Ann. Rev. Social. 1980. 6:1-20 Copyright @ 1980 by Annual Reviews Inc. All rights reserved

D ISCRIMIN ATION:

MOTIVATION, ACTION,

EFFECTS, AND CONTEXT

Joe R. Feagin

Department of Sociology, University of Texas, Austin, Texas 78712

Douglas Lee Eckberg

Department of Sociology, University of Tulsa, Tulsa, Oklahoma 74104

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

.10584

At the heart of social science research on racial and ethnic structure and conflict in the United States are the concepts of discrimination and prejudice.l Social scientists have recently examined these central concepts, but much of the racial-ethnic literature uses them implicitly and unreflectively_ Since these ideas are important for analysis, we remain puzzled about why so little systematic attention has been given to them. One might judge from the lack of explicit attention to prejudice and discrimination in standard reference works that the concepts are not important for the social sciences. The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, published in the 1930s, had no article on prejudice. By the late 1960s The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences did include a brief article on prejudice written by a psychologist, but this distinguished 17-volume work had no general article on discrimination. As yet the social science literature contains no sustained theoretical treatment of discrimination.

lBecause of space limitations we will focus here on the racial-ethnic area. However, much of the analysis is relevant to analyzing sex and age discrimination.

1 0360-0572/8010815-0001$01.00

Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 19

80.6

:1-2

0. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by O

hio

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

on

09/2

6/13

. For

per

sona

l use

onl

y.

2 FEAGIN & ECKBERG

Immediate Organizational Context (f)

r---------------�

j-------------,

I (a) Motivation I I I I

(d)

: (b) Discriminatory Action

I I I I I

(e)

(c) Effects L ____________ -J

L _______________ �

Larger Societal Context (g)

Figure I The dimensions of discrimination.

This review examines social science research and theory related to the concept of discrimination. This task requires thoroughgoing attention to the dimensions of discrimination. As a first step in sorting out social science thinking, we suggest that an analytical diagram (Figure 1) is of heuristic value. The dimensions of discrimination include (a) motivation, (b) discriminatory action, (c) effects, (d) the relation between motivation and action, (e) the relation between action and effects, (f) the immedi­ate organizational (institutional) context, and (g) the larger societal con­text. Diagraming these components (not done in previous sociological analysis) is a necessary first step in disentangling the issues we now examine.

SOCIAL SCIENCE ANALYSIS

A Focus on Prejudice

Several of the components in Figure 1 have been given the greatest attention: motivation (a), effects (c), and the relation of motivation to action (d). The discriminatory practices or mechanisms themselves (b) and the larger sociocultural contexts (f, g) have received less theoretical and empirical attention. Indeed, research on discrimination has focused almost exclusively on one type of motivation-the prejudice of oneself or one's reference group. Blalock (1967: 15) has noted that defining dis­crimination is difficult and that "many texts and descriptive works fail

Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 19

80.6

:1-2

0. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by O

hio

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

on

09/2

6/13

. For

per

sona

l use

onl

y.

DISCRIMINATION 3

to attempt any definition at all." The definition implicit in much tradi­tional analysis focuses on the relation between prejudice and discrimina­tion (d in Figure 1): Prejudice is seen as the crucial factor causing discriminatory treatment of the singled-out group.

Most of the germane social science literature contains some variation of the assumption that prejudice causes discrimination. Thus in his path­breaking study An American Dilemma ( 1964:52n), Myrdal saw racial prejudice as a complex of beliefs that "are behind discriminatory behav­ior on the part of the majority group" and that contradict the egalitarian American Creed. Myrdal's view of prejudice, discrimination, and the American Creed influenced subsequent researchers. Not long after the publication of An American Dilemma, Merton (1970) developed a four-category typology interrelating prejudice and discrimination: un­prejudiced non discriminators, prejudiced discriminators, unprejudiced discriminators, and prejudiced nondiscriminators. Merton was among the first to highlight the latter two human types, whose actions had seemed, in terms of the prejudice-causes-discrimination model, to be inconsistent. Merton's brief discussion of these latter types stimulated later researchers to probe what they regarded as an inconsistent fit be­tween prejudiced attitudes and behavior.

Only a few dozen prejudice-discrimination studies exist among the many attitude-behavior studies in the empirical literature (Hill 1978). In these, prejudice is typically determined by means of simple question­naires. Discriminatory action is often measured in a questionable way, as, for example, by the readiness of a white subject to sign a release indicating a Willingness to be photographed with blacks. Such studies have found a low positive correlation between expressed prejudice and the measured behavior. The weakness of this correlation has been ex­plained in various ways. The behavior exhibited in filling out question­naires and that exhibited in subsequent experimental situations may arise from different sources (Tarter 1970). Variables may exist that mediate or suppress the attitude-behavior relationship. According to Hill (1978: 160-6 1), the few studies that have closely followed attitude theory and have carefully defined the indexed attitudes have confirmed a mediated prejudice-discrimination relationship. Jones ( 1979) has asked why re­searchers take at face value the statements of preference made by experi­mental subjects; he has investigated the conditions under which stable predispositions or demand characteristics of situations come to be seen as generating attitudinal statements.

Among the variables postulated as mediating the attitude-behavior relationship in the more general attitude-behavior literature have been

Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 19

80.6

:1-2

0. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by O

hio

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

on

09/2

6/13

. For

per

sona

l use

onl

y.

4 FEAGIN & ECKBERG

(a) various dimensions of attitudes (Fazio & Zanna 1978; Sherman et al 1978; Ajzen & Fishbein 1977; Perry et aI1976), (b) changes in attitudes (Schwartz 1978), (c) social pressures (Andrews & Kandel 1979), (d) the specificity of attitudes (Heberlein & Black 1976), ( e) attitudes toward behavioral criteria (Jaccard et al 1977), and (f) the anonymity of the situation (Tyson & Kaplowitz 1977; Perry 1977). However, few of these recent attitude-behavior studies have dealt specifically with the issue of mediation in the prejudice-discrimination linkage. In studies of prejudice discrimination, a number of situational and dispositional characteristics have been found to meditate the empirical linkage found (Hill 1978: 104-14).

Attitude-behavior research, published primarily in a few social psy­chology journals, emphasizes individualistic explanations; it seldom con­siders variables outside an experimental subject's personality or immediate reference group. Thus the relationship between prejudice (or related attitudes), on the one hand, and larger societal, structural, or organizational contexts on the other, remains unexamined (for an excep­tion, see Pettigrew 1971). While we know that rank-and-file Americans have in recent decades become more liberal in publicly expressed racial views (Greeley & Sheatsley 1971), we cannot be certain whether (or how) either deep-lying attitudes or discriminatory actions have changed. We do not know whether the liberalization of public attitudes reflects changes in personal predispositions or merely in the characteristics of sample surveys. Furthermore, we cannot tell if racial attitudes, surface or deep-lying, are themselves more than rationalizations for ongoing discriminatory situations. Historical treatments of discrimination strongly suggest that scientific explanation can be used to rationalize the supremacy of racial and ethnic groups in power. This is clearly demon­strated in the deVelopment of intelligence (I.Q.) measurement in the United States (Eckberg 1979). .

Few studies of prejudice and discrimination, in looking at causal expla­nations, have focused on economic and political contexts (a partial ex­ception is Levin 1975). Instead, theories of frustration-aggression, scapegoating, the authoritarian personality, etc, have been examined. Childhood problems are often viewed as important sources of prejudice, as in theories of working-class authoritarianism. Yet several recent re­ports suggest that prejudice may be an economic and cultural phenome­non rather than an individual predisposition (e.g. Orpen 1971; Heaven 1976; Archibald 1978:189). One maverick social psychologist (Ar­chibald 1978: 187) has argued recently that an exclusive concern with prejudice as a mechanism of psychological compensation distracts atten­tion from "the labor-market processes of exploitation and competition."

Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 19

80.6

:1-2

0. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by O

hio

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

on

09/2

6/13

. For

per

sona

l use

onl

y.

DISCRIMINA nON 5

Archibald's point is that individualistic theories of prejudice cannot ac­count for such massive patterns of discrimination as the centuries-long enslavement of the black Africans.

In addition to this variegated research literature, more general and theoretical discussions in the social sciences continue to accent a preju­dice-causes-discrimination model. In his widely used book Gordon All­port (1958:14) suggested that prejudiced people rarely keep their antipathies entirely to themselves but instead act out their feelings in a variety of ways, running from speaking against to discriminating against an outgroup. Tumin's textbook (1973:418) defines discrimination as "the translation into consequential behavior of prejudicial beliefs." Kinloch (1974:54) conceptualizes discrimination as "applied prejudice in which negative social definitions are translated into action;" and in his recent commentary on institutional racism models, Butler (1978) develops his core argument to the effect that racial discriminatory action translates the conscious actions of prejudiced individuals.

Because of their focus on prejudice and its relation to discrimination, social sci�ntists have tended toward optimism about the eradication of discrimination. For example, Gary Becker (1971) suggests that preju­dice-generated discrimination, motivated by an irrational "taste" for discrimination (e.g. among employers) has greater social costs than bene­fits. If this is so, the growing rationality in the economic sphere should lead to the eradication of prejudice-generated discrimination and to ben­efits for employers and for society. Moreover, assimilation theory, the main theoretical perspective in the field of race-ethnic relations, is com­patible with the notion that an irrational prejudice causes discrimination. Sociological analysts such as Milton Gordon, Talcott Parsons, and Na­than Glazer have highlighted the ongoing assimilation or inclusion pro­cess that has inflicted varying degrees of prejudice-motivated discrimination upon all new groups, white and nonwhite, coming into the society. According to this view, an inevitable decline in prejudice will lead to chances for significant minority advancement, and probably to assimilation and inclusion; the traditional processes of industrialization and mobility will gradually eradicate prejudice and, therefore, its close relative, discrimination. Some policy-oriented social scientists have sug­gested that certain individuals-sometimes called bigots-are responsi­ble for most acts of discrimination. These analysts seek to reduce bigotry as a means of reducing discrimination.

The Effects of Discrimination

Social scientists have also sought to delineate the statistical and psycho­logical effects of discrimination (c in Figure 1). There are a number of

Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 19

80.6

:1-2

0. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by O

hio

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

on

09/2

6/13

. For

per

sona

l use

onl

y.

6 FEAGIN & ECKBERG

social psychological studies of the effects of discrimination on the per­sonalities of black Americans, such as the famous Clark (1955) studies of identity problems and Kardiner & Ovesey's (1962) psychoanalytic study of personality marks of oppression. Numerous empirical studies, often utilizing government demographic data, analyze such statistical effects of discrimination as income inequality or residential segregation. Much of this discussion remains atheoretical. In the lengthy book index of their study of residential segregation, the Taeubers (1965) have no entry for discrimination. They find that the economic status of blacks does not account for residential segregation, clearly implying that direct racial discrimination must therefore be responsible; but they supply no significant discussion of the discriminatory actions and mechanisms ly­ing behind these demographic patterns. Farley's more recent (1977) demographic analysis sees discrimination as, in effect, a residual catego­ry: Parley concludes that the large dollar differential in black-white in­come levels (the residual) left after accounting for the impact on income of regional, educational, and occupational differences between the two groups represents the "cost of discrimination" (see also Hauser & Pea­therman 1974). Nordlie (1974), in his attempt to measure racial inequali­ties in the military, devised a "discrimination indicator" (calculated by dividing the number of minority persons expected, on the basis of po pula­tion percentage, in a given job category into the actual number, multiply­ing by 100, then subtracting 100). This indicator is in use in a number of anti-discrimination research programs. However, Nordlie's analysis, too, is atheoretical. A number of research papers similarly examine dif­ferentials in income, occupation, education, and residence. Virtually all look at the effects of discrimination, with only fleeting attention to the actions lying behind the effects. Moreover, much of the empirical litera­ture on the effects of racial discrimination analyzes only those effects for which convenient governmental or survey data exist.2

INSTITUTIONALIZED DISCRIMINATION:

A SHIFT IN EMPHASIS

New Conceptual Developments

Beginning in earnest in the 1960s, some social scientists departed from the prejudice-causes-discrimination model and focused on other types of

2 A conceptual distinction between the "immediate" effects and the "distant" or cumula­tive effects of discrimination may deserve further analysis. Census tract data on income or housing segregation usually reflect somewhat removed or distant effects of discriminatory action. Immediate effects would include the lost jobs, lost housing opportunities, and immediate individual or family suffering caused by discriminatory actions.

Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 19

80.6

:1-2

0. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by O

hio

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

on

09/2

6/13

. For

per

sona

l use

onl

y.

DISCRIMINATION 7

motivation and other dimensions of discrimination. Slowly, other actors besides individual bigots were examined. Some analysts found patterns of discrimination in institutions. The larger societal context received more attention, as did the linkage between discriminatory mechanisms and effects (relation e in Figure 1)� Three major lines of conceptual development have led to a more comprehensive view of discrimination: the interest theory of discrimination, the institutionalized racism theory, and the internal colonialism perspective.

DISCRIMINATION AND VESTED INTEREST Interest theory suggests that discrimination can be shaped by desire for social, economic, or political gain. Such motivation need not be linked to a prejudiced view of a minority outgroup. Some time ago Blumer (1960) argued that the domi­nant group's race prejudice is but a mask protecting the dominant group's position; and Antonovsky (1960) advocated distinguishing between prej­udice-motivated discrimination and gain-motivated discrimination, the latter referring to persons discriminating solely for economic or political gain. Williams (1966) suggested that the imperial expansion of European powers overseas generated racial inequality in North America and that racial ideologies developed to rationalize the new social privileges of Europeans in this colonial setting. An articulate recent advocate of the vested interest perspective is Wellman, whose Portraits oj White Racism (1977) provides an analysis of, and evidence on, the range of motivations involved in white support for anti-black discrimination. In Wellman's view, racial discrimination is a rational reaction to group conflict over scarce social and economic resources. Protection and enhancement of group privilege vis-a-vis another group is what discrimination entails, a conclusion Wellman drew from in-depth interviews with several whites. Wellman portrays racial stratification as fundamentally rooted in the current social structure of the United States, not as a leftover from the distant past. The justifications for race discrimination and stratification have "an element of rationality to them; they are not simply manufac­tured reasons, misperceptions, or defenses for personality defects" (Well­man 1977:37).

INSTITUTIONAL RACISM In Black Power (1967), the activist Carmichael and the scholar Hamilton first used the concept of institutional racism in an extended sociological analysis. Looking beyond individual white bigots, they try to discern community-wide patterns of discrimination, but racial prejudice remains for them the fundamental motivation for institutional patterns of discrimination. Many subsequent analysts of Black America have used the language of "institutional racism," yet only

Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 19

80.6

:1-2

0. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by O

hio

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

on

09/2

6/13

. For

per

sona

l use

onl

y.

8 FEAGIN & ECKBERG

a few contributed, even in a small way, to its conceptual development. In 1969, Knowles & Prewitt suggested briefly that racist institutional practices could "occur without the presence of conscious bigotry" and could even be unintentional. Downs (1970) analyzed at greater length the arguments (a) that discrimination can be motivated by factors other than prejudice, and (b) that the term institutional racism can cover actions where individuals have "no intention of subordinating others because of color, or are totally unaware of doing so." Both Downs and Pettigrew (in his 1973 analysis of discrimination and mental health) have noted the possibility of indirect racial discrimination: Practices whose negative impact on minorities is unintentional become linked to inten­tionally discriminatory practices.

Federal judges (including Supreme Court Justices) and government agencies, faced with practical problems in connection with legal com­plaints of discrimination, have also grappled with the definition of institu­tional discrimination. In a number of cases they have followed a theory of institutional discrimination outlined by Equal Employment Opportu­nity Commission lawyers: Actions are legally defined as discriminatory if they have serious discriminatory effects. In the case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971), the Supreme Court examined one of the company's criteria of employment-the high school diploma-and found that it disqualified more black than white applicants. The Court argued that institutionalized practices that are fair in form but negative in effect constitute illegal discrimination in certain situations (e.g. when the dis­criminatory device has not been proven to be a valid predictor of job performance). The Supreme Court has recently abandoned this theory of institutionalized discrimination [see Washington v. Davis (1976)].

fNTERNAL COLONIALISM The internal colonialism perspective asserts that privilege was created when colonizing Europeans wrested resources such as labor and land away from native peoples. Once the resources of non-Europeans had been appropriated, the dominant group sought "to stabilize and monopolize its advantages through policies aiming at the institutionalization and perpetuation of the existing stratification sys­tem" (Hechter 1975:39). The European conquest or enslavement of non-European groups such as blacks, Mexican Americans, and Native Americans provided the structural foundation for institutionalized ar­rangements of internal colonialism. Racial stratification could thus exist where few people were prejudiced once the mechanisms of colonial domination had become components of the basic economic and political institutions of society (Blauner 1972). This literature emphasizes not only economic exploitation and stratification but also control through

Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 19

80.6

:1-2

0. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by O

hio

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

on

09/2

6/13

. For

per

sona

l use

onl

y.

DISCRIMINA nON 9

political institutions. Tabb's (1970) discussion of the colonial role of police in ghettos illustrates this argument, as does the discussion of internal-colonial government action in the work of Carmichael & Hamil­ton (1967) on black Americans and Acuna's work (1972) on chicanos.

A TYPOLOGY OF DISCRIMINATION

Defining Discrimination

The traditional emphasis on prejudice and its effects has left undefined the major types of discriminatory mechanisms and the range of motiva­tions behind them. Drawing on and revising previous analyses by the senior author (Feagin 1977; Feagin & Feagin 1978) and integrating the research just reviewed, we here suggest a definition and then a heuristic typology of discrimination.

Race-ethnic discrimination consists of the practices and actions of dominant race-ethnic groups that have a differential and negative impact on subordinate race-ethnic groups. (There are other types of discrimina­tion with which we cannot deal here.) This definition focuses explicitly on actions with negative effects. Differential treatment might have cer­tain positive effects, as Banton (1967:8) notes, but negative impact has been virtually the exclusive focus of race-relations research. Our defini­tion does not specify the motivation, or the source, of the discrimination. Rather, it highlights the discriminatory mechanisms, the negative effects of those mechanisms, and the relation (e in Figure 1) between mecha­nisms and effects.

Embeddedness and Motivation

Two features of institutionalized discrimination are important for analytical purposes: (a) its organizational embeddedness and (b) its motivation. Embeddedness refers to the organizational environment, to the size and complexity of the relevant social unit. Size and complexity can vary from actions of a single individual to the routine practices of many individuals in a large organization. Individual and small-group actions may not be embedded in larger-scale organizations, but rather in small-scale primary groups. Modern societies are characterized by large­scale hierarchical organizations-bureaucracies-that are miniature so­cieties in themselves. These miniature societies reflect the historical and contemporary values and actions of the larger society. Racial discrimina­tion often becomes part of these large-scale organizations and is tied to certain formal and informal rules. To a significant degree, practices of these organizations come to represent the specific race (or class) interests

Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 19

80.6

:1-2

0. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by O

hio

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

on

09/2

6/13

. For

per

sona

l use

onl

y.

10 FEAGIN & ECKBERG

of the more powerful constellations of actors, such as white Americans. Note that bureaucratization does not eliminate the importance of the individual discriminator. However impersonal an action may appear­e.g. a rejection notice from a college or employer to a minority person-a specific person follows organizational rules and sends the notice.

Motivation is another important dimension of discrimination; we have noted how large it looms in the prejudice-causation assumptions of much of the traditional discrimination literature. In analyzing discriminatory actions, we distinguish two basic types-intentional and unintentional. Intentional motivation includes (a) prejudice-motivated discrimination, (b) conformity-motivated discrimination and (c) gain-motivated dis­crimination. The first two sorts of intentional discrimination have re­ceived the most attention. Discrepancies between discrimination tendencies and individual prejudice have been explained, in some of the best socio-psychological research, in terms of conformity to prejudices and stereotypes of relevant reference groups-e.g. fellow workers or customers. Such discrimination can involve conformity to the expressed prejudices of relevant others, to the discriminator's perception of the desires of others, or-and this is crucial in bureaucracies-to the "stan­dard operating procedure." Gain-motivated discrimination is discussed primarily in recent interest- and institutional-racism theories. A few social scientists (particularly Wellman 1977) have underscored the point that the intent to harm that motivates discriminatory acts may have no immediate relation to prejudice but rather can be tied to protection of one's own political and economic interests. Particularly in institutional­ized discrimination has the conscious intent behind the patterns of dis­crimination less to do with hostility toward minorities than with protecting the privileges of the dominant group.

Much discrimination may be unintentional-Leo not motivated directly or immediately by a conscious intent to harm its victims. Acts of unintentional discrimination may nevertheless have harmful effects because of their close linkage to intentionally harmful practices in other areas or in the past. This indirect linkage has been discussed in the court cases concerning employment and such � educational screening proce­dures as credential and testing requirements.

Types of Discrimination

As can be seen in Table 1, these two dimensions of discrimination, embeddedness and intent, can be cross-classified to generate four basic types of discriminatory practices: Type A-isolate discrimination; Type B-small group discrimination; Type C-direct institutionalized dis-

Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 19

80.6

:1-2

0. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by O

hio

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

on

09/2

6/13

. For

per

sona

l use

onl

y.

DISCRIMINATION 11

cnmmation; and Type D-indirect institutionalized discrimination. These types are here abstracted for the purposes of further analysis; in everyday life they interact.

Table 1 Embeddedness of discriminatory behavior"

Embedded in large-scale organizations?

Intentional?

Not at all Somewhat Entirely

Entirely Isolate Small group Direct institutional

discrimination discrimination discrimination

(Type A) (Type B) (Type C) Somewhat

Not at all Rare? Rare? Indirect institutional discrimination (TypeD)

3Source: Adapted from Feagm & Feagin 1978.

Type A, isolate discrimination, consists of intentionally harmful ac­tion by a dominant-group individual against members of a subordinate group when that action is not embedded in a large-scale institutional or organizational setting. In Type A discrimination, for example, a bigoted white prison guard would implement his prejudice by beating (only) black prisoners whenever he can, even though prison regulations specifi­cally prohibit such beatings. If the majority of fellow guards in a large prison behaved in similar fashion, such actions would no longer be isolat­ed (Type A) discrimination, for the formal prison regulations would be a sham in the face of an informal consensus. Research indicates that Type A discrimination remains common in the United States.

Type B, small-group discrimination, comprises intentionally harmful actions taken by a small group of dominant-group individuals acting in concert against members of a subordinate group, without the immediate support of a large-scale organizational framework. Bombings by con­spirators of a black church in a southern city and of a black's home in a northern city are examples of this type (see Carmichael & Hamilton 1967). Numerous lynchings are Type B actions. Many acts of small­group violence by whites against nonwhites are not supported by a majority of the whites in a community or by a large organization, though a majority might well support less extreme discriminatory actions. Where such practices attract majority support, they become Type C discrimina­tion. Small-group discrimination has often been violent, constituting a

Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 19

80.6

:1-2

0. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by O

hio

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

on

09/2

6/13

. For

per

sona

l use

onl

y.

12 FEAGIN & ECKBERG

serious threat to the lives and property of subordinate group members. Types C and D discrimination concern large-scale organizational con­

texts (dimensionfin Figure 1). Type C, termed here direct institutional­ized discrimination, comprises organizationally or community prescribed actions that by intention have a differential and negative impact on members of a surbordinate group. Both the actions and organi­zational policies directing the actions can be seen as examples of institu­tionalized discrimination. Typically, these actions are carried out routinely by individuals, indeed by large groups of individuals, who occupy roles and positions in organizations and institutions-e.g. legally required practices resulting in the residential or school segregation of blacks and other nonwhites (Franklin 1974:280-81). Type C discrimina­tion can be shaped by informal organizational rules as well as by formal regulations or by laws; and both types of rules have often been embedded in the routine operation of large bureaucracies. Examples include the informal norms guiding real estate practices, which have shaped segre­gated housing patterns in all US cities (Pearce 1976). Informal rules in all institutional areas have long resulted in widespread and routine dis­criminatory practices. Members of certain communities and businesses are often required to act in a discriminatory way, regardless of their own feelings; violation of these norms can result in sanctions. In carrying out institutionalized norms requiring discriminatory practices, bigoted indi­viduals may also express their own prejudices, while unprejudiced indi­viduals may recognize the harm they are doing and regret their actions. Sjoberg, Brymer, and Faris (1966) have shown how bureaucracies become committed to discrimination against subordinated nonwhites and how they routinely implement and serve dominant group interests.

Type D, indirect institutionalized discrimination, consists of organiza­tionally or community prescribed practices, motivated by neither preju­dice nor intent to harm, that nevertheless have a negative and differential impact on members of a subordinate group. On their face, and in their intent, the norms and resulting practices are neutral, or "fair in form." Examples of indirect institutionalized discrimination take two forms: past-in-present discrimination and side-effect discrimination.

Past-in-present discrimination involves apparently neutral present practices whose negative effects derive from prior intentional discrimina­tory practices. One variant involves penalizing minorities now because they lack an ability or qualification they were prevented from acquiring in the past. The use of age restrictions and cumulative employment records in employment screening exemplifies past-in-present discrimina­tion. Where employers or unions have intentionally discriminated against minority persons in the past, but no longer do, the present routine

Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 19

80.6

:1-2

0. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by O

hio

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

on

09/2

6/13

. For

per

sona

l use

onl

y.

DISCRIMINATION 13

enforcement of age ceilings screens out minority persons who are now too old but who would not have been hired when they were younger because of intentional discrimination. Those who faced blatant discrimi­nation in the past are now disproportionately subject to layoffs during periods of economic recession because of a lack of seniority (see US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 1974). Research (Davis 1977) on personnel records in the military shows that the commulative personnel, file is a primary basis for many organizational decisions about promotions and other job opportunities. Unintentionally discriminatory decisions in the present may thus be shaped by blatant discrimination by white officers against nonwhite minorities in past decisions about evalua­tions and recommendations, intentional discrimination now ensconced in the personnel file in the form of apparently neutral statistics and evaluation statements.

Another variant of past-in-present discrimination occurs when stan­dards established in the past, and applicable then only to white Ameri­cans, are applied in the present to nonwhites. The height and weight requirements for jobs in fire and police departments intended in the past for the evaluation of white males, now screen out disproportionate num­bers of Mexican American and Asian American applicants. Research by the senior author on medical schools has pinpointed the negative impact on minority students of attempts to protect traditional white ways of doing things. Some medical schools heavily emphasize authority and impersonality in d'octor(teacher)-student relations. Minority students from different subcultural backgrounds have different values in regard to interpersonal relations and authority. Accenting the traditional white values, and terminating minority students' studies if they do not con­form, may be a type of institutionalized discrimination. Behind a bureau­cratic facade of fairness and impersonality a defense of white interests and values may be detected. How often discrimination in such organiza­tional settings is conscious has not been determined, but the practices themselves were not established originally to have a racially discrimina­tory impact.

Side-effect discrimination involves practices in one institutional or organizational area that have an adverse impact because they are linked to intentionally discriminatory practices in another. For example, reli­ance on educational credentials in the hiring process is widespread among employers (see Krislov 1974). If the routine requirement of a credential has a differential and adverse effect on the employment of minority persons even though it is not used intentionally to differentiate by race, this practice can be seen as side-effect discrimination. Because of poor, segregated school systems and low family incomes, many

Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 19

80.6

:1-2

0. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by O

hio

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

on

09/2

6/13

. For

per

sona

l use

onl

y.

14 FEAGIN & ECKBERG

minority persons are unlikely to have certain of the credentials required in the employment sector (see US Equal Opportunity Commission 1974).

THE LARGER CONTEXT

Interaction and Overlay

Discriminatory actions within one institutional area are frequently linked to discrimination in other institutional settings. Interaction among the various types listed above, and among several examples of a given type, is important in everyday life. Type D discrimination is closely tied to Type C discrimination and, perhaps to a lesser extent, to Types A and B. Various combinations of the types of discrimination can coexist in a given social setting. Minority persons can suffer from a variety of institu­tionalized discriminatory actions, both those intended to have a harmful effect and those not so intended, as well as from flamboyant acts by white bigots. A given act, such as turning away a minority applicant because of organizational regulations, may be carried out more vigorously by a prejudiced white person. Bureaucrats, for example, are often obliged or permitted to make subjective judgments (e.g. a recruiting officer for the armed services can waive entry requirements). A bigoted person might in such a situation practice Type A discrimination. Zucca (1979) found that bigots with the power of institutions behind them can do greater harm than those acting without it. Moreover, the interactive character of discriminatory mechanisms can be seen in the shaping effect of inten­tional discrimination on indirect discrimination. Mechanisms typically exemplifying indirect discrimination can be used by sophisticated dis­criminators intentionally; in recent years some discriminators, realizing that certain traditional discriminatory mechanisms are now illegal, have sometimes resorted to the use of mechanisms that are not intentionally subordinating in other contexts (Blumrosen 1971).

As suggested in Figure 1 (dimension g), the various patterns of dis­crimination ultimately reside within the larger context of a regional or national social system. A few researchers have accentuated this dimen­sion, using terms like "web of racism" or "systematic discrimination." Some time ago Myrdal (1964) illustrated the principle of the cumulative impact of intentional discrimination against southern blacks. More re­cently, Baron (1969) in his analysis of urban areas, has argued that there is a web of racism, that discrimination is cumulative and self-reinforcing as one moves across the urban institutional areas of housing, employ­ment, and education. The joint effect of discrimination across institution-

Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 19

80.6

:1-2

0. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by O

hio

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

on

09/2

6/13

. For

per

sona

l use

onl

y.

DISCRIMINA nON 15

al sectors is substantial because the United States societal system is racially discriminatory in its age-old foundations.

The Cultural Background

Several recent authors have reemphasized the cultural context of institu­tionalized discrimination. Kovel (1970) shows how basic societal values, such as ideas about private property and patriotism, have been the cul­tural crucible in which the particularly American brand of racism was blended. Jones (1972) has noted that America's basic cultural features, including language and the legal system, share Anglo-Saxon-European origins; major organizations operate in this Anglo-Saxon cultural envi­ronment. Persons of African, Mexican, Asian, and Native American ancestry and culture have faced unfamiliar cultural expectations.

Culture also influences science, sometimes misusing it as a basis for discrimination. Kamin (1974) and Eckberg (1979) have demonstrated that the theories and practice of intelligence testing developed by the biological and social sciences have sometimes been instrumental in the oppression of American racial and ethnic groups. In this case the trap­pings of science, including an emphasis on "objectivity" and "value-free investigation," have been used to legitimate racial subordination. Riegel (1972, 1973) and Bowles & Gintis (1976) have argued even more broadly that traditional economic and political ideologies have shaped the devel­opment of the social sciences in the United States.

Class and Racial Discrimination

What is the relationship between the capitalistic political-economic sys­tem and institutionalized racial discrimination? Social scientific discus­sion of this relationship has long been insufficient. Internal colonialism analysts have considered it, but they have focused primarily on colonial­ism and imperialism rather than on other features of capitalism.

Class analysis in the orthodox Marxist tradition has generally played down the importance of racism analysis, seeing class oppression as the core characteristic in this society and racist ideologies as class weapons. Exploitation theories of discrimination date back at least to Marx & Engels' discussion (Marx & Engels 1971) of the stereotype of the poor Irish fostered by British capitalists to divide the working class. A similar view of capitalist activity in the United States was expressed by Cox (1948:393), a neglected Marxist analyst of race relations, who argued that racial prejudice is an "attitude propagated among the public by an exploiting class for the purpose of stigmatizing some group as inferior so that the exploitation of either the group itself or its resources or both may

Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 19

80.6

:1-2

0. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by O

hio

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

on

09/2

6/13

. For

per

sona

l use

onl

y.

16 FEAGIN & ECKBERG

be justified." Clearly, this Marxist tradition can supplement those current psychological explanations of the functions of prejudice that stress exter­nalization and social adjustment (see Pettigrew 1971). Since a form of racial subordination (e.g. slavery) often predates the emergence of well­developed prejudice or ideology, it is plausible to view much prejudice as rationalization. '.

Authors such as Reich (1975) and Ofari (1970) have noted the benefits accruing to those capitalists who channel the labor discontent of white workers against black scapegoats. Reich (1972:91) emphasizes the divi­siveness of attitudinal racism-its role in transferring the "locus of whites' resentment toward blacks and away from capitalism"-but he also shows how discrimination, in such forms as wage differentials, pro­vides additional profits for the capitalist class.

Other authors have taken issue with portions of these arguments. Wilhelm (1970: 132) contends that the orthodox Marxist theory absolves the white working class of responsibility for racial prejudice and discrimi­nation, that. discrimination exists in noncapitalist settings, and that dis­crimination may well disappear as automation increases. Bonacich (1972) develops a "split labor market" perspective that highlights the role of white workers in maintaining privileges, once those privileges are built into a society's structure, by discriminating against nonwhite work­ers.

In contrast, a few social scientists have begun to see both class and race oppression as core characteristics of US society. In their path-breaking book Unorthodox Marxism (1978:181), Albert & Hahnel have devel­oped the view that both class and race discrimination -and stratification have "a determining impact upon the life situation of a particular op­pressed group and a defining effect upon everyone else as well." In their concrete analysis of American society they show how these two core characteristics operate separately and then jointly in specific institutional areas, frequently reproducing and reinforcing each other. This reinforc­ing effect can be seen in the ease with which an employer's gains from illegal racial discrimination (e.g. dual wage scales) can be laundered and banked to look like class-based inequality (e.g. inherited wealth), which is legal in the United States. For Albert & Hahnel, remedies for racial discrimination require grappling with class.

Some who argue in the Marxist tradition (broadly construed) see an eventual decline in the importance of race discrimination. In his contro­versial book The Declining Significance of Race, Wilson (1978: 150) dem­onstrates that in the last decade an affluent class of blacks has surfaced whose economic condition differs significantly from the black majority "underclass." Thus racial oppression, while still important, is now sec-

Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 19

80.6

:1-2

0. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by O

hio

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

on

09/2

6/13

. For

per

sona

l use

onl

y.

DISCRIMINATION 17

ondary to class "in determining black life-chances in the modern indus­trial period." Wilson's nearly exclusive focus on job placement and occu­pational mobility has been cited as a major weakness, since patterns of institutional discrimination in areas other than employment (e.g. hous­ing) have changed little if at all. Nevertheless, in Wilson's view the traditional civil rights organizations and approaches now under the con­trol of comparatively affluent blacks are less important for the rise of the black underclass than a broad attack on class inequality and subordina­tion. Similarly Freeman (1978), an expert on race-relations law, has argued that the United States cannot be rid of racial discrimination as long as the built-in wealth inequality generated by capitalistic exploita­tion of workers remains. Without remedying class inequality, Freeman argues, attempted remedies for racial discrimination only pit working class "white ethnics" against working class blacks and create a (token) affluent class of blacks.

CONCLUSION: WHITHER RESEARCH ON

DISCRIMINATION?

Apart from bits and pieces of anecdotal or demographic data on the political, employment, housing, educational, and judicial problems faced by minority Americans, remarkably few systematic data exist on specific discriminatory mechanisms, particularly the subtler institutionalized practices, in operation. Social scientists have often left the subject to the unsystematic reports of journalists (see Griffin 1961). One of the few recent studies of discriminatory practices is Pearce's 1976 investigation of realtor discrimination, work worthy of imitation in future research on discrimination. Pearce sent black and white couples (matched for in­come) into the field to see if differential treatment by real estate brokers would occur. She found only slight racial discrimination in regard to quality of financial advice and personal courtesy but a substantial amount of discrimination in matters such as houses shown and time spent with the couples. Black couples were much less likely to be shown houses on the first visit, and those blacks shown houses were more likely than whites to be steered to black housing areas. More time was spent on the white couples. Moreover, the more discriminatory brokers tended to be part of the larger and more profitable firms; the prejudice of individual brokers was relatively unimportant since "the organizational situation that salespersons find themselves in overwhelms whatever personal predilections they may have had" (Pearce 1976:261).

Several factors may explain the absence of studies of concrete dis-

Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 19

80.6

:1-2

0. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by O

hio

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

on

09/2

6/13

. For

per

sona

l use

onl

y.

18 FEAGIN & ECKBERG

criminatory action. First, in the last two decades the virtual disappear­ance of traditional legal segregation has caused most discrimination to take new forms that are subtle, informal, and thus both difficult and expensive to document. Even some of Pearce's black couples were un­aware that they had been the victims of intentional discrimination until they later reviewed results from the comparable white couple's visit. Second, as Duster, Matza & Wellman (1979) have noted, government agencies that control funds for much social science research routinely restrict participant-observation studies like Pearce's. By emphasizing census data, survey data, laboratory settings, and the mathematical analysis of existing data, social science will not deal with phenomena such as discrimination that occur in natural settings.

Perhaps one additional sign of the need for reinvigorated sociological research on race-ethnic discrimination is the fact that much current documentation of discrimination is to be found in federal and state court cases. While the testimony in these cases is seldom available, the court decisions and writings of veteran attorneys are often better sources on discriminatory practices than social science research. In addition to court-related materials, much of the best documentation of discriminato­ry practices, and data on the relation of discrimination to effects as well as on the effects themselves, is to be found in the law-related materials of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the US Com­mission on Civil Rights.

Social scientists must now focus intensively on long-neglected aspects of discrimination: the discriminatory actions themselves and their insti­tutional and societal contexts. Recent rethinking of the conventional theories of discrimination and systematic field research such as that of Pearce give us some hope that in the next decade social scientists will develop a comprehensive analysis of discrimination. However, the politi­cal context for such renewed research is not good as we move into the 1980s. Many prominent neo-conservative social scientists (e.g. Daniel P. Moynihan and Nathan Glazer) have hammered home the ideas of "benign neglect" and "great minority advancement," which suggest that racial discrimination will soon be a thing of the past. We dissent from this now-conventional wisdom. Racial discrimination remains a bedrock fea­ture of this society; only research documenting the dimensions of dis­crimination seems to be on the decline.

Literature Cited

Acuna, R. 1972. Occupied America. NY: analysis and review of empirical re-Canfield Press. 282 pp. search. Psychol. Bull. 84:888-914

Ajzen, L, Fishbein, M. 1977. Attitude- Albert, M., Hahnel, R. 1 978. Unorthodox behavior relationships: a theoretical Marxism. Boston: South End Press.

Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 19

80.6

:1-2

0. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by O

hio

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

on

09/2

6/13

. For

per

sona

l use

onl

y.

DISCRIMINATION 19

377 pp. The Origins and Dimensions of the IQ Allport, G. 1958. The Nature of Prejudice. Controversy. NY: Praeger

NY: Doubleday Anchor. 496 pp. Farley, R. 1977. Trends in racial inequali-Andrews, K. H., Kandel, D. B. 1979. Atti- ties. Am. Sociol. Rev. 42:189-207

tude and behavior: a specification of the Fazio, R. H., Zanna, M. P. 1978. Attitudi-contingent consistency hypothesis. Am. nal qualities relating to the stren�th of Sociol. Rev. 44:298-310 the attitude-behavior relationship. J.

Antonovsky,A. 1960. The social meaning Exp. Soc. Psychol. 14:398-408 of discrimination. Phylon 21:81-95 Feagm, J. R. 1977. Indirect institutional-

Archibald, W. P. 1978. Social Psychology ized discrimination. Am. Pol. Q. 5: 177-as Political Economy. Toronto: 200 McGraw Hill Ryerson. 296 pp. Feagin, J. R., Feagin, C. B. 1978. Dis-

Banton, M. 1967. Race Relations. NY: crimination American Style. Engle-Basic Books. 400 pp. wood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 190 pp.

Baron, H. M. 1969. The web of urban ra- Franklin, J. H. 1974. From Slavery to Free-cism. In Institutional Racism in Amer- dom. NY: Knopf. 548 pp. 4th ed. ica, ed. L. L. Knowles, K. Prewitt, pp. Freeman, A. D. 1978. School Desegrega-134-76. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Pren- tion Law: Promise, Contradiction, Ra-tice-HalL 180 pp. tionalization. Minneapolis: Univ.

Becker, G. S. 1971. The Economics of Dis- Minnesota Law School. (Typescript) crimination. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Greeley, A, Sheatsley, P. B. 1971. Atti­Press. 165 pp. 2nd ed. tudes toward racial integration. Sci.

Blalock, H. M. 1967. Toward a Theory of Am. 225:14-18 Minority-Group Relations. NY: Wiley. Griffin, J. H. 1961. Black Like Me. NY: 227 pp. Signet Books. 157 pp.

Blauner, R. 1972. Racial Oppression in Hauser, R., Featherman, D. 1974. White-America. NY: Harper and Row. 309 pp. nonwhite differentials in occupational

Blumer, H. 1960. Race prejudice as a mobility among men in the United sense of group position. Pac. Sociol. States. Demography 11:247-66 Rev. 1:3-10 Heaven, P. C. L. 1976. Personality, preju-

Blumrosen, A W. 1971. Black Employ- dice, and cultural factors. Psychol. Rep. ment and the Law. New Brunswick, 39:724 NJ: Rutgers Univ. Press Heberlein, T. A., Black, J. S. 1976. At-

Bonacich, E. 1972. A theory of ethnic an- titudinal specificity and the prediction tagonism. Am. Sociol. Rev. 37:547-59 of behavior in a field setting. J. Person.

Bowles, S., Gintis, H. 1976. Schooling in Soc. Psychol. 33:474-79 Capitalist America. NY: Basic Books. Hechter, M. 1975. Internal Colonialism. 340 pp. Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Press. 361 pp.

Butler, J. 1978. Institutional racism. J. Hill, L. 1978. Prejudice and discrimina-Black Sociol. 7:5-25 tion: a theoretical investigation of the

Carmichael, S., Hamilton, C. 1967. Black attitude-behavior relationship. PhD Power. NY: Random House. 198 pp. thesis. Univ. Texas, Austin. 194 pp.

Clark, K. B. 1955. Prejudice and Your Jaccard, J., King, G. W., Pomazal, R. Child. Boston: Beacon Press. 247 pp. 1977. Attitudes and behavior: an analy-

Cox, O. C. 1948. Caste, Class, and Race. sis of specificity of attitudinal predic-Garden City, NY: Doubleday. 621 pp. tors. Hum. Relat. 30:817-24

Daniels, J., Houghton, V. 1972. Jensen, Jones, E. E. 1979. The rocky road from Eysenck, and the eclipse of the Galton acts to dispositions. Am. Psychol. paradigm. In Race and Intelligence, ed. 34:107-17 K. Richardson, D. Spears, M. Richards, Jones, J. 1972. Prejudice and Racism. pp. 68-80. Baltimore: Penguin. 205 pp. Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley. 194

Davis, E. 1977. The undermining of unity pp. and the chain of command. In Antholo- Kamin, L. J. 1974. The Science and Poli-gy on Institutional Discrimination, ed. tics of I.Q. NY: Wiley. 184 pp. E. Davis, pp. 66-70. Patrick AFB: De- Kardiner, A., Ovesey, L. 1962. The Mark fense Race Relat. Inst. of Oppression. Cleveland: World

Downs, A 1970. Racism in America and Meridian Books. 396 pp. How to Combat It. Washington DC: US Kinloch, G. C. 1974. The Dynamics of Comm. Civil Rights. 43 pp. Race Relations. NY: McGraw-Hill.

Duster, T., Matza, D., Wellman, D. 1979. 305 pp. Field work and the protection of human Knowles, L. L., Prewitt, K. 1969. Institu-subjects. Am. Sociol. 14:136-41 tiona I Racism in America. Englewood

Eckberg, D. 1979. Intelligence and Race: Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 180 pp.

Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 19

80.6

:1-2

0. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by O

hio

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

on

09/2

6/13

. For

per

sona

l use

onl

y.

20 FEAGIN & ECKBERG

Kovel, J. 1 97 1 . White Racism. NY: Ran­dom House Vintage. 300 pp.

Krislov, S. 1 974. Representative Bureau­cracy. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice­Hall. 1 80 pp.

Levin, J. 1 975. The Functions of Preju­dice. NY: Harper & Row. 1 50 pp.

Marx, K., Engels, F. 1 9 7 1 . Ireland and the Irish Question. Moscow: Progress Pub­lishers. 1 1 6 pp.

Merton, R. K. 1 970. Discrimination and the American creed. In The Study of SOciety, ed. P. l. Rose, pp. 449-57. NY: Random House. 600 pp.

Myrdal, G. 1 964. An American Dilemma, Vol. 1 . NY: McGraw-Hill. 520 pp.

Nordlie, P. G. 1 974. Measuring Changes in Institutional Racial Discrimination in the Army. Washington DC: Hum. Sci. Res. Inc. 109 pp.

Orari, E. 1 970. The Myth of Black Capi­talism. NY: Monthly Rev. Press

Orpen, C. 1 9 7 1 . Prejudice and adjustment to cultural norms among English­speaking South Africans. J. Psychol. 77:2 1 7- 1 8

Pearce, D . M . 1 976. Black, white, and many shades of gray: real estate brokers and their racial practices. PhD thesis. Univ. Michigan. 300 pp.

Perry, R. W. 1 977. Relationship of atti­tudes and action as a function of re­porting conditions and reinforcement history. J. Soc. Psycho/' 1 0 1 :247-54

Perry, R. W., Gillespie, D. F., Parker, H. A. 1 976. Configurations in the analysis of attitudes, importance, and social behavior. Sociol. Soc. Res. 60: 1 3 5-46

Pettigrew, T. F. 1 97 1 . RaciaUy Separate or Together? NY: McGraw-Hill. 3 7 1 pp.

Pettigrew, T. F. 1 973. Racism and the mental health of white Americans. In Racism in Mental Health, ed. C. V. Willie, B. M. Kramer, B. S. Brown, pp. 269-98. Pittsburgh: Univ. Pittsburgh Press. 595 pp.

Reich, M. 1 975. Economic theories of ra­cism. In Schooling in a Corporate Soci­ety, ed. M. Carnoy, pp. 80-92. NY: David McKay. 374 pp.

Riegel, K. F. 1972. Influence of economic and political ideologies on the develop­ment of developmental psychology. Psychol. Bull. 78: 1 29-4 1

Rie�el, K. F. 1 973. An epitaph for a para­digm: introduction for a symposium. Hum. Devel. 1 6: 1-7

Schwartz, S. H. 1 978. Temporal instabili­ty as a moderator of the attitude-behav­ior relationship. J. Person. Soc. Psychol. 36:7 1 5-24

Sherman, S. J., Ahlm, K., Berman, L. Lynn, S. 1 978. Contrast effects and their relation to subsequent behavior. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 14:340-50

Sjoberg, G., Brymer, R. A., Faris, B. 1 966. Bureaucracy and the lower class. Soci-01. Soc. Res. 50:325-37

Tabb, W. K. 1 970. The Political Economy of the Black Ghetto. NY: W. W. Nor­ton. 1 52 pp.

Taeuber, K. E., Taeuber, A. F. 1 965. Negroes in Cities. Chicago: Aldine. 284 pp.

Tarter, D. 1 970. Attitude: the mental myth. Am. Social. 5:276-78

Tumin, M. 1 973. Patterns of Society. Bos­ton: Little, Brown. 458 pp.

Tyson, H. L. Jr., Kaplowitz, S. A. 1 977. Attitudinal conformity and anonymity. Publ. Opin. Q. 4 1 :226-34

US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 1 974. Affirmative Action and Equal Employment. Washington DC: USGPO. 70 pp.

Wellman, D. M. 1 977. Portraits of White Racism. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ.­Press. 254 pp.

Willhelm, S. M. 1 970. Who Needs the Ne­gro? Cambridge: Schenkman. 266 pp.

Williams, R. 1 966. Prejudice and society. In The American Negro Reference Book, ed. J. P. Davis, pp. 727-30. En­glewood Cliffs,' NJ: Prentice-Hall

Wilson, W. J. 1 978. The Declining Si�nifi­cance of Race. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press. 204 pp.

Zucca, G. J. 1 979. A Method of Assess­ment of Institutional Discrimination in the Navy. Patrick AFB, Fla: Defense Race Relat. Inst. 97 pp.

Ann

u. R

ev. S

ocio

l. 19

80.6

:1-2

0. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om w

ww

.ann

ualr

evie

ws.

org

by O

hio

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

on

09/2

6/13

. For

per

sona

l use

onl

y.