Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bennouna_Accordance With International Law of the Unilateral Declaration...

8/11/2019 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bennouna_Accordance With International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, ICJ Advisor

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OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. LE JUGE BENNOUNA

Opportunit pour la Cour de donner un avis consultatif Respect de lint-grit de la fonction judiciaire de la Cour Demandes frivoles davis consulta-tifs Substitution de la Cour au Conseil de scurit dans lexercice de sesresponsabilits politiques Sens et porte de la question pose laCour Conformit au droit international de la dclaration dindpendanceadopte dans le contexte dun territoire administr par les Nations Unies Iden-

tit des auteurs de la dclaration unilatrale dindpendance Consquences dublocage du Conseil de scurit Interprtation du silence en droit interna-tional Lex specialis et droit international gnral Cadre constitutionneltabli par la MINUK.

1. Avant den venir aux raisons qui ne mont pas permis de me rallier lavis de la Cour, je voudrais tout dabord examiner lopportunitmme pour celle-ci de sengager dans un exercice aussi prilleux pour elle,en tant quorgane judiciaire principal des Nations Unies, en rpondant la demande davis consultatif qui lui a t adresse par lAssemble gn-rale dans sa rsolution 63/3 du 8 octobre 2008.

2. Cette rsolution a t adopte dans des conditions sans prcdentdans lhistoire des Nations Unies. En effet, cest la premire fois quelAssemble gnrale demande un avis consultatif sur une question quintait pas, en tant que telle, son ordre du jour et quelle traitait, jusque-l, essentiellement sous langle de lautorisation des dpenses de laMission dadministration intrimaire des Nations Unies au Kosovo(MINUK). Il est admis que lensemble de cette question relevait, ensubstance, de la comptence exclusive du Conseil de scurit depuisau moins une dizaine dannes, en particulier depuis que cet organe adcid de placer le territoire du Kosovo sous administration interna-

tionale (rsolution 1244 du 10 juin 1999) ; lexception cependantde la rsolution 54/183 de lAssemble gnrale, en date du 17 dcembre1999, sur la situation des droits de lhomme au Kosovo (avis,par. 38).

3. Je pense que, si elle avait refus de rpondre cette demande, laCour aurait pu donner un coup darrt toutes les demandes frivolesdavis que des organes politiques pourraient tre tents, lavenir, de luiadresser et de protger par l mme lintgrit de sa fonction judiciaire.Ce qui est surtout en cause dans cette affaire, cest la protection de laCour elle-mme contre des tentatives visant linstrumentaliser dans un

dbat politique, plutt que la protection de lquilibre entre les organespolitiques principaux des Nations Unies (Assemble gnrale et Conseilde scurit), question laquelle la Cour a consacr des dveloppementstendus (ibid., par. 37-48), ou encore la question de lautodtermination

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DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE BENNOUNA

[Translation]

Propriety of the Court giving an advisory opinion Respect for the integrityof the Courts judicial function Frivolous requests for advisory opinions Substitution of the Court for the Security Council in exercising its politicalresponsibilities Scope and meaning of the question put to the Court Accordance with international law of the declaration of independence adopted inthe context of a territory under United Nations administration Identity of the

authors of the unilateral declaration of independence Consequences of thestalemate in the Security Council Interpretation of silence in internationallaw Lex specialisand general international law Constitutional Frameworkestablished by UNMIK.

1. Before turning to the reasons which have prevented me from con-curring with the Opinion of the Court, I should first like to consider thepropriety of the Court embarking on an exercise that is so hazardous forit, as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, by responding tothe request for an advisory opinion submitted to it by the GeneralAssembly in resolution 63/3 of 8 October 2008.

2. That resolution was adopted in circumstances that are without prec-edent in the history of the United Nations. It is the first time that theGeneral Assembly has sought an advisory opinion on a question whichwas not, as such, on its agenda and which it had until then dealt withessentially in terms of authorizing the expenditure of the United NationsMission in Kosovo (UNMIK). It is recognized that, in substance, thewhole of this question had fallen under the exclusive jurisdiction of theSecurity Council for at least ten years or so, in particular since the latterdecided to place the territory of Kosovo under international administra-tion (resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999) with the exception, however, of

General Assembly resolution 54/183 on the Situation of Human Rights inKosovo, of 17 December 1999 (Advisory Opinion, para. 38).

3. I believe that if it had declined to respond to this request, the Courtcould have put a stop to any frivolous requests which political organsmight be tempted to submit to it in future, and indeed thereby protectedthe integrity of its judicial function. What is at issue above all in this caseis protecting the Court itself against any attempts to exploit it in a poli-tical debate, rather than protecting the balance between the prin-

cipal political organs of the United Nations (the General Assembly andSecurity Council), a matter which the Court discusses at some length(ibid., paras. 37-48), or indeed the question of the self-determination andindependence of Kosovo, which has rightly been disregarded as lying

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et de lindpendance du Kosovo, qui a t carte, juste titre, comme nerelevant pas de la demande davis (avis, par. 83).

1. LOPPORTUNIT POUR LACOUR DE DONNER UN AVIS CONSULTATIF

4. Il convient de rappeler que, lorsque la Cour est saisie dune demandedavis consultatif, conformment larticle 65 de son Statut, la Cour nestpas tenue dy donner suite si elle considre quune rponse de sa part laquestion pose serait incompatible avec le caractre judiciaire de laCour (Sahara occidental, avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1975, p. 25,par. 33).

5. Certes, la Cour a rappel maintes reprises, dans sa jurisprudence,son pouvoir discrtionnaire dapprcier lopportunit de donner un avisconsultatif (depuis laffaire de lInterprtation des traits de paix conclusavec la Bulgarie, la Hongrie et la Roumanie, premire phase, avis consul-tatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1950), mais elle ne la, jusqu prsent, jamais exerc,au point que la doctrine sest mise douter de son existence relle. Eneffet, la Cour en vient, en fin de compte, faire dpendre lopportunit dedonner son avis de lorgane requrant lui-mme, se privant ainsi de sonpouvoir propre dapprciation (Robert Kolb, De la prtendue discr-tion de la Cour internationale de Justice de refuser de donner un avisconsultatif, dans Lordre juridique international, un systme en qutedquit et duniversalit : liber amicorum Georges Abi-Saab, 2001, p. 609-627). La Cour sest montre trs rticente pour refuser de participer laction des Nations Unies lorsquelle lui est demande par lun de sesorganes. Elle a ainsi encadr de faon stricte son pouvoir discrtionnaire,en posant comme condition son exercice lexistence de raisons dci-sives (compelling reasons)pour ne pas donner un avis, sans dailleursprciser ce quelle entend par l.

6. Cependant, la question de la compatibilit dune demande davisavec les fonctions de la Cour et son caractre judiciaire reste entire,mme si, jusqu prsent, aucun cas dincompatibilit na t relev.

7. La Cour a t confronte dans laffaire du Kosovo une situationindite puisquil lui est demand finalement de sriger en dcideur poli-tique, au lieu et place du Conseil de scurit. En dautres termes, on acherch, au travers de cette demande davis consultatif, lui faire assu-mer les fonctions dun organe politique des Nations Unies, le Conseil descurit, fonctions auxquelles celui-ci na pas pu faire face.

8. Il est demand la Cour de donner son avis sur le point de savoir sila dclaration unilatrale dindpendance (DUI), du 17 fvrier 2008, desinstitutions provisoires dadministration autonome du Kosovo est

conforme au droit international; mais la rponse cette question ne peutse limiter lanalyse de la dclaration en tant quacte formel, la Cour doitncessairement examiner son contenu et sa porte, ainsi que les circons-tances dans lesquelles elle a t adopte. De ce point de vue, la Cour ne

501 DCLARATION UNILATRALE DINDPENDANCE(OP. DISS. BENNOUNA)

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son pouvoir discrtionnaire et refuser de donner son avis sur une ques-tion qui est incompatible avec sa qualit dorgane judiciaire. En effet,

par-del la question de la conformit au droit international de la dcla-ration dindpendance, ce qui est en jeu cest lexercice de ses pouvoirspar un organe politique des Nations Unies, le Conseil de scurit. Quantau rapport Ahtisaari, on sait que, tant que le Conseil ne sest pas pro-nonc son sujet, il nengage que son auteur.

15. Il est essentiel pour la Cour de veiller, dans lexercice de sa fonc-tion consultative, ce quelle ne soit pas instrumentalise en faveur detelle ou telle stratgie proprement politique, et en particulier, dans cetteaffaire, ne pas tre enrle soit dans la campagne visant rassembler lemaximum de reconnaissances de lindpendance du Kosovo par dautres

Etats, soit dans celle tendant les restreindre au minimum ; alors que leConseil de scurit, auquel il revenait en premier de se prononcer surloption de lindpendance, ne la pas fait.

16. Je suis conscient du fait que la Cour a le devoir de contribuer, surle plan juridique, laction des Nations Unies, mais, en loccurrence, ladcision sur le statut futur du Kosovo ne relve pas de lAssemble gn-rale, do mane la demande davis adresse la Cour, mais du Conseilde scurit. La Cour, en effet, ne peut, dans cette affaire, se prononcer surla lgalit de la dclaration dindpendance sans singrer dans le proces-sus politique de maintien de la paix mis en place par le Conseil de scuritil y a une dizaine dannes et que cet organe na pu mener son terme.

17. La rponse de la Cour aurait t concevable si le dbat au fond surle Kosovo stait dplac du Conseil de scurit lAssemble gnrale la faveur, par exemple, de la convocation dune session extraordinairedurgence de lAssemble gnrale, conformment la rsolution 377 A(V) intitule Lunion pour le maintien de la paix, comme ce fut le caspour la demande davis consultatif par lAssemble gnrale concernantlaffaire desConsquences juridiques de ldification dun mur dans le ter-ritoire palestinien occup(avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 2004 (I), p. 145-146, par. 18-19). Encore que, dans ce dernier cas, lAssemble gnrale at en permanence associe au dbat sur la question du Moyen-Orient et

la question palestinienne, depuis le plan de partage de 1947, qui ont tinscrites anne aprs anne son ordre du jour. Par contre, laffaire duKosovo a t place, depuis lintervention arme des forces de lOTANen Serbie, en 1999, sous lunique responsabilit du Conseil de scurit.

18. Ds lors, si la Serbie a initi linscription lordre du jour delAssemble gnrale dune demande davis consultatif de la Cour, ctaitnon pas pour que celle-ci puisse se prononcer sur certains aspects juridi-ques du dbat engag par lAssemble au sujet de laffaire du Kosovo,mais parce quelle y voyait la seule possibilit qui lui tait encore offertepour remettre en cause la dclaration unilatrale dindpendance

du 17 fvrier 2008. Il ne sagit pas, en loccurrence, des motifs ayant ins-pir les Etats qui sont lorigine ... [de la] demande davis consultatif etqui ne sont pas pertinents au regard de lexercice par la Cour de sonpouvoir discrtionnaire (avis, par. 33); mais plutt de lapprciation de


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cretionary power and declined to give its opinion on a question which isincompatible with its status as a judicial organ. Beyond the question of

the accordance with international law of the declaration of independence,what is at issue here is the exercise of the powers of a political organ ofthe United Nations, the Security Council. As for the Ahtisaari Report, aslong as the Security Council makes no finding in this respect, it commitsonly its author.

15. It is essential for the Court to ensure, in performing its advisoryfunction, that it is not exploited in favour of one specifically politicalstrategy or another, and, in this case in particular, not enlisted either inthe campaign to gather as many recognitions as possible of Kosovosindependence by other States, or in the one to keep these to a minimum;

whereas the Security Council, which is primarily responsible for pro-nouncing on the option of independence, has not done so.

16. I am aware of the fact that the Court has a duty to contribute toUnited Nations action in legal terms, but here, the decision on the futurestatus of Kosovo is not a matter for the General Assembly, which hassubmitted the request for an opinion to the Court, but for the SecurityCouncil. In this case, the Court cannot pronounce on the legality of thedeclaration of independence without interfering in the political process ofmaintaining peace established by the Security Council some ten yearsago, which that organ has been unable to bring to a conclusion.

17. A response from the Court would have been conceivable if thesubstantive debate on Kosovo had moved from the Security Council tothe General Assembly, for example through the convening of an emer-gency special session of the General Assembly under the terms of resolu-tion 377 A (V), entitled Uniting for peace, as was the case withthe request for an advisory opinion by the General Assembly concerningthe Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the OccupiedPalestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004 (I),pp. 145-146, paras. 18-19). In that case, however, the General Assemblyhad been continuously involved in the debate on the issue of the Middle East

and the Palestinian question since the partition plan of 1947, and thesewere included year after year on its agenda. In contrast, the Kosovo casehas been solely the responsibility of the Security Council since the armedintervention by NATO forces in Serbia in 1999.

18. Consequently, while Serbia initiated the inclusion on the GeneralAssemblys agenda of a request for an advisory opinion of the Court,that was not in order to allow the Court to pronounce on certain legalaspects of the debate which the General Assembly had started on theKosovo case, but because it saw in this the only opportunity still avail-able to it to challenge the unilateral declaration of independence of

17 February 2008. What is involved here is not the motives of individualStates which sponsor . . . a resolution requesting an advisory opinion,which are not relevant to the Courts exercise of its discretion(Advisory Opinion, para. 33), but rather an assessment of the situation in

503UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE(DISS. OP. BENNOUNA)

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la situation au Kosovo et de son traitement par les Nations Unies, aumoment de ladoption par lAssemble gnrale de la demande davis

le 8 octobre 2008.19. Dailleurs, il ny a pas eu de vritable dbat sur la question du sta-

tut du Kosovo lors de ladoption de la rsolution 63/3 de lAssemblegnrale demandant la Cour un avis consultatif (Assemble gnrale,soixante-troisime session, A/63/PV.22, le 8 octobre 2008).

20. On peut se demander, ds lors, si la demande davis adopte parlAssemble (par 77 voix contre 6, avec 74 abstentions) est compatibleavec les fonctions de la Cour en tant quorgane judiciaire, telles quellesont t dfinies par la Charte des Nations Unies et par le Statut de cette

juridiction.

21. Dailleurs, quelle que soit la rponse de la Cour la question delAssemble gnrale, elle nassistera en aucune faon cet organe politique,lequel ne peut, la lumire de lavis, ni modifier la rsolution 1244 duConseil de scurit ni linterprter en consquence; cette tche revenant lorgane qui la adopte. Il ne suffit pas de dire que seule lAssemble est mme dapprcier les raisons qui lont amene demander un avis consul-tatif (avis, par. 34); car ce serait, de la part de la Cour, renoncer, pure-ment et simplement, lexercice de son pouvoir dapprciation de loppor-tunit de donner un tel avis. Or, lensemble des protagonistes de laffairedu Kosovo ont tenu prciser lavance, notamment devant la Cour, quelavis, quel quil soit, naura aucun impact sur leur position par rapport

la dclaration dindpendance. Ds lors, lavis consultatif ne pourra queservir dargument dans le dbat politique en cours entre les partisans de lareconnaissance de lindpendance du Kosovo et ceux qui sy opposent.

22. En tant enrle de cette faon, la Cour a tout perdre dans ce jeupolitique, sans contribuer rellement ni lattnuation des tensions sus-cites par la dclaration unilatrale dindpendance, ni la clarificationdes fonctions et de la responsabilit des Nations Unies lgard dun ter-ritoire plac sous leur administration.

23. Par ailleurs, depuis la dclaration dindpendance du 17 fvrier2008, le fait accompli de la cration du Kosovo en tant quentit ind-

pendante sest inscrit sur le terrain, en marginalisant de facto et de plusen plus la prsence des Nations Unies et de leur administration. Une tellesituation rend encore plus problmatique et douteuse lopportunit derpondre la question pose par lAssemble gnrale, alors que lOrga-nisation des Nations Unies a donn limpression de saccommoder dunouvel tat des choses (mais pouvait-elle faire autrement?).

24. La Cour doit veiller elle-mme au respect de lintgrit de sa fonc-tion judiciaire aussi bien en matire contentieuse quen matire consulta-tive, comme elle la rappel avec force dans son arrt du 2 dcembre 1963dans laffaire du Cameroun septentrional (Cameroun c. Royaume-Uni),

exceptions prliminaires :

la Cour permanente de Justice internationale et la Cour actuelleont toutes deux soulign que le pouvoir confr la Cour de rendre


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des avis consultatifs doit sexercer dans le cadre de la fonction judi-ciaire. Les deux Cours ont eu loccasion de formuler, propos de

demandes davis consultatifs, des observations qui sappliquent ga-lement au rle que doit jouer la Cour en matire contentieuse; dansles deux cas, la Cour exerce une fonction judiciaire. Cette fonctionest soumise des limitations inhrentes qui, pour ntre ni faciles classer, ni frquentes en pratique, nen sont pas moins imprieuses entant quobstacles dcisifs au rglement judiciaire. Quoi quil en soit,cest toujours la Cour quil appartient de dterminer si ses fonc-tions judiciaires sont en jeu. La Cour actuelle sest toujours inspire,comme la Cour permanente de Justice internationale, du principepos par celle-ci le 23 juillet 1923 dans laffaire duStatut de la Car-

lie orientale :La Cour, tant une Cour de Justice, ne peut pas se dpartir des

rgles essentielles qui dirigent son activit de tribunal, mmelorsquelle donne des avis consultatifs. (C.P.J.I., srie B n 5,p. 29.) (Cameroun septentrional (Cameroun c. Royaume-Uni),exceptions prliminaires, arrt, C.I.J. Recueil 1963, p. 30.)

25. Si la Cour ne peut se substituer au Conseil de scurit dans lexer-cice de ses responsabilits, elle ne peut non plus servir de caution lgale une politique de fait accompli fonde sur le simple rapport de forces. Elle

se doit de prserver son rle, qui est de dire le droit avec clart et en touteindpendance. Et cest l que se trouve la garantie de sa crdibilit, danslexercice de ses fonctions judiciaires au service de la communaut inter-nationale.

26. Ce sont l autant de raisons qui mont amen voter contre ladcision de la Cour de donner un avis consultatif dans cette affaire. Celatant, la rponse de la Cour la demande de lAssemble gnrale ne mapas paru convaincante et je vais maintenant men expliquer.

2. LA PORTE ET LE SENS DE LA QUESTION POSE

27. Ce deuxime aspect de lavis est bien entendu li au prcdent. Eneffet, alors que la Cour refuse dapprcier aussi bien les motivations delAssemble gnrale que les objectifs quelle poursuivait au travers de sademande davis, elle sest crue autorise nanmoins modifier lintitulde celle-ci, au point den bouleverser le sens et la porte.

28. La Cour tire argument du fait que le point de lordre du jour souslequel la rsolution 63/3 a t examine ainsi que lintitul de celle-ci ne

mentionnent pas lidentit des auteurs de la dclaration unilatrale dind-pendance, et que, lors du dbat consacr au projet de rsolution, cettedernire question na pas t souleve, pour conclure quelle est libre dedterminer elle-mme si cette dclaration a t prononce par les insti-


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opinions must be exercised as a judicial function. Both Courts havehad occasion to make pronouncements concerning requests for advi-

sory opinions, which are equally applicable to the proper role of theCourt in disposing of contested cases; in both situations, the Courtis exercising a judicial function. That function is circumscribed byinherent limitations which are none the less imperative because theymay be difficult to catalogue, and may not frequently present them-selves as a conclusive bar to adjudication in a concrete case. Never-theless, it is always a matter for the determination of the Courtwhether its judicial functions are involved. This Court, like the Per-manent Court of International Justice, has always been guided bythe principle which the latter stated in the case concerning the Status

of Eastern Carelia on 23 July 1923:The Court, being a Court of Justice, cannot, even in giving

advisory opinions, depart from the essential rules guiding theiractivity as a Court. (P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 5, p. 29.) (NorthernCameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objec-tions, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1963, p. 30.)

25. While the Court cannot substitute itself for the Security Council inexercising its responsibilities, nor can it stand legal guarantor for a policyof fait accompli based simply on who can gain the upper hand. Its duty

is to preserve its role, which is to state the law, clearly and independently.That is how it will safeguard its credibility in performing its functions, forthe benefit of the international community.

26. Those are the reasons which led me to vote against the Courtsdecision to give an advisory opinion in this case. Having said that, theCourts response to the request of the General Assembly did not strikeme as convincing, and I shall now explain why.

2. THE SCOPE ANDMEANING OF THEQUESTIONPOSED

27. This second aspect of the opinion is of course linked with the first.Whereas the Court declines to consider either the motivation of the Gen-eral Assembly or the aims it was pursuing by means of its request for anopinion, it has nonetheless deemed itself authorized to modify the word-ing of the request, to the point of completely altering its meaning andscope.

28. The Court relies on the fact that neither the agenda item underwhich resolution 63/3 was debated, nor the title of the resolution specified

the identity of the authors of the unilateral declaration of independence,and that the question of their identity was not raised during the debateon the draft resolution. The Court then concludes that it is free to . . .decide for itself whether that declaration was promulgated by the Provi-


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tutions provisoires dadministration autonome ou par une autre entit(avis, par. 54).

29. Pourtant, la question de lAssemble gnrale est on ne peut plusclaire et rien dans le dbat qui a prcd ladoption de la rsolution 63/3du 8 octobre 2008 ne permet de considrer que lAssemble gnrale nesintressait qu la conformit de la dclaration dindpendance au droitinternational, quels que soient les auteurs de cette dclaration. Est-ceparce que les participants au dbat consacr au projet de rsolution(A/63/PV.22) nont pas soulev la question de lidentit des auteurs de ladclaration que cette question ne serait pas essentielle pour lorganedemandeur, ou est-ce plutt parce que prcisment elle va de soi pourlensemble des Etats Membres de lONU que ceux-ci nont, de ce fait, pas

jug ncessaire de la discuter ou de la contester? Quant la diffrencereleve par la Cour entre lintitul du point de lordre du jour, celui de larsolution, et la question soumise la Cour, on ne voit pas quelle peuttre sa pertinence puisque, ce qui compte pour la Cour, cest bien lecontenu de la question pose par lAssemble gnrale.

30. Or, cette question na nul besoin dtre interprte. La Courdailleurs le reconnat: la question pose par lAssemble gnrale estclairement formule. Cest une question circonscrite et prcise. (Avis,par. 51.) Or, lAssemble gnrale na pas demand la Cour de donnerson avis sur la conformit en droit international de nimporte quelledclaration dindpendance, mais de celle qui a t adopte le 17 fvrier

2008 par les institutions provisoires dadministration autonome duKosovo, institutions qui ont t cres par lOrganisation desNations Unies avec des comptences prcises. Pourtant, le reprsentantde la Grande-Bretagne avait adress, le 2 octobre 2008, pralablement ladoption de la rsolution 63/3, une note explicative au prsident delAssemble gnrale dans laquelle il a indiqu:

Il serait utile de savoir si la Serbie cherche se concentrer sur laquestion plus troite de la comptence des institutions provisoiresdadministration autonome du Kosovo et, dans laffirmative, de sedemander prcisment de quelle manire cette question est lie austatut actuel du Kosovo. (A/63/461 du 2 octobre 2008.)

31. La rponse cette question a t donne par la Serbie et parlAssemble gnrale. Il sagit bien de lapprciation dun acte adopt parles institutions provisoires dadministration autonome du Kosovo et nonde nimporte quel acte provenant dune centaine de personnes qui seseraient autoproclames reprsentantes du peuple.

32. La seule institution reconnue par lONU, ce moment-l, commereprsentant le peuple du Kosovo tait lAssemble lue des institutionsprovisoires dadministration autonome. En supposant mme que la Cour

en arrive la conclusion que la dclaration dindpendance na pas tadopte par lAssemble des institutions provisoires dadministrationautonome du Kosovo en tant que telle, contrairement laffirmation delAssemble gnrale des Nations Unies, ne devrait-elle pas alors user de


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sional Institutions of Self-Government or some other entity (AdvisoryOpinion, para. 54).

29. However, the General Assemblys question could not be moreclear, and there is nothing in the debate which preceded the adoption ofresolution 63/3 of 8 October 2008 to suggest that the General Assemblysonly concern was the accordance with international law of the declara-tion of independence, regardless of who the authors were. Does the factthat the participants in the debate on the draft resolution (A/63/PV.22)did not raise the question of the identity of the authors of the declarationimply that it is not a relevant consideration for the requesting organ, or isit rather precisely because the question is such an obvious one for all theUnited Nations Member States that they consequently did not consider it

necessary to discuss or contest it? As for the difference noted by theCourt between the title of the agenda item, the title of the resolution, andthe question submitted to the Court, it is hard to see any significance inthis since what matters for the Court is the content of the question put bythe General Assembly.

30. This question therefore does not need to be interpreted in any way.And the Court acknowledges this: the question posed by the GeneralAssembly is clearly formulated. The question is narrow and specific.(Advisory Opinion, para. 51.) The General Assembly did not request theCourt to give its opinion on just any declaration of independence, but onthe one adopted on 17 February 2008 by the Provisional Institutions of

Self-Government of Kosovo, which were established with specific com-petences by the United Nations. On 2 October 2008, however, before theadoption of resolution 63/3, the representative of the United Kingdomaddressed a note of issues to the President of the General Assembly inwhich he indicated that:

It would be useful to know whether Serbia is seeking to focus ona narrower question about the competence of the Provisional Insti-tutions of Self-Government of Kosovo, and, if so, precisely how thatquestion relates to Kosovos status at the present time. (A/63/461 of2 October 2008.)

31. The answer to that question has been given by Serbia and by theGeneral Assembly. It is indeed a matter of assessing an act adopted bythe Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo, and not justany act emanating from a hundred or so persons who supposedly declaredthemselves to be representing the people.

32. At that point in time, the only institution recognized by the UnitedNations as representing the people of Kosovo was the elected Assemblyof the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government. Even supposing that

the Court comes to the conclusion that the declaration of independencewas not adopted by the Assembly of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo, acting as such, contrary to the assertion of theGeneral Assembly of the United Nations, should it not then exercise its


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son pouvoir dopportunit et ne pas rpondre une question qui auraitt vide de son contenu et de sa porte? Car, enfin, lAssemble gnrale

nattend pas de la Cour quelle lui donne son avis juridique sur une ques-tion quelle ne lui a pas pose, savoir la dclaration mise par une cen-taine de personnes, sans lien avec lorganisation universelle.

33. Il est arriv la Cour dlargir la question pose afin dy rpondrele plus compltement possible (Interprtation de laccord du 25 mars 1951entre lOMS et lEgypte, avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1980, p. 88-89,par. 35). Elle a procd de mme dans lavis consultatif sur Certainesdpenses des Nations Unies (article 17, paragraphe 2, de la Charte)(C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 156-157), o elle sest propos dexaminer lar-ticle 17 en lui-mme et dans ses relations avec le reste de la Charte; de

mme a-t-elle d clarifier la question pose lorsquelle lui paraissait malpose et vague (Demande de rformation du jugement n 273 du Tribu-nal administratif des Nations Unies, avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1982,p. 348, par. 46). Mais nous restons l dans les limites des fonctions judi-ciaires de la Cour consistant prendre en compte lensemble du droitapplicable ou interprter un texte confus ou imprcis.

34. Nulle part, cependant, la Cour na requalifi la question posedune faon contraire son objet et son but, qui sont, en lespce, desavoir si la dclaration dindpendance du 17 fvrier 2008 relve ou nonde la comptence des institutions provisoires dadministration autonome

du Kosovo, ainsi que lavait soulign le reprsentant de la Grande-Bretagne dans sa lettre prcite du 2 octobre 2008 au prsident delAssemble gnrale.

35. Si la Cour pouvait discrtionnairement aller jusque-l, en rpon-dant finalement une question quelle a elle-mme, au pralable, calibrepour la faire entrer dans un certain moule, alors elle porterait srieuse-ment atteinte au sentiment de scurit juridique qui devrait prvaloir ausein des Etats et des organes de lOrganisation des Nations Unies quisadressent elle.

3. LA CONFORMIT AU DROIT INTERNATIONALDE LA DCLARATION UNILATRALE DINDPENDANCE

36. LAssemble gnrale a tenu qualifier la dclaration dindpen-dance unilatrale pour bien prciser quelle mane dune seule des parties(lAssemble des institutions provisoires dadministration autonome duKosovo), engage dans le processus politique, sur la base de la rsolu-tion 1244 du Conseil de scurit, en date du 10 juin 1999, en vue de dter-miner le statut dfinitif du Kosovo.

37. La Cour tait invite par lAssemble gnrale donner son avissur la conformit dune telle dclaration au droit international. Pour cefaire, elle aurait d, tout dabord, dterminer le droit international appli-cable en la matire.


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discretionary power and decline to respond to a question that would nolonger have any content or scope? Ultimately, the General Assembly

does not expect the Court to provide its legal opinion on a questionwhich it has not put to it, i.e., a declaration issued by a hundred or sopersons, unconnected with the United Nations.

33. The Court has in the past extended the question posed in order toreply to it as fully as possible (Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports1980, pp. 88-89, para. 35). It took the same approach in the AdvisoryOpinion on Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, para-

graph 2, of the Charter) (I.C.J. Reports 1962, pp. 156-157), in which itset out to examine Article 17 in itself and in its relation to the rest of the

Charter; likewise, the Court was obliged to clarify the question posedwhen this appeared to be infelicitously expressed and vague (Applica-tion for Review of Judgement No. 273 of the United Nations Administra-tive Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 348, para. 46). Inthese instances, however, the Court remained within the bounds of its

judicial functions in taking account of all the applicable law or interpret-ing a confused or imprecise text.

34. Never, though, has the Court amended the question posed in amanner contrary to its object and purpose, which in this case are todetermine whether the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008did or did not fall within the competence of the Provisional Institutions

of Self-Government of Kosovo, as indicated by the United Kingdomrepresentative in his above-mentioned note of 2 October 2008 to thePresident of the General Assembly.

35. If the Court were able to employ discretion to such an extent, byreplying in the end to a question which it has itself adjusted beforehandin order to make it fit a certain mould, then it would seriously prejudicethe sense of judicial security that ought to prevail among the States andorgans of the United Nations applying to the Court.

3. ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONALLAWOF THE UNILATERALDECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

36. The General Assembly made a point of characterizing the declara-tion of independence as unilateral to make it clear that it issued fromonly one of the parties (the Assembly of the Provisional Institutions ofSelf-Government of Kosovo) involved in the political process, based onSecurity Council resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999, for the determinationof Kosovos final status.

37. The Court was requested by the General Assembly to give itsopinion on the accordance of the declaration with international law. Inrendering its opinion, the Court should first of all have ascertained theinternational law applicable in this area.


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38. Or, si la Cour relate le rgime juridique mis en place par le Conseilde scurit, par le moyen de la rsolution 1244 et des rglements adopts

par le reprsentant spcial du Secrtaire gnral et par la MINUK (avis,par. 58-63), elle ne dfinit, au pralable, ni les rgles de droit internationalgnral applicables, ni comment elle devrait procder pour apprcier laconformit de la dclaration unilatrale ces deux sries de normes. Elledevrait normalement se pencher dabord sur la lex specialis applicable(soit le droit des Nations Unies) avant de sinterroger sur la conformitde la dclaration au droit international gnral. Ainsi que lavait soulignle prsident du groupe dtudes de la Commission du droit internationalsur la fragmentation du droit international: La priorit tait souventaccorde une norme spciale parce quelle prenait mieux en compte non

seulement les impratifs du contexte mais aussi lintention de ceux quidevaient tre lis par elle. (Rapport de la Commission du droit interna-tional, 2004, A/59/10, p. 289.)

39. La Cour a choisi, au contraire, de se pencher sur la licit desdclarations dindpendance en droit international gnral (avis,par. 78). Or, lAssemble gnrale na pas demand la Cour de se pro-noncer, dans labstrait, sur les dclarations dindpendance en gnral,mais sur une dclaration particulire adopte dans un contexte dtermin

celui dun territoire plac, par le Conseil, sous administration desNations Unies alors que la rsolution 1244 du Conseil de scurittait, et est toujours, en vigueur. Dailleurs cela naurait aucun sens

dapprcier la conformit au droit international dune dclaration dind-pendance quels quen soient le ou les auteurs et quel que soit le contextede son adoption. De mme, la conclusion de la Cour ce propos est elle-mme dnue de signification:

la Cour estime que le droit international gnral ne comporteaucune interdiction applicable des dclarations dindpendance. Enconsquence, elle conclut que la dclaration dindpendance du17 fvrier 2008 na pas viol le droit international gnral. (Ibid.,par. 84.)

40. Il sagit l tout au plus dun sophisme, soit un raisonnement quinest logique quen apparence, puisquil part de lide que ce qui est va-lable pour le tout est valable pour la partie. En effet, dans la mesure oles principes du droit international gnral, lintgrit territoriale et lauto-dtermination, devraient sanalyser, en loccurrence, dans le contextedun territoire administr par les Nations Unies, la conclusion de la Courne pouvait tre mise avant que le droit rgissant ce territoire nait texamin, au pralable, dans sa relation avec la dclaration dindpen-dance.

41. Ce nest que dans un deuxime temps que la Cour parvient la

conclusion selon laquelle la rsolution 1244 (1999) du Conseil de scu-rit et le cadre constitutionnel font partie du droit international quilconvient de considrer pour rpondre la question pose par lAssemblegnrale dans sa demande davis consultatif (ibid., par. 93).


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38. But, while the Court does describe the legal rgime established bythe Security Council through resolution 1244 and regulations adopted by

the Secretary-Generals Special Representative and UNMIK (AdvisoryOpinion, paras. 58-63), it fails first to identify the applicable rules of gen-eral international law and to explain how it will go about determiningwhether the unilateral declaration is in accordance with these two sets ofstandards. Ordinarily, the Court should first look into the applicable lexspecialis(that is to say the law of the United Nations) before consideringwhether the declaration is in accordance with general international law.As observed by the Chairman of the International Law CommissionsStudy Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: [P]referencewas often given to a special standard because it not only best reflects the

requirements of the context, but because it best reflected the intent ofthose who were to be bound by it. (Report of the International LawCommission, 2004, A/59/10, p. 286.)

39. The Court has chosen instead to examine the lawfulness of dec-larations of independence under general international law (AdvisoryOpinion, para. 78). The General Assembly did not however ask theCourt to opine in the abstract on declarations of independence generallybut rather on a specific declaration adopted in a particular context that of a territory which the Council has placed under United Nationsadministration and this at a time when Security Council resolu-tion 1244 was in force, and it still is. It would moreover make no sense to

assess the accordance with international law of a declaration of inde-pendence without regard to who the author(s) are or to the backgroundagainst which it was adopted. Likewise, the Courts conclusion in thisrespect is itself meaningless:

the Court considers that general international law contains noapplicable prohibition of declarations of independence. Accordingly,it concludes that the declaration of independence of 17 Febru-ary 2008 did not violate general international law. (Ibid., para. 84.)

40. This is at best a sophism, in other words reasoning that is logical inappearance alone, because it proceeds from the proposition that what isvalid for the whole is valid for the part. Since the principles of generalinternational law, i.e., territorial integrity and self-determination, callhere for analysis in the context of a territory under United Nationsadministration, the Court could not announce its conclusion beforeexamining the law governing the territory as it relates to the declarationof independence.

41. It is only in a second stage that the Court reaches the conclusion

that : Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and the ConstitutionalFramework form part of the international law which is to be consideredin replying to the question posed by the General Assembly in its requestfor the advisory opinion (ibid., para. 93).


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42. Certes, la rsolution 1244 visait, comme le rappelle la Cour, mettre en place un cadre provisoire pour ladministration autonome du

Kosovo, mais je ne vois pas ce qui permet ensuite la Cour de considrerque, lors de ladoption de la rsolution, la conviction prvalait quele statut final du Kosovo dcoulerait du cadre institutionnel tabli parcelle-ci et serait labor dans ce cadre (avis, par. 104).

43. Il sagit simplement pour la MINUK de faciliter un processus poli-tique visant dterminer le statut futur du Kosovo en tenant compte desaccords de Rambouillet. Cest le processus politique que lenvoy spcial,M. Ahtisaari, a t appel, par le Conseil de scurit, conduire par lemoyen dune ngociation entre la Serbie et les reprsentants lus duKosovo (Assemble); les deux parties ntant pas parvenues se mettre

daccord, M. Ahtisaari a propos au Conseil un plan de rglement quecelui-ci na jamais approuv.44. Que les auteurs de la dclaration, membres de lAssemble des ins-

titutions provisoires dadministration autonome du Kosovo, se soientrfrs lchec des ngociations et quils naient pas entendu agir dans lecadre du rgime intrimaire dadministration autonome (ibid., par. 105),ces lments ne peuvent en eux-mmes changer la nature juridique dunacte adopt par lAssemble des institutions provisoires dadministrationautonome du Kosovo. En droit, il ne suffit pas pour une institutiondadopter un acte qui excde ses comptences (ultra vires) pour que lelien juridique entre cette institution et lacte en question soit rompu.

Dans un tel cas, linstitution doit tre considre comme ayant enfreint lecadre lgal qui la justifie et la lgitime.

45. De mme, ce nest pas parce que lAssemble a empit sur les pou-voirs du reprsentant spcial (ibid., par. 106), en oprant dans le domainedes relations extrieures du Kosovo, quelle doit tre considre commeagissant un autre titre ou en tant quentit qui na plus rien voiravec les institutions provisoires dadministration autonome du Kosovo.L aussi, elle a tout simplement commis, en droit international, un acteillicite.

46. La dmonstration de la Cour, tendant laver la dclaration de tout

soupon dillgalit par rapport au droit des Nations Unies, a consist la dtacher de linstitution (lAssemble) qui a t cre dans ce cadre:

la dclaration dindpendance du 17 fvrier 2008 nest pas le fait delAssemble du Kosovo ... mais est celui de personnes ayant agi deconcert en leur qualit de reprsentants du peuple du Kosovo, endehors du cadre de ladministration intrimaire (ibid., par. 109).

Et, pour cela, la Cour sappuie sur la terminologie employe et la proc-

dure suivie (ibid., par. 107). Ainsi, il suffirait pour les auteurs de la dcla-ration de modifier la prsentation de leur texte et de se prsenter commeles dirigeants dmocratiquement lus du peuple pour quils ne soientplus tenus par le cadre constitutionnel du Kosovo, qui dispose pourtant

509 DCLARATION UNILATRALE DINDPENDANCE (OP. DISS. BENNOUNA)

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42. While resolution 1244 was indeed concerned with setting up aninterim framework of self-government for Kosovo, as the Court notes, I

do not see anything to justify the assertion the Court then makes: at thetime of the adoption of the resolution, it was expected that the finalstatus of Kosovo would flow from, and be developed within, the frame-work set up by the resolution (Advisory Opinion, para. 104).

43. It was simply a matter of UNMIK facilitating a political processdesigned to determine Kosovos future status, taking into account theRambouillet accords. That political process is what the Special Envoy,Mr. Ahtisaari, was asked by the Security Council to lead through nego-tiations between Serbia and the elected representatives of Kosovo (theAssembly) ; as the two parties were unable to reach agreement,

Mr. Ahtisaari proposed a settlement plan to the Council, but the Councilnever approved it.44. The facts that the authors of the Declaration, members of the

Assembly of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo,cited the breakdown of negotiations and that they did not intend to actwithin the framework of the interim rgime of self-government (ibid.,para. 105) do not by themselves change the legal nature of an act adoptedby the Assembly of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government ofKosovo. In law, it is not merely because an institution has adopted an actexceeding its powers (ultra vires) that the legal bond between the insti-tution and the act is broken. In such a case, the institution must be con-

sidered to be in breach of the legal framework that justifies and legiti-mizes it.

45. Similarly, it is not because the Assembly trespassed on the powersof the Special Representative (ibid., para. 106) by involving itself in mat-ters of Kosovos external relations that it must be considered as acting ina different capacity or as an entity no longer related to the ProvisionalInstitutions of Self-Government of Kosovo. Here as well, the Assemblysimply committed an act which is illegal under international law.

46. The Courts reasoning, aimed at dispelling any inkling of the

declarations illegality under the law of the United Nations, consisted ofsevering it from the institution (the Assembly) that was created withinthis framework:

the authors of the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008did not act as one of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Govern-ment . . . but rather as persons who acted together in their capacityas representatives of the people of Kosovo outside the framework ofthe interim administration (ibid., para. 109).

To reach this conclusion, the Court relies upon the language used and the

procedure employed (ibid., para. 107). Thus it was enough for the authorsof the declaration to change the appearance of the text, and to holdthemselves out as the democratically-elected leaders of [the] people inorder for them to cease to be bound by the Constitutional Framework


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que les institutions provisoires dadministration autonome du Kosovoet leurs fonctionnaires ... exercent leurs attributions conformment aux

dispositions de la rsolution 1244 (1999) du Conseil de scurit et cellesnonces dans le cadre constitutionnel. Si on suivait jusquau bout untel raisonnement, il suffirait, en quelque sorte, de se mettre hors la loipour ne plus avoir respecter la loi.

47. En vue de clarifier cet aspect de la question, javais demand, aucours des plaidoiries orales, aux participants et, en particulier, aux auteursde la dclaration dindpendance (CR 2009/33, p. 24) si, lors de la cam-pagne pour llection de lAssemble des institutions provisoires, ennovembre 2007, la question de ladoption dune telle dclaration avait tvoque dune manire ou dune autre. La rponse a t ngative, de

la part aussi bien des auteurs de la dclaration dindpendance que de laSerbie (rponses des auteurs de la dclaration dindpendance et de laRpublique de Serbie, dates du 22 dcembre 2009). En effet, si les mem-bres de lAssemble, lus le 17 novembre 2007, entendaient exprimer lavolont du peuple le 17 fvrier 2008 dans une dclaration, il auraitfallu, pour le moins, quils en aient fait tat devant leurs lecteurs.

48. Il est trs significatif que, lorsquil a rendu compte au Conseilde scurit, lors de la sance quil a tenue le 18 fvrier 2008 (S/PV.5839),au lendemain de ladoption de la dclaration dindpendance du Ko-sovo du 17 fvrier 2008, le Secrtaire gnral des Nations Unies la faitde la sorte: Hier, mon reprsentant spcial pour le Kosovo ma infor-

m que lAssemble des institutions provisoires dadministration auto-nome du Kosovo stait runie pour adopter une dclaration dind-pendance par laquelle le Kosovo a t proclam Etat souverain etindpendant.

49. Dautre part, dans son rapport au Conseil de scurit sur la Mis-sion dadministration intrimaire des Nations Unies au Kosovo du28 mars 2008 (S/2008/211), le Secrtaire gnral, aprs avoir rappel laclture du processus lectoral au Kosovo, le 19 dcembre 2007, et la cr-monie de prestation de serment par les membres de lAssemble duKosovo, le 4 janvier 2008, a ajout: Lors dune sance tenue le 17 fvrier,

lAssemble du Kosovo a adopt une dclaration dindpendance pro-clamant le Kosovo Etat indpendant et souverain. Je suppose que leSecrtaire gnral ainsi que son envoy spcial se sont appuys galementsur le discours du premier ministre du Kosovo lui-mme, le 17 fvrier 2008,lorsquil sest adress la session extraordinaire de lAssemble duKosovo:

Today, the President of Kosovo and myself, as the Prime Ministerof Kosovo, have officially requested from the President of the Assem-bly, Mr Krasniqi; to call for a special session with two agenda items,

This invitation for a special session is extended in accordance with

the Kosovo Constitutional framework, whereby we present twoitems on the agenda:

1. Declaration of independence for Kosovo, and


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for Kosovo, which states that [t]he Provisional Institutions of Self-Gov-ernment and their officials shall . . . [e]xercise their authorities consistent

with the provisions of UNSCR 1244 (1999) and the terms set forth in thisConstitutional Framework. If such reasoning is followed to its end, itwould be enough to become an outlaw, as it were, in order to escapehaving to comply with the law.

47. With a view to shedding light on this aspect of the question, duringthe oral proceedings I asked participants generally, and the authors ofthe declaration of independence specifically (CR 2009/33, p. 24), whetherthe question of adopting such a declaration had been raised in any formduring the campaign for election to the Assembly of the Provisional Insti-tutions in November 2007. A response in the negative was received both

from the authors of the declaration of independence and from Serbia(replies by the authors of the declaration of independence and by theRepublic of Serbia, dated 22 December 2009). If the members of theAssembly, who had been elected on 17 November 2007, had wished toexpress the will of [their] people in a declaration made on 17 Febru-ary 2008, they should at least have told their electors so.

48. It is very significant that when he reported to the Security Councilat the meeting held on 18 February 2008 (S/PV.5839), the day after theadoption of the declaration of independence of Kosovo dated 17 Febru-ary 2008, the Secretary-General of the United Nations did so as follows:Yesterday, my Special Representative for Kosovo informed me that the

Assembly of Kosovos Provisional Institutions of Self-Government helda session during which it adopted a declaration of independence, whichdeclares Kosovo an independent and sovereign State.

49. On the other hand, in his report of 28 March 2008 to the SecurityCouncil on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission inKosovo (S/2008/211) the Secretary-General added, after noting that theelectoral process in Kosovo had concluded on 19 December 2007 and thatthe members of the Assembly of Kosovo had taken their oath on 4 Janu-ary 2008: On 17 February, the Assembly of Kosovo held a session dur-

ing which it adopted a declaration of independence, declaring Kosovoan independent and sovereign State. I would infer that the Secretary-General as well as his special representative were also relying on theaddress by the Prime Minister of Kosovo on 17 February 2008, when hespoke before the extraordinary meeting of the Assembly of Kosovo:

Today, the President of Kosovo and myself, as the Prime Ministerof Kosovo, have officially requested from the President of the Assembly,Mr. Krasniqi; to call for a special session with two agenda items,

This invitation for a special session is extended in accordance with

the Kosovo Constitutional Framework, whereby we present twoitems on the agenda:

1. Declaration of independence for Kosovo, and


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2. Presentation of Kosovo State symbols. (Written Contributionof the Authors of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence,

17 April 2009, Ann. 2.)

50. Thus, there was no doubt in the minds of the Secretary-Generaland his Special Representative in Kosovo that the declaration was in factthe work of the recently elected Assembly of the Provisional Institutionsof Self-Government of Kosovo.

51. Of course, the serious problem the declaration raised in respect ofthe United Nations Mission and the mandate it had been given by theSecurity Council did not escape the Secretary-General:

I immediately drew this development to the attention of the

Security Council, so that it could consider the matter. In doing so, Ireaffirmed that, pending guidance from the Security Council, theUnited Nations would continue to operate on the understandingthat resolution 1244 (1999) remains in force and constitutes the legalframework for the mandate of UNMIK, and that UNMIK wouldcontinue to implement its mandate in the light of the evolving cir-cumstances. (Report of the Secretary-General on the UnitedNations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, S/2008/211 of28 March 2008.)

52. It must also be kept in mind that when, in its resolution on

7 November 2002, the Assembly of Kosovo had previously asserted theright to determine Kosovos future status, the Special Representative ofthe United Nations Secretary-General stated on the same day:

Kosovo is under the authority of UN Security Council resolu-tion 1244 (1999). Neither Belgrade nor Pristina can prejudge thefuture status of Kosovo. Its future status is open and will be decidedby the UN Security Council. Any unilateral statement in whateverform which is not endorsed by the Security Council has no legaleffect on the future status of Kosovo.

53. Accordingly, no unilateral declaration affecting Kosovos futurestatus, whatever the form of the declaration or the intentions of itsauthors, has any legal validity until it has been endorsed by the SecurityCouncil. Contrary to what the Court implies, it is not enough for theauthors simply to step beyond the bounds of the law to cease being sub-

ject to it.54. The Court believes the inaction of the Security Council, the Secretary-

General and his Special Representative, in response to the declarationof independence, to be confirmation that the declaration was not the workof the Assembly of Kosovo, and it contrasts this inertia with the actions

taken between 2002 and 2005, when

the Special Representative had qualified a number of acts as beingincompatible with the Constitutional Framework on the ground that


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comptences [de lAssemble] (dossier dpos par lOrganisationdes Nations Unies, pice no 189, 7 fvrier 2003) et excdaient donc

les pouvoirs de lAssemble du Kosovo (avis, par. 108).

55. Or, le Conseil de scurit tait empch de dcider, depuis quil at saisi du rapport Ahtisaari, en mars 2007, au sujet de la question duKosovo, faute daccord entre ses membres permanents. Et, comme celaest courant aux Nations Unies, cette paralysie du Conseil se rpercutaitsur le Secrtaire gnral, charg de mettre en uvre ses dcisions, et surson reprsentant spcial.

56. Le blocage du Conseil de scurit ne dcharge pas les parties un

diffrend de leurs obligations, ni par consquent les membres de lAssem-ble du Kosovo du respect du cadre constitutionnel et de la rsolu-tion 1244. Si tel tait le cas, ce serait porter atteinte la crdibilit dusystme de scurit collective tabli par la Charte des Nations Unies. Ceserait, en effet, laisser les parties un diffrend face face, chacun pou-vant mettre en uvre unilatralement sa position. Et, thoriquement,lautre partie, la Serbie, aurait pu, se fondant sur la mme paralysie, sedire justifie exercer pleinement et effectivement la souverainet sur leKosovo, dans le cadre de la dfense de lintgrit de son territoire.

57. A mon avis, la situation de blocage, un moment donn, du

Conseil de scurit ne peut justifier les actes unilatraux ou les faitsaccomplis de la part de lune ou de lautre des parties, ni leur approbationtacite. La non-prise de dcision par le Conseil, du fait du droit de veto delun des membres permanents, est prvue par la Charte. Son effet juridi-que sarrte l; labsence daction est un acte politique en soi.

58. Dautre part, bien que ne pouvant se prononcer sur le rapport Ahti-saari, dont il a t saisi en mars 2007, le Conseil nen a pas moins encou-rag des tentatives de mdiation entre les parties, notamment lorsquil adcid denvoyer une mission, compose des membres du Conseil etconduite par Johan C. Verbeke, reprsentant de la Belgique, en avril 2007,

Belgrade et Pristina (S/2007/220 du 20 avril 2007) et lorsquil a sou-tenu linitiative de la troka (Union europenne, Etats-Unis et Russie)cre par le groupe de contact pour rapprocher les deux parties (de juillet dcembre 2007).

59. Dans ces conditions, je ne peux partager linterprtation que laCour fait du silence du reprsentant spcial du Secrtaire gnral, quiconfirmerait ainsi que la dclaration dindpendance nmane pas delAssemble des institutions provisoires dadministration autonome duKosovo.

60. On sait quel point linterprtation en droit international du

silence des acteurs concerns est dlicate. En tous cas, le silence doittre interprt par rfrence lensemble du contexte en question et deson arrire-plan. En loccurrence, la paralysie des instances des NationsUnies dans le droulement du processus visant dterminer le statut


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declaration of independence hitherto not in accordance with internationallaw is suddenly deserving of an imprimatur of compliance. In fact, the

reason why the Special Representative of the Secretary-General took noaction was not that he considered the declaration to be in accordancewith international law, but simply that the political body to which he wasanswerable was unable to reach a decision on advancing in the processunder way to determine the future status of Kosovo.

61. The Court then reflects on resolution 1244 and arrives at the con-clusion that the resolution does not contain a prohibition binding on theauthors of the declaration of independence (Advisory Opinion, para. 118).And for good reason, since the Provisional Institutions had yet to be cre-

ated and the authors in question could not yet be identified. In reality,the issue at this juncture is not establishing whether resolution 1244 wasaimed at prohibiting action by the authors of the declaration of inde-pendence, but simply recalling the mandatory force of this text, which isbinding on the institutions to be created to provide an interim adminis-tration . . . under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantialautonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (paragraph 10 ofresolution 1244 (1999) of the Security Council).

62. UNMIK thus adopted the Constitutional Framework and set upthe interim administration on the basis of the mandate it had received

from the Security Council in resolution 1244. A violation of the Consti-tutional Framework therefore entails a simultaneous violation of theSecurity Council resolution, which is binding on all States and non-Stateactors in Kosovo as a result of the territory having been placed underUnited Nations administration. This being the case, it is difficult to seehow the Court could find that Security Council resolution 1244(1999) did not bar the authors of the declaration of 17 February 2008 fromissuing a declaration of independence from the Republic of Serbia(Advisory Opinion, para. 119). In my view, it does establish such a bar,on at least two counts: because the declaration is not within the Consti-

tutional Framework established pursuant to the mandate given toUNMIK in the resolution ; and because the declaration is unilateral,whereas Kosovos final status must be approved by the Security Council.

63. Finally, even if it is assumed that the declaration of 17 February2008 was issued by a hundred or so individuals having proclaimed them-selves representatives of the people of Kosovo, how is it possible for themto have been able to violate the legal order established by UNMIK underthe Constitutional Framework, which all inhabitants of Kosovo are sup-posed to respect?

64. The Court responds merely by asserting that, when adopting the

declaration of independence, the authors were not bound by the Consti-tutional Framework and that the declaration was not an act intended totake effect within the legal order put in place by the United Nations(ibid., para. 121). But then what legal order governed the authors and the


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dclaration elle-mme? Ce nest en tout cas ni lordre juridique serbe nicelui dun nouvel Etat souverain. Et ce nest pas parce quils ne feraient

pas partie des institutions intrimaires que les auteurs chapperaient lordre juridique tabli par le rglement 1999/1 de la MINUK, selonlequel tous les pouvoirs lgislatifs et excutifs affrents au Kosovo, ycompris ladministration de lordre judiciaire, sont confrs la MINUKet exercs par le reprsentant spcial du Secrtaire gnral. Cela signifiesimplement que tous les habitants du Kosovo sont soumis ces pouvoirset doivent respecter le rgime dautonomie institu par les Nations Unies.Ds lors, mon avis, peu importe que les auteurs de la dclarationdindpendance soient considrs comme membres ou non de lAssem-ble du Kosovo; ils ne pouvaient de toute faon adopter une dclaration

contraire au cadre constitutionnel et la rsolution 1244 du Conseil descurit, dans la mesure o elle va lencontre du rgime juridiquedadministration du Kosovo mis en place par les Nations Unies.

65. Cela tant, la Cour a minimis le sens et la porte de son avispuisquelle la limit la dclaration en tant que telle, dtache de seseffets juridiques. Ds lors, on peut se demander en quoi cet avis quiconclut quune dclaration, adopte par une centaine de personnes auto-proclames reprsentantes du peuple, na pas viol le droit international,peut-il clairer lorgane demandeur, lAssemble gnrale, dans son actionpropre future.

66. Le mystre est total, mme si lavis fera lobjet dune exploitation

politique.67. Je serais tent de dire, en ce qui me concerne, quil en rsulte que

lassistance de la Cour lAssemble gnrale en vient, de la sorte, devenir insignifiante et quil sagit l dune raison supplmentaire quiaurait d amener la Cour user de son pouvoir discrtionnaire et nepas rpondre la demande davis.

68. Finalement, dans cette affaire, la Cour na pas relev de rgles dedroit international, gnrales ou spciales, rgissant la dclaration dind-pendance du 17 fvrier 2008; le droit international gnral serait inop-rant en la matire et le droit des Nations Unies ne couvrirait pas lhypo-

thse retenue par la Cour dune dclaration ne dans un ordre juridiqueindtermin. Ds lors, on ne voit pas ce qui empcherait, en droit, lesNations Unies de poursuivre luvre de mdiation relative au Kosovo encoopration avec les organisations rgionales concernes.

69. Il en va de telles dclarations comme de lcume des jours; elles nepermettent ni de rejeter le pass dans loubli, ni de construire lavenir surles fragments du prsent.

(Sign) Mohamed BENNOUNA.


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declaration itself? It was not, in any case, the legal order of Serbia northat of a new sovereign State. And not being part of the interim institu-

tions does not exempt the authors from the legal order established byUNMIK regulation 1999/1, providing that [a]ll legislative and executiveauthority with respect to Kosovo, including the administration of the

judiciary, is vested in UNMIK and is exercised by the Special Repre-sentative of the Secretary-General. This simply means that all those liv-ing in Kosovo are subject to such authority and must comply with thergime of self-government established by the United Nations. Hence, inmy opinion, it does not matter whether or not the authors of the declara-tion of independence are considered to be members of the Assembly ofKosovo; under no circumstances were they entitled to adopt a declara-

tion that contravenes the Constitutional Framework and Security Coun-cil resolution 1244 by running counter to the legal rgime for the admin-istration of Kosovo established by the United Nations.

65. That said, the Court has minimized the purport and scope of itsOpinion, since it has limited it to the declaration as such, severed from itslegal effects. It may therefore be asked: how can this Opinion, wherein itis concluded that a declaration adopted by some one hundred individu-als, self-proclaimed representatives of the people, does not violate inter-national law, guide the requesting organ, the General Assembly, inrespect of its own action?

66. This remains a complete mystery, even if the Opinion will be

exploited for political ends.67. Expressing my personal view, I would be tempted to say that the

result is that the Courts assistance to the General Assembly has emergedtrivialized, and this is yet another reason why the Court should haveexercised its discretion by refraining from acceding to the request for anopinion.

68. Finally, the Court in this case has not identified the rules, generalor special, of international law governing the declaration of independenceof 17 February 2008; according to the Opinion, general international lawis inoperative in this area and United Nations law does not cover the

situation the Court has chosen to consider: that of a declaration arisingin an indeterminate legal order. Accordingly, there is apparently nothingin the law to prevent the United Nations from pursuing its efforts atmediation in respect of Kosovo in co-operation with the regional organi-zations concerned.

69. Such declarations are no more than foam on the tide of time; theycannot allow the past to be forgotten nor a future to be built on frag-ments of the present.

(Signed) Mohamed BENNOUNA.


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Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bennouna_Accordance With International Law of the Unilateral Declaration...

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