Elements of Democratic Governance

Discussion Paper*

June 2006

Elements of Democratic Governance – Executive Summary

The promotion of democracy has become an explicit focus in aid activities and internationalrelations to an extent that was largely unforeseen prior to 1990. These trends, and Canada’s owninvolvement in international democracy promotion, have been the subject of an informaldialogue amongst Canadian practitioners and officials. The following paper, which emerged fromthese informal discussions, revisits some basic questions concerning the nature of democraticgovernance, its value, and some of the contemporary challenges in promoting democracy. Itconcludes with some preliminary considerations about identifying a distinctive approach andpoints of comparative advantage for Canada.

Canada has traditionally approached ‘democratic governance’ by emphasizing two of the mainpillars of the liberal democratic tradition: citizen participation in the determination ofgovernment itself and in the broader decision-making processes by which communities aregoverned; and a rights ‘platform’ that supports and protects the role of individuals and minoritiesin the governance process. Canada has an interest in promoting liberal democratic governance fordifferent types of reasons: for the benefits this may bring to citizens abroad and Canadians alike(in terms of peace, security, prosperity, and development dividends); and insofar as some coreliberal democratic values are taken to have intrinsic merit and to be universal in scope. Inparticular, the participation and protection of individuals as basic elements of governance aretaken to be valuable in their own right, and are increasingly perceived as key components of statelegitimacy in international relations.

However, the contemporary challenges facing democracy are many. In regions where democracyis relatively ‘fresh,’ concerns about its ‘depth’ or quality are often linked to doubts about itsability to deliver much-needed goods, such as equitable prosperity, development or security. Inother cases, the challenges are different in kind: the values at the heart of liberal democracy maybe rejected or seen as problematic. In some fragile states, where the main ‘fault-lines’ are ethnic,racial or religious in nature, democratization may be undertaken in ways that exacerbate pre-existing tensions. Electoral democracies may be characterized by authoritarian tendencies and anincomplete commitment to the rights of some, or all, of their citizens.

Attempts to undertake reform in the context of foreign political institutions and processes musttherefore be acutely sensitive to local context. This includes the need to understand localinstitutions and “change agents” within their national and regional contexts; to effectively selectand train those delivering democracy assistance; to consider carefully the sequencing of aid; tohave local “buy in” as a necessary condition of success; to consider the ways in which localinstitutions or indigenous customs might serve as ‘bridging elements’ for democratic practices;and to look for areas in which Canada has a comparative advantage or “niche” expertise to offer.__________________________

* This paper reflects discussions amongst the Democracy Council including: Elections Canada,International Development Research Council, Parliamentary Centre, Forum of Federations, NationalJudicial Institute, Rights and Democracy, Canadian International Development Agency, and ForeignAffairs and International Trade Canada.

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It is clear that Canada has some well-established expertise in promoting some of the keyelements of democratic governance, and that Canadian democracy itself has some uniquestrengths – e.g. the promotion of tolerance and the forging of a common identity across majorcultural, linguistic and regional differences in Canada – to which some of our ‘niche’ expertisemay be well placed to speak internationally. Canada is also perceived in manner that may, atcertain times and places, make it a more trusted partner in delivering assistance that can besensitive and highly political in nature. This would be further encouraged by an approach andlargely demand-driven style in which Canadian organizations seek, in the main, to facilitatereform processes and to assist local actors in achieving their own agendas for democratic change.

Elements of Democratic Governance

1 Introduction

.1 The extent to which the promotion of democracy has become an explicit focus of aidactivities – if not an organizing concept or force in the conduct of international relations – issignificant in a way that was largely unforeseen prior to 1990. In the last decade, there has beenan increase in ‘political’ aid dedicated to the promotion of democracy; an increase in the numberof groups and agencies working in this area; the emergence of new international and regionalinitiatives organized around the promotion of democratic norms and states; a larger role formultilateral organizations in‘validating’ domestic elections and in attempting to build democraticinstitutions in weak and failed states; and so on.

.2 The relative newness and scale of this enterprise is encouraging many democracypractitioners to reflect on the experiences of the past decade and beyond. With this in mind, thefollowing paper revisits some of the basic questions about democratic governance, chiefly: (1)What are some of the essential elements of democratic governance? (2)Why is such governancedesirable? And (3) what are some of the key challenges that arise in promoting democracy abroadand adapting Canadian models? Discussion of the latter includes some preliminary commentsabout identifying comparative advantages for Canada.

2 Elements of Democratic Governance

.1 A theory or definition of ‘democratic governance’ and conclusions about its applicability indifferent contexts faces a number of large challenges. A definition might be derived from anumber of sources: from Canada’s own democratic experience; from international standards andthe growing normative architecture that surrounds multilateral efforts to define and promotedemocratic institutions; from theories of democracy which reflect, and have informed, the growthof Western democracy itself.

.2 This paper does not purport to offer a comprehensive definition of democratic governance.Rather, it attempts to capture some of the key elements of democratic governance; to identifysome of the relevant considerations concerning its adaptability in different contexts; and tooutline some of the areas and ways in which Canadian expertise might suggest a distinctive

1 International IDEA summarizes the main trends in these terms (IDEA, Ten Years of SupportingDemocracy Worldwide, 2005, chapter 1). There are other semantic debates not characterized here and theabove is a very cursory explication of the concept of democracy within the Western tradition. A numberof one-party states would maintain that they are also democratic, and that the relevant distinction is notbetween democratic and undemocratic governance, per se, but rather between different kinds ofdemocracy, e.g. between ‘representative' and ‘participatory' democracies. A number of one-party stateswould be "democratic" according to the conceptual boundaries for which they argue, though they wouldnot satisfy the minimal procedural requirements for democracy in the terms noted above. One mightcontinue this debate at the semantic level – about what is actually meant by "democracy" – but at acertain moment the semantic arguments can be sidelined by talking more directly about the value of freespeech and multi-party politics, or those aspects of governance that separate liberal democratic systemsfrom others, including one-party states.

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contribution to the promotion of democratic governance.

.3 In 2005, International IDEA (Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance) published aten-year retrospective that includes a succinct discussion of the trends in international democracyassistance and a summary of the principal veins of Western thought with respect to characterizingdemocracy itself. The following section draws from IDEA’s summary, from some of Canada’sown statements on the promotion of democracy, and from reflections offered by some ofCanada’s own practitioners.

3 Conceptual Issues

.1 Two issues that are not always explicitly addressed in discussions of democracy assistanceare ones about the nature of democratic governance and its value. What are the essential elementsdemocratic governance and why are they desirable? Cast more broadly: what do we mean by"democracy" (as a ‘system-wide’ type of governance) and what good is it? The answers are noteasy to formulate, though they have important implications, including for the kind ofprogramming a country undertakes in this area and for the way in which aid and other programsare categorized and reported as “democracy assistance.” They are also germane to the largerobjectives that frame or orient such programming, and, ultimately, to the kinds of publicjustifications that are given for democracy assistance.

.2 The core ‘procedural’ elements of democratic governance are often not contested: there needsto be both competition and popular participation in the determination of government itself. Thisyields a ‘procedural' conception of democracy about which there is significant consensus in termsof the minimal conditions that would have to obtain in order for the basic governing institutionsand practices of a state to be considered democratic.1 Competition, or "contestation," occurs mostpublicly in the form of multi-party elections, which presuppose freedom of expression andassociation, and a party and electoral system in order to determine government on the basis of apeaceful, public expression of options and differences. Popular participation gives meaning to thenotion of ‘popular sovereignty' or collective self-determination, and hinges crucially on the rightto vote.

2 Ibid.

3As quoted in Gerald Schmitz, “The Role of International Democracy Promotion in Canada’sForeign Policy,” IRPP, Vol. 5, no. 10, November 2004.

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.3 Most of the key differences over definitions of "democracy" arise with respect to howrobustly the concept of democracy should be characterized beyond its core procedural aspects."Liberal" and "social" definitions maintain the core procedural content but adopt more expansiveaccounts of the rights and institutions by which a democracy is defined.2 Liberal definitionsemphasize civil, political, property and minority rights; they also place increased, explicitemphasis on institutional checks and balances, accountability to citizens, and equality withrespect to representation and participation. “Social” definitions of democracy adopt theprocedural and liberal content (and the inherent constraints on the exercise of majority rule),while expanding the notion of what it means for a state to be democratic to include the protectionand promotion of social and economic rights.

.4 In brief, Canadian practice has been not simply to promote democracy in its procedural form,but rather liberal democracy, with its emphasis on the enshrinement of rights and protection ofindividuals and minorities. Some of Canada’s initial forays into the promotion of democraticdevelopment were aimed largely at fostering greater participation in decision-making andpolitical processes. The report that led to the creation, in 1988, of the International Centre forHuman Rights and Democratic Development underlined this approach:

...The notion of democracy we have adopted, and which we believe must define andinspire Canadian assistance in this area, is quite simply the participation of citizens indecision-making which affects their lives...The ultimate objective is to assist thepopulation to develop the ability to intervene on its own behalf in the decision-makingprocess at the local, regional and national level and to assist the public powers to createinstitutions to safeguard the rights and liberties of citizens.3

.5 The decision to focus on the rights and political engagement of citizens was anchored not inthe promotion of a particular Canadian brand or model of democracy or development, but ratherin principles contained in the International Bill of Rights. This unites the two principal strands ofthe liberal democratic tradition: on one side, the centrality of participation in shaping andlegitimating decision-making processes and the formation of government itself; on the other, arights ‘platform’ to support and protect the role of individuals in the democratic process.

.6 A tentative and simple matrix that captures some of the key aspects of constitutional liberaldemocracy might include the elements shown below. It should perhaps be re-emphasized that thefollowing list is provisional and is not intended as a definition; by no means does it offer a list ofindividually necessary and jointly sufficient elements, including the relations between them, thatwould serve as a formal definition of liberal democratic governance. The undertaking is far moremodest and is simply meant to capture some – but not all – of the basic ingredients of democraticgovernance; and some – but not all – of the key points of engagement between formal institutions

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and civil society actors.

Democratic Element Institutional Aspects Civil Society Aspects

Elections - Independent electoralcommission(s)

- Political Parties- Citizen and YouthEngagement organizations

Possible Indicators: - Free, fair, and regular elections - “Free” if substantive rights areprotected, contested by multipleparties- “Fair” if procedural guaranteesare in place

- Rules governing the creation,funding, and administration ofparties- Functions fulfilled by politicalparties and other organizations- Effective representation ofinterests, including those ofwomen and minorities

Human Rights - Courts- National and sub-nationalhuman rights institutions(commissions and ombudsmen)- Government departments withmandate for promotion andprotection of human rights- Arms-length institutions withmandates for promotion andprotection of human rights

- Human rights organizations- Groups representing thematicrights issues (e.g. women’srights, environmental groups)- Groups representingvulnerable members of thepopulation- Academics and universities- Primary and secondaryeducators

Possible Indicators: - Constitutional/legal protections- International commitments- Independent commissions andother institutional mechanisms forredress- Political/economic/social/cultural barriers to effectiveimplementation/enjoyment ofrights

- Range and effectiveness ofcivil society groups- Mechanisms for interactionwith political process- Legal standing- Role of education

Court/Judicial system - Judges, courts- Law Commissions- Arms-length institutions withmandate to support and train

- Bar associations- Law firms- Law faculties- Legal Aid

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Possible Indicators: - Well-trained and independentjudiciary- Rules governing appointmentand terms of office- Relations (formal/informal) withexecutive and legislative branches- Rules governing due process andjudicial decision-making

- Adequate training for legalexperts- Access to judicial system forcitizens

Media - Institutions/organizations/businesses dedicated to thedissemination of information,including national and sub-national networks- Relevant governmentdepartments and agencies,regulating/promoting the flow ofinformation

- Groups dedicated to theprotection of journalists/freespeech- Education and institutionsdedicated to the professionaltraining of media personnel

Possible Indicators: - Regulations/policies governingcommunications and technology- Ownership and control of mediaand means of communication- Impediments to free flow ofinformation

- Limitations on/protections offree speech- Treatment of journalists/CSOs- Legal standing- Support for programs to trainand enhance media

Legislature - Legislature (upper and lowerchambers)- Legislative committees- Arms-length institutions withmandate to support legislators

- Political parties- Associations of legislators- Associations of formerlegislators- Lobby groups

Possible Indicators: - Size, composition, powers- Governing rules and relationshipwith executive- Mechanisms for accountability

- Effectiveness of parties, lobbygroups- Insertion in the politicalprocess and rules governingfinancing and operation- Legal standing

Executive - Executive office and advisors - Lobby groups

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Possible Indicators: - Size, composition, powers- Governing rules and relationshipwith legislature- Mechanisms for accountability

- Effectiveness of mechanismsfor citizen interaction withexecutive

Civilian oversightmechanisms

- Auditor General- Courts- Police, secret service andmilitary complaint and reviewcommissions- Ethics commissioner

- Media- Human Rights Organizations

Possible Indicators: - Powers, mandate- Relations with executive andlegislature- Terms of office

- Rules governing access toinformation- Extent of critical review ofoversightmechanisms/institutions

Public sectormanagement,including publicfinances

- Professional civil service- Auditor general- Comptroller- Administrative courts andtribunals

- Public service commissions- Ombudsmen- Ethics Commissioner(s)

Possible indicators - Mechanisms of accountability,including anti-corruptionmeasures/agencies- Codes of ethics and rulesgoverning malfeasance - Relations with executive andlegislature

- Rules and practices governingadvancement/promotion- Reviews conducted ofinstitutional performance

Constitution - Levels of government- Key branches of government(executive, legislative, judicial)- Key documents establishingbasic rights of citizens andinstitutions/procedures ofgovernment

- Associations of officials atnational and sub-nationalofficials- Political and legal advocacygroups- NGOs, CSOs

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Possible Indicators – Clearly defined levels andbranches of government, includingrelationships between- Effectiveness and interaction ofdifferent levels of government- Entrenchment of basic rights andprocedures by which governmentand key offices are filled- Definition of procedures foramending constitution

- Platform of constitutionally-protected rights and proceduresby which citizens engage withdifferent levels and branches ofgovernment

.7 The design of the matrix is intended to suggest that many of the elements of democraticgovernance have both (a) an institutional dimension and (b) a public interface that provides forcitizen engagement with the formal institutions themselves. For example, as political institutions,democratic legislatures are filled on the basis of elections, and governed according to rules setout in legal and constitutional provisions, along with conventional rules. But their functioningalso depends on the existence and operation of groups – such as political parties, lobby groupsand other associations – through which citizens’ interests are aggregated, represented andultimately reflected in the work of legislatures.

.8 This approach also coheres with some of the original thinking that defined Canada’sapproach to the promotion of democracy abroad. It is motivated by the consideration that, asone Canadian practitioner suggested, “...democracy should be understood both as a politicalstructure, as well as a space within which citizens can participate meaningfully in the decisionsthat affect their lives. In this optic, building an enduring democratic system involves building thetrust between government and governed and strengthening the nexus between institutions andcitizenship.” In terms of assisting the development of democratic practices and institutions, thisapproach also suggests that there will be a variety of entry points with respect to a particularelement: assisting with the development of a new constitution might, for example, be approachedboth as an exercise in system design and as one in which the capacity of local stakeholders toinform the design process itself are both seen as integral parts of democratic governance.

.9 The inclusion of “possible indicators” is highly provisional and not meant to be exhaustiveor exclusive. Rather, they are simply meant to indicate some of the assessment criteria that wouldbe relevant to a determination of the existence and quality of democratic governance. The criteriaby which the formal institutions are assessed would include the rules governing the functioningof the institutions themselves, their composition, the creation of mechanisms of accountability,etc. Those pertaining to civil society would include the rights platform which supports citizenengagement, and the composition, functioning, and effectiveness of such groups, etc. Even then,such a ‘snapshot’ would at best help to capture some of the key formal and informal elements ofdemocratic governance. It would be subject to the important caveat that many ‘exogenousfactors’ not reflected in such a matrix – e.g. the economic, social, cultural and other country-specific realities that surround the political process itself – will bear intimately on the quality ofdemocracy that is, in practice, achieved.

4USAID views democracy and good governance as “mutually reinforcing” yet distinct in nature.For instance: “Democracy as reflected in free, fair, and competitive elections is not strictly necessary forgood governance. And it is quite possible to have bad governance under the formal structures ofdemocracy....” (USAID, “Promoting Democratic Governance,” www.usaid.gov/fani/ch01)

5 However, particularly where democratization and state-building take place concurrently, suchas in failed and fragile states, the proposition likely fails to reflect the tenuous nature of democracy andthe proximity of potential conflict, be it conflict with a neighbouring states or within a single state.

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.10 Democratic governance, in whichever terms it comes to be defined, need not be taken as asynonym for ‘good governance,’ though it will often be considered as a necessary (but notsufficient) condition of the latter. Certainly, not all democratic governance will, in fact, be good –either in design or in output – and it perhaps remains an open question if all good (political)governance is necessarily democratic.4 At any rate, the kind of distinction between governancethat is good and that which is democratic is a clear one in principle: it is one between the qualityand the type of governance.

4 Normative Issues

.1 With respect to the larger objectives or reasons for which democracy and good governanceought to be promoted, three types of justifications might, in broad terms, be offered. In the firstinstance (and from the standpoint of development agencies in particular) fostering governancethat is both good and democratic in nature is primarily a question of promoting the best ‘enablingenvironment’ for the effective use of aid money: good governance is taken to be a necessarycondition of the optimal use of development funds with a view to reducing poverty and achievingthe Millennium Development Goals.

.2 In much the same way that good governance is pursued in order to achieve developmentalgoals, democratic values and institutions are, secondly, pictured as means to the achievement ofdesirable political or economic ends, such as security, peace, or prosperity. In other words,democratic political systems are instrumentally valuable in the realization of other goods orobjectives. Some, if not many, of the goods in question – such as peace or prosperity – can beboth intrastate (good for their citizens) and interstate (good for the international order) in nature.The "Democratic Peace Proposition" – that mature democratic states do not go to war -- isperhaps the most common thesis regarding the international utility of democratic states.5 Thesecurity agenda of many Western states is predicated on similar reasoning: efforts to promoteinclusive, accountable, democratic structures are ultimately good for the security of individuals,for particular states, and for international security more generally.

.3 Thirdly, some core liberal democratic values are taken to have intrinsic merit and to beuniversal in scope. This is the sense in which democratic governance might be promoted as an"end in itself," that is, for reasons that are not solely contingent upon the added benefits thatgoverning democratically may achieve. This is a stronger claim, different in kind, and is the morecontroversial and difficult case to make. The core idea can be articulated in different ways, butinvariably turns on the notion that what is intrinsically valuable about liberal democracy is the

6 For example, the argument in favour of an emerging ‘democratic entitlement' in internationallaw is covered in Democratic Governance and International Law, Fox and Roth, 2000, chapter 1.

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central importance it attaches to the protection and participation of individuals in the verydefinition of the system itself.

.4 A few cursory remarks might be added concerning the relationship between democraticgovernance and legitimacy. Legitimacy within a democratic system of governance is often alsoseen to be a function of some of the basic principles and procedures of the system itself. Thosewielding power are accountable to citizens through the regular holding of free and fair elections;government is “legitimate” insofar as it arises from the consent of the governed. More robustcharacterizations of “legitimacy” are possible. Liberal democrats will posit that legitimate formsof government not only arise from the consent of the governed but also protect basic rights andfreedoms and thereby recognize inherent limits on the exercise of the state's own power.

.5 The concept of legitimacy – and, in practice, what it takes, subjectively, for citizens to feelthat their governments are ‘legitimate’ – may, in the end, require more yet. It may hinge notsimply on the processes and restraints according to which the use of power is authorized, but alsoon the aims and performance of government itself. But whatever the formula for ‘legitimacy' maybe, the participation and protection of individuals in the basic design and workings of a politicalsystem might be seen as some of the essential ingredients not just of democratic but also oflegitimate forms of government. In this account, the two are closely tied.

.6 Internationally, at least two developments are striking in this regard in the post 1989-1991period: the extent to which the international community has come increasingly to treat "free andfair" elections as a more fundamental constituent of legitimate government; and that there is nowan expanded international role in legitimating the elections by which (some) governments areformed – i.e. this is no longer necessarily taken to be a strict matter of domestic competence.Both might be seen, in part, as a natural outcome of greater international involvement in themanagement of intrastate conflicts, post-1990. The UN and other regional organizations havebeen drawn not simply into the business of state- and institution-building, but also into‘validation' exercises such as the monitoring of domestic elections.

.7 A corollary to these trends has been a greater focus in international and regional fora on the‘normative architecture' that underpins multilateral efforts to promote ‘free and fair elections' anddemocratic institutions. One implication seems to be that international legitimacy is coming to beseen perhaps far less in terms of sovereignty in the traditional sense, involving a nationalgovernment’s ability to exercise effective control over a given territory, and more in terms of agovernment’s ability to meaningfully demonstrate that its rule is based on the will of those itclaims to represent and legitimately govern.6 The holding of free and fair elections is often seen,in this interpretation, as a sine qua non condition of legitimate government based on popular

7The international acceptance of a state’s “responsibility to protect” its citizens reflectsconvergence around the norm that sovereignty implies not just effective control but also the will andcapacity to provision some of the basic public goods that are essential to individual security and well-being. Similarly, the above interpretation suggests that sovereignty is fundamentally anchored in, andshould be responsive to, popular will – it does not simply arise from, nor merely aim to achieve, thewielding of effective control within the boundaries of a given territory.

8See in particular Oxford Analytica reports of November 4, 2005, “Strong economy does nothelp democracy,” and of May 13, 2004, “Doubts over democratic development.”

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sovereignty.7

5 Context: Challenges to Democracy

.1 A list of contemporary challenges facing democratic governance is likely to be extensive andto include considerations that are different in kind. The following sections identify merely someof the different kinds of relevant challenges, along with others that arise in adapting our ownmodels and knowledge to suit foreign contexts. The ultimate goal of an extended treatment ofthis topic would be to arrive at a clearer notion of the elements or principles of a distinctiveCanadian approach to the provision of democracy assistance and to confronting some of thecurrent challenges facing democracy.

.2 Concerns about the efficacy and quality of democratic governance have, roughly speaking,kept pace with the rise in the sheer number of democratic states. The concerns are certainly notunique to the South or to ‘transitional’ states where democracy is new. The notion of a“democratic deficit” has variously been applied to some of the well-established institutions ofolder democracies, and, as well, to some of the international institutions, non-state actors andothers that have come to play a more predominant role in a globalized world.

.3 Concerns about the ‘depth’ or quality of democracy in states or regions where democracy isrelatively fresh are often linked to doubts about its efficacy – about the extent to whichdemocratic governance is robust or substantial enough to adequately address fundamentalproblems. Where democratic governance is promoted as a means to the achievement otherimportant objectives, such as peace, development or security, it may be seen as ineffective if thedesired results do not obtain. This is a challenge the likes of which is not unfamiliar in manycontemporary criticisms of democracy, with some arguing that it does not deliver, or does notdeliver enough, or does not deliver quickly enough – be it equitable prosperity, development,security or other goods.

.4 Latin America is instructive in this regard. Conclusions contained in a 2004 UNDP report onthe state of democracy in Latin America were re-confirmed and extended in reports concerningpublic perceptions of democracy in the region, issued after the UNDP survey.8 A mainpreoccupation, reflected in both public perception and empirical data, is about the extent towhich democratic governance can effectively generate equitable prosperity throughout the region.Real GDP per capita did not significantly increase over a 20 year period, while the absolute

9Thomas Carothers argues that most so-called ‘transitional’ states are located in a democratic‘gray zone’ characterized by considerable diversity in political patterns: “...what is often thought of as anuneasy, precarious middle ground between full-fledged democracy and outright dictatorship is actuallythe most common political condition today of countries in the developing world and the post-communistworld.” (T. Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy Volume 13, Number1 January 2002). Carothers offers a basic typology of states that occupy that democratic ‘gray zone’based on the “syndromes” they exhibit: those which suffer from a static and ineffective pluralism; andthose in which a single party, personality or movement has come to dominate. In both cases, states areweak and, though perhaps democratic in many formal aspects, the quality or depth of democratic

governance is poor.

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number of Latin Americans living in poverty increased, in a region that registered significantdemocratic gains but maintains the highest levels of inequality in the world. Findings suggestedthat politics and political parties were not well-regarded; they were seen as largely irrelevant toaddressing fundamental issues of social rights and justice. It was found that over half of LatinAmericans would favour authoritarian rule if it were to solve economic problems.

.5 A separate set of challenges concerns the values of democratic governance themselves andthe ways in which they are put into practice. In some cases, there may be a fundamental aversionto governance based on liberal democratic values (an aversion that may at times be rooted in themaintenance of elite or partial interests); in others, governance may be democratic in many of itsformal and procedural aspects, but fail to achieve a substantive commitment to a form ofgovernance that is, in practice, inclusive and tolerant with respect to all members of society.Governance may be “democratic” in its formal or procedural aspects yet retain authoritarian andilliberal tendencies.9 In some weak and failed/fragile states, democratization can be undertaken inways that, while incorporating some of the essential attributes of democracy – such as freespeech, the formation of political parties, and the holding of elections – serve to exacerbate pre-existing tensions along ethnic, racial or religious lines.

.6 Democratic governance might, then, be rejected or resisted, or seen as undesirable, fordifferent sorts of reasons, ranging from the values on which it is based or its perceivedineffectiveness in producing other benefits, to the way in which it might negatively impinge onthe interests of local actors or elites. Part of the challenge in ‘selling' democracy is to show that itcan be flexible and sensitive to local circumstance; that it permits of ‘degrees' or ‘grades' inimplementation over time; that it can be effective in achieving other goals; and that, at its core, itis persuasive and powerful in its appeal to the democratic empowerment and protection ofindividuals. As the views of Canadian practitioners also suggest in following section, a clearsense of which indigenous actors favour enhanced democratic governance, and on what basis,should inform any effort to support indigenous efforts to promote democratic governance.

6 Canadian Practice

.1 In addressing the many challenges inherent in democracy promotion, accepted doctrine is thatan understanding of local/national context is fundamental, including analysis of the way in whichsuch factors as economic wealth, institutional history, ethnic divisions, social class, etc., affect

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the formal political process. One objective is to ensure that the design of democratic assistanceis informed by an appreciation of the structural features that impinge on democratic governance.Perhaps more fundamentally, democratic assistance comes to be seen -- by some, at least -- asless about building a fixed set of democratic institutions and more about assisting the process ofaltering political relations within a given society.

.2 Reflections from some of Canada’s practitioners confirm, at a practical level, the importanceof a number of aforementioned considerations in undertaking democracy programming:

– They underscore the importance of understanding local institutions and “changeagents,” and the need to connect such an understanding with an appreciation of moregeneral dynamics at play in the reform and political processes.

– The effective selection and training of those delivering assistance is critical,including the study of local contexts in order to adapt and translate Canadian experiencesin the most appropriate fashion. The importance of determining a sequence of aiddelivery that is appropriate to local circumstance is often emphasized.

– Local “buy in” is a necessary condition of success. As one Canadian practitioneremphasised: “Every evaluation of democracy development programming has shown thatwithout the precondition of local commitment and engagement, outside assistance, nomatter how badly needed, is likely to be ineffective or of marginal benefit.” Localinstitutions or indigenous customs might serve as valuable ‘bridging elements’ fordemocratic practices, particularly where democracy assistance is conceived fundamentallyto be the kind of activity that should respond and adapt to local demand and custom.

– The most useful types of Canadian engagement often occur in areas where Canada hasa comparative advantage or “niche” expertise to offer.

Local Knowledge

.3 Many Canadian organisations active in promoting democracy are relatively specific in theinstitutions or themes which comprise the focal point of their work. In this respect, the type of‘local knowledge’ that is required varies both according to the nature of the institutional orthematic focus and the time-frame for engagement. For instance, some types of assistance, suchas that undertaken to support electoral processes, is more short-term in nature, and characterizedby a need for higher volumes of time-sensitive information in order to deliver electoralassistance. Longer-term engagement might, by contrast, require that a more detailedunderstanding of the workings of a host institution be assembled and modified over time.

.4 At least three types of information are of particular relevance with respect to localinstitutions. First, practitioners need a thorough understanding of the essential characteristics ofthe institution in question, including such things as its performance, organizational capacity,culture, prevailing values, previous efforts to reform or strengthen the institution, etc. Such

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information should be collected from different sources or ‘angles’, including local actors frominside and outside the institution in question. (In practice, ‘inside’ actors have a propensity toexaggerate the degree of commitment to change and to downplay the impediments to reform.)Information of this kind is useful, among other reasons, in determining where change can occurwithin an organization – possibly, as separate from where it is most badly needed or sought. Promoting change in surer or ‘safer’ areas can build confidence and have positive effects onother parts of the organization.

.5 A second type of information pertains to the environment surrounding a particular institution,including the political system, socioeconomic conditions, other stakeholders and internationalactors. As one practitioner noted: “The commonest weakness of democracy programming hasbeen to treat the institution in question as an island unto itself, unconnected to the surroundingenvironment....The institutions that most need strengthening (like judiciaries and legislatures) areoften too connected to the surrounding environment to be able to develop the institutionalautonomy necessary for effective functioning.” Situating particular democratic institutions intheir broader political context helps to identify the extent to which there is real will and capacityfor change – or impediments to change in other parts of the system itself.

.6 Third, those who deliver assistance need to identify key partners, including those who favourchange within the organization and those on the outside who might act as local/national capacitybuilders and deliver programming in their own right. The latter involves learning more aboutindigenous capacities for training and education, and is motivated, in part, by a recognition thatbuilding local capacity helps to enhance direct stakes in reform – and to avoid suspicionsconcerning the hidden agendas of those working in this area. “By helping people achieve theirown agendas for democratic change rather than exporting our own,” noted one expert,“Canadians can and often do earn a rare degree of trust in democracy promotion.”

Canadian Approach and Comparative Advantages

.7 The suggestion has been made that the latter – that is, an approach in which Canada seeks tofacilitate reform processes and to respond to demands for democratic change that existindependently of external involvement -- might, in fact, be one of the defining elements of adistinct ‘Canadian approach’ to democracy assistance. It would reflect a demand-driven approachto assistance, and implicitly builds on a number of the previous conclusions, including theimportance of establishing local ‘buy in’ and agents of change, and the greater likelihood ofsuccess in assisting or facilitating – as opposed to driving – indigenous processes of change.

.8 Identifying Canadian strengths or areas of comparative advantage might be done in differentways. One might ask: (1) what sort of experience and expertise has Canada accumulated throughits aid programs and arms-length and other institutions, and where, in that regard, has Canadabuilt expertise that perhaps distinguishes it from other countries? A second question might be:(2) What are the unique aspects or strengths of the Canadian democratic system itself and howare these aspects reflected or focussed in the kinds of assistance that Canada delivers? Anotherapproach might be to ask: (3) Are there particular geographic regions or institutional fora in

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which Canada has particular strengths or advantages, or a history of positive engagement onwhich to build?

.9 Canada’s arms-length (and other) institutions have accumulated considerable experience withrespect to delivering assistance focussed on some of the key elements of liberal democraticgovernance. By way of one example, one organization suggested the following five broadclusters as among the potential areas in which Canada would have a comparative advantage:public sector management (broadly conceived to include public administration reform, financialmanagement and the interface between public and private corporate sectors); sub-nationalgovernance, including fiscal federalism; the participation of civil society in public decisionmaking; legal and judicial reform; and anti-corruption. Other potential strengths could be added.

.10 In addressing strengths within Canada’s own system and the institutional fora in whichCanada might have a special role to play, a number of answers might also be given. Multiculturaland linguistic policies have often been suggested as areas in which innovative approaches havebeen taken to promoting tolerance and common identity across major cultural and linguisticdifferences in Canada. Federalism in the Canadian context also works in a number of uniqueways to accommodate – within a single nation – vast spaces and important regional differences.With respect to arriving at a more comprehensive assessment of the particular countries, regions,or institutions in which Canada may have a special role to play, a fuller discussion is clearlywarranted, and would also need to be informed by consideration of Canadian priorities andcapacities for increased engagement and how these might connect with, or reflect, niche expertisefor Canada.