G.R. No. 177721             July 3, 2007

KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION AND BANTAY KATARUNGAN FOUNDATION, petitioners, vs.EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA; SANDIGANBAYAN JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

AZCUNA, J.:

Filed on May 23, 2007 was this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioners are people’s and/or non-governmental organizations engaged in public and civic causes aimed at protecting the people’s rights to self-governance and justice.

Respondent Executive Secretary is the head of the Office of the President and is in charge of releasing presidential appointments including those of Supreme Court Justices.

Respondent Gregory S. Ong is allegedly the party whose appointment would fill up the vacancy in this Court.

Petitioners allege that:

On May 16, 2007, respondent Executive Secretary, in representation of the Office of the President, announced an appointment in favor of respondent Gregory S. Ong as Associate Justice of the Supreme

Court to fill up the vacancy created by the retirement on April 28, 2007 of Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. The appointment was reported the following day, May 17, 2007, by the major daily publications.

On May 18, 2007, the major daily publications reported that the appointment was "recalled" or "held in abeyance" by Malacañang in view of the question relating to the citizenship of respondent Gregory S. Ong. There is no indication whatever that the appointment has been cancelled by the Office of the President.

On May 19, 2007, the major daily publications reported that respondent Executive Secretary stated that the appointment is "still there except that the validation of the issue is being done by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)."

Petitioners contend that the appointment extended to respondent Ong through respondent Executive Secretary is patently unconstitutional, arbitrary, whimsical and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, that this fact is plain and incontestable, and that his own birth certificate indicates his Chinese citizenship. Petitioners attached a copy of said birth certificate as Annex "H" to the petition. The birth certificate, petitioners add, reveals that at the time of respondent Ong’s birth on May

25, 1953, his father was Chinese and his mother was also Chinese.

Petitioners invoke the Constitution:

Section 7 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines." Sec. 2 of Art. IV defines "natural-born citizens as those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine Citizenship."1

Petitioners maintain that even if it were granted that eleven years after respondent Ong’s birth his father was finally granted Filipino citizenship by naturalization, that, by itself, would not make respondent Ong a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Petitioners further argue that respondent Ong’s birth certificate speaks for itself and it states his nationality as "Chinese" at birth. They invoke the Civil Code:

Article 410 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]he books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto x x x shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained."

Therefore, the entry in Ong’s birth certificate indicating his nationality as Chinese is prima facie evidence of the fact that

Ong’s citizenship at birth is Chinese.

Article 412 of the Civil Code also provides that "[N]o entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order." Thus, as long as Ong’s birth certificate is not changed by a judicial order, the Judicial & Bar Council, as well as the whole world, is bound by what is stated in his birth certificate.2

This birth certificate, petitioners assert, prevails over respondent Ong’s new Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated October 16, 1996, stating that he is a natural-born Filipino and over the opinion of then Secretary of Justice Teofisto Guingona that he is a natural-born Filipino. They maintain that the Department of Justice (DOJ) does not have the power or authority to alter entries in a birth certificate; that respondent Ong’s old Identification Certificate did not declare that he is a natural-born Filipino; and that respondent Ong’s remedy is an action to correct his citizenship as it appears in his birth certificate.

Petitioners thereupon pray that a writ of certiorari be issued annulling the appointment issued

to respondent Ong as Associate Justice of this Court.

Subsequently, on May 24, 2007, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), praying that a TRO be issued, in accordance with the Rules of Court, to prevent and restrain respondent Executive Secretary from releasing the appointment of respondent Ong, and to prevent and restrain respondent Ong from assuming the office and discharging the functions of Associate Justice of this Court.

The Court required respondents to Comment on the petition.

Respondent Executive Secretary accordingly filed his Comment, essentially stating that the appointment of respondent Ong as Associate Justice of this Court on May 16, 2007 was made by the President pursuant to the powers vested in her by Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution, thus:

SEC. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and Judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.

Respondent Executive Secretary added that the President appointed respondent Ong from among the list of nominees who were duly screened by and bore

the imprimatur of the JBC created under Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution. Said respondent further stated: "The appointment, however, was not released, but instead, referred to the JBC for validation of respondent Ong’s citizenship."3 To date, however, the JBC has not received the referral.

Supporting the President’s action and respondent Ong’s qualifications, respondent Executive Secretary submits that:

1. The President did not gravely abuse her discretion as she appointed a person, duly nominated by the JBC, which passed upon the appointee’s qualifications.

2. Justice Gregory S. Ong is a natural-born citizen as determined by the Bureau of Immigration and affirmed by the Department of Justice, which have the authority and jurisdiction to make determination on matters of citizenship.

3. Undisputed evidence disclosed that respondent Ong is a natural-born citizen.

4. Petitioners are not entitled to a temporary restraining order.4

Respondent Ong submitted his Comment with Opposition, maintaining that he is a natural-

born Filipino citizen; that petitioners have no standing to file the present suit; and that the issue raised ought to be addressed to the JBC as the Constitutional body mandated to review the qualifications of those it recommends to judicial posts. Furthermore, the petitioners in his view failed to include the President who is an indispensable party as the one who extended the appointment.

As to his citizenship, respondent Ong traces his ancestral lines to one Maria Santos of Malolos, Bulacan, born on November 25, 1881, who was allegedly a Filipino citizen5 who married Chan Kin, a Chinese citizen; that these two had a son, Juan Santos; that in 1906 Chan Kin died in China, as a result of which Maria Santos reverted to her Filipino citizenship; that at that time Juan Santos was a minor; that Juan Santos thereby also became a Filipino citizen;6 that respondent Ong’s mother, Dy Guiok Santos, is the daughter of the spouses Juan Santos and Sy Siok Hian, a Chinese citizen, who were married in 1927; that, therefore, respondent’s mother was a Filipino citizen at birth; that Dy Guiok Santos later married a Chinese citizen, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, thereby becoming a Chinese citizen; that when respondent Ong was eleven years old his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was naturalized, and as a result he, his brothers and sisters, and his mother were included in the naturalization.

Respondent Ong subsequently obtained from the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ a

certification and an identification that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen under Article IV, Sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution, since his mother was a Filipino citizen when he was born.

Summarizing, his arguments are as follows:

I. PETITIONERS’ LACK OF STANDING AND INABILITY TO IMPLEAD AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY WHOSE OFFICIAL ACTION IS THE VERY ACT SOUGHT TO BE ANNULLED CONSTITUTE INSUPERABLE LEGAL OBSTACLES TO THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER AND SHOULD PREVENT THIS CASE FROM PROCEEDING FURTHER FOR DETERMINATION ON THE MERITS BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.

II. RESPONDENT ONG IS, IN TRUTH AND IN FACT, A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES, CONSIDERING THAT:

A. DY GUIOK SANTOS WAS A FILIPINO CITIZEN AT THE TIME OF HER MARRIAGE TO EUGENIO; and

B. HAVING BEEN BORN BEFORE JANUARY 17, 1973 OF A FILIPINO MOTHER AND WHO ELECTED

FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP UPON REACHING THE AGE OF MAJORITY, RESPONDENT ONG MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS UNDER ARTICLE IV, SECTIONS 1 AND 2 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.

III. THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF RESPONDENT ONG AS PRESENTED BY PETITIONERS CAN, IN NO WAY, WITHOUT MORE, ESTABLISH WITH FINALITY THAT HE IS A CHINESE NATIONAL, OR DISPROVE CONCLUSIVELY THAT HE IS, IN FACT, A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO, DESCENDED FROM "INDIOS."

IV. IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR RESPONDENT ONG TO RESORT TO JUDICIAL ACTION UNDER RULE 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT FOR HIM TO BE ABLE TO CLAIM AND ENJOY HIS RIGHTFUL STATUS AS A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO.

V. THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION HAS PREEMPTIVE LEGAL AUTHORITY OR PRIMARY ADMINISTRATIVE JURIDICTION TO MAKE A DETERMINATION AS REGARDS THE CITIZENSHIP OF RESPONDENT ONG, AND

UPON SUBSEQUENT CONFIRMATION BY THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AS REQUIRED BY THE RULES, ISSUE A DECLARATION (I.E., IDENTIFICATION CERTIFICATE NO. 113878) RECOGNIZING THAT RESPONDENT ONG IS A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO, THEREBY RENDERING NONEXISTENT ANY CONTITUTIONAL IMPEDIMENT FOR HIM TO ASSUME THE POSITION OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT.7

Petitioners, in turn, filed a Consolidated Reply, in which they asserted their standing to file this suit on the strength of previous decisions of this Court, e.g., Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona8 and Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato,9 on the ground that the case is one of transcendental importance. They claim that the President’s appointment of respondent Ong as Supreme Court Justice violates the Constitution and is, therefore, attended with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Finally, they reiterate that respondent Ong’s birth certificate, unless corrected by judicial order in non-summary proceedings for the purpose, is binding on all and is prima facie evidence of what it states, namely, that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen. The alleged naturalization of his father when he was a minor would not make him a natural-born Filipino citizen.

The petition has merit.

First, as to standing. Petitioners have standing to file the suit simply as people’s organizations and taxpayers since the matter involves an issue of utmost and far-reaching Constitutional importance, namely, the qualification – nay, the citizenship – of a person to be appointed a member of this Court. Standing has been accorded and recognized in similar instances.10

Second, as to having to implead the President as an alleged necessary party. This is not necessary since the suit impleads the Executive Secretary who is the alter ego of the President and he has in fact spoken for her in his Comment. Furthermore, the suit does not seek to stop the President from extending the appointment but only the Executive Secretary from releasing it and respondent Ong from accepting the same.

Third, as to the proper forum for litigating the issue of respondent Ong’s qualification for memberhip of this Court. This case is a matter of primordial importance involving compliance with a Constitutional mandate. As the body tasked with the determination of the merits of conflicting claims under the Constitution,11 the Court is the proper forum for resolving the issue, even as the JBC has the initial competence to do so.

Fourth, as to the principal issue of the case – is respondent Ong a natural-born Filipino citizen?

On this point, the Court takes judicial notice of the records of respondent Ong’s petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar.

In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar, docketed as B.E. No. 1398-N filed on September 14, 1979, under O.R. No. 8131205 of that date, respondent Ong alleged that he is qualified to be admitted to the Philippine bar because, among others, he is a Filipino citizen; and that he is a Filipino citizen because his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, a Chinese citizen, was naturalized in 1964 when he, respondent Ong, was a minor of eleven years and thus he, too, thereby became a Filipino citizen. As part of his evidence, in support of his petition, be submitted his birth certificate and the naturalization papers of his father. His birth certificate12 states that he was a Chinese citizen at birth and that his mother, Dy Guiok Santos, was a Chinese citizen and his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was also a Chinese citizen.

Specifically, the following appears in the records:

P E T I T I O N

COMES now the undersigned petitioner and to this Honorable Court respectfully states:

1. That he is single/married/widower/widow, Filipino citizen and 26 years of age, having been born on May 25, 1953, at SAN JUAN RIZAL,

to spouses Eugenio Ong Han Seng and Dy Guiok Santos who are citizens of the Philippines, as evidenced by the attached copy of his birth certificate marked as Annex A (if born outside of wedlock, state so; or if Filipino citizen other than natural born, state how and when citizenship was acquired and attach the necessary proofs: By Nat. Case #584 of Eugenio Ong Han Seng (Father) See Attached documents Annex B, B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4.

x x x

V E R I F I C A T I O N

Republic of the Philippines )

City of Manila ) S.S.

I, GREGORY SANTOS ONG, after being sworn, depose and state: that I am the petitioner in the foregoing petition; that the same was prepared by me and/or at my instance and that the allegations contained therein are true to my knowledge.

(Sgd.) GREGORY SANTOS ONG

Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

28th day of August, 1979, City of Manila, Philippines, affiant exhibiting his/her Residence Certificate No. A-___________, issued at ________________, on __________________, 19__.

Until December 31, 1979

January 19, 1979, Pasig, MM

Doc. No. 98;Page No. 10;Book No. VIII;Series of 1979.13

In fact, Emilio R. Rebueno, Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant, wrote respondent Ong a letter dated October 3, 1979 stating that in connection with his Petition for Admission to the 1979 Bar Examinations, he has to submit:

1) A certified clear copy of his Birth Certificate; and

2) A certification of non-appeal re his citizenship from the Office of the Solicitor General.

Respondent Ong complied with these requirements.

It was on the basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted evidence of naturalization that this Court allowed respondent Ong to take the oath as a lawyer.

It is clear, therefore, that from the records of this Court, respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father.

Furthermore, as petitioners correctly submit, no substantial change or correction in an entry in a civil register can be made without a judicial order, and, under the law, a change in citizenship status is a substantial change. In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic,14 this Court held that:

Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted.15

Republic Act No. 9048 provides in Section 2 (3) that a summary administrative proceeding to correct clerical or typographical errors in a birth certificate cannot apply to a change in nationality. Substantial corrections to the nationality or citizenship of

persons recorded in the civil registry should, therefore, be effected through a petition filed in court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.16

The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities of respondent Ong’s ancestors, by various births, marriages and deaths, all entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial proceedings so as to correct the existing records on his birth and citizenship. The chain of evidence would have to show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ong’s mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still appears in the records of this Court. Respondent Ong has the burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral tree as well as his citizenship under the time-line of three Constitutions.17 Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot accept an appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution. For this reason, he can be prevented by injunction from doing so.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED as one of injunction directed against respondent Gregory S. Ong, who is hereby ENJOINED from accepting an appointment to the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court or assuming the position and discharging the functions of that office, until he shall have successfully completed all necessary steps, through the appropriate adversarial proceedings in court, to show that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen and correct the records of his birth and citizenship.

This Decision is FINAL and IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 177721, July 3, 2007 KILOSBAYAN VS ERMITA

Only natural-born Filipino citizens may be appointed as justice of the Supreme Court

Decision of administrative body (Bureau of Immigration) declaring one a natural-born citizen is not binding upon the courts when there are circumstances that entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial proceedings

FACTS:

This case arose when respondent Gregory S. Ong was appointed by Executive Secretary, in representation of the Office of the President, as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Petitioners contended that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, born on May 25, 1953 to Chinese

parents. They further added that even if it were granted that eleven years after respondent Ong's birth, his father was finally granted Filipino citizenship by naturalization, that, by itself, would not make respondent Ong a natural-born citizen. For his part, respondent Ong contended that he is a natural-born citizen and presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ declaring him to be such.

ISSUE:

yWhether or not respondent Ong is a natural-born Filipino citizen RULING:

xxx respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father.

The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities of respondent Ong's ancestors, by various births, marriages and deaths, all

entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial proceedings so as to correct the existing records on his birth and citizenship. The chain of evidence would have to show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ong's mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still appears in the records of this Court. Respondent Ong has the burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral tree as well as his citizenship under the time-line of three Constitutions. Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot accept an appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution. For this reason, he can be prevented by injunction from doing so.

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

CIRILO R. VALLES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PURISIMA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing Resolutions dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 98-336, dismissing the petition for disqualification filed by the herein petitioner, Cirilo R. Valles, against private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in the May 1998 elections for governor of Davao Oriental.

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines.

On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in Manila. Since then, she has continuously participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. She served as Provincial Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992, she

ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her election was contested by her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo warranto, docketed as EPC No. 92-54, alleging as ground therefor her alleged Australian citizenship. However, finding no sufficient proof that respondent had renounced her Philippine citizenship, the Commission on Elections en banc dismissed the petition, ratiocinating thus:

“A cursory reading of the records of this case vis-a-vis the impugned resolution shows that respondent was able to produce documentary proofs of the Filipino citizenship of her late father... and consequently, prove her own citizenship and filiation by virtue of the Principle of Jus Sanguinis, the perorations of the petitioner to the contrary notwithstanding.

On the other hand, except for the three (3) alleged important documents . . . no other evidence substantial in nature surfaced to confirm the allegations of petitioner that respondent is an Australian citizen and not a Filipino. Express renunciation of citizenship as a mode of losing citizenship under Commonwealth Act No. 63 is an equivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its

significance and consequence. The evidence adduced by petitioner are inadequate, nay meager, to prove that respondent contemplated renunciation of her Filipino citizenship”.1[1]

In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental. Her opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed a petition for disqualification, docketed as SPA No. 95-066 before the COMELEC, First Division, contesting her Filipino citizenship but the said petition was likewise dismissed by the COMELEC, reiterating substantially its decision in EPC 92-54.

The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue when she ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998 elections. Her candidacy was questioned by the herein petitioner, Cirilo Valles, in SPA No. 98-336.

On July 17, 1998, the COMELEC’s First Division came out with a Resolution dismissing the petition, and disposing as follows:

1

“Assuming arguendo that res judicata does not apply and We are to dispose the instant case on the merits trying it de novo, the above table definitely shows that petitioner herein has presented no new evidence to disturb the Resolution of this Commission in SPA No. 95-066. The present petition merely restates the same matters and incidents already passed upon by this Commission not just in 1995 Resolution but likewise in the Resolution of EPC No. 92-54. Not having put forth any new evidence and matter substantial in nature, persuasive in character or sufficiently provocative to compel reversal of such Resolutions, the dismissal of the present petition follows as a matter of course.

xxx....................................xxx....................................xxx

“WHEREFORE, premises considered and there being no new matters and issues tendered, We find no convincing reason or impressive explanation to disturb and reverse the Resolutions promulgated by this Commission in EPC 92-54 and SPA. 95-066. This Commission RESOLVES as it hereby RESOLVES to DISMISS the present petition.

SO ORDERED.”2[2]

Petitioner interposed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution but to no avail. The same was denied by the COMELEC in its en banc Resolution of January 15, 1999.

Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present petition; questioning the citizenship of private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez.

The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino citizen and therefore, qualified to run for a public office because (1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen under the 1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) she was married to a Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her Australian passport was accordingly cancelled as

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certified to by the Australian Embassy in Manila; and (4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her a Filipino citizen duly qualified to run for the elective position of Davao Oriental governor.

Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the private respondent is an Australian citizen, placing reliance on the admitted facts that:

a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of Immigration as an Australian national and was issued Alien Certificate of Registration No. 404695 dated September 19, 1988;

b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), and

c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988.

Petitioner theorizes that under the aforestated facts and circumstances, the private respondent had renounced her Filipino citizenship. He contends that in her application for alien certificate of registration and immigrant certificate of residence, private

respondent expressly declared under oath that she was a citizen or subject of Australia; and said declaration forfeited her Philippine citizenship, and operated to disqualify her to run for elective office.

As regards the COMELEC’s finding that private respondent had renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and had her Australian passport cancelled on February 11, 1992, as certified to by the Australian Embassy here in Manila, petitioner argues that the said acts did not automatically restore the status of private respondent as a Filipino citizen. According to petitioner, for the private respondent to reacquire Philippine citizenship she must comply with the mandatory requirements for repatriation under Republic Act 8171; and the election of private respondent to public office did not mean the restoration of her Filipino citizenship since the private respondent was not legally repatriated. Coupled with her alleged renunciation of Australian citizenship, private respondent has effectively become a stateless person and as such, is disqualified to run for a public office in the

Philippines; petitioner concluded.

Petitioner theorizes further that the Commission on Elections erred in applying the principle of res judicata to the case under consideration; citing the ruling in Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration,3

[3] that:

“xxx Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. xxx”

The petition is unmeritorious.

The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or

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citizenship on the basis of place of birth.

Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.

Among others, these laws defined who were deemed to be citizens of the Philippine islands. The Philippine Bill of 1902 defined Philippine citizens as:

SEC. 4 xxx all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in the Philippine Islands, and their children born subsequent

thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. (underscoring ours)

The Jones Law, on the other hand, provides:

SEC. 2 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and except such others as have since become citizens of some other country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided

for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who cannot come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States if residing therein. (underscoring ours)

Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondent’s father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.

The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, to wit:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 19734[4] and 19875[5] Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent,

4

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Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.

Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the private respondent is a Filipino citizen, she has nonetheless renounced her Philippine citizenship. To buttress this contention, petitioner cited private respondent’s application for an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), on September 19, 1988, and the issuance to her of an Australian passport on March 3, 1988.

Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship:

(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;

(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;

(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the

constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more;

(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country;

(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;

(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted: and

(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her husband’s country, she acquires his nationality.

In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express. Petitioner’s contention that the application of private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was put to rest in the case of Aznar vs. COMELEC6[6] and in the more recent case of Mercado

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vs. Manzano and COMELEC.7

[7]

In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that respondent Osmena was a holder of a certificate stating that he is an American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an application for an alien certificate of registration was not tantamount to renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the fact that respondent Manzano was registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and was holding an American passport on April 22, 1997, only a year before he filed a certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor of Makati, were just assertions of his American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship.

Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to

7

effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express.8[8] As held by this court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an express renunciation or repudiation of one’s citizenship. The application of the herein private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her holding of an Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship - she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well.

Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was born in another country has not been included as a ground for losing one’s Philippine citizenship. Since private respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioner’s claim that respondent must go through the process of repatriation does not hold water.

8

Petitioner also maintains that even on the assumption that the private respondent had dual citizenship, still, she is disqualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental; citing Section 40 of Republic Act 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which states:

“SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

xxx....................................xxx....................................xxx(d) Those with dual citizenship;xxx....................................xxx....................................xxx”

Again, petitioner’s contention is untenable.

In the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified “dual citizenship” as used in the Local Government Code and reconciled the same with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual allegiance.9[9] Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may, without performing any act, and as an involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different countries, be

9

also a citizen of another state, the Court explained that dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to citizens with dual allegiance. The Court succinctly pronounced:

“xxx the phrase ‘dual citizenship’ in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40 (d) and in R.A. No. 7854, xxx 20 must be understood as referring to ‘dual allegiance’. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.”

Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not automatically disqualify her from running for a public office. Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship.10

[10] The filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual citizen.11[11] This is so because in the certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and

10

11

that he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the herein private respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship.

Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private respondent executed a Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship, duly registered in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on February 11, 1992, the Australian passport of private respondent was cancelled, as certified to by Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of Australia in Manila. As aptly appreciated by the COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were enough to settle the issue of the alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since her renunciation was effective, petitioner’s claim that private respondent must go through the whole process of repatriation holds no water.

Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as

an issue in judicial or administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is generally not considered res judicata in any subsequent proceeding challenging the same; citing the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration.12[12] He insists that the same issue of citizenship may be threshed out anew.

Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e. the principle of res judicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on the issue of citizenship. However, in the case of Burca vs. Republic,13[13] an exception to this general rule was recognized. The Court ruled in that case that in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present:

1) a person’s citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party;

2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof, and

12

13

3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.

Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao, the case did not foreclose the weight of prior rulings on citizenship. It elucidated that reliance may somehow be placed on these antecedent official findings, though not really binding, to make the effort easier or simpler.14[14] Indeed, there appears sufficient basis to rely on the prior rulings of the Commission on Elections in SPA. No. 95-066 and EPC 92-54 which resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of the herein private respondent. The evidence adduced by petitioner is substantially the same evidence presented in these two prior cases. Petitioner failed to show any new evidence or supervening event to warrant a reversal of such prior resolutions. However, the procedural issue notwithstanding, considered on the merits, the petition cannot prosper.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the COMELEC Resolutions, dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, in SPA No. 98-336 AFFIRMED.

14

Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is hereby adjudged qualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

DIGEST!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Facts: Petitioner questions the qualification of private respondent RosalindYbasco Lopez to run for governor of Davao Oriental on citizenship grounds. Respondent was born in 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian mother. In 1998, she applied for an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) and was issued an Australian passport.

Issue: WON respondent is a Filipino; and if she is, WON she renounced her citizenship by applying for ACR and ICR and being issued an Australian passport.

Ruling: Respondent is a Filipino. In 1934, the controlling laws of the Philippines were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916 (Jones Law). Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein, including their children, are

considered Philippine citizens. Respondent’s father was therefore a Filipino, and consequently, her.

Respondent did not lose her citizenship. Renunciation of citizenship must be express. Applying for ACR, ICR, and Australian passport are not enough to renounce citizenship. They are merely acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the same.

N RE petition to declare ZITA NGO to possess all qualifications and none of the disqualifications for naturalization under Commonwealth Act 473 for the purpose of cancelling her alien registry with the BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION. ZITA NGO BURCA, petitioner and appellee, vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor and appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor and appellant.Imperio & Tinio and Artemio Derecho for petitioner and appellee.

SANCHEZ, J.:

On petition to declare Zita Ngo — also known as Zita Ngo Burca —

"as possessing all qualifications and none of the qualifications for naturalization under Commonwealth Act 473 for the purpose of cancelling her Alien Registry with the Bureau of Immigration".1 She avers that she is of legal age, married to Florencio Burca, a Filipino citizen, and a resident of Real St., Ormoc City; that before her marriage, she was a Chinese citizen, subject of Nationalist China, with ACR No. A-148054; that she was born on March 30, 1933 in Gigaquit, Surigao, and holder of Native Born Certificate of Residence No. 46333. After making a number of other allegations and setting forth certain denials, she manifests that "she has all the qualifications required under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications required under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473" aforesaid.

Notice of hearing was sent to the Solicitor General and duly published.

The Solicitor General opposed and moved to dismiss the petition on two main grounds, viz: (1) that "there is no proceeding established by law, or the rules for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual"; and (2) that as an application for Philippine citizenship, "the petition is fatally defective for

failure to contain or mention the essential allegations required under Section 7 of the Naturalization Law", such as, among others, petitioner's former places of residence, and the absence of the affidavits of at least two supporting witnesses.

Trial was held on December 18, 1964. Sole witness was petitioner. With the documentary evidence admitted, the case was submitted for decision.

The judgment appealed from, dated December 18, 1964, reads:

WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered dismissing the opposition, and declaring that ZITA NGO BURCA petitioner, has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino Citizen and that she being married to a Filipino Citizen, is hereby declared a citizen of the Philippines, after taking the necessary oath of allegiance, as soon as this decision becomes final and executory.

The controlling facts are not controverted. Petitioner Zita Ngo was born in Gigaquit, Surigao (now Surigao del Norte), on March 30, 1933. Her father was Ngo Tay Suy and her mother was

Dee See alias Lee Co, now both deceased and citizens of Nationalist Republic of China. She holds Native Born Certificate of Residence 46333 and Alien Certificate of Registration A-148054. She married Florencio Burca a native-born Filipino, on May 14, 1961.

1. By constitutional and legal precepts, an alien woman who marries a Filipino citizen, does not — by the mere fact of marriage - automatically become a Filipino citizen.

Thus, by Article IV of the Constitution, citizenship is limited to:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of

majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

And, on the specific legal status of an alien woman married to a citizen of the Philippines, Congress — in paragraph 1, Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law legislated the following:

Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.

Jurisprudence has since stabilized the import of the constitutional and statutory precepts just quoted with a uniform pronouncement that an alien wife of a Filipino citizen may not acquire the status of a citizen of the Philippines unless there is proof that she herself may be lawfully naturalized.2 Which means that, in line with the national policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship, the wife must possess the qualifications under Section 2, and must not be laboring under any of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4, of the Revised Naturalization Law.3

This Court, in Ly Giok Ha, et al. vs. Galang, et al., L-21332, March 18,1966, explains the reasons for the rule in this wise:

Reflection will reveal why this must be so. The qualifications prescribed under section 2 of the Naturalization Act, and the disqualifications enumerated in its section 4, are not mutually exclusive; and if all that were to be required is that the wife of a Filipino be not disqualified under section 4, the result might well be that citizenship would be conferred upon persons in violation of the policy of the statute. For example, section 4 disqualifies only —

(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;

(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude', so that a blackmailer, or a maintainer of gambling or bawdy houses, not previously convicted by a competent court, would not be thereby disqualified; still, it is certain that the law did not intend such a person to be admitted as a citizen

in view of the requirement of section 2 that an applicant for citizenship 'must be of good moral character'.

Similarly the citizen's wife might be a convinced believer in racial supremacy, in government by certain selected classes, in the right to vote exclusively by certain "herrenvolk", and thus disbelieve in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution; yet she would not be disqualified under section 4, as long as she is not "opposed to organized government", nor affiliated to groups "upholding or teaching doctrines opposing all organized governments", nor "defending or teaching the necessity or of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success or predominance of their ideas'. Et sic de caeteris".

Indeed, the political privilege of citizenship should not to any alien woman on the sole basis of her marriage to a Filipino — "irrespective of moral character, ideological beliefs, and identification with Filipino ideals, customs and traditions".4

The rule heretofore adverted to is to be observed whether the husband be a natural born Filipino,5 a naturalized Filipino,6 or a Filipino by election.

2. We next go to the mechanics of implementation of the constitutional and legal provisions, as applied to an alien woman married to a Filipino. We part from the premise that such an alien woman does not, by the fact of marriage, acquire Philippine citizenship. The statute heretofore quoted (Sec. 15, Revised Naturalization Law), we repeat, recites that she "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" if she "might herself be lawfully naturalized".

How then shall she be "deemed" a citizen of the Philippines? An examination of the Revised Naturalization Law is quite revealing. For instance, minor children of persons naturalized under the law who were born in the Philippines "shall be considered citizens thereof". Similarly, a foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the parents, "shall automatically become a Filipino citizen".7 No conditions are exacted; citizenship of said minor children is conferred by the law itself, without further proceedings and as a matter of course. An alien wife of a Filipino

does not fit into either of the categories just mentioned. Legal action has to be taken to make her a citizen.

There is no law or rule which authorizes a declaration of Filipino citizenship.8 Citizenship is not an appropriate subject for declaratory judgment proceedings.9 And in one case, we held that citizenship of an alien woman married to a Filipino must be determined in an "appropriate proceeding". 10

Speculations arise as to the import of the term "appropriate proceeding". The record of this case disclose that, in some quarters, opinion is advanced that the determination of whether an alien woman married to a Filipino shall be deemed a Filipino citizen, may be made by the Commissioner of Immigration. 11 Conceivably, absence of clear legal direction on the matter could have given rise to divergence of views. We should aim at drying up sources of doubt. Parties interested should not be enmeshed in jurisdictional entanglements. Public policy and sound practice, therefore, suggest that a clear-cut ruling be made on this subject.

If an alien woman married to a Filipino does not become ipso facto a citizen, then she must have to file a "petition for citizenship" in order that she may acquire the

status of a Filipino citizen. Authority for this view is Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law in which the plain language is: "Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship, shall file with the competent court" a petition for the purpose. And this, because such alien woman is not a citizen, and she desires to acquire it. The proper forum, Section 8 of the same law points out, is the Court of First Instance of the province where the petitioner has resided "at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition".

It is quite plain that the determination of whether said alien wife should be given the status of a citizen should fall within the area allocated to competent courts. That this is so, is exemplified by the fact that this Court has taken jurisdiction in one such case originating from the court of first instance, where an alien woman had directly sought naturalization in her favor. 12

And, as nothing in the Revised Naturalization Law empowers any other office, agency, board or official, to determine such question, we are persuaded to say that resolution thereof rests exclusively with the competent courts.

We accordingly rule that: (1) An alien woman married to a Filipino

who desires to be a citizen of this country must apply therefor by filing a petition for citizenship reciting that she possesses all the qualifications set forth in Section 2, and none of the disqualifications under Section 4, both of the Revised Naturalization Law; (2) Said petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance where petitioner has resided at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition; and (3) Any action by any other office, agency, board or official, administrative or otherwise — other than the judgment of a competent court of justice — certifying or declaring that an alien wife of the Filipino citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is hereby declared null and void.

3. We treat the present petition as one for naturalization. Or, in the words of law, a "petition for citizenship". This is as it should be. Because a reading of the petition will reveal at once that efforts were made to set forth therein, and to prove afterwards, compliance with Sections 2 and 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law. The trial court itself apparently considered the petition as one for naturalization, and, in fact, declared petition "a citizen of the Philippines".

We go to the merits of the petition.

We note that the petition avers that petitioner was born in Gigaquit, Surigao that her former residence was Surigao, Surigao, and that presently she is residing at Regal St., Ormoc City. In court, however, she testified that she also resided in Junquera St., Cebu, where she took up a course in home economics, for one year. Section 7 of the Naturalization Law requires that a petition for naturalization should state petitioner's "present and former places of residence". Residence encompasses all places where petitioner actually and physically resided. 13 Cebu, where she studied for one year, perforce comes within the term residence. The reason for exacting recital in the petition of present and former places of residence is that "information regarding petitioner and objection to his application are apt to be provided by people in his actual, physical surrounding". 14 And the State is deprived of full opportunity to make inquiries as to petitioner's fitness to become a citizen, if all the places of residence do not appear in the petition. So it is, that failure to allege a former place of residence is fatal. 15

Viewed from another direction, we find one other flaw in petitioner's petition. Said petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons, "stating that they are citizens of

the Philippines and personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by this Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable, and that said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of this Act". Petitioner likewise failed to "set forth the names and post-office addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner may desire to introduce at the hearing of the case". 16

The necessity for the affidavit of two witnesses cannot be overlooked. It is important to know who those witnesses are. The State should not be denied the opportunity to check on their background to ascertain whether they are of good standing in the community, whose word may be taken on its face value, and who could serve as "good warranty of the worthiness of the petitioner". These witnesses should indeed prove in court that they are reliable insurers of the character of petitioner. Short of this, the petition must fail. 17

Here, the case was submitted solely on the testimony of the petitioner. No other witnesses were presented. This does not meet with the legal requirement.

Upon the view we take of his case, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the petition dismissed, without costs. So ordered.

Digest!!!!!!!!!!!

Facts: Zita Ngo was married to Florencio Burca, a Filipino citizen and a resident of Ormoc City. Prior to her marriage, Zita was a Chinese citizen. The record showed, however, that she was born in Gigaquit, Surigao, and was a holder of Native Born Certificate of Residence No. 46333. She filed a petition declaring herself as possessing all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for naturalization under Commonwealth Act No. 473, and sought the cancellation of her alien certification of registration with the Bureau of Immigration. The Solicitor General opposed such petition and moved that the petition be dismissed because: (1) there was no procedure under the law that can judicially declare citizenship to a particular person; and (2) fatal defects in the petition. After trial, Zita was declared a Filipino citizen, primarily because she was married to a Filipino citizen.

Held: The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the lower court and held that Zita was not a citizen of the Philippines. It had the same ratiocination as those of

its previous rulings, i.e. that the Philippine citizenship of the husband does not ipso facto grant Philippine citizenship to the alien wife. “Indeed, the political privilege of citizenship should not be handed out blindly to any alien woman on the sole basis of her marriage to a Filipino—‘irrespective of moral character, ideological beliefs, and identification with Filipino ideals, customs and traditions.’” [Emphasis supplied.] Thus, if an alien wife of a Filipino wishes to acquire Philippine citizenship, the Supreme Court held that she herself must file a petition for citizenship or naturalization.

1 Citizenship derived from that of another, as from a person who holds citizenship by virtue of naturalization.

2 If there is no valid repatriation, then he can be summarily deported for being an undocumented alien.

Bengzon vs HRET

Facts: Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the

Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.” He was naturalized in US in 1990. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.

Issue: Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen.”

Held: Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen

before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.