RESEARCH ARTICLE

Discourses on Salt and Iron: A First CenturyB.C. Chinese Debate over the Political Economyof Empire

Ming Wan

Published online: 26 February 2012# Journal of Chinese Political Science/Association of Chinese Political Studies 2012

Abstract A first century B.C. Chinese classic Yantielun or Discourses on Salt andIron recorded a heated debate over the costs and benefits and economic foundation ofimperial expansion shortly after the death of Emperor Wudi who had greatly expandedthe Chinese empire. The managers of the empire argued for practical solutions such asstate monopolies of salt and iron to centralize the state and conquer the nomadicXiongnu and touted policy successes they achieved from this. Their scholar criticswanted moral principles rather than material calculations to guide policy and assertedthat human suffering caused by monopolies and expansionary war would doom theempire. This tension between ideals and political necessities created an ideationalfoundation for the successful Chinese empire, which then lasted for two millennia.Strategic dialogues such as the one narrated in Discourses should on balance makecontemporary Chinese leaders cautious in using coercive force. From early on, Chinahas had its own imperial overreach and understands the cost of extensive adventuresbeyond its borders and how excessive reliance on force abroad might threaten theirdomestic political order, which is what the current Chinese government is mostconcerned about.

Keywords Empire . Political Economy of Security . Chinese Foreign Policy . ChineseTraditions .Discourses on Salt and Iron . EmperorWudi

What is the price of an empire? What is the economic foundation of an empire? Willimperial expansion inevitably lead to imperial decline? And ultimately, what is thepurpose of building empires in the first place? These questions have been raised notonly by contemporary strategic thinkers, but also all ancient empires must have beendriven by such questions, whether or not contemporaries were fully cognizant ofthem or whether they were written down for the benefit of posterity. Thus, we paygreat attention to historical texts that reveal these ideas. Thucydides’ Peloponnesian

J OF CHIN POLIT SCI (2012) 17:143–163DOI 10.1007/s11366-012-9190-6

M. Wan (*)Department of Public and International Affairs, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030, USAe-mail: mwan@gmu.edu

War (431-404 B.C.), for example, has influenced studies of international relations tothis day.

This paper examines a first century B.C. Chinese classic Yantielun or Discourseson Salt and Iron (hereinafter Discourses) by Huan Kuan. Discourses is weighty, with60 chapters in 10 volumes, slightly over one third of Thucydides’ Peloponnesian Warin length. 1 We have textual information and archeological finds to corroborate thisbook. 2 Considered a Chinese classic, it connects contemporary international studiesin at least five areas. First, in purpose and breadth of fundamental issues addressed,Discourses is more similar to Federalist Papers than to Peloponnesian War. Dis-courses is fundamentally about how a country should be governed. It discussesfinance and punishment as well as war and peace. Thus, the study of the bookcontributes to comparative political philosophy.

Secondly, as one of the earliest public debates on foreign policy ever recorded,Discourses recounts a major debate between two sharply divided camps over a widerange of fundamental questions facing the Han Empire. Such a clash of mindssharpens our understanding of the ideas held by intellectuals and officials of the time.Interest in ideas as a driving force in international relations has heightened. Ideas aredefined here as consisting of world-views, principled beliefs, and causal beliefs. [1]To argue that ideas matter, we need to examine their content and context as well astheir consequences, particularly when we discuss canonical works, in order tounderstand what concerns, theories, and arguments endure over time. We need tostudy non-Western cannons because they shed light on what is universal acrosscultures and because they shaped the strategic traditions of non-Western powers likeChina. The ideas expressed in Discourses when historicized should also enrich ourunderstanding of international relations. Scholars based in the West do talk aboutancient Chinese thinkers like Sun Zi (Sun Tzu). Now, it is time to broaden ourunderstanding of Chinese strategic traditions. [2, 3]

Third, Discourses sheds light on the political economy of empires in general.Discourses is comparable to Peloponnesian War in sophistication. InternationalRelations theorists tend to treat Peloponnesian War as a classic on distribution ofpower: Thucydides attributed the cause of the Peloponnesian War to Athens’ growingpower and the corresponding fear of its archrival Sparta of losing its own power. 3 Bycontrast, Discourses can be viewed as a text of the ‘political economy of security’ bycontemporary International Relations scholars.

1 Calculated from the e-text of Discourses at the website of www.gouxue.com [http://www.guoxue.com/zibu/zhajia/yantielun/ytlml.htm], Esson M. Gale, trans., Discourses on Salt and Iron: A debate on StateControl of Commerce and Industry in Ancient China, Chapters I-XIX (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1931), andThucydides, The Peloponnesian War, trans. Benjamin Jowett, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990),scanned and edited especially for Peithô's Web [http://www.classicpersuasion.org/pw/thucydides/thucydides-jowetttoc-b.htm].2 Sima Qian (145-86 B.C.), Shiji (Records of the grand historian]. www.guoxue.com [http://www.guoxue.com/shibu/24shi/shiji/sjml.htm]; Ban Gu (32–92), Hanshu (The history of the Former Han dynasty). www.guoxue.com [http://www.guoxue.com/shibu/24shi/hansu/hsuml.htm]; Chun-shu Chang, The Rise of theChinese Empire, 2 vols. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007), 3–6; Zhongshu Wang, HanCivilization, trans. K.C. Chang (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); Michael Loewe, Records of HanAdministration, 2 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967).3 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, revised and intro by T.E. Wick (New York: ModernLibrary, 1982), Book I, 23.

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Fourth, Discourses is a civilizational work—the debate was about what someconsidered to be a moral life—rather than a parsimonious analysis of security.Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War is such a text as well. [4] Therefore, this Chineseclassic should be relevant for those interested in power versus morality as well.

Last but not least, Discourses illustrates the intrinsic value of Chinese strategicthinking at a crucial formative stage of the Chinese empire, a topic of increasingsignificance given the country’s return to great power status and the Chinese govern-ment’s recent efforts to enhance soft power; partly by highlighting China’s imperialglories and seeking guidance from its traditions.

This paper cannot address all five areas sufficiently, which require engagementwith considerable existing scholarship and debates to determine how this Chineseclassic will lend its weight to a particular line of arguments. Instead, it focuses on howDiscourses sheds light on financing, economic foundation, and purpose of empire.

Some early scholars like John K. Fairbank analyzed Chinese foreign policy in thecontext of Chinese traditions. They particularly focused on “Sino-centralism”, theChinese belief that their country enjoyed moral superiority and should be at the centerof a hierarchical international system. [5–7] They argue that the past frames thepresent, despite the fact that Mao Zedong appeared to be destroying Chinese tradi-tions. This cultural approach was challenged by more systemic and realist scholarslike Michael Ng-Quinn. Ng-Quinn argues that traditions change and that scholarswho emphasize traditions put too much emphasis on Confucian values. [8] However,we do not have to take a historical essentialist view that tradition does not change.Chinese strategic traditions can be remolded and re-imagined for contemporary use,which is precisely why we need to study them. The causal effect of traditions shouldbe viewed as presenting contemporary decision makers with a strategic repertoire ormodels of success and failure, which was what Fairbank had in mind. [9] This paperwill discuss an important foreign policy debate during the formative years of theChinese empire as part of China’s strategic repertoire. Moreover, studies of Chinesetraditions do not have to be limited to Confucianism.

With Chinese reform and opening to the outside world in the late 1970s, Chinesetraditions drew little attention from those who study Chinese foreign relations. Tomany observers, China was seeking modernization, which meant abandoning tradi-tional ways or what was left with Mao’s revolution. Scholars also sought moreuniversal explanations, consistent with their academic training and a trend in thefield of international studies to move away from cultural considerations. The end ofthe Cold War initially weakened area studies including China studies.

Now that China is rising, the issue of Chinese strategic traditions is again catchingacademic attention. To understand where East Asia is headed, one vital considerationis that Asia will return to its past. When the Cold War imperative disappeared in theearly 1990s, scholars sought a new lens through which to think about East Asianinternational relations. As Samuel Huntington argued, “Asia’s past will be Asia’sfuture. The choice for Asia is between power balanced at the price of conflict or peacesecured at the price of hegemony. Western societies might go for conflict and balance.History, culture, and the realities of power strongly suggest that Asia will opt forpeace and hegemony. The era that began with the Western intrusions of the 1840s and1850s is ending. China is resuming its place as regional hegemon, and the East iscoming into its own.” [10] In a recent book focused on China’s rise and Asia’s future,

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David Kang argues that China’s rise will lead to a stable East Asia thanks to Chineseconstraints and Asian accommodations of China based on identities that have devel-oped over millennia. [11]

Asia’s future may well be shaped by an all encompassing global force, which wasnot as much present in Europe’s or Asia’s past. Thus, we should be guarded againstmaking a deterministic argument linking China’s strategic traditions to its currentforeign policy. At the same time, it would be unrealistic to ignore how traditions helpframe one’s worldview, interests, and identity. We need to take Chinese strategictraditions seriously also because both the Chinese government and scholars areincreasingly turning to Chinese history for wisdom and guidance in current foreignpolicy strategies. Chinese President Hu Jintao promoted the idea of a harmoniousworld at the United Nations in September 2005, which has become a mantra for thegovernment. Chinese thinkers are again interested in ancient Chinese notions ofinternational relations such as Tianxia or “all under heaven,” which is the Chineseway of describing the morality-based Chinese world order. [12] Moreover, Confu-cianism is seeing a revival in Chinese elite politics and everyday life. [13]

Two schools of thought have emerged over Chinese strategic traditions eventhough there is not yet a sustained, sharp, and high profile debate. On one side, earlyscholars heavily influenced by Fairbank emphasize the centrality of Confucianmorality in China’s relations with foreign peoples. Kang’s China Rising book is acurrent example of such thinking. On the other side, while emphasizing Chineseculture, Alastair Iain Johnston argues in Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture andGrand Strategy in Chinese History that Chinese strategic traditions, which could betermed “strategic culture” because of their consistency over time, also justifiedoffensive use of military force, no less than any other civilizations. 4

Johnston’s book situates studies of Chinese strategic culture in mainstream inter-national relations and helps to expand academic interest in Chinese traditions. At thesame time, while serving as a necessary correction to earlier overemphasis onConfucian values in Chinese strategic thinking, Johnston too easily dismisses Con-fucianism as merely symbolic. His research on the seven Chinese military classicsapplied to Ming generals’ strategic thoughts, impressive though it is, is insufficient tosustain a sweeping claim that Chinese strategic culture has followed a parabellumparadigm. Arthur Waldron is right in his book review of Cultural Realism thatJohnston needs to engage with far more prominent Confucians rather than justmilitary writers and to reconcile his view of Chinese strategic culture with thehistorical fact that Chinese consistently put Confucian values at the core of theirpolitical system. [14]

This paper analyzes a policy debate between officials and Confucian scholarsabout how to deal with “barbarians” at the door. What is particularly interesting aboutthis debate is that the governments side was represented by managers of the empirerather than generals, which brought into sharp focus the issue of financing militaryexpansion, an issue often ignored by Chinese military writers. This debate was morefundamental than whether China should adopt an offensive or defensive militarystrategy. Rather, Confucian scholars went to the core of the matter, namely how use offorce would affect what we now call security of political regime. One key impact of

4 Johnston, Cultural Realism.

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Chinese traditions on contemporary Chinese strategy is arguably this persistenttendency to have a “comprehensive” strategy that often subordinates military con-siderations to the more paramount concern of maintaining imperial rule in a Chinesefashion. Confucianism largely prevailed on that higher level. In his review ofCultural Realism, Joseph W. Esherick criticized Johnston’s tendency to view callsfor restraint as contingent on a weak military position and argued that China’spolitical preferences had kept the military force weak in the first place. [15] TheChinese imperial court often preferred to have a weak military force to preventemergence of rival power centers or peasant rebellions due to excessive defensespending’s burden on them. Moreover, this paper examines the calls by Confucianscholars for restraint when China was enjoying a favorable military position in theHan Dynasty, one of China’s great expansion eras. At present Chinese tend to turn toChina’s glorious dynasties such as the Han Dynasty for inspiration and strategiclessons.

Whither Imperial Expansion

The Salt and Iron Debate (hereinafter the Debate) took place amid a dramatic imperialexpansion under Emperor Wudi, the Martial Emperor, of the Former Han dynasty(202 B.C.-A.D. 8). Wudi (r. 141-87 B.C.), the sixth Han emperor, expanded theChinese empire in all directions, with modern-day Xinjiang in the west, the edge ofthe Gobi Desert in the north, Korea in the northeast, Hainan Island in the south, andVietnam and Yunnan in the southwest. Wudi conducted 28 military expeditions infour decades (129-90 B.C.) and seized 1.5–1.7 million square miles of new territory.He came to rule over 50 million people in an area of 3.5 million square miles. 5 At theother end of the Eurasian continent, the Roman Empire was expanding also, butultimately was much smaller in territory than the Han Empire during Wudi’s reign.

This paper emphasizes Wudi’s campaigns against the nomadic Xiongnu in thenorth and northwest and his diplomatic and military efforts to control “the states ofthe Western Regions”, the Chinese expression for Central Asia, in order to outflankthe Xiongnu. The Debate focuses on the “Xiongnu problem”. The Xiongnu Empire,formed in 209 B.C., was Han China’s chief rival and repeated attacker. Before theHan recovered the great bend of the Yellow River, the Xiongnu cavalry could reachthe Han capital Changan in a day or two. No other Han foes were in a similar positionto threaten its very survival.

Wudi’s expansion took place in the formative age of the Chinese empire. EmperorShihuangdi of the Qin dynasty unified what was then China in 221 B.C. andexpanded its territories. In fact, the enhanced external threat to Han China had beengenerated by Qin China’s imperial expansion. Shihuangdi sent an army to seize thefertile bend of the Yellow River, which had been the traditional grazing land for thenomadic Xiongnu, provoking the creation of the first known nomadic empire to fightthe Chinese. 6[16] The first centralized Chinese empire lasted for merely 14 years. Arebel leader Liu Bang established the Han dynasty in 202 B.C. and it took six decades

5 Chang, Rise of the Chinese Empire, Vol. 1, 215.6 See also [17]

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for the Han government to consolidate power. The government let the people “take arest” by reducing taxes, lessening criminal punishment, and adopting a more frugal courtlife style than had the Qin dynasty. During this period, the Han dynasty was too weak tostrike back at the Xiongnu who repeatedly penetrated into Han territories. A majorXiongnu attack in 201 B.C. resulted in a humiliating defeat for Liu Bang. The Chineseemperors subsequently adopted an appeasement policy of “heqin” (peace and marriage)by paying tributes to the Xiongnu and marrying off Chinese princesses to “barbarian”rulers. But the Xiongnu continued to raid Chinese territories, with 13 recordedinvasions in 198-141 B.C., two of which threatened the safety of the Han capital. 7

Emperor Wudi reversed the policy of appeasement of his predecessors and wagedepic battles with the Xiongnu Empire. Wudi first sent embassies to Central Asia to seekallies. By 133 B.C., he firmly decided on war with the Xiongnu. In 129 B.C. Wudiordered four generals to attack the Xiongnu in the frontier. From 128 to 117 B.C., theChinese sought to conquer the Xiongnu. Han general Huo Qubing struck deep into theXiongnu territories and dealt a severe blow to the Xiongnu. That defeat led to an internalsplit among the Xiongnu and the surrender of a Xiongnu chief with 40,000 men to theHan government. In 119 B.C. Han generals Wei Qing and Huo Qubing made a pincermove into the desert and defeated the Xiongnu. In 116-101 B.C. the Xiongnu avoidedconfronting the Han and Wudi engaged in expansionary wars against Korea, thesouthern and southwestern kingdoms. [18] The Han government had to create newadministrative organs in the conquered regions due to their vastness, 164,749 squaremiles west of the Yellow River alone. 8 To ensure safe passage for diplomats andmerchants traveling to the west, Wudi created a line of defensive watchtowers andfortresses, which would ensure Chinese influence in the region for the next twocenturies. Incidentally, Wudi opened the eastern end of the Silk Road that would linkEast Asia all the way to Europe.

Wudi’s imperial expansion was based on China’s stronger economic base inagriculture and industry and on a series of financial policies designed to raiserevenues, particularly the government’s monopolies of crucial commodities such assalt and iron. Wudi’s military campaigns were costly. In wars with the Xiongnu in thenorth and the northwest, the Han dispatched a total of 1.2 million cavalrymen,800,000 foot soldiers, and 10.5 million men in logistic support, which cost the Hangovernment 100 billion cash (Han copper coin) a year whereas the regular annualgovernment revenue was only 12 billion. 9 By the end of Wudi’s reign, the empirewas spent. Refugees roamed around the country and peasant rebellions eruptedfrequently. Moreover, serious fighting resumed in 100 B.C. and the Xiongnu dealtHan troops a series of defeats. Thus, in 89 B.C. Wudi refused his minister SangHongyang’s request for new military colonies in Central Asia and for continuousconstructions of fortresses westward. Wudi died shortly afterwards. Grand Comman-dant Huo Guang, whose granddaughter became the empress of the new emperor,wanted to continue Wudi’s new policy to “rest the people” and clashed with Sangwho wanted to follow Wudi’s early policies of imperial expansion. 10

7 Chang, Rise of the Chinese Empire, Vol. 1, 142.8 Chang, Rise of the Chinese Empire, Vol. 1, 2.9 Ibid., Vol. 1, 2–3.10 Wang, Ping xi ben bai hua Yan tie lun, 7–9.

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The Han court convened a meeting in 81 B.C. The meeting generated a heated debateabout the costs and benefits of imperial expansion. Sixty plus representatives fromaround the country were invited to the meeting. They belonged to two categories:wenxue (man of learning referred to as the Literati here) and xianliang (man of virtuereferred to as the Worthies here). The government was represented by two person-ages, Chancellor Tian Qianqiu, along with his Lieutenant Chancellor, and GrandeeSecretary Sang Hongyang, along with his Secretary. The Chancellor (chengxiang),the Grandee Secretary (yushidafu), and the Grand Commandant (dasima) wereknown as “the three excellencies” in the Han dynasty. The chancellor was in chargeof the state budget and evaluation of officials. The Grandee Secretary was initially adeputy to the chancellor but became independent over time. He was the judiciarysupervisor of all officials.

At the meeting, the Literati and Worthies sharply criticized the state monopoliesand war with the Xiongnu. Of the 294 speeches made in the Debate, the critics spoke148 times (123 from the Literati and 25 from the Worthies) whereas Sang spoke 113times. Known to be cautious, Tian the host hardly talked. The other two officials atthe meeting spoke 29 times and supported Sang’s views. A senior official during thereign of Emperor Xuandi (74 B.C.-49 B.C.), Huan Kuan compiled Discourses basedon the meeting records. A Confucianist himself, Huan favored the critics of Wudi’spolicy. But commentators on the Discourses generally agree that Huan provided aneven-handed, accurate account of the Debate.

The participants of the Debate did not use the term empire. Chinese did not have aterm at the time that would be the equivalent of the English word empire. The debaterssimply called China zhongguo (the middle kingdom) as contrast to siyi (surroundingbarbarians). Chinese rulers were called tianzi (the son of heaven) who ruled tianxia(all under the heaven), which used to have different states (guo). The Debate wasfundamentally about the expanding Han Empire and its consequences. It raisedquestions that should be familiar for contemporary students of empire. Historiansrecognize Emperor Wudi as an empire builder that set the standards for Chinese rulersfor the next 2000 years. [19, 20]

Financing an Empire

Discourses wastes no time getting to the core issue of the Debate, namely the statemonopolies of salt and iron, thus the title of the book. Unlike his predecessors whoadopted lassie faire economic policies, Emperor Wudi chose state intervention in theeconomy to centralize the state and to generate revenues for imperial expansion. Nextto grains, salt and iron were the main sources of revenue for the Han government,which established monopolies over the two commodities in 119 B.C. The GrandMinister of Agriculture administered the state monopolies of salt and iron with saltand iron officials stationed throughout the country. [21] Other interventionist eco-nomic policies included monopolies on the minting of coins in 112 B.C. and of liquorin 98 B.C., and the equable marking measures in 115 B.C. 11

11 Chang, Rise of the Chinese Empire, Vol. 1, 87–88.

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The Literati and Worthies argued against state monopolies. First, “with the systemof the salt and iron monopolies, the liquor excise, and equable marketing, establishedin the provinces and demesnes, the Government has entered into financial competi-tion with the people, dissipating primordial candor and simplicity and sanctioningpropensities to selfishness and greed” (chap 1 para 2 or 1.2). 12 Second, “nimbletraders and unscrupulous officials buy in cheap to get high returns” (1.12). Third, “theiron implements made by the government are expensive but of lower quality” because“unhappy corvée labor and inmates do not work hard” (36.6).

Sang Hongyang, the Grandee Secretary, defended the state monopolies as neces-sary for funding wars to secure the country from the Xiongnu threat. “When therevenue for the defense of the frontier fell short, the salt and iron monopoly wasestablished, the liquor excise and the system of equable marketing introduced; goodswere multiplied and wealth increased so as to furnish the frontier expenses” (1.3).How could the critics suggest that the sources of revenues be abolished, Sang askedpointedly, when “our sons and younger brothers, far from home, suffer privations onthe borders” (12.1). Using historical examples, Sang argued that the state monopolieswere necessary for centralizing state power (9.1). If the central government did notcontrol natural resources, they would fall into the hands of powerful private families.“Only aggressive people can come at their wealth” since “the sources of power andprofit are assuredly in the mountain fastnesses and the depths of the marshes” (5.1). Aresulting polarization of wealth would threaten the central government. The officialsalso concluded that the policies were well implemented (2.1, 14.1, 36.5).

The Secretary under Sang argued that the government followed a successful policyof enriching the state and strengthening the army. Thanks to the state monopolies “inspite of the fact that our armies made expeditions east and west, expenditures werewell provided for without increasing the levies and taxes. Arithmetic is perceivedonly by the talented and not understood by the multitude” (14.3). The Secretary citedhistorical cases in which wise leaders built strong states by opening up new land andpromoting manufacture, which encouraged neighbors to trade with them (14.1).

The debate over the state monopolies relates directly to the debate over nationalsecurity, and particularly to wars with the Xiongnu. The Literati and Worthiesessentially argued a case of “imperial overstretch” under Wudi. Criticizing endlessmilitary campaigns, the Literati argued that the costly wars sank the state and thepeople into poverty. “The Middle Kingdom is in the throes of forced labor and levies,while the frontiersmen are beset by garrison duties” (14.6). By contrast, “in the notvery distant past before the expeditions against the Barbarians of the North and South,labor conscriptions and levies were few, and the people were rich and satisfied”(15.2). The critics who did not believe trade generates value thought the benefits of

12 The English quotations for the first 19 chapters of the book used in this paper come from Esson M. Gale,trans., Discourses on Salt and Iron: A debate on State Control of Commerce and Industry in Ancient China,Chapters I-XIX (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1931). This author translated the English quotations for the otherchapters. For Chinese versions, see Lu Liehong, Xin yi Yan tie lun (New translation of Discourses on Saltand Iron) (Taipei: Sanmin shuju, 1995); Wang Liqi, Yan tie lun jiao zhu (Discourses on salt and iron:corrections and notes) (Beijing: Zhonghua shujun, 1992); and Wang Ning, ed., Ping xi ben bai hua Yan tielun, Qian fu lun (Discourses on Salt and Iron and Discourses of a Non-Official in modern Chinese)(Beijing: Beijing guangbo xueyuan chubanshe, 1992). The chapter and paragraph numbers are based inWang, Yan tie lun jiao zhu.

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trade were exaggerated and they dismissed the new territories gained on the frontieras worthless (14.6).

Sang offered several lines of defense over the cost of the war. First, costly warswaged successfully yield long-term benefits. As he noted, “during the time of Wudi,provinces and demesnes were tired of wars but services were relaxed later in the east,west, and south” (42.4). Second, the government could afford wars while not hurtingthe population thanks to the state monopolies. As a case in point, thanks to thereforms initialized by Chancellor Shang Yang (390-338 B.C.) to introduce firm law athome and collect taxes, “he was able to wage war on enemy countries, to conquerforeign states, to annex new lands, and to extend wide his territories, without over-taxing the people for the support of the army” (7.1). Third, wars actually pay if oneadopts correct policies. Thanks to Shang’s reform, “the mobilization of troopsbrought always new additions to the territory, and peace a constant increase inwealth” (7.7). Fourth, the heqin policy of appeasing the Xiongnu was costly andineffective, “with the rise of Han, the government adopted a heqin policy and sentrich presents to Shanyu [Xiongnu emperor] but…attacks on the Chinese borderincreased” (43.1). The Secretary also defended expansion as beneficial for a crowdedpopulation. People were spared hardship from trudging behind the ploughs thanks tohorses and cattle from the north and people could enjoy fruit from the south.

We have some economic information to piece together a rough picture of howEmperor Wudi paid for his wars. The Han government established a taxation system,with two main financial institutions that collected revenues. The ministry of agricul-ture (dasinong), which financed state functions, collected taxes on the people andrevenues from the state-owned land and sale of official titles, and administered themonopolies of salt and iron. The lesser treasury (shaofu), which financed the imperialhousehold, collected revenues from registered merchants, natural products except saltand iron, and managed the minting of coins and also collected poll tax on minors. TheHan government continued the practice of previous rulers to collect capitation (fu) taxon the population, 120 cash per adult between 15 and 56, which went to the publictreasury, and 20 cash per child and elderly, which went to the imperial household.Cash is a copper coin, 10,000 cash equal to 1 jin or catty of gold (1 jin0244 g). Seniorofficials and soldiers were exempted whereas merchants had to pay twice as much.The government also collected land taxes, one fifteenth of the harvest set at 203 B.C.and reduced to one thirtieth in 156-155 B.C. In addition, men had to provide civil andmilitary service for the empire. [22] It is estimated that the Han government in Wudi’stime collected 12 billion cash plus 1 million shi (1 shi equals 0.565 U.S. bushel) ofgrain for the government and 8 billion cash for the imperial household. In addition,the government could draft 13 to 15 million eligible men for military service. 13

Wudi’s imperial expansion was expensive. His standing army of 400,000 men,including 80,000–100,000 cavalrymen, in his early years grew to 600,000–700,000men, including 300,000 cavalrymen, after 124 B.C. and more than 400,000 of histroops were professional soldiers. Wudi introduced a military affairs revolution inChina by shifting from infantry to cavalry and from conscripts to professionalsoldiers, having learned a lesson from the founding Han emperor’s humiliating defeatat the hand of the Xiongnu when the Han army was composed of largely immobile

13 Chang, Rise of the Chinese Empire, Vol. 1, 85–86.

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foot soldiers. But it cost far more to maintain cavalry than infantry and even moreduring wartime. In addition to 36 shi of grain provision for a soldier, the average costof having a foot soldier was 10,000 cash per year and that for a cavalryman and hishorse was 87,000 cash per year. Thus, it would cost the Han government 29.1 billioncash if it maintained a peacetime standing army of 600,000 with 300,000 infantrymenand 300,000 horsemen, which would be 2.43 times of the government annual revenueof 12 billion cash and 1.46 times of the total revenues that included 8 billion cash forthe imperial household. Costs spiked dramatically during military campaigns, costing36,500 cash for a foot soldier a year and 150,000 cash for a cavalryman. During hisreign, Wudi committed 1.2 million cavalrymen, 800,000 infantrymen, and 10.5million men for logistic support in wars with the Xiongnu. He also resettled morethan 1 million Chinese in the newly conquered territories west of the Yellow River,thus costing 100 billion cash a year in the western expansion alone. 14

Sang and other managers of empire had a good reason to be proud of their achievementin paying for military campaigns as well as for other imperial projects. While the Hangovernment was spent by 90 B.C., the empire had sustained 40 years of virtually non-stopmilitary campaigns and preparation, no small achievement from a fiscal perspective.

Ultimately, we do not know whether Chinese conquest paid off. It is difficult toprovide a balance sheet for empires, with or without good economic information, asshown by the difficulties of making such a calculation for modern colonial empires. [23]But from a realist perspective that emphasizes competition for power and survival,Emperor Wudi succeeded in the game of international politics. The Han dynasty ulti-mately succeeded in subduing the Xiongnu. Wudi had destroyed much of the Xiongnuwealth even though he suffered major military setbacks before he died. The Xiongnumoved their headquarters further west, away from the Chinese border. In 71 B.C. theXiongnu lost a war against Wusun, a former Xiongu vassal that was now allied with theHan dynasty. That defeat was followed by an internal fight over succession, leading to twocompeting Xiongnu confederations. In 53 B.C., the southern confederation surrendered toChina and became a Chinese vassal. A China-dominated peace emerged until the fall ofthe Former Han dynasty. The Xiongnu could not take advantage of China’s weaknessduring the Wang Mang period (A.D. 9–23) and the subsequent civil war. By the midsecond century A.D., the Xiongnu threat essentially ended. [24]

What Sang did not argue but the Han government learned to do in later years was toeconomize expansion. From 65 B.C. to 40 B.C., the Han court focused on militarycolonies rather than military campaigns to give China a more permanent base as a cost-effective way to handle elusive foes. [25] The Han government also promoted “local-ization,” which required much diplomatic skill to accomplish. After Wudi’s death, theHan government increasingly relied on non-Chinese allies led by Chinese generals toengage in military campaigns. The Han government maintained Chinese dominance inCentral Asia through alliance formation, diplomacy, and a divide and conquer strategy. 15

Sang largely won the debate over state monopolies. Whereas the state monopolyon liquor was removed the monopolies on salt and iron continued for the remainder ofthe Former Han dynasty except for 3 years in 44-41 B.C. 16 For those who wanted a

14 Ibid., Vol. 1, 2, 86.15 Loewe, Military Operations in the Han Period, 6–9.16 Nishijima, “Economic and Social History of Former Han,” 605–607.

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strong state and an expanding empire, the state monopolies made sense because theyserved the purpose of national defense against the Xiongnu and also made it easier forthe Han government to centralize power. At the very least, they were importantsources of revenue for the government, which is why the Han government continuedthe policies. One may argue that state monopolies distorted the Han economy just asthey would today but it was much more difficult to tax flows of private goodsefficiently than extracting resources directly.

On the opposing side, the Literati and Worthies asked why the countryside waspoorer than before the state monopolies were introduced. They went into great detailsabout how the average person was suffering from the services, taxes, and statemonopolies. As a sure indication of growing problems, there were a large numberof refugees and protests throughout the country. Following sophisticated reasoning,the Literati essentially argued about the unintended consequences of the state mo-nopolies. “Far-sighted and far-reaching in intent is your policy but contiguous withprofit for powerful families” (9.2). Indeed, the powerful families would gain groundovertime and ultimately contributed to the downfall of the Later Han dynasty.

The state monopolies adopted by Wudi need to be understood in the context of thepolicy innovations by a series of statesmen serving their rulers since the Spring andAutumn period (770-453 B.C.). Ambitious scholars traveled to various states to lobbyfor a hearing of their reform ideas from rulers to achieve personal wealth and successfor rulers. Among them were Legalists such as Guan Zhong (d. 645 B.C.) of thedomain of Chi, Li Kui (late 5th century B.C.) of the state of Wei, Shen Buhai (d. 337B.C.) and Han Feizi (d. 233 B.C.) of the state of Han, Shang Yang (d. 338 B.C.) andLi Si (d. 208 B.C.) of the state of Qin. Of different philosophical schools competing atthe time, Legalists designed policy measures to advance their central political concernabout preserving and strengthening the state. [26] Legalists emphasized centralizationof power based on punishment and rewards. Complaining that few people “put theirhands to a plow” or “buckle on armor,” Han Feizi maintained that “an enlightenedruler will make use of men’s strength but will not heed their words, will reward theiraccomplishments but will prohibit useless activities. Then the people will be willingto exert themselves to the point of death in the service of their sovereign”. [27] ShangYang helped the state of Qin to become a rich nation with a strong army thateventually defeated the other six competing states. [28] For Legalists, to build astrong army one needs to increase extraction of revenues. The state also promotedproduction. The policy innovated by Legalists played a crucial role in determiningwhich state came out on top in the Warring States period. [29] As an indication of hisemulation of the Legalists, Sang Hongyang talked admiringly about the policies andideas of Shang, Guan, and Li in the Debate.

The Economic Foundation of Empire

The Salt and the Iron Debate was intertwined with an agriculture-versus-commercedebate. The Literati preferred agriculture over commerce. “Agriculture should be thefundamental occupation of men, clothes and food being of primary necessity to thepeople. With both of these attended to, the country will be rich and the people atpeace” (2.2). Thus, “the true King promotes rural pursuits and discourages branch

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industries; he checks the people’s desires through the principles of propriety andrighteousness” (1.9). The Literati found a justification for a pro-agriculture policy firstin the thinking of the ancient saints who “honored virtue and scorned profit” (4.2). Theyalso reasoned that there is “no other means of enriching the realm apart from applyingoneself to the development of agriculture, the fundamental industry” (14.2). In fact, acountry with fertile land may starve when merchants prosper whereas agriculture isneglected (1.10). And commerce will corrupt people by enticing them with gains (1.8).

In response, Sang argued that society needs both agriculture and commerce.“Thus, without artisans, the farmers will be deprived of the use of implements;without merchants, all prized commodities will be cut off. The former would leadto stoppage of grain production, the latter to exhaustion of wealth” (1.7). In fact,commerce and agriculture facilitate each other. And “people who live in the moun-tains and marshes, or on moors and sterile uplands, depend on the effective circula-tion of goods to satisfy their wants” (3.5). Moreover, commerce creates wealth. Citingsome affluent large cities as examples, Sang reasoned that they were wealthy becauseof their convenient locations near the networks of roads. Thus, “profits depend on‘circumstances,’ not on strenuous farming” (3.1). And since large merchant familiesamassed wealth by seeking profit, “why then must one encourage simple agriculturein order to enrich the country?” (2.5)

The debate over agriculture versus commerce did not have immediate policy impact.The idea that agriculture was essence or fundamental occupation (ben) and manufac-ture, mining and commerce were lower in priority (mo) had been well establishedbefore Wudi’s time. [30] The Qin dynasty adopted policies to discriminate againstmerchants by designating them as occupying lower social status, by forbidding themto become officials, and by imposing heavier taxes on them. The Han dynastycontinued that policy. The first Han emperor favored agriculture and reduced theagricultural tax. Nevertheless, with agriculture flourishing the population increasedquickly as well, resulting in larger urban population and greater needs for commerce.The merchant class did accumulate wealth, which brought them political influence.

The debate between agriculture and commerce was significant for imperial expan-sion. On the one hand, Sang’s argument that commerce may contribute to wealthcreation and its complementarity with agriculture make economic sense. Factually, tradehad been important for the Han government, even before the Wudi era. From thatperspective, a state policy of actively discriminating against commerce would damagethe economic foundation of an empire. In China’s own history, the Southern Songdynasty (1127–1279) depended heavily on maritime commerce for government reve-nues, which was crucial for financing its strong navy to defend itself against the“barbarian” dynasty in Northern China. From a modern perspective, overseas tradewas closely linked with European imperial expansion. In the eighteenth century GreatBritain was the strongest power even though it had smaller territories and populationthan France and Austria. Great Britain’s power was based on its greater financialresources most of which came from the taxation of commercial activities at home andoverseas. [31]

On the other hand, it was not unreasonable for Chinese elites to consider agricul-ture the center of life and power. One should not view Confucianists as alwaysfavoring agriculture and Legalism always favoring commerce. Shang Yang, a herofor Sang Hongyang, built a strong Qin state with an emphasis on agriculture and free

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movement of farmers to increase incentives for agricultural production. Shang dis-couraged trade because it was difficult to extract taxes from it. 17 Shang’s preferencefor agriculture was well known by his contemporaries. Assuming that value comesonly from agricultural labor, Han Feizi, a leading Legalist, complained that “Now thepeople of the state all discuss good government, and everyone has a copy of theworks on law by Shang Yang and Kuan Chung [Guan Zhong] in his house, and yetthe state gets poorer and poorer, for though many talk about farming, very few puttheir hands to a plow.” 18

Historically, China’s advanced agriculture sustained a large population and supporteda vibrant civilization, both important for the country’s influence in Asia. China had apopulation of 59.6 million in AD 1, which was 25.8% of the world population at thetime. China accounted for 26.1% of world gross domestic product. [32] Sinicization wasan important reason for China’s expansion from the Yellow River region in the northall the way to the southern sea. More advanced agriculture gave Northern Chinese theadvantage over the peoples engaged in more primitive agriculture and hunting andgathering in the south. Settled agriculture laid the economic foundation for the earlierChinese expansion. [33] From a world history perspective, Jared Diamond has shownhow farmers came to conquer hunter-gatherers worldwide because food productionallowed greater population density and stronger administration thanks to surplus foodto provide for leaders, soldiers, craftsmen, and other professionals. Following thatargument, he shows how China became Chinese and how it expanded. [34]

Agriculture explained why it was relatively easy for the Chinese to move south,which was suitable geographically for settled agricultural life. By contrast, theChinese and Xiongnu lived drastically different life styles, the settled versus nomadic.But the Western Regions were different from the steppes in that the Western stateswere largely engaged in settled agriculture. As Hanshu (The history of the FormerHan dynasty) (chap 96A) observed, “the states of the Western Regions for the mostpart settled on the soil, with walled cities, cultivated fields and domesticated animals.Their customs differed those of the Hsiung-nu and Wu-sun.” [35] That explains theChinese efforts to expand into the areas where military colonization was feasible.

One may argue that even though agriculture had been important China had reacheda new stage of economic development where trade would become important. Officialrhetoric and policy aside, commerce had been important for the pre-Han period andfor the Han dynasty. Trade was also one of the reasons for imperial expansion. [36]We do not have good data about the pattern and magnitude of Han trade. Buthistorical records, particularly in Shiji (Records of the grand historian), showed thatthe Han government was interested in products from Central Asia. Moreover, HanChina’s expansion to the south of the Yangtze River was driven more by trade thanwar. 19 If so, a government policy to deliberately stunt the growth of commerce wouldhave a long term negative effect on the country’s economy. Conversely, China wouldconceivably have taken a different path if the mercantilist thinking as embodied inSang’s arguments continued to prevail. However, Sang’s ideas were ahead of his timegiven the strong political and social constraints at the time.

17 Lewis, “Warring States: Political History,” 621–623.18 Han, “Five Vermin,” 110–111.19 Loewe, Records of Han Administration, Vol. 1, 52–56.

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It would be natural to attribute the debate over the primacy of agriculture versuscommerce to a clash of farming and commercial interests. However, agricultural andcommercial interests were not sharply opposed to each other at this time. China’slandownership had largely become private. The communal system began to disinte-grate during the Spring and Autumn period due to gains in productivity and use ofiron tools. During the Warring States period, Shang Yang introduced land reform toallow the peasants to till the land as a means to enrich the nation and strengthen thearmy. The Qin dynasty and Han dynasty continued that practice. But there was achronic challenge of landownership polarization as it was inevitable for the powerfuland rich to accumulate land at the expense of the poor. In particular, Han China’seconomic recovery after a long period of wars and chaos was also favorable forlandlords. Han economy became considerably commercialized and monetized withthe result that average farmers engaged in non-agricultural production and commerceto supplement their agricultural income. Moreover, powerful families often engagedin government administration, agriculture, manufacture, and commerce at the sametime. Successful merchants often tried to purchase land not only because land wasconsidered safer but also because of high return from landownership. [37] To preventmerchants from seizing the land, the government since Shang’s time had beendiscriminating against merchants. However, some merchants still became wealthyand influential. 20

The government attempt to restrict the power of merchants reflected ironically thatthe merchants had had power. Sima Qian talked admiringly about a number ofsuccessful businessmen in a collective biography of money makers. 21 The Hangovernment resorted to sale of official titles as a way to raise revenues, a systemwhich merchants could take advantage of. Despite discrimination, merchant familiescontinued to flourish. The law to discriminate against merchants became largelyempty. 22 Thus, officials bitterly complained. During the reign of Emperor Wendi(180-157 B.C.) Chao Cuo gave a damning memorial about merchants enrichingthemselves at the expense of farmers even though law favored farmers and discrim-inated against merchants. 23

The private salt and iron business families that had lost these industries to the statevehemently opposed state monopolies. 24 The irony was that Wudi used powerfulbusinessmen like Sang to adopt policies that would ultimately reduce the power of thebusiness class. Sang came from a merchant family in Luoyang, which would becomethe capital of the Later Han Dynasty. He was a math prodigy and was selected to serve inthe palace at the age of 13. He then participated in managing state economic affairs andemerged as a key economic advisor for Wudi. He became the Superintendent ofAgriculture and then Grandee Secretary (87 B.C.), one of the top three public positionsin the empire. Sang’s commercial thinking unavoidably surfaced in the Debate.

Sang and others like him were willing participants in Wudi’s efforts to monopolizesalt and iron because they were now politically weak and because they were seducedby access to power. By Wudi’s time, it should have become obvious where the

20 Zhang, Hanshi lunji, 34–41.21 Sima, Shiji, chap 129.22 Zhang, Hanshi lunji, 37–41.23 Ban, Hanshu, chap 24A.24 Loewe, Crisis and Conflict in Han China, 20.

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ultimate power lay in the empire, which also determined the prosperity and demise ofany family, merchant or otherwise. And public service was a path toward personalprosperity. This phenomenon in the Former Han dynasty was common in mostcivilized societies toward A.D. 1000. [38]

The Purpose of Empire

The two sides of the Debate talked past each other because they differed over the verypurpose of empire. The discussion of imperial war, particularly with the Xiongnu,revealed the preferences of the two camps about the nature of politics and desirabilityof the empire.

Being political realists, Sang and his fellow officials believed that real worldnecessities should dictate state policies. The Lieutenant Chancellor argued that thegovernment needed to adapt to changing times. Even Confucius himself offereddifferent proposals for three different kings (23.4). For Sang, the political reality ofthe time was that China had a large empire. As he argued, “the feudal lord, whose fiefcan be considered as forming but one household, has his concern limited to hismanor. The Emperor, whose domain has as its boundaries the Eight Extremities, hasconcerns extending far and wide” (13.1). The government thus needed to be wellorganized and financed, efficient, and pro-active. Sang is similar to Machiavelli inpolitical thinking. Both Sang and Machiavelli were administrators who wantedcentralization. Throughout the Debate, Sang emphasized the importance of interestsand profits as motives for policies, “everyone and all working but for profit andsalary.” That is the same for Confucian scholars who “roam back and forth with theirsophists’ arguments” to pursue “honor and fame; wealth and rank, the object of hisexpectations” (18.5).

By contrast, the Literati emphasized virtue and principles rather than policyresults. To be sure, they had self interests. For example, they resented the purchaseof official positions by wealthy merchants whom Confucianists despised. But theydid raise an important issue: what is the whole purpose of having an empire thatdestroys domestic life and is self-defeating in any case? Is life all about getting richerand stronger?

The Literati and Worthies wanted to end the expansionary war and they preferredappeasement. Their position was thus fundamentally about whether the war shouldbe waged in the first place rather than how best to fight it. Citing Confuciancannons, the Literati and Worthies argued that it was wrong to use force and thatmoral persuasion was better than use of force. At the start of the Debate, the Literatiasserted, “the ancients held in honor virtuous methods and discredited resort toarms. Thus, Confucius said: If remoter people are not submissive, all the influencesof civil culture and virtue are to be cultivated to attract them to be so; and when theyhave been so attracted, they must be made contented and tranquil” (1.6). Theyrepeated this mantra throughout the Debate. One may argue that the Literati andWorthies were naïve about how moral behavior would lead to peace. But theirreasoning of how war was not the solution was powerful. They pointed out how theQin dynasty that depended on force collapsed quickly. In response to Sang’s praiseof Shang Yang who made the kingdom of Qin powerful and Meng Tian, the Qin

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general who occupied the Xiongnu territories, the Literati replied that “Shang Yangwith his opportunist and calculating policy jeopardized the Ch’in [Qin] state, whileMeng Tien by acquisition of a thousand miles of territory brought about the fall ofthe house of Ch’in. These two men recognized advantage but not peril, knew wellhow to advance, but not the way of retreat. So they themselves died and theiradherents were defeated” (7.6). The critics of imperial expansion repeated this pointfrom different angles frequently during the Debate.

In fact, the Literati argued that an empire inevitably declines, using EmperorShihuangdi’s short-lived Qin dynasty as an example. After conquering the other sixkingdoms to unify China, Shihuangdi continued to be dissatisfied and his greedexpanded. That insatiable greed led to his downfall (53.2). Based on an implicitargument that power corrupts, the Literati reasoned that the Qin dynasty collapsed soquickly because Shihuangdi let loose his inner desires when he faced no seriousexternal attacks (52.6).

Moreover, the fact that it would be difficult to subdue the Xiongnu made it somuch more costly to wage endless wars against them. The Xiongnu enjoyed ageographical advantage. Unlike the warring states that bordered on each other anddid not need long supply lines to fight, “the Xiongnu migrate in the boundlessgrassland, with its territories endless in all directions. Even light chariots and fastwar horses cannot capture them, let alone infantry who carry heavy provisions andweapons…Even if our troops catch up with the Xiongu, they are already exhaustedand become food for the Xiongnu” (46.2). To make things worse, the Xiongnu were awarrior nation that did not require much provision to operate (52.2). The Xiongnuwere also highly mobile, “assemble like wind and disperse like clouds” (38.8). Thecritics voiced a sentiment felt by other civilizations in Iran and Europe. With theinvention of horseback riding and iron tools, all settled agricultural societies found itdifficult to match the military power of the nomads who could raise a cheaper andmore mobile strike force than farming communities. 25

Sang was focused on paying for the war against the Xiongnu. But he also madeother arguments in support of the war. To start with, Wudi’s policy was working and itwas now an issue of finishing off the Xiongnu (42.2). Sang viewed the Hangovernment as having no choice. “When the Hsiung Nu [Xiongnu] rebelled againstour authority and frequently raided and devastated the frontier settlements, to beconstantly on the watch for them was a great strain upon the soldiery of the MiddleKingdom; but without measures of precaution being taken, these forays and depre-dations would never cease” (1). He also emphasized the prestige of the “HeavenlyDynasty” because “worthies cannot be insulted” (38.1). Three and half centuriesearlier, in a similar reasoning Athenians defended their empire as necessitated by“three of the strongest motives, fear, honor and interest.” 26

The officials’ position on war with the Xiongnu was fundamentally a realist one.Sang cited cases where kingdoms declined or perished because their rulers relied onvirtue or Confucianism. “Thus, a gentleman not only acts benevolently but alsobuilds city walls to defend himself and installs weapons to prepare himself becausemalevolent people may hurt him” (48.1). Sang also argued that Shihuangdi unified

25 Ibid., 14–16.26 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Book I, 76.

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China and defeated the barbarians with the result that everyone came to show respect“not because of his virtue but because of his power.” By contrast, the house of Zhou,which Confucianists admired, focused on ceremonies and love but was too weak todefend itself. In conclusion, “if you are powerful, others come to pay respects. If you areweak, you go pay respects” (44.1). The Secretary under Sang argued that strong stateswere desirable because of the predatory nature of international relations. “When Chou[the house of Zhou] established the Empire, there were probably a thousand and eighthundred feudal barons. Later on, the strong swallowed the weak, and the large engulfedthe small, with the result that there were formed Six States. These Six States fought withone another, settling their scores” (14.5). Classical realists such as Edward H. Carr andHans J. Morgenthau would make similar arguments two millennia later. [39, 40]

The debaters were keenly aware of the connection between domestic and interna-tional orders. The Literati and Worthies argued that expansionary wars cause domes-tic dislocation, sowing the seeds for the downfall of a kingdom or empire (7, 43.6,45.2). By contrast, Sang saw domestic centralization of power and imperial expan-sion as flip sides of the same coin. In fact, reversing the arguments of the critics, Sangmaintained that the Han had not been able to achieve an achievable goal of finishingoff the Xiongnu mainly because of domestic disunity (45.1).

One may view the Debate as one between “the intellectual” and “the bureaucrat.” Theintellectual thinks on a priori lines whereas the bureaucrat draws from empiricalexperience. The intellectual wants to make political reality conform to his principleswhereas the bureaucrat makes decision based on political necessities on a case by casebasis. 27 The critics of Wudi’s imperial expansion indeed emphasized politicalprinciples throughout the Debate even though they also made some empirical observa-tion. By contrast, Sang repeatedly dismissed the critics as intellectuals who wereunfamiliar with actual politics and public administration. He ridiculed the critics that“to talk is easy, but to act is difficult. So the ancient worthies would stick to the realitiesand exert their efforts and would banish the mere exhibition of empty learning” (7.5). Onanother occasion Sang said that “Can you,mere stay-home’s, know anything of the toil ofburden-carriers, of worries of incumbents in office, incommensurable with yours, criticalbystanders? Here we sit now in the heart of a mighty Empire, with all the outlying stateslooking up to us for the solution of crucial domestic and foreign problems…Wehave nowconvened with us over 60 of your class, ohWorthies and Literati…[But] none has helpedthe government in solving difficulties, none has had any merit whatever!” (10.1)

Was the Debate between Confucianism and Legalism? On the one hand, such adivide was obvious during the Debate. The Confucian critics wanted to go back to theideals of Confucius. Confucius idealized the early Zhou dynasty as the golden age.They argued that an imperial expansion strained the nation and ruined a moral orderat home. The Debate revealed Confucianism’s continuous longing for the good olddays and their reasoning of why smaller size of a polity would work better: longdistance entails more labor (16.2). They also wanted to manage the non-Chinese“barbarians” with the help of luxury goods and display of dignity and moral strength,but they did not think it was possible to change them.

Sang and the other officials participating in the Debate showed little respect forConfucius and his disciples, ridiculing them openly and dismissing their policy ideals

27 Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 13–19.

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as impractical for current political affairs (11.1). Sang actually cheered Shihuangdi’sdecisions to burn Confucian books and bury alive Confucian scholars (27.5). Hecalled Confucius a failed politician who stubbornly lobbied for rulers to adopt hispolitical ideas, which showed his greed, stupidity, and shamelessness (59.5).

On the other hand, lines were blurred between Confucianism and Legalism. For onething, the academic schools were not as clearly divided at this time. Sang and otherofficials were familiar with Confucian scholarship. The division was more blurred overpolicies, as shown in the agriculture versus commerce debate discussed earlier in the paper.

Confucianism did not originate as an ideology of empire. Confucius lived in thefeudal Spring and Autumn period. And Shihuangdi depended on Legalism as theideology to forge a strong state and to unify China. However, unlike Christianity thatcreated a corporate basis of power, Confucianism was meant from the start to serverulers by providing amoral anchor and better administration. The Chinese emperors thusfound Confucianists useful advisors. 28 That is why Wudi endorsed Confucianism andestablished an imperial academy on Confucianism in 124 B.C., which recruited moreand more Confucian students. It was in the Han Dynasty that Confucianism wasestablished as the orthodoxy of Chinese political science. At the same time, Wudidepended on Legalists like Sang to expand his empire.

The Debate revealed what is obvious, namely that the participants were trying toascertain how to run the country in the formative years of the Chinese empire. TheFormer Han dynasty inherited and consolidated the imperial institutions of the short-lived Qin dynasty, which essentially remained unchanged until 1911. In the end, bothConfucianists and Legalists were needed for the empire. The Confucianists helpedlegitimize the imperial system. It was during the Han dynasty that the Chineseimperial institution came to be accepted as the legitimate form of government. Inthat sense, the critics of Sang contributed a lasting political impact.

The fact that Confucianism became so dominant on the conscious level should notlead one to think that the methods of Shang and Sang were forgotten in later days. Moralpersuasion has its limits. Confucianist fundamentalists could continue to talk about theancient ideals precisely because there was an offsetting ideology of aggressiveness andpunishment in Chinese political philosophy. An intellectual debate was both inevitableand necessary during imperial expansion. As Lien-Sheng Yang, a noted Chinesehistorian, pointed out, “the major reason for the paramount influence of Han institutionswas the success of their judicious amalgamation of various apparently contradictoryelements in their legacy from pre-Han China.” As a case in point, “the consciouscombination of Confucianism and Legalism in theory and practice allowed a wide rangeof variation and vibration between idealism and realism” as well “militarism andpacifism, laissez-faire and state control.” [41]

Conclusion

The Salt and Iron Debate was less about military strategies than the political economyof empire. The costs of military campaigns were as relevant then as now. Themanagers of the expanding Han Empire argued for practical solutions and touted

28 Fairbank, China, 66–68.

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their policy successes. They asserted that a state control of material wealth wasneeded for national defense. The essence of their program was that of rich nationand strong army.

The government officials had the advantage of knowing state affairs and stateneeds. They were driven by the necessities of governance. Thus, men of learningappeared to be removed from political realities. At the same time, they had theadvantage of knowing what is happening on the ground. Their most lethal argumentwas that things were not as good as they used to be.

The question of political economy of empire goes beyond costs and benefits, asshown in the Debate. The two sides talked past each other. The scholar critics wantedprinciples rather than material calculations to drive government policy. The emperor’smoral character rather than prosperity should be the aim of the government. Morepowerfully, they argued that if people in the country are suffering from imperialpolicies, that would eventually doom the empire. In essence, they were attacking whatthey viewed as a development of “rich officials, poor people.”

Studies of Discourses also show that the essence of Chinese strategic traditions isnot the dominance of Confucianism or Legalism but a dynamic dialogue between thetwo, which was reflected in the debate described in the book. In fact, the early Hanperiod saw both great military expansion and Confucianism gaining political influence.It was this continuous tension between ideals and political necessities that created theideational foundation of the successful Chinese empire that lasted for two millenniumsand that will continue to influence contemporary Chinese strategic thinking.

We cannot predict what Chinese foreign policy behavior will be based solely onChinese historical experiences and thinking, but knowledge of Chinese strategictraditions helps us understand which way the Chinese may lean. Strategic dialoguessuch as the one described in Discourses and the rise and fall of dynasties in Chinesehistorical memory should on balance reinforce the factors that make contemporaryChinese leaders and strategic thinkers exceedingly cautious in use of force, as theyare. China had its own imperial overreach early on and understands the cost ofextensive adventures beyond its borders and how excessive reliance on force abroadmight threaten their domestic political order, which is what the Chinese governmentis most concerned about.

Acknowledgement He thanks David Kang and Victoria Hui for comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

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Ming Wan is Professor of Government and Politics of George Mason University. He is on academic leavein Japan from August 2010 to August 2012, as a visiting professor at Keio University. His Ph.D. was fromthe Government Department, Harvard University. He held postdoctoral fellowships at Harvard from theProgram on U.S.-Japan Relations, the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies and the Pacific BasinResearch Center, and was also a visiting research scholar at Tsukuba University and a George WashingtonUniversity-WoodrowWilson International Center for Scholars Luce Fellow in Asian Policy Studies. He hasauthored The Political Economy of East Asia: Striving for Wealth and Power (CQ Press 2008), Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic, and Transformation (Stanford 2006), Human Rights in ChineseForeign Relations: Defining and Defending National Interests (UPenn 2001), and Japan between Asia andthe West: Economic Power and Strategic Balance (M.E. Sharpe 2001). He has also published in journalssuch as Asian Survey, Human Rights Quarterly, Orbis, Pacific Affairs, Pacific Review, and InternationalStudies Quarterly and in edited volumes. His current research interests include the China model, Sino-Japanese relations, Japanese party politics and foreign policy, and East Asian international relations.

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