Dinh Con Law Outline

7/23/2019 Dinh Con Law Outline

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/dinh-con-law-outline 1/27

I. Framing ConstitutionA. Articles of Confederation (“Expressly”)

1. Expressly Delegated

1. In Congress Assemled1. Articles of Confederation !rolems

a) Factionalism(1) "alance factions and le#el of go#ernment against eac$

ot$era) %elf&Interest(1) Amition to counter amition

a) Centrali'ed o#ernment distanced from ill of t$e people(1) *ori'ontal and #ertical alancing of poer

A. Congress (“*erein ranted”)1. “*erein ranted” (+% Const. Article 1 %ection 1) omitting

“expressly” (Articles of Confed. Article 1)

A. Interpretation (Textualism and

Intentionalism)1. ,ext - Context (%tructure it$in document) - *istory

(%tructure of roader /rst principles)

a) %tart it$ text - Intent (Drafters or !opulations orCurrent !resident)

(1) Drafters0 "ecause t$ey ere #ested it$ aut$ority topass t$e la

(1) !opulation0 ,$ese ere t$e people from $om t$epoer deri#ed and $o rati/ed t$e constitution

(1) Current !resident0 *e does t$e immediateinterpretation prior to enforcement

a) $at meaning con#eyed0(1) 2eaning of text to t$e population (,extualism)

i) 3udicial 4estraint - 5ess su6ecti#e interpreti#etools7 *istory7 Common 5a interpreti#e cannons

(1) Intent of t$e drafters (Intentionalism)i) !rolem of pri#ate meaning trumping accepted usagei) %econd Amendment is only one to spea8 to its on

purpose - “,o preser#e a militia(1) Clas$ eteen meaning and intent

i) %cri#ener9s error - "+, implies narro error



(a) ACA *ealt$care Exc$anges - %uper Clear Intent :%uper Clear 5anguage ($at t$en0)

I. *ori'ontal %eparation of

!oersA. 3udicial !oer

1. %upreme Court 5imited 3urisdiction

a) 2arury #. 2adison(1) Finite list of items it$ original 6urisdiction

i) “,$e 6udicial poer s$all extend;” (Art. III %ec. <)

Ambassadors, Public ministers and consuls, admiralty and

maritime, US a party, land grants, diversity

i) “In all cases a=ecting amassadors> pulic ministersand consuls and in $ic$ a state s$all e a party> t$e%upreme Court s$all $a#e original 6urisdiction” (Art ?%ec. <)

(a) A@rmati#e language gi#es negati#e implication toot$er areas of original 6urisdiction

(a) Asence of similar alteration language as it$appellate 6urisdiction (Exceptions Clause)

a) Criticisms(1) Could extend to constitutional oor instead of oor and

ceiling(1) Exceptions clause could e meant to ta8e fromappellate and add to original

1. 3udicial 4e#ie

a) 2arury #. 2adison(1) Courts decide - Executi#e Discretion or Bested 4ig$ts

(Purely Ministerial) 1. %tanding

a) Constitutional 5imits(1) In6ury In&Fact

i) Concrete!articulari'edIndi#iduali'ed(a) %tanding

i) ot general taxpayer grie#ancei) "road 4ace&"ased stigmatic In6ury not su@cient

(Allen #. rig$t)



i) Fat$er cannot assert daug$ter9s rig$ts to not say“under god” $is ex&ife $as not roug$t suit ands$e $as “tie&rea8er” custody. (edo)

(A) Court does not ant to rule on family la issue(A) *is on rig$t to raise $is daug$ter is deri#ati#e

of $is daug$ter9s rig$t $ic$ $e cannot assert(Dissent disagrees)

(a) E% standingi) 2assac$usetts ale to ring claims against E!A

emissions enforcement ecause of in6ury to itson so#ereign lands (E!A)

i) Actual or imminent(a) %tanding

i) %ierra Clu memers ere not personally a=ectedy national par8 de#elopment ecause no one

used t$e par8 (%ierra Clu)i) Ecosystem common $arm argument re6ected and

future $arm deemed speculati#e (5u6an)(4eGuirement of recurring interest)

i) ,$e mere t$reat of enforcement is not an in6ury(Clapper)

(a) E% %tandingi) C$illing e=ect on free speec$ is a cogni'ale in6ury

it$in t$e 'one of protection of t$e FirstAmendment (%usan " Ant$ony)

(1) Fairly ,racealei) I4% tax rea8s don9t directly in6ury access to

integrated education (Allen #. rig$t)(1) 4edressaility

i) 5imiting tax rea8s ill not pro#ide and integratededucation (Allen #. rig$t)

i) C$anges in endangered species la may not impactagency enforcement (5u6an) o “procedural in6uriesfrom t$e citi'en suit pro#ision”

a) !rudential 5imits (Prudentially created so can be

disregarded)(1) o ,$ird !arty rie#ances(1) o enerali'ed rie#ances(1) one utside t$e Hone of Interest of t$e 5a

a) Example(1) For an indi#idual to $a#e standing to ring a claim t$e

constitution reGuires t$at t$e indi#idual $a#e a personal



in6ury in fact t$at is concrete> particulari'ed and actualor imminent to $ic$ t$e defendants conduct is fairlytraceale and is redressale y t$is court. Additionallycongress $as prudentially limited standing y excludingcases of t$ird party grie#ances> generali'ed grie#ances

and t$ose outside t$e 'one of interest of t$e la. ,$esemec$anisms or8 to ensure t$at t$e 6udiciary onlydecides actual disputes eteen interested parties anddoes not issue ad#isory opinions or address$ypot$etical issues to maintain separation of poersand 6udicial integrity.

1. !olitical Juestion

a) Framing t$e issue in an area it$ 6udicially disco#eraleand manageale standards (Luther to Baker )

(1) 5ut$er 4epulican uarantee to "a8er EGual !rotection

a) "rennan "a8er K !art ,est : "us$ (Textual commitment,standards, embarrassment) (NOT hen insuringse!aration o" !oers Bush)

(1) ,extual Commitmenti) %enate s$all “try” all impeac$ments (ixon)(a) %outer Dissent in ixonL “,ry” ouldn9t e !J

it$out meeting some minimum due process.2ixing it$ merit decision0

(a) %ee also (Clinton #. 3ones) “*ig$ crimes” ill not elitigated after congressional #ote

i) "us$ #. oreL !rotecting state legislatures from statesupreme court ma8ing la. “Eac$ %tate s$all appoint>in suc$ manner as t$e 5egislature t$ereof may directM.(Article II %ection 1 Clause <)

(1) 3udicially manageale standardsi) 5ut$er (4epulican) - "a8er (EGual !rotection) -

3uelirer (!artisan errymandering is !J

Four Justices in Jubelirer, tried and failed to discover judicially

manageable standards.

No consensus on what standards to apply.Frankfurter, not worth the costs to discover

i) "us$ #. ore court as ale to apply t$e politicalGuestion doctrine in re#erse to rule on t$e Florida%upreme court9s o#erreac$.

(a) Biolation of eGual protection ecause t$e state&iderecount disrupts normal county system so t$ere



must e state&ide standards for t$e nedenominator

(1) Foreign A=airs (eed to Ad$ere to !olicy)i) $et$er president can unilaterally nullify a treaty is

!J (oldater)

i) "ut %ee Hi#otofs8y (Foreign a=airs can e 6usticiale$en t$ere is congressional encroac$ment onexecuti#e poers suc$ as passport standards andforeign relations)

i) Example(a) Foreign a=airs issues are generally non&6usticiale

under t$e political Guestion doctrine $en congress$as not acted against t$e president. %ee oldater#. Carter (deciding if t$e president $as t$e politicalpoer to act unilaterally to nullify a treaty it$out

consulting congress is a political Guestion). "ut %eeHi#otofs8y (deciding an issue of foreign a=airs areais 6usticiale $en t$ere is congressionalencroac$ment on executi#e foreign a=airs poert$roug$ statute reGuiring Israel to e printed onpassports).

(1) !olicy decision(1) Disrespect7 Emarrassment(1) : "us$ #. oreL %eparation of !oers and ,extual

Commitment

i) !rotecting state legislatures against state supremecourt creating la

a) !ro&3usticiaility (#rong incenti$es% increase legit% P&merely 'udicially created, no textual !ermission allcases)

(1) Systematic incentives lac8ing for congress toaddress all possily “political” Guestions

(1) 3udiciary ould increase legitimacy $en acting tosecure indi#idual rig$ts

i) If leads to unpopularity - 4ole of court7 Enforce

Constitution> Counter 2a6oritarian #s. ,emporal2a6orities

(1) !J is 6udicially created (2arury)7 Article III %ection <“%$all extend to all cases” does not gi#e textual permission to exercise discretion.

a) !ro&!olitical Juestion (*e!aration o" !oers% inter"erence%decr+ legit% enter the thicket)



(1) %eparation of poers reGuires discretion it$in eac$ranc$

(1) 3udicial interference it$ intraranc$ matters oulddecrease legitimacy

i) Especially $en are no standards to apply

(1) ort$ t$e crediility in6uries to “enter t$e t$ic8et” to/nd standards0

(1) 4ules clause (Art. 1 %ection N) - ixon “try”impeac$ments gi#es discretion - “$ear all cases”gi#es similar discretion

a) Compromise (Focus on standards - Fran8furter in 3uelirer)

(1) Fran8furter in 3uelirer> as correct in alancing outeac$ side9s legitimacy arguments and focusing on t$estandards efore “entering into t$e t$ic8et”

a) Example(1) "rennan "a8er ,est

i) In "a8er #. Carr "rennan put fort$ a six part analysisfor determining political Guestion issues. First> t$ecourt loo8s for a textually demonstrale commitmentof t$e issue to anot$er department. %econd onedetermines if 6udicially disco#erale and managealestandards for resol#ing t$e issue exist. Additionally>t$e court e#aluates if an initial policy decision outsideof 6udicial discretion exists or if independent

resolution ill s$o a lac8 of respect for ot$erranc$es or if t$ere is an unusual need to ad$ere toan existing policy or a decision may causeemarrassment to anot$er ranc$.

(1) !ro&3usticiailityi) !ro&6usticiaility 6ustices ould argue t$e systemic

incenti#es may not e t$ere to encourage congress toaddress t$e prolem and t$erefore t$e 6udiciarys$ould step in and increase t$eir legitimacy yad6udicating t$e a=ected persons indi#idual rig$ts. If

t$is ma8es t$em unpopular t$at is of no conseGuenceecause t$is is t$e courts role as a counterma6oritarian force to protect t$e constitution fortemporal ma6orities. ,$e political Guestion is merely a

6udicially created doctrine in 2arury it$ noconstitutional asis. %ee e.g. dissent Beit$ #. 3uelirer.Article III gi#es poer to $ear cases and contro#ersy



and no$ere mentions any discretion in exercisingt$is poer as certain contro#ersies ut insteadexplicitly states t$e 6udicial poer s$all extend to Mallcases”. Article III %ection <.

(a) ,$e argument t$at t$e political Guestion doctrine is

an expression of 6udicial $umility is a farce ecauset$e poer to decide $ic$ cases to $ear or not $earas a $uge extra&constitutional poer gra y t$eearly court in 2arury. ,$e aility to decide $ic$cases to $ear and t$e ultimate cordoning o= ofentire classes of cases sties t$e de#elopment ofalternati#e legal t$eories and is detrimental to t$eultimate legitimacy of t$e court as t$e protector ofindi#idual rig$ts. As Oennedy says in 3uelirer> t$ereare no 6udicial standards ecause t$e court $as

refused to $ear t$e cases ut t$at does not meant$at t$ey cannot e de#eloped in t$e future.

(1) !ro&!olitical Juestioni) "a8er #. Carr and its progenies s$oed t$e long

searc$ for 6udicial standards to apply and t$eprolems t$at arise in $earing cases it$ less t$anmanageale standards ecause t$e decisions arein$erently political and discretionary. ,$e decision torefuse to $ear cases of t$is nature preser#es 6udiciallegitimacy ecause t$ere is no decision on t$e merits

to e#aluate or attac8 it$ t$is expression of 6udicial$umility t$at is t$e political Guestion doctrine. Asdiscussed y and Fran8furter in Beit$ #. 3uelirer>t$ere may e a possiility of or8ing t$roug$ cases to/nd manageale standards ut t$e Guestion is if t$emessy 6o of /nding t$em is ort$ t$e cost to 6udiciallegitimacy in t$e interim. ,$e decision to not $ear acase ased on political Guestion is not denying t$eclaim ut merely ac8noledging t$at t$e decision andremedy to t$e claim do not come from t$e courts

ecause t$ere is no asis on $ic$ to decide t$ecases.

(1) Compromisei) Fran8furter in 3uelirer> as correct in alancing out

eac$ side9s legitimacy arguments and focusing on t$estandards efore “entering into t$e t$ic8et”



1. !olitical Controlling 3udicial (Traditional tools% 'urisdiction

exce!tions clause rt II *ec -)

a) ,raditional !olitical Control ,ools(1) Constitutional amendments(1) Appointment and impeac$ment(1) Determining umer of 3udges(1) 5egislating around non&constitutional common la(1) Exceptions clause to limit supreme court appellate

6urisdictiona) Jurisdiction Modifcation (.lass o" cases (Mc.ardle)%

NOT /ules o" decision0Outcomes (1lein)% 2ssential3unctions Must 4est (Ne *ynthesis )

(1) Article III %ection < & Exceptions Clausei) In all t$e ot$er Cases efore mentioned> t$e supreme

Court s$all $a#e appellate 3urisdiction> ot$ as to 5a

and Fact> it$ suc$ Exceptions> and under suc$4egulations as t$e Congress s$all ma8e.

i) ear !lenary !oer(a) Can remo#e appellate 6urisdiction for class of cases

(2cCardle)(a) Cannot prescrie outcomes of indi#idual cases

(Olein) "+, can alter cause of action6urisdiction orac8ground la

(a) “Essential Functions” - “%$all extend to all”Federal Juestion7 Amassadors7 Admiralties (e

%ynt$eses)i) Article III cannot #est in t$e state courts ecause

t$ey are “ound” y federal la (Article BI %ection<)

(a) Example(s)i) Congress> cannot alter t$e 6urisdiction in a ay

t$at prescries t$e outcomes of indi#idual casesor intrudes on 6udicial poer (Olein). *oe#er>t$ey can remo#e entire classes of cases from t$eappellate 6urisdiction> especially $en t$e

6urisdiction as statutorily granted or 6urisdictionfor t$at class of cases is not aolis$ed entirelyfrom Article III courts so as to destroy article III9s“essential functions” and fail to #est t$e 6udicialpoer. (2cCardle7 e %ynt$esis).

i) Additional textual limits can e argued to existeteen certain classes of cases. Congress may



e unale to entirely remo#e federal Guestion>amassador> or admiralty cases ecause t$e

6udicial poer s$all extend to MallM cases and if t$e 6urisdiction is not assigned to anot$er article IIIcourt t$e 6udicial poer ill not #est as reGuired.

For example federal Guestion 6urisdiction cannote remo#ed from Article III courts ecause original

6urisdiction is not granted else$ere y t$econstitution. Federal 6udicial poer cannot e#ested in state courts ecause t$ey are ound yfederal la and t$us 6udicial poer ould notproperly #est if it does not #est in a federal court.Congress can only exercise t$e exception clauseto entirely remo#e appellate 6urisdiction in ot$erclasses of cases suc$ as 6urisdiction suc$ as

di#ersity in $ic$ t$e 6udicial poer s$all extendut MallM is omitted. %ee Article III %ection <

(1) 5egitimate Exceptionsi) 2cCardle - Congress remo#ing pre#iously

statutorily granted $aeas 6urisdiction7 %trippingentire class o cases

BUT cases could still be heard on constitutional grounds(1) +nconstitutional Exceptions4egulations

i) Olien - !rescriing outcomes in indi#idual cases(Interference it$ ",* 6udicial and executi#e)

Congress prescribing how presidential pardons will be used

as evidence

Pardon is a purely executive discretion act congress is

interfering with

A. Executi#e !oer1. In$erent !oer (No herein granted, Take .are, 5iscretion to

en"orce, 3oreign 6airs,*ole Organ, .hie" 2xecuti$e,

.ommander in .hie", *el"72xecuting Treaty)

a) o “$erein granted”> ,a8e Care Clausea) reatest in Foreign A=airs - %ole rgan of Foreign

A=airs (Dames P 2oore) (Curtiss&rig$t)(1) Congress can delegate more broadly to presidential

discretion in areas of Foreign A=airs (Curtiss&rig$t)

Allowing president to determine if selling arms is detrimental to

peace in South America



(1) ,$eatre of ar and Enemy Comatants -Commander in C$ief and C$ief Executi#e

i) %ummary process of enemy comatants ascommander in c$ief

(a) Executi#e Aility to c$oose Do3 or DoD (*amdi)

i) "+, limited y some due process concerns suc$as a neutral $earing on enemy comatant status

i) mission to try enemy comatants under +C23 isdepri#ation of poer (*amdan) "+, see Dames P2oore

i) Example(a) ,$e president is empoered to detain and su6ect

enemy comatants to summary process in t$eprosecution of ar as t$e commander&in&c$ief. ,$ear on terror is prolematic for t$e presidents

execution of $is ar poers ecause t$e enemy isnot concentrated exclusi#ely in any t$eatre of ar.

,$ese Menemy comatantsM could arguale eprosecuted for criminal o=enses under t$e Do3 or astrue enemy comatants under t$e DoD and it is upto t$e president to determine $ic$ a#enue topursue as long as t$ey are it$in t$e minimumlimits of due process. %ee *amdi. An omission ycongress of gi#ing a certain poer to t$e presidentsuc$ as t$e aility to try enemies under t$e +C23 is

construed as depri#ation of t$at poer. %ee*amdan7 "ut see Dames P 2oore (/nding omissionof poer to settle claims $en congress $ad gi#ensimilar and road poers an act of implied appro#alor at least acGuiescence)

(1) ,reaties - %elf&Executing0i) 2edellin L Consular treaty language not inding on its

face. !romise for future action. o congressionalaction so no la to apply.

i) "ond L Congressional action to ratify treaty interpretedso as not to interfere it$ general police poers

1. 4elati#e to Congress (oungston & ExpressImplied Aut$.>

%ilence> Defying)(.ongress 3irst, President Last))

a) "alance of poer it$ congress (.ongress 3irst, President Last )

(1) Congress - !oer to act /rst



i) Congressional !oerL Enumerated and implied fromArt 1 %ection Q : Aility to augment scope ofpresident9s poers y initial actioninaction(oungston)

(1) !resident - !oer to act last

i) !residential !oerL Commander in c$ief> c$iefexecuti#e> sole organ> #eto poer. %trong poer tointerpret and enforce las constrained only y“fait$ful” execution.

a) 3ac8son oungston Concurrence(1) Express of Implied Aut$ority(1) ,ilig$t Hone of %ilence

i) Congressional Inaction - Appro#alAcGuiescence(Dames P 2oore) 4 Denial of !oer (oungston)

(a) %ilence as Appro#alL !ost crisis7 Foreign a=airs7 ide

poers gi#en to president in t$e arena7 no record ofconsideration (Dames P 2oore)

(a) %ilence as DenialL Consideration and it$$olding7 no$istory of similar presidential action7 "+, didaut$ori'e Oorean ar "+, t$is is not in t$e t$eatreof ar

(1) pposed to Congressi) oungstonL o in$erent poer to sei'e steel mills

t$at t$e president can rely upon $en in oppositionit$ congress

1. Executi#e !ri#ilege ((Pres Nixon) %cope y courts>alancing> #ested rig$ts> no liaility for presidential action

(3it8gerald) > yes liaility efore (.linton)

a) rigin - eed to 8eep con/dence it$ ad#isors in orderto gi#e and recei#e candid ad#ice

a) ot Asolute - %cope y t$e Courts (!res ixon)(1) $en t$e executi#e interest in con/dence is in conict

it$ indi#idually #ested rig$ts - "alance eedsi) "alancing executi#e prerogati#e (discretion> military>

diplomatic) it$ t$e prosecutor9s need for information

and #ested rig$ts (all a#enues ex$austed0) (+% #.ixon)

(a) !resident in#ited courts in $en created rules andregulations - Could not enforce t$em ut mustta8e political $it

(1) o #ested rig$ts in disputes it$ congress so executi#epri#ilege not o#ercome



i) ,$e same conicts eteen #ested rig$ts and t$eexecuti#e9s need for con/dence is not present indispute9s it$ congress so are not it$in t$e scope oft$e court9s reac$

a) ot 5iale for damages for actions $ile president

(Fit'gerald) - "urden on t$e executi#e7 ,arget for suits(1) "+, , for actions ta8en efore president (Clinton) -

%ome urden permissile7 ature of action (criminal

or civil ) and interests e$ind claims1. Analogies

a) "roader or sort of congressional aut$ori'ations -Compare oungston (Oorean ar) it$ Dames P 2oore(EE!A and *ostage acts road similar aut$ority)

a) Congressional Consideration of !oer - Compare oungston it$ Dames P 2oore

a) Emergency !oer - 5imited to t$eatre of ar(oungston)

a) Does executi#e poer really $inge on poer of t$e purse(Douglas in oungston)

a) Did t$e poer come from t$e states0(1) Foreign a=airs poer passed from Oing eorge7 %tate9s

ne#er $ad7 no non&delegation (Curtiss&rig$t)a) oungston Category ,$ree !resident defying is enoug$

for foreign a=airs (Hi#otofs8y)

A. 5egislati#e !oer1. Formalism (%calia) - %trict demarcations

a) %trict demarcation eteen ranc$es and separation ofpoers

1. Functionalism ("reyer) - 2odern Accommodations7

Aggrandi'ement

a) 2odern accommodations considering t$e separation ofpoers it$ a primary concern for aggrandi'ement of anyone ranc$

1. Non-Delegation Doctrine (Art 1 %ec R "icam!resent

(!anama “IneGuitale”)7 Enforce , Amend (Clinton #C))

a) 5a 2AOI must satisfy Article 1 %ection R"icameralism and !resentment

(1) Executi#e - I,E4!4E, - EF4CEi) Delegation "y intelligile standards c o -

2a8ing la (!anama7 A5A %c$etcer)



Panama Refinery: Executive deciding “inequitable” oil

practices is delegating law making

ALA Shecter: Determination by trade groups of “unfair”

competition is delegation of law making(a) , amending la on t$e oo8s (Article I %ection R)

Clinton v. City of New York(Line item veto diverts funds to

lockbox and in effect amends the law while choosing to

simply not spend the funds would have been a permissible

discretionary act of enforcement or execution of the law)(a) Current practical non&enforcement ut some outer

limits are de/ned1. Appointments Clause (Article II %ection <)

a) Superior @cers - !resident Appoint :Ad#iceConsent %enate

a) nerior @cers - !resident alone> courts> $eads ofdepartments

(1) Congress can #est appointment of inerior o!cer inonly president> courts> or $eads of departments

i) *e s$all $a#e !oer> y and it$ t$e Ad#ice andConsent of t$e %enate> to ma8e ,reaties> pro#ided tot$irds of t$e %enators present concur7 and $e s$allnominate> and y and it$ t$e Ad#ice and Consent of

t$e %enate> s$all appoint Amassadors> ot$er pulic2inisters and Consuls> 3udges of t$e supreme Court>and all ot$er @cers of t$e +nited %tates> $oseAppointments are not $erein ot$erise pro#ided for>and $ic$ s$all e estalis$ed y 5aL ut t$eCongress may y 5a #est t$e Appointment of suc$inferior @cers> as t$ey t$in8 proper> in t$e !residentalone> in t$e Courts of 5a> or in t$e *eads ofDepartments.

1. Control over Executive Agencies (o one&$ouse #eto

(C$ad$a)7 aggrandi'ement (2yers)7 to le#elinterference (Free Enterprise)7 E% pure&executi#e for cause

(2orrison)7 nly executi#e remo#al of executi#e functions

("os$er)7 2ixed o@cer for cause (*ump$ries)

a) , alloed to maintain one&$ouse #eto for action t$atould ot$erise reGuire act of congress (NoBicam+0Present+)



(1) C$ad$a (Impermissile attempt to maintain a one&$ouse #eto o#er decisions delegated to attorneygeneral $ic$ ould ot$erise reGuire an act ofcongress to accomplis$)

a) 4emo#al and Appointment Control #er Agencies

(1) All executi#e poer must e exercised y t$e presidentecause t$ey #est in $im - 2ust $a#e general controlo#er o@cers7 nly executi#e doing executi#e functions

(1) Congress CA, aggrandi'e itself7 can 5 pro#ideone layer of good cause remo#al

i) $o can remo#e0 and *o0i) 5imitation on anot$er ranc$0i) Aggrandi'ement of poer0i) Interference it$ fait$fully execute0i) ,ype of @cer and Functions !erformed

i) Inferior @cer0i) *o many layers of protection0

a) 5egitimate Control(1) "udgets 4 Amending4epealing agency aut$ority

a) Cases(1) %trongest Cases

i) Improper aggrandi'ement it$ pure executi#e -2yers

i) !ure Executi#e for good Cause (%pecial !rosecutor)o aggrandi'ement - 2orrison

i) 2ixed @cer7 ,o le#els for good cause isinterference - Free Enterprise Fund (limiting*ump$ries executor)

i) Executi#e functions and legislati#e remo#al improper- "os$er

i) Case Details(a) 2yersL !ure executi#e superior o@cer and

aggrandi'ement (!ostmaster general)(a) 2orrison L o aggrandi'ement. ood cause on purely

executi#e o@cer. o interference it$ fait$fully

execute. %econd order (%pecial !rosecutor)(a) "os$er L 5egislati#e agent (congressional poer to

remo#e) impermissily gi#en executi#e functions.Congressional remo#al 6usti/cation eyondimpeac$ment is improper (Article II %ection S)

(a) *ump$ries ExecutorL 2ixed @cer. oaggrandi'ement. ood cause. (F,C)



i) 5imited y Free Enterprise Fund to one le#el(a) C$ad$a L Inappropriate one&$ouse #eto to control A

decisions(a) 2istretta L Inferior o@cers appointed y t$e courts.

Inferior appointments clause. (%entencing

Commission)(a) Free Enterprise FundL ,o le#els for mixed o@cer is

too muc$1. 5egislati#e #s. 3udicial - o#ersig$t of Article III

(*ayurn9s)7 reopening /nal 6udgments (%pendt$rift)7

E% c$anging ac8ground la ( outcomes)7

a) Article III Duties and Functions0(1) Article III functions must e done in Article III cannot e

super#ised or re#ised y non&article III odies or agentsecause 6udicial poer #ests solely in t$e supremecourt and ot$ers congress creates. T*ayurn9s Case(Executi#e %uper#ision)7 %pendt$rift (5egislati#ereopening of /nal 6udgments)7 Olein(congressprescriing outcomes> a 6udicial function) Article III%ection 1U

i) Congress can alter t$e ac8ground la> e#enretroacti#ely if clear> ut cannot prescrie outcomesin indi#idual cases or re&open /nal 6udgements (Olein7%pendt$rift Farms)

(1) on&Article III functions can e preformed y Article III

6udges as commissioners (*ayurn9s Case)a) %olely %upreme 4e#ie0(1) Cannot $a#e executi#e (%ecretary of ar) re#ieing

article III decisions (*ayurn9s Case)(1) ,$e supreme doesn9t *ABE to re#ie (Exceptions

clause) ut non&article III cannot e in t$e c$ain ofre#ie o#er any Article III at all

(1) Congress can attempt to ma8e a decisionunrevie"able y not creating a cause o action int$e la and t$en remo#ing t$e entire class o cases

TOlein (Congress can prescrie la ut not outcomes)72cCardle (remo#ing class of cases ould epermissile)Ufrom t$e courts ut t$ese cases ill still ere#ieale on constitutional grounds ecause of t$esupremacy clause

a) Final 3udgements



(1) 3udicial poer rests in t$e /nality of renderingdispositi#e 6udgements (%pendt$rift)

i) Court decisions are fully retroacti#e ecause t$ey areessentially “disco#eries” of t$e la

i) Congressional decisions are presumed not to e

retroacti#e ut can e(a) ould e=ect cases still in t$e pipeline as t$e la to

apply as c$anged ut not /nal 6udgments(%pendt$rift)

a) t$er Article III reGuirements (,enure> pay)a) Article I Courts(1) Administrati#e issues7 no “s$all extend to all” for t$ose

classes of cases(1) "ecause t$e issues are primarily administrati#e and

article III 6udicial poer need not extend to t$ese issues

ecause of t$e omission of MallM from t$e categories ofcases eyond admiralty and amassadors so congressmay #est t$e poer to $ear t$ose cases outside ofarticle III.

I. Bertical %eparation of!oers (Federalism)

A. Implied !oers1. "road Frameor8 (2numerated% NO ex!ressly, Broad

Princi!les, .onstitution 2x!ounded (Mc.ulloch)% Not strictly

necessary)

a) ,$e federal go#ernment is one of enumerated poers(1) *oe#er> t$e lac8 of “expressly” as in t$e Articles of

Confederation(1) and t$e nature of t$e constitution as a broad

principles rat$er t$an prescripti#e detail documenti) Allos for t$e existence of implied poers $ic$ t$e

necessary and proper clause gi#es textual permission(a) ot %trictly ecessary - Among granted poers>

omits asolutely> “proper” ould e superuousi) “ecessary” is not strictly necessary ecause it is

listed among t$e grant of poers (Art 1 %ection Q)AD omits “asolutely” as in Article 1 %ection 1V.Furt$er> a “strictly necessary” interpretation ouldma8e “proper” %uperuous and t$us is disfa#ored



(1) Examplei) ,$e federal go#ernment is one of enumerated

poers.T(Article 1 %ection 1 (*erein ranted7 Article I%ection Q(Enumerated !oers)U. *oe#er> t$e lac8 ofMexpresslyM in t$e grant of congressional poers in

t$e constitution> a document of road principles notprescripti#e details> allos one to infer ot$er impliedpoers and t$e necessary and proper clause gi#est$e textual permission to do so. ,$e necessary andproper clause is an expansion of congressional poer.It is listed among t$e poers granted to congress> notits limits and omits MasolutelyM as it is included inArticle I %ection 1V. Furt$ermore> a MstrictlynecessaryM interpretation ould ma8e t$e addition ofMproperM superuous ma8ing suc$ an interpretation is

disfa#ored. 2cCulloc$ #. 2aryland.(a) 5et t$e end e legitimate> let it e it$in t$e scope

of t$e Constitution> and all means $ic$ areappropriate> $ic$ are plainly adapted to t$at end>$ic$ are not pro$iited> ut consist it$ t$e letterand spirit of t$e constitution. 2cCulloc$ #. 2aryland.

1. o ,axation it$out 4epresentation (2cCulloc$)

a) %tates CA, tax instrumentalities of t$e go#ernment- %er#es as indirect tax on ot$er state9s citi'ens(2cCulloc$)

State’s did not have this power before the constitution and are not

textually granted it. The purpose of the constitution is to promote

and enforce democracy and representation.1. Is W a Federal !oer0

a) Does it $a#e a asis in Article 1 %ection Q0 : ecessaryand !roper

(1) All ot$er poers reser#ed for t$e states and people(,ent$ Amendment)(4emainder0 (*olland)7 Core%o#ereignty ("ond)7 ,reaty ot independent (4eid)

i) "+, %EE 2issouri #. *olland (,ent$ merely remainderand treaty independent)

i) ut e#en more "+, %EE "ond (o police poer e#enit$ treaty)

a) Is it ot included in Article I %ection 1V0

A. Commerce Clause1. E% Commerce Clause



a) Articles and Instrumentalities of Commerce(1) Anyt$ing interstate and Anyt$ing Commercial (ic8ard7

4aic$) - Commerce !resumed Interstate (!retextdoesn9t matter (Dary))

i) "+, , Inacti#ity (FI") - Cannot create acti#ity

to regulate itCf. Raich: Non-interstate and non-commercial BUT the

activity of growinga) C$annels of Commercea) on&Commercial Acti#ities it$ %ustantial E=ect (But

must be limit )(1) Aggregation of minimal e=ects (ic8ard)(1) "+, , Entirely local> non&commercial acti#ities

(5ope') - ,$en o 5imit

(1) "+, , ased on costs of crime (2orrison)(1) E% e=ects on interstate tra#el directly $en t$ing islocal (*eart of Atlanta)

a) ecessary to !rotect Interstate 4egulation !rogram(2s!ecially Prohibition)

(1) 4aic$ L ,o protect mari6uana pro$iitiona) forcing action to regulate it (FI")

1. Example

a) Congress alays $as t$e poer to regulate articlesTDary (Commerce presumed interstate and articles can

e regulated despite pretext as long as t$e acti#ities$a#e economic e=ects)7 54" (local production it$inreac$ ecause control is necessary to pre#ent interstatecommerce from ostruction)7 5ottery CasesU andinstrumentalities (%$re#eport) of interstate commerce.Additionally congress can regulate t$ose acti#ities t$atsustantially e=ect (ic8ard local consumption as mar8etparticipation and aggregation of de minimis indi#iduale=ects) interstate commerce or as necessary to protectits interstate regulatory sc$eme $en t$ose acti#ities areinterstate or commercial in nature. %ee 5ope'(directregulation of guns on sc$ool grounds it$ no commercialacti#ity in#ol#ed ould lea#e no room for state generalpolice poers so is out of reac$ of congress)7 *eart ofAtlanta (Congressional policy against discrimination toencourage African Americans into interstate commerce)7%$re#eport 4ate (Congressional policy against interstaterate discrimination> or no as presumed interstate



commerce)7 54"(Congress can regulate steel productionlaor relations ecause its regulation is essential andappropriate to protect t$e interstate commerce fromostructions).

(1) Congress can ta8e action MnecessaryM to t$e execution

of t$ose enumerated poers (2cCulloc$) ut t$ataction must also e MproperM to t$e letter and spirit oft$e constitution t$at sets out a federal go#ernment ofenumerated poers (FI") $ose poers must $a#esome limit as to preser#e general police po"ers fort$e states so may not e ased on generali'ed e=ectson commerce t$at $a#e no limit suc$ as crime. 5ope'(restricting simple gun possession ould imply no limitto congressional poers and resemles federalapplication of general police poers)7 2orrison (Federal

creation of domestic #iolence ci#il remedy inappropriateecause it is purely local acti#ities t$at are notcommercial in nature and regulation of marital relationss$ould e left to t$e states).

i) ,$e mere fact t$at an acti#ity is non-economic andlocal is not enoug$ to ma8e t$e exercise of a poerMimproperM. ,$e regulation may e to protect aroader interstate regulation program (4aic$) ut t$eapplication of t$is or ot$er poers must e limited(5ope'). ,$e poer cannot e inconsistent it$ a

federal go#ernment of enumerated poers suc$ aso#erstepping into general police poers orcompulsion of action or mar8et participation. (5ope')7Compare 4aic$ (purely local production of giftedmari6uana is still a class of commercial acti#ities andnecessary to support complete federal pro$iition ofmari6uana) it$ FI" (mandated participation in amar8et on nonparticipants ould lea#e federal poerit$out ounds and e contrary to a go#ernment ofenumerated poers)7 %ee also 2orrison (federal

regulation of local crime ould lead to unlimitedpoer to regulate and infringes on state generalpolice poer and marital relations)

i) Congress can act to regulate mar#ets $ile it cannotact to regulate purely local> non&commercial e$a#iorsuc$ as simple possession. Compare ic8ard(regulating t$e interstate mar8et for $eat $ic$



a=ects $eat production for local use) it$ 5ope'(Inappropriate regulation of pure possessioninappropriate ecause t$ere is no similar mar8et orcommercial acti#ities eing regulated). Congress canregulate t$ose mar8ets and t$eir participants ut

cannot directly compel parties into action or mar8etparticipation y a direct mandate. Compare FI"(Inescapale mandate to purc$ase $ealt$care for non&mar8et participants7 compelling action to t$enregulate) it$ ic8ard (%trong incenti#es created tocur local $eat production ut ultimate c$oice leftt$e farmer to participate in t$e mar8et).

i) ,$ere is no constitutionally enumerated poer forcongress to sol#e national problems and in fact itcan e argued t$at t$e system is set up in a ay to

encourage t$e states as laoratories for /ndingtailored rat$er t$an one si'e /ts all solutions.Congress is empoered to use its enumerated poersto sol#e national prolems ut not to create greatsustanti#e independent poers eyond t$oseenumerated. %ee FI".

1. Cases

a) ions #. gden (yes poer)L Conicting ferrylicenses granted y t$e state and t$e federal

go#ernment. Expansi#e #ie of t$e commerceclause%$re#eport 4ate Cases (yes poer)L 4ailroad linereac$es out of state ut solely in state acti#itiesare regulated ecause it is necessary to protectt$e interstate sc$eme of non&rate discrimination. ,$e poer extends to matters $a#ing suc$ a closeand sustantial relation to interstate [email protected] Cases(yes poer)L !unis$ing carriers of

lottery tic8ets across state lines permissile*eart of Atlanta (yes poer)L $otel near interstateinstrumentality it$ some ci#il rig$ts usiness.ic8ard #. Filurn (yes poer)L !roduction ofpersonal consumption of $eat e=ects t$e mar8etand prices y your lac8 of participation in it and



t$ose e=ects $en aggregated are sustantialDary (yes poer)L Congress can pro$iit nonminimum age articles e#en t$oug$ a pretext toa=ect t$e minimum age. Commerce is

presumed interstate. 5oo8 to economic e=ects noindirect or direct. Direct regulation of ages aslong as necessary to protect regulation of t$earticles54" #. 3ones 5aug$lin %teelL regulation of laorrelations in steel productions ecause of t$eirclose and sustantial relations$ip to interstatecommerceCarter Coal (o poer)L !roduction of coal is

distinct from commerce and proceeds it.!roduction is distinct from commerce ecauseit$out suc$ a distinction t$ere is no preser#ationof state poer to regulate intrastate commerceA5A %c$ecter (no poer)L Interstate c$ic8enscoming to slaug$ter$ouse t$roug$ in state u=ercompany and used for local consumption. 4egularo of commerce does not mean commercecontinues once t$e item $as arri#ed in state.EC Onig$t (no poer) ("ad 5a)L 2anufacturingproceeds commerce and t$us is an indirect e=ecton interstate commerce and are sounregulateale y congressC$ild 5aor Case (no poer)("ad la)L C$ild laordone once commerce egins despite t$eregulation targeting articles of commerce5ope' (no poer)L Inappropriate regulation of

pure possession. o mar8et for gun possessionunli8e $eat. %c$ool is not a mar8et or t$e cost of crime is not determinati#e ecause t$is ouldlea#e no limit on t$e application of t$e commerceclause and defeat t$e idea of a go#ernment oflimited and enumerate poers.4aic$ (yes poer)L $olly intrastate production



and consumption of a federally anned good is acommercial and economic class of acti#ities>despite nonpayment> and necessary to supportt$e asolute federal pro$iition on t$at good. ,$e

court is not in t$e usiness of excising as tri#ialindi#idual applications of an ot$erise #alidpro$iition2orrison (no poer)L Federal go#ernment cantpro#ide ci#il remedy for domestic #iolenceecause of local crimes e=ect on commerceecause t$is ould lea#e t$e poer to regulateunounded and it infringes on t$e states generalpolice poer and poer to regulate martial

relationsA. %tate %o#ereign Immunity (Ele#ent$ and

Fourteent$ Amendments)1. Elevent$ Amendment (: pre constitutional common la

X %%I) - Consent or state o@cials can e sued (Alden)7

Art 1 %ec Q cannot arogate %%I (%eminole)

a) %%I deri#ed from pre&constitutional common la and t$eEle#ent$ Amendment

a) !ermissile 2ec$anisms to %ue %tates(1) Consent(1) %tate @cials

i) %tate o@cials are ound y t$e constitution(%upremacy) $a#e a duty to up$old it. %uits againsto@cials are defended y t$e states anyay (Alden)

a) Congress cannot arogate %%I it$ Article 1 %ection Q!oers (%ee %eminole ,rie7 Ele#ent$ Amendment)

(1) Co&EGual so#ereigns and Cores Aspect of %o#ereignty1. %ourteent$ Amendment (Fundamental re&ordering7 after

11t$7 %ection 1 rig$ts7 %ection N enforcement7 non&

economic acti#ity)

a) Fourteent$ Amendment AF,E4 Ele#ent$ Amendment(1) %ection 1 is a fundamental restructuring of t$e

federalstate relations$ipi) ,extually expansi#e for congress and limiting for

states “Congress %$all” “o state s$all”



(1) %ection NL Congress $as t$e poer to enforce> yappropriate means> t$e pro#isions of t$is article

i) !oer to regulate non&economic acti#ity under eGualprotection it$out t$e use of t$e commerce clause

a) Fourteent$ Application (4ede/ning rig$t7 5e#el of

scrutiny7 #iolations s$on)Ratchet UP —> Katzenbach OR Specific applications Katzenbach

NO redefining right (Flores) finding generally violations where are

none by SC(1) %tate Action0(1) %ection 1 De/nition0 - ,argetBiolations0 - 5e#el of

scrutiny0i) %ection 1 #iolations de/ned y t$e courts (Flores)(a) Congress can ratc$et &' protection ("road

Oat'enac$ “Enforce” is a one ay ord)(a) Congress can remedy or act prop$ylactically

$en #iolations are found in speci/c applications(arro Oat'enac$ literacy tests eing used forroader disenfranc$isement of !uerto 4icans)

(a) "+, Congress CA, rede/ne rig$ts (Flores) -4emedy must e congruent and proportional

i) ,$e remedy must $a#e air congruence andproportionality to t$e #iolation as de/ned y t$ecourts (Flores least restricti#e means test

o#erprotecti#e for generally applicale lasdetermined y %C to e constitutional)(a) Example

i) Congress may e ale to roaden or ratc$et upt$e protections o=ered y t$e constitution tosome extent> especially $en /nding #iolations inspeci/c circumstances $en t$e courts ruled on apractice generally (Oat'enac$) ut cannotpro#ide a remedy it$out a fair congruence andproportionality to t$e in6ury pre#ented so as to not

rede/ne t$e rig$ts unless t$ey can s$o #iolationsof an actual or di=erent nature (Flores)i) *as congress s$on t$e #iolations0 - Congruent

and !roportional (5e#el of %crutiny) arrett and Flores(o) Oat'enac$ and *is (es)

(a) 4ational "asis (2ost)

Katzenbach: Literacy tests as applied to Puerto Ricans



i) Any concei#ale rational asis and may not $a#eto e actually asserted

(a) En$anced 4ational "asis (Disailities and roup*omes)

Garrett: “Reasonable accommodations for disabled” —>

Remedy is NOTcongruent and proportional to the

violations shown

(a) Intermediate %crutiny (*is ender)

Disparate leave policies and childrearing stereotypes.

Reching second order causes

(a) %trict %crutiny (Immutale c$aracteristics7 4ace>4eligion> ational rigin)

i) Compelling go#ernment interest and narrolytailored

i) Is it legit0(a) es - (iolations ere identifed and

legislation as narro"ly tailored to t$at#iolation. ,$e c$oice among remedies is alegislati#e decision (*is) /eaching second ordercauses% 4iolations shon

(a) es - Fundamental rig$t7 o#ious #iolations (5anep$ysical access to courts y disaled people)

(a) o - #erly protecti#e so as to rede/ne rig$t(Flores)

(a) o - o per#asi#e pattern of #iolations s$on.En$anced 4ational "asis (arret)

A. ,ax and %pend1. For general elfare0

1. +namiguous condition0

1. Coercion0 on states or peopleusinesses0merely political

processes0

a) n "usinesses7 +sing t$e political processes - %teard2ac$ine +nemployment !rogram

a) In#oluntary C$oice - 1VY of udgets from medicaid(FI") + , *EAD

a) NY of $ig$ay funds> 1Y of udgets - 5egit (Dole)1. 5ogical exus0

a) %ame program or ne program0 (FI")a) E% logical nexus - Dri#ing and Drin8ing Age (Dole)

1. Independent Constitutional arriers (5iscrimination)



1. %igni/cant %pending - 4oing !eter to !ay !aul (Doule

!enalty)

a) FI" - !enali'ed for not participating AD paying forot$ers

A. Core Hones of %o#ereignty (Tenth mendment% Treaties% .ommandeering)

1. ,ent$ Amendment (Core Hone - o longer enforceale

(,ransit Aut$ority)

a) Does t$e ,ent$ Amendment $a#e independent functionaside from mirroring Article 1 %ection Q0 - E% CoreHone of %o#ereignty

(1) ,ent$ as negati#e pro$iition on t$e federal go# -Co#ert

(1) ,ent$ as a mere remainder - *olland(1) ,ent$ as core 'one of %o#ereignty - ational 5eague

of Cities (payment of go#ernment employeeso#erturned y ,ransit Aut$ority as no longer 6udiciallyenforceale)

i) Cannot regulate $o a state regulates - If couldt$en not$ing left for ,ent$ amendment to retain tostates

i) 2ust e a clear statement to interfere it$ “core'one” - As$croft (no clear statement to regulate

6udge9s pay)1. ,reaties and t$e ,ent$ Amendment

a) Independent treaty poer - E% (*olland ut onlyreac$ing an area no in reac$ of t$e commerce clause)

a) %elf&Executing ,reaty0 (2edellin consulars) Couldcongress regulate t$is0 ("ond local crime)

1. o Commandeering state " Fed (o legislati#e ()> o

executi#e (!rint')> es 6udicial Art BI)

a) $y0(1) Co&EGual %o#ereigns

(1) !olitical accountaility and t$e democratic process(1) Essential c$aracteristics of semi&autonomousgo#ernments (Core Hones)

a) o legislati#e commandeering(1) e or8 L ,a8e title to radioacti#e aste. Forced false

c$oice to regulate. Encouragement to coercion.i) ,axes on aste7 susidi'ing ne dumps7 aut$ori'ed

interstate discrimination - all legit



a) o executi#e commandeering(1) !rint' L +sing state s$eri=s for "rady "ill ac8ground

c$ec8sa) es 6udicial commandeering - Article BI “s$all e ound

y oat$ or a@rmation to support t$is constitution”

A. !re&Emption1. "ac8ground (Not inde!endent !oer, not negate, choice o"

la, trum!)

a) o independent poer to negate state las(1) nly supremacy clause as a c$oice of la rule(1) Congress $as t$e poer to trump $ere it $as t$e

poer to regulate1. !reemption ,ypes (.ongress ction to Inaction)

a) Express !reemption ("roaden Conict)

(1) Congress expressly adds preemption languagei) Expands scope of regulation eyond actual conicts

to areas t$at congress C+5D e regulateda) Conict !reemption (Impossiility)(1) !$ysical impossiility to comply it$ ot$ state and

federal laa) stacle !reemption (Frustrates !urpose)(1) %tate la frustrates t$e purpose or interferes it$

federal laa) Field !reemption (!er#asi#e 4 strong interest)

(1) Federal regulation is so per#asi#e t$at it can e inferredcongress $as intended to occupy t$e /eld

(1) 4 t$ere is a strong or uniGuely federal interest(immigration)

a) Federal Common 5a (3udicially created to protect stronginterest (Defense ,ort Immunity "oyle)

(1) 3udge created la to protect strong federal interests("oyle Defense contractor tort liaility immunity)

a) Dormant Commerce Clause (+ni/ed ational 2ar8et> ,Exclusi#e7

(1) %trong Federal interest in a unifed national mar#eti) , Exclusi#e ecause poer can gi#e ac8 to statespoer to impede commerce

(a) %tate9s $a#e t$e aility to regulate so long as t$eydon9t interfere it$ interstate commerce

(1) Analysisi) Facial Discrimination - A52%, !er %e In#alid



(a) %topping at t$e order (City of !$iladelp$iadiscrimination against fungile interstate garaget$at presents no greater ris8 to $ealt$ and safetyt$an out of state garage or in state transportation)

(a) "+, %ee 2aine #. ,aylor (Actual ris8 of

contamination from out&of state ait/s$ andnarroly tailored protection) see also Juarantinecases (*ealt$ and safety protection is t$e goal andno ot$er ay to accomplis$ it)

(a) enerally applicale tax : in&state susidy -Discrimination (Dairy %usidy)

i) E#en $anded application it$ cost and beneftsdistributed among local and interstate commerce(Dairy %usidy)

(a) , a least restricti#e means test

(a) "alancing t$e ene/ts and urdens on local andinterstate commerce

i) All state9s acting in on interest ould e ad fort$e national mar8et

i) ,$ey ouldn9t engage in t$is acti#ity if t$ey ereto ear t$e $ole cost

(a) Concern for lac8 of representationi) Dairy %usidy (ut of state $ad no #oice instate to

oppose and money as limited to application tomil8 so no political restraints as it as pure

ene/t to instate producers)

Dinh Con Law Outline

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