from such that if one was to criticise Caesar too much one may have accidentally slurred Augustus, something that may have deterred ancient writers from revising the contents of Caesar’s works too thoroughly

Therefore, for a lot of our information on Caesar we rely on sources such as Appian, Suetonius, Plutarch and Cassius Dio, all written at least a century and a half after the death of Caesar. Whilst these suffer from much of the problems of being derived from earlier flawed sources they cannot be expected to fully and accurately represent the ideals of the first century BC, a time vastly different to the principate under which they wrote (Goldsworthy, 2006, 8).

For these reasons discussed, much about Caesar’s documented life is up for interpretation. Much of the ancient sources, for example, agree that Caesar had set out from the start for autocracy, something that some modern authors strive to prove is wrong (Plut. Caes. 3.2-4, 11.3-6; Cic. De Off. 3.82; Gardner, 2009, 60). One can see that Caesar’s political character can be interpreted in different ways, depending on the political affiliations of the observer. As Aristotle said, ''man is a political animal'' with the power of speech and moral reasoning (Politics. 1.1253a). Therefore, one will apply their own moral reasoning to Caesar's political decisions and will be incapable of being truly objective in the assessment of his reign.

With such logic in mind, this dissertation will strive to use all available works and writings to assess the political manoeuvres of Caesar and evaluate the extent to which he can be called innovative

Caesar as a man: Does Caesar present a new personality in Rome?

Politics in Rome’s late republic were a rather personal affair. Unlike politicians of the modern era, one did not have organised parties to rely on and thus candidates had to use their own initiative, connections and charm to climb their way to success (Yakobsen, 1999, 148; Steel, 2009, 112). One can therefore perceive from this Caesar’s personality might have constituted an integral part of his success. We must, however, remain cautious when attempting to understand Caesar on a personal level. Much of that which alludes to his personality or ability in the ancient sources derives from exaggerated anecdotal evidence from sources such as Oppius which, as has been stated above, cannot be fully trusted (Plut. Pomp. 10.7-9). There are however, certain aspects of Caesar’s life and character that have strong evidential bases and thus cannot be discarded so easily. Many of the traits discussed in Caesar’s biographies and his works shine through in his legislation and his actions. The recalling of his enemies from exile, for example, goes some way to proving Caesar’s clemency and Cicero himself attests to his great oratorical skill (Yavetz, 1983, 96; Cic. Brut. 2.62). Therefore, whilst it is true that we cannot wholly plumb the depths of Caesar’s personality, we can use reasoning to attempt conclusions

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One aspect in which Caesar’s personality shines is in his political intrigue. If one see’s Caesar’s career as a plan for domination, one must accept that he is an accomplished multi-tasker and a forward thinker. If one thinks that Caesar’s career is reactionary, one must permit that he had a phenomenal ability for quick-thinking and must also accept that he worked extraordinarily well under pressure (Gardner, 2009, 60). Therefore, regardless of Caesar’s benevolence/malevolence, one must appreciate acts such as the conciliation of Pompey and Crassus under the triumvirate for the ingenuity that they represent. The fact that he manages at all to get these two politicians to work together is testament to his political persuasion in itself given that they are thought to have loathed each other (Suet. Jul. 19).

On top of this feat however, one must consider the various favours that the act allowed him, such as the avoidance of responsibility for his consular crimes and extended governorship in his province (Suet. Jul. 24). It is fair to say that the triumvirate was not flawless however as the hiring of tribunes was still necessary which when coupled with Caesar’s efforts at keeping ties of kinship with Pompey, indicate that there was much distrust within the relationship (Evans, 2003, 70, 91; Balsdon, 1967, 93). Another action of Caesar’s that speaks of excellence is his treatment of the army. Whilst Suetonius’ tales of the heroic deeds undertaken by Caesar’s soldiers are likely exaggerated pieces of propaganda from dubious sources, we can certainly take some stories as indicative of Caesar’s genius. The story of Caesar’s quelling of the Campanian mutiny, regardless of whether or not certain facts may have been exaggerated, certainly speaks for Caesar’s rapport with his troops (Suet. Jul. 70). So much so does the legend of this event endure that Germanicus imitates Caesar’s actions some years later and achieves a similar result (Tac. Ann. 1.42-3). To give further proof of Caesar’s military legacy, one need only look to military honorific events such as the Feriale Duranum. Unlike Caesar’s cult in the city, which at times was rather uncomfortable, Caesar was celebrated uninterruptedly within the military (Levick, 2009, 216). One can put this down not only to Caesar’s military achievements, but also to his prowess in leadership and his strength of character. We know, by other examples of generals, such as Lucullus, that circumstance alone is not enough to make a republican army love their general. A personal relationship is clearly also required (Goldsworthy, 2009, 217).

One reason for Caesar’s success with leadership is his fabled clemency. Not only does Caesar secure the loyalty of his troops with such behaviour, as in the event where he borrows money from his officers and centurions to give it to his soldiers (Caes. B Civ. 1.39.3), he also employs good-naturedness in civil life. Caesar always seeks to use and develop his popularity with the people that he inherited from his links with Marius, but simultaneously did not dismiss the power of the ruling classes (Steel, 2009, 116; Yavetz, 1983, 166). This policy of trying to appeal to everyone can be seen in the land distribution bill issued during his 59BC consulship that no opponent of his was said to find fault with besides that it came from him (Dio. 38.2-3). Caesar is seen to act in a way that pleases the most people possible often in his career, leading him to possess many friends in various walks of life. Caesar’s renowned clementia undoubtedly resulted in his fabled mass of clientes. By putting so many people in his debt, Caesar created a vast network of people who were ready and willing to help his cause. This can be evidenced by Caesar’s liberal hiring of tribunes who all benefited greatly from their espousing of Caesar’s cause (Evans, 2003, 91). Good-naturedness towards the populace also had its benefits in that they were more likely to be more receptive to his legislation, and more likely to grant him special honours, like that to stand for the consulship in absentia whilst he was still in Gaul (App. B Civ, 2.25).

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If one combines Caesar’s clemency and leadership skills with his history of success and his expertise as a soldier, one can begin to understand that Caesar was a hard figure to denounce in the late republic. Caesar’s success speaks for itself of course, with the conquest of Gaul and the invasions of Britain. These, in spite of what the senate may have thought of him, were required to be publically celebrated due to the glory and riches which they brought to Rome and were in fact given the some of the longest terms of public celebration known in Roman history (Balsdon, 1967, 79). His soldiery is also well attested, starting with his being awarded a military tribuneship and the Corona Civica at a young age (Suet. Jul. 2, 5). With such an impressive record, one would not be wrong in partially believing the outlandish tales of his physical courage in the accounts of Plutarch and Suetonius. Caesar’s success, as previously mentioned, required the senate to celebrate him, but his excellency as a soldier demanded their respect and the awe of the people. When combined with Caesar’s clementia, and thus his popularity with the populace, this essentially forces the senate into a corner, leaving them with no alternative but to humour to his whims, something that can be seen in Bibulus’ retreat into privacy after his lack of success against Caesar (Plut. Caes. 14.9). The futility of the senate’s defence to the over-whelming tide of Caesar’s will can perhaps be seen in the perpetuation of the petty attacks on Caesar’s care of his appearance that survived to be written into the account of Suetonius (Jul. 45). Whilst attacking Caesar’s policy would at times, make his detractors unpopular, one could imagine that the proud, ever-masculine elite, personified by the hardy image of Cato (Plut. Cato. 7-10), would find no issue in attacking Caesar for his rumoured affair with Nicomedes (Suet. Jul. 2) or the effeminate care he supposedly took with his appearance. Indeed, even his soldiers were said to indulge in such mockery with the good-humour of their general (Dio. 43.20). One can imagine that such allegations would not be so welcome from those who opposed him politically.

Whilst it is a tempting concept to look upon Caesar as a completely new personality to Rome, this is not the case. One cannot merely dismiss the legacies of those like Pompey and Marius who also courted the favour of the populace (Plut. Mar. 4; Pomp. 52) or indeed others who showed military leadership and proved themselves admirable Romans. However, what can be concluded is that, to use the words of Gruen, Caesar was “simply better at it than anyone else” (Gruen, 2009, 35). Caesar was gifted in birth by being a patrician, and early in his career encamped himself firmly in the camp of Marius by denying Sulla’s request that he divorce Cornelia (Suet. Jul, 1; Steel, 2009, 114-116). Caesar then went on to make the most of these wide-reaching connections by courting almost anyone with which he came into contact. One anecdote has him courting even the slaves of those whose support he sought (Suet. Jul. 27). He is said to have outdone all before him in the games that he puts on in his aedileship and used his god-given charisma to claim all the praise for himself and none for his colleague, Bibulus (Suet, Jul. 10). In this, and more in which he outdoes his colleagues, Caesar can be said to be politically innovative. Caesar masters the game that is Republican politics in a way that none before him had quite managed.

Caesar’s political dealings and manoeuvres

The political world into which Caesar entered was one of turbulence. As a young man Caesar would have grown up watching men like Marius, Sulla and Cinna bring the Republic to the brink of extinction (Billows, 2009, 38). If this cannot be seen as enough of an influence on Caesar’s later actions in politics, his family were also connected by marriage to the Marians under whom, Caesar would have likely conducted some form of political apprenticeship (Billows, 2009, 34). These facts undoubtedly have some bearing on the eventual circumstance of Caesar’s eventful career. Having said this, some argue that the happenings in Caesar’s era has more to do with the existing political climate rather than the man himself (Gardner, 2009, 60). Whilst Plutarch’s insistence that the 5

populace were crying out that monarchy was the only solution to the Republic’s woes is likely an exaggerated claim, one can see that in such turmoil the thought would likely have been on the minds of some (Plut. Caes, 28). Strengthening such a viewpoint is the fact that in many regards, Caesar’s career can be considered conventional. Gruen goes so far to state that none of Caesar’s activity breaks with conventional modes of political behaviour (Gruen, 2009, 28). Caesar, after all, rose to each office at the age which was considered conventional (Gruen, 2009, 28). His peer Pompey, frequently disregarded such customs, an example of which being the event which saw him gaining a triumph before he was of age to be considered a senator (Plut. Pomp. 14-15). This chapter will assess the conventionality of Caesar’s career in regard to his political manoeuvres. Caesar’s legislation and ideology over this period will be assessed in later chapters.

It can be reasonably argued that Caesar was not a ground-breaking politician. Much of Caesar’s early political actions are to be expected of a young aristocrat who is entering the political forum. Therefore it has been a much posited question, one arguably yet to be answered, what sets Caesar apart? The possible answer lies in a number of different areas. Whilst Caesar does follow a similar career progression to those before him, he tends to excel at that which he does. For example, Caesar, looking to prove himself capable in the skills of oratory takes on the law cases that were customary to one of his age and social standing (Billows, 2009, 62). One case against Dolabella however, results in Caesar making a remarkable name for himself, with his eloquent response being studied for centuries to come (Plut. Caes, 4; Canfora, 2007, 6). Such displays of excellence could only work to gain Caesar friends and prestige amongst the populace and the nobilitas of Roman society. Caesar also cultivates such prestige amongst the populace with the cases and political dealings that he chooses to participate in, many of which are concerned with lessening the corruption of senators and repealing Sulla’s freedom-buckling legislation (Steel, 2009, 115). He is also said to have earned their respect through his good nature and the “easy friendliness” with which he conducted himself (Plut. Caes, 4). Furthermore, Caesar champions some high-profile popularis causes from an early stage in his career such as supporting Pompey’s over-arching anti-piracy command in the Mediterranean and again when he is given command in the east against Mithridates (Plut. Pomp. 25.4; Dio 36.43.2-4). What is interesting, however, is that in spite of such actions, which can of course be considered normal actions for a political aristocrat, Caesar never tied himself down to one political camp or another (Steel, 2009, 112; Gruen, 2009, 24). In the period before his first consulship Caesar is said to have used his allies, which spanned the entire political spectrum, in a “flexible and opportunistic manner” (Steel, 2009, 116). Whilst championing these causes, Caesar kept close with those of a more conservative persuasion through acts such as marriage ties, like that with Sulla’s granddaughter (Plut. Caes. 5). He also never seemed to fully benefit from the ample patronage opportunities that being in the camp of Pompey might offer (Billows, 2009, 81). Although it is likely that he did benefit partly from Pompey’s influence, perhaps in his election to the Pontifex Maximus over Catalus (Gruen, 2009, 25). Such observation leads to the conclusion that Caesar was not prepared to streamline himself politically. Whether or not Caesar’s intentions were for the good of the Republic (Billows, 2009, 81) or for his own political needs (Gruen, 2009, 25), it cannot be argued that Caesar was not somewhat of a political maverick in regard to his wide-reaching contacts. It is only when approaching his first consulship that Caesar begins to narrow his political options within the confines of the triumvirate.

Contrary to popular opinion, the triumvirate needn’t be considered wholly unconventional. Many politicians could be seen to form factions in the Republican era, indeed even the placement of Bibulus as Caesar’s consular colleague is said to have been due to the meddling of optimates figures (App. BCiv, 2.2.9). One therefore, might be correct in saying that the awful reputation of the triumvirate may have more likely emanated from the recorded utterances of disgruntled and bitter

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senators, much akin to the reason behind the survival of the allegations of Caesar’s effeminacy. Gruen states that in general, the triumvirs operated within the conventions of the republic and that their violence and strong-hand tactics originated from posturing and political theatre rather than from challenging the institutions of the republic (2009, 35). Furthermore, Gruen suggests that the enactments backed by Caesar and his faction were genuine and that many of the events that record their brutality were orchestrated by the opposing factions (2009, 34, 1974, 282-5). Perhaps, what can be witnessed here is more akin to the hypocrisy recorded by the tribune Memmius who states that political co-operation among “good men” is considered friendship and among the “wicked” factions (Sall. BJ. 31.15). Having said this, the outspokenness of the triumvirate was clearly a cause for concern amongst the elite. Caesar and Pompey were not secret about the creation of their marriage alliance, something that can be seen to alarm the optimates based on the reaction of Cato (Plut. Caes. 14.4; Steel, 2009, 117). One could stipulate from this that the scale and openness of such a pairing, one which was comprised of three successful, ambitious figures, was a worrying innovation in political life (Steel, 2009, 117).

Moreover, it can also be argued that Caesar does not show unconventionality in the way that he deals with tribunes and subordinates. If one was to understand Caesar as a man of the people, one would expect innovation in this area over all others. At first glance, one might assume that Caesar does look after such people, after all he takes tribunes like Vatinius into his staff in Gaul when he faced prosecution in Rome after espousing his causes (Billows, 2009, 128). Indeed, many of the tribunes who Caesar takes under his wing are seen to have profited lucratively from association with him (Evans, 2003, 91). Delving deeper, however, one begins to see flaws in this position. Firstly, when one considers Caesar’s writings, one can see that tribunes are rarely referenced and often, their contributions to Caesar’s success are completely ignored (Evans, 2003, 68). This attitude towards tribunes, as a political tool, rather than a valued ally, is very familiar in the practises of other politicians of the late republican era (Evans, 2003, 91). One could perhaps see the mirroring of this attitude towards tribunes as political tools in the example set by Marius with Saturninus (Plut. Mar, 30). Caesar can also be seen to frequently act against and condemn the power of certain tribunes who were supposedly the representatives of the people. An example of such lives in Caesar’s violent conduct towards the tribune, Metellus whilst breaking in to the treasury (Plut. Caes. 35.4). Caesar naturally attempts to portray the event in a non-violent manner, but one is more inclined to believe the event to be an unfriendly one judging by his general apathy towards tribunes and their office. In Caesar’s Bellum Civale, for example, when addressing his troops Caesar expresses annoyance at the tribune’s declaration of martial law at Rome in response to his presence in Italy (1.7). Even if one does not regard this event as an unfounded criticism one cannot help but view Caesar’s grumpiness and disrespect towards tribune Pontus Aquilla as a betrayal of his aristocratic arrogance and sense of superiority towards the popular institution (Evans, 2003, 79). If this was not the case and Caesar truly was the champion of the people he claimed to be, he would not openly show the aristocratically inherited distaste for the office that he does.

In conclusion, it is without basis to say that Caesar’s career in regard to his political dealings was a conventional one on all levels. The depth of Caesar’s unique personality clearly shines in his contact with other people which naturally helps him to accumulate a mass of willing companions on which he based his future career. In spite of this however, one cannot help but once again bring to mind the viewpoint of Gruen that Caesar is simply more adept at the political game than anyone else (2009, 35). Being better at these political dealings however, is where Caesar’s innovation ends. Caesar is merely intelligent enough to keep his fingers in many pies, if you will, and determined or fearless enough to play the field. If Caesar was a true innovator in this area, one would not expect to see the betrayal of his aristocratic background as frequently as one does. Caesar’s identity therefore,

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can be described as a carefully constructed one and occasionally, when he is in contact with some people, one can see the guard drop. This arrogance, combined with ruthless ambition can be clearly seen to fuel his increasing alienation with those of a conservative persuasion.

Are Caesar’s reforms innovative?

Legislation is always by far the biggest testimony to the actions of a dictatorial leader and Caesar is no exception to this rule (Yavetz, 1983, 59). However, when attempting to judge the rule of a leader who has been dead for over two-thousand years some unique problems arise. Alongside the obvious concerns, such as lack of surviving material, the historian has to deal with a number of more complex issues specifically pertaining to the material regarding Caesar’s reign. Firstly, of the thirty-eight laws, actions and decrees that are said to have been attached to Julius Caesar’s name (Yavetz, 1983, 57) two cannot even be traced definitively back to Caesar, and five, in spite of bearing the name Lex Julia, cannot be linked to Caesar at all (Yavetz, 1983, 176). This is due to a variety of reasons, one of which being that there is considerable confusion between the laws of Caesar and those of Augustus, some of which also bore the name Lex Julia. (Yavetz, 1983, 85). A potential example of such a confusion is recorded in Suetonius (42.3) where he records a law regarding Collegia that is unrecorded in any of the contemporary sources, and thus is thought to have possibly come from Augustus (Yavetz, 1983, 85). Another reason we must also be careful when looking at the Leges Juliae is because some of them are likely innovations by Caesar’s successors who were looking to use his name for their own needs. The Lex Julia de Insula Creta for example, a bill that was to abolish Crete as a provicnce after Brutus’ governorship, was likely a bill that Anthony fabricated to increase his clientela (Yavetz, 1983, 98). Cicero, points out that the bill could not have come from Caesar as Brutus’ placement in Crete was not announced until after his death (Cic. Phil. 2.97). In spite of these flaws in the record, this chapter will seek to assess the level of innovation that is present in Caesar’s legislation.

It is common opinion amongst some scholars that Caesar’s legislation is unoriginal (Fuller, 1965, 312). Indeed, such a position is not invalid. When one looks at his early political manoeuvres one can see that Caesar was quite careful to publicise the fact that he was backing high profile popularis causes (Gruen, 2009, 26-7). Furthermore, in positions of power Caesar can be seen to embrace many causes that have previously been championed by other popularis politicians. The distribution of land to the plebeians during his consulship for example, had only recently been suggested by the likes of Rullus and Flavius (Goldsworthy, 2006, 203). In the simple words of Syme it is clear that Caesar was not a revolutionary (1939, 52). During his Consulship, whilst Caesar was perhaps less bothered about causing offence than his predecessors, such as with the clause requiring senators to swear by his land bill (Dio. 38.2), his legislation still had familiar aims in mind (Gruen, 2009, 35). He can also be seen, through the actions of the triumvirate, to be scheming his way to a rich pro-consulship just as any other politician of his time might have done (Gruen, 2009, 33). Much the same can be said of Caesar’s legislation as a dictator. Gardner points out that innovation cannot be seen in any clause of the Tabula Heracleensis (2009, 60-61).

Having said this, one might regard such views as overly simplistic. When one analyses certain pieces of Caesar’s legislation, whilst it may have the same aims of his predecessors, it cannot be denied that the way in which some are fashioned can be described as ingenious. The land bill of Caesar’s consulship perhaps provides the most illustrative example of said ingenuity. Caesar had quite clearly studied the failings of previous bills and made adjustments based on this (Goldsworthy, 2006, 203). Caesar made sure that the bill was water-tight from senatorial disapproval on the basis of not involving himself, not unlawfully taking land, fixing those attached to the land for 20 years and

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making a committee of 20 to oversee the affair to ensure against corruption. Caesar was even sure to add in a clause that stated that he would amend anything to which any senator raised objection (Dio. 38.1-7). Due to Caesar’s earlier legislation regarding the publishing of senatorial meetings, none were likely to raise an unfair objection lightly (Suet. Jul. 20). Naturally, considering this legislation and the fact that no-one spoke against the measure immediately, one can assume that the later rejection from Cato merely reflects the attitude of an elite who opposed any innovation in the public sphere (Goldsworthy, 2006, 204; Billows, 2009, 70; Dio. 38.2).

Much like his personality, Caesar’s legislation was much more complex than that of the standard popularis (Tatum, 2008, 4; Cic. Phil. 116). The complexity of Caesar’s various pieces of legislation, which overlap numerous demographics throughout the empire is something that cannot be under-appreciated. Various decrees, as they are naturally expected to do, are seen to have done a disservice to one group or another. No-one, for example, was granted freedom from debt in entirety, something that previous up-starts like Catiline had supposedly promised (Sall. Cat. 21), and Cicero reports was expected in Rome at the start of the civil war (Cic. Att, 9.7.4; 10.8.2). This evidently won the respect of the money-lenders at the expense of those of his followers who were heavily in debt, a constant problem amongst the aristocracy of Rome (Yavetz, 1983, 134). However, Caesar was also said to have been aware of the how interest had gotten out of hand and thus acted upon it (Suet. Jul. 42.2). Caesar, by looking to compensate those which he had to disenfranchise, shows his ingenuity. One might expect that with actions such as confiscating some of the powers of the corrupt Publicani in Asia one might expect to see Caesar’s popularity drop. The opposite however, is often closer to the truth. The Publicani are kept loyal through the power of a compromise, leaving them with some power remaining over indirect taxes (Yavetz, 1983, 103-4). Such compromises are characteristic of Caesar’s legislation and work to assure his popularity which only began to flounder towards the end of his reign. This was perhaps more due to his increasingly questionable conduct towards the republic and its citizenry rather than any of his policies (Yavetz, 1983, 183-4). Nevertheless, to hold together the republic at such a critical stage in a dubious position required a special sort of person (Yavetz, 1983, 183).

In conclusion, it can be said that Caesar’s legislation clearly does constitute more innovation than is let on at first glance. This, however, does not mean that Fuller’s statement is untrue. One would be fair in saying that, judging Caesar’s bills in a rudimentary fashion, they generally appear to be old popularis points of concern that have been dressed more attractively. One might put this down to unoriginality in legislation or perhaps that Caesar was rushed and reactionary in his dictatorship. Whilst either position may be true one must not undermine the vast wealth of subjects that were targeted by such legislation against the vast swathes of clientes that Caesar managed to cultivate. The innovation in Caesar’s legislation lies not in the aims of each law, decree or measure but in the way in which they were crafted to offend the least amount of people and the way in which they all inter-twine and fit together with the surprising effect of bolstering Caesar’s popularity. One must not fail to appreciate this when judging the complex political character that is Caesar.

Caesar’s ideology: Popularis, traditionalist or something different?

Much like Caesar’s personality, Caesar’s political ideology can be seen to be somewhat elusive in the sources. As can be evidenced in his Bellum Civale, Caesar wanted to portray himself as a man of the people, and the saviour of the republic (9, 29). Contrastingly, the picture from contemporaries such as Cicero (Att. 13.37.2) and later biographers such as Plutarch (Caes. 11.3-6; Pelling, 2009, 255) is one of an ambitious despot who aimed at supreme power from very early on in his career. When

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one combines such views with the ambiguity of other aspects of Caesar’s career one can see why the question of Caesar’s ideology is a major cause for academic contention. Rather conversely to much of the contemporary and ancient sources, the view of Mommsen, that Caesar was alone in possessing the knowledge necessary to remedy the ills of the republic (1854-6, 171-4) is one that still has its advocates. Such a view however, is by no means without contention. Gardner, for example, is rather firm on her belief that Caesar had no plans for the future of the republic (Gardner, 2009, 60). Considering this, one would not be surprised in finding that there are views that consider Caesar as a strictly popularis and anti-sullan politician (Meir, 1995, 130-2; Baltrusch, 2004, 44-8, 51), and others, such as Syme, who viewed Caesar as a traditionalist who was dismayed to find he had “wrecked the playground” when he achieved supreme power (Syme, 1988, 705). A number of modern scholars have taken a mediating view on the political ideology of Caesar, condemning the pigeon-holing of Caesar into one political camp or another (Gruen, 2009, 25; Fuller, 1965, 49). This chapter will seek to explore the political ideology of Caesar in regard to his political innovation, and will seek to answer the question of how different Caesar can be considered to be compared to his contemporaries.

In spite of the aforementioned criticism of pigeon-holing Caesar, one would not be un-founded in regarding Caesar as a popularis politician. It is undeniable that Caesar’s career certainly takes on many of the traits that one might consider to be attached to that political camp. Not only does Caesar champion a number of popularis causes, such as land redistribution (Dio. 38.1-7), he can also be seen to act in a typically popularis fashion. One rather illustrative example can be seen in his attempts to bypass the resistance of the ever-conservative senate by taking his reforms directly to the people. In front of them the unfounded criticisms of the senate daren’t be mentioned (Dio. 38.4). Such popular posturing can be evidenced in previous popularis figures such as Caius Gracchus (Plut. CG. 3). On a similar vein, Caesar can be seen to build vast swathes of clientes amongst the masses by the way of lavish games and public spending (Plut. Caes. 5; Suet. Jul. 10). It is quite clear that, like previous popular posturers, Caesar does this to win favour for himself (Suet. Jul. 11; Yakobsen, 1999, 148). One can also see that the people had been known to act violently on Caesar’s behalf. An example of this is provided by Bibulus’ escape to privacy in the face of violence and threats towards his life whilst he was in the forum (Plut. Caes. 14). Furthermore, Caesar is quite happy to be associated with Marius through marriage and repeatedly emphasises this association with acts such as the re-introduction of Marian trophies to the public after Sulla had disposed of them and alluding to his marital links in his funeral speech for his aunt Julia (Suet. Jul. 11; Plut. Caes. 5; Billows, 2009, 81).

Having said this, there are also aspects of Caesar’s life and career that one could take as indicators of his traditionalism. Caesar, being of patrician birth had the contacts one might need for a successful traditional political career, something that Caesar cannot be seen to eschew (Gruen, 2009, 24). Not only can such connections help to explain Caesar’s early political advancements, such as his placement as military tribune and his co-optation into the pontificate (comprised mainly on Sullan supporters), Caesar can be seen to have used his high-birth for political advantage at the events of his wife and aunt’s funerals (Gruen, 2009, 24; Plut. Caes. 5; Billows, 2009, 80). Another aspect of Caesar’s career is that he can be understood to have had a very aristocratic idea of success in mind. One would find it hard to deny that Caesar was a gifted politician and his apparent natural competence shines through in his desire for political success. Caesar can be seen on some occasions to logically choose the path that would offer the most success and not let an egotistical greed for glory get in the way of his career. An example of this is Caesar’s denouncing of a triumph when he is forced to choose between this and standing for the consulship (Suet. Jul. 18). An additional factor that alludes to Caesar’s traditionalism lies with his aristocratically biased views that can be

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evidenced at various parts of his career. Caesar’s attitudes towards tribunes for instance [see above], are indicative of his aristocratic privilege (Evans, 2003, 65-92). Also, in spite of the triumph that Caesar passed up for the consulship he did celebrate four consecutive triumphs at Rome during the civil war (Plut. Caes. 55). Triumphs were held in particular esteem with the elite at Rome and celebrating four consecutively can naturally be seen as indicative of traditional arrogance (Beard, 2007, 1). Additionally, Caesar is known to have made concessions to former pompeians during his dictatorship which shows his reluctance to completely break with his origins and undoubtedly would have been unpopular with those of a more radical popularis persuasion (Yavetz, 1983, 182). Alongside lingering aristocratic values, Caesar also sought to align himself with those of a more conservative persuasion through marriage, an example of which being his marriage to Sulla’s granddaughter, Pompeia (Suet. Jul. 6). Such a move would have provided Caesar with more allies in high places, something one might expect a true popularis to have shunned.

In the face of such evidence it is clear that Caesar constitutes something more than either a popularis or a traditionalist politician. This is made quite clear by the fact that his alliances span both sides of the political spectrum and that his legislation panders to all citizens (Gruen, 2009, 24; Yavetz, 1983, 183). The remarkability of Caesar’s political character can also be seen in the fact that he inspired genuine warmth amongst many people from different walks of life. Matius for example, says to Cicero that he followed Caesar into the civil war not because he believed in his cause and not as a potential beneficiary but merely because he was his friend (Cic. Fam. 11.28.2). This is striking to one who might regard Caesar as a figure who merely attracted followers because of promises and financial reward. Matius, being a friend of Cicero and coming from a wealthy background was intelligent enough to make an informed decision on his actions and was probably even aware that Caesar’s future intentions may cause him financial distress (Steel, 2009, 123). Whilst inspiring figures like Matius, Caesar also cultivated great respect amongst the military [as discussed above]. This did not come as easily to some other figures, such as Cinna who was killed by his own troops whilst trying to force them to fight Sulla’s veteran army. That Caesar can inspire such confidence in figures like Matius whilst also charming the army proves that labels such as popularis or traditionalist do not his character justice.

The question of Caesar’s intentions then remains largely unanswered. It can be argued that Caesar was a self-serving demagogue, one who looked for a traditional sense of aristocratic fulfilment, but one who was prepared and able to do so by largely unconventional means. Such a position is more than valid when one considers Caesar’s questionable popularis morals. Caesar, was undeniable aiming for something, but this cannot have been plebeian advancement. Whilst Caesar was undeniably kind and generous to the populace he was always careful to not give them any real political power (Yavetz, 1983, 179). Caesar can be seen to have bared no expense to keep the people happy, as detailed by Suetonius’ description of the post-civil war celebrations (Jul. 39), but all of what he grants to the populace (Suet. Jul. 41-2), was merely what had been promised by other popularis politicians (Gruen, 2009, 35). One might expect a sincere reformer to have sought to genuinely improve the lot of the plebeians and possibly innovate legislation in their favour. Having failed to do this, one can regard Caesar’s as either healing the wounds of the republic caused by the previous decades of turmoil, or merely keeping the “ignorant” masses in his favour (Gruen, 2009, 28; Yavetz, 1983, 166). With the popularis position essentially eliminated one must look elsewhere for Caesar’s main motivations which must come in the form of aristocratic success. This is a goal which Caesar can repeatedly be seen to strive for, whether that be in the form of his scheming with the triumvirate to be given a potentially auspicious province (Plut. Caes. 11.9), or his stubbornness in the face of senatorial demands at the start of the Civil War. The position of Syme could be valid in this regard, in that Caesar had no wish to strive after supreme power (Syme, 1939, 47) and his lack of

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innovation in his aims regarding political renovation of the republic perhaps go some way to strengthen this position. Building on this position one could perhaps argue that Caesar, whilst he did not aim for supreme power, was not completely odious of his position. When one regards the excessive honours he accepted, even if he was in no position to deny all of what the faux-sycophantic senate offered him (Gardner, 2009, 66; Dio. 44.3.1), one would not be at fault to question why some of the more ostentatious honours were both accepted and publicly adhered to (Suet. Jul. 76). A figure such as Caesar, who has already been noted to have shown aristocratic arrogance in some circumstances [see above], might well be expected to have had his ego massaged by some of these measures. This trend can perhaps be witnessed in Caesar’s planned campaign in Parthia. Contrary to Syme’s opinion (1939, 53) Caesar may have been fuelled by his stroked ego to attempt to expand his already far-reaching legacy with more conquest.

To conclude, Caesar’s political ideology is quite clearly an example of his political innovation in the sense that he presents a unique figure in the roman republic. Caesar had the contacts necessary to soar in the political spectrum of the elite inner-circle and the political foresight to emphasise his Marian marriage connections too. Alongside these methods and virtues, Caesar had the spark of aristocratic arrogance that was all too familiar in his era combined with the ruthlessness and guile to drive him to success in the ever-turbulent political world of the roman republic. To paraphrase Fuller, Caesar never allowed ideals and ideologies to lead him astray (Fuller, 1965, 49). He was prepared to use them, much like he did with his contacts, in a way that was convenient to him in order to be successful and then worry about the consequences of this at a later date.

Did Caesar aim for sole power from an early age?

The intentions of Caesar in regard to the fate of the republic is a point of serious contention among scholars and the debate has attracted a vast range of widely contrasting view-points. Indeed the position that there is little point in posing the question at all due to the scarcity of source material to answer it is one that is adopted by some historians such as Meier (1970, 131-5). Whilst this point may hold some truth, this does not mean that debate on the topic is fruitless. Therefore this chapter will seek to assess the intentions of Caesar, as far as is possible to determine whether or not he resembles Syme’s playground wrecking traditionalist (Syme, 1988, 705) or Mommsen’s republic saving reformer (1854-6, 171-4; Yavetz, 1983, 21). In order to understand Caesar’s value as a political reformer in a broad sense, one may find having a grasp upon his ultimate intentions considerably helpful.

When assessing Caesar’s intentions, one must first understand that, in spite of what much of the ancient sources say, there is no solid evidence to prove that Caesar definitively sought to bring about the fall of the republic for the majority of his life (Goldsworthy, 2006, 574). As has been mentioned above, Caesar can actually be seen to act within the boundaries of normal political behaviour during his career (Gruen, 2009, 35). Some scholars, such as Strasburger, go so far as to call Caesar the “last patrician” and to support this he referenced Caesar’s challenge to the senate to help him run the state (Strasburger, 1953, 225-64; Caes. BCiv. 1.32.7). One would be forgiven for theorising that if Caesar wished to overthrow the oligarchic clique of nobles at Rome he would not have showed them respect or obeyed their rules so strictly, especially when others such as Pompey hadn’t and had gotten away with it (Plut. Pomp. 14-15). Something else that can be said to be out of place in the actions of a Caesar, who was scheming for supreme power is his dubious actions as a dictator. One would expect a figure who aimed at sole authority his whole life to have had a rather distinct plan in place for when he achieved it. That Caesar did have any such plans is something that can be denied, as scholars such as Gardner have done (2009). As has already been established, Caesar did not really

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innovate in his legislation which can be seen to target nothing more than that which had been promised by previous champions of popularis causes [see above] (Gruen, 2009, 35). Indeed, Caesar’s legislation can be seen to be rushed and reactionary, hardly indicative of the culmination of a grand plan (Gardner, 2009, 60). The state, in fact, witnessed a much more all-encompassing change under Augustus than it ever did under Caesar (Levick, 2009, 211-212). Furthermore, much of Caesar’s actions can be understood as feverish attempts to repay the many personal debts that he had contracted during his rise to power, such as the measure which made Rebilus consul for a matter of hours (Dio. 43.46). This attracted much criticism from his detractors such as Cicero who quipped that Rebilus was so vigilant he managed to stay awake for his entire consulship (Cic. Fam. 7.30). One can see that Caesar was clearly hard-pressed to find acceptable avenues with which to award his supporters, something one might have expected Caesar to have thought about more clearly had he always aimed at supreme power.

Moving from the political sphere one can see some oddities that don’t match up with the views of the ancient sources in Caesar’s actions during the civil war. As Syme rightly points out, Caesar was always looking to consolidate his position of friendship with Pompey, even after crossing the Rubicon (Syme, 1939, 47). Before the outbreak of the civil war, Caesar sought to do so through the re-forging of marital ties, something to which Pompey was not receptive (Suet. Jul. 27; Canfora, 2007, 69). One can understand this move to have been necessary to Caesar to better his position whilst he was still in his province and thus is not problematic. What is however, is the fact that Caesar can be repeatedly evidenced to attempt to come to terms with Pompey during the civil war (Caes. BCiv. 1.9, 1.24). It could be suggested that such a move can be seen as a well-judged bluff of sorts, in that Caesar knew that Pompey wouldn’t back down which gave him a useful piece of propaganda. This viewpoint is perhaps accentuated when one considers that among Pompey’s affiliates were many members of the senate, people who would naturally be loath to back down to Caesar (Goldsworthy, 2010, 221). Having said this, the question still remains. Why would Caesar run this risk on multiple occasions? He already possessed evidence of Pompey’s stubbornness to come to terms with Pompey’s denial of Caesar’s first call for an armistice so it seems too odd to run the risk again if sole power is to be considered his ultimate aim. One must also consider the fact that Caesar was in a position to afford war with Pompey and therefore would have no need to have held off a confrontation until a later date (Evans, 2003, 74). One therefore may be correct in saying that Caesar was looking first and foremost to reconcile with his amicitia and thus had no designs for sole rule.

Be that as it may, there are plenty of indicators in Caesar’s career to suggest that sole power was his ultimate aim. Firstly, throughout his career Caesar was known to have shown arrogance, ruthlessness, ambition and often proved his ability to manipulate. In the aristocratic world of the republic, where strength was valued over benevolence, Caesar was clearly a man capable of great achievements, as proved by his successes in Gaul and on the political home-front in Rome (Fuller, 1965, 49). Whilst this great man was busy carving out an epochal career, the republic was in turmoil which would likely have caused many of those in the know to have considered the future of the republic in regard to its contemporary corrupt form of government (Billows, 2009, 1). Such a statement is proven by the likely rather exaggerated quote of Plutarch stating that people were known to decry in public that monarchy was the only way that the state’s ails could be cured (Plut. Caes, 28). Whilst people may have not cried out for such in public, it is not hard to imagine that the thought must have been prevalent in the minds of many, especially due to Rome’s increasing contact with the east (Glay et al, 2009, 85), and its monarchical past. With this in mind, it is also not hard to imagine that one as self-assured, ruthless and arrogant as Caesar may have thought that he was the one to answer these cries for monarchy.

To further extend this argument one needs to examine Caesar’s reign in closer detail. On looking at some of Caesar’s legislation and measures, one could get the impression that Caesar was attempting to bolster his own regime and that he was loathe to give up sole power. Whilst laws such as the limiting of luxury and the defining of the periods one can hold office could be construed as measures which helped to restore order to the republic, one can also theorise that Caesar was loathe to give another figure the chance to follow in the footsteps that he had. (Suet. Jul. 43.1; Dio. 42.25.3, 43.51.4, 43.25.2). This point is strengthened by the issue regarding the honours that were conferred upon Caesar. Whilst it is true that he was likely not in a position to deny much of the honours that were conferred upon him (Dio. 44.3.1), there are those who argue that Caesar’s expectations were fulfilled by such honours (Weinstock, 1971, 412). One could deduce from this that Caesar was in fact settling into his role as sole ruler and perhaps was quite happy to accept these honours. As has been stated above, one could certainly imagine that the sycophantic honours offered by the senate would have served to inflate Caesar’s ego.

The idea of Caesar’s inflated ego could also go some way to explaining some of the peculiarities of Caesar’s later reign too. It is often wondered as to why Caesar didn’t designate a definitive heir if he did aim at supreme power1. At face value this is indeed a problematic oddity if one is to view Caesar as one who had always aimed at sole power. However, when one combines this with other oddities such as Caesar’s accepting of the dictatorship in perpetuity and the dropping of his bodyguard, one cannot help but think that Caesar thought more of his position and less of his own mortality than was apparent in reality (Suet, Jul. 76; 86). Perhaps this explanation is suitable for his peculiarities. Maybe it was not that Caesar had never aimed at sole power and was thus at a loss with what to do with it (Goldsworthy, 2010, 222), but that the words of John Dalburg-Acton ring true with Caesar in that “absolute power corrupts absolutely” (1887). Revisiting Syme’s interpretation of Caesar’s imminent departure to Parthia (1939, 52), one can see that by such logic Caesar cannot be seen to have been planning a campaign due to frustration with events in Rome, but that he was doing so due to a senatorial inspired greed for success.

To summarise, one may stipulate that the idea that Caesar had aimed at sole power his entire life is rather problematic. One feels that opportunity had too much play in his plans, especially insomuch as the events of the civil war are concerned. It is therefore the duty of the historian to question sources like Plutarch who suggest that his ambition for sole power is wholly true (Plut. Caes. 11.3-6). One can indeed explain away the strength of such opinions with the legacy of surviving senatorial bitterness pertaining to Caesar’s robbing of their influence (Goldsworthy, 2006, 3). Having said this, one can quite clearly see a change in Caesar throughout his reign, perhaps explaining why people such as Sallust lost faith in him as a reformer after 46BC (Yavetz, 1983, 53; Collins, 1955, 455; Sall. Letters to Caesar. 1.2.4). Furthermore, the arrogance that allowed Caesar to be charmed by the sycophantic senate did not lay dormant until this point in his career and thus must be brought into question when studying Caesar’s intentions. Whilst Caesar may not have aimed for his supreme position at Rome, he can be understood as having enjoyed it and having wished to perpetuate it. One would be forgiven for assuming that whilst sole power may not have been his aim, to be the “first” in Rome may have been.

Conclusion

Throughout writing this dissertation, it has become increasingly clear that Caesar should be judged on his innovation as a populist or a demagogue before he is judged as a politician. To recycle the 1 In spite of what Augustus may have claimed later, Caesar’s posthumous adoption of him likely did not constitute the designation of an heir and was more likely to do with the carrying on of the family name and the bequeathing of Caesar’s estate (Gardner, 2009, 67-9)

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analogy of Yavetz, it is Caesar’s epochal skills as a populist which runs through all his political dealings like a golden thread through string (Yavetz, 1983, 181). Even if Caesar cannot be considered to have been innovative in the aims of his legislation, it is undeniable that he had a certain je ne sais quoi that allowed him, and him alone among his contemporaries, to mend together the vast amount of groupings that his legislation effected. We will of course never know if Caesar truly did have any long-lasting plans for the future of the republic, and if we did, works such as this would become largely redundant in the face of that which is purely factual. In the meantime however, one can at least stand in awe at Caesar’s staggering ability to seemingly offer very little which is new and simultaneously maintain the vast swathes of clinetes that he did right up until the very end of his career. Whether or not such a feat resulted from Caesar’s natural genius and good-naturedness or whether his well-attested magnetism was a carefully constructed façade is largely immaterial, the feat is impressive nonetheless and should not be under-appreciated when assessing Caesar as the political colossus that he was.

Having said this we must also be careful not to laud Caesar as something of a political superman (Syme, 1938, 2). Caesar was ultimately killed by a jealous and bitter senate and this event is a testament to Caesar’s ultimate failure. Caesar never managed to win over the senate, ironically because he was a patrician, the last patrician if Strasburger is to be believed (1955, 225-64). His aristocratic arrogance, ruthlessness and ceaseless self-belief ultimately left him forgetting that charm alone was not enough to be the first citizen at Rome, something that Augustus was not so careless in forgetting. One should remember that it was in fact under Augustus that the roman monarchy which lasted into late antiquity was largely constructed. Caesar therefore, should not be viewed as the one who was destined to rule over the empire which proceeded his death, but can perhaps be remembered as a man who was destined to triumph over the republic.

Therefore one must conclude that Caesar is something of a mediating figure of transition, an unfortunately clichéd conclusion so common amongst historical matters but which undoubtedly rings true with Caesar. It cannot be denied that in material innovation Caesar was somewhat lacking. His unknown potential designs for the future aside, Caesar’s legislation was by no means revolutionary and his aims cannot have been said to have been unambiguously centred on sole-power. Mommsen’s viewpoint that Caesar was the saviour of the republic who alone knew how to fix that which was wrong with it is seemingly rather lacking in evidence. When one looks closer however, the full-force of Caesar’s genius cannot help but blindside those who study his career. This perhaps goes some way to explain why so many academic papers and biographies are released with him at their centre. What set Caesar apart from his contemporaries is the easy-charm that Plutarch comments on so early into his biography, something that clearly struck all those around him, including his political enemies (Plut. Caes. 4; Cic. Phil. 2.116). Caesar manages to appeal to people all over the social spectrum of the Roman Republic, a surprising feat for one of his social standing. Indeed, apart from the occasional slip-up where this background shows, he can often be seen to turn it to his advantage when dealing with those of lesser standing than himself. These skills in networking, combined with his genuine talent as a republican politician undoubtedly paved the way for his rise to eminence. Said rise, however was always going to be limited. The roman republic would not fully yield until it was met with one as talented as Caesar who was not so tainted with the stain of patrician values. Augustus, therefore, must be seen as more of an innovator than Caesar. One is left wondering however, whether such a rise would have been possible without the genius that was Caesar to both pave the way and show his eventual successor how not to go about creating the princeps.

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