Digested Cases Montejo Consti 1.doc

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 REVIEWAtty. Vincent Paul Montejo

DIGESTED CASESThyrza Marbas/4Manresa2009-2010

JUDICIAL ELABORATION OF THECONSTITUTION

CONSTRUCTION

TONDO MEDICAL vs. COURT OF APPEALS

527 SCRA 746 (2007)

FACTS: In 1999, the DOH launched the Health Sector ReformAgenda (HSRA)a reform agenda developed by the HSRA TechnicalWorking Group It provided for five general areas of reform the first ofwhich is, to provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals.

Petitioners questioned the first reform agenda involving the fiscalautonomy of government hospitals, particularly the collection ofsocialized user fees and the corporate restructuring of governmenthospitals.

Petitioners allege that the HSRA should be declared void, since it runscounter to the aspiration and ideals of the Filipino people as embodiedin the Constitution. They claim that the HSRAs policies of fiscalautonomy, income generation, and revenue enhancement violateSections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 of Article II, Section 1 of Article III;Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV ofthe 1987 Constitution. Such policies allegedly resulted in makinginaccessible free medicine and free medical services.

ISSUE: Whether or not the HSRA is unconstitutional.

HELD: No, it is not unconstitutional.

As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are consideredself-executing, and do not require future legislation for theirenforcement. For if they are not treated as self-executing, themandate of the fundamental law can be easily nullified by the inactionof Congress. However, some provisions have already beencategorically declared by this Court as non self-executing.In Tanada v. Angara, the Court specifically set apart the sections found

under Article II of the 1987 Constitution as non self-executing and ruledthat such broad principles need legislative enactments before they canbe implemented, By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is adeclaration of principles and state policies. x x x. These principles inArticle II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready forenforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary asaids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and bythe legislature in its enactment of laws.

The HSRA cannot be nullified based solely on petitioners bareallegations that it violates the general principles expressed in the nonself-executing provisions they cite herein. There are two reasons fordenying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of broadconstitutional principles: basic considerations of due process and thelimitations of judicial power.

PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY

PEREZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES544 SCRA 532 (2008)

FACTS: Zenon Perez was convicted by the Sandiganbayan formalversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised PenalCode and was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of fromTEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY ofprision mayoras the minimumto FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS of reclusiontemporal as the maximum and to suffer perpetual specialdisqualification. On appeal, in his last ditch effort to exculpate himself,petitioner argues that the penalty meted for the crime of malversationof public funds that have been replenished, remitted and/or returnedto the government is cruel and therefore unconstitutional, asgovernment has not suffered any damage.

ISSUE: Whether or not the penalty is cruel and thereforeunconstitutional as the government did not suffer damage becausePerez returned the money.

HELD: The penalty is not unconstitutional.First. What is punished by the crime of malversation is the act of apublic officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountablefor public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall takeand misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment ornegligence shall permit any other person to take such public funds orproperty, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of themisappropriation or malversation of such funds or property.

Payment or reimbursement is not a defense for exoneration inmalversation; it may only be considered as a mitigating circumstance.This is because damage is not an element of malversation.

Second. There is strong presumption of constitutionality accorded tostatutes.It is established doctrine that a statute should be construed wheneverpossible in harmony with, rather than in violation of, the Constitution.The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid,sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may benecessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. It is presumedthat the legislature has acted within its constitutional powers. So, it isthe generally accepted rule that every statute, or regularly acceptedact, is, or will be, or should be, presumed to be valid and constitutional.He who attacks the constitutionality of a law has the onus probanditoshow why such law is repugnant to the Constitution. Failing toovercome its presumption of constitutionality, a claim that a law iscruel, unusual, or inhuman, like the stance of petitioner, must fail.

CONDITIONS FOR THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

STA. ROSA REALTY DEVELOPMENT vs. AMANTE

453 SCRA 432 (2005)

FACTS: Sta. Rosa Realty Devt. Corporation (SRRDC) questions theconstitutionality of Section 22 of R.A. No. 6657 CARP, which reads inpart:SECTION 22. Qualified Beneficiaries. The lands covered by theCARP shall be distributed as much as possible to landless residents ofthe same barangay, or in the absence thereof, landless residents ofthe same municipality in the following order of priority.(a) agricultural lessees and share tenants;

(b) regular farmworkers;(c) seasonal farmworkers;(d) other farmworkers;(e) actual tillers or occupants of public lands;(f) collectives or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries;and

(g) others directly working on the land.. . .SRRDC argues that Section 22 sweepingly declares landlessresidents as beneficiaries of the CARP (to mean also squatters), inviolation of Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution, which aims tobenefit only the landless farmers and regular farmworkers.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can entertain such constitutionalchallenge.

HELD: The Court cannot entertain such constitutional challenge.

The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality ofa law are well-delineated, viz.:(1) The existence of an actual and appropriate case;(2) A personal and substantial interest of the party raising theconstitutional question;

(3) The exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliestopportunity; and(4) The constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.

Earliest opportunity means that the question of unconstitutionality ofthe act in question should have been immediately raised in theproceedings in the court below, in this case, the DAR Secretary. Itmust be pointed out that all controversies on the implementation of theCARP fall under the jurisdiction of the DAR, even though they raisequestions that are also legal or constitutional in nature. The earliestopportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadingsbefore a competent court that can resolve the same, such that, if it isnot raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial, and, ifnot considered at the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal. Recordsshow that SRRDC raised such constitutional challenge only before thisCourt despite the fact that it had the opportunity to do so before theDAR Secretary. The DARAB correctly refused to deal on this issue as

it is the DAR Secretary who, under the law, has the authority todetermine the beneficiaries of the CARP. This Court will not entertainquestions on the invalidity of a statute where that issue was notspecifically raised, insisted upon, and adequately argued in the DAR.

Likewise, the constitutional question raised by SRRDC is not the verylis mota in the present case. Basic is the rule that every law has in itsfavor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification,there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, andnot one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative. The controversyat hand is principally anchored on the coverage of the subject propertyunder the CARP, an issue that can be determined without delving intothe constitutionality of Section 22 of R.A. No. 6657.

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ESTARIJA vs. RANADA492 SCRA 652 (2006)

FACTS: The Ombudsman in an administrative case found Estarijaguilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct. Estarija seasonably filed amotion for reconsideration. On appeal, Estarija claimed that dismissalwas unconstitutional since the Ombudsman did not have direct andimmediate power to remove government officials, whether elective or

appointive, who are not removable by impeachment. He maintains thatunder the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsmans administrativeauthority is merely recommendatory, and that Republic Act No. 6770,otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989", is unconstitutionalbecause it gives the Office of the Ombudsman additional powers thatare not provided for in the Constitution.

The Court of Appeals held that the constitutional question on theOmbudsmans power cannot be entertained because it was notpleaded at the earliest opportunity.

ISSUE: Whether or not the question on constitutionality was raised atthe earliest opportune time.

RULING: Yes, it was raised in the earliest opportune time.

When the issue of unconstitutionality of a legislative act is raised, the

Court may exercise its power of judicial review only if the followingrequisites are present: (1) an actual and appropriate case andcontroversy; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raisingthe constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleadedat the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question raised isthe very lis mota of the case.For our purpose, only the third requisite is in question. Unequivocally,the law requires that the question of constitutionality of a statute mustbe raised at the earliest opportunity. In Matibag v. Benipayo, we heldthat the earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise itin the pleadings before a competent court that can resolve the same,such that, if it was not raised in the pleadings before a competentcourt, it cannot be considered at the trial, and, if not considered in thetrial, it cannot be considered on appeal.

In Matibag, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed, ad interim,Alfredo L. Benipayo as Chairman of the Commission on Elections(COMELEC). Ma. J. Angelina G. Matibag was the Director IV of theEducation and Information Department (EID) but Benipayo reassignedher to the Law Department. Matibag sought reconsideration of herrelief as Director of the EID and her reassignment to the LawDepartment. Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration.Consequently, Matibag appealed the denial of her request to theCOMELEC en banc. In addition, Matibag filed a complaint againstBenipayo before the Law Department for violation of the Civil ServiceRules and election laws. During the pendency of her complaint beforethe Law Department, Matibag filed a petition before this Court assailingthe constitutionality of the ad interim appointment of Benipayo and theother COMELEC Commissioners. We held that the constitutional issuewas raised on time because it was the earliest opportunity for pleadingthe constitutional issue before a competent body.

In the case of Umali v. Guingona, Jr., the question of theconstitutionality of the creation of the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) was raised in the motion forreconsideration after the Regional Trial Court of Makati rendered adecision. When appealed, the Court did not entertain the constitutionalissue because it was not raised in the pleadings in the trial court. Inthat case, the Court did not exercise judicial review on theconstitutional question because it was belatedly raised and notproperly pleaded, thus, it cannot be considered by the Court on appeal.

In this case, petitioner raised the issue of constitutionality of Rep. ActNo. 6770 in his motion for the reconsideration of the Ombudsmansdecision. Verily, the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to entertainquestions on the constitutionality of a law. Thus, when petitioner raisedthe issue of constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 6770 before the Court ofAppeals, which is the competent court, the constitutional question wasraised at the earliest opportune time. Furthermore, this Court may

determine, in the exercise of sound discretion, the time when aconstitutional issue may be passed upon.

GOBENCIONG vs. COURT OF APPEALS550 SCRA 502 (2008)

RULING:And it is basic that the matter of constitutionality shall, as arule, be considered if it is the lis mota of the case and raised andargued at the earliest opportunity. Estarija v. Ranada formulates therule in the following wise:

When the issue of unconstitutionality of a legislative act israised, the Court may exercise its power of judicial reviewonly if the following requisites are present: (1) an actual

and appropriate case and controversy; (2) a person andsubstantial interest of the party raising the constitutionalquestion; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded atthe earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutionalquestion raised is the very lis mota of the case.

For our purpose, only the third requisite is in question.Unequivocally, the law requires that the question ofconstitutionality of a statute must be raised at the earliestopportunity. In Matibag v. Benipayo, we held that theearliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is toraise it in the pleadings before a competent court that canresolve the same, such that, if it was not raised in thepleadings before a competent court, it cannot beconsidered at the trial, and, if not considered in the trial, itcannot be considered on appeal.

The issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest possibleopportunity; this means before the Office of the Ombudsman, or atleast before the CA, it was raised here for the first time in this petitionfor review under Rule 45. Withal, it cannot now be considered inGobenciongs petitions for review.

NERI vs. SENATE COMMITTEE564 SCRA 52 (2008)

FACTS: Petitioner appeared before respondent Committees andtestified for about eleven (11) hours on matters concerning theNational Broadband Project (the "NBN Project"), a project awarded bythe Department of Transportation and Communications ("DOTC") toZhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment ("ZTE").when probedfurther on President Arroyo and petitioners discussions relating to theNBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking "executiveprivilege." To be specific, petitioner refused to answer questions on: (a)whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b)whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or notshe directed him to approve it.

Respondent Committees persisted in knowing petitioners answers tothese three questions by requiring him to appear and testify once moreon November 20, 2007.

On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before respondentCommittees upon orders of the President invoking executive privilege.On November 22, 2007, the respondent Committees issued the show-cause letter requiring him to explain why he should not be cited incontempt. On November 29, 2007, in petitioners reply to respondentCommittees, he manifested that it was not his intention to ignore theSenate hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions werethose he claimed to be covered by executive privilege. He alsomanifested his willingness to appear and testify should there be newmatters to be taken up. He just requested that he be furnished "inadvance as to what else" he "needs to clarify."

Respondent Committees found petitioners explanationsunsatisfactory. Without responding to his request for advance notice ofthe matters that he should still clarify, they issued the Order datedJanuary 30, 2008 citing petitioner in contempt of respondent

Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of theSenate Sergeant-at-Arms until such time that he would appear andgive his testimony.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Committees committed graveabuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order.

RULING: Yes, there was grave abuse of discretion.

The Courts exercise of its power of judicial review is warrantedbecause there appears to be a clear abuse of the power of contempton the part of respondent Committees. Section 18 of the Rulesprovides that:

"The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its members,may punish for contempt any witness before it who disobeyany order of the Committee or refuses to be sworn or to

testify or to answer proper questions by the Committee or anyof its members."

In the assailed Decision, we said that there is a cloud of doubt as tothe validity of the contempt order because during the deliberation ofthe three (3) respondent Committees, only seven (7) Senators werepresent. This number could hardly fulfill the majority requirementneeded by respondent Committee on Accountability of Public Officersand Investigations which has a membership of seventeen (17)Senators and respondent Committee on National Defense andSecurity which has a membership of eighteen (18) Senators. Withrespect to respondent Committee on Trade and Commerce which hasa membership of nine (9) Senators, only three (3) members werepresent.

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Obviously the deliberation of the respondent Committees that led tothe issuance of the contempt order is flawed. Instead of beingsubmitted to a full debate by all the members of the respondentCommittees, the contempt order was prepared and thereafterpresented to the other members for signing. As a result, the contemptorder which was issued on January 30, 2008 was not a faithfulrepresentation of the proceedings that took place on said date.Records clearly show that not all of those who signed the contemptorder were present during the January 30, 2008 deliberation when thematter was taken up.

FUNCTIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: CHECKING,LEGITIMATING, SYMBOLIC

CENTRAL BANK EMPL. ASSOC. vs. BSP446 SCRA 229 (2004)

FACTS: Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653provides for the "fiscal and administrative autonomy of BSP indetermining wage structure of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), agovernmental financial institutions (GFI). Congresspassed subsequentlaws amending the charter of seven other (7) GFIs namely GSIS, LBP,DBP, SSS, etc. with the exception of BSP exempting the rank and fileemployees of the 7 GFIs from the coverage of the SalaryStandardization Law. The Central Bank Employees Association

contends that this constitutes invidious discrimination on the rank-and-file employees of the BSP.

ISSUE: Can a provision of law, initially valid, become subsequentlyunconstitutional, on the ground that its continued operation wouldviolate the equal protection of the law?

RULING: Yes, the passage of the subsequent laws amending thecharter of seven (7) other governmental financial institutions (GFIs),the continued operation of the lastproviso of Section 15(c), Article II ofRepublic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, constitutes invidious discrimination ontherank-and-file employees of the BSP.

The exemption from the SSL is a "privilege" fully within the legislativeprerogative to give or deny. However, its subsequent grant to the rank-and-file of the seven other GFIs and continued denial to the BSP rank-and-file employees breached the latter's right to equal protection. Inother words, while the granting of a privilege per se is a matter ofpolicy exclusively within the domain and prerogative of Congress, thevalidity or legality of the exercise of this prerogative is subject tojudicial review. So when the distinction made is superficial, and notbased on substantial distinctions that make real differences betweenthose included and excluded, it becomes a matter of arbitrariness thatthis Court has the duty and the power to correct.

POLITICAL QUESTION vs. JUSTICICABLE QUESTION

BRILLANTES vs. COMELEC432 SCRA 269 (2004)

FACTS: On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No.8436 authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election system

(AES) for the process of voting, counting of votes andcanvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections.It also mandated the COMELEC to acquire automated countingmachines (ACMs), computer equipment, devices and materials; and toadopt new electoral forms and printing materials.

On April 28, 2004, barely two weeks before the 2004 national and localelections, Comelec approved the assailed resolution declaring that it"adopts the policy that the precinct election results of each city andmunicipality shall be immediately transmitted electronically in advanceto the COMELEC, Manila."Resolution 6712 authorized the use ofelection returns for the consolidation of the election results for the May10, 2004 elections.

NAMFREL and political parties have the following concerns aboutResolution 6712 one of which is that:

a) The Resolution disregards RA 8173, 8436, and 7166which authorize only the citizens arm to use an electionreturn for an unofficial count; other unofficial counts maynot be based on an election return; Indeed, it may befairly inferred from the law that except for the copy of thecitizens arm, election returns may only be used forcanvassing or for receiving dispute resolutions.

x x x x

The COMELEC, for its part, assails the jurisdiction of this Court topass upon the assailed resolutions validity claiming that it waspromulgated in the exercise of the respondent COMELECsexecutive or administrative power. It asserts that the presentcontroversy involves a "political question;" hence, beyond the ambitof judicial review.

ISSUE: Whether the issues they raise are political in nature over whichthe Court has no jurisdiction.

RULING: No, the issues raised are not political in nature.

Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution expands the concept ofjudicial review by providing that:

SEC. 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one SupremeCourt and in such lower courts as may be established bylaw.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actualcontroversies involving rights which are legally demandable andenforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been graveabuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on thepart of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

The Court does not agree with the posture of the respondentCOMELEC that the issue involved in the present petition is a politicalquestion beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to review. As the leadingcase of Taada vs. Cuenco put it, political questions are concernedwith "issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particularmeasure."

The issue raised in the present petition does not merely concern thewisdom of the assailed resolution but focuses on its alleged disregardfor applicable statutory and constitutional provisions. In other words,that the petitioner and the petitioners-in-intervention are questioningthe legality of the respondent COMELECs administrative issuance willnot preclude this Court from exercising its power of judicial review todetermine whether or not there was grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of therespondent COMELEC in issuing Resolution No. 6712. Indeed,administrative issuances must not override, supplant or modify the law,but must remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out. Whenthe grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, theissue of whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions have beenmet or the limitations respected, is justiciable the problem being oneof legality or validity, not its wisdom. In the present petition, the Courtmust pass upon the petitioners contention that Resolution No. 6712does not have adequate statutory or constitutional basis.

CITIZENSHIP

LOSS AND REACQUISITION OF CITIZENSHIP

LOPEZ vs. COMELEC559 SCRA 698 (2008)

FACTS: Petitioner Lopez, a dual citizen, was a candidate for theposition of Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo Cityheld on October 29, 2007, who eventually emerged as the winner.

On October 25, 2007, respondent Villanueva filed a petition before theProvincial Election Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo, praying for the

disqualification of Lopez (American citizen), hence, ineligible fromrunning for any public office.

Lopez argued that he is a Filipino-American, by virtue of theCitizenship Retention and Re- acquisition Act of 2003.He said, hepossessed all the qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman.

On February 6, 2008, COMELEC issued the Resolution granting thepetition for disqualification of Lopez from running as BarangayChairman. COMELEC said, to be able to qualify as a candidate in theelections, Lopez should have made a personal and sworn renunciationof any and all foreign citizenship. Lopez now assails that Comelecacted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess ofjursisdiction.

RULING: The COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion indisqualifying petitioner as candidate for Chairman in the Barangayelections of 2007.

Lopez was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought Americancitizenship and renounced his Filipino citizenship. He later on becamea dual citizen by re-acquiring Filipino citizenship.

R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those whore-acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a public office in thePhilippines. Section 5 of the said law states:

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those whoretain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy fullcivil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities andresponsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the followingconditions:

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(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meetthe qualification for holding such public office as required by theConstitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of thecertificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation ofany and all foreign citizenship before any public officerauthorized to administer an oath.

Lopez was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of the DualCitizenship Law when he took his oath of allegiance before the ViceConsul of the Philippine Consulate General's Office in Los Angeles,California, the same is not enough to allow him to run for a publicoffice.

Lopez's failure to renounce his American citizenship as proven by theabsence of an affidavit that will prove the contrary leads thisCommission to believe that he failed to comply with the positivemandate of law.

SOVEREIGNTY

WHEN IS A SUIT AGAINST THE STATE

REPUBLIC vs. SANDIGANBAYAN484 SCRA 119 (2006)

FACTS: Civil Case No. 0034 entitled Republic of the Philippines,plaintiff, v. Roberto S. Benedicto, et al., defendants, is a complaint forreconveyance, reversion, accounting, reconstitution and damages. Thecase is one of several suits involving ill-gotten or unexplained wealththat petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, filed with theSandiganbayan against private respondent Roberto S. Benedicto andothers pursuant to Executive Order (EO) No. 14, series of 1986.

Pursuant to its mandate under EO No. 1, series of 1986, the PCGGissued writs placing under sequestration all business enterprises,entities and other properties, real and personal, owned or registered inthe name of private respondent Benedicto, or of corporations in whichhe appeared to have controlling or majority interest. Among theproperties thus sequestered and taken over by PCGG fiscal agentswere the 227 shares in NOGCCI owned by private respondent

Benedicto and registered in his name or under the names ofcorporations he owned or controlled.

As sequestrator of the 227 shares of stock in question, PCGG did notpay the corresponding monthly membership due thereon totalingP2,959,471.00. On account thereof, the 227 sequestered shares weredeclared delinquent to be disposed of in an auction sale.

On November 3, 1990, petitioner Republic and private respondentBenedicto entered into a Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No.0034. The agreement contained a general release clause whereunderpetitioner Republic agreed and bound itself to lift the sequestration onthe 227 NOGCCI shares, among other Benedictos properties,petitioner Republic acknowledging that it was within private respondentBenedictos capacity to acquire the same shares out of his incomefrom business and the exercise of his profession. Implied in thisundertaking is the recognition by petitioner Republic that the subject

shares of stock could not have been ill-gotten.

In a decision dated October 2, 1992, the Sandiganbayan approved theCompromise Agreement and accordingly rendered judgment inaccordance with its terms.

PCGG failed to comply with the above directive.

In a last-ditch attempt to escape liability, petitioner Republic, throughthe PCGG, invokes state immunity from suit. As argued, the order for itto pay the value of the delinquent shares would fix monetary liability ona government agency, thus necessitating the appropriation of publicfunds to satisfy the judgment claim.

ISSUE: Whether or not PCGG could validly claim state immunity fromsuit.

RULING: No, it cannot invoke immunity. One of the exceptions to thestate immunity principle, i.e., when the government itself is the suitor,as in Civil Case No. 0034. Where, as here, the State itself is no lessthe plaintiff in the main case, immunity from suit cannot be effectivelyinvoked. For, as jurisprudence teaches, when the State, through itsduly authorized officers, takes the initiative in a suit against a privateparty, it thereby descends to the level of a private individual and thusopens itself to whatever counterclaims or defenses the latter may haveagainst it. Petitioner Republics act of filing its complaint in Civil CaseNo. 0034 constitutes a waiver of its immunity from suit. Being itself theplaintiff in that case, petitioner Republic cannot set up its immunityagainst private respondent Benedictos prayers in the same case.

In fact, by entering into a Compromise Agreement with privaterespondent Benedicto, petitioner Republic thereby stripped itself of its

immunity from suit and placed itself in the same level of its adversary.When the State enters into contract, through its officers or agents, infurtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant toconstitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocalbenefits accrue and rights and obligations arise therefrom, the Statemay be sued even without its express consent, precisely because byentering into a contract the sovereign descends to the level of thecitizen. Its consent to be sued is implied from the very act of enteringinto such contract, breach of which on its part gives the correspondingright to the other party to the agreement.

PHILIPPINE AGILA SATELLITE vs. TRINIDAD-LICHAUCO, UnderSecretary for Communications, DOTC

489 SCRA 22 (2006)

FACTS: Petitioner Philippine Agila Satellite Inc. (PASI) is a dulyorganized corporation. PASI was established by a consortium ofprivate telecommunications carriers which had entered into aMemorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the DOTC, through itsthen Secretary Jesus Garcia, concerning the planned launch of aPhilippine-owned satellite into outer space. Under the MOU, the launchof the satellite was to be an endeavor of the private sector, and thesatellite itself to be owned by the Filipino-owned consortium(subsequently organized as PASI).

PASI itself was organized by the consortium. The government,together with PASI, coordinated through the InternationalTelecommunication Union two (2) orbital slots, designated as 161East Longitude and 153 East Longitude, for Philippine satellites. PASIwrote then DOTC Secretary Amado S. Lagdameo, Jr., seeking forofficial Philippine government confirmation on the assignment of thetwo aforementioned Philippine orbital slots to PASI for its satellites,which PASI had designated as the Agila satellites. SecretaryLagdameo, Jr. replied in a letter confirming "the PhilippineGovernment's assignment of Philippine orbital slots 161E and 153E to[PASI] for its [Agila] satellites.

PASI avers that after having secured the confirmation from thePhilippine government, it proceeded with preparations for thelaunching, operation and management of its satellites, including theavailment of loans, the increase in its capital, negotiation with businesspartners, and an initial payment of US$3.5 Million to the Frenchsatellite manufacturer. However, respondent Lichauco, then DOTCUndersecretary for Communications, allegedly "embarked on acrusade to malign the name of and sabotage the business of PASI."Lichauco's purported efforts against PASI culminated allegedly in heroffering orbital slot 153 East Longitude for bidding to other partiesdespite the prior assignment to PASI of the said slot. It was laterclaimed by PASI that Lichauco subsequently awarded the orbital slot toan entity whose indentity was unknown to PASI.

Aggrieved by Lichauco's actions, PASI instituted a civil complaintagainst Lichauco, by then the Acting Secretary of the DOTC, and the"Unknown Awardee" who was to be the recipient of orbital slot 153East Longitude. The complaint, alleging three (3) causes of action, wasfor injunction, declaration of nullity of award, and damages.

Lichauco moved for the dismissal of the case. She rooted her prayer

for the dismissal of the complaint primarily on the grounds that the suitis a suit against the State which may not be sued without its consent.According to her she is being sued for issuing the aforementionedNotice of Offer, which fell within her official functions as DOTCUndersecretary for Communications. She claims that it was SecretaryLagdameo who authorized her to offer orbital slot 153 East Longitudefor bidding, and she thus acted well within the scope of her authority toadvise and assist the DOTC Secretary in the formulation andimplementation of department objectives and policies. The Notice ofOffer cites Department Circular 97-01, signed by then DOTC SecretaryArturo Enrile, as authority for it which establishes the "Guidelines onthe Procurement of Orbital Slots and Frequency Registration ofPhilippine Satellites". Therein, the DOTC is mandated "to conduct abidding process in case there are competing applications for any oneof the assigned or applied-for-orbital slots."

ISSUE: Whether Lichauco may validly invoke state immunity from suit

to secure the outright dismissal of petitioners' complaint.

RULING:As to the first two (2) causes of action, the Court rules thatthe defense of state immunity from suit do not apply since said causesof action cannot be properly considered as suits against the State inconstitutional contemplation. These causes of action do not seek toimpose a charge or financial liability against the State, but merely thenullification of state action. The prayers attached to these two causesof action are for the revocation of the Notice of Bid and the nullificationof the purported award, nothing more. Had it been so that petitioneradditionally sought damages in relation to said causes of action, thesuit would have been considered as one against the State. Had thepetitioner impleaded the DOTC itself, an unincorporated governmentagency, and not Lichauco herself, the suit would have been consideredas one against the State. But neither circumstance obtains in this case.

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A different set of principles applies to the third cause of action,anchored as it is on alleged acts that are tortious in character orotherwise beyond the scope of Lichauco's official duties. The complaintalleges that Lichauco uttered several disparaging and defamatoryremarks against petitioners and made false assertions against them inher letter to the Land Bank President.

The veracity of those allegations is of course presented at the trial tobe determined on the basis of the evidence. However, if proven, theywould establish liability on the part of Lichauco that is not shielded bythe doctrine of state immunity from suit. The doctrine, as summarizedin Shauf v. Court of Appeals:

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against thestate without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filedagainst officials of the state for acts allegedly performed bythem in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the

judgment against such officials will require the state itself toperform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as theappropriation of the amount needed to pay the damagesawarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against thestate itself although it has not been formally impleaded. It mustbe noted, however, that the rule is not so all-encompassing asto be applicable under all circumstances.

It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in hiscapacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights ofplaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of theBureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al. 'Inasmuchas the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized actsof government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and anaction against the officials or officers by one whose rights have beeninvaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not asuit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit.In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit inequity against a State officer or the director of a State department onthe ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates orinvades the personal and property rights or the plaintiff, under anunconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he doesnot have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutionalprovision that the State may not be sued without its consent.' The

rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot beused as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.

The doctrine poses no controversy if after trial on the merits, it isestablished that the public official concerned had committed illegal ortortious acts against the plaintiff. How does it apply in relation to amotion to dismiss on the ground of state immunity from suit,necessarily lodged before trial on the merits?

A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of actionhypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint.

Thus, Lichauco, in alleging in her Motion to Dismiss that she isshielded by the State's immunity from suit, to hypothetically admittedthe truth of the allegations in the complaint. Such hypotheticaladmission has to be deemed a concession on her part that she had

performed the tortious or damaging acts against the petitioners, whichif true, would hold her liable for damages.

Of course, Lichauco could very well raise the defense of stateimmunity from suit in regard to the third cause of action with theassertion that the acts complained of constituting said cause of actionfell within her official functions and were not tortious in character. Still,to establish such assertions of fact, a full-blown trial on the meritswould be necessary, as would the case be if Lichauco raised thedefense that she did not commit these acts complained of. Certainly,these defenses cannot be accorded merit before trial, factual as theyare in character.

The case was remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong totry and decide the case on the merits.

SCOPE OF CONSENT

REPUBLIC vs. HIDALGO477 SCRA 32 (2005)

FACTS: On 02 June 1999, Tarcila Laperal Mendoza filed an action forthe annulment or declaration of nullity of the title and deed of sale,reconveyance and/or recovery of ownership and possession of a fourthousand nine hundred twenty-four-square meter (4,924.60 sq. m. tobe exact) property against the Republic of the Philippines (in whosename the title to the property was transferred and registered) in theRegional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, and was docketed as Civil CaseNo. 94075.

In an Order dated 07 July 2003, Judge Hidalgo declared the Republicin default for failure of Solicitor Gabriel Francisco Ramirez, the

handling solicitor, to file the required Answer within the period prayedfor in his motion for extension. In its judgment it declared, amongothers, the government answerable to the attorneys fees of the plaintiffand other costs of the suit.

Respondent issued an order directing the issuance of a writ ofexecution. Subsequently a writ of execution was issued.

Solicitor now contends in this administrative case that the respondentJudge violated the Constitution and the fundamental rule thatgovernment funds are exempt from execution or garnishment when hecaused the issuance of the writ of execution against the Republic. It islikewise asserted that in ordering the Republic to pay the attorneysfees of plaintiff and the cost of the suit, the respondent violated theclear provision of Section 1, Rule 142 of the Rules of Court heretoforecited.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Hidalgo is guilty of gross ignorance ofthe law.

RULING: In declaring the government answerable to the attorneysfees of the plaintiff and other costs of the suit, the respondent Judgeutterly disregarded the well-established rule that costs of suit are notrecoverable against the government (Section 1, Rule 142, Rules ofCourt).

It is settled that when the State gives its consent to be sued, it does notthereby necessarily consent to an unrestrained execution against it.Tersely put, when the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, isto give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the statehas a liability. In Republic v. Villasor this Court, in nullifying theissuance of an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of theArmed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a final and executoryjudgment, has explained, thus

. . . The universal rule that where theState gives its consent to be sued by privateparties either by general or special law, it may l imitclaimants action only up to the completion ofproceedings anterior to the stage of executionand that the power of the Courts ends when thejudgment is rendered, since government funds

and properties may not be seized under writs ofexecution or garnishment to satisfy suchjudgments, is based on obvious considerations ofpublic policy. Disbursements of public funds mustbe covered by the correspondent appropriation asrequired by law. The functions and public servicesrendered by the State cannot be allowed toparalyzed or disrupted by the diversion of publicfunds from their legitimate and specific objects, asappropriated by law.

For issuing the writ of execution and pronouncing the costs of the suitagainst the government, we deem that the respondent Judge is liablefor gross ignorance of the law or procedure under Rule 140 of theRules of Court.

THE STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF THENATIONAL GOVERNMENT

A. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)B. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FAIR ELECTIONS

UGDORACION vs. COMELEC552 SCRA 231 (2008)

ISSUE: Whether or not green card status in the USA is arenunciation of ones status as resident of the Philippines thusdisqualifying a candidate from running for office.

RULING: A Filipino citizens acquisition of a permanent resident statusabroad constitutes an abandonment of his domicile and residence inthe Philippines. In short, the green card status in the USA is arenunciation of ones status as a resident of the Philippines.

Residence, in contemplation of election laws, is synonymous todomicile. Domicile is the place where one actually or constructivelyhas his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be foundat any given time, eventually intends to return (animus revertendi) andremain (animus manendi). It consists not only in the intention to residein a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled withconduct indicative of such intention.

Domicile is classified into (1) domicile of origin, which is acquired byevery person at birth; (2) domicile of choice, which is acquired upon

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abandonment of the domicile of origin; and (3) domicile by operation oflaw, which the law attributes to a person independently of hisresidence or intention.

In a controversy such as the one at bench, given the parties naturallyconflicting perspectives on domicile, we are guided by three basicrules, namely: (1) a man must have a residence or domicilesomewhere; (2) domicile, once established, remains until a new one isvalidly acquired; and (3) a man can have but one residence or domicileat any given time.The general rule is that the domicile of origin is not easily lost; it is lostonly when there is an actual removal or change of domicile, a bonafide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing anew one, and acts which correspond with such purpose. In the instantcase, however, Ugdoracions acquisition of a lawful permanentresident status in the United States amounted to an abandonment andrenunciation of his status as a resident of the Philippines; it constituteda change from his domicile of origin, which was Albuquerque, Bohol, toa new domicile of choice, which is the USA.The contention that Ugdoracions USA resident status was acquiredinvoluntarily, as it was simply the result of his sisters beneficence,does not persuade. Although immigration to the USA through apetition filed by a family member (sponsor) is allowed by USA

immigration laws, the petitioned party is very much free to accept orreject the grant of resident status. Permanent residency in the USA isnot conferred upon the unwilling; unlike citizenship, it is not bestowedby operation of law. And to reiterate, a person can have only oneresidence or domicile at any given time.Moreover, Ugdoracions contention is decimated by Section 68 of theOmnibus Election Code and Section 40(f) of the Local GovernmentCode, which disqualifies a permanent resident of, or an immigrant to, aforeign country, unless said person waives his status. Corollarythereto, we are in complete accord with the COMELECs ruling on thevalidity and effect of the waiver of permanent resident statussupposedly executed by Ugdoracion, to wit:

Following the Caasi case, in order to reacquireresidency in the Philippines, there must be awaiver of status as a greencard holder as

manifested by some acts or acts independent ofand prior to the filing of the certificate ofcandidacy. In the case at bar, [Ugdoracion]presented a photocopy of a document entitled

Abandonment of Lawful Permanent ResidentStatus dated October 18, 2006. A close scrutiny ofthis document however discloses that it is a mereapplication for abandonment of his status as lawfulpermanent resident of the USA. It does not bearany note of approval by the concerned US official.Thus, [w]e cannot consider the same as sufficientwaiver of [Ugdoracions] status of permanentresidency in the USA. Besides, it is a merephotocopy, unauthenticated and uncertified by thelegal custodian of such document.

Assuming arguendo that said application was dulyapproved, [Ugdoracion] is still disqualified for hefailed to meet the one-year residency requirement.[Ugdoracion] has applied for abandonment ofresidence only on 18 October 2006 or for justabout seven (7) months prior to the May 14, 2007elections, which clearly fall short of the requiredperiod.

The Permanent Resident Cardor the so-called greencard issued bythe US government to respondent does not merely signify transitorystay in the USA for purpose of work, pleasure, business or study but tolive there permanently. This is the reason why the law considersimmigrants to have lost their residency in the Philippines.

Thus the COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion incanceling Ugdoracions COC for material misrepresentation

specifically, that he complied with the residency requirement and thathe does not have green card holder status, are false.

SEMA vs. COMELEC558 SCRA 700 (2008)

FACTS: On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMMRegional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces underSection 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim MindanaoAutonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of ShariffKabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district ofMaguindanao.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ARMM Regional Assembly Can Create theProvince of Shariff Kabunsuan.

RULING: We rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as itgrants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provincesand cities, is void for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI andSection 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of theOrdinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can createprovinces and cities because the creation of provinces and citiesnecessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power onlyCongress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitutionand Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. TheARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without alegislative district because the Constitution mandates that everyprovince shall have a legislative district.

PARTY LIST SYSTEM

BANAT vs. COMELECGR 179271 APRIL 21, 2009

RULING: By a unanimous vote, the Supreme Court En Banc recentlychanged the 2000 Veterans formula to allocate party-list seats by,among others, declaring unconstitutional the two percent threshold inthe distribution of additional party-list seats in the second clause ofsec. 11(b) of RA 7941, the Party-List System Act. The Court held thatthe provision struck down is an unwarranted obstacle to theattainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or

group interests in the House of Representatives.

The 39-page decision penned by Justice Antonio T. Carpio thus setaside the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)s resolution datedAugust 3, 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as its resolution datedJuly 9, 2007 in NBC No. 07-60 which had relied on the Veteransformula. The Court declared its decision as immediately executory.

By an 8-7 vote, however, the Court decided to continue the ruling inVeterans disallowing major political parties from participating directly orindirectly in the party-list elections. Those in the majority are ChiefJustice Reynato S. Puno, Senior Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing andJustices Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez,Renato C. Corona, Minita V. Chico-Nazario, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.,and Teresita J.Leonardo-de Castro, while Justices Carpio, ConchitaCarpio Morales, Dante O. Tinga, Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, ArturoD. Brion, Diosdado M. Peralta, and Lucas P. Bersamin votedotherwise.

The Court said it was compelled to revisit the formula in Veteransbecause of flaws in its mathematical interpretation of the termproportional representation in sec. 11 (b) of RA 7941 for theallocation of additional seats. It noted that Veterans interprets theclause in proportion to their total number of votes to be in proportionto the votes of the first party or the party-list organization receiving thehighest number of votes when it should be for the total number of votescast for party-list candidates.

Thus in determining the allocation of seats for party-list representativesunder Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the Court laid down the followingprocedure:

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the

highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garneredduring the elections.

2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least twopercent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall beentitled to one guaranteed seat each.

3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the rankingin paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to theirtotal number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.

4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not morethan three (3) seats.

The Court held that in computing the additional seats, the guaranteedseats shall no longer be included because they have already beenallocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter.

Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as additional seatsare the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less theguaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of aprovision in RA 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.

In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limitour allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-listcandidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered byeach party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-listcandidates [in the 2007 elections]. There are two steps in the secondround of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by theremaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17

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guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of theproduct of the percentage and of the remaining available seatscorresponds to a partys share in the remaining available seats.Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next inrank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributedall of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation.Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seatseach qualified party-list candidate is entitled, the Supreme Courtclarified.

The Court stressed that though neither the Constitution nor RA 7941mandates that the 20% allocation of party-list representatives beentirely filled up, it cannot allow the continued existence of a provisionin the law [referring to the two percent threshold in the distribution ofadditional party-list seats in sec. 11(b) of RA 7941] which willsystematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-listrepresentation from being filled.

The Court, however, upheld the three-seat cap as it is a valid statutorydevice that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections.

In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Puno stressedthat it is through the party-list system that the Constitution sought toaddress the problem of underrepresentation of our marginalizedsectors. In ratifying the Constitution, our people recognized how the

interests of our poor and powerless sectoral groups can be frustratedby the traditional political parties who have the machinery andchicanery to dominate our political institutions. If we allow majorpolitical parties to participate in the party-list system electoral process,we will surely suffocate the voice of the marginalized, frustrate theirsovereignty and betray the democratic spirit of the Constitution. Thatopinion will serve as the graveyard of the party-list system, hereasoned.In his separate opinion, Justice Nachura opined that until Congressshall have effected an acceptable amendment to the minimum voterequirement in RA 7941, a gradually regressive threshold voterequirement, inversely proportional to the increase in the number ofparty-list seats, should be adopted such that the minimum voterequirement will gradually lessen as the number of party-list seatsincrease.

4. INTERNAL GOVERNMENT OF CONGRESS

e. JOURNAL AND CONGRESSIONAL RECORDS(1) THE ENROLLED BILL THEORY

8. POWERS OF CONGRESSA. GENERAL PLENARY POWERS

1. LIMITATIONS O LEGISLATIVE POWERPROHIBITION AGAINST DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE

POWER

2. PROCEDURAL LIMITATION

ABAKADA vs. PURISIMA562 SCRA 251 (2008)

Note: medyo lengthy siya kasi dami topics covered niya and important kasi siyana case.

FACTS: This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents fromimplementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335 (Attrition Act of2005).

RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capabilityand collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureauof Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOCofficials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing asystem of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewardsand Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance EvaluationBoard (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and theBOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employmentstatus.

The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission

(CSC) were tasked under Section 12 of RA 9335 to promulgate andissue the implementing rules and regulations of RA 9335, to beapproved by a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created forsuch purpose.

Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC officialsmay be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall shortof the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix therevenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targetshas been delegated to the President.

PROHIBITION AGAINST DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVEPOWER

ISSUE # 1: Whether or not there was undue delegation of powers tothe President in fixing revenue collection target.

RULING: There was a valid delegation of legislative power.

Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1)the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law iscomplete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carriedout or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standardwhen it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to mapout the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent thedelegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specifythe limits of the delegates authority, announce the legislative policyand identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.

RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide thePresident in fixing revenue targets and the implementing agencies incarrying out the provisions of the law. Section 2 spells out the policy ofthe law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is the policy of the State tooptimize the revenue-generation capability and collection ofthe Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of

Customs (BOC) by providing for a system of rewards andsanctions through the creation of a Rewards and IncentivesFund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board in theabove agencies for the purpose of encouraging their officialsand employees to exceed their revenue targets.

2. LEGISLATIVE VETO

ISSUE # 2: Whether or not Sec. 12 of RA 9335 is unconstitutional onthe ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers that thecreation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislativeparticipation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.

RULING: Yes, Sec. 12 of RA 9335 is unconstitutional.

The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was createdfor the purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations

(IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. OnMay 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it becamefunctus officio and ceased to exist.

The scholarly discourse of Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno on theconcept of congressional oversight in Macalintal v. Commission onElections is illuminating:

Concept and bases of congressional oversight

Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activitiesundertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of andinfluence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted.Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measuresundertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliancewith program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are

properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste anddishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislativeauthority, and (d) to assess executive conformity with thecongressional perception of public interest.

The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grantof legislative power itself and integral to the checks and balancesinherent in a democratic system of government. x x x x x x x x x

Categories of congressional oversight functions

The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of itsoversight powers may be divided into three categories, namely:scrutiny, investigation and supervision.

a. ScrutinyCongressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and

continuity of attention to administrative operations. Itsprimary purpose is to determine economy and efficiencyof the operation of government activities. In the exerciseof legislative scrutiny, Congress may request informationand report from the other branches of government. It cangive recommendations or pass resolutions forconsideration of the agency involved.xxx xxx xxx

b. Congressional investigationWhile congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passiveprocess of looking at the facts that are readily available,congressional investigation involves a more intensedigging of facts. The power of Congress to conduct

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investigation is recognized by the 1987 Constitution undersection 21, Article VI, xxx xxx xxx

c. Legislative supervision

The third and most encompassing form by which Congressexercises its oversight power is thru legislative supervision."Supervision" connotes a continuing and informed awareness onthe part of a congressional committee regarding executiveoperations in a given administrative area. While bothcongressional scrutiny and investigation involve inquiry intopastexecutive branch actions in order to influence future executivebranch performance, congressional supervision allows Congressto scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-making authority, and

permits Congress to retain part of that delegated authority.

Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies throughits veto power. It typically utilizes veto provisions when granting thePresident or an executive agency the power to promulgate regulationswith the force of law. These provisions require the President or anagency to present the proposed regulations to Congress, which retainsa "right" to approve or disapprove any regulation before it takes effect.Such legislative veto provisions usually provide that a proposedregulation will become a law after the expiration of a certain period oftime, only if Congress does not affirmatively disapprove of the

regulation in the meantime. Less frequently, the statute provides that aproposed regulation will become law if Congress affirmatively approvesit.

In Macalintal, given the concept and configuration of the power ofcongressional oversight and considering the nature and powers of aconstitutional body like the Commission on Elections, the Court struckdown the provision in RA 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of2003) creating a Joint Congressional Committee. The committee wastasked not only to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the saidlaw but also to review, revise, amend and approve the IRRpromulgated by the Commission on Elections. The Court held thatthese functions infringed on the constitutional independence of theCommission on Elections.

With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is notunconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an

encroachment on the executive power to implement laws norundermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it isintegral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system ofgovernment. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as itprevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.

However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment"beyond the legislative sphere," the Constitution imposes two basicand related constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself, any of itscommittees or its members with either executive or judicial power. And,when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single, finelywrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" specified under theConstitution, including the procedure for enactment of laws andpresentment.

Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should

be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressionaloversight must be confined to the following:

(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress power ofappropriation and the budget hearings conducted inconnection with it, its power to ask heads of departments toappear before and be heard by either of its Houses on anymatter pertaining to their departments and its power ofconfirmation and

(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation oflaws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiriesin aid of legislation.

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powersguaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.

Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or anadministrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules andregulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through acommittee formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve ordisapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such, alegislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is inthe form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach acongressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) toan agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broadpowers. It radically changes the design or structure of theConstitutions diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct rolein enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.

Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define nationalpolicy within the broad horizons of its legislative competence. It can

itself formulate the details or it can assign to the executive branch theresponsibility for making necessary managerial decisions in conformitywith those standards. In the latter case, the law must be complete in allits essential terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of thelegislature. Thus, what is left for the executive branch or the concernedadministrative agency when it formulates rules and regulationsimplementing the law is to fi ll up details (supplementary rule-making) orascertain facts necessary to bring the law into actual operation(contingent rule-making).

Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies toimplement and interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforcehave the force of law and are entitled to respect. Such rules andregulations partake of the nature of a statute and are just as binding asif they have been written in the statute itself. As such, they have theforce and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionalityand legality until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate caseby a competent court. Congress, in the guise of assuming the role ofan overseer, may not pass upon their legality by subjecting them to itsstamp of approval without disturbing the calculated balance of powersestablished by the Constitution. In exercising discretion to approve ordisapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not theyconformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicialpower unto itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court by the

Constitution.

3. PROCEDURAL LIMITATION

The requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected toapproval by Congress as a condition for their effectivity violates thecardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule onpresentment.Legislative power (or the power to propose, enact, amend and repeallaws) is vested in Congress which consists of two chambers, theSenate and the House of Representatives. A valid exercise oflegislative power requires the act of both chambers. Corrollarily, it canbe exercised neither solely by one of the two chambers nor by acommittee of either or both chambers. Thus, assuming the validity of alegislative veto, both a single-chamber legislative veto and acongressional committee legislative veto are invalid.

Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President forapproval or veto. In the absence of presentment to the President, nobill passed by Congress can become a law. In this sense, law-makingunder the Constitution is a joint act of the Legislature and of theExecutive. Assuming that legislative veto is a valid legislative act withthe force of law, it cannot take effect without such presentment even ifapproved by both chambers of Congress.

In sum, two steps are required before a bill becomes a law. First, itmust be approved by both Houses of Congress. Second, it must bepresented to and approved by the President. As summarized byJustice Isagani Cruz and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., the following isthe procedure for the approval of bills:

A bill is introduced by any member of the House ofRepresentatives or the Senate except for some measures

that must originate only in the former chamber.

The first reading involves only a reading of the number andtitle of the measure and its referral by the Senate President orthe Speaker to the proper committee for study.

The bill may be "killed" in the committee or it may berecommended for approval, with or without amendments,sometimes after public hearings are first held thereon. If thereare other bills of the same nature or purpose, they may all beconsolidated into one bill under common authorship or as acommittee bill.

Once reported out, the bill shall be calendared for secondreading. It is at this stage that the bill is read in its entirety,scrutinized, debated upon and amended when desired. Thesecond reading is the most important stage in the passage ofa bill.

The bill as approved on second reading is printed in its finalform and copies thereof are distributed at least three daysbefore the third reading. On the third reading, the membersmerely register their votes and explain them if they areallowed by the rules. No further debate is allowed.

Once the bill passes third reading, it is sent to the otherchamber, where it will also undergo the three readings. Ifthere are differences between the versions approved by thetwo chambers, a conference committee representing bothHouses will draft a compromise measure that if ratified by theSenate and the House of Representatives will then besubmitted to the President for his consideration.

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The bill is enrolled when printed as finally approved by theCongress, thereafter authenticated with the signatures of theSenate President, the Speaker, and the Secretaries of theirrespective chambers

The final step is submission to the President for approval.Once approved, it takes effect as law after the requiredpublication.

Where Congress delegates the formulation of rules to implement thelaw it has enacted pursuant to sufficient standards established in thesaid law, the law must be complete in all its essential terms andconditions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. And it may bedeemed to have left the hands of the legislature when it becomeseffective because it is only upon effectivity of the statute that legalrights and obligations become available to those entitled by thelanguage of the statute. Subject to the indispensable requisite ofpublication under the due process clause, the determination as towhen a law takes effect is wholly the prerogative of Congress. As such,it is only upon its effectivity that a law may be executed and theexecutive branch acquires the duties and powers to execute the saidlaw. Before that point, the role of the executive branch, particularly ofthe President, is limited to approving or vetoing the law.

From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law thatempowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in theimplementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle ofseparation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle,a provision that requires Congress or its members to approve theimplementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect shall beunconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its membersto overturn any directive or ruling made by the members of theexecutive branch charged with the implementation of the law.

LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATIONS

STANDARD CHARTERED vs. SENATE COMMITTEE541 SCRA 456 (2007)

FACTS: Standard Chartered Bank Philippines (SCB) is engaged inbanking, trust and other related activities in the Philippines.Respondent Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions andCurrencies, on the other hand, is one of the committees of the Senateof the Philippines.

Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Vice-Chairman of respondentcommittee,accused SCB of violating the Securities RegulationCode (R.A. 8799) for selling unregistered foreign securities. Thishas led the Senate, through respondent Committee, to conductinvestigation in aid of legislation. Petitioner SCB refused to attend theinvestigation proceedings on the ground that criminal and civil casesinvolving the same issues were pending in courts.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate Committee on Banks,Financial Institutions and Currencies can conduct investigationagainst SCB despite criminal and civil cases against the latter

pending in courts.

HELD: Petition DENIED.

Citing Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, the petitionersclaim that since the issue of whether or not SCB-Philippinesillegally sold unregistered foreign securities is already preemptedby the courts that took cognizance of the foregoing cases, the SenateCommittee, by this investigation, would encroach upon the judicialpowers vested solely in these courts.

The argument is misplaced. Bengzon does not apply squarely to thiscase.

It is true that in Bengzon, the Court declared that the issue to beinvestigated was one over which jurisdiction had already beenacquired by the Sandiganbayan, and to allow the [Senate Blue Ribbon]

Committee to investigate the matter would create the possibility ofconflicting judgments; and that the inquiry into the same justiciablecontroversy would be an encroachment on the exclusive domain ofjudicial jurisdiction that had set in much earlier.

To the extent that, in the case at bench, there are a number of casesalready pending in various courts and administrative bodies involvingthe petitioners, relative to the allege sale of unregistered foreignsecurities, there is a resemblance between this case and Bengzon.

However, the similarity ends there. Central to the Courts ruling inBengzonthat the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was without anyconstitutional mooring to conduct the legislative investigationwas the Courts determination that the intended inquiry was not in aidof legislation. The Court found that the speech of Senator Enrile,

which sought such investigation contained no suggestion of anycontemplated legislation; it merely called upon the Senate to look intopossible violations of Section 5, Republic Act No. 3019.

Unfortunately for the petitioners, this distinguishing factual milieu inBengzon does not obtain in the instant case. P.S. ResolutionNo. 166 is explicit on the subject and nature of the inquiry to be (andalready being) conducted by the respondent Committee, as found inthe last three Whereas clauses.

The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in thesaid resolution, exposes the error in petitioners allegation that theinquiry, as initiated in a privilege speech by the very same SenatorEnrile, was simply to denounce the illegal practice committed by aforeign bank in selling unregistered foreign securities x x x. Thisfallacy is made more glaring when we consider that, at the conclusionof his privilege speech, Senator Enrile urged the Senate toimmediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to preventthe occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future.

Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaintbefore a court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically barthe conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would beextremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress throughthe convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative

complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, ofwhich the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component,cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an administrativeinvestigation.

NERI vs. SENATE COMMITTEE564 SCRA 52 (2008)

ISSUE: Whether or not the Committees contemplated inquiry as to thethree questions subject of this petition was in aid of legislation.

RULING: No, the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee isnot really in aid of legislation.

In Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, there the Courtfurther ratiocinated that "the contemplated inquiry by respondentCommittee is not really in aid of legislation because it is not relatedto a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim ofthe investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of thePresident or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of R.A. No.3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a matter thatappears more within the province of the courts rather than of theLegislature."

The general thrust and the tenor of the three (3) questions is to tracethe alleged bribery to the Office of the President. While it may be aworthy endeavor to investigate the potential culpability of highgovernment officials, including the President, in a given governmenttransaction, it is simply not a task for the Senate to perform. The role ofthe Legislature is to make laws, not to determine anyones guilt of acrime or wrongdoing. Our Constitution has not bestowed upon theLegislature the latter role. Just as the Judiciary cannot legislate, neither

can the Legislature adjudicate or prosecute.

Respondent Committees claim that they are conducting an inquiry inaid of legislation and a "search for truth," which in respondentCommittees view appears to be equated with the search for personsresponsible for "anomalies" in government contracts.

No matter how noble the intentions of respondent Committees are,they cannot assume the power reposed upon our prosecutorial bodiesand courts. The determination of who is/are liable for a crime or illegalactivity, the investigation of the role played by each official, thedetermination of who should be haled to court for prosecution and thetask of coming up with conclusions and finding of facts regardinganomalies, especially the determination of criminal guilt, are notfunctions of the Senate. Congress is neither a law enforcement nor atrial agency. Moreover, it bears stressing that no inquiry is an end initself; it must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of

the Congress, i.e. legislation. Investigations conducted solely to gatherincriminatory evidence and "punish" those investigated areindefensible. There is no Congressional power to expose for the sakeof exposure. In this regard, the pronouncement in Barenblatt v. UnitedStates is instructive, thus:

Broad as it is, the power is not, however, withoutlimitations. Since Congress may only investigate into the areasin which it may potentially legislate or appropriate, it cannotinquire into matters which are within the exclusive province ofone of the other branches of the government. Lacking thejudicial power given to the Judiciary, it cannot inquire intomatters that are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary.Neither can it supplant the Executive in what exclusivelybelongs to the Executive.

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ROMERO vs. SEN. JINGGOY ESTRADAApril 2, 2009

The Subject Matter of the Senate Inquiry Is no Longer SubJudice

RULING: Petitioners contend that the subject matter of the legislative

inquiry is sub judice in view of the Chavez petition.

The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining tojudicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing thecourt, or obstructing the administration of justice. A violation of the subjudice rule may render one liable for indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d),Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The rationale for the rule adverted to isset out in Nestle Philippines v. Sanchez:[I]t is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courtsand juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immunefrom every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided uponevidence produced in court; and that the determination of such factsshould be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.

Chavez, assuming for argument that it involves issues subject of therespondent Committees assailed investigation, is no longer sub judiceor "before a court or judge for consideration." For by an en banc

Resolution dated July 1, 2008, the Court, in G.R. No. 164527, deniedwith finality the motion of Chavez, as the petitioner in Chavez, forreconsideration of the Decision of the Court dated August 15, 2007. Infine, it will not avail petitioners any to invoke the sub judice effect ofChavez and resist, on that ground, the assailed congressionalinvitations and subpoenas. The sub judice issue has been renderedmoot and academic by the supervening issuance of the en bancResolution of July 1, 2008 in G.R. No. 164527. An issue or a casebecomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciablecontroversy, so that a determination of the issue would be withoutpractical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual substantialrelief to which the petitioner would be entitled and which would benegated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts decline jurisdiction oversuch cases or dismiss them on the ground of mootness, save in certainexceptional instances, none of which, however, obtains under thepremises.

Thus, there is no more legal obstacleon the ground of sub judice,assuming it is invocableto the continuation of the Committeesinvestigation challenged in this proceeding.

At any rate, even assuming hypothetically that Chavez is still pendingfinal adjudication by the Court, still, such circumstance would not barthe continuance of the committee investigation. What we said in Sabiov. Gordon suggests as much:The same directors and officers contend that the Senate is barred frominquiring into the same issues being litigated before the Court ofAppeals and the Sandiganbayan. Suffice it to state that the SenateRules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation providethat the filing or pendency of any prosecution or administrative actionshould not stop or abate any inquiry to carry out a legislative purpose.A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedingshas different purposes. On one hand, courts conduct hearings or like

adjudicative procedures to settle, through the application of a law,actual controversies arising between adverse litigants and involvingdemandable rights. On the other hand, inquiries in aid of legislationare, inter alia, undertaken as tools to enable the legislative body togather information and, thus, legislate wisely and effectively; and todetermine whether there is a need to improve existing laws or enactnew or remedial legislation, albeit the inquiry need not result in anypotential legislation. On-going judicial proceedings do not precludecongressional hearings in aid of legislation. Standard Chartered Bank(Philippine Branch) v. Senate Committee on Banks, FinancialInstitutions and Currencies (Standard Chartered Bank) provides thefollowing reason:[T]he mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before acourt or quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct oflegislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy tosubvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ployof instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the

exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power oflegislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be madesubordinate to a criminal or administrative investigation.1avvphi1.zw+As succinctly stated in x x x Arnault v. Nazareno[T]he power of inquirywith process to enforce itis an essential andappropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative bodycannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of informationrespecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect orchange; and where the legislative body does not itself possess therequisite informationwhich is not infrequently truerecourse mustbe had to others who possess it.While Sabio and Standard Chartered Bank advert only to pendingcriminal and administrative cases before lower courts as not posing abar to the continuation of a legislative inquiry, there is no rhyme or

reason that these cases doctrinal pronouncement and their rationalecannot be extended to appealed cases and special civil actionsawaiting final disposition before this Court.

The foregoing consideration is not all. The denial of the instantrecourse is still indicated for another compelling reason. As may benoted, PS Resolution Nos. 537 and 543 were passed in 2006 and theletter-invitations and subpoenas directing the petitioners to appear andtestify in connection with the twin resolutions were sent out in themonth of August 2006 or in the past Congress. On the postulate thatthe Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of theSenate before and after it, the aforesaid invitations and subpoenas areconsidered functos oficio and the related legislative inquiry conductedis, for all intents and purposes, terminated. In this regard, the Courtdraws attention to its pronouncements embodied in its Resolution ofSeptember 4, 2008 in G.R. No. 180643 entitled Neri v. SenateCommittee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations:Certainly, x x x the Senate as an institution is "continuing," as it is notdissolved as an entity with each national election or change in thecomposition of its members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-daybusiness, the Senate of each Congress acts separately andindependently of the Senate before it. T

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