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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION
AUSTIN LIFECARE, INC., ROMAN
CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF AUSTIN,CATHOLIC CHARITIES OFCENTRAL TEXAS, AUSTINPREGNANCY RESOURCE CENTER,AND SOUTH AUSTIN PREGNANCYRESOURCE CENTER,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF AUSTIN,
Defendant.
CIVIL ACTION NO. A-11-CA-00875-LY
!
PLAINTIFFS ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF AUSTIN, CATHOLIC CHARITIES
OF CENTRAL TEXAS, AUSTIN PREGNANCY RESOURCE CENTER, AND SOUTH
AUSTIN PREGNANCY RESOURCE CENTERS OPENING TRIAL BRIEF
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Plaintiffs Roman Catholic Diocese, et al. Opening Trial Brief 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................................... 5!
A.! The Centers: Gabriel Project Life Center, Austin Pregnancy Resource Center,
and South Austin Pregnancy Resource Center ................................................................... 5!B.! Chapter 10-9 of the Austin City Code: The 2010 Ordinance ............................................. 8!
C.! Repeal of the 2010 Ordinance ........................................................................................... 11!
D.! Chapter 10-10 of the Austin City Code: the 2012 Ordinance ........................................... 12!
II. ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................... 17!
A.! The 2012 Ordinance forces the Centers to engage in compelled speech andcompelled misleading speech ........................................................................................... 17!
B.! The 2012 Ordinance discriminates based on content and viewpoint ................................ 20!
C.! The Centers are engaging in religious and charitable speech, not commercialspeech ................................................................................................................................ 24!
D.! The Centers are not engaging in Professional Speech ...................................................... 26!
E.! The 2012 Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague and substantially overbroad ................ 30 !
1.! The Ordinance is substantially overbroad................................................................... 30!
2.! The Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague................................................................. 33!
F.! The 2012 Ordinance violates the Fourteenth Amendments Equal ProtectionClause ................................................................................................................................ 34!
G.! The 2012 Ordinance violates Plaintiffs right to the free exercise of religion .................. 36!
H.! The 2012 Ordinance fails strict scrutiny ........................................................................... 40!
1.! Defendant can point to no compelling governmental interest .................................... 40!
2.! The Ordinance cannot be justified based onpost-hoc evidence because itis content-discriminatory on its face ........................................................................... 41!
3.! The Ordinance is not the least restrictive means of furthering any interest ................ 43!
I.! The Ordinance cannot survive lower forms of judicial scrutiny, including
rational basis review ......................................................................................................... 45!
J.! The 2012 Ordinance violates of the right to free speech under article 1, section8, and the right to freedom of religion under article I, section 6 of the TexasConstitution ....................................................................................................................... 46!
K.! The 20121 Ordinance violates Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act ...................... 48!
III. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 49!
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Plaintiffs Roman Catholic Diocese, et al. Opening Trial Brief 3
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
!
A.A. v. Needville Indep. Sch. Dist., 611 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2010)!""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!#$!
Amidon v. Student Ass'n, 508 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2007)!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!%%!
Barr v. City of Sinton, 295 S.W.3d 287 (Tex. 2009)!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!#$!
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983)!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""!!
Broadrick v. Okla., 413 U.S. 601 (1973)!""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!%&!
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992)!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!%'!
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!&'!
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""""""!%()!#*!
City of Boerne v. Florez, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)!""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!#+!
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984)!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!#&!
Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. 1992)!""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!#,)!#()!#$!
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973)!""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!#,!
Evergreen Association v. City of New York, 801 F. Supp. 2d 197 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2011)!""!')!&+)!)!&,)!&()!&-)!%%)!
#+)!#%!
Ex parte Tucci, 859 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1993)!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!#(!
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988)!""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!#%!
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)!""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""!%*!
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000)!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!%%!
Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987)!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!%&!
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995)!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!*()!*$!
Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985)!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!&()!&-)!%+!
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976)!""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!%#!
Merced v. Kasson, 577 F.3d 578 (5th Cir. 2009)!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!#$!
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!*$!
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)!""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!%%!
O'Brien v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 768 F. Supp. 2d 804 (D. Md. 2011) !"""""!')!&+)!&&)!&%)!&,)!%&)!%()!#+)!
#*)!##!
OQuinn v. State Bar of Texas, 763 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. 1988)!""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!#(!
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1 (1986)!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!*()!#(!
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009)!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!&*!Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)!""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!%#)!%'!
Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972)!""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!&+)!%'!
R.A.V.v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992)!""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!&+)!&%!
Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980)!""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""!#'!
Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988)!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!*$)!&,)!#(!
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!#')!#,!
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995)!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""!&+)!&*!
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991)!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!&+!
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974)!""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!%%!
Tepeyac v. Montgomery County, 779 F. Supp. 2d 456 (D. Md. 2011) !"""""""""""""""!')!&+)!&%)!&,)!&()!&$)!%+)!%')!#+)!#&)!#%!
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945)!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!&$!
Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1996)!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!#$!
Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994)!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!*-)!&+)!#+!United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983)!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""""""!#&!
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954)!""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!%%!
United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803 (2000)!""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!&%)!#+)!#%!
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""""""!#&!
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)!""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!*$)!%'!
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968)!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!%')!#&!
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977)!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!*()!*$)!#*!
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Plaintiffs Roman Catholic Diocese, et al. Opening Trial Brief 4
On April 8, 2010, the Austin City Council unanimously passed an ordinance enacting
Chapter 10-9 of the Austin City Code (the 2010 Ordinance). The 2010 Ordinance targeted
pregnancy resource centers (PRCs) that have moral and religious viewpoints against abortion
and certain forms of birth control. The 2010 Ordinance unlawfully compelled PRCs to
communicate a false and/or misleading message about services they do not provide. Plaintiffs
are charitable and religious organizations that provide free services and support to pregnant
women and families in need.
On January 26, 2012, the City of Austin, recognizing that the 2010 Ordinance suffered
from Constitutional infirmities, repealed it and passed a new ordinance that adopts Chapter 10-10
of the Austin City Code (the 2012 Ordinance or Ordinance). The 2012 Ordinance, like its
predecessor, forces charitable pregnancy centers, under the threat of criminal penalties, to post
misleading, government-dictated messages concerning their licensing and services. The
Ordinance also targets and discriminates against PRCs based on the content and viewpoint of
their message.
The City of Austin is unlawfully attempting to suppress one side of a contentious social,
ethical, and public debate by subjecting those who speak on a disfavored topic to government
regulations and criminal penalties. The City of Austin passed the ordinances without any
evidence that the Centers have misled or misinformed clients about their services or whether they
are medical facilities, or engaged in deceptive practices of any kind.
The 2012 Ordinance violates Plaintiffs rights under federal and state law, including the
First Amendment rights to free speech and the free exercise of religion; the Fourteenth
Amendment right to equal protection; the right to free speech under article I, 8, of the Texas
Constitution; the right to the free exercise of religion under article I, 6, of the Texas
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Constitution; and the right to religious freedom under the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 110.001 et seq.
Three other federal district courts across the country have struck down similar ordinances
that regulate PRCs by forcing them to engage in compelled speech. In Evergreen Association v.
City of New York, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York preliminarily
enjoined a local law that contained similar disclosures to the Ordinance at issue in this case. The
local law required a pregnancy center to make certain disclosures at its entrance, waiting areas,
advertisements, and oral communications, including whether it has a licensed medical provider
on staff who provides or directly supervises all of the services at the facility. The court held the
law unlawfully compelled speech and was both content- and viewpoint-based. 801 F. Supp. 2d
197 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2011). The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland held in
OBrien v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore that a Baltimore city ordinance requiring a
pregnancy center to post a sign in its waiting room notifying clients about services that it does
not provide violates the First Amendment, and permanently enjoined its enforcement. 768 F.
Supp. 2d 804, 808, 818 (D. Md. 2011). In Tepeyac v. Montgomery County, the Maryland district
court granted a preliminary injunction, an extraordinary remedy, against part of a Montgomery
County ordinance requiring a pregnancy center to post a sign in its waiting room encouraging
women who are or may be pregnant to consult with a licensed health care provider. The court
held this ordinance unlawfully compelled speech and enjoined its enforcement. 779 F. Supp. 2d
456, 459, 489, 472 (D. Md. 2011).
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.The Centers: Gabriel Project Life Center, Austin Pregnancy Resource Center, andSouth Austin Pregnancy Resource Center
The Gabriel Project Life Center (GPLC), Austin Pregnancy Resource Center
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(APRC), and South Austin Pregnancy Resource Center (APRC) (collectively, the Centers)
are charitable and religious ministries that provide information and services related to pregnancy
and parenting, all free of charge (Stip. Tabs I-K; P-15 at 2-3, 26, 28-29, 60, 62-63). GPLC a
ministry in Catholic Charities of Central Texas, which is the social service arm of the Roman
Catholic Diocese of Austin; the GPLC has been in operation since 2002 and is supported by local
Catholic churches and individuals (Stip. 33). The GPLCs mission is to provide
compassionate, practical, life-affirming alternatives to abortion (P-48 at 4) by providing free
pregnancy tests, mentoring and emotional support, material support (baby items, maternity
clothes, baby clothes, etc.), educational classes, and referrals (Stip. Tab I; P-15 at 18). The GPLC
will make referrals for sonograms, medical assistance (including prenatal care), professional
counseling, and to other community agencies (Stip. Tab I; P-15 at 4-5, 25). Following the
teachings of the Catholic Church, the GPLC holds a religious belief against abortion and
artificial birth control (Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2270-71, 2370) and will not provide
or refer out for these services; it will, however, provide birth control services in the form of
abstinence1 and natural family planning (Stip. 22, 34-35), and will provide information about
abortion from A Womans Right to Know a brochure published by the Texas Department of
State Health Services (P-72).
APRC and SAPRC are separate non-profit, religious ministries2
that have been in
operations since 2005 and 2009, respectively (Stip. 36). Both state that they are an outreach
ministry of Jesus Christ through His church and are financially supported by private individuals
and churches (Stip. Tab M; P-1 1). APRC and SAPRC provide free pregnancy tests, educational
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1 In the Food and Drug Administrations (FDA) Birth Control Guide, it recommends abstinence as the best
way to avoid pregnancy and sexually transmitted infections (STIs). (P-145).2 Although organized as separate 501(c)(3)s with separate boards and directors, APRC provided SAPRC with
information and support when it was being organized, explaining their similar practices and documents. (Cottone
Dep. 7:2-23.)
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Plaintiffs Roman Catholic Diocese, et al. Opening Trial Brief 7
classes, mentoring and individual support, limited sonograms, maternity clothes, and baby items
(Stip. 37; P-15 at 41, 72). Based on their religious beliefs, they will not provide or refer for
abortion (Stip. 22; P-1 at 7), but will provide information on abortion from A Womans
Right to Know, published by the Texas Department of State Health Services (P-72). APRC and
SAPRC do not provide artificial birth control, but will refer married clients to family physicians
for birth control, with the exception of emergency contraception, which they believe can act as
an abortifacient (Stip. 29; P-1 10). Additionally, both centers will provide information on
abstinence, the best way to avoid pregnancy and sexually transmitted infections. FDA Birth
Control Guide (P-145). APRC and SAPRC will provide clients with referrals for medical care
(including prenatal care), professional counseling, STD testing, and other services (Stip. Tabs J,
K; P-1 at 26, 29, 62-63).
The Centers ministries are solely motivated by charitable and religious concerns (Stip.
Tabs I-K; P-1 at 2, 26, 60), and their service to women is a matter of religious exercise.3 The
Mission of Catholic Charities, of which GPLC is a part, is people of faith serving anyone in
need (P-48 at 4), and APRC and SAPRCs Statement of Principles states that they are
committed to presenting the gospel of our Lord to women with crisis pregnanciesboth in
word and deed. (Stip. Tab M, P-1 1) (emphasis added). APRC and SAPRC only receive
funding from private sources, namely individuals and churches. The GPLC receives funding
from Catholic churches, individuals, and the Texas Pregnancy Care Network (TPCN), which is
a non-profit, charitable organization that is committed to assisting organizations that help
women in crisis pregnancies via free and compassionate, practical and life-affirming services.
(Stip. 40). The Texas Health and Human Services Commission provides funds to the TPCN as
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!3 GPLC, APRC and SAPRC state that all activities of [each respective pregnancy center], including non-religious
discussions and activities, are motivated by religious beliefs and are part of [each centers] religious exercise.
(GPLC, APRC, and SAPRC Response to Def.s Req. for Admis. 28).
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Plaintiffs Roman Catholic Diocese, et al. Opening Trial Brief 8
part of the Texas Alternative to Abortion Services Program. (Stip. 40).
B.Chapter 10-9 of the Austin City Code: The 2010 OrdinanceOn April 8, 2010, the Austin City Council unanimously passed Ordinance No. 20100408-
027, (the 2010 Ordinance), requiring a limited service pregnancy center to prominently
display a sign on its front entrance setting forth the products and services it does notprovide,
namely abortion and birth control services (Stip. Tab A; P-2 at 10-9-2(A)). The ordinance
required the sign to state: This center does not provide abortions or refer to abortion providers.
This center does not provide or refer to providers of U.S. Food and Drug Administration
approved birth control drugs and medical devices. (Stip. Tab A; P-2 at 10-9-2(A)). The
Ordinance only applied to organizations that provide information on pregnancy from the so-
called pro-life perspective, specifically those who do not provide or refer for abortion and
comprehensive birth control, which includes emergency contraception.4 (Stip. Tab A; P-2 at
10-9-1(C)). Failure to comply with the ordinance was a criminal violation. (Stip. Tab A; P-2 at
10-9-3).
The City clearly and publicly stated its purpose for passing the 2010 Ordinance. In a
press release dated April 2, 2010, the it stated that the 2010 Ordinance is a consumer awareness
measurethat helps women make safe, healthy, informed, and responsible decisions. (Stip. Tab
Q; P-6). The press release went on to state that the ordinance would ensure that women are
informed about the range of services offered by an Austin limited service pregnancy center. Id.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!4 The 2010 Ordinance defined a limited service pregnancy center as an organization or facility that providespregnancy counseling or information as its primary purpose, either for a fee or as a free service; does not provide
Abortions or make referrals to Abortion providers; does not provide Comprehensive Birth Control Services or make
referrals for Comprehensive Birth Control Services; and is not licensed or certified by the state or federalgovernment to provide medical or health care services. (Stip. Tab A; P-2 at 10-9-1(C))
Comprehensive Birth Control Services was defined as alldrugs and medical devices that have been approved by
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration for birth control. (Stip. Tab A; P-2 at 10-9-1(B)) (emphasis added). The
FDA has approved emergency contraception as a form of birth control. Def.s Answer to Pls Am. Compl 20. The
Centers believe that emergency contraception can at as an abortifacient.
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Plaintiffs Roman Catholic Diocese, et al. Opening Trial Brief 9
Notably, the Press Release did notstate any other reason for passing the ordinance; there was no
mention that Austin pregnancy centers have in any way been untruthful or misleading about the
services they offer. Additionally, Council Member Spelmans website stated that the 2010
Ordinance require[s] [pregnancy centers] to post signs that say they do not provide or refer for
birth control services or abortion,so that women know if they require those serves that they will
need to seek them elsewhere (Stip. Tab S; P-23 at 3) (emphasis added), affirming the Citys
stated purpose for passing the 2010 Ordinance: consumer awareness.
To support passage of the 2010 Ordinance, the City cited four documents as Additional
Backup Material (P-3): a 2009 Annual Report by the NARAL Pro-Choice Texas Foundation
entitled Taxpayer Financed Crisis Pregnancy Centers in Texas: A Hidden Threat to Womens
Health (2009 NARAL Report) (Stip. Tab F; P-4), a July 2006 report prepared for
Representative Henry A. Waxman by the Special Investigations Division of the United States
House of Representatives Committee on Government ReformMinority Staff (the Waxman
Report) (Stip. Tab E; P-5), a fiscal memo, and a draft of the ordinance.
None of these items offered any evidence that pregnancy centers in Austin had been
untruthful or misleading about their services. Furthermore, during the April 8, 2010 Austin City
Council meeting, no evidence was presented either from the City Council or from any individual
testifying in favor of the Ordinance that any pregnancy center in Austin has been untruthful or
misleading about their services (Stip, Tab C; P-7). The only evidence supporting the 2010
Ordinance that was specific to Austin was the written testimony of Ambrosia Ortiz y Prentice5
(Stip. Tab L; P-8), who stated that she disagreed with the religious viewpoint presented and that
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!5Although she did not disclose this in her written statement, Ms. Ortiz y Prentice serves on the Board of Directors of
NARAL Pro-Choice Texas (P-8), an organization that worked to pass the Ordinance in Austin (see, e.g., P-29; P-30,
P-85). It is therefore not surprising that she disagreed with APRCs religious and (constitutionally protected)
viewpoint against abortion. Additionally, APRC documents each client who receives services from the center
(through its various intake forms), and it has no record of Ms. Ortiz y Prentice ever visiting the center.
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it made her feel uncomfortable; Ms. Ortiz y Prentice did not claim that APRC was dishonest
about the services it provides or was untruthful in any way.Id.
While the evidential record for Defendants provided no information that the Centers were
dishonest, the Centers presented ample evidence demonstrating their transparency and
truthfulness with clients. Representatives of pregnancy centers in Austin testified that they
always provide truthful and accurate information about their services. (Stip. Tab C; P-7). Marie
Seale, Director of the Office of Pro-Life Activities and Chaste Living for the Catholic Diocese of
Austin, testified that the GPLC and its representatives are always honest about the services that
we provides and do not provide. (Stip. Tab C; P-7 at 13:1-2). Ms. Seale provided the City with a
copy of its intake form (P-54), the first thing that a client sees that discloses to clients that the
GPLC is not a medical facility and that [it] do[es] not provide or refer for abortions. (Stip. Tab
C; P-7 at 13:2-7). Terry Williams, the Executive Director of Care Net Austin, testified that Care
Net pregnancy center provides clients with accurate and truthful information including proper
disclaimers to clients stating that the center does not refer for abortions. (Stip. Tab C; P-7 at
18:12, 18:15-18). Both the representative from GPLC and Care Net stated that the centers use A
Womans Right to Know brochure, published by the state, to provide clients with accurate
information on abortion (Stip. Tab C; P-7, 14:21-23, 18:3-6).
In addition to failing to present any evidence that the pregnancy centers in Austin have
been untruthful about their services, the Waxman and 2009 NARAL reports both exhibit hostility
towards pregnancy centers and their religious viewpoint against abortion. (Stip. Tabs E, F; P-4,
P-5). The 2009 NARAL Report faults pregnancy centers for having the express purpose of
persuading pregnant teenagers and women seeking services for unexpected pregnancies to opt
for motherhood and adoption and accuses them of having the express purpose of interfering
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with pregnant teenagers and women who are seeking comprehensive womens healthcare. (Stip.
Tab F; P-4 at 15, 17). The NARAL Report calls pregnancy centers biased and anti-choice,
and states that their primary purpose is to advance an ideological, political, and religious
agenda. (Stip. Tab F; P-4 at 23). It accuses pregnancy centers of having a controversial
history and a religious, anti-choice mission such as shar[ing] Gods gift of eternal life
through Jesus Christ with women in crisis pregnancies by ministering to the physical,
emotional, and spiritual needs of women .Id.
The Waxman Report criticizes pregnancy centers because they are virtually always pro-
life organizations whose goal is to persuade teenagers and women with unplanned pregnancies to
choose motherhood or adoption and refers to one centers religious mission in a demeaning
manner. (Stip. Tab E; P-5 at 1). It concludes by accusing pregnancy centers of engaging in
tactic[s] [that] may be effective in frightening pregnant teenagers and women and discouraging
abortion. (Stip. Tab E; P-5 at 14).
C.Repeal of the 2010 OrdinanceOn January 26, 2012, after Plaintiffs brought a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of
the 2010 Ordinance, claiming inter alia that the 2010 Ordinance required compelled false
speech, and three federal court decisions6 found similar ordinance to be unconstitutional, the City
passed Ordinance Number 20120126-017, An Ordinance Repealing Chapter 10-9 of the City
Code. (P-19). One of the supporting materials (P-18) for the ordinance stated:
The Law Department recommends repeal of the ordinance. At the time the City Council passed the
ordinance in 2010, there were no court decisions ruling on the constitutionality of similar ordinances.Subsequent to its passage, federal courts in other parts of the country have ruled that certain language in
this type of ordinance is unconstitutional. Those court decisions have been appealed, and it is likely the
U.S. Supreme Court will be asked to address the constitutionality of this type of ordinance. The City of
Austin has also been sued following issuance of the court rulings, and the Law Department recommends
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!6O'Brien v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 768 F. Supp. 2d 804 (D. Md. 2011); Tepeyac v. Montgomery
County, 779 F. Supp. 2d 456 (D. Md. 2011); Evergreen Association v. City of New York, 801 F. Supp. 2d 197
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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repeal of the ordinance to avoid further litigation costs.
D.Chapter 10-10 of the Austin City Code: the 2012 OrdinanceOn January 26, 2012, the same day the City repealed the 2010 Ordinance, the Austin City
Council unanimously passed ordinance No. 20120126 An Ordinance Amending the City Code
to Add Chapter 10-10 to Require Signs at Unlicensed Pregnancy Service Centers; Creating an
Offense and Imposing a Penalty (2012 Ordinance or the Ordinance) (Stip. Tab B; P-19).
The 2012 Ordinance requires unlicensed pregnancy service centers to prominently
display a black and white sign, in English and in Spanish, affixed to the entrance of the center so
that the sign is conspicuously visible to a person entering the center, that accurately discloses the
following information: (1) whether the center provides medical services[;] (2) if the center
provides medical services, whether all medical services are provided under direction and
supervision of a licensed health care provider; and (3) if the center provides medical services,
whether the center is licensed by a state or federal regulatory entity to provide those services.
(Stip. Tab. B; P-19). Regarding the third required disclaimer, the City stipulated that there is no
license a pregnancy center can obtain from a state or federal regulatory entity for only providing
sonograms and pregnancy diagnoses. (Stip. 25).
An Unlicensed pregnancy service center was defined as an organization or facility
that: as its primary purpose, provides pregnancy related services, including pregnancy testing and
options counseling; and does not have a health care provider that is licensed by a state or federal
regulatory entity maintaining a full time practice on site. (Stip. Tab. B; P-19 at 10-10-1(1)).
The 2012 Ordinance states that Medical Service includes, without limitation, diagnosing
pregnancy or performing a sonogram. (Stip. Tab. B; P-19 10-10-1(2)). The ordinance is
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enforced with criminal penalties.7
The City stipulated that the 2012 Ordinance compels speech and mandates the timing
and content of Plaintiffs speech, by requiring the sign specified in the Ordinance. (Stip. 20).
City further stipulated that the 2012 Ordinance only applies to speakers who discuss the topic of
pregnancy (Stip. 16). Additionally, the City stipulated that even though the Ordinances
language appears viewpoint neutral, that 2012 Ordinance was designed to apply to the same
centers as the 2010 Ordinance, those who do not provide or refer for abortion and comprehensive
birth control services (Stip. 4), so it is in fact viewpoint-based. Additionally, the City admitted
that it drafted the definition of a pregnancy center to only target the narrow class of pregnancy
centers, and no other organizations (Spelman Depo. 83:4-15). The City stipulated that [t]here is
no requirement that a [center] has committed any wrongdoing to be regulated by the 2012
Ordinance (Stip. 18) so even centers whose practices are flawless are subject to regulation and
criminal penalties. Lastly, the City stipulated that the 2012 Ordinance only applies to
organizations that do not have a health care provider who maintains a full time practice on site.
Organizations that have a health care provider who supervises all medical services, as defined
in the Ordinance, still must post the disclaimer if the practice isnt full time. (Stip. 17).
Attached to the item, the City Council had ten documents as Supporting Materials: the
text of a draft ordinance (Draft Ordinance) (P-13), which was different than the ordinance
ultimately passed8; Item from Council; March 2011 NARAL Pro-Choice Texas Foundation
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!7 An owner or operator commits an offense if the owner or operator violates [the 2012 Ordinance]. An offense
under this article shall be punished by a fine of not less than $250 for the first offense, not less than $350 for a
second offense, and not less than $450 for a third or succeeding offense. A culpable mental state is not required, andneed not be proved, for an offense under this chapter. (Stip. Tab. B; P-19 at 10-10-3).8 The City admitted that [i]t was never mentioned during the City Council meeting that a different version of
Chapter 10-10 was being substituted or enacted. The new language of Chapter 10-10 was never read during the City
Council meeting. (Def.s Answer to Pls. Am. Compl. 78).
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Report entitled The Texas Alternatives to Abortion Program: Bad Health Policy, Bad Fiscal
Policy (2011 NARAL Report,) (Stip. Tab G; P-14); Texas Pregnancy Care Networks
financial statements from 2007-09; an Agreement between the Health and Human Services
Commission and Texas Pregnancy Care Network for Program and Administrative Services; and
five Texas Alternative to Abortion Services Program Quarterly Status Reports. (Stip. 8; P-11).
None of these documents provided as supporting material evidenced that any of the
Austin pregnancy centers have misrepresented or mislead their clients about whether they are
medical facilities or have engaged in any other deceptive practices concerning their services.
Additionally, no one from the public testifying in favor of the 2012 Ordinance stated that any
Austin pregnancy center had misrepresented their services to clients or committed any other
wrongdoings (Stip. Tab D; P-20).
Furthermore, the 2011 NARAL Report, which the City publically posted as a supporting
material for the 2012 Ordinance exhibits hostility towards the religious viewpoint against
abortion. It states that the Alternatives to Abortion Program is wasteful and inefficient because
it uses money to purchase materials produced by religious organizations. (Stip. Tab G; P-14 at
2). It goes on to fault pregnancy centers for using literature from religious organizations
and from ordering materials from religious sources such as Loving and Caring, Inc. (whose
mission is to pray and work towards keeping the pro-life community holy and seeking the face
of God). (Stip. Tab G; P-14 at 6). The 2011 NARAL Report criticizes one unnamed pregnancy
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
The Draft Ordinance defines a Limited Service Pregnancy Center as an organization or facility that: as itsprimary purpose, provides pregnancy related services, such as pregnancy testing or options counseling; does not
provide Abortions or make referrals to Abortion providers; does not provide Comprehensive Birth Control Services
or make referrals for Comprehensive Birth Control Services[;] and is not licensed or regulated by a state or federal
regulatory entity to provide medical services. P-13 at 10-10-1 (C) (emphasis added). The Draft Ordinance, like the2010 Ordinance, targeted organizations that spoke about the topic of pregnancy from the pro-life perspective: those
that did not refer for abortion and comprehensive birth control. The language changed from the Draft Ordinance
(which specifically only applied to centers that do not provide or refer for abortion and comprehensive birth control)
to the 2012 Ordinance on the advice of [the Citys] attorneys (Spelman Dep. 86:8-10).
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center in San Antonio for providing religious references. (Stip. Tab G; P-14 at 6). The Report
further describes pregnancy centers as independentoften church-affiliatedorganizations that
offer limited counseling services. [They] regularly provide biased and frequently inaccurate
information about the supposed risks (both spiritualand physical) of safe and legal abortion
care, contraception, premarital sex, and other subjects. (Stip. Tab G; P-14 at 7) (emphasis
added). The 2011 NARAL Report criticizes an unnamed center for an alleged interaction
between a young woman and a pregnancy volunteer where the volunteer discussed what she
understood as the spiritual consequences of pre-martial sex; the report called this false
information and scare tactics. (Stip. Tab G; P-14 at 8) (emphasis added). The report faulted
pregnancy centers for offering either prayer or religious counseling and maintaining
connections to Care Net, a national organization working to promote a culture where lives are
transformed by the Gospel of Jesus Christ.9 (Stip. Tab G; P-14 at 8).
The City stipulated that the 2012 Ordinance was created to achieve the same goals, in
whole or in part, as the 2010 Ordinance (Stip. 4), namely consumer protection and
consume awareness. (Spelman Dep. 36:2-3; Stip. Tab R; P-17). Council Member Spelman, the
Sponsor of the 2012 Ordinance, stated the purpose: This is a consumer awareness issue. I still
believe that it is important for women to have as much information about these businesses as
possible. (Stip. Tab R; P-17).10
During the Council Meeting, each City Council member
stated the reasons for passing the Ordinance. Each Council Member only stated vague
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!9 The 2011 NARAL report incorrectly states that maintaining ties to a Christian organization and offering religioushelp violates the Charitable Choice Act. The Charitable Choice Act requires that religious activates be separate in
time or location from federally funded activities, but does notrequire that groups receiving funds not be religious or
have no ties to religious groups (indeed, it is a violation of the act if the government discriminated against groupsthat are religious in nature). The act further allows clients to voluntarily participate in religious activities. 45 C.F.R.
260.34 (b)-(c).10 During the City Council meeting, Council Member Spelman stated in reference to the Draft Ordinance, All were
doing is asking people to tell the truth. Stip. Tab D; P-20.
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justifications, not tied to any facts in the record demonstrating that the Austin centers had
committed any wrongdoings. Specifically the Council Members stated the 2012 Ordinance
furthers womens rights, information rights, transparency and mak[es] sure groups do not
mislead or misinform (Stip. D; P-20, 46:18-19, 47:23, 48:15-16). Only Council Member
Spelman made a statement about facts in the record when he stated that the information in the
backup to this motion, which I think all of us have had access to for several daysdocument[s]
that many crisis pregnancy centers in Austin, Texas [have] posed significant problems for a
large number of women for a long period of time. (Stip. D; P-20, 50:3-8). However, nothing in
the backup information stated that any of the Austin centers had harmed women in any way;
specifically, nothing in the backup information stated that any Austin center had misrepresented
the nature of their services to any client, including whether they are medical facilities. Spelman
incorrectly thought that the 2011 NARAL Report studied pregnancy centers in Austin. (Spel.
Dep. 151:20 -152:9). The City has admitted, however, that [t]here is no evidence in the 2011
NARAL Report that any of the Austin pregnancy centers have misrepresented or mislead their
clients about whether they are medical facilities or engaged in any other deceptive practices
concerning their services. (Def.s Answer to Pls. Am. Compl. 54).
Contrasted to the Citys complete lack of evidence showing that pregnancy centers are
misleading clients about their services, the Plaintiffs submitted scores of documents proving their
truthfulness regarding their services. The information included copies of intake forms, release
forms, disclaimers, and referrals provided to clients, including medical referrals. The information
submitted to the City Council stated that each Center is always upfront and truthful with clients
about the scope of services and client confidentiality. (Stip. Tabs I-K; P-15). Specifically, the
information submitted to the Council demonstrated that each Center discloses to its clients that it
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is not a medical facility (Stip. Tabs I-K; P-15 at 7, 9, 32, 34, 6611) and refers clients to medical
facilities for medical care (Stip. Tabs I-K; P-15 at 4-5, 25, 41, 43, 52-59, 72, 76, 84-8512).
Furthermore, the Centers submission showed that all of their advertisements are truthful (Stip.
Tabs I-K; P-15 at 23, 36 8, 40-41, 48, 50, 71-72).
II. ARGUMENT
The 2012 Ordinance violates the Plaintiffs federal constitutional rights to be free from
compelled misleading speech, content- and viewpoint- based discrimination, regulations that are
substantially overbroad and vague, violate equal protection, and infringe on the free exercise of
religion. Furthermore, the 2012 Ordinance violates the Plaintiffs Texas Constitutional claims for
freedom of speech and religion, and their state statutory claim under the Texas Religious
Freedom Restoration Act.
A.The 2012 Ordinance forces the Centers to engage in compelled speech andcompelled misleading speech
The City admits that the 2012 Ordinance compels speech and mandates the timing and
content of Plaintiffs speech, by requiring the sign specified in the Ordinance (Stip. 20).
[O]ne important manifestation of the principle of free speech is that one who chooses to speak
may also decide what not to say,Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of
Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995) (quoting Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities
Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 11 (1986));see alsoWooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714, (1977)
("A system which secures the right to proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must
also guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts."). It is well-established
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!11 GPLC Request for Services Form; GPLC Statement of Self-Administered Pregnancy Test; APRC New ClientRequest for Services; APRC Return Client Request for Services; SAPRC New Client Request for Services.
12 GPLC refers clients to the John Paul II Life Center for Sonograms and to the Vitae Clinic or St. Davids for
prenatal medical care; APRC and SAPRC make referrals to over fifteeen various hospitals, clinics, dentists and
physicians for medical care, including prenatal care.
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that the government cannot compel one to recite a government-dictated message or host another
speakers message. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (plurality opinion)
(compelling corporation to include third-party speech in billing envelopes violates First
Amendment); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (compelling citizen to display license
plate containing state motto with which he disagrees violates the First Amendment); Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (compelling newspaper to publish a
reply-piece by a candidate violates First Amendment); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943) (compelling schoolchildren to salute flag and recite pledge violates First
Amendment).
Even if the Ordinance compelled only true statements, it could not withstand
constitutional review. SeeHurley, 515 U.S. at 573-74 (The government may not compel
affirmance of a belief with which the speaker disagrees.Indeed, this general rule, that the
speaker has the right to tailor the speech, appliesequally to statements of fact.); Riley v.
Natl Fedn of Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 797-98 (1988) (striking down a state law requiring factual
disclosures). The Ordinance is even more harmful and constitutionally suspect because it
compels misleadingstatements.
APRC and SAPRC representatives provide limited sonograms, but do not diagnose
pregnancy (Stip. Tabs J-K; P-15 at 32, 34, 38, 66, 68). Under the 2012 Ordinance, performing a
sonogram is deemed a medical service (Stip. Tab B; P-19 at 10-10-1(2)) and both centers
therefore have to post a sign at their entrance stating that they provide[] medical services.
(Stip. Tab B; P-19 at 10-10-2(A)(1)). However, APRC and SAPRC communicate to clients,
both orally and in writing, that they are not medical facilities and make referrals to hospitals,
clinics, and physicians for the provision of medical services. (P-15 at 26-30; 32, 34, 41, 43, 52-
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59, 60-64, 66, 68, 72, 76, 84-85; P-57 at 8). Forcing APRC and SAPRC to state that they
provide medial services directly conflicts with what they communicate to clients, and will
ultimately mislead clients to think that these two centers are medical facilities, when they are not.
Additionally, the 2012 Ordinance requires APRC and SAPRC to state that they are not
licensed by a state or federal regulatory entity to provide medical services. (Stip. Tab B; P-19 at
10-10-2(A)(3)). However, as the City stipulated, [t]here is no license a pregnancy center can
obtain from a state or federal regulatory entity for only providing sonograms and pregnancy
diagnoses. (Stip. 25). The 2012 Ordinance therefore requires the Center to state that they do
not have a license that is impossible for them to obtain. The 2012 Ordinance therefore forces
APRC and SAPRC to deliver the implied and misleading message that their services are not up
to state licensing standards, even though they are in full compliance with all applicable laws.
The 2012 Ordinance requires GPLC to state that it does not provide medical services.
Although the GPLC does not provide medical services in-house, it attempts to makes referrals to
the Vitae Clinic13 or other medical facilities that are in line with the Catholic Churchs teaching
on abortion and birth control (Stip. Tab I; P-15 at 5, 25) as part of its religious ministry. Ensuring
that women receive medical care, especially medical care that respects Catholic doctrine, is one
of the GPLCs primary objectives. By mandating that the Gabriel Project post the disclaimer
sign, the Defendant is forcing it to deliver the implied, misleading message that it does not
provide access or information on how women can obtain medical care.
Government action that requires the utterance of a particular message favored by the
Government, contravenes this essential right [to freedom of expression]. Turner Broad. Sys. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994). Laws of this sort pose the inherent risk that the Government
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!13 Through the prayers of many and the support of the John Paul II Life Center, the Vitae Clinic opened its clinic
doors in October of 2010 to provide women with excellence in healthcare while promoting the Culture of Life.
http://www.vitaeaustin.com/About.html
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seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information
or manipulate the public debate through coercion rather than persuasion. These restrictions raise
the specter that the Government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the
marketplace. Id. (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991)). Although Plaintiffs speech may be politically unpopular
in Austin, it is nevertheless entitled to full protections under the First Amendment, and
Defendant cannot seek to stifle it through regulations.
All three federal district courts to evaluate similar ordinances compelling pregnancy
centers to post disclaimers have found them to be a form of compelled speech subject to strict
scrutiny, regardless if the required disclosures are factual. OBrien, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 812, 816-
17; Tepeyac, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 463, 471; Evergreen, 801 F.Supp.2d at 203-04, 206-07. As
outlined in Section II.H infra, the Ordinance fails strict scrutiny and is thus unconstitutional.
B.The 2012 Ordinance discriminates based on content and viewpointIt is axiomatic that the government cannot regulate speech based on its content or
viewpoint. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995).
[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content. Police Dept. v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). Indeed, [c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid.
R.A.V.v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
The Defendant stipulated that the 2012 Ordinance only applies to speakers who discuss
the topic of pregnancy. (Stip. 16). Indeed, only an organization or facility that, as its primary
purpose, provides pregnancy related services, including pregnancy testing and options
counseling and does not have a health care provider maintaining a full time practice on site
must post the disclaimers. (Stip. Tab B at 10-10-1(1)). Defendant has not required organizations
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that speak on any other topic to make such a disclosure; if the Centers primary purpose were to
address cancer, sexually transmitted diseases, vaccines, or any other subject, they would not be
subject to the Ordinance. The Ordinance singles out the Centers because they choose to provide
information and services related to the topic of pregnancy and is therefore a presumptively-
invalid, content-based restriction.
Even worse, the Ordinance further targets speech based on the particular viewpoint
expressed. When the government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by
speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant. Viewpoint
discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at
829; Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132 (2009) (Restrictions based on
viewpoint are [] prohibited.). Defendant stipulated that the 2012 Ordinance was designed to
apply to the same centers as the 2010 Ordinance, those who do not provide or refer for abortion
and comprehensive birth control services. (Stip. 4). Furthermore, as the history of the
Ordinance demonstrates, the Defendant intentionally drafted it to only target centers that hold a
viewpoint against abortion and comprehensive birth control.14 Furthermore, the Defendants
supporting materials demonstrate hostility toward one viewpoint15 and Council Member
Spelman stated that pregnancy centers are a brainwashing outfit. (P-78, Transcript of NARAL
video at 3:6-9), despite his testimony he has never been to a pregnancy center or spoken to a
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!14 The now-repealed Chapter 10-9 and the first draft of Chapter 10-10 on their faces only applied to one viewpoint.Furthermore, the current Ordinance was gerrymandered to apply to one viewpoint; the requirement that a health care
provider maintain a full time practice on site shows that the Defendants intent is to only regulate pregnancycenters that primarily provide information and referrals to clients, as opposed to abortion clinics who primarily
provide medical services.15 The three reports that evidence hostility to the pro-life, religious viewpoint are the 2009 NARAL Report, the
Waxman Report, and the 2011 NARAL Report. The 2009 NARAL report calls pregnancy centers biased andanti-choice, and states that their primary purpose is to advance an ideological, political, and religious agenda.
(Stip. Tab F; P-4). The 2011 NARAL report criticizes pregnancy centers for using religious, pro-life literature. (Stip.
Tab G; P-14). The Waxman Report faults pregnancy centers because they are virtually always pro-life
organizations whose goal is to persuade teenagers and women with unplanned pregnancies to choose motherhood or
adoption. (Stip. Tab E; P-5).
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senior staff member of a pregnancy center (Spelman Dep. 25:15-21). In OBrien, the court found
it probative that the government described the pregnancy centers speech as propaganda, and
stated that [s]uch descriptions can only support the conclusion that Defendants enacted the
Ordinance out of disagreement with Plaintiffs viewpoints on abortion and birth-control. 768 F.
Supp. 2d at 816. In the same way, the hostile reports cited by the Defendant, Spelmans
characterization of the centers, and the gerrymandered language of the Ordinance can only lead
to the conclusion that Defendant passed the Ordinance due to its disagreement with the Centers
viewpoint.
Additionally, emails from the City of Austin show that the City was targeting the
Plaintiffs because they disagreed with their position on abortion and comprehensive birth
control. Prior to the drafting of the 2010 Ordinance, emails between City employees and others
list each center in Austin by name, showing they were targeted (P-26, P-27, P-28). An email
stated that the Baltimore Ordinance (the model for Austins 2010 Ordinance16) was criticized
because it only applied to one viewpoint; the email went on state If we wrote our own
disclosure [for pro-choice facilities] and include it we diminish that criticism and seem
reasonable, that of course may not be the goal, we may want to just flex our muscle in Travis
County and say to [sic] damn bad we have the power and this is what we want. (P-30); the City
ultimately decided to only target pro-life centers. At one point, the City was considering
including a phone number on the signs that would direct women to pro-choice facilities (P-32)
and it was stated by one of the Citys Womens Commissioners17 Id like to impact of [sic] this
proposal to add a list of C[ity] O[f] A[ustin]-contracted agencies which provide pregnancy
services (inc[luding] abo[rtion] and b[irth] c[ontrol]). I think our general goal (personally and
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!16 P-32; P-33; P-34.17 Laurie Felker Jones is Council Member Spelmans appointment to the Citys Commission for Women (Spelman
Dep. 140:18-141:13).
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politically) is so get women to a place where they can get what they need: terminate if they
choose, plan for a spaced pregnancy by getting repro[ductive] health care and b[irth]
c[ontrol] (P-32 at 2-3). At one point, the City considered using 2-1-118 as a referral number
they could put on the signs. However, when the City discovered that 2-1-1 refers to both
pregnancy centers and abortion clinics, it found this option to unacceptable. (P-35). Specifically,
the City stated Our intern called 211, and we discovered that they refer women to CPCs, as well
as to places that offer comprehensive services/non-directive counseling. [I]f you dont
SPECIFICALLY ask for family planning or abortion, you get referred to ALL the agencies from
Planned Parenthood to Lifecare.[We] would really prefer to be able to refer women
somewhere for referrals and comprehensive options counseling on the signs, and [] 211 does not
appear to be the answer (P-35). The City found it unacceptable that 2-1-1 presented all
choices to women; it only wanted women to have information on places that provide abortion
services and not places that provide alternatives to abortion.19 This type of viewpoint
discrimination is unconstitutional. R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (The First
Amendment does not permit [the government] to impose special prohibitions on those speakers
who express views on disfavored subjects.).
In both OBrien and Tepeyac, the courts found that similar ordinances were viewpoint
and/or content discriminatory. OBrien, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 816; Tepeyac , 779 F. Supp. 2d at 462
& n.5. Because it is content and viewpoint discriminatory, the Ordinance is presumptively
unconstitutional, and can only stand if the government proves that it satisfies strict scrutiny.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!18 2-1-1 is a service of the United Way (P-37). The 2-1-1 Texas community resource database contains detailedinformation about available health and human services provided by government agencies, nonprofit organizations,
and faith-based entities serving the residents of our 10-conty service area (2-1-1 Texas Info Sheet, P- 35 at 2).19 Additionally, the City also rejected Austins 3-1-1 service (which allows individuals to request social services
over the phone) as a number to put on the signs because it refers to 2-1-1 and would provide women with all
referrals, to both PRCs and abortion clinics. (P-37).
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United States v. Playboy Entmt Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000). The Ordinance cannot meet
this high standard,see Section II.H. infra.
C.The Centers are engaging in religious and charitable speech, not commercial speechThe PRCs are engaging in protected, non-commercial expression. Commercial speech is
defined as speech proposing a commercial transaction. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp.,
463 U.S. 60, 64 (1983). [A]n organization does not propose a commercial transaction simply
by offering a good or service that has economic value. Rather, a commercial transaction is an
exchange undertaken for some commercial purpose[.]Evergreen Ass'n, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 205
(emphasis added). The PRCs are notmotivated by profits or economic incentives but by their
sincerely-held religious beliefs. Furthermore, they do not enter into any sort of commercial
transactions with the women and families they serve; all of their products and services are free of
charge. The PRCs are therefore properly classified as ministries engaged in fully-protected
religious speech; not businesses engaging in commercial speech. Indeed, APRC and SAPRC are
each an outreach ministry of Jesus Christ through His Church. (Stip. Tab M; P-1 at 1). The
GPLC is a ministry of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Austin and Catholic Charities of Central
Texas that exists to be pastoral by meeting both the spiritual and material needs of women and
families. (see P-48 at 3, 4).
It is totally irrelevant that the Centers provide their clients with free goods and services
that the clients would otherwise have to purchase. As the Evergreen decision pointed out when
enjoining a similar ordinance regulating PRCs:
If speech becomes commercial speech merely through the offer of a valuable good or service, then any
house of worship offering their congregants sacramental wine, communion wafers, prayer beads, or other
objects with commercial value, would find their accompanying speech subject to diminished constitutional
protection. Likewise, a domestic violence organization advertising shelter to an abuse victim would find its
First Amendment rights curtailed, since the provision of housing confers an economic benefit on therecipient. But plainly speech by a church or domestic violence organization is not undertaken for a
commercial purpose. For the same reasons, the offer of free services such as pregnancy tests in furtherance
of a religious belief does not propose a commercial transaction. Adoption of [the argument that offering
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goods and services transforms speech to commercial speech] would represent a breathtaking expansion of
the commercial speech doctrine.
801 F. Supp. 2d at 205 (internal quotations and citations removed).
Moreover, commercial speech [is] expression relatedsolely to the economic interests of
the speaker and its audience. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 561 (1980) (emphasis added). As stated above, the expression of the PRCs is wholly related
to and motivated by religious and charitable interests. Defendant has previously asserted that the
GPLC engages in commercial speech because some of its activities are reimbursed by the
government through the TPCN. Receiving government reimbursement does not mean that the
GPLC is engaging in their speech for a commercial purpose. Indeed, of all GPLCs client visits
more than half are not eligible for reimbursement through TPCN.20 Additionally, the GPLC is
not reimbursed for pregnancy tests (Skinner Dep. 89:1823), one of GPLCs services and one
that it heavily advertises. (P-47, P-51). When the GPLC is reimbursed for material goods, the
reimbursement is limited to ten dollars per distribution of clothing, food, or furniture (Skinner
Dep. 80:2381:14) and up to four times per client (Skinner Dep. 82:46). One distribution is
typically five to seven outfits (not pieces) or a bag full of food (Skinner Dep. 82:1215, 83:12
14), which likely costs much more than the reimbursement that GPLC receives. If GPLC were
concerned about its economic interest, it would not provide help primarily to persons whose
provision cannot be reimbursed, heavily advertise a service that cannot be reimbursed, and
distribute five to seven whole outfits for a reimbursement of only ten dollars, when GPLC would
receive the same reimbursement for only one outfit.
But, even assuming arguendo that the PRCs speech contains some commercial elements,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!20 51.18% of all GPLC client visits since January 1, 2010 were not eligible for reimbursement through TPCN. The
GPLC serves both undocumented immigrants and those here with proper documentation. Because TPCN does not
reimburse for undocumented immigrants, and a large percentage of the GPLCs clientele is undocumented, more
than half of all client visits are ineligible for reimbursement.
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it would still receive the full protection of the First Amendment due to the intertwined religious
and charitable speech. The Supreme Court stated, We do not believe that the speech retains its
commercial character when it is inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully protected
speech. [W]e cannot parcel out the speech, applying one test to one phrase and another test to
another phrase. Riley v. Natl Fedn of Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988) (recognizing that
charitable solicitation is typically informative and persuasive speech, and therefore fully
protected expression).
The Centers speech is protected, non-commercial expression. Indeed, three federal
district courts evaluating similar ordinances concerning pregnancy centers have all held that their
speech is improperly classified as commercial expression and therefore entitled to full protection.
Evergreen Ass'n, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 204-05; Tepeyac, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 463; O'Brien, 768 F.
Supp. 2d at 813.
D.The Centers are not engaging in Professional SpeechDefendant have argued that even though the Ordinance compels speech, it is not subject
to strict scrutiny because the Centers are engaging in professional speech by addressing topics
related to health such as pregnancy. Def.s Mot. Dismiss 11-15. Two other federal district courts
have evaluated whether the speech of virtually identical pregnancy resource centers should be
classified as professional speech, and both have rejected the argument. In Tepeyac, the District
Court for the District of Maryland held that even if the broadest interpretation of the
professional speech doctrine is applied a pregnancy center that provides free information and
services related to pregnancy, including confidential discussion of pregnancy options is not
engaging in professional speech. 779 F. Supp. 2d at 467-68. Likewise, the District Court for the
Southern District of New York held in Evergreen Association that a pregnancy center that
offers obstetric ultrasounds, obstetric sonograms or prenatal care[,] or (2) has the appearance of
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a licensed medical facility,"21 and meets with the client individually for pregnancy
counseling,22 does not engage in professional speech. 801 F. Supp. 2d at 20002, 2223. The
Centers in this case are indistinguishable from the ones at issue in Tepeyac andEvergreen,23 and
this court should likewise find that their speech is not professional speech and therefore entitled
to the fullest protections of the First Amendment.
A regulation burdening professional speech is subject to a lower level of scrutiny because
it is merely a regulation of a profession with incidental effects on speech. Tepeyac, 779 F.
Supp. 2d at 467. The government may properly restrict entry into professions and vocations
through licensing schemes, and the regulation of a professionals speech is inherently tied to the
governments authority to regulate the profession. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 229 (1985)
(White, J., concurring). [B]urdens on professional speech are more susceptible to disclosure
requirements in light of the government's interest in regulating the underlying profession.
Tepeyac, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 465-466 (emphasis added); see alsoLowe, 472 U.S. at 232 (White,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!21The following factors are among the factors that shall be considered in determining whether a facility has the
appearance of a licensed medical facility:[whether the facility] (a) offers pregnancy testing and/or pregnancydiagnosis; (b) has staff or volunteers who wear medical attire or uniforms; (c) contains one or more examination
tables; (d) contains a private or semi-private room or area containing medical supplies and/or medical instruments;
(e) has staff or volunteers who collect health insurance information from clients; and (f) is located on the same
premises as a licensed medical facility or provider or shares space with a licensed medical provider. Evergreen
Ass'n, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 200.22 Both the Tepeyac and the EvergreenAssociation courts explicitly rejected the argument that advice given in the
form of information in a one-on-one setting transforms the speech into professional speech. The Evergreen
Association court, in finding that the pregnancy centers did not engage in professional speech, stated that [w]hile
Plaintiffs meet with clients individually, there is no indication that they employ any specialized expertise or
professional judgment in service of their clients' individual needs and circumstances. 801 F. Supp. 2d 197, 207;
Tepeyac, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 467 (finding that confidential discussions of pregnancy optionsin person-to-person
situations does not make the speech professional and individualized). What matters is not whether the Centers offer
general information and services that are relevant to the womens situation, but whether they employ anyspecialized expertise or professional judgment in doing so.23 The pregnancy center at issue in Tepeyac among other thingsprovides pregnancy testing, referral
services,confidential discussion of pregnancy options[,]information on parenting and post-abortion
guidance[,][and] practical support in the form of diapers, baby clothes, and other needed items," all free of charge.779 F. Supp. 2d at 460. The various pregnancy centers at issue in Evergreen Association provide various
pregnancy-related services, including pregnancy testing, ultrasounds, [] counseling[,]parenting and maternity
education, [] referrals to adoption and domestic violence agencies and to licensed medical facilities[,]non-
financial assistance in the form of diapers, formula, clothing, and toys[,]...[and] residential facilities for homeless
and abused pregnant women. 801 F. Supp. 2d 197, 201-202 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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J., concurring) ("Just as offer and acceptance are communications incidental to the regulable
transaction called a contract, the professional's speech is incidental to the conduct of the
profession.").
The Centers are not members of the regulated medical profession, but are charitable and
religious organizations; therefore, classifying their speech as professional speech is entirely
inappropriate. Furthermore, the 2012 Ordinance by its very terms exempts centers that have
medical professionals licensed by a state or federal regulatory entity that maintain a full time
practice on site. (Stip. Tab B; P-19 at 10-10-1(1)(b)). Indeed, the 2012 Ordinance targets what it
calls unlicensedpregnancy service center[s] (Stip. Tab B; P-19 at 10-10-1(1)(b)) (emphasis
added). If the centers have no license, then they are not professions regulated by the state, and
the government cannot claim their speech is professional in nature.
Indeed, Defendant seeks to blur the key distinction between professional speech and
generalized speech related to traditionally professional subject matter. SeeTepeyac, 779 F.
Supp. 2d at 466. As Justice Jackson stated:
[A] rough distinction always exists, I think, which is more shortly illustrated thanexplained. A state may forbid one without its license to practice law as a vocation,but I think it could not stop an unlicensed person from making a speech about therights of man or the rights of labor, or any other kind of right, includingrecommending that his hearers organize to support his views. Likewise, the statemay prohibit the pursuit of medicine as an occupation without its license, but I donot think it could make it a crime publicly or privately to speak urging persons tofollow or reject any school of medical thought.
Id. at 467 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 544-45 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring))
(emphasis added). The government may regulate the speech of abortion providers as it relates to
regulating the medical profession, but the government may notas the Defendant hasreach
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the speech of private individuals and ministries who wish to speak against abortion,24 simply
because it touches the broad subject of medicine. Defendants may disagree with the centers
speech on abortion, abortion risks, and birth control, but that does not mean it can regulate it.
Each centers clients only interact with non-professional, unlicensed staff and volunteers.
The GPLC only provides information and material assistance. SAPRC and APRC perform
sonograms, but they are never performed by medical professionals; indeed Texas does not
license individuals who only perform sonograms, so it is impossible for any sonographer to
posses a state license. InEvergreen, the court stated that because the state did not require
ultrasound technicians to be licensed, their speech could not be classified as professional speech.
801 F. Supp. 2d at 207.
Interestingly, the Citys own supporting documents state that pregnancy centers staff
community volunteers, not licensed professionals. The 2011 NARAL Report criticize pregnancy
centers for not [being] staffed by trained medical provides and counselors and only having
community volunteers (Stip. Tab G; P-14 7, 10). The 2009 NARL Report states that TPCN
pregnancy centers are staffed primarily by unlicensed volunteers who are specifically
prohibited from discussing medical needs. (Stip Tab F; P-4 at 11) It further states pregnancy
center have limited expertise and licensed support, and serve primarily as a source of
information and referral (Id. at 15).
Furthermore, the definition of a professional from Lowe and relied upon in Tepeyac,
andEvergreenAssociation makes clear that the Centers do not fall into this category:
One who takes the affairs of a client personally in hand and purports to exercise judgment on behalf of the
client in the light of the client's individual needs and circumstances is properly viewed as engaging in the
practice of a profession. Where the personal nexus between professional and client does not exist, and a
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!24 It should also be noted that the subject of abortion is fully protected speech because it is an important issue of
public policy. SeeSnyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011) ("[S]peech on public issues occupies the highest
rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is entitled to special protection.") (internal citation and
quotations omitted).
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speaker does not purport to be exercising judgment on behalf of any particular individual with whose
circumstances he is directly acquainted, government regulation ceases to function as legitimate regulation
of professional practice with only incidental impact on speech; it becomes regulation of speaking or
publishing as such.
Tepeyac, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 466 (quotingLowe, 472 U.S. at 232). The Centers do not purport[]
to exercise judgment on behalf of the client or take[] the affairs of a client personally in hand.
The Centers simply provide general information concerning the topics of pregnancy; the decision
about whether to seek an abortion or carry the pregnancy to term is a choice ultimately left to the
woman. The Centers merely give women the tools to reason through whether to have abortions
on their own. (APRC, SAPRC, and GPLCs response to Def. Req. for Admis. No. 4). For these
reasons, no quasi-fiduciary or actual fiduciary relationship is formed.25
Because the Centers
do[] not purport to be exercising judgment on behalf of any particular individual the Ordinance
ceases to function as legitimate regulation of professional practice with only incidental impact
on speech [and instead] it becomes regulation of speaking or publishing as such. Tepeyac, 779
F. Supp. 2d at 466 (quotingLowe, 472 U.S. at 232).
The Centers are comprised of individuals who seek to fulfill the Centers religious
mission, not professionals exercising professional medical judgment. If Defendants argument
were accepted, the distinction illustrated in Lowe and Thomas between discussion of
professional subject matter and practice of a profession would be rendered meaningless.
Tepeyac, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 467.
E.The 2012 Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague and substantially overbroad1. The Ordinance is substantially overbroadThe Ordinances definition of an unlicensed pregnancy service center is so broad that
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!25 A fiduciary relationship is defined as [a] relationship in which one person is under a duty to act for the benefit of
another on matters within the scope of the relationship; Fiduciary relationships- such as trustee-beneficiary,
guardian-ward, principal-agent, and attorney-client- require an unusually high degree of care. BLACKS LAW
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). As stated above, the Centers simply provide information and resources to women, and
are not under the duty to act for their benefit. Therefore, no fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary relationship is formed.
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it covers any organization or facility that provides pregnancy related services as its primary
purpose that does not have a health care provider that is licensed by a state or federal regulatory
entity maintaining a full time practice on site. (Stip. Tab B; P-19 at 10-10-1(1)). Organizations
that are swept up by this definition face criminal penalties if they do not post the required
government-dictated disclaimers. Id. The Ordinance therefore regulates and criminalizes
substantially more speech than the Constitution allows. Even [a] clear and precise enactment
may nevertheless be overbroad if in its reach it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct.
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972). The crucial question, then, is whether
the ordinance sweeps within its prohibitions what may not be punished under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 114-115.
Numerous organizations provide pregnancy related services as their primary purpose, and
fall within the ordinances purview because they do not have a licensed heath care provider
maintaining a full time practice on site. (Stip. Tab B; P-19). For example, the following
organizations all as [their] primary purpose, provide[] pregnancy related services and do not
have a full-time health care provider on site: support groups for pregnant women such as the
Austin Pregnancy & New Moms Group; fertility organizations that take a holistic, non-
medical approach to pregnancy such as the Texas Center for Reproductive Acupuncture;
pregnancy and birthing classes such as Conscious Birthing Austin; lactation consultants such as
Central Texas Healthy Mothers Healthy Babies Coalition; adoption agencies such as Adoption
Advocates; maternity stores such as Motherhood Maternity; lay counselors who specialize in
pregnancy and fertility; ultrasound Imaging centers such as Clearview Ultrasound; and
pregnancy spas such as Blooming Pregnancy Spa. These organizations are covered by the
Ordinance, and are thus subject to criminal penalties for engaging in protected speech on the
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topic of pregnancy, unless they post the government-mandated disclaimers.
The Defendant admitted that the Ordinance applies to some of the above-mentioned
organizations in its 30(b)(6) deposition testimony:
Q (by LifeCares Counsel): Was it your intention that this ordinance apply to other groups besides
PRCs?
A (by Councilmember Spelman): If they fit the requirement that their primary purpose is
pregnancy-related services and they do not have a health care provider licensed by state or federal
regulatory entity maintaining a full-time practice yes.
Q: Okay. So it would perhaps apply to support groups for pregnant women?A: It could. Yes.
Q: Pregnancy and birthing coaches?
A: If they are not licensed, do not maintain a full-time practice, if theyre providing pregnancy-
related services, absolutely true. Yes, sir.
(Spelman Dep. 89:1025).