DigiCert Certificate Policy, version 4 - SSL Digital Certificate … · 2018-01-29 · DigiCert...
Transcript of DigiCert Certificate Policy, version 4 - SSL Digital Certificate … · 2018-01-29 · DigiCert...
DigiCert
CertificatePolicy
DigiCert,Inc.Version4.14
January25,20182801N.ThanksgivingWay
Suite500Lehi,UT84043
USATel:1‐801‐877‐2100Fax:1‐801‐705‐0481
www.digicert.com
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TABLEOFCONTENTS1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 1
1.1. Overview ...................................................................................................................................... 1 1.2. Document name and Identification ............................................................................................... 1 1.3. PKI Participants ........................................................................................................................... 3
1.3.1. DigiCert Policy Authority and Certification Authorities ............................................................. 3 1.3.2. Registration Authorities ........................................................................................................... 4 1.3.3. Subscribers ............................................................................................................................. 4 1.3.4. Relying Parties ........................................................................................................................ 4 1.3.5. Other Participants ................................................................................................................... 4
1.4. Certificate Usage ......................................................................................................................... 4 1.4.1. Appropriate Certificate Uses ................................................................................................... 4 1.4.2. Prohibited Certificate Uses ...................................................................................................... 4
1.5. Policy administration .................................................................................................................... 5 1.5.1. Organization Administering the Document .............................................................................. 5 1.5.2. Contact Person ....................................................................................................................... 5 1.5.3. Person Determining CPS Suitability for the Policy .................................................................. 5 1.5.4. CP Approval Procedures ......................................................................................................... 5
1.6. Definitions and acronyms ............................................................................................................. 5 1.6.1. Definitions ............................................................................................................................... 5 1.6.2. Acronyms ................................................................................................................................ 6 1.6.3. References .............................................................................................................................. 7
2. PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY RESPONSIBILITIES .................................................................... 7 2.1. Repositories ................................................................................................................................. 7 2.2. Publication of certification information .......................................................................................... 8 2.3. Time or frequency of publication .................................................................................................. 8 2.4. Access controls on repositories ................................................................................................... 8
3. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION ......................................................................................... 8 3.1. Naming ........................................................................................................................................ 8
3.1.1. Types of Names ...................................................................................................................... 8 3.1.2. Need for Names to be Meaningful ........................................................................................... 8 3.1.3. Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers ............................................................................ 8 3.1.4. Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms ............................................................................ 8 3.1.5. Uniqueness of Names ............................................................................................................. 9 3.1.6. Recognition, Authentication, and Role of Trademarks ............................................................ 9
3.2. Initial identity validation ................................................................................................................ 9 3.2.1. Method to Prove Possession of Private Key ........................................................................... 9 3.2.2. Authentication of Organization and Domain Control ............................................................... 9 3.2.3. Authentication of Individual Identity ....................................................................................... 10 3.2.4. Non-verified Subscriber Information ...................................................................................... 15 3.2.5. Validation of Authority ........................................................................................................... 16
3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests .................................................................. 16 3.3.1. Identification and Authentication for Routine Re-key ............................................................. 16 3.3.2. Identification and Authentication for Re-key After Revocation............................................... 17
3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request ............................................................. 17 4. CERTIFICATE LIFE-CYCLE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS ....................................................... 17
4.1. Certificate Application ................................................................................................................ 17 4.1.1. Who Can Submit a Certificate Application ............................................................................ 17 4.1.2. Enrollment Process and Responsibilities .............................................................................. 17
4.2. Certificate application processing .............................................................................................. 17 4.2.1. Performing Identification and Authentication Functions ........................................................ 17 4.2.2. Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications ................................................................... 18 4.2.3. Time to Process Certificate Applications ............................................................................... 18
4.3. Certificate issuance .................................................................................................................... 18 4.3.1. CA Actions during Certificate Issuance ................................................................................. 18 4.3.2. Notification to Subscriber by the CA of Issuance of Certificate ............................................. 18
4.4. Certificate acceptance ............................................................................................................... 18 4.4.1. Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance ........................................................................ 18 4.4.2. Publication of the Certificate by the CA ................................................................................. 18 4.4.3. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities ............................................. 18
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4.5. Key pair and certificate usage .................................................................................................... 18 4.5.1. Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage ...................................................................... 18 4.5.2. Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage .................................................................... 19
4.6. Certificate renewal ..................................................................................................................... 19 4.6.1. Circumstance for Certificate Renewal ................................................................................... 19 4.6.2. Who May Request Renewal .................................................................................................. 19 4.6.3. Processing Certificate Renewal Requests ............................................................................ 19 4.6.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber .......................................................... 19 4.6.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Renewal Certificate .................................................. 19 4.6.6. Publication of the Renewal Certificate by the CA .................................................................. 19 4.6.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities ............................................. 19
4.7. Certificate re-key ........................................................................................................................ 20 4.7.1. Circumstance for Certificate Rekey ....................................................................................... 20 4.7.2. Who May Request Certificate Rekey .................................................................................... 20 4.7.3. Processing Certificate Rekey Requests ................................................................................ 20 4.7.4. Notification of Certificate Rekey to Subscriber ...................................................................... 20 4.7.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Rekeyed Certificate .................................................. 20 4.7.6. Publication of the Rekeyed Certificate by the CA .................................................................. 20 4.7.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities ............................................. 20
4.8. Certificate modification ............................................................................................................... 20 4.8.1. Circumstance for Certificate Modification .............................................................................. 20 4.8.2. Who May Request Certificate Modification............................................................................ 20 4.8.3. Processing Certificate Modification Requests ....................................................................... 20 4.8.4. Notification of Certificate Modification to Subscriber ............................................................. 21 4.8.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Modified Certificate ................................................... 21 4.8.6. Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA .................................................................. 21 4.8.7. Notification of Certificate Modification by the CA to Other Entities ........................................ 21
4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension ....................................................................................... 21 4.9.1. Circumstances for Revocation .............................................................................................. 21 4.9.2. Who Can Request Revocation .............................................................................................. 22 4.9.3. Procedure for Revocation Request ....................................................................................... 22 4.9.4. Revocation Request Grace Period ........................................................................................ 23 4.9.5. Time within which CA Must Process the Revocation Request .............................................. 23 4.9.6. Revocation Checking Requirement for Relying Parties ......................................................... 23 4.9.7. CRL Issuance Frequency ...................................................................................................... 23 4.9.8. Maximum Latency for CRLs .................................................................................................. 24 4.9.9. On-line Revocation/Status Checking Availability ................................................................... 24 4.9.10. On-line Revocation Checking Requirements .................................................................... 24 4.9.11. Other Forms of Revocation Advertisements Available ..................................................... 24 4.9.12. Special Requirements Related to Key Compromise ......................................................... 24 4.9.13. Circumstances for Suspension ......................................................................................... 24 4.9.14. Who Can Request Suspension ........................................................................................ 24 4.9.15. Procedure for Suspension Request .................................................................................. 24 4.9.16. Limits on Suspension Period ............................................................................................ 25
4.10. Certificate status services .......................................................................................................... 25 4.10.1. Operational Characteristics .............................................................................................. 25 4.10.2. Service Availability ........................................................................................................... 25 4.10.3. Optional Features ............................................................................................................. 25
4.11. End of subscription .................................................................................................................... 25 4.12. Key escrow and recovery ........................................................................................................... 25
4.12.1. Key Escrow and Recovery Policy Practices ..................................................................... 25 4.12.2. Session Key Encapsulation and Recovery Policy and Practices ...................................... 26
5. FACILITY, MANAGEMENT, AND OPERATIONAL CONTROLS ........................................................ 26 5.1. Physical Controls ....................................................................................................................... 26
5.1.1. Site Location and Construction ............................................................................................. 26 5.1.2. Physical Access .................................................................................................................... 26 5.1.3. Power and Air Conditioning ................................................................................................... 27 5.1.4. Water Exposures ................................................................................................................... 27 5.1.5. Fire Prevention and Protection .............................................................................................. 27 5.1.6. Media Storage ....................................................................................................................... 27 5.1.7. Waste Disposal ..................................................................................................................... 27 5.1.8. Off-site Backup ...................................................................................................................... 27
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5.1.9. Certificate Status Hosting, CMS and External RA Systems .................................................. 27 5.2. Procedural controls .................................................................................................................... 27
5.2.1. Trusted Roles ........................................................................................................................ 27 5.2.2. Number of Persons Required per Task ................................................................................. 28 5.2.3. Identification and Authentication for each Role ..................................................................... 28 5.2.4. Roles Requiring Separation of Duties ................................................................................... 28
5.3. Personnel controls ..................................................................................................................... 28 5.3.1. Qualifications, Experience, and Clearance Requirements .................................................... 28 5.3.2. Background Check Procedures ............................................................................................. 29 5.3.3. Training Requirements .......................................................................................................... 29 5.3.4. Retraining Frequency and Requirements .............................................................................. 29 5.3.5. Job Rotation Frequency and Sequence ................................................................................ 30 5.3.6. Sanctions for Unauthorized Actions ...................................................................................... 30 5.3.7. Independent Contractor Requirements ................................................................................. 30 5.3.8. Documentation Supplied to Personnel .................................................................................. 30
5.4. Audit logging procedures ........................................................................................................... 30 5.4.1. Types of Events Recorded .................................................................................................... 30 5.4.2. Frequency of Processing Log ................................................................................................ 32 5.4.3. Retention Period for Audit Log .............................................................................................. 33 5.4.4. Protection of Audit Log .......................................................................................................... 33 5.4.5. Audit Log Backup Procedures ............................................................................................... 33 5.4.6. Audit Collection System (internal vs. external) ...................................................................... 33 5.4.7. Notification to Event-causing Subject .................................................................................... 33 5.4.8. Vulnerability Assessments .................................................................................................... 33
5.5. Records archival ........................................................................................................................ 33 5.5.1. Types of Records Archived ................................................................................................... 33 5.5.2. Retention Period for Archive ................................................................................................. 34 5.5.3. Protection of Archive ............................................................................................................. 34 5.5.4. Archive Backup Procedures .................................................................................................. 34 5.5.5. Requirements for Time-stamping of Records ........................................................................ 34 5.5.6. Archive Collection System (internal or external) .................................................................... 34 5.5.7. Procedures to Obtain and Verify Archive Information ........................................................... 35
5.6. Key changeover ......................................................................................................................... 35 5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery ........................................................................................... 35
5.7.1. Incident and Compromise Handling Procedures ................................................................... 35 5.7.2. Computing Resources, Software, and/or Data Are Corrupted .............................................. 35 5.7.3. Entity Private Key Compromise Procedures ......................................................................... 35 5.7.4. Business Continuity Capabilities after a Disaster .................................................................. 36
5.8. CA or RA termination ................................................................................................................. 36 6. TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS ................................................................................................ 36
6.1. Key pair generation and installation ........................................................................................... 36 6.1.1. Key Pair Generation .............................................................................................................. 36 6.1.2. Private Key Delivery to Subscriber ........................................................................................ 37 6.1.3. Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer ............................................................................... 37 6.1.4. CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties ............................................................................ 37 6.1.5. Key Sizes .............................................................................................................................. 37 6.1.6. Public Key Parameters Generation and Quality Checking .................................................... 38 6.1.7. Key Usage Purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field) ....................................................... 38
6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls .................................. 38 6.2.1. Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls ..................................................................... 38 6.2.2. Private Key (n out of m) Multi-person Control ....................................................................... 39 6.2.3. Private Key Escrow ............................................................................................................... 39 6.2.4. Private Key Backup ............................................................................................................... 39 6.2.5. Private Key Archival .............................................................................................................. 40 6.2.6. Private Key Transfer into or from a Cryptographic Module ................................................... 40 6.2.7. Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module ..................................................................... 40 6.2.8. Method of Activating Private Key .......................................................................................... 40 6.2.9. Method of Deactivating Private Key ...................................................................................... 40 6.2.10. Method of Destroying Private Key .................................................................................... 40 6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating ........................................................................................... 40
6.3. Other aspects of key pair management ..................................................................................... 40 6.3.1. Public Key Archival ............................................................................................................... 40
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6.3.2. Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods................................................ 41 6.4. Activation data ........................................................................................................................... 42
6.4.1. Activation Data Generation and Installation .......................................................................... 42 6.4.2. Activation Data Protection ..................................................................................................... 42
6.5. Computer security controls ........................................................................................................ 42 6.5.1. Specific Computer Security Technical Requirements ........................................................... 42 6.5.2. Computer Security Rating ..................................................................................................... 42
6.6. Life cycle technical controls ....................................................................................................... 43 6.6.1. System Development Controls .............................................................................................. 43 6.6.2. Security Management Controls ............................................................................................. 43 6.6.3. Life Cycle Security Controls .................................................................................................. 43
6.7. Network security controls ........................................................................................................... 43 6.8. Time-stamping ........................................................................................................................... 43
7. CERTIFICATE, CRL, AND OCSP PROFILES .................................................................................... 44 7.1. Certificate profile ........................................................................................................................ 44
7.1.1. Version Number(s) ................................................................................................................ 44 7.1.2. Certificate Extensions ........................................................................................................... 44 7.1.3. Algorithm Object Identifiers ................................................................................................... 44 7.1.4. Name Forms ......................................................................................................................... 45 7.1.5. Name Constraints ................................................................................................................. 45 7.1.6. Certificate Policy Object Identifier ......................................................................................... 46 7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints Extension ................................................................................. 46 7.1.8. Policy Qualifiers Syntax and Semantics ................................................................................ 46 7.1.9. Processing Semantics for the Critical Certificate Policies Extension ..................................... 46
7.2. CRL profile ................................................................................................................................. 46 7.2.1. Version number(s) ................................................................................................................. 46 7.2.2. CRL and CRL Entry Extensions ............................................................................................ 46
7.3. OCSP profile .............................................................................................................................. 46 7.3.1. Version Number(s) ................................................................................................................ 46 7.3.2. OCSP Extensions ................................................................................................................. 47
8. COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS ....................................................................... 47 8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment .............................................................................. 47 8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor .............................................................................................. 47 8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity ................................................................................. 47 8.4. Topics covered by assessment .................................................................................................. 47 8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency ....................................................................................... 47 8.6. Communication of results .......................................................................................................... 47 8.7. Self-Audits ................................................................................................................................. 48
9. OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL MATTERS ...................................................................................... 48 9.1. Fees ........................................................................................................................................... 48
9.1.1. Certificate Issuance or Renewal Fees ................................................................................... 48 9.1.2. Certificate Access Fees ........................................................................................................ 48 9.1.3. Revocation or Status Information Access Fees ..................................................................... 48 9.1.4. Fees for Other Services ........................................................................................................ 48 9.1.5. Refund Policy ........................................................................................................................ 48
9.2. Financial responsibility ............................................................................................................... 48 9.2.1. Insurance Coverage .............................................................................................................. 48 9.2.2. Other Assets ......................................................................................................................... 48 9.2.3. Insurance or Warranty Coverage for End-Entities ................................................................. 48
9.3. Confidentiality of business information ....................................................................................... 48 9.3.1. Scope of Confidential Information ......................................................................................... 48 9.3.2. Information Not Within the Scope of Confidential Information ............................................... 48 9.3.3. Responsibility to Protect Confidential Information ................................................................. 48
9.4. Privacy of personal information .................................................................................................. 49 9.4.1. Privacy Plan .......................................................................................................................... 49 9.4.2. Information Treated as Private .............................................................................................. 49 9.4.3. Information Not Deemed Private ........................................................................................... 49 9.4.4. Responsibility to Protect Private Information ......................................................................... 49 9.4.5. Notice and Consent to Use Private Information .................................................................... 49 9.4.6. Disclosure Pursuant to Judicial or Administrative Process .................................................... 49 9.4.7. Other Information Disclosure Circumstances ........................................................................ 49
9.5. Intellectual property rights .......................................................................................................... 49
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9.6. Representations and warranties ................................................................................................ 49 9.6.1. CA Representations and Warranties ..................................................................................... 49 9.6.2. RA Representations and Warranties ..................................................................................... 49 9.6.3. Subscriber Representations and Warranties ......................................................................... 49 9.6.4. Relying Party Representations and Warranties ..................................................................... 50 9.6.5. Representations and Warranties of Other Participants ......................................................... 50
9.7. Disclaimers of warranties ........................................................................................................... 50 9.8. Limitations of liability .................................................................................................................. 50 9.9. Indemnities ................................................................................................................................ 50
9.9.1. Indemnification by an Issuer CA ............................................................................................ 50 9.9.2. Indemnification by Subscribers ............................................................................................. 50 9.9.3. Indemnification by Relying Parties ........................................................................................ 50
9.10. Term and termination ................................................................................................................. 50 9.10.1. Term ................................................................................................................................. 50 9.10.2. Termination ...................................................................................................................... 50 9.10.3. Effect of Termination and Survival .................................................................................... 51
9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants ........................................................... 51 9.12. Amendments .............................................................................................................................. 51
9.12.1. Procedure for Amendment ............................................................................................... 51 9.12.2. Notification Mechanism and Period .................................................................................. 51 9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID Must Be Changed ........................................................ 51
9.13. Dispute resolution provisions ..................................................................................................... 51 9.14. Governing law ............................................................................................................................ 51 9.15. Compliance with applicable law ................................................................................................. 51 9.16. Miscellaneous provisions ........................................................................................................... 52
9.16.1. Entire Agreement ............................................................................................................. 52 9.16.2. Assignment ....................................................................................................................... 52 9.16.3. Severability ....................................................................................................................... 52 9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights) ........................................................... 52 9.16.5. Force Majeure .................................................................................................................. 52
9.17. Other provisions ......................................................................................................................... 52
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. OVERVIEWThisCertificatePolicy(CP)definestheproceduralandoperationalrequirementsthatDigiCertrequiresentitiestoadheretowhenissuingandmanagingdigitallysignedobjects(digitalCertificatesandtime‐stamptokens)withinDigiCert’sPKI,excludingparticipantsinDigiCert’sPrivatePKIservices,whicharenotcross‐certifiedorpubliclytrusted.SpecificrequirementsregardingthoseCertificatesaresetforthintheindividualagreementswiththeappropriateDigiCertcustomer.DigiCert’sCertificateandtime‐stamppoliciesarecontrolledbytheDigiCertPolicyAuthority(DCPA)thatdetermineshowthisCPappliestoCertificateAuthorities(CAs),RegistrationAuthorities(RAs),Subscribers,RelyingPartiesandotherPKIentitiesthatinteroperatewithorwithintheDigiCertPKI.ThisdocumentspecifiesthepoliciesDigiCertadoptstomeetthecurrentversionsofthefollowingpolicies,guidelines,andrequirements:
theFederalBridgeCertificationAuthority(“FBCA”)CertificatePolicy, theCertificationAuthority/BrowserForum("CABForum")BaselineRequirementsforthe
IssuanceandManagementofPublicly‐TrustedCertificates(“BaselineRequirements”)locatedathttps://cabforum.org/baseline‐requirements‐documents,
theCABForumGuidelinesforExtendedValidationCertificates(“EVGuidelines”)locatedathttps://cabforum.org/extended‐validation,
theCABForumGuidelinesfortheIssuanceandManagementofExtendedValidationCodeSigningCertificates,and
MinimumRequirementsfortheIssuanceandManagementofPublicly‐TrustedCodeSigningCertificates(“MinimumRequirementsforCodeSigning”)locatedathttps://aka.ms/csbr.
WithregardtoSSL/TLSServerCertificatesorCodeSigningCertificates,ifanyinconsistencyexistsbetweenthisCPandtherequirementsandguidelinesabove,thentheCABForumrequirementsandguidelinesabovetakeprecedence.Time‐stampingpoliciesareinaccordancewithIETFRFC3161,X9.95,ETSI102023,andETSI101861technicalstandards.ThisCPisonlyoneofseveraldocumentsthatgoverntheDigiCertPKI.OtherimportantdocumentsincludeCertificationPracticeStatements,registrationauthorityagreementsandpracticestatements,subscriberagreements,relyingpartyagreements,customeragreements,privacypolicies,andmemorandaofagreement.DigiCertmaypublishadditionalcertificatepoliciesorcertificationpracticestatementsasnecessarytodescribeotherproductandserviceofferings.Thesesupplementalpoliciesandstatementsareavailabletoapplicableusersorrelyingparties.PursuanttotheIETFPKIXRFC3647CP/CPSframework,thisCPisdividedintoninepartsthatcoverthesecuritycontrolsandpracticesandproceduresforcertificateortime‐stampingserviceswithintheDigiCertPKI.TopreservetheoutlinespecifiedbyRFC3647,sectionheadingsthatdonotapplyhavethestatement"Notapplicable"or"Nostipulation."
1.2. DOCUMENTNAMEANDIDENTIFICATIONThisdocumentistheDigiCertCertificatePolicyandwasapprovedforpublicationon2August2010bytheDigiCertPolicyAuthority(DCPA).Thefollowingrevisionshavebeenmadetotheoriginaldocument:
Date Changes Version25‐January‐2018 AddedlanguagebasedontheCABForum’sBaseline
Requirements,asindicatedbyMozilla’sSelf‐Assessmentprocess
4.14
8‐November‐2017 MadeeditstoconformCPwithCPS andtoclarifyprovisions. 4.13
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Alsoaddedprovisionconcerning theprocessingof CAArecords.
8‐September‐2017 RemovedreferencestoPIV‐Ithroughout,conflictsofinterestinsection5.2.1,auditorqualificationsinsection8.2,andmadeotherminorchanges.
4.12
23‐February‐2017 Updatedaddress,maderevisionsrelatedtotheMinimumRequirementsfortheIssuanceandManagementofPublicly‐TrustedCodeSigningCertificates,andmadeotherchangestoupdatetheCP.
4.11
9‐September‐2016 Updatedto clarifyIDdocumentsallowedandforconsistencywithFBCACP2.29,andsec.9.6.3ofBaselineRequirements
4.10
1‐June‐2015 UpdatedforconsistencywithCA/BrowserForumBaselineRequirementsandnewFederalPIV‐IProfilereference
4.09
1‐April‐2015 MadeadditionalchangesbasedonFPKICPWGreview. 4.087‐October‐2014 UpdatedforconsistencywithFBCACPv.2.27 4.0714‐May‐2014 UpdatedtocomplywithchangestoBaselineRequirements
andtheEVGuidelines.4.06
2‐May‐2013 Updatedmailingaddress,removedreferencestoAdobeCDSProgram,revisedexplanationofLevel2identificationrequirements,revisedprivatekeymanagementprovisionsandkeyceremonywitnessrequirements.
4.05
10‐May‐2012 UpdatedtoincludeprovisionssetforthintheBaselineRequirements,toaddEVCodeSigning,improvereadability,andtomodifyrequirementsrelatedtoIGTFCertificates.
4.04
3‐May‐2011 PolicyOIDsrevisedforcertaincertificatetypesandminorupdatesmadetovarioussections.
4.03
29‐October‐2010 ChangesmadeinresponsetocommentsfromtheFPKICPWGregardingcertificatestatusservices,trustedroles,andoff‐sitebackupofarchive.
4.02
26‐August‐2010 Updatedtheprocessusedtoauthenticate thecertificaterequester’sauthorityundersection3.2.5forcodesigningcertificatesissuedtoorganizations
4.01
2‐August‐2010 Thisversion4.0replacestheDigiCertCertificatePolicyandCertificationPracticesStatement,Version3.08,datedMay29,2009.
4.0
TheOIDforDigiCertisjoint‐iso‐ccitt(2)country(16)USA(840)US‐company(1)DigiCert(114412).DigiCertorganizesitsOIDarcsforthevariousCertificatesanddocumentsdescribedinthisCPasfollows:
DigitallySignedObject ObjectIdentifier(OID)PolicyDocuments 2.16.840.1.114412.0 ThisCPDocument 2.16.840.1.114412.0.1.4CertificatesissuedpursuanttoCPS 2.16.840.1.114412.0.2.4NonEVSSL/TLSServerCertificates 2.16.840.1.114412.1 Organization‐ValidatedSSL/TLS Certificate* 2.16.840.1.114412.1.1Domain‐ValidatedSSL/TLSCertificate* 2.16.840.1.114412.1.2Hotspot2.0OSUServerCertificates 2.16.840.1.114412.1.5 FederatedDeviceCertificate 2.16.840.1.114412.1.11 FederatedDeviceHardwareCertificate 2.16.840.1.114412.1.12ExtendedValidationSSL/TLSCertificates* 2.16.840.1.114412.2.1ObjectSigningCertificates 2.16.840.1.114412.3 CodeSigning 2.16.840.1.114412.3.1 MinimumRequirementsforCodeSigning 2.16.840.1.114412.3.1.1
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ExtendedValidationCodeSigning* 2.16.840.1.114412.3.2 WindowsKernelDriverSigning 2.16.840.1.114412.3.11 AdobeSigningCertificates 2.16.840.1.114412.3.21ClientCertificateOIDarc 2.16.840.1.114412.4. Level1Certificates–Personal 2.16.840.1.114412.4.1.1 Level1Certificates–Enterprise 2.16.840.1.114412.4.1.2 Level2Certificates 2.16.840.1.114412.4.2 Level3Certificates–US 2.16.840.1.114412.4.3.1 Level3Certificates–CBP 2.16.840.1.114412.4.3.2 Level4Certificates–US 2.16.840.1.114412.4.4.1 Level4Certificates–CBP 2.16.840.1.114412.4.4.2GridCertificates 2.16.840.1.114412.4.31or
2.16.840.1.114412.31(Grid‐onlyarc)IGTF‐ComparabletoClassicwithSecuredInfrastructure
2.16.840.1.114412.4.31.1(Clientw/Public)or2.16.840.1.114412.31.4.1.1(ClientGridOnly)
IGTF‐ComparabletoMember‐IntegratedCredentialServiceswithSecuredInfrastructure
2.16.840.1.114412.4.31.5
IGTFGridHost‐PublicTrust 2.16.840.1.114412.1.31.1Grid‐OnlyHostCertificate 2.16.840.1.114412.31.1.1.1
Authentication‐OnlyCertificates 2.16.840.1.114412.6Legacyarc 2.16.840.1.114412.81Testarc 2.16.840.1.114412.99
*AlsogovernedbyguidelinesoftheCA/BrowserForum.ThisCPappliestoanyentityassertingoneormoreoftheDigiCertOIDsidentifiedabove.WhenaCAissuesaCertificatecontainingoneoftheabove‐specifiedpolicyidentifiers,itassertsthattheCertificatewasissuedandismanagedinaccordancewiththerequirementsapplicabletothatrespectivepolicy.AllotherOIDsmentionedabovebelongtotheirrespectiveowners.CommercialBestPractices(“CBP”)differsfrom“US”inthattherearenotrustedrolecitizenshiprequirementsforanIssuerCAissuingunderaCBPpolicy,whereaspoliciesdesignated“US”mustfollowthecitizenshippracticessetforthinSection5.3.1ofthisCP.TheLegacyarcexiststoidentifyCertificatesissuedforpurposeofachievingcompatibilitywithlegacysystemsthatareincapableofprocessingneweralgorithmsthatmightberequiredbycomparableindustrybestpractices.SubsequentrevisionstothisCPmightcontainnewOIDassignmentsforthecertificatetypesidentifiedabove.
1.3. PKIPARTICIPANTS
1.3.1. DigiCertPolicyAuthorityandCertificationAuthoritiesDigiCertRootCertificateAuthoritiesandIntermediateCAsaremanagedbytheDigiCertPolicyAuthority(DCPA)whichiscomposedofmembersofDigiCertmanagementappointedbyDigiCert’sexecutivemanagement.TheDCPAisresponsibleforthisCP,theapprovalofrelatedpracticestatements,andoverseeingtheconformanceofCApracticeswiththisCP.DigiCert’spoliciesaredesignedtoensurethattheDigiCertPKIcomplies,inallmaterialrespects,withU.S.andinternationalstandardsandregulations,includingtheFederalBridgeCertificatePolicy,CA/BrowserForumGuidelines,andrelevantlawonelectronicsignatures.DigiCertmayestablishorrecognizeotherCAs(e.g.subordinateCAs)inaccordancewiththisCP,applicablecross‐certification/
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federationpoliciesandmemorandaofagreement.Foreaseofreferenceherein,allCAsissuingCertificatesinaccordancewiththisCP(includingDigiCert)arehereafterreferredtoas“IssuerCAs.”DigiCertshallnotifytheU.S.FederalPKIPolicyAuthority(FPKIPA)priortoissuinganyCACertificatetoanexternalIssuerCAthatDigiCertdesirestochaintotheFederalBridgeCA.
1.3.2. RegistrationAuthoritiesRegistrationAuthorities(RA)operateidentitymanagementsystems(IdMs)andcollectandverifySubscriberinformationontheIssuerCA’sbehalf.TherequirementsinthisCPapplytoallRAs.AnIssuerCAshallmonitoreachRA’scompliancewiththispolicy,theCPS,andifapplicable,anyRegistrationPracticesStatement(RPS)underwhichtheRAoperates.AnIssuerCAthatreliesonavarietyofRAsorIdMstosupportvariouscommunitiesofinterestmaysubmitanRPSforeachRAorIdMtotheDCPAforapproval.TheRPSmustcontaindetailsnecessaryfortheDCPAtodeterminehowtheRAachievescompliancewiththisPolicy.NecessarydetailsincludehowtheRA’sprocessorIdMestablishestheidentitiesofapplicants,howtheintegrityandauthenticityofsuchidentifyinginformationissecurelymaintainedandmanaged,andhowchangesandupdatestosuchinformationarecommunicatedtotheIssuerCA.
1.3.3. SubscribersSubscribersuseDigiCert’sservicesandPKItosupporttransactionsandcommunications.SubscribersarenotalwaysthepartyidentifiedinaCertificate,suchaswhenCertificatesareissuedtoanorganization’semployees.TheSubjectofaCertificateisthepartynamedintheCertificate.ASubscriber,asusedherein,referstoboththesubjectoftheCertificateandtheentitythatcontractedwiththeIssuerCAfortheCertificate’sissuance.PriortoverificationofidentityandissuanceofaCertificate,aSubscriberisanApplicant.
1.3.4. RelyingPartiesRelyingPartiesareentitiesthatactinrelianceonaCertificateand/ordigitalsignatureissuedbytheIssuerCA.RelyingpartiesmustchecktheappropriateCRLorOCSPresponsepriortorelyingoninformationfeaturedinaCertificate.
1.3.5. OtherParticipantsOtherparticipantsincludeBridgeCAsandCAsthatcross‐certifyIssuerCAstoprovidetrustamongotherPKIcommunities.
1.4. CERTIFICATEUSAGEAdigitalCertificate(orCertificate)isformatteddatathatcryptographicallybindsanidentifiedsubscriberwithaPublicKey.AdigitalCertificateallowsanentitytakingpartinanelectronictransactiontoproveitsidentitytootherparticipantsinsuchtransaction.DigitalCertificatesareusedincommercialenvironmentsasadigitalequivalentofanidentificationcard.Atime‐stamptoken(TST)cryptographicallybindsarepresentationofdatatoaparticulartimestamp,thusestablishingevidencethatthedataexistedatacertainpointintime.
1.4.1. AppropriateCertificateUsesCertificatesissuedunderthisCPmaybeusedforthepurposesdesignatedinthekeyusageandextendedkeyusagefieldsfoundintheCertificate.However,thesensitivityoftheinformationprocessedorprotectedbyaCertificatevariesgreatly,andeachRelyingPartymustevaluatetheapplicationenvironmentandassociatedrisksbeforedecidingonwhethertouseaCertificateissuedunderthisCP.
1.4.2. ProhibitedCertificateUsesCertificatesdonotguaranteethattheSubjectistrustworthy,honest,reputableinitsbusinessdealings,safetodobusinesswith,orcompliantwithanylaws.ACertificateonlyestablishesthattheinformationintheCertificatewasverifiedasreasonablycorrectwhentheCertificateissued.Code
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signingCertificatesdonotindicatethatthesignedcodeissafetoinstallorisfreefrommalware,bugs,orvulnerabilities.
1.5. POLICYADMINISTRATION
1.5.1. OrganizationAdministeringtheDocumentThisCPandthedocumentsreferencedhereinaremaintainedbytheDCPA,whichcanbecontactedat:
DigiCertPolicyAuthoritySuite5002801N.ThanksgivingWayLehi,UT84043USATel:1‐801‐701‐9600Fax:1‐801‐705‐[email protected]
1.5.2. ContactPersonAttn:LegalCounselDigiCertPolicyAuthoritySuite5002801N.ThanksgivingWayLehi,[email protected]
1.5.3. PersonDeterminingCPSSuitabilityforthePolicyTheDCPAdeterminesthesuitabilityandapplicabilityofthisCPandtheconformanceofaCPStothisCPbasedontheresultsandrecommendationsreceivedfromanindependentauditor(seeSection8).TheDCPAisalsoresponsibleforevaluatingandactingupontheresultsofcomplianceaudits.
1.5.4. CPApprovalProceduresTheDCPAapprovestheCPandanyamendments.AmendmentsaremadebyeitherupdatingtheentireCPorbypublishinganaddendum.TheDCPAdetermineswhetheranamendmenttothisCPrequiresnoticeoranOIDchange.SeealsoSection9.10andSection9.12below.
1.6. DEFINITIONSANDACRONYMS
1.6.1. Definitions“AffiliatedOrganization”meansanorganizationthathasanorganizationalaffiliationwithaSubscriberandthatapprovesorotherwiseallowssuchaffiliationtoberepresentedinaCertificate.“Applicant”meansanentityapplyingforacertificate.“AuditPeriod”meansaninaperiod‐of‐timeaudit,theperiodbetweenthefirstday(start)andthelastdayofoperations(end)coveredbytheauditorsintheirengagement.(Thisisnotthesameastheperiodoftimewhentheauditorsareon‐siteattheCA.)Thecoveragerulesandmaximumlengthofauditperiodsarediscussedinsection8.1.
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“BaseDomainName”isasdefinedintheBaselineRequirements.“Certificate”meansanelectronicdocumentthatusesadigitalsignaturetobindaPublicKeyandanidentity.“DomainName”isasdefinedintheBaselineRequirements.“DomainNamespace”isasdefinedintheBaselineRequirements. “EVGuidelines”isdefinedinsection1.1.“KeyPair”meansaPrivateKeyanditsassociatedPublicKey.“OCSPResponder”meansanonlinesoftwareapplicationoperatedundertheauthorityofDigiCertandconnectedtoitsrepositoryforprocessingcertificatestatusrequests.“PrivateKey”meansthekeyofaKeyPairthatiskeptsecretbytheholderoftheKeyPair,andthatisusedtocreatedigitalsignaturesand/ortodecryptelectronicrecordsorfilesthatwereencryptedwiththecorrespondingPublicKey.“PublicKey”meansthekeyofaKeyPairthatmaybepubliclydisclosedbytheholderofthecorrespondingPrivateKeyandthatisusedbyaRelyingPartytoverifydigitalsignaturescreatedwiththeholder'scorrespondingPrivateKeyand/ortoencryptmessagessothattheycanbedecryptedonlywiththeholder'scorrespondingPrivateKey.“QualifiedCertificate”meansaCertificatethatmeetstherequirementsofEUlawandisprovidedbyanIssuerCAmeetingtherequirementsofEUlaw.“RelyingParty”meansanentitythatreliesuponeithertheinformationcontainedwithinaCertificateoratime‐stamptoken.“RelyingPartyAgreement”meansanagreementwhichmustbereadandacceptedbytheRelyingPartypriortovalidating,relyingonorusingaCertificateoraccessingorusingDigiCert’sRepository.“SecureSignatureCreationDevice”meansasignature‐creationdevicethatmeetstherequirementslaiddowninEUlaw.“Subscriber”meanseithertheentityidentifiedasthesubjectintheCertificateortheentityreceivingDigiCert’stime‐stampingservices.“SubscriberAgreement”meansanagreementthatgovernstheissuanceanduseofaCertificatethattheApplicantmustreadandacceptbeforereceivingaCertificate.“WebTrust”meansthecurrentversionofCPACanada’sWebTrustProgram(s)forCertificationAuthorities.
1.6.2. AcronymsCA CertificateAuthorityorCertificationAuthorityCAA CertificationAuthorityAuthorizationCAB CA/Browserasin“CABForum”CBP CommercialBestPracticesCMS CardManagementSystemCP CertificatePolicyCPS CertificationPracticeStatement
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CRL CertificateRevocationListCSR CertificateSigningRequestDCPA DigiCertPolicyAuthorityDV DomainValidatedETSI EuropeanTelecommunicationsStandardsInstituteEU EuropeanUnionEV ExtendedValidationFIPS (USGovernment)FederalInformationProcessingStandardFQDN FullyQualifiedDomainNameHSM HardwareSecurityModuleHTTP HypertextTransferProtocolIANA InternetAssignedNumbersAuthorityICANN InternetCorporationforAssignedNamesandNumbersIdM IdentityManagementSystemIETF InternetEngineeringTaskForceIGTF InternationalGridTrustFederationITU InternationalTelecommunicationUnionITU‐T ITUTelecommunicationStandardizationSectorMICS Member‐IntegratedCredentialService(IGTF)OCSP OnlineCertificateStatusProtocolOID ObjectIdentifierOV OrganizationValidatedPIN PersonalIdentificationNumber(e.g.asecretaccesscode)PKI PublicKeyInfrastructurePKIX IETFWorkingGrouponPublicKeyInfrastructurePKCS PublicKeyCryptographyStandardRA RegistrationAuthorityRFC RequestforComments(atIETF.org)SHA SecureHashingAlgorithmSSCD SecureSignatureCreationDeviceSSL SecureSocketsLayerTLD Top‐LevelDomainTLS TransportLayerSecurityURL UniformResourceLocatorUTC CoordinatedUniversalTimeX.509 TheITU‐TstandardforCertificatesandtheircorrespondingauthentication
framework
1.6.3. References
CA/BrowserForumBaselineRequirementsCertificatePolicyfortheIssuanceandManagementofPublicly‐TrustedCertificates(“BaselineRequirements”)CA/BrowserForumGuidelinesfortheIssuanceandManagementofExtendedValidationCertificates(“EVGuidelines”)
2. PUBLICATIONANDREPOSITORYRESPONSIBILITIES
2.1. REPOSITORIESIssuerCAsshallpublishallpubliclytrustedCACertificatesandcross‐Certificates,issuedtoandfromtheIssuerCA,revocationdataforissueddigitalCertificates,CP,CPS,andstandardRelyingPartyAgreementsandSubscriberAgreementsinonlinerepositories.TheIssuerCAshallensurethatitsrootCertificateandtherevocationdataforissuedCertificatesareavailablethrougharepository
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24hoursaday,7daysaweekwithaminimumof99%availabilityoverallperyearwithascheduleddowntimethatdoesnotexceed0.5%annually.TheIssuerCAshalldevelop,implement,enforce,andannuallyupdatetheCPand/orCPSthatdescribesindetailhowtheCAimplementsthelatestversionoftheBaselineRequirements.
2.2. PUBLICATIONOFCERTIFICATIONINFORMATIONIssuerCAsshallmakethefollowinginformationpubliclyaccessibleontheweb:allpubliclytrustedrootCertificates,crossCertificates,CRLs,CPsandCPSs.PointerstorepositoryinformationinCAandendentityCertificatesshallonlycontainvalidUniformResourceIdentifiers(URIs)thatareaccessiblebyrelyingparties.
2.3. TIMEORFREQUENCYOFPUBLICATIONIssuerCAsshallpublishCACertificatesandrevocationdataassoonaspossibleafterissuance.IssuerCAsshallpublishnewormodifiedversionsCPSswithinsevendaysoftheirapproval.
2.4. ACCESSCONTROLSONREPOSITORIESInformationpublishedinarepositoryispublicinformation.TheIssuerCAshallprovideunrestrictedreadaccesstoitsrepositoriesandshallimplementlogicalandphysicalcontrolstopreventunauthorizedwriteaccesstosuchrepositories.
3. IDENTIFICATIONANDAUTHENTICATION
3.1. NAMING
3.1.1. TypesofNamesIssuerCAsshallissueCertificateswithanon‐nullsubjectDistinguishedName(DN)thatcomplieswithITUX.500standards.Level1CertificatesmayincludeanullsubjectDNiftheyincludeatleastonealternativenameformthatismarkedcritical.SubjectAlternateNameformsmaybeincludedinCertificatesiftheyaremarkednon‐critical.WhenDNsareused,commonnamesmustrespectnamespaceuniquenessandmustnotbemisleading.IssuerCAsshallcomplywithsection3.1.2ofRFC3739whenprovidingEUQualifiedCertificates.
3.1.2. NeedforNamestobeMeaningfulWhenapplicable,IssuerCAsshallusedistinguishednamestoidentifyboththeentity(i.e.person,organization,device,orobject)thatisthesubjectoftheCertificateandtheentitythatistheissueroftheCertificate.Directoryinformationtreesshallaccuratelyreflectorganizationalstructures.Whenapplicable,IssuerCAsshallensurethateachUserPrincipalName(UPN)isuniqueandaccuratelyreflectsorganizationalstructures.
3.1.3. AnonymityorPseudonymityofSubscribersIssuerCAsmayissueend‐entityanonymousorpseudonymousCertificatesprovidedthat(i)suchCertificatesarenotprohibitedbyapplicablepolicy(e.g.forcertificatetype,assurancelevel,orcertificateprofile)and(ii)namespaceuniquenessispreserved.
3.1.4. RulesforInterpretingVariousNameFormsDistinguishedNamesinCertificatesareinterpretedusingX.500standardsandASN.1syntax.SeeRFC2253andRFC2616forfurtherinformationonhowX.500distinguishednamesinCertificatesareinterpretedasUniformResourceIdentifiersandHTTPreferences.
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3.1.5. UniquenessofNamesNameuniquenessisrequiredineachCertificateissuedbyeachCA.TheDCPAmayenforcenameuniquenessbyrequiringthateachCertificateincludeauniqueserialnumberthatisincorporatedaspartofthesubjectname.
3.1.6. Recognition,Authentication,andRoleofTrademarksSubscribersmaynotrequestCertificateswithanycontentthatinfringestheintellectualpropertyrightsofanotherentity.Unlessotherwisespecificallystated,thisCPdoesnotrequireanIssuerCAtoverifyanApplicant’srighttouseatrademark.IssuerCAsmayrejectanyapplicationorrequirerevocationofanyCertificatethatispartofatrademarkdispute.
3.2. INITIALIDENTITYVALIDATIONAnIssuerCAmayuseanylegalmeansofcommunicationorinvestigationtoascertaintheidentityofanorganizationalorindividualApplicant.TheIssuerCAmayrefusetoissueaCertificateinitssolediscretion.
3.2.1. MethodtoProvePossessionofPrivateKeyTheIssuerCAshallverifythattheApplicantpossessesthePrivateKeycorrespondingtothePublicKeyinthecertificaterequest.TheIssuerCAshallrequirethatPrivateKeysforEUQualifiedCertificatebegeneratedintheSubscriber’spresenceonaSecureSignatureCreationDevice(SSCD)(OID0.4.0.1456.1.1)andstoredsecurelyontheSSCDwithaSubscriber‐selectedPIN.
3.2.2. AuthenticationofOrganizationandDomainControlDomainnamesincludedinapubliclytrustedSSL/TLSCertificatemustbeverifiedinaccordancewithSection3.2.2.4oftheBaselineRequirements.Ifapublicly‐trustedSSL/TLSCertificatewillcontainanorganization’sname,thentheIssuerCA(oranRA)shallverifytheinformationabouttheorganizationanditslegalexistenceinaccordancewithSection3.2.2.1oftheBaselineRequirementsusingreliablethirdpartyandgovernmentdatabasesorthroughotherdirectmeansofcommunicationwiththeentityorjurisdictiongoverningtheorganization’slegalcreation,existence,orrecognition.IftherequestisforaCertificatethatassertsanorganizationalaffiliationbetweenahumansubscriberandanorganization,theIssuerCAshallobtaindocumentationfromtheorganizationthatrecognizestheaffiliationandobligatestheorganizationtorequestrevocationoftheCertificateifthataffiliationends.SeeSections3.2.5,4.9.1and9.6.1.IftheFQDNcontainsawildcardcharacter,thentheIssuerCAmustremoveallwildcardlabelsfromtheleftmostportionofrequestedFQDN.TheCAmayprunezeroormorelabelsfromlefttorightuntilencounteringaBaseDomainNameandmayuseanyoneoftheintermediatevaluesforthepurposeofdomainvalidation.BeforeissuingacertificatewithawildcardcharacterinaCNorsubjectAltNameofatypeDNS‐ID,theCAmustfollowadocumentedprocedurethatdeterminesifthewildcardcharacteroccursinthefirstlabelpositiontotheleftofa“registry‐controlled”labelor“publicsuffix”(e.g.“*.com”,“*.co.uk”,seeRFC6454Section8.2forfurtherexplanation).Ifawildcardwouldfallwithinthelabelimmediatelytotheleftofaregistry‐controlledorpublicsuffix,theIssuerCAmustrefuseissuanceunlesstheapplicantprovesitsrightfulcontroloftheentireDomainNamespace.IssuerCAsmustcompleteallDomain/IPAddressvalidationprocedures—suchvalidationproceduresmustnotbecompletedbythirdparties.
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ForaCertificateissuedtoaDomainNamewith.onionintheright‐mostlabeloftheDomainName,theIssuerCAconfirms,asofthedatetheCertificatewasissued,theApplicant’scontroloverthe.onionDomainNameinaccordancewithAppendixFoftheEVGuidelines.IssuerCAsandRAsshallidentifyhigh‐riskcertificaterequestsandshallconductadditionalverificationactivityandtakeadditionalprecautionsasarereasonablynecessarytoensurethathigh‐riskrequestsareproperlyverified.AllrequestsforIssuerCACertificatesorCertificateswithanorganization’snamethatarecross‐certifiedwiththeFBCAshallincludetheorganizationname,address,anddocumentationoftheexistenceoftheorganization.ForIssuerCACertificatesandCAcross‐Certificates,representativesoftheDCPAverifytheinformation,inadditiontotheauthenticityoftherequestingrepresentativeandtherepresentative’sauthorizationfortheCertificate.
3.2.3. AuthenticationofIndividualIdentityTheIssuerCAoranRAshallverifyanindividual’sidentityinaccordancewiththeprocessestablishedinitsCPSorRPSthatmeetsthefollowingminimumrequirements:
Certificate IdentityVerificationSSL/TLSServerCertificatesandObjectSigningCertificates(issuedtoanIndividual)
TheApplicantshallsubmitalegiblecopy,whichdiscerniblyshowstheApplicant’sface,ofatleastonecurrentlyvalidgovernment‐issuedphotoID(passport,driverslicense,militaryID,nationalID,orequivalentdocumenttype).Thecopyofthedocumentshallbeinspectedforanyindicationofalterationorfalsification.ForObjectSigningCertificates,theIssuerCAorRAshallobtainaface‐to‐faceidentificationoftheApplicant(i.e.aDeclarationofIdentity),whichmaybeperformedviaavideoconferencecall.IftheIssuerCAorRArequiresfurtherassurance,theApplicantshallprovideadditionalformsofidentification,includingnon‐photoandnon‐governmentalformsofidentificationsuchasrecentutilitybills,financialaccountstatements,Applicantcreditcard,additionalIDcredential,orequivalentdocumenttype.TheIssuerCAorRAshallconfirmthattheApplicantisabletoreceivecommunicationbytelephone,postalmail/courier,orfax.IftheIssuerCAorRAcannotverifytheApplicant’sidentityusingtheproceduresdescribedabove,thentheIssuerCAorRAshallobtainaDeclarationofIdentity*witnessedandsignedbyaRegistrationAuthority,TrustedAgent,notary,lawyer,accountant,postalcarrier,oranyentitycertifiedbyaStateorNationalGovernmentasauthorizedtoconfirmidentities.
DeviceCertificateSponsors
Seesection3.2.3.3
EVSSL/TLSCertificatesissuedtoaBusinessEntity
AsspecifiedintheEVGuidelines
Authentication‐OnlyCertificates
Theentitycontrollingthesecurelocationrepresentsthatthecertificateholderhasauthorizationtoaccessthelocation.
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Grid‐onlyCertificates EithertheRAresponsibleforthegridcommunityoraTrustedAgentmusteitherreviewanidentitydocumentduringaface‐to‐facemeetingwiththeApplicant,oraTrustedAgentmustattestthattheApplicantispersonallyknowntotheTrustedAgent.Ifanidentificationdocumentisused,theRAmustretainsufficientinformationabouttheApplicant’sidentityinordertoverifytheApplicantatalaterdate.
Level1ClientCertificates–Personal(emailcertificates)
Applicant’scontroloveranemailaddress(oranyoftheidentityverificationmethodslistedforahigherlevelclientcertificate).
Level1ClientCertificates‐Enterprise(emailcertificates)
Anyoneofthefollowing:
1.In‐personappearancebeforeanRAorTrustedAgentwithpresentmentofanidentitycredential(e.g.,driver'slicenseorbirthcertificate).
2.Usingproceduressimilartothoseusedwhenapplyingforconsumercreditandauthenticatedthroughinformationinconsumercreditdatabasesorgovernmentrecords,suchas:
‐theabilitytoplaceorreceivecallsfromagivennumber;or‐theabilitytoobtainmailsenttoaknownphysicaladdress.
3.Throughinformationderivedfromanongoingbusinessrelationshipwiththecredentialproviderorapartnercompany(e.g.,afinancialinstitution,airline,employer,orretailcompany).Acceptableinformationincludes:
‐theabilitytoobtainmailatthebillingaddressusedinthebusinessrelationship;or‐verificationofinformationestablishedinprevioustransactions(e.g.,previousordernumber);or‐theabilitytoplacecallsfromorreceivephonecallsataphonenumberusedinpreviousbusinesstransactions.4.AnymethodrequiredtoverifyidentityforissuanceofaLevel2,3,or4ClientCertificate
Level2ClientCertificates
ThislevelofassurancerequiresthattheIssuerCAorRAverifytheApplicant’sidentityusingthepossessionofareliableformofidentification.PersonalidentifyinginformationshallbecomparedwithApplicant‐providedinformationtoconfirmthattheassertednamematches:(a) thenamecontainedinthepresentedidentificationcredential;(b) theindividual’sdateofbirth;and(c) acurrentaddressorpersonaltelephonenumbersufficienttoidentifyauniqueindividual.TheIssuerCAorRAshallverifytheApplicant’sidentityusingoneofthefollowingfour(4)methods:1.In‐personproofingbeforeanRAorTrustedAgent(orentitycertifiedbyaStateorNationalGovernmentasauthorizedtoconfirmidentities)withpresentmentofavalidcurrentgovernment‐issuedidentitydocumentthatcontainstheApplicant’spictureandeitheraddressofrecordornationality(e.g.driver’slicenseorPassport).SuchauthenticationdoesnotrelievetheRAofitsresponsibilityto
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verifythepresenteddata.2.RemotelyverifyinginformationprovidedbytheApplicant(verifiedelectronicallybyarecordcheckwiththespecifiedissuingauthorityorthroughsimilardatabasestoestablishtheexistenceofsuchrecordswithmatchingnameandreferencenumbersandtocorroboratedateofbirthandcurrentaddressofrecordortelephonenumber).TheIssuerCAorRAmayconfirmanaddressbyissuingthecredentialsinamannerthatconfirmstheaddressofrecordorverifyingknowledgeofrecentaccountactivityassociatedwiththeApplicant’saddressandmayconfirmatelephonenumberbysendingachallenge‐responseSMStextmessageorbyrecordingtheapplicant’svoiceduringacommunicationafterassociatingthetelephonenumberwiththeapplicantinrecordsthatareavailabletotheIssuerCAorRA.
3.IftheIssuerCAorRAhasacurrent,ongoingrelationshipwiththeApplicant,theIssuerCAorRAmayverifyidentityusinganexchangeofapreviouslyexchangedsharedsecret(e.g.,aPINorpassword)thatmeetsorexceedsNISTSP800‐63Level2entropyrequirements,providedthat:(a)identitywasoriginallyestablishedwiththedegreeofrigorequivalenttothatrequiredin1or2aboveusingagovernment‐issuedphotoID,and(b)theongoingrelationshipexistssufficienttoensuretheApplicant’scontinuedpersonalpossessionofthesharedsecret.4.AnyofthemethodsrequiredtoverifyidentityforissuanceofaDigiCertLevel3or4ClientCertificate.
Level3ClientCertificates
In‐personproofingbeforeanRA,TrustedAgent, oranentitycertifiedbyaStateorNationalGovernmentthatisauthorizedtoconfirmidentities(providedthatthecertifiedentityforwardstheinformationcollectedfromtheapplicantdirectlytotheRAinasecuremannerandthattheRAisnotrelievedofitsresponsibilitytoverifythepresenteddata).
TheApplicantshallprovideatleastoneFederalGovernment‐issuedPictureI.D.,aREALID,ortwoNon‐FederalGovernmentI.D.s,oneofwhichmustbeaphotoI.D.AcceptableformsofNon‐FederalGovernmentphotoIDsincludeadriver'slicense,state‐issuedphotoIDcard,passport,nationalidentitycard,permanentresidentcard,trustedtravelercard,tribalID,militaryID,orsimilarphotoidentificationdocument.SeeUSCISFormI‐9.
TheIssuerCAorRAshallexaminethecredentialsanddeterminewhethertheyareauthenticandunexpired.ForeachLevel3orhigherassuranceClientCertificateissued,theIssuerCAortheRAshallreviewandrecordaDeclarationofIdentity*whichshallbesignedbytheapplicantandthepersonperformingthein‐personidentification.TheIssuerCAorRAshallchecktheprovidedinformation(name,dateofbirth,andcurrentaddress)toensurelegitimacyandmayverifyitelectronicallybyarecordcheckasdescribedabove.
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TheIssuerCAorRAmayemployanin‐personantecedentprocess,definedinFBCASupplementaryAntecedent,In‐PersonDefinition,tomeetthein‐personidentityproofingrequirement.Underthisdefinition,historicalin‐personidentityproofingissufficientif(1)itmeetsthethoroughnessandrigorofin‐personproofingdescribedabove,(2)supportingIDproofingartifactsexisttosubstantiatetheantecedentrelationship,and(3)mechanismsareinplacethatbindtheindividualtotheassertedidentity.Inoneusecase,theApplicant(e.g.anemployee)hasbeenidentifiedpreviouslybyanemployerusingUSCISFormI‐9andisboundtotheassertedidentityremotelythroughtheuseofknownattributesorsharedsecrets.Inanotherusecase,athirdpartyIdentityVerificationProviderconstructsareal‐time,five‐questionprocess,basedonmultiplehistoricantecedentdatabases,andtheapplicantisgiventwominutestoansweratleastfourofthefivequestionscorrectly.SeeFBCASupplementaryAntecedent,In‐PersonDefinition.IfthephotoIDisunexpiredandconfirmstheaddressofrecordfortheApplicant,thenthecertificatemaybeapprovedforissuancewithnoticeofissuancesenttotheaddressofrecord.IfthephotoIDdoesnotconfirmtheApplicant’saddressofrecord,thenthecertificateshallbeissuedinamannerthatconfirmstheaddressofrecord.ForallLevel3orhigherassuranceClientCertificates,theidentityoftheApplicantmustbeestablishednoearlierthan30dayspriortoinitialcertificateissuance.
Level4ClientCertificates(MediumHardware)Mustbeissuedtocryptographichardware.
In‐personproofingbeforeanRA,TrustedAgent,oranentitycertifiedbyaStateorNationalGovernmentthatisauthorizedtoconfirmidentities(providedthatthecertifiedentityforwardstheinformationcollectedfromtheapplicantdirectlytotheRAinasecuremannerandthattheRAisnotrelievedofitsresponsibilitytoverifythepresenteddata).TheApplicationshallsupply(i)oneFederalGovernment‐issuedPictureI.D.,aREALID,ortwoNon‐FederalGovernmentI.D.s,oneofwhichmustbeaphotoI.D.and(ii)thecontemporaneouscollectionofatleastonebiometric(e.g.photographorfingerprints)toensurethattheApplicantcannotrepudiatetheapplication.AcceptableformsofNon‐FederalGovernmentphotoIDsincludeadriver'slicense,state‐issuedphotoIDcard,passport,nationalidentitycard,permanentresidentcard,trustedtravelercard,tribalID,militaryID,orsimilarphotoidentificationdocument.SeeUSCISFormI‐9.TheIssuerCAorRAshallexaminethecredentialsanddeterminewhethertheyareauthenticandunexpired.ForeachLevel4ClientCertificateissued,theIssuerCAortheRAshallreviewandrecordaDeclarationofIdentity*thatissignedbytheapplicantandthepersonperformingthein‐personidentification.ForallLevel4ClientCertificatestheuseofanin‐personantecedentisnotapplicableandtheApplicantshallestablishhisorheridentitynomorethan30dayspriortoinitialcertificateissuance.IssuerCAsandRAsshallissueLevel4ClientCertificatesinamannerthatconfirmstheApplicant’saddressofrecord.
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EUQualifiedCertificates In‐personverificationofthe Applicant’sidentitybyappropriatemeansinaccordancewithnationallaw.Theentityperformingthevalidationshallchecktheevidenceofidentitydirectlyagainstaphysicalpersonorindirectlyusingmeansthatprovideequivalentassurancetophysicalpresence.
*ADeclarationofIdentityconsistsofthefollowing:
a. theidentityofthepersonperformingtheverification;b. asigneddeclarationbytheverifyingpersonstatingthattheyverifiedtheidentityofthe
Subscriberasrequiredusingtheformatsetforthat28U.S.C.1746(declarationunderpenaltyofperjury)orcomparableprocedureunderlocallaw;thesignatureonthedeclarationmaybeeitherahandwrittenordigitalsignatureusingacertificatethatisofequalorhigherlevelofassuranceasthecredentialbeingissued;
c. uniqueidentifyingnumber(s)fromtheApplicant’sidentificationdocument(s),orafacsimileoftheID(s);
d. thedateoftheverification;ande. adeclarationofidentitybytheApplicantthatissigned(inhandwritingorthroughuseofa
digitalsignaturethatisofequivalentorhigherassurancethanthecredentialbeingissued)inthepresenceofthepersonperformingtheverificationusingtheformatsetforthat28U.S.C.1746(declarationunderpenaltyofperjury)orcomparableprocedureunderlocallaw.
Wherein‐personidentityverificationisrequiredandtheApplicantcannotparticipateinface‐to‐faceregistrationalone(e.g.becauseApplicantisanetworkdevice,minor,orpersonnotlegallycompetent),thentheApplicantmaybeaccompaniedbyapersonalreadycertifiedbythePKIorwhohastherequiredidentitycredentialsforaCertificateatthesameorhigherlevelofassuranceappliedforbytheApplicant.ThepersonaccompanyingtheApplicant(i.e.the“Sponsor”)willpresentinformationsufficientforregistrationatthelevelofthecertificatebeingrequested,forhimselforherself,andfortheApplicant.Forin‐personidentityproofingatLevels3and4,anentitycertifiedbyaStateorNationalGovernmentasauthorizedtoconfirmidentitiesmayperformin‐personauthenticationonbehalfoftheRA.Theinformationcollectedfromtheapplicantshouldbereliablycollectedfromthecertifiedentity.Packagessecuredinatamper‐evidentmannerbythecertifiedentitysatisfythisrequirement;othersecuremethodsarealsoacceptable.SuchauthenticationdoesnotrelievetheRAofitsresponsibilitytoverifythepresenteddata.
3.2.3.1. Authentication for Role‐based Client Certificates AnIssuerCAmayissueCertificatesthatidentifyaspecificrolethattheSubscriberholds,providedthattheroleidentifiesaspecificindividualwithinanorganization(e.g.,ChiefInformationOfficerisauniqueindividualwhereasProgramAnalystisnot).Theserole‐basedCertificatesareusedwhennon‐repudiationisdesired.TheIssuerCAmayonlyissuerole‐basedcertificatestoSubscriberswhofirstobtainanindividualSubscriberCertificatethatisatthesameorhigherassurancelevelastherequestedrole‐basedCertificate.AnIssuerCAmayissueCertificateswiththesameroletomultipleSubscribers.However,theIssuerCAshallrequirethateachCertificatehaveauniqueKeyPair.Individualsmaynotsharetheirissuedrole‐basedCertificatesandarerequiredtoprotecttherole‐basedCertificateinthesamemannerasindividualCertificates.TheIssuerCAoranRAshallverifytheidentityoftheindividualrequestingarole‐basedCertificate(i.e.thesponsor)inaccordancewithSection3.2.3andrecordtheinformationidentifiedinSection3.2.3forasponsorassociatedwiththerolebeforeissuingarole‐basedCertificate.ThesponsormustholdanindividualCertificateinhis/herownnameissuedbythesameCAatthesameorhigherassurancelevelastherole‐basedCertificate.Proceduresandpoliciesforissuingrole‐basedCertificatesshallcomplywithallprovisionsofthisCP(e.g.,keygeneration,privatekeyprotection,andSubscriberobligations).
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IGTFandEUQualifiedCertificatesarenotissuedasrole‐basedCertificates.IftheCertificateisapseudonymouscertificatecross‐certifiedwiththeFBCAthatidentifiessubjectsbytheirorganizationalroles,thentheIssuerCAorRAshallverifythattheindividualeitherholdsthatroleorhastheauthoritytosignonbehalfoftherole.
3.2.3.2. Authentication for Group Client Certificates Ifseveralentitiesareactinginonecapacityandnon‐repudiationisnotnecessary,theIssuerCAmayissueaCertificatecorrespondingtoaPrivateKeysharedbymultipleSubscribers.TheIssuerCAorRAshallrecordtheinformationidentifiedinSection3.2.3forasponsorfromtheInformationSystemsSecurityOfficeorequivalentbeforeissuingagroupCertificate.Inaddition,theIssuerCAortheRAshall:
1. RequirethattheInformationSystemsSecurityOffice,orequivalent,beresponsibleforensuringcontrolofthePrivateKey,includingmaintainingalistofSubscriberswhohaveaccesstothePrivateKey,andaccountforthetimeperiodduringwhicheachSubscriberhadcontrolofthekey,
2. NotincludeasubjectNameDNinthecertificateinawaythatcouldimplythatthesubjectisasingleindividual,
3. RequirethatthesponsorprovideandcontinuouslyupdatealistofindividualswhoholdthesharedPrivateKey,and
4. EnsurethattheproceduresforissuinggroupcertificatescomplywithallotherstipulationsofthisCP(e.g.,keygeneration,privatekeyprotection,andSubscriberobligations).
IGTFandEUQualifiedCertificatesarenotissuedasgroupCertificates.
3.2.3.3. Authentication of Devices with Human Sponsors AnIssuerCAmayissueaLevel1,2,3or4ClientorFederatedDeviceCertificateforuseonacomputingornetworkdevice,providedthattheentityowningthedeviceislistedasthesubject.Insuchcases,thedevicemusthaveahumansponsorwhoprovides:
1. Equipmentidentification(e.g.,serialnumber)orservicename(e.g.,DNSname),2. EquipmentPublicKeys,3. Equipmentauthorizationsandattributes(ifanyaretobeincludedinthecertificate),and4. Contactinformation.
IftheCertificate’ssponsorchanges,thenewsponsorshallreviewthestatusofeachdevicetoensureitisstillauthorizedtoreceiveCertificates.TheCPSshalldescribeprocedurestoensurethatcertificateaccountabilityismaintained.TheIssuerCAshallverifyallregistrationinformationcommensuratewiththerequestedcertificatetype.Acceptablemethodsforperformingthisauthenticationandintegritycheckinginclude:
1. Verificationofdigitallysignedmessagessentfromthesponsor(usingCertificatesofequivalentorgreaterassurancethanthatbeingrequested)
2. Inpersonregistrationbythesponsor,withtheidentityofthesponsorconfirmedinaccordancewiththerequirementsofSection3.2.3.
3.2.4. Non‐verifiedSubscriberInformationIssuerCAsarenotrequiredtoconfirmthatthecommonnameinaLevel1‐PersonalClientCertificateisthelegalnameoftheSubscriber.Anyothernon‐verifiedinformationincludedinaCertificateshallbedesignatedassuchintheCertificate.NounverifiedinformationshallbeincludedinanyLevel2,Level,3,Level4,ObjectSigning,EV,FederatedDevice,orEUQualifiedCertificate.
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3.2.5. ValidationofAuthorityTheIssuerCAorRAshallverifytheauthorizationofacertificaterequestasfollows:
Certificate VerificationDVSSL/TLSCertificates,OVSSL/TLSCertificates,andFederatedDeviceCertificates
AnauthorizedcontactlistedwiththeDomainNameRegistrar,apersonwithcontroloverthedomainname,orthroughcommunicationwiththeapplicantusingaReliableMethodofCommunication,asdefinedintheBaselineRequirements.
EVCertificates InaccordancewiththeEVGuidelines.ObjectSigningCertificates(includingEVCodeSigningCertificates)
IfaCertificatenamesanorganization,anauthoritativesourcewithintheorganization(e.g.corporate,legal,IT,HR,orotherappropriateorganizationalsources)usingaReliableMethodofCommunication.
Level1ClientCertificates‐PersonalorEnterprise(emailcertificates)
Anindividualwithcontroloverthe emailaddresslistedintheCertificateorwithapersonwhohastechnicaloradministrativecontroloverthedomainortheemailaddresstobelistedintheCertificate.
IGTFCertificates Pursuanttotherelevantrequirementsbytheaccreditationauthority.
ClientCertificatesLevels2,3and4
Individuals affiliatedwiththeorganizationwhoconfirmtheapplicant’sauthoritytoobtainaCertificateindicatingtheaffiliationandwhoagreetorequestrevocationoftheCertificatewhenthataffiliationends.
EUQualifiedCertificates AnindividualisassociatedwiththeorganizationthatisauthorizedtoconsenttotheCertificate’spublication(seesection7.3.1ofTS101456).
TheIssuerCAshallimplementaprocesswherebyanApplicantmaylimitthenumberofindividualsauthorizedtorequestCertificates.TheIssuerCAshallprovidealistofauthorizedcertificaterequestersafterreceivingaverifiedrequestforsuchinformationfromanindividualauthorizedtomakesuchrequest.
3.3. IDENTIFICATIONANDAUTHENTICATIONFORRE‐KEYREQUESTS
3.3.1. IdentificationandAuthenticationforRoutineRe‐keyAnIssuerCAmayallowSubscribersofSSL/TLSServerandCodeSigningCertificatestoauthenticatethemselvesoveraTLS/SSLsessionwithusernameandpassword.EachSubscribershallreestablishitsidentityusingtheinitialregistrationprocessesofsection3.2accordingtothefollowingtable:
Certificate RoutineRe‐KeyAuthentication Re‐VerificationRequiredDVandOVSSL/TLSCertificates Usernameandpassword AccordingtotheBaseline
RequirementsEVSSL/TLSCertificates Usernameandpassword AccordingtotheEV
GuidelinesSubscriberCodeSigningCertificates(MinimumRequirementsandEV)
Usernameandpassword Atleastevery39months
SigningAuthorityEVCodeSigningCertificates
Usernameandpassword Atleastevery123months
TimestampEVCodeSigningCertificates
Usernameandpassword Atleastevery123months
ObjectSigningCertificates Usernameandpassword AtleasteverysixyearsLevel1ClientCertificates Usernameandpassword AtleasteverynineyearsLevel2ClientCertificates Currentsignaturekeyormulti‐
factorauthenticationmeetingAtleasteverynineyears
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NIST SP800‐63Level3Level3and4ClientCertificates Currentsignaturekey ormulti‐
factorauthenticationmeetingNISTSP800‐63Level3
Atleasteverynineyears
FederatedDeviceandFederatedDevice‐hardware
Currentsignaturekeyormulti‐factorauthenticationmeetingNIST‐800‐63Level3
Atleasteverynineyears
IGTFCertificates Usernameandpassword,RAattestationaftercomparisonofidentitydocuments,re‐authenticatethroughanapprovedIdM,orthroughassociatedPrivateKey
Atleastevery13months.However,certificatesassociatedwithaPrivateKeyrestrictedsolelytoahardwaretokenmayberekeyedorrenewedforaperiodofupto5years
Authentication‐OnlyCertificates UsernameandpasswordorwithassociatedPrivateKey
None
TheIssuerCAshallnotre‐keyaCertificatewithoutadditionalauthenticationifdoingsowouldallowtheSubscribertousetheCertificatebeyondthelimitsdescribedabove.
3.3.2. IdentificationandAuthenticationforRe‐keyAfterRevocationTheIssuerCAshallrequiresubscribersofCertificatesthathavebeenrevokedforreasonsotherthanastheresultofaroutinecertificaterenewal,update,ormodificationactiontoundergotheinitialregistrationprocess(describedinSection3.2)toobtainanewCertificate.
3.4. IDENTIFICATIONANDAUTHENTICATIONFORREVOCATIONREQUESTTheIssuerCAortheRAthatapprovedtheCertificate’sissuanceshallauthenticateallrevocationrequests.TheIssuerCAorRAmayauthenticatearevocationrequestusingtheCertificate’sPublicKey,regardlessofwhethertheassociatedPrivateKeyiscompromised.
4. CERTIFICATELIFE‐CYCLEOPERATIONALREQUIREMENTS
4.1. CERTIFICATEAPPLICATION
4.1.1. WhoCanSubmitaCertificateApplicationNoindividualorentitylistedonagovernmentdeniedlist,listofprohibitedpersons,orotherlistthatprohibitsdoingbusinesswithsuchorganizationorpersonunderthelawsoftheUnitedStatesmaysubmitanapplicationforaCertificate.ApplicantsorindividualsauthorizedtorequestCertificates,whoarenotincludedinanyofthepreviouslists,mayapplyforaCertificate.
4.1.2. EnrollmentProcessandResponsibilitiesTheIssuerCAisresponsibleforensuringthattheidentityofeachCertificateApplicantisverifiedinaccordancewiththisCPandtheapplicableCPSpriortotheissuanceofaCertificate.ApplicantsareresponsibleforsubmittingsufficientinformationanddocumentationfortheIssuerCAortheRAtoperformtherequiredverificationofidentitypriortoissuingaCertificate.
4.2. CERTIFICATEAPPLICATIONPROCESSING
4.2.1. PerformingIdentificationandAuthenticationFunctionsTheIssuerCAortheRAshallidentifyandverifyeachApplicantinaccordancewiththeapplicableCertificationPracticesStatementsandRegistrationPracticesStatements.AnIssuerCAissuingpubliclytrustedSSL/TLSservercertificatesshallstateinitsCPSitspracticesonprocessingCAARecordsforFullyQualifiedDomainNames.TheIssuerCAshallensurethatallcommunicationbetweentheIssuerCAandanRAregardingcertificateissuanceorchangesinthestatusofa
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Certificatearemadeusingsecureandauditablemethods.Ifdatabasesorothersourcesareusedtoconfirmsensitiveorconfidentialattributesofanindividualsubscriber,thenthatsensitiveinformationshallbeprotectedandsecurelyexchangedinaconfidentialandtamper‐evidentmanner,protectedfromunauthorizedaccess,andtrackedusinganauditablechainofcustody.
4.2.2. ApprovalorRejectionofCertificateApplicationsTheIssuerCAshallrejectanycertificateapplicationthatcannotbeverified.TheIssuerCAshallnotissueCertificatescontaininganewgTLDunderconsiderationbutnotyetapprovedbyICANN.TheIssuerCAmayalsorejectacertificateapplicationonanyreasonablebasis,includingiftheCertificatecoulddamagetheIssuerCA’sbusinessorreputation.IssuerCAsarenotrequiredtoprovideareasonforrejectingacertificateapplication.IssuerCAsandRAsshallfollowindustrystandardswhenapprovingandissuingCertificates.TheIssuerCAorRAshallcontractuallyrequiresubscriberstoverifytheinformationinaCertificatepriortousingtheCertificate.
4.2.3. TimetoProcessCertificateApplicationsAllpartiesinvolvedincertificateapplicationprocessingshallusereasonableeffortstoensurethatcertificateapplicationsareprocessedinatimelymanner.Identityshallbeestablishednomorethan30daysbeforeinitialissuanceofLevel3and4Certificates.
4.3. CERTIFICATEISSUANCE
4.3.1. CAActionsduringCertificateIssuanceIssuerCAsshallverifythesourceofacertificaterequestbeforeissuance.TheIssuerCAandanyRAshallprotectdatabasesundertheircontrolandthatareusedtoconfirmSubscriberidentityinformationfromunauthorizedmodificationoruse.TheIssuerCAshallperformitsactionsduringthecertificateissuanceprocessinasecuremanner.CertificateissuancebytheRootCArequiresanindividualauthorizedbytheIssuerCA(i.e.theCAsystemoperator,systemofficer,orPKIadministrator)todeliberatelyissueadirectcommandinorderfortheRootCAtoperformacertificatesigningoperation.
4.3.2. NotificationtoSubscriberbytheCAofIssuanceofCertificateTheIssuerCAorRAshallnotifytheSubscriberwithinareasonabletimeofcertificateissuanceandmayuseanyreliablemechanismtodelivertheCertificatetotheSubscriber.
4.4. CERTIFICATEACCEPTANCE
4.4.1. ConductConstitutingCertificateAcceptanceThepassageoftimeafterdeliveryornoticeofissuanceofaCertificatetotheSubscriberortheactualuseofaCertificateconstitutestheSubscriber’sacceptanceoftheCertificate.
4.4.2. PublicationoftheCertificatebytheCATheIssuerCAshallpublishallCACertificatestotheIssuerCA’srepository.
4.4.3. NotificationofCertificateIssuancebytheCAtoOtherEntitiesNostipulation.
4.5. KEYPAIRANDCERTIFICATEUSAGE
4.5.1. SubscriberPrivateKeyandCertificateUsageAllSubscribersshallprotecttheirPrivateKeysfromunauthorizeduseordisclosurebythirdpartiesandshallusetheirPrivateKeysonlyfortheirintendedpurpose.
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4.5.2. RelyingPartyPublicKeyandCertificateUsageRelyingPartiesshallusesoftwarethatiscompliantwithX.509andapplicableIETFPKIXstandards.TheIssuerCAshallspecifyrestrictionsontheuseofaCertificatethroughcertificateextensionsandshallspecifythemechanism(s)todeterminecertificatevalidity(CRLsandOCSP).RelyingPartiesmustprocessandcomplywiththisinformationinaccordancewiththeirobligationsasRelyingParties.ARelyingPartyshouldusediscretionwhenrelyingonaCertificateandshouldconsiderthetotalityofthecircumstancesandriskoflosspriortorelyingonaCertificate.RelyingonadigitalsignatureorCertificatethathasnotbeenprocessedinaccordancewithapplicablestandardsmayresultinriskstotheRelyingParty.TheRelyingPartyissolelyresponsibleforsuchrisks.Ifthecircumstancesindicatethatadditionalassurancesarerequired,theRelyingPartymustobtainsuchassurancesbeforeusingtheCertificate.
4.6. CERTIFICATERENEWAL
4.6.1. CircumstanceforCertificateRenewalAnIssuerCAmayrenewaCertificateif:
1. theassociatedPublicKeyhasnotreachedtheendofitsvalidityperiod,2. theassociatedPrivateKeyhasnotbeencompromised,3. theSubscriberandattributesremainconsistent,and4. re‐verificationofsubscriberidentityisnotrequiredbySection3.3.1.
AnIssuerCAmayalsorenewaCertificateifaCACertificateisre‐keyedorasotherwisenecessarytoprovideservices.AfterrenewingaclientCertificate,theIssuerCAmaynotre‐key,renew,ormodifytheoldCertificate.
4.6.2. WhoMayRequestRenewalOnlythecertificatesubjectoranauthorizedrepresentativeofthecertificatesubjectmayrequestrenewaloftheSubscriber’sCertificates.ForCertificatescross‐certifiedwiththeFBCA,renewalrequestsareonlyacceptedfromcertificatesubjects,PKIsponsorsorRAs.AnIssuerCAmayperformrenewalofitssubscriberCertificateswithoutacorrespondingrequest,suchaswhentheCAre‐keys.
4.6.3. ProcessingCertificateRenewalRequestsTheIssuerCAmayrequirereconfirmationorverificationoftheinformationinaCertificatepriortorenewal.
4.6.4. NotificationofNewCertificateIssuancetoSubscriberTheIssuerCAshallnotifytheSubscriberwithinareasonabletimeofcertificateissuanceandmayuseanyreliablemechanismtodelivertheCertificatetotheSubscriber.
4.6.5. ConductConstitutingAcceptanceofaRenewalCertificateThepassageoftimeafterdeliveryornoticeofissuanceoftheCertificatetotheSubscriber,oractualuseoftheCertificate,constitutestheSubscriber’sacceptanceofit.
4.6.6. PublicationoftheRenewalCertificatebytheCATheIssuerCAshallpublishallrenewedCACertificatestotheIssuerCA’srepository.
4.6.7. NotificationofCertificateIssuancebytheCAtoOtherEntitiesNostipulation.
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4.7. CERTIFICATERE‐KEY
4.7.1. CircumstanceforCertificateRekeyRe‐keyingaCertificateconsistsofcreatinganewCertificatewithadifferentPublicKey(andserialnumber)whileretainingtheremainingcontentsoftheoldCertificatethatdescribethesubject.ThenewCertificatemayhaveadifferentvalidityperiod,keyidentifiers,specifydifferentCRLandOCSPdistributionpoints,and/orbesignedwithadifferentkey.Subscribersrequestingre‐keyshouldidentifyandauthenticatethemselvesaspermittedbySection3.3.1.Afterre‐keyingaClientCertificateorafederateddeviceCertificate,theIssuerCAmaynotre‐key,renew,ormodifythepreviousCertificate.
4.7.2. WhoMayRequestCertificateRekeyOnlythesubjectoftheCertificateorthePKIsponsormayrequestre‐key.TheIssuerCAoranRAmayinitiatecertificatere‐keyattherequestofthecertificatesubjectorinitsowndiscretion.
4.7.3. ProcessingCertificateRekeyRequestsRe‐keyrequestsareonlyacceptedfromthesubjectoftheCertificateorthePKIsponsor.Ataminimum,theIssuerCAshallcomplywithsection3.3.1inidentifyingandauthenticatingtheSubscriberorPKIsponsorpriortorekeyingtheCertificate.
4.7.4. NotificationofCertificateRekeytoSubscriberTheIssuerCAshallnotifytheSubscriberwithinareasonabletimeofcertificateissuanceandmayuseanyreliablemechanismtodelivertheCertificatetotheSubscriber.
4.7.5. ConductConstitutingAcceptanceofaRekeyedCertificateThepassageoftimeafterdeliveryornoticeofissuanceoftheCertificatetotheSubscriberortheactualuseoftheCertificateconstitutestheSubscriber’sacceptanceofit.
4.7.6. PublicationoftheRekeyedCertificatebytheCATheIssuerCAshallpublishrekeyedCACertificatestotheIssuerCA’srepository.
4.7.7. NotificationofCertificateIssuancebytheCAtoOtherEntitiesNostipulation.
4.8. CERTIFICATEMODIFICATION
4.8.1. CircumstanceforCertificateModificationModifyingaCertificatemeanscreatinganewCertificateforthesamesubjectwithauthenticatedinformationthatdiffersslightlyfromtheoldCertificate(e.g.,changestoemailaddressornon‐essentialpartsofnamesorattributes)providedthatthemodificationotherwisecomplieswiththisCP.ThenewCertificatemayhavethesameoradifferentsubjectPublicKey.AftermodifyingaCertificatethatiscross‐certifiedwiththeFBCA,theIssuerCAmaynotre‐key,renew,ormodifytheoldCertificate.
4.8.2. WhoMayRequestCertificateModificationTheIssuerCAmaymodifyaCertificateattherequestofthecertificatesubjectorinitsowndiscretion.
4.8.3. ProcessingCertificateModificationRequestsAfterreceivingarequestformodification,theIssuerCAshallverifyanyinformationthatwillchangeinthemodifiedCertificate.TheIssuerCAmayissuethemodifiedCertificateonlyaftercompletingthe
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verificationprocessonallmodifiedinformation.ThevalidityperiodofamodifiedCertificatemustnotextendbeyondtheapplicabletimelimitsfoundinsection3.3.1or6.3.2.
4.8.4. NotificationofCertificateModificationtoSubscriberTheIssuerCAshallnotifytheSubscriberwithinareasonabletimeofcertificateissuanceandmayuseanyreliablemechanismtodelivertheCertificatetotheSubscriber.
4.8.5. ConductConstitutingAcceptanceofaModifiedCertificateThepassageoftimeafterdeliveryornoticeofissuanceoftheCertificatetotheSubscriberoractualuseoftheCertificateconstitutestheSubscriber’sacceptanceofit.
4.8.6. PublicationoftheModifiedCertificatebytheCATheIssuerCAshallpublishmodifiedCACertificatestotheIssuerCA’srepository.
4.8.7. NotificationofCertificateModificationbytheCAtoOtherEntitiesNostipulation.
4.9. CERTIFICATEREVOCATIONANDSUSPENSION
4.9.1. CircumstancesforRevocationRevocationofaCertificatepermanentlyendstheoperationalperiodoftheCertificatepriortotheCertificatereachingtheendofitsstatedvalidityperiod.PriortorevokingaCertificate,theIssuerCAshallverifythattherevocationrequestwasmadebyeithertheorganizationorindividualthatmadethecertificateapplicationorbyanentitywiththelegaljurisdictionandauthoritytorequestrevocation.TheIssuerCAshouldrevokeaCertificateiftheIssuerCAisawarethat:
1. TheSubscriberrequestedrevocationofitsCertificate;2. TheSubscriberdidnotauthorizetheoriginalcertificaterequestanddidnotretroactively
grantauthorization;3. EitherthePrivateKeyassociatedwiththeCertificateorthePrivateKeyusedtosignthe
Certificatewascompromisedormisused;4. TheSubscriberorthecross‐certifiedCAbreachedamaterialobligationundertheCP,the
CPS,ortherelevantagreement;5. EithertheSubscriber’sortheIssuerCA’sobligationsundertheCPorCPSaredelayedor
preventedbycircumstancesbeyondtheparty’sreasonablecontrol,includingcomputerorcommunicationfailure,and,asaresult,anotherentity’sinformationismateriallythreatenedorcompromised;
6. TheApplicanthaslostitsrightstoatrademarkorthedomainnamelistedintheCertificate;7. AwildcardCertificatewasusedtoauthenticateafraudulentlymisleadingsubordinate
domainname;8. TheCertificatewasnotissuedinaccordancewiththeCP,CPS,orapplicableindustry
standards;9. TheIssuerCAreceivedalawfulandbindingorderfromagovernmentorregulatorybodyto
revoketheCertificate;10. TheIssuerCAceasedoperationsanddidnotarrangeforanothercertificateauthorityto
providerevocationsupportfortheCertificate;11. TheIssuerCA'srighttomanageCertificatesunderapplicableindustrystandardswas
terminated(unlessarrangementshavebeenmadetocontinuerevocationservicesandtomaintaintheCRL/OCSPRepository);
12. AnyinformationappearingintheCertificatewasorbecameinaccurateormisleading;13. ThetechnicalcontentorformatoftheCertificatepresentsanunacceptablesecurityrisk
toapplicationsoftwarevendors,RelyingParties,orothers;14. TheSubscriberwasaddedasadeniedpartyorprohibitedpersontoablacklist,oris
operatingfromadestinationprohibitedunderU.S.law;or
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15. Forcode‐signingCertificates,theCertificatewasusedtosign,publish,ordistributemalwareorotherharmfulcontent,includinganycodethatisdownloadedontoauser’ssystemwithouttheirconsent.
TheIssuerCAshallrevokeaCertificateifthebindingbetweenthesubjectandthesubject’sPublicKeyintheCertificateisnolongervalidorifanassociatedPrivateKeyiscompromised.TheIssuerCAwillrevokeaSubordinateCACertificatewithinseven(7)daysifoneormoreofthefollowingoccurs:
1. TheSubordinateCArequestsrevocationinwriting;2. TheSubordinateCAnotifiestheIssuerCAthattheoriginalcertificaterequestwasnot
authorizedanddoesnotretroactivelygrantauthorization;3. TheIssuerCAobtainsevidencethattheSubordinateCA’sPrivateKeycorrespondingtothe
PublicKeyintheCertificatesufferedaKeyCompromiseornolongercomplieswiththerequirementsofSections6.1.5and6.1.6,
4. TheIssuerCAobtainsevidencethattheCACertificatewasmisused;5. TheIssuerCAismadeawarethattheCACertificatewasnotissuedinaccordancewithor
thatSubordinateCAhasnotcompliedwiththisdocumentortheapplicableCertificatePolicyorCertificationPracticeStatement;
6. TheIssuerCAdeterminesthatanyoftheinformationappearingintheCACertificateisinaccurateormisleading;
7. TheIssuerCAortheSubordinateCAceasesoperationsforanyreasonandhasnotmadearrangementsforanotherCAtoproviderevocationsupportfortheCACertificate;
8. TheIssuerCA’sortheSubordinateCA'srighttoissueCertificatesundertheBaselineRequirementsexpiresorisrevokedorterminated,unlesstheIssuerCAhasmadearrangementstocontinuemaintainingtheCRL/OCSPRepository;
9. RevocationisrequiredbytheIssuerCA’sCertificatePolicyand/orCertificationPracticeStatement;or
10.ThetechnicalcontentorformatoftheCACertificatepresentsanunacceptablerisktoApplicationSoftwareSuppliersorRelyingParties.
IfaCertificateexpressesanorganizationalaffiliation,theIssuerCAortheRAshallrequiretheAffiliatedOrganizationtoinformitifthesubscriberaffiliationchanges.IftheAffiliatedOrganizationnolongerauthorizestheaffiliationofaSubscriber,thentheIssuerCAshallrevokeanyCertificatesissuedtothatSubscribercontainingtheorganizationalaffiliation.IfanAffiliatedOrganizationterminatesitsrelationshipwiththeIssuerCAorRAsuchthatitnolongerprovidesaffiliationinformation,theIssuerCAshallrevokeallCertificatesaffiliatedwiththatAffiliatedOrganization.AnIssuerCAorcross‐certifiedentityshallrequestrevocationofitsDigiCert‐issuedcross‐CertificateifitnolongermeetsthestipulationsofDigiCert’spolicies,asindicatedbyDigiCert’spolicyOIDsinCertificatesorthoselistedinthepolicymappingextensionofthecross‐Certificate.
4.9.2. WhoCanRequestRevocationTheIssuerCAorRAshallacceptrevocationrequestsfromauthenticatedandauthorizedparties,suchasthecertificateSubscriberortheAffiliatedOrganizationnamedinaCertificate.TheIssuerCAorRAmayestablishproceduresthatallowotherentitiestorequestcertificaterevocationforfraudormisuse.TheIssuerCAshallrevokeaCertificateifitreceivessufficientevidenceofcompromiseoflossofthePrivateKey.TheIssuerCAmayrevokeaCertificateofitsownvolitionwithoutreason,evenifnootherentityhasrequestedrevocation.
4.9.3. ProcedureforRevocationRequestEntitiessubmittingcertificaterevocationrequestsmustlisttheiridentityandexplainthereasonforrequestingrevocation.TheIssuerCAorRAshallauthenticateandlogeachrevocationrequest.The
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IssuerCAwillalwaysrevokeaCertificateiftherequestisauthenticatedasoriginatingfromtheSubscriberortheAffiliatedOrganizationlistedintheCertificate.IfrevocationisrequestedbysomeoneotherthananauthorizedrepresentativeoftheSubscriberorAffiliatedOrganization,theIssuerCAorRAshallinvestigatetheallegedbasisfortherevocationrequest.TheIssuerCAshallmaintainacontinuous24/7abilitytointernallyrespondtoanyhighprioritycertificateproblemreports.Ifappropriate,theIssuerCAortheRAmayforwardcomplaintstolawenforcement.
4.9.4. RevocationRequestGracePeriodTherevocationrequestgraceperiodisthetimeavailabletothesubscriberwithinwhichthesubscribermustmakearevocationrequestafterreasonsforrevocationhavebeenidentified.IssuerCAsandRAsarerequiredtoreportthesuspectedcompromiseoftheirCAorRAPrivateKeyandrequestrevocationtoboththepolicyauthorityandoperatingauthorityofthesuperiorissuingCA(e.g.,theFPKIPA/FBCAOA,DCPA,cross‐signingCA,RootCA,etc.)withinonehourofdiscovery.SubscribersshallrequestrevocationassoonaspossibleifthePrivateKeycorrespondingtotheCertificateislostorcompromisedorifthecertificatedataisnolongervalid.TheIssuerCAmayextendrevocationgraceperiodsonacase‐by‐casebasis.
4.9.5. TimewithinwhichCAMustProcesstheRevocationRequestAnIssuerCAshallrevokeaCertificatewithinonehourofreceivingappropriateinstructionfromtheDCPA.AnIssuerCAshallrevoketheCACertificateofasubordinateorcross‐signedCAassoonaspracticalafterreceivingpropernoticethatthesubordinateorcross‐signedCAhasbeencompromised.Exceptasotherwisesetforthinsection4.9.1.2oftheBaselineRequirements,ifanIssuerCAortheDCPAdeterminesthatimmediaterevocationisnotpractical,becausethepotentialrisksofrevocationoutweightheriskscausedbythecompromise,thentheIssuerCAandtheDCPAshalljointlydeterminetheappropriateprocesstofollowinordertopromptlyrevokethesubordinateorcross‐signedCACertificate.TheIssuerCAshallrevokeotherCertificatesasquicklyaspracticalaftervalidatingtherevocationrequest.TheIssuerCAshallprocessrevocationrequestsasfollows:
1. BeforethenextCRLispublished,iftherequestisreceivedtwoormorehoursbeforeregularperiodicCRLissuance,
2. BypublishingitintheCRLfollowingthenextCRL,iftherequestisreceivedwithintwohoursoftheregularlyschedulednextCRLissuance,and
3. Regardless,within18hoursafterreceipt.
4.9.6. RevocationCheckingRequirementforRelyingPartiesPriortorelyingontheinformationlistedinaCertificate,aRelyingPartyshallconfirmthevalidityofeachCertificateinthecertificatepathinaccordancewithIETFPKIXstandards,includingchecksforcertificatevalidity,issuer‐to‐subjectnamechaining,policyandkeyuseconstraints,andrevocationstatusthroughCRLsorOCSPrespondersidentifiedineachCertificateinthechain.
4.9.7. CRLIssuanceFrequencyCRLissuanceiscomprisedofCRLgenerationandpublication.ForIssuerCAsandonlineintermediateCAs,theintervalbetweenCRLissuanceshallnotexceed24hours.ForRootCAsandIntermediateCAsthatareoperatedinanoff‐linemanner,routineCRLsmaybeissuedlessfrequentlythanspecifiedabove,providedthattheCAonlyissuesCACertificates,certificate‐status‐checkingCertificates,andinternaladministrativeCertificates.CRLissuanceintervalsforsuchofflineCAsarenogreaterthan6months.However,theintervalbetweenroutineCRLissuanceforofflineCAschainingtotheFederalBridgeCAshallnotexceed31days,andsuchCAsmustmeettherequirementsspecifiedinsection4.9.12forissuingEmergencyCRLsandarerequiredtonotifytheDCPAuponEmergencyCRLissuance.
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4.9.8. MaximumLatencyforCRLsAllCRLsforCAschainingtotheFederalBridgeshallbepublishedwithinfourhoursofgeneration.Furthermore,eachCRLshallbepublishednolaterthanthetimespecifiedinthenextUpdatefieldofthepreviouslyissuedCRLforsamescope.
4.9.9. On‐lineRevocation/StatusCheckingAvailabilityTheIssuerCAshallensurethatthecertificatestatusinformationdistributedbyiton‐linemeetsorexceedstherequirementsforCRLissuanceandlatencystatedinsections4.9.5,4.9.7and4.9.8.Whereoffered,OCSPresponsetimesshallbenolongerthansixseconds.OCSPresponsesmustconformtoRFC6960and/orRFC5019.OCSPresponsesmusteither:1.BesignedbytheCAthatissuedtheCertificateswhoserevocationstatusisbeingchecked,or2.BesignedbyanOCSPResponderwhoseCertificateissignedbytheCAthatissuedtheCertificatewhoserevocationstatusisbeingchecked.Inthelattercase,theOCSPsigningCertificatemustcontainanextensionoftypeid‐pkix‐ocsp‐nocheck,asdefinedbyRFC6960and/orRFC5019.
4.9.10. On‐lineRevocationCheckingRequirementsArelyingpartyshallconfirmthevalidityofaCertificateviaCRLorOCSPinaccordancewithsection4.9.6priortorelyingontheCertificate.IssuerCAsshallsupportanOCSPcapabilityusingtheGETmethodforCertificatesissuedinaccordancewiththeBaselineRequirements.IftheOCSPresponderreceivesarequestforstatusofacertificatethathasnotbeenissued,thentherespondershallnotrespondwitha"good"status.
4.9.11. OtherFormsofRevocationAdvertisementsAvailableAnIssuerCAmayuseothermethodstopublicizerevokedCertificates,providedthat:
1. thealternativemethodisdescribedinitsCPS,2. thealternativemethodprovidesauthenticationandintegrityservicescommensuratewith
theassuranceleveloftheCertificatebeingverified,and3. thealternativemethodmeetstheissuanceandlatencyrequirementsforCRLsstatedin
sections4.9.5,4.9.7,and4.9.8.
4.9.12. SpecialRequirementsRelatedtoKeyCompromiseTheIssuerCAortheRAshallusecommerciallyreasonableeffortstonotifypotentialRelyingPartiesifitdiscoversorsuspectsthatitsPrivateKeyhasbeencompromised.TheIssuerCAmusthavetheabilitytotransitionanyrevocationreasontocodeto“keycompromise”.IfaCertificateisrevokedbecauseofcompromiseorsuspectedcompromise,theIssuerCAshallissueaCRLwithin18hoursafteritreceivesnoticeofthecompromiseorsuspectedcompromise.
4.9.13. CircumstancesforSuspensionNotapplicable.
4.9.14. WhoCanRequestSuspensionNotapplicable.
4.9.15. ProcedureforSuspensionRequestNotapplicable.
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4.9.16. LimitsonSuspensionPeriodNotapplicable.
4.10. CERTIFICATESTATUSSERVICES
4.10.1. OperationalCharacteristicsIssuerCAsshallmakecertificatestatusinformationavailableviaCRLorOCSP.TheIssuerCAshalllistrevokedCertificatesontheappropriateCRLwheretheyremainuntiloneadditionalCRLispublishedaftertheendoftheCertificate’svalidityperiod,exceptforCodeSigningCertificatesandEVCodeSigningCertificates,whichshallremainontheCRLforatleast10yearsfollowingtheCertificate’svalidityperiod.
4.10.2. ServiceAvailabilityIssuerCAsshallprovidecertificatestatusservices24x7withoutinterruption.ThisincludestheonlinerepositorythatapplicationsoftwarecanusetoautomaticallycheckthecurrentstatusofallunexpiredCertificatesissuedbytheIssuingCA.TheIssuingCAoperatesandmaintainsitsCRLandOCSPcapabilitywithresourcessufficienttoprovidearesponsetimeoftensecondsorlessundernormaloperatingconditions.TheIssuingCAshallmaintainacontinuous24x7abilitytorespondinternallytoahigh‐priorityCertificateProblemReport,andwhereappropriate,forwardsuchacomplainttolawenforcementauthorities,and/orrevokeaCertificatethatisthesubjectofsuchacomplaint.
4.10.3. OptionalFeaturesNostipulation.
4.11. ENDOFSUBSCRIPTIONTheIssuerCAshallallowSubscriberstoendtheirsubscriptiontocertificateservicesbyhavingtheirCertificaterevokedorbyallowingtheCertificateorapplicableSubscriberAgreementtoexpirewithoutrenewal.
4.12. KEYESCROWANDRECOVERY
4.12.1. KeyEscrowandRecoveryPolicyPracticesIssuerCAsshallnotescrowCAPrivateKeys.IssuerCAsmayescrowSubscriberkeymanagementkeystoprovidekeyrecoveryservices.IssuerCAsshallencryptandprotectescrowedPrivateKeyswithatleastthelevelofsecurityusedtogenerateanddeliverthePrivateKey.ForCertificatescross‐certifiedwiththeFBCA,thirdpartiesarenotpermittedtoholdtheSubscribersignaturekeysintrust.Subscribersandotherauthorizedentitiesmayrequestrecoveryofanescrowed(decryption)PrivateKey.EntitiesescrowingPrivateKeysshallhavepersonnelcontrolsinplacethatpreventunauthorizedaccesstoPrivateKeys.Keyrecoveryrequestscanonlybemadeforoneofthefollowingreasons:
1. TheSubscriberhaslostordamagedtheprivate‐keytoken,2. TheSubscriberisnotavailableorisnolongerpartoftheorganizationthatcontractedwith
theIssuerCAforPrivateKeyescrow,3. ThePrivateKeyispartofarequiredinvestigationoraudit,4. Therequesterhasauthorizationfromacompetentlegalauthoritytoaccessthe
communicationthatisencryptedusingthekey,5. Ifkeyrecoveryisrequiredbylaworgovernmentalregulation,or6. IftheentitycontractingwiththeIssuerCAforescrowofthePrivateKeyindicatesthatkey
recoveryismissioncriticalormissionessential.
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AnentityreceivingPrivateKeyescrowservicesshall:
1. NotifySubscribersthattheirPrivateKeysareescrowed,2. Protectescrowedkeysfromunauthorizeddisclosure,3. ProtectanyauthenticationmechanismsthatcouldbeusedtorecoverescrowedPrivateKeys,4. Releaseescrowedkeysonlyforproperlyauthenticatedandauthorizedrequestsfor
recovery,and5. Complywithanylegalobligationstodiscloseorkeepconfidentialescrowedkeys,escrowed
key‐relatedinformation,orthefactsconcerninganykeyrecoveryrequestorprocess.
4.12.2. SessionKeyEncapsulationandRecoveryPolicyandPracticesIssuerCAsthatsupportsessionkeyencapsulationandrecoveryshalldescribetheirpracticesintheirCPS.
5. FACILITY,MANAGEMENT,ANDOPERATIONALCONTROLS
5.1. PHYSICALCONTROLS
5.1.1. SiteLocationandConstructionTheIssuerCAshallperformitsCAoperationsfromasecuredatacenterequippedwithlogicalandphysicalcontrolsthatmaketheCAoperationsinaccessibletonon‐trustedpersonnel.Thesitelocationandconstruction,whencombinedwithotherphysicalsecurityprotectionmechanismssuchasguards,doorlocks,andintrusionsensors,shallproviderobustprotectionagainstunauthorizedaccesstoCAequipmentandrecords.RAsmustprotecttheirequipmentfromunauthorizedaccessinamannerthatisappropriatetothelevelofthreattotheRA,includingprotectingequipmentfromunauthorizedaccesswhilethecryptographicmoduleisinstalledandactivatedandimplementingphysicalaccesscontrolstoreducetheriskofequipmenttampering,evenwhenthecryptographicmoduleisnotinstalledandactivated.
5.1.2. PhysicalAccessEachIssuerCAandeachRAshallprotectitsequipment(includingcertificatestatusservers)fromunauthorizedaccessandshallimplementphysicalcontrolstoreducetheriskofequipmenttampering.TheIssuerCAandallRAsshallstoreallremovablemediaandpapercontainingsensitiveplain‐textinformationrelatedtoCAorRAoperationsinsecurecontainers.Thesecuritymechanismsshouldbecommensuratewiththelevelofthreattotheequipmentanddata.TheIssuerCAshallmanuallyorelectronicallymonitoritssystemsforunauthorizedaccessatalltimes,maintainanaccesslogthatisinspectedperiodically,andrequiretwo‐personphysicalaccesstotheCAhardwareandsystems.AnIssuerCAshalldeactivateandsecurelystoreitsCAequipmentwhennotinuse.ActivationdatamusteitherbememorizedorrecordedandstoredinamannercommensuratewiththesecurityaffordedthecryptographicmoduleandmustnotbestoredwiththecryptographicmoduleorremovablehardwareassociatedwithremoteworkstationsusedtoadministertheCAequipmentorPrivateKeys.IfthefacilityhousingtheCAequipmentiseverleftunattended,theIssuerCA’sadministratorsshallverifythat:
1. theCAisinastateappropriatetothecurrentmodeofoperation,2. thesecuritycontainersareproperlysecured3. physicalsecuritysystems(e.g.,doorlocks,ventcovers)arefunctioningproperly,and4. theareaissecuredagainstunauthorizedaccess.
TheIssuerCAshallmakeapersonorgroupofpersonsexplicitlyresponsibleformakingsecuritychecks.Ifagroupofpersonsisresponsible,theIssuerCAshallmaintainalogthatidentifieswhoperformedthesecuritycheck.Ifthefacilityisnotcontinuouslyattended,thelastpersontodepart
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shallinitialasign‐outsheetthatindicatesthedateandtimeandassertsthatallnecessaryphysicalprotectionmechanismsareinplaceandactivated.
5.1.3. PowerandAirConditioningTheIssuerCAshallmaintainabackuppowersupplyandsufficientenvironmentalcontrolstoprotecttheCAsystemsandallowtheCAtoautomaticallyfinishpendingoperationsandrecordthestateofequipmentbeforealackofpowerorairconditioningcausesashutdown.
5.1.4. WaterExposuresTheIssuerCAshallprotectitsCAequipmentfromwaterexposure.
5.1.5. FirePreventionandProtectionTheIssuerCAshallusefacilitiesequippedwithfiresuppressionmechanisms.
5.1.6. MediaStorageIssuerCAsandRAsshallprotectallmediafromaccidentaldamageandunauthorizedphysicalaccess.EachIssuerCAandeachRAshallduplicateandstoreitsauditandarchiveinformationinabackuplocationthatisseparatefromitsprimaryoperationsfacility.
5.1.7. WasteDisposalPaperwastecontainingsensitivedatashallbeshreddedbeforedisposal.Sensitivedataonmagneticorotherdigitalmediamustbepermanentlyerasedbeforedisposal.
5.1.8. Off‐siteBackupTheIssuerCAorRAshallmakeweeklysystembackupssufficienttorecoverfromsystemfailureandshallstorethebackups,includingatleastonefullbackupcopy,atanoffsitelocationthathasproceduralandphysicalcontrolsthatarecommensuratewithitsoperationallocation.
5.1.9. CertificateStatusHosting,CMSandExternalRASystemsAllphysicalcontrolrequirementsunderthisSection5.1applyequallytoanyCertificateStatusHosting,CMSorexternalRAsystem.
5.2. PROCEDURALCONTROLS
5.2.1. TrustedRolesCAandRApersonnelactingintrustedrolesincludeCAandRAsystemadministrationpersonnelandpersonnelinvolvedwithidentityvettingandtheissuanceandrevocationofCertificates.IssuerCAsandRAsshalldistributethefunctionsanddutiesperformedbypersonsintrustedrolesinawaythatpreventsonepersonfromcircumventingsecuritymeasuresorsubvertingthesecurityandtrustworthinessofthePKI.SeniormanagementoftheIssuerCAortheRAshallberesponsibleforappointingindividualstotrustedroles.Alistofsuchpersonnelshallbemaintainedandreviewedannually.ThefollowingfourtrustedrolesaredefinedbythisCP,althoughanIssuerCAorRAmaydefineadditionalones:
5.2.1.1. CA Administrators TheCAAdministratorisresponsiblefortheinstallationandconfigurationoftheCAsoftware,includingkeygeneration,userandCAaccounts,auditparameters,keybackup,andkeymanagement.TheCAAdministratorisresponsibleforperformingandsecurelystoringregularsystembackupsoftheCAsystem.AdministratorsmaynotissuecertificatestoSubscribers.
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5.2.1.2. Registration Officers – CMS, RA, Validation and Vetting Personnel TheRegistrationOfficerroleisresponsibleforissuingandrevokingCertificates,includingenrollment,identityverification,andcompliancewithrequiredissuanceandrevocationstepssuchasmanagingthecertificaterequestqueueandcompletingcertificateapprovalchecklistsasidentityvettingtasksaresuccessfullycompleted.
5.2.1.3. System Administrator/ System Engineer (Operator) TheSystemAdministrator,SystemEngineerorCAOperatorisresponsibleforinstallingandconfiguringCAsystemhardware,includingservers,routers,firewalls,andnetworkconfigurations.TheSystemAdministrator/Engineerisalsoresponsibleforkeepingsystemsupdatedwithsoftwarepatchesandothermaintenanceneededforsystemstabilityandrecoverability.
5.2.1.4. Internal Auditor Role TheInternalAuditorRoleisresponsibleforreviewing,maintaining,andarchivingauditlogsandperformingoroverseeinginternalcomplianceauditstodetermineiftheIssuerCAorRAisoperatinginaccordancewiththisCP.
5.2.1.5. RA Administrators RAAdministratorsinstall,configureandmanagetheRAsoftware,includingtheassignmentofIssuingCAsandcertificateprofilestocustomeraccounts.
5.2.2. NumberofPersonsRequiredperTaskEachIssuerCAshallrequirethatatleasttwopeopleactinginatrustedrole(oneshallbeaCAAdministratorandtheothercannotbeanInternalAuditor)takeactionrequiringatrustedrole,suchasactivatingtheIssuerCA’sPrivateKeys,generatingaCAKeyPair,orcreatingabackupofaCAPrivateKey.TheInternalAuditormayservetofulfilltherequirementofmultipartycontrolforphysicalaccesstotheCAsystem,butlogicalaccessshallnotbeachievedusingpersonnelthatserveintheInternalAuditorrole.
5.2.3. IdentificationandAuthenticationforeachRoleIssuerCApersonnelshallauthenticatethemselvestothecertificatemanagementsystembeforetheyareallowedaccesstothesystemsnecessarytoperformtheirtrustedroles.
5.2.4. RolesRequiringSeparationofDutiesIndividualpersonnelshallbespecificallydesignatedtothefourrolesdefinedinSection5.2.1above.AnindividualmayassumeonlyoneoftheRegistrationOfficer,Administrator,orInternalAuditorroles.IndividualsdesignatedasRegistrationOfficerorAdministratormayalsoassumetheOperatorrole.AnInternalAuditormaynotassumeanyotherrole.TheIssuerCAandRAmayenforceseparationofdutiesusingCAequipment,procedurally,orbybothmeans.TheCAandRAsoftwareandhardwareshallidentifyandauthenticateitsusersandshallensurethatnouseridentitycanassumebothanAdministratorandaRegistrationOfficerrole,assumeboththeAdministratorandInternalAuditorroles,orassumeboththeInternalAuditorandRegistrationOfficerroles.Anindividualmaynothavemorethanoneidentity.
5.3. PERSONNELCONTROLS
5.3.1. Qualifications,Experience,andClearanceRequirementsTheDCPAisresponsibleandaccountablefortheoperationoftheDigiCertPKIandcompliancewiththisCP.IssuerCAandRApersonnelandmanagementwhopurporttoactwithinthescopeofthisdocumentshallbeselectedonthebasisofloyalty,trustworthiness,andintegrity.AlltrustedrolesforIssuerCAsissuingFederatedDeviceCertificates,ClientCertificatesatLevels3‐USand4‐US(whichareintendedforinteroperabilitythroughtheFederalBridgeCAatid‐fpki‐certpcy‐mediumAssurance
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andid‐fpki‐certpcy‐mediumHardware)shallbeheldbycitizensoftheUnitedStatesorthecountrywheretheIssuerCAislocated.Inadditiontotheabove,anindividualperformingatrustedroleforanRAmaybeacitizenofthecountrywheretheRAislocated.ThereisnocitizenshiprequirementforIssuerCAorRApersonnelperformingtrustedrolesassociatedwiththeissuanceofSSL/TLSServer,CodeSigningorClientCertificatesatLevels1,2,3‐CBP,and4‐CBP.Managerialpersonnelinvolvedintime‐stampingoperationsmustpossessexperiencewithinformationsecurityandriskassessmentandknowledgeoftime‐stampingtechnology,digitalsignaturetechnology,mechanismsforcalibrationoftimestampingclockswithUTC,andsecurityprocedures.TheIssuerCAortheRAshallensurethatallindividualsassignedtotrustedroleshavetheexperience,qualifications,andtrustworthinessrequiredtoperformtheirdutiesunderthisCP.
5.3.2. BackgroundCheckProceduresTheIssuerCAandRAshallrequireeachpersonfulfillingatrustedroletoundergoidentityverification,backgroundchecks,andadjudicationpriortoactingintherole,includingverificationoftheindividual’sidentity,employmenthistory,education,characterreferences,socialsecuritynumber,previousresidences,drivingrecords,andcriminalbackground.TheIssuerCAorRAshallrequireeachindividualtoappearin‐personbeforeatrustedagentwhoseresponsibilityitisverifyidentity.Thetrustedagentshallverifytheidentityoftheindividualusingatleastoneformofgovernment‐issuedphotoidentification.Checksofpreviousresidencesareoverthepastthreeyears.Allotherchecksareforthepriorfiveyears.TheIssuerCAorRAshallverifythehighesteducationdegreeobtainedregardlessofthedateawardedandshallrefreshallbackgroundchecksatleasteverytenyears.Basedupontheinformationobtained,acompetentadjudicationauthoritywithintheIssuerCAorRAshalladjudicatewhethertheindividualissuitableforthepositiontowhichtheywillbeassigned.
5.3.3. TrainingRequirementsTheIssuerCAshallprovideskillstrainingtoallpersonnelinvolvedintheIssuerCA’sPKIoperations.Thetrainingmustrelatetotheperson’sjobfunctionsandcover:
1. basicPublicKeyInfrastructure(PKI)knowledge,2. softwareversionsusedbytheIssuerCA,3. authenticationandverificationpoliciesandprocedures,4. CA/RAsecurityprinciplesandmechanisms,5. disasterrecoveryandbusinesscontinuityprocedures,6. commonthreatstothevalidationprocess,includingphishingandothersocialengineering
tactics,and7. CA/BrowserForumGuidelinesandotherapplicableindustryandgovernmentguidelines.
IssuerCAsshallmaintainarecordofwhoreceivedtrainingandwhatleveloftrainingwascompleted.IssuerCAsandRAsshallensurethatRegistrationOfficershavetheminimumskillsnecessarytosatisfactorilyperformvalidationdutiesbeforetheyaregrantedvalidationprivileges.Wherecompetencewasdemonstratedinlieuoftraining,theIssuerCAorRAmustmaintainsupportingdocumentation.IssuerCAsshallrequireallRegistrationOfficerstopassanexaminationprovidedbytheIssuerCAontheinformationverificationrequirementsoutlinedintheBaselineRequirements.IssuerCAsandRAsinvolvedwiththeoperationofCMSshallensurethatallpersonnelwhoperformdutiesinvolvingtheCMSreceivecomprehensivetraining.IssuerCAsandRAsshallcreateatraining(awareness)plantoaddressanysignificantchangetoCMSoperationsandshalldocumenttheexecutionoftheplan.
5.3.4. RetrainingFrequencyandRequirementsPersonnelmustmaintainskilllevelsthatareconsistentwithindustry‐relevanttrainingandperformanceprogramsinordertocontinueactingintrustedroles.TheIssuerCAorRAshallmake
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individualsactingintrustedrolesawareofanychangestotheIssuerCA’sorRA’soperations.Ifsuchoperationschange,theIssuerCAorRAshallprovidedocumentedtraining,inaccordancewithanexecutedtrainingplan,toalltrustedroles.
5.3.5. JobRotationFrequencyandSequenceNostipulation.
5.3.6. SanctionsforUnauthorizedActionsIssuerCAorRAemployeesandagentsfailingtocomplywiththisCP,whetherthroughnegligenceormaliciousintent,shallbesubjecttoadministrativeordisciplinaryactions,includingterminationofemploymentoragencyandcriminalsanctions.Ifapersoninatrustedroleiscitedbymanagementforunauthorizedorinappropriateactions,thepersonwillbeimmediatelyremovedfromthetrustedrolependingmanagementreview.Aftermanagementreviewsanddiscussestheincidentwiththetrustedpersonnel,managementmayreassigntheemployeetoanon‐trustedroleordismisstheindividualfromemploymentasappropriate.
5.3.7. IndependentContractorRequirementsAnyIssuerCAorRAallowingindependentcontractorstobeassignedtoperformtrustedrolesshallrequirethattheyagreetotheobligationsunderthisSection5(Facility,Management,andOperationalControls)andthesanctionsstatedaboveinSection5.3.6.
5.3.8. DocumentationSuppliedtoPersonnelIssuerCAsandRAsshallprovidepersonnelintrustedroleswiththedocumentationnecessarytoperformtheirduties.
5.4. AUDITLOGGINGPROCEDURES
5.4.1. TypesofEventsRecordedIssuerCAandRAsystems(includinganyCMS)shallrequireidentificationandauthenticationatsystemlogon.Importantsystemactionsshallbeloggedtoestablishtheaccountabilityoftheoperatorswhoinitiatesuchactions.IssuerCAsandRAsshallenableallessentialeventauditingcapabilitiesofitsCAorRAapplicationsinordertorecordalleventsrelatedtothesecurityoftheCAorRA,includingthoselistedbelow.AmessagefromanysourcereceivedbytheIssuerCArequestinganactionrelatedtotheoperationalstateoftheCAisanauditableevent.IftheIssuerCA’sapplicationscannotautomaticallyrecordanevent,theIssuerCAshallimplementmanualprocedurestosatisfytherequirements.Foreachevent,theIssuerCAshallrecordtherelevant(i)dateandtime,(ii)typeofevent,(iii)successorfailure,and(iv)userorsystemthatcausedtheeventorinitiatedtheaction.TheIssuerCAshallmakealleventrecordsavailabletoitsauditorsasproofoftheIssuerCA’spractices.
AuditableEventSECURITYAUDITAnychangestotheauditparameters,e.g.,auditfrequency,typeofeventauditedAnyattempttodeleteormodifytheauditlogsAUTHENTICATIONTOSYSTEMSSuccessfulandunsuccessfulattemptstoassumearoleThevalueofmaximumnumberofauthenticationattemptsischangedMaximumnumberofauthenticationattemptsoccurduringuserloginAnadministratorunlocksanaccountthathasbeenlockedasaresultofunsuccessfulauthenticationattemptsAnadministratorchangesthetypeofauthenticator,e.g.,fromapasswordtoabiometricLOCALDATAENTRYAllsecurity‐relevantdatathatisenteredinthesystem
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AuditableEventREMOTEDATAENTRYAllsecurity‐relevantmessagesthatarereceivedbythesystemDATAEXPORTANDOUTPUTAllsuccessfulandunsuccessfulrequestsforconfidentialandsecurity‐relevantinformationKEYGENERATIONWheneveraCAgeneratesakey(notmandatoryforsinglesessionorone‐timeusesymmetrickeys)CAKEYLIFECYCLEMANAGEMENTKeygeneration,backup,storage,recovery,archival,anddestructionCryptographicdevicelifecyclemanagementeventsCAANDSUBSCRIBERCERTIFICATELIFECYCLEMANAGEMENTAllverificationactivitiesstipulatedintheBaseline RequirementsandthisCPSDate,time,phonenumberused,personsspokento,andendresultsofverificationtelephonecallsAcceptanceandrejectionofcertificaterequestsIssuanceofCertificatesGenerationofCertificateRevocationListsandOCSPentries.PRIVATEKEYLOADANDSTORAGETheloadingofComponentPrivateKeysAllaccesstocertificatesubjectPrivateKeysretainedwithintheCAforkeyrecoverypurposesTRUSTEDPUBLICKEYENTRY,DELETIONANDSTORAGESECRETKEYSTORAGEThemanualentryofsecretkeysusedforauthenticationPRIVATEANDSECRETKEYEXPORTTheexportofprivateandsecretkeys(keysusedforasinglesessionormessageareexcluded)CERTIFICATEREGISTRATIONAllcertificaterequests,includingissuance,re‐key,renewal,andrevocationCertificateissuanceVerificationactivitiesCERTIFICATEREVOCATIONAllcertificaterevocationrequestsCERTIFICATESTATUSCHANGEAPPROVALORREJECTIONCACONFIGURATIONAnysecurity‐relevantchangestotheconfigurationofaCAsystemcomponentACCOUNTADMINISTRATIONRolesandusersareaddedordeletedTheaccesscontrolprivilegesofauseraccountorarolearemodified CERTIFICATEPROFILEMANAGEMENTAllchangestothecertificateprofileREVOCATIONPROFILEMANAGEMENTAllchangestotherevocationprofileCERTIFICATEREVOCATIONLISTPROFILEMANAGEMENTAllchangestothecertificaterevocationlistprofileGenerationofCRLsandOCSPentriesTIMESTAMPINGClocksynchronizationMISCELLANEOUSAppointmentofanindividualtoaTrustedRoleDesignationofpersonnelformultipartycontrolInstallationofanOperatingSystem
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AuditableEventInstallationofaPKIApplicationInstallationofaHardwareSecurityModulesRemovalofHSMsDestructionofHSMsSystemStartupLogonattemptstoPKIApplicationReceiptofhardware/softwareAttemptstosetpasswordsAttemptstomodifypasswordsBackupoftheinternalCAdatabaseRestorationfrombackupoftheinternalCAdatabase Filemanipulation (e.g.,creation,renaming,moving)PostingofanymaterialtoarepositoryAccesstotheinternalCAdatabaseAllcertificatecompromisenotificationrequestsLoadingHSMswithCertificatesShipmentofHSMsZeroizingHSMsRe‐keyoftheComponentCONFIGURATIONCHANGESHardwareSoftwareOperatingSystemPatchesSecurityProfilesPHYSICALACCESS/SITESECURITYPersonnelaccesstosecureareahousingCAcomponentsAccesstoaCAcomponentKnownorsuspectedviolationsofphysicalsecurityFirewallandrouteractivitiesEntriestoandexitsfromtheCAfacility,PKIandsecuritysystemactionsperformedANOMALIESSystemcrashesandhardwarefailuresSoftwareerrorconditionsSoftwarecheckintegrityfailuresReceiptofimpropermessagesandmisroutedmessagesNetworkattacks(suspectedorconfirmed)EquipmentfailureElectricalpoweroutagesUninterruptiblePowerSupply(UPS)failureObviousandsignificantnetworkserviceoraccessfailuresViolationsofaCPorCPSResettingOperatingSystemclock
5.4.2. FrequencyofProcessingLogTheIssuerCAorRAshall,atleasteverytwomonths,reviewsystemlogs,makesystemandfileintegritychecks,andmakeavulnerabilityassessment.TheIssuerCAorRAmayuseautomatedtoolstoscanforanomaliesorspecificconditions.Duringitsreview,theIssuerCAorRAshallverifythatthelogshavenotbeentamperedwith,examineanystatisticallysignificantsetofsecurityauditdatageneratedsincethelastreview,andmakeareasonablesearchforanyevidenceofmaliciousactivity.TheIssuerCAorRAshallbrieflyinspectalllogentriesandinvestigateanydetectedanomaliesor
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irregularities.TheIssuerCAorRAshallmakeasummaryofthereviewavailabletoitsauditorsuponrequest.TheIssuerCAofRAshalldocumentanyactionstakenasaresultofareview.
5.4.3. RetentionPeriodforAuditLogTheIssuerCAandRAshallretainauditlogson‐siteuntilaftertheyarereviewed.AuditlogsrelatedtopubliclytrustedSSL/TLScertificatesshallberetainedforatleastseven(7)years.TheindividualwhoremovesauditlogsfromtheIssuerCA’sorRA’ssystemsmustbedifferentthantheindividualswhocontroltheIssuerCA’ssignaturekeys.
5.4.4. ProtectionofAuditLogTheIssuerCAandRAshallimplementproceduresthatprotectarchiveddatafromdestructionpriortotheendoftheauditlogretentionperiod.TheIssuerCAandRAshallconfigureitssystemsandestablishoperationalprocedurestoensurethat(i)onlyauthorizedpeoplehavereadaccesstologs,(ii)onlyauthorizedpeoplemayarchiveauditlogs,and(iii)auditlogsarenotmodified.TheIssuerCA’soff‐sitestoragelocationmustbeasafeandsecurelocationthatisseparatefromthelocationwherethedatawasgenerated.TheIssuerCAandRAshallmakerecordsavailableifrequiredforthepurposeofprovidingevidenceofthecorrectoperationoftime‐stampingservicesforthepurposeoflegalproceedings.TheIssuerCAshallmakeitsauditlogsavailabletoauditorsuponrequest.
5.4.5. AuditLogBackupProceduresOnatleastamonthlybasis,theIssuerCAandRAshallmakebackupsofauditlogsandauditlogsummariesandsaveacopyoftheauditlogtoasecure,off‐sitelocation.
5.4.6. AuditCollectionSystem(internalvs.external)TheIssuerCAorRAmayuseautomaticauditprocesses,providedthattheyareinvokedatsystemstartupandendonlyatsystemshutdown.Ifanautomatedauditsystemfailsandtheintegrityofthesystemorconfidentialityoftheinformationprotectedbythesystemisatrisk,theDCPAshallbenotifiedanddeterminewhethertosuspendtheIssuerCA’sorRA’soperationsuntiltheproblemisremedied.
5.4.7. NotificationtoEvent‐causingSubjectNostipulation.
5.4.8. VulnerabilityAssessmentsTheIssuerCAshallperformroutineriskassessmentsthatidentifyandassessreasonablyforeseeableinternalandexternalthreatsthatcouldresultinunauthorizedaccess,disclosure,misuse,alteration,ordestructionofanycertificatedataorcertificateissuanceprocess.TheIssuerCAshallalsoroutinelyassessthesufficiencyofthepolicies,procedures,informationsystems,technology,andotherarrangementsthattheIssuerCAhasinplacetocontrolsuchrisks.TheIssuerCA’sauditorsshouldreviewthesecurityauditdatachecksforcontinuityandalerttheappropriatepersonnelofanyevents,suchasrepeatedfailedactions,requestsforprivilegedinformation,attemptedaccessofsystemfiles,andunauthenticatedresponses.
5.5. RECORDSARCHIVALTheIssuerCAshallcomplywithanyrecordretentionpoliciesthatapplybylaw.TheIssuerCAshallincludesufficientdetailinarchivedrecordstoshowthataCertificatewasissuedinaccordancewiththeCPS.
5.5.1. TypesofRecordsArchivedTheIssuerCAshallretainthefollowinginformationinitsarchives(assuchinformationpertainstotheIssuerCA’sCAoperations):
1. AnyaccreditationoftheIssuerCA,
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2. CPandCPSversions,3. ContractualobligationsandotheragreementsconcerningtheoperationoftheCA,4. Systemandequipmentconfigurations,modifications,andupdates,5. Certificateissuance,rekey,renewal,andrevocationrequests,6. Rejectionoracceptanceofacertificaterequest,7. Identityauthenticationdata,8. AnydocumentationrelatedtothereceiptoracceptanceofaCertificateortoken,9. SubscriberAgreements,10. Issuedcertificates,11. Arecordofcertificatere‐keys,12. CRLsforCAscross‐certifiedwiththeFederalBridgeCA,13. Anydataorapplicationsnecessarytoverifyanarchive’scontents,14. Complianceauditorreports,15. AnychangestotheIssuerCA’sauditparameters,16. Anyattempttodeleteormodifyauditlogs,17. CAKeygenerationanddestruction,18. AccesstoPrivateKeysforkeyrecoverypurposes,19. ChangestotrustedPublicKeys,20. ExportofPrivateKeys,21. Approvalorrejectionofarevocationrequest,22. Appointmentofanindividualtoatrustedrole,23. Destructionofacryptographicmodule,24. Certificatecompromisenotifications,25. Remedialactiontakenasaresultofviolationsofphysicalsecurity,and26. ViolationsoftheCPorCPS.
5.5.2. RetentionPeriodforArchiveTheIssuerCAshallretainarchiveddataassociatedwithLevel3,Level4,andfederateddeviceCertificatesfor10.5years.ForallotherCertificates,theIssuerCAshallretainarchiveddataforatleast7.5years.RAssupportingCertificatesthatarenotcross‐certifiedwiththeFBCAmayretainarchiveddataforashorterperiodoftimeifthepracticeisdocumentedinaRPSordocumentretentionpolicy.
5.5.3. ProtectionofArchiveTheIssuerCAshallstoreitsarchivedrecordsatasecureoff‐sitelocationinamannerthatpreventsunauthorizedmodification,substitution,ordestruction.Nounauthorizedusermayaccess,write,ordeletethearchives.Iftheoriginalmediacannotretainthedatafortherequiredperiod,thearchivesitemustdefineamechanismtoperiodicallytransferthearchiveddatatonewmedia.TheIssuerCAshallmaintainanysoftwareapplicationrequiredtoprocessthearchivedatauntilthedataiseitherdestroyedortransferredtoanewermedium.
5.5.4. ArchiveBackupProceduresIfanIssuerCAorRAchoosestobackupitsarchiverecords,thentheIssuerCAorRAshalldescribehowitsrecordsarebackedupandmanagedinitsCPSorareferenceddocument.
5.5.5. RequirementsforTime‐stampingofRecordsTheIssuerCAshallautomaticallytime‐stamparchiverecordsastheyarecreated.Cryptographictime‐stampingofarchiverecordsisnotrequired;however,theIssuerCAshallsynchronizeitssystemtimeatleasteveryeighthoursusingarealtimevaluetraceabletoarecognizedUTC(k)laboratoryorNationalMeasurementInstitute.
5.5.6. ArchiveCollectionSystem(internalorexternal)TheIssuerCAshallcollectarchiveinformationinternally.
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5.5.7. ProcedurestoObtainandVerifyArchiveInformationTheIssuerCAmayarchivedatamanuallyorautomatically.Ifautomaticarchivalisimplemented,theIssuerCAshallsynchronizeitsarchiveddataonadailybasis.TheIssuerCAmayallowSubscriberstoobtainacopyoftheirarchivedinformation.Otherwise,theIssuerCAshallrestrictaccesstoarchivedatatoauthorizedpersonnelinaccordancewiththeIssuerCA'sinternalsecuritypolicyandshallnotreleaseanyarchivedinformationexceptasallowedbylaw.CAsshallstateintheirCPSthedetailsofhowtheycreate,verify,package,transmit,andstorearchivedinformation.
5.6. KEYCHANGEOVERTheIssuerCAshallperiodicallychangeitsPrivateKeysinamannersetforthintheCPSthatpreventsdowntimeintheIssuerCA’soperation.Afterkeychangeover,theIssuerCAshallsignCertificatesusingonlythenewkey.TheIssuerCAshallstillprotectitsoldPrivateKeysandshallmaketheoldCertificateavailabletoverifysignaturesuntilalloftheCertificatessignedwiththePrivateKeyhaveexpired.IssuerCAscross‐certifiedwiththeFBCAmustbeabletocontinuetointeroperatewiththeFBCAaftertheFBCAperformsakeyrollover,whetherornottheFBCADNischanged.IssuerCAseithermustestablishkeyrolloverCertificatesasdescribedaboveormustobtainanewCACertificateforthenewPublicKeyfromtheissuersoftheircurrentCertificates.
5.7. COMPROMISEANDDISASTERRECOVERY
5.7.1. IncidentandCompromiseHandlingProceduresTheIssuerCAshalldevelopandimplementprocedurestobefollowedintheeventofaserioussecurityincidentorsystemcompromise.Requireddocumentationincludes,butisnotlimitedto,anIncidentResponsePlan,aDisasterRecoveryorBusinessContinuityPlan(DR/BCP),andrelatedresources.TheIssuerCAshallreview,test,andupdateitsIncidentResponsePlanandDR/BCP,andsupportingprocedures,atleastannually.TheIssuerCAshallrequirethatanyCMShavedocumentedincidenthandlingproceduresthatareapprovedbytheheadoftheorganizationresponsibleforoperatingtheCMS.IftheCMSiscompromised,theIssuerCAshallrevokeallCertificatesissuedtotheCMS,ifapplicable.TheIssuerCAanditsRAsshallalsoassessanydamagecausedbytheCMScompromise,revokeallpotentiallycompromisedSubscriberCertificates,notifyaffectedsubscribersoftherevocation,andre‐establishtheoperationoftheCMS.
5.7.2. ComputingResources,Software,and/orDataAreCorruptedTheIssuerCAshallmakeregularback‐upcopiesofitsPrivateKeysandstoretheminasecureoff‐sitelocation.TheIssuerCAshallalsomakeregularsystemback‐upsonatleastaweeklybasis.IfadisastercausestheIssuerCA’soperationstobecomeinoperative,theIssuerCAshall,afterensuringtheintegrityoftheCAsystems,re‐initiateitsoperationsonreplacementhardwareusingbackupcopiesofitssoftware,data,andPrivateKeysatasecurefacility.TheIssuerCAshallgiveprioritytoreestablishingthegenerationofcertificatestatusinformation.IfthePrivateKeysaredestroyed,theIssuerCAshallreestablishoperationsasquicklyaspossible,givingprioritytogeneratingnewKeyPairs.
5.7.3. EntityPrivateKeyCompromiseProceduresIftheIssuerCAsuspectsthataCAPrivateKeyiscomprisedorlostthentheIssuerCAshallfollowitsIncidentResponsePlanandimmediatelyassessthesituation,determinethedegreeandscopeoftheincident,andtakeappropriateaction.IssuerCApersonnelshallreporttheresultsoftheinvestigation.Thereportmustdetailthecauseofthecompromiseorlossandthemeasuresshouldbetakentopreventareoccurrence.Ifthereisacompromiseorloss,theIssuerCAshallnotifyany
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affiliatedentitiessothattheymayissueCRLsrevokingcross‐CertificatesissuedtotheIssuerCAandshallnotifyinterestedpartiesandmakeinformationavailablethatcanbeusedtoidentifywhichCertificatesandtime‐stamptokensaffected,unlessdoingsowouldbreachtheprivacyoftheIssuerCA’suserorthesecurityoftheIssuerCA’sservices.FollowingrevocationofaCACertificateandimplementationoftheIssuerCA’sIncidentResponsePlan,theIssuerCAshallgenerateanewCAKeyPairandsignanewCACertificateinaccordancewithitsCPS.TheIssuerCAshalldistributethenewself‐signedCertificateinaccordancewithSection6.1.4.TheIssuerCAshallceaseitsCAoperationsuntilappropriatestepsaretakentorecoverfromthecompromiseandrestoresecurity.
5.7.4. BusinessContinuityCapabilitiesafteraDisasterStatedgoalsoftheIssuerCA’sDR/BCPshallincludethatcertificatestatusservicesbeminimallyaffectedbyanydisasterinvolvingtheIssuerCA’sprimaryfacilityandthatotherservicesresumeasquicklyaspossiblefollowingadisaster.TheIssuerCAshallestablishasecurefacilityinatleastonesecondary,geographicallydiverselocationtoensurethatitsdirectoryandon‐linestatusservers,ifany,remainoperationalintheeventofaphysicaldisasterattheIssuerCA’smainsite.TheIssuerCAshallprovidenoticeattheearliestfeasibletimetoallinterestedpartiesifadisasterphysicallydamagestheIssuerCA’sequipmentordestroysallcopiesoftheIssuerCA’ssignaturekeys.
5.8. CAORRATERMINATIONIfanIssuerCA’soperationsareterminated,theIssuerCAshallprovidenoticetointerestedpartiesandshalltransferitsresponsibilitiesandrecordstosuccessorentities.TheIssuerCAmayallowasuccessortore‐issueCertificatesifthesuccessorhasallrelevantpermissionstodosoandhasoperationsthatareatleastassecuretheIssuerCA’s.Ifaqualifiedsuccessordoesnotexist,theIssuerCAshalltransferallrelevantrecordstoagovernmentsupervisoryorlegalbody.
6. TECHNICALSECURITYCONTROLS
6.1. KEYPAIRGENERATIONANDINSTALLATION
6.1.1. KeyPairGenerationAllkeysmustbegeneratedusingaFIPS‐approvedmethodorequivalentinternationalstandard.IssuerCAsshallgeneratecryptographickeyingmaterialonaFIPS140level3validatedcryptographicmoduleusingmultipleindividualsactingintrustedroles.Whengeneratingkeymaterial,theIssuerCAshallcreateauditableevidencetoshowthattheIssuerCAenforcedroleseparationandfolloweditskeygenerationprocess.AnindependentthirdpartyshallvalidatethateachCAkey,includinganyrootorintermediateCAkeysassociatedwithaCertificatecross‐certifiedwiththeFBCAandeachRootCAKey(forCertificatesnotcross‐certifiedwiththeFBCA),isgeneratedinaccordancewiththisCPeitherbyhavingtheindependentthirdpartywitnessthekeygenerationorbyexaminingasignedanddocumentedrecordofthekeygeneration.SubscriberswhogeneratetheirownkeysshalluseaFIPS‐approvedmethodandeitheravalidatedhardwareorvalidatedsoftwarecryptographicmodule,dependingonthelevelofassurancedesired.KeysforLevel3HardwareorLevel4BiometricCertificatesmustbegeneratedonvalidatedhardwarecryptographicmodulesusingaFIPS‐approvedmethod.SubscriberswhogeneratetheirownkeysforaQualifiedCertificateonanSSCDshallensurethattheSSCDmeetstherequirementsofCWA14169andthatthePublicKeytobecertifiedisfromtheKeyPairgeneratedbytheSSCD.
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6.1.2. PrivateKeyDeliverytoSubscriberIftheIssuerCA,aCMS,oranRAgenerateskeysonbehalfoftheSubscriber,thentheentitygeneratingthekeyshalldeliverthePrivateKeysecurely(encrypted)totheSubscriber.TheentitymaydeliverPrivateKeystoSubscriberselectronicallyoronahardwarecryptographicmodule/SSCD.Inallcases:
1. Exceptwhereescrow/backupservicesareprovided,thekeygeneratormaynotretainacopyoftheSubscriber’sPrivateKeyafterdelivery,
2. ThekeygeneratorshallprotectthePrivateKeyfromactivation,compromise,ormodificationduringthedeliveryprocess,
3. TheSubscribershallacknowledgereceiptofthePrivateKey(s),and4. ThekeygeneratorshalldeliverthePrivateKeyinawaythatensuresthatthecorrecttokens
andactivationdataareprovidedtothecorrectSubscribers,including:a. Forhardwaremodules,thekeygeneratormaintainingaccountabilityforthe
locationandstateofthemoduleuntiltheSubscriberacceptspossessionofitandb. ForelectronicdeliveryofPrivateKeys,thekeygeneratorencryptingkeymaterial
usingacryptographicalgorithmandkeysizeatleastasstrongasthePrivateKey.Thekeygeneratorshalldeliveractivationdatausingaseparatesecurechannel.
TheentityassistingwithSubscriberkeygenerationshallmaintainarecordoftheSubscriber’sacknowledgementofreceiptofthedevicecontainingtheSubscriber’sKeyPair.ACMSorRAprovidingkeydeliveryservicesshallprovideacopyofthisrecordtotheIssuerCA.
6.1.3. PublicKeyDeliverytoCertificateIssuerSubscribersshalldelivertheirPublicKeystotheIssuerCAinasecurefashionandinamannerthatbindstheSubscriber’sverifiedidentitytothePublicKey.ThecertificaterequestprocessshallensurethattheApplicantpossessesthePrivateKeyassociatedwiththePublicKeypresentedforcertification.Ifcryptographyisusedtoachievethebinding,thecryptographymustbeatleastasstrongastheCAkeysusedtosigntheCertificate.
6.1.4. CAPublicKeyDeliverytoRelyingPartiesTheIssuerCAshallprovideitsPublicKeystoRelyingPartiesinasecurefashionandinamannerthatprecludessubstitutionattacks.TheIssuerCAmaydeliveritsCAPublicKeystoRelyingPartiesas(i)specifiedinacertificatevalidationorpathdiscoverypolicyfile,(ii)trustanchorsincommercialbrowsersandoperatingsystemrootstores,and/or(iii)rootssignedbyotherCAs.TheIssuerCAmaydistributePublicKeysthatarepartofanupdatedsignatureKeyPairasaself‐signedCertificate,asanewCACertificate,orinakeyroll‐overCertificate.AllaccreditationauthoritiessupportingDigiCertCertificatesandallapplicationsoftwareprovidersarepermittedtoredistributeanyRootCertificatethatisissuedunderthisCP.
6.1.5. KeySizesForsigningCertificatesissuedwithinthepolicyOIDarcsof2.16.840.1.114412.1,2.16.840.1.114412.2,or2.16.840.1.114412.4,andforsigningCRLsandcertificatestatusserverresponsesforsuchCertificates,theIssuerCAsshalluseatleasta2048‐bitRSAKeyor384‐bitECDSAKeywithSHA‐256(orahashalgorithmthatisequallyormoreresistanttoacollisionattack).TheIssuerCAshallonlyissueend‐entityCertificatesthatcontainatleast2048‐bitPublicKeysforRSA,DSA,orDiffie‐Hellman,or224bitsforellipticcurvealgorithms.TheIssuerCAmayrequirehigherbitkeysinitssolediscretion.AnyCertificates(exceptRootCACertificates)expiringafter12/31/2030mustbeatleast3072‐bitforRSAand256‐bitforECDSA.TheIssuerCAandSubscribersmayfulfillthetransmissionsecurityrequirementsofthisCPusingTLSoranotherprotocolthatprovidessimilarsecurity,providedtheprotocolrequiresatleastAES128
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bitsorequivalentforthesymmetrickeyandatleast2048‐bitRSAorequivalentfortheasymmetrickeys(andatleast3072‐bitRSAorequivalentforasymmetrickeysafter12/31/2030).
6.1.6. PublicKeyParametersGenerationandQualityCheckingTheIssuerCAshallgeneratePublicKeyparametersforsignaturealgorithms(thevalueofthispublicexponentshallbeanoddnumberequaltothreeormore)andperformparameterqualitycheckinginaccordancewithFIPS186.
6.1.7. KeyUsagePurposes(asperX.509v3keyusagefield)TheIssuerCAshallincludekeyusageextensionfieldsthatspecifytheintendeduseoftheCertificateandtechnicallylimittheCertificate’sfunctionalityinX.509v3‐compliantsoftware.TheuseofaspecifickeyisdeterminedbythekeyusageextensionintheX.509Certificate.PrivateKeyscorrespondingtoRootCACertificatesmustnotbeusedtosignCertificatesexceptinthefollowingcases:1.Self‐signedCertificatestorepresenttheRootCAitself;2.CertificatesforSubordinateCAsandCrossCertificates;3.Certificatesforinfrastructurepurposes(e.g.administrativerolecertificates,internalCAoperationaldevicecertificates;and4.CertificatesforOCSPResponseverificationCACertificatesshallhavetwokeyusagebitsset:keyCertSignandcRLSign,andforsigningOCSPresponses,theCertificateshallalsosetthedigitalSignaturebit.TheIssuerCAshallnotissueLevel4Certificatesthatarecertifiedforbothsigningandencryption.Theuseofasinglekeyforencryptionandsignatureisdiscouraged,andIssuerCAsshouldissueSubscriberstwoKeyPairs—oneforkeymanagementandonefordigitalsignatureandauthentication.However,forsupportoflegacyapplications,otherCertificates,includingthoseatLevels1,2and3,mayincludeasinglekeyforusewithencryptionandsignature.Suchdual‐useCertificatesmust:
1. begeneratedandmanagedinaccordancewiththeirrespectivesignaturecertificaterequirements,exceptwhereotherwisenotedinthisCP,
2. neverassertthenon‐repudiationkeyusagebit,and3. notbeusedforauthenticatingdatathatwillbeverifiedonthebasisofthedual‐use
Certificateatafuturetime.SubscriberCertificatesassertkeyusagesbasedontheintendedapplicationoftheKeyPair.Inparticular,Certificatestobeusedfordigitalsignatures(includingauthentication)setthedigitalSignatureand/ornonRepudiationbits.CertificatestobeusedforkeyordataencryptionshallsetthekeyEnciphermentand/ordataEnciphermentbits.CertificatestobeusedforkeyagreementshallsetthekeyAgreementbit.
6.2. PRIVATEKEYPROTECTIONANDCRYPTOGRAPHICMODULEENGINEERINGCONTROLS
6.2.1. CryptographicModuleStandardsandControlsTheIssuerCAandallsystemsthatsignOCSPresponsesorCRLsinordertoprovidecertificatestatusservicesshallusecryptographichardwaremodulesvalidatedtoFIPS140‐2Level3andInternationalCommonCriteria(CC)InformationTechnologySecurityEvaluationAssuranceLevel(EAL)14169EAL4+Type3(EAL4AugmentedbyAVA_VLA.4andAVA_MSU.3)intheEuropeanUnion(EU).
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Cryptographicmodulerequirementsforsubscribersandregistrationauthoritiesareshowninthetablebelow.
AssuranceLevel Subscriber RegistrationAuthority
EVCodeSigningFIPS140Level2(Hardware)
FIPS140Level2(Hardware)
AdobeSigningCertificates
FIPS140Level2(Hardware)
FIPS140Level3(Hardware)
Level1‐Rudimentary N/A FIPS140Level1(HardwareorSoftware)
Level2–Basic FIPS140Level1(HardwareorSoftware)
FIPS140Level1(HardwareorSoftware)
Level3‐MediumFIPS140Level1(Software)FIPS140Level2(Hardware)
FIPS140Level2(Hardware)
Level4,MediumHardware,Biometric,
FIPS140Level2(Hardware)
FIPS140Level2(Hardware)
EUQConSSCDEAL4Augmented
(Hardware)EAL4Augmented
(Hardware)
ForEVCodeSigningCertificates,theIssuerCAshallensurethatthePrivateKeyisproperlygenerated,stored,andusedinacryptomodulethatmeetsorexceedstherequirementsofFIPS140level2.
6.2.1.1. Custodial Subscriber Key Stores CustodialSubscriberKeyStoresholdkeysforanumberofSubscribercertificatesinonelocation.EffectiveJanuary1,2017,allcryptographicmodulesforCustodialSubscriberKeyStoresforcertificatesissuedatLevels2,3‐US,3‐CBP,4‐US,and4‐CBPshallbenolessthanFIPS140Level2Hardwareandauthenticationtoactivatetheprivatekeyassociatedwithagivencertificateshallrequireauthenticationcommensuratewiththeassurancelevelofthecertificate.
6.2.2. PrivateKey(noutofm)Multi‐personControlTheIssuerCAshallensurethatmultipletrustedpersonnelarerequiredtoactinordertoaccessanduseanIssuerCA’sPrivateKeys,includinganyPrivateKeybackups.
6.2.3. PrivateKeyEscrowTheIssuerCAshallnotescrowitssignaturekeys.Subscribersmaynotescrowtheirprivatesignaturekeys.TheIssuerCAmayescrowSubscriberPrivateKeysusedforencryptioninordertoprovidekeyrecoveryasdescribedinsection4.12.1.
6.2.4. PrivateKeyBackupTheIssuerCAshallbackupitsCA,CRL,andcertificatestatusPrivateKeysundermulti‐personcontrolandshallstoreatleastonebackupatasecure,offsitelocation.TheIssuerCAshallprotectallcopiesofitsCA,CRL,andcertificatestatusPrivateKeysinthesamemannerastheoriginals.
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TheIssuerCAmayprovidebackupservicesforPrivateKeysthatarenotrequiredtobemaintainedincryptographichardware.AccesstoPrivateKeybackupsshallbesecuredinamannerthatonlytheSubscribercancontrolthePrivateKey.TheIssuerCAmaynotbackupLevel4subscriberprivatesignaturekeys.TheIssuerCAmaynotstorebackupkeysinaplaintextformoutsideofthecryptographicmodule.StoragethatcontainsbackupkeysshallprovidesecuritycontrolsthatareconsistentwiththeprotectionprovidedbytheSubscriber’scryptographicmodule.
6.2.5. PrivateKeyArchivalTheIssuerCAshallnotarchiveitsPrivateKeysandshallnotallowthearchivalofanyPrivateKeysassociatedwithEUQualifiedCertificates.
6.2.6. PrivateKeyTransferintoorfromaCryptographicModuleAllkeysmustbegeneratedbyandinacryptographicmodule.TheIssuerCAandRAshallneverallowtheirPrivateKeystoexistinplaintextoutsideofthecryptographicmodule.TheIssuerCAshallonlyexportitsPrivateKeysfromthecryptographicmoduletoperformCAkeybackupprocedures.Whentransportedbetweencryptographicmodules,theIssuerCAshallencryptthePrivateKeyandprotectthekeysusedforencryptionfromdisclosure.IftheIssuerCAbecomesawarethataSubordinateCA’sPrivateKeyhasbeencommunicatedtoanunauthorizedpersonoranorganizationnotaffiliatedwiththeSubordinatedCA,thentheIssuerCAwillrevokeallcertificatesthatincludethePublicKeycorrespondingtothecommunicatedPrivateKey.
6.2.7. PrivateKeyStorageonCryptographicModuleTheIssuerCAshallstoreitsCAPrivateKeysonacryptographicmodulewhichhasbeenevaluatedtoatleastFIPS140Level3andEAL4+.
6.2.8. MethodofActivatingPrivateKeyTheIssuerCAshallactivateitsPrivateKeysinaccordancewiththespecificationsofthecryptographicmodulemanufacturer.SubscribersaresolelyresponsibleforprotectingtheirPrivateKeys.Ataminimum,SubscribersmustauthenticatethemselvestothecryptographicmodulebeforeactivatingtheirPrivateKeys.Entryofactivationdatashallbeprotectedfromdisclosure.
6.2.9. MethodofDeactivatingPrivateKeyTheIssuerCAshalldeactivateitsPrivateKeysandstoreitscryptographicmodulesinsecurecontainerswhennotinuse.TheIssuerCAshallpreventunauthorizedaccesstoanyactivatedcryptographicmodules.
6.2.10. MethodofDestroyingPrivateKeyTheIssuerCAshalluseindividualsintrustedrolestodestroyCA,RA,andstatusserverPrivateKeyswhentheyarenolongerneeded.SubscribersshalldestroytheirPrivateKeyswhenthecorrespondingCertificateisrevokedorexpiredorifthePrivateKeyisnolongerneeded.Forsoftwarecryptographicmodules,theIssuerCAmaydestroythePrivateKeysbyoverwritingthedata.Forhardwarecryptographicmodules,theIssuerCAmaydestroythePrivateKeysbyexecutinga“zeroize”command.Physicaldestructionofhardwareisnotrequired.
6.2.11. CryptographicModuleRatingSeeSection6.2.1.
6.3. OTHERASPECTSOFKEYPAIRMANAGEMENT
6.3.1. PublicKeyArchivalTheIssuerCAshallarchiveacopyofeachPublicKey.
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6.3.2. CertificateOperationalPeriodsandKeyPairUsagePeriodsAllCertificates,includingrenewedCertificates,havemaximumvalidityperiodsof:
Type PrivateKeyUse CertificateTermRootCA 20years 25yearsSubCA 12years 15yearsFBCA‐Cross‐certifiedSubCAs 6years (periodof
keyuseforsigningcertificates)
10years(keystillsignsCRLs,OCSPresponses,andOCSPresponder
certificates)IGTFCross‐certifiedSubCA* 6years 15yearsCRLandOCSPrespondersigning 3years 31daysOVSSL/TLS Nostipulation asspecifiedinsection
6.3.2oftheBaselineRequirements(i.e.825daysafter1March
2018)EVSSL/TLS Nostipulation 825daysCodeSigningCertificateissuedtoSubscriberundertheMinimumRequirementsforCodeSigningCertificatesortheEVCodeSigningGuidelines
Nostipulation 39months
EVCodeSigningCertificateissuedtoSigningAuthority
Nostipulation 123months
TimeStampingAuthority 15months 135monthsObjectSigningCertificateandDocumentSigning
Nostipulation‡ 123months
FBCAandIGTFClientusedforsignatures(includingEUQualifiedCertificates)
36months 36months
FBCAandIGTFClientusedforkeymanagement
36months 36months
Clientforallotherpurposes(FBCAorIGTFcompliant)
36months 36months
Clientforallotherpurposes(nonFBCAandIGTFcerts)
Nostipulation 60months
IGTFonhardware 60months 13months
*IGTFsigningCertificatesmusthavealifetimethatisatleasttwicethemaximumlifetimeofanendentityCertificate.‡Codeandcontentsignerscross‐certifiedwithFBCAmayusetheirPrivateKeysforthreeyears;thelifetimeoftheassociatedPublicKeysshallnotexceedeightyears.RelyingpartiesmaystillvalidatesignaturesgeneratedwiththesekeysafterexpirationoftheCertificate.Privatekeysassociatedwithself‐signedrootCertificatesthataredistributedastrustanchorsareusedforamaximumof20years.TheIssuerCAmayretireitsCAPrivateKeysbeforetheperiodslistedabovetoaccommodatekeychangeoverprocesses.TheIssuerCAshallnotissueaSubscriberCertificatewithanexpirationdatethatispasttheIssuerCA’spublickeyexpirationdateorthatexceedstheroutinere‐keyidentificationrequirementsspecifiedinSection3.1.1.
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6.4. ACTIVATIONDATA
6.4.1. ActivationDataGenerationandInstallationTheIssuerCAshallgenerateactivationdatathathassufficientstrengthtoprotectitsPrivateKeys.IftheIssuerCAusespasswordsasactivationdataforasigningkey,theIssuerCAshallchangetheactivationdatauponrekeyoftheCACertificate.TheIssuerCAmayonlytransmitactivationdataviaanappropriatelyprotectedchannelandatatimeandplacethatisdistinctfromthedeliveryoftheassociatedcryptographicmodule.
6.4.2. ActivationDataProtectionTheIssuerCAshallprotectdatausedtounlockPrivateKeysfromdisclosureusingacombinationofcryptographicandphysicalaccesscontrolmechanisms.Activationdatashallbe:
memorized biometricinnature,or recordedandsecuredatthelevelofassuranceassociatedwiththeactivationofthe
cryptographicmodule,andshallnotbestoredwiththecryptographicmodule.
TheIssuerCAshallrequirepersonneltomemorizeandnotwritedowntheirpasswordorsharetheirpasswordswithotherindividuals.TheIssuerCAshallimplementprocessestotemporarilylockaccesstosecureCAprocessesifacertainnumberoffailedlog‐inattemptsoccurassetforthintheapplicableCPS.
6.5. COMPUTERSECURITYCONTROLS
6.5.1. SpecificComputerSecurityTechnicalRequirementsTheIssuerCAshallconfigureitssystems,includinganyremoteworkstations,to:
1. authenticatetheidentityofusersbeforepermittingaccesstothesystemorapplications,2. managetheprivilegesofusersandlimituserstotheirassignedroles,3. generateandarchiveauditrecordsforalltransactions,4. enforcedomainintegrityboundariesforsecuritycriticalprocesses,and5. supportrecoveryfromkeyorsystemfailure.
TheIssuerCAshallauthenticateandprotectallcommunicationsbetweenatrustedroleanditsCAsystem.AllCertificateStatusServersinteroperatingwithcross‐certifiedenvironmentsmust:
1. authenticatetheidentityofusersbeforepermittingaccesstothesystemorapplications,2. manageprivilegestolimituserstotheirassignedroles,3. enforcedomainintegrityboundariesforsecuritycriticalprocesses,and4. supportrecoveryfromkeyorsystemfailure.
ACMSmusthavethefollowingcomputersecurityfunctions:
1. authenticatetheidentityofusersbeforepermittingaccesstothesystemorapplications,2. manageprivilegesofuserstolimituserstotheirassignedroles,3. generateandarchiveauditrecordsforalltransactions,(seeSection5.4)4. enforcedomainintegrityboundariesforsecuritycriticalprocesses,and5. supportrecoveryfromkeyorsystemfailure.
IssuerCAsshallenforcemulti‐factorauthenticationonanyaccountcapableofdirectlycausingCertificateissuance.
6.5.2. ComputerSecurityRatingNostipulation.
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6.6. LIFECYCLETECHNICALCONTROLS
6.6.1. SystemDevelopmentControlsInoperatingitsCA,theIssuerCAshalluseonly:
1. Commercialoff‐the‐shelfsoftwarethatwasdesignedanddevelopedunderaformalanddocumenteddevelopmentmethodology,
2. HardwareandsoftwaredevelopedspecificallyfortheIssuerCAbyverifiedpersonnel,usingastructureddevelopmentapproachandacontrolleddevelopmentenvironment,
3. Opensourcesoftwarethatmeetssecurityrequirementsthroughsoftwareverification&validationandstructureddevelopment/life‐cyclemanagement,
4. Hardwareandsoftwarepurchasedandshippedinafashionthatreducesthelikelihoodoftampering,and
5. ForCAoperations,hardwareandsoftwarethatisdedicatedonlytoperformingtheCAfunctions.
TheIssuerCAshalltakepropercaretopreventmalicioussoftwarefrombeingloadedontotheCAequipment.TheIssuerCAshallscanallhardwareandsoftwareformaliciouscodeonfirstuseandperiodicallythereafter.TheIssuerCAshallpurchaseordevelopupdatesinthesamemannerasoriginalequipment,andshallusetrustedtrainedpersonneltoinstallthesoftwareandequipment.TheIssuerCAshallnotinstallanysoftwareonitsCAsystemsthatarenotpartoftheCA’soperations.
TheIssuerCAshalluseaformalconfigurationmanagementmethodologyforinstallationandongoingmaintenanceofanyCMS.AnymodificationsandupgradestoaCMSshallbedocumentedandcontrolled.TheIssuerCAshallimplementamechanismfordetectingunauthorizedmodificationtoaCMS.
6.6.2. SecurityManagementControlsTheIssuerCAshallestablishformalmechanismstodocument,control,monitor,andmaintaintheinstallationandconfigurationofitsCAsystems,includinganymodificationsorupgrades.TheIssuerCA’schangecontrolprocessesshallincludeprocedurestodetectunauthorizedmodificationtotheIssuerCA’ssystemsanddataentriesthatareprocessed,loggedandtrackedforanysecurity‐relatedchangestoCAsystems,firewalls,routers,softwareandotheraccesscontrols.WhenloadingsoftwareontoaCAsystem,theIssuerCAshallverifythatthesoftwareisthecorrectversionandissuppliedbythevendorfreeofanymodifications.TheIssuerCAshallverifytheintegrityofsoftwareusedwithitsCAprocessesatleastonceaweek.
6.6.3. LifeCycleSecurityControlsNostipulation.
6.7. NETWORKSECURITYCONTROLSTheIssuerCAshalldocumentandcontroltheconfigurationsofitssystems,includinganyupgradesormodificationsmade.TheIssuerCAshallimplementaprocessfordetectingunauthorizedmodificationstoitshardwareorsoftwareandforinstallingandmaintainingitssystems.TheIssuerCAanditsRAsshallimplementappropriatenetworksecuritycontrols,includingturningoffanyunusednetworkportsandservicesandonlyusingnetworksoftwarethatisnecessaryfortheproperfunctioningoftheCAsystems.TheIssuerCAshallimplementthesamenetworksecuritycontrolstoprotectaCMSasusedtoprotectitsotherCAequipment.
6.8. TIME‐STAMPINGIssuerCAsshallensurethattheaccuracyofclocksusedfortime‐stampingarewithinthreeminutes.Electronicormanualproceduresmaybeusedtomaintainsystemtime.Clockadjustmentsareauditableevents,seeSection5.4.1.
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7. CERTIFICATE,CRL,ANDOCSPPROFILES
7.1. CERTIFICATEPROFILEIssuerCAsshallgeneratenon‐sequentialCertificateserialnumbersgreaterthanzero(0)containingatleast64bitsofoutputfromaCSPRNG.
7.1.1. VersionNumber(s)IssuerCAsshallissueX.509version3Certificates.
7.1.2. CertificateExtensionsIssuerCAsshallusecertificateextensionsinaccordancewithapplicableindustrystandards,includingRFC3280/5280.IssuerCAsshallnotissueCertificateswithacriticalprivateextension.IGTFCertificatesmustcomplywiththeGridCertificateProfileasdefinedbytheOpenGridForumGFD.125.
7.1.3. AlgorithmObjectIdentifiersIssuerCAsshallsignCertificatesusingoneofthefollowingalgorithms:id‐dsa‐with‐sha1* {iso(1)member‐body(2)us(840)x9‐57(10040)x9cm(4)3}sha‐1WithRSAEncryption* {iso(1)member‐body(2)us(840)rsadsi(113549)pkcs(1)
pkcs‐1(1)5}sha256WithRSAEncryption {iso(1)member‐body(2)us(840)rsadsi(113549)pkcs(1)
pkcs‐1(1)11}id‐RSASSA‐PSS {iso(1)member‐body(2)us(840)rsadsi(113549)pkcs(1)
pkcs‐1(1)10}ecdsa‐with‐SHA1* {iso(1)member‐body(2)us(840)ansi‐X9‐62(10045)
signatures(4)1}ecdsa‐with‐SHA224 {iso(1)member‐body(2)us(840)ansi‐X9‐62(10045)
signatures(4)ecdsa‐with‐SHA2(3)1}ecdsa‐with‐SH256 {iso(1)member‐body(2)us(840)ansi‐X9‐62(10045)
signatures(4)ecdsa‐with‐SHA2(3)2}ecdsa‐with‐SHA384 {iso(1)member‐body(2)us(840)ansi‐X9‐62(10045)
signatures(4)ecdsa‐with‐SHA2(3)3}ecdsa‐with‐SHA512 {iso(1)member‐body(2)us(840)ansi‐X9‐62(10045)
signatures(4)ecdsa‐with‐SHA2(3)4}IfanIssuerCAsignsCertificatesusingRSAwithPSSpadding,theIssuerCAmayuseanRSAsignaturewithPSSpaddingwiththefollowingalgorithmsandOIDs:id‐sha256 {joint‐iso‐itu‐t(2)country(16)us(840)organization(1)
gov(101)csor(3)nistalgorithm(4)hashalgs(2)1}id‐sha512 {joint‐iso‐itu‐t(2)country(16)us(840)organization(1)
gov(101)csor(3)nistalgorithm(4)hashalgs(2)3}IssuerCAsandSubscribersmaygenerateKeyPairsusingthefollowing:id‐dsa {iso(1)member‐body(2)us(840)x9‐57(10040)x9cm(4)1}
RsaEncryption{iso(1)member‐body(2)us(840)rsadsi(113549)pkcs(1)pkcs‐1(1)1}
Dhpublicnumber{iso(1)member‐body(2)us(840)ansi‐x942(10046)number‐type(2)1}
id‐ecPublicKey{iso(1)member‐body(2)us(840)ansi‐X9‐62(10045)id‐publicKeyType(2)1}
id‐keyExchangeAlgorithm[joint‐iso‐ccitt(2)country(16)us(840)organization(1)gov(101)dod(2)infosec(1)algorithms(1)22]
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IfanIssuerCAissuesanon‐CACertificateforafederalagencyandtheCertificatecontainsanellipticcurvePublicKey,theIssuerCAshallspecifyoneofthefollowingnamedcurves:ansip192r1 {iso(1)member‐body(2)us(840)10045curves(3)prime(1)1}ansit163k1 {iso(1)identified‐organization(3)certicom(132)curve(0)1}ansit163r2 {iso(1)identified‐organization(3)certicom(132)curve(0)15}ansip224r1 {iso(1)identified‐organization(3)certicom(132)curve(0)33}ansit233k1 {iso(1)identified‐organization(3)certicom(132)curve(0)26}ansit233r1 {iso(1)identified‐organization(3)certicom(132)curve(0)27}ansip256r1 {iso(1)member‐body(2)us(840)10045curves(3)prime(1)7}ansit283k1 {iso(1)identified‐organization(3)certicom(132)curve(0)16}ansit283r1 {iso(1)identified‐organization(3)certicom(132)curve(0)17}ansip384r1 {iso(1)identified‐organization(3)certicom(132)curve(0)34}ansit409k1 {iso(1)identified‐organization(3)certicom(132)curve(0)36}ansit409r1 {iso(1)identified‐organization(3)certicom(132)curve(0)37}ansip521r1 {iso(1)identified‐organization(3)certicom(132)curve(0)35}ansit571k1 {iso(1)identified‐organization(3)certicom(132)curve(0)38}ansit571r1 {iso(1)identified‐organization(3)certicom(132)curve(0)39}IssuerCAsshallnotissueSSLCertificateswithaReservedIPAddressorInternalName.*IssuerCAsshallnotissueSubCA,OCSP,orSubscriberSSLCertificatesutilizingtheSHA‐1algorithm.
7.1.4. NameFormsIssuerCAsshallusedistinguishednamesthatarecomposedofstandardattributetypes,suchasthoseidentifiedinRFC3280/5280.IssuerCAsshallincludeauniqueserialnumberineachCertificate.ThecontentoftheCertificateIssuerDistinguishedNamefieldmustmatchtheSubjectDNoftheIssuerCAtosupportnamechainingasspecifiedinRFC5280,section4.1.2.4. TheIssuerCAshallrestrictOUfieldsfromcontainingSubscriberinformationthatisnotverifiedinaccordancewithSection3.ThecommonNameattributemustbepresentandthecontentsshouldbeanidentifierforthecertificatesuchthatthecertificate’sNameisuniqueacrossallcertificatesissuedbytheissuingcertificate.
7.1.5. NameConstraintsIssuerCAsmayincludenameconstraintsinthenameConstraintsfieldwhenappropriate.TechnicallyConstrainedSubordinateCACertificatesshallincludeanExtendedKeyUsage(EKU)extensionspecifyingallextendedkeyusagesforwhichtheSubordinateCACertificateisauthorizedtoissuecertificates.TheanyExtendedKeyUsageKeyPurposeIdshallnotappearintheEKUextension.
7.1.5.1. Name‐Constrained serverAuth CAs IftheSubordinateCACertificateincludestheid‐kp‐serverAuthextendedkeyusage,thenatechnicallyconstrainedSubordinateCACertificateshallincludetheNameConstraintsX.509v3extensionwithconstraintsondNSName,iPAddressandDirectoryNameasfollows:
(a)ForeachdNSNameinpermittedSubtrees,theIssuerCAshallconfirmthattheApplicanthasregisteredthedNSNameorhasbeenauthorizedbythedomainregistranttoactontheregistrant'sbehalfinlinewiththeverificationpracticesofBaselineRequirementssection3.2.2.4.(b)ForeachiPAddressrangeinpermittedSubtrees,theIssuerCAshallconfirmthattheApplicanthasbeenassignedtheiPAddressrangeorhasbeenauthorizedbytheassignertoactontheassignee'sbehalf.
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(c)ForeachDirectoryNameinpermittedSubtreestheIssuerCAshallconfirmtheApplicant’sand/orSubsidiary’sOrganizationalname(s)andlocation(s)suchthatendentitycertificatesissuedfromthesubordinateCACertificatewillcomplywithsection7.1.2.4and7.1.2.5oftheBaselineRequirements.
IftheSubordinateCACertificateisnotallowedtoissuecertificateswithaniPAddress,thentheSubordinateCACertificateshallspecifytheentireIPv4andIPv6addressrangesinexcludedSubtrees.TheSubordinateCACertificateshallincludewithinexcludedSubtreesaniPAddressGeneralNameof8zerooctets(coveringtheIPv4addressrangeof0.0.0.0/0).TheSubordinateCACertificateshallalsoincludewithinexcludedSubtreesaniPAddressGeneralNameof32zerooctets(coveringtheIPv6addressrangeof::0/0).Otherwise,theSubordinateCACertificateshallincludeatleastoneiPAddressinpermittedSubtrees.
IftheSubordinateCAisnotallowedtoissuecertificateswithdNSNames,thentheSubordinateCACertificateshallincludeazero‐lengthdNSNameinexcludedSubtrees.Otherwise,theSubordinateCACertificateshallincludeatleastonedNSNameinpermittedSubtrees.
7.1.5.2. Name‐Constrained emailProtection CAs IfthetechnicallyconstrainedSubordinateCAcertificateincludestheid‐kp‐emailProtectionextendedkeyusage,itshallincludetheNameConstraintsX.509v3extensionwithconstraintsonrfc822Name,withatleastonenameinpermittedSubtrees,eachsuchnamehavingitsownershipvalidatedaccordingtosection3.2.2.4oftheBaselineRequirements.
7.1.6. CertificatePolicyObjectIdentifierWhenanIssuerCAissuesaCertificatecontainingoneofthepolicyidentifierssetforthinSection1.2,itassertsthattheCertificateismanagedinaccordancewiththepolicythatisidentifiedherein.
7.1.7. UsageofPolicyConstraintsExtensionNotapplicable.
7.1.8. PolicyQualifiersSyntaxandSemanticsIssuerCAsmayincludebriefstatementsinthePolicyQualifierfieldoftheCertificatePolicyextension.
7.1.9. ProcessingSemanticsfortheCriticalCertificatePoliciesExtensionNostipulation.
7.2. CRLPROFILE
7.2.1. Versionnumber(s)IssuerCAsshallissueversion2CRLsthatconformtoRFC3280/5280.
7.2.2. CRLandCRLEntryExtensionsIssuerCAsshalluseCRLextensionsthatconformwiththeFederalPKIX.509CRLExtensionsProfile.
7.3. OCSPPROFILEIssuerCAsshalloperateanOCSPserviceinaccordancewithRFC2560.
7.3.1. VersionNumber(s)IssuerCAsshallsupportversion1OCSPrequestsandresponses.
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7.3.2. OCSPExtensionsNostipulation.
8. COMPLIANCEAUDITANDOTHERASSESSMENTSThepoliciesinthisCParedesignedtomeetorexceedtherequirementsofgenerallyacceptedanddevelopingindustrystandards,includingtheWebTrustProgramforCertificationAuthorities.ForIssuerCAschainedtotheFBCA,theauditorletterofcomplianceshallmeetFPKIPAAuditRequirements.AllIssuerCAsshallensurethatauditsareconductedforallPKIfunctionsregardlessofhoworbywhomthePKIcomponentsaremanagedandoperated.
8.1. FREQUENCYORCIRCUMSTANCESOFASSESSMENTOnatleastanannualbasis,IssuerCAsshallretainanindependentauditorforaperiodintimeauditwhoshallassesstheIssuerCA’scompliancewiththisCPanditsCPS.ThisauditmustcoverCMSs,SubCAs,RAs,andeachstatusserverthatisspecifiedinacertificateissuedbytheIssuerCA.AnyindependententityinteroperatingwithintheDigiCertPKIshallsubmititspracticesstatementandtheresultsofitscomplianceaudittotheDCMAonanannualbasisforreviewandapproval.
8.2. IDENTITY/QUALIFICATIONSOFASSESSOR
TheIssuerCAshalluseanauditorthatmeetsSection8.2oftheBaselineRequirements(forWebTrust)andSection8.2oftheFederalBridgeCP(forcertificatescross‐certifiedundertheFederalBridgeCA).
8.3. ASSESSOR'SRELATIONSHIPTOASSESSEDENTITYTheIssuerCAshallutilizeindependentauditorsthatdonothaveafinancialinterest,businessrelationship,orcourseofdealingthatcouldforeseeablycreateasignificantbiasfororagainsttheIssuerCA.
8.4. TOPICSCOVEREDBYASSESSMENTTheauditmustconformtoindustrystandards,covertheIssuerCA'scompliancewithitsbusinesspracticesdisclosure,andevaluatetheintegrityoftheIssuerCA’sPKIoperations.TheauditmustverifythateachIssuerCAiscompliantwiththisCPandanyMOAbetweenitandanyotherPKI.
8.5. ACTIONSTAKENASARESULTOFDEFICIENCYIfanauditreportsamaterialnoncompliancewithapplicablelaw,thisCP,theCPS,oranyothercontractualobligationsrelatedtotheIssuerCA’sservices,then(1)theauditorshalldocumentthediscrepancy,(2)theauditorshallpromptlynotifytheIssuerCAandtheDCPA,and(3)theIssuerCAandtheDCPAshalldevelopaplantocurethenoncompliance.TheDCPAshallalsonotifyanyaffectedcross‐certifyingentityandanyrelevantgovernmentaccreditingbody.TheIssuerCAshallsubmittheplantotheDCPAforapprovalandtoanythirdpartythattheIssuerCAislegallyobligatedtosatisfy.TheDCPAmayrequireadditionalactionifnecessarytorectifyanysignificantissuescreatedbythenon‐compliance,includingrequiringrevocationofaffectedCertificates.
8.6. COMMUNICATIONOFRESULTSTheresultsofeachauditshallbereportedtotheDCPAforreviewandapproval.Theresultsshallalsobecommunicatedtoanythirdpartyentitiesentitledbylaw,regulation,oragreementtoreceiveacopyoftheauditresults.Onanannualbasis,theDCPAshallsubmitanauditcompliancepackagetotheFederalPKIPolicyAuthoritypreparedinaccordancewiththe“ComplianceAuditRequirements”document,whichshallincludeanassertionthatallPKIcomponentshavebeenaudited,includinganycomponentsthatmaybeseparatelymanagedandoperated.ThepackageshallidentifytheversionsoftheCPandCPSusedintheassessment.
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8.7. SELF‐AUDITSTheIssuerCAshallperformregularinternalauditsofitsoperations,personnel,andcompliancewiththisCPusingarandomlyselectedsampleofCertificatesissuedsincethelastinternalaudit.TheIssuerCAshallself‐auditatleastthreepercentofSSL/TLSCertificatesandEVCodeSigningCertificates.
9. OTHERBUSINESSANDLEGALMATTERS
9.1. FEES
9.1.1. CertificateIssuanceorRenewalFeesIssuerCAsmaychargefeesforcertificateissuanceandrenewal.
9.1.2. CertificateAccessFeesIssuerCAsmaychargefeesforaccesstotheirdatabasesofCertificates.
9.1.3. RevocationorStatusInformationAccessFeesNostipulation.
9.1.4. FeesforOtherServicesNostipulation.
9.1.5. RefundPolicyNostipulation.
9.2. FINANCIALRESPONSIBILITY
9.2.1. InsuranceCoverageIssuerCAsshallmaintainErrorsandOmissions/ProfessionalLiabilityInsuranceofatleast$1millionperoccurrencefromaninsurancecompanyratednolessthanA‐astoPolicyHolder’sRatinginthecurrenteditionofBest’sInsuranceGuide(orwithanassociationofcompanies,eachofthemembersofwhicharesorated).
9.2.2. OtherAssetsNostipulation.
9.2.3. InsuranceorWarrantyCoverageforEnd‐EntitiesNostipulation.
9.3. CONFIDENTIALITYOFBUSINESSINFORMATION
9.3.1. ScopeofConfidentialInformationIssuerCAsshallspecifywhatconstitutesconfidentialinformationinitsCPS.
9.3.2. InformationNotWithintheScopeofConfidentialInformationIssuerCAsmaytreatanyinformationnotlistedasconfidentialintheCPSaspublicinformation.
9.3.3. ResponsibilitytoProtectConfidentialInformationIssuerCAsshallcontractuallyobligateemployees,agents,andcontractorstoprotectconfidentialinformation.IssuerCAsshallprovidetrainingtoemployeesonhowtohandleconfidentialinformation.
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9.4. PRIVACYOFPERSONALINFORMATION
9.4.1. PrivacyPlanIssuerCAsshallcreateandfollowapubliclypostedprivacypolicythatspecifieshowtheIssuerCAhandlespersonalinformation.
9.4.2. InformationTreatedasPrivateIssuerCAsshalltreatallpersonalinformationaboutanindividualthatisnotpubliclyavailableinthecontentsofaCertificateorCRLasprivateinformation.TheIssuerCAshallprotectprivateinformationinitspossessionusingareasonabledegreeofcareandappropriatesafeguards.TheIssuerCAshallnotdistributeCertificatesthatcontaintheUUIDinthesubjectalternativenameextensionviapubliclyaccessiblerepositories(e.g.,LDAP,HTTP).
9.4.3. InformationNotDeemedPrivatePrivateinformationdoesnotincludeCertificates,CRLs,ortheircontents.
9.4.4. ResponsibilitytoProtectPrivateInformationIssuerCAsareresponsibleforsecurelystoringandprotectingprivateinformation.
9.4.5. NoticeandConsenttoUsePrivateInformationSubscribersmustconsenttotheglobaltransferandpublicationofanypersonaldatacontainedinCertificates.
9.4.6. DisclosurePursuanttoJudicialorAdministrativeProcessIssuerCAsmaydiscloseprivateinformation,withoutnotice,whenrequiredtodosobylaworregulation.
9.4.7. OtherInformationDisclosureCircumstancesNostipulation.
9.5. INTELLECTUALPROPERTYRIGHTSIssuerCAsshallnotknowinglyviolatetheintellectualpropertyrightsofanythirdparty.
9.6. REPRESENTATIONSANDWARRANTIES
9.6.1. CARepresentationsandWarrantiesIssuerCAsmustrepresenttoDigiCert,Subscribers,andRelyingPartiesthattheycomply,inallmaterialaspects,withthisCP,theirCPS,andallapplicablelawsandregulations.
9.6.2. RARepresentationsandWarrantiesAtaminimum,IssuerCAsshallrequireRAsoperatingontheirbehalftorepresentthattheyhavefollowedthisCPandtherelevantCPSwhenparticipatingintheissuanceandmanagementofCertificates.
9.6.3. SubscriberRepresentationsandWarrantiesDigiCertrequires,aspartoftheSubscriberAgreementorTermsofUse,thattheApplicantmakethecommitmentsandwarrantiesinthissectionforthebenefitofDigiCertandtheCertificateBeneficiaries.PriortotheissuanceofaCertificate,DigiCertwillobtain,fortheexpressbenefitofDigiCertandtheCertificateBeneficiaries,either:
1.TheApplicant’sagreementtotheSubscriberAgreementwithDigiCert,or2.TheApplicant’sacknowledgementoftheTermsofUse.
PriortobeingissuedandreceivingaCertificate,eachSubscribershallrepresenttoDigiCertandtheIssuerCAthattheSubscriberwill:
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1. SecurelygenerateitsPrivateKeysandprotectitsPrivateKeysfromcompromise,2. ProvideaccurateandcompleteinformationandcommunicationtotheIssuerCAandRA,3. ConfirmtheaccuracyofCertificatedatapriortousingtheCertificate,4. Promptly(i)requestrevocationofaCertificate,ceaseusingitanditsassociatedPrivate
Key,andnotifytheIssuerCAifthereisanyactualorsuspectedmisuseorcompromiseofthePrivateKeyassociatedwiththePublicKeyincludedintheCertificate,and(ii)requestrevocationoftheCertificate,andceaseusingit,ifanyinformationintheCertificateisorbecomesincorrectorinaccurate,
5. EnsurethatindividualsusingCertificatesonbehalfofanorganizationhavereceivedsecuritytrainingappropriatetotheCertificate,
6. UsetheCertificateonlyforauthorizedandlegalpurposes,consistentwiththerelevantCPSandSubscriberAgreement,includingonlyinstallingSSL/TLSServerCertificatesonserversaccessibleatthedomainlistedintheCertificateandnotusingcodesigningCertificatestosignmaliciouscodeoranycodethatisdownloadedwithoutauser’sconsent,and
7. PromptlyceaseusingtheCertificateandrelatedPrivateKeyaftertheCertificate’sexpiration.
9.6.4. RelyingPartyRepresentationsandWarrantiesRelyingPartiesmustfollowtheproceduresandmaketherepresentationsrequiredbytherelevantCPSandintheapplicableRelyingPartyAgreementpriortorelyingonorusingaCertificate.
9.6.5. RepresentationsandWarrantiesofOtherParticipantsNostipulation.
9.7. DISCLAIMERSOFWARRANTIESExceptasexpresslystatedotherwisehereinoraslimitedbylaw,DigiCertdisclaimsallwarrantiesandobligationsrelatedtothisCP.AfiduciarydutyisnotcreatedsimplybecauseanentityusesservicesofferedwithintheDigiCertPKI.
9.8. LIMITATIONSOFLIABILITYIssuerCAsmaylimittheirliabilitytoanyextentnototherwiseprohibitedbythisCP,providedthattheIssuerCAremainsresponsibleforcomplyingwiththisCPandtheIssuerCA’sCPS.
9.9. INDEMNITIES
9.9.1. IndemnificationbyanIssuerCAIssuerCAsarerequiredtoindemnifyDigiCertforanyviolationofthisCP.
9.9.2. IndemnificationbySubscribersIssuerCAsshallincludeanyindemnificationrequirementsforSubscribersintheirCPSandintheirSubscriberAgreements.
9.9.3. IndemnificationbyRelyingPartiesIssuerCAsshallincludeanyindemnificationrequirementsforRelyingPartiesintheirCPS.
9.10. TERMANDTERMINATION
9.10.1. TermThisCPandanyamendmentsareeffectivewhenpublishedtoDigiCert’sonlinerepositoryandremainineffectuntilreplacedwithanewerversion.
9.10.2. TerminationThisCPandanyamendmentsremainineffectuntilreplacedbyanewerversion.
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9.10.3. EffectofTerminationandSurvivalDigiCertwillcommunicatetheconditionsandeffectofthisCP’sterminationviatheDigiCertRepository.Thecommunicationwillspecifywhichprovisionssurvivetermination.Ataminimum,responsibilitiesrelatedtoprotectingconfidentialinformationwillsurvivetermination.
9.11. INDIVIDUALNOTICESANDCOMMUNICATIONSWITHPARTICIPANTSDigiCertacceptsdigitallysignedorpapernoticesrelatedtothisCPthatareaddressedtothelocationsspecifiedinSection2.2ofthisCP.NoticesaredeemedeffectiveafterthesenderreceivesavalidanddigitallysignedacknowledgmentofreceiptfromDigiCert.Ifanacknowledgementofreceiptisnotreceivedwithinfivedays,thesendermustresendthenoticeinpaperformtothestreetaddressspecifiedinSection2.2usingeitheracourierservicethatconfirmsdeliveryorviacertifiedorregisteredmailwithpostageprepaidandreturnreceiptrequested.
9.12. AMENDMENTS
9.12.1. ProcedureforAmendmentTheDCPAdetermineswhatamendmentsshouldbemadetothisCP.AmendmentsaremadebypostinganupdatedversionoftheCPtotheonlinerepository.ControlsareinplacetoreasonablyensurethatthisCPisnotamendedandpublishedwithoutthepriorauthorizationoftheDCPA.TheDCPAreviewsthisCPannually.
9.12.2. NotificationMechanismandPeriodDigiCertwillpostnoticeonitswebsiteofanyproposedsignificantrevisionstothisCP.AlthoughDigiCertmayincludeafinaldateforreceiptofcommentsandtheproposedeffectivedate,DigiCertisnotrequiredtohaveafixednotice‐and‐commentperiod.
9.12.3. CircumstancesunderwhichOIDMustBeChangedIftheDCPAdeterminesanamendmentnecessitatesachangeinanOID,thentherevisedversionofthisCPwillalsocontainarevisedOID.Otherwise,amendmentsdonotrequireanOIDchange.
9.13. DISPUTERESOLUTIONPROVISIONSBeforeresortingtoanydisputeresolutionmechanism,includingadjudicationoranytypeofalternativedisputeresolution,apartymustnotifyDigiCertofthedisputewithaviewtoseekdisputeresolution.
9.14. GOVERNINGLAWFordisputesinvolvingQualifiedCertificates,thenationallawoftherelevantMemberStateshallgovern.Forallothercertificates,thelawsofthestateofUtahshallgoverntheinterpretation,construction,andenforcementofthisCPandallproceedingsrelatedhereunder,includingtortclaims,withoutregardtoanyconflictsoflawprinciples,andUtahshallbethenon‐exclusivevenueandshallhavejurisdictionoversuchproceedings.
9.15. COMPLIANCEWITHAPPLICABLELAWThisCPissubjecttoallapplicablelawsandregulations,includingUnitedStatesrestrictionsontheexportofsoftwareandcryptographyproducts.Subjecttosection9.4.5’sNoticeandConsenttoUsePrivateInformationcontainedinCertificates,eachIssuerCAshallmeettherequirementsofEuropeandataprotectionlawsandshallestablishandmaintainappropriatetechnicalandorganizationmeasuresagainstunauthorizedorunlawfulprocessingofpersonaldataandagainsttheloss,damage,ordestructionofpersonaldata.
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9.16. MISCELLANEOUSPROVISIONS
9.16.1. EntireAgreementIssuerCAsshallcontractuallyobligateeachRAinvolvedinCertificateissuancetocomplywiththisCPandapplicableindustryguidelines.IssuerCAsshallcontractuallyobligatepartiesusingproductsandservicesissuedunderthisCP,suchasSubscribersandRelyingParties,totherelevantprovisionsherein.ThisCPdoesnotgiveanythirdpartyrightsundersuchagreements.
9.16.2. AssignmentEntitiesoperatingunderthisCPmaynotassigntheirrightsorobligationswithoutthepriorwrittenconsentofDigiCert.
9.16.3. SeverabilityIfaprovisionofthisCPisheldinvalidorunenforceablebyacompetentcourtortribunal,theremainderoftheCPwillremainvalidandenforceable.
9.16.4. Enforcement(attorneys'feesandwaiverofrights)DigiCertmayseekindemnificationandattorneys'feesfromapartyfordamages,losses,andexpensesrelatedtothatparty'sconduct.DigiCert’sfailuretoenforceaprovisionofthisCPdoesnotwaiveDigiCert’srighttoenforcethesameprovisionlaterorrighttoenforceanyotherprovisionofthisCP.Tobeeffective,waiversmustbeinwritingandsignedbyDigiCert.
9.16.5. ForceMajeureDigiCertisnotliableforadelayorfailuretoperformanobligationunderthisCPtotheextentthatthedelayorfailureiscausedbyanoccurrencebeyondDigiCert’sreasonablecontrol.TheoperationoftheInternetisbeyondDigiCert’sreasonablecontrol.
9.17. OTHERPROVISIONSNostipulation.