Digested Cases Admin

7/31/2019 Digested Cases Admin

1/12

166 SCRA 533 (1988)

GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of Legislative Power EXCEPTION: Subordinate Legislation Tests for Valid Delegation of Legislative Power

FACTS:

Vitaliano Saco, the Chief Officer of a ship, was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan. The widow fileda complaint for damages against the Eastern Shipping Lines with the POEA, based on MemorandumCircular No. 2 issued by the latter which stipulated death benefits and burial expenses for the familyof an overseas worker. Eastern Shipping Lines questioned the validity of the memorandum circular.Nevertheless, the POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.

ISSUE: W/N the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of

powers

HELD:

SC held that there was valid delegation of powers.

In questioning the validity of the memorandum circular, Eastern Shipping Lines contendedthat POEA was given no authority to promulgate the regulation, and even with such authorization,the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is notsubject to delegation.

GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of powers; exception

It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated.What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the lawshall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogativecannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.

Two Tests of Valid Delegation of Legislative Power

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative

power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law mustbe complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reachesthe delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test,there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegatesauthority and prevent the delegation from running riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who isnot allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

Xxx The delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception.


2/12

Rationale for Delegation of Legislative Power

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of thelegislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of societyhas ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannotbe expected to reasonably comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. Toomany of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have thecompetence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. Thesesolutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in theparticular fields.

Power of Subordinate Legislation

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicableto administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiarproblems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrativeagencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called

the power of subordinate legislation.

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in statute byfilling in the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide.Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation.

PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT and SERVICES CORPORATION vs. THE HON. SECRETARY OFLABOR AND EMPLOYMENT

G.R. No. 103144 April 4, 2001FACTSPhilsa is a domestic corporation engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment.Sometime in January 1985, private respondents, who were recruited by petitioner for employment inSaudi Arabia, were required to pay placement fees in the amount ofP5,000.00 for private respondentRodrigo L. Mikin and P6,500.00 each for private respondents Vivencio A. de Mesa and Cedric P.Leyson. After the execution of their respective work contracts, private respondents left for Saudi

Arabia on January 29, 1985. They then began work for Al-Hejailan Consultants A/E, the foreignprincipal of petitioner. While in Saudi Arabia, private respondents were allegedly made to sign asecond contract which changed some of the provisions of their original contract resulting in thereduction of some of their benefits and privileges. They were again allegedly forced by their foreign

employer to sign a third contract which increased their work hours from 48hours to60hours a weekwithout any corresponding increase in their basic monthly salary. When they refused to sign this thirdcontract, the services of private respondents were terminated by Al-Hejailan and they wererepatriated to the Philippines. Upon their arrival in the Philippines, private respondents demandedfrom petitioner Philsa the return of their placement fees and for the payment of their salaries for theunexpired portion of their contract. When petitioner refused, they filed a case before the POEAagainst petitioner Philsa and its foreign principal, Al-Hejailan. On the aspects of the case involvingmoney claims arising from the employer-employee relations and illegal dismissal, the POEA rendereda decision dated August 31, 1988 ordering respondent PHILSA to pay complainants, jointly andseverally with its principal Al-Hejailan. In a decision dated July 26, 1989, the NLRC modified the


3/12

appealed decision of the POEA Adjudication Office by deleting the award of salary deductions anddifferentials. The awards to private respondents were deleted by the NLRC considering that thesewere not raised in the complaint filed by private respondents. Private respondents then elevated theJuly 26, 1989 decision of the NLRC to the Supreme Court in a petition for review for certiorari whereit was docketed as G.R. No. 89089. However, in a Resolution dated October 25, 1989, the petitionwas dismissed outright for "insufficiency in form and substance, having failed to comply with theRules of Court and Circular No. 1-88 requiring submission of a certified true copy of the questionedresolution dated August 23, 1989." Almost simultaneous with the promulgation of the August 31,1988 decision of the POEA on private respondents' money claims, the POEA issued a separate Orderdated August 29, 1988 resolving the recruitment violations aspect of private respondents' complaint.In this Order, the POEA found petitioner guilty of illegal exaction, contract substitution, and unlawfuldeduction. Under the POEA Rules and Regulations, the decision of the POEA thru the LRO suspendingor canceling a license or authority to act as a recruitment agency may be appealed to the Ministry(now Department) of Labor and Employment. Accordingly, after the denial of its motion forreconsideration, petitioner appealed the August 31, 1988Order to the Secretary of Labor andEmployment. However, in an Order dated September 13, 1991, public respondent Secretary of Laborand Employment affirmed in toto the assailed Order. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration butthis was likewise denied in an Order dated November 25, 1991.

ISSUES1. Whether or not the petitioner can beheld liable for illegal exaction as POEA Memorandum CircularNo. 11, Series of 1983, which enumerated the allowable fees which may be collected from applicants,is void for lack of publication.2. Whether or not the public respondent has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with graveabuse of discretion in holding petitioner liable for illegal deductions/withholding of salaries for thesupreme court itself has already absolved petitioner from this charge.HELD1. No.The administrative circular under consideration is one of those issuances which should bepublished for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant toa valid delegation. Considering that POEA Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not as yetbeen published or filed with the National Administrative Register, the same is ineffective and may notbe enforced. The fact that the said circular is addressed only to a specified group, namely privateemployment agencies or authority holders, does not take it away from the ambit of our ruling inTaada vs. Tuvera. In the case of Phil. Association of Service Exporters vs. Torres, the administrativecirculars questioned therein were addressed to an even smaller group, namely Philippine and HongKong agencies engaged in the recruitment of workers for Hong Kong, and still the Court ruled thereinthat, for lack of proper publication, the said circulars may not be enforced or implemented. Ourpronouncement in Taada vs. T uvera is clear and categorical. Administrative rules and regulationsmust be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a validdelegation. The only exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature, or

those so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules andguidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. AdministrativeCircular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not been shown to fall under any of these exceptions.2. Petitioner is correct in stating that the July 26, 1989 Decision of the NLRC has attained finality byreason of the dismissal of the petition for certiorari assailing the same. However, the said NLRCDecision dealt only with the money claims of private respondents arising from employer-employeerelations and illegal dismissal and as such, it is only for the payment of the said money claims thatpetitioner is absolved. The administrative sanctions, which are distinct and separate from the moneyclaims of private respondents, may still be properly imposed by the POEA. In fact, in the August 31,1988 Decision of the POEA dealing with the money claims of private respondents, the POEA


4/12

Adjudication Office precisely declared that "respondent's liability for said money claims is withoutprejudice to and independent of its liabilities for the recruitment violations aspect of the case which isthe subject of a separate Order." The fact that petitioner has been absolved by final judgment for thepayment of the money claim to private respondent de Mesa does not mean that it is likewiseabsolved from the administrative sanctions which may be imposed as a result of the unlawfuldeduction or withholding of private respondents' salary. The POEA thus committed no grave abuse ofdiscretion in finding petitioner administratively liable of one count of unlawful deduction/withholdingof salary.

Philsa International Placement and Service Corp. v. Sec. of Labor and EmploymentG.R. No. 103144 April 4, 2001Gonzaga-Reyes, J.FACTS:Private respondents, who were recruited by Philsa for employment in Saudi Arabia, were required to

pay placement fees. After the execution of their respective work contracts, private respondents leftfor Saudi Arabia. While in Saudi Arabia, private respondents were allegedly made to sign a secondcontract which changed some of the provisions of their original contract resulting in the reduction ofsome of their benefits and privileges. Their foreign employer forced them to sign a third contractwhich increased their work hours from 48 hours to 60 hours a week without any correspondingincrease in their basic monthly salary. When they refused to sign this third contract, the services ofprivate respondents were terminated and they were repatriated to the Philippines. Upon their arrivalin the Philippines, private respondents demanded from Philsa the return of their placement fees andfor the payment of their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contract. When Philsa refused,they filed a case before the POEA against Philsa on the grounds of illegal dismissal, payment of salarydifferentials, illegal deduction/withholding of salaries, illegal exactions/refund of placement fees, andcontract substitution. Philsa insists, however, that it cannot be held liable for the POEA MemorandumCircular No. 11 and 2, Series of 1983, which enumerated the allowable fees which may be collectedfrom applicants, is void for lack of publication.HELD:See the landmark ruling inTaada case. The assailed issuances upon which private respondents based their cause of actionwere not published or filed with the National Administrative Register as required by the

Administrative Code of 1987. Hence, Philsa is not liable.

Calalang vs Williams, Constitutional Law DigestSeptember 9, 2008G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940MAXIMO CALALANG, petitioner, vs. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., respondents. Maximo Calalang in hisown behalf.The case of Calalang vs Williams is known for the elegant exposition of the definition of social

justice. In this case, Justice Laurel defined social justice as neither communism, nor despotism, noratomism, nor anarchy but humanization of laws and equalization of social and economic forces bythe State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least beapproximated.
http://elaw.i.ph/blogs/elaw/2008/09/09/calalang-vs-williams-constitutional-law-digest/http://elaw.i.ph/blogs/elaw/2008/09/09/calalang-vs-williams-constitutional-law-digest/http://elaw.i.ph/blogs/elaw/2008/09/09/calalang-vs-williams-constitutional-law-digest/


5/12

As I browse through the entire case, I found out that there is more to this case than the definition ofsocial justice. In fact, another important issue raised here is whether there was a valid delegation ofpower by the National Assembly to the Director of Public Works. Let us begin with the facts of thecase.Facts:In pursuance of Commonwealth Act 548 which mandates the the Director of Public Works, with theapproval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rulesand regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on such roads and streets to promotesafe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads, theDirector of Public Works adopted the resolution of the National Traffic Commission, prohibiting thepassing of animal drawn vehicles in certain streets in Manila.Petitioner questioned this as it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.Issues:Whether or not there is a undue delegation of legislative power?Ruling:There is no undue delegation of legislative power. Commonwealth Act 548 does not conferlegislative powers to the Director of Public Works. The authority conferred upon them and underwhich they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public

policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly insaid Act, to wit, to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streetsdesignated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the Presidentof the Philippines and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic whenever thecondition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the publicconvenience and interest.The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, butmerely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is tobe predicated.To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and howlong a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the trafficthereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function whichcannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly.It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty ofdetermining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that theexercise of such discretion is the making of the law.

Group 6 DigestCalalang vs. WilliamsG.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940Petitioner: Maximo CalalangRespondents: A.D. Williams, Et al.Ponente: Laurel,J:

Facts:Maximo Calalang in his capacity as a private citizen and a taxpayer of Manila filed apetition for a writof prohibition against the respondents.It is alleged in the petition that the National TrafficCommission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the PublicWorks and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles beprohibited from passingalong Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca toDasmarias Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and along Rizal Avenueextending from therailroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm for aperiod of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Chairman ofthe National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works with


6/12

the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolutionaforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of the Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizessaid Director with the approval from the Secretary of the Public Works and Communication topromulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads. On

August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of there commendationsmade by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of PublicWorks approved the recommendations on August 10,1940.The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chiefof Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As aconsequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the placesabove mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.Issue:1.Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions ofCommonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade andabridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?2. Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regardingthe promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people?

Held:1. No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions onnational roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National

Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by thedesire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety.Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order topromote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with businessand occupations. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in orderto secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of thegovernment, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not bemade to prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority bemade to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery.The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means ofinsuring its preserving.

2.No. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by theGovernment of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements ofsociety, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations ofthe members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable,or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governmentson the time-honored principles of salus populi est suprema lex.

Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence amongdivers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extendedto all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamentaland paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and ofbringing aboutthe greatest good to the greatest number.THE PETITION IS DENIED WITH COSTS AGAINST THE PETITIONER


7/12

MILLER VS. MARDO BARRERA; July 31, 1961

FACTS- These are different cases taken together astheypresent only one identical question- 1st case: Manuel Gonzales filed complaintagainst Bill Miller at the DoL, claiming that heis a driver of Miller and was arbitrarilydismissed without separation pay.- Miller filed petition for prohibition againstHearing Officer Mardo of the DoL on groundthat HO has no jurisdiction to hear and decideon the case.- Court rendered decision though that Reorg.Plan 2-A did not repeal Judiciary Act thatconferred to CFI original jurisdiction to takecognizance of money claims re violations of

labor standards.

- 2nd case: Cresencio Estano filed complaint atthe DoL against Chin Hua Trading Co., for notbeing paid overtime and vacation leave pay asa driver in the company.- Same circumstances as 1st case, and courtissued permanent injunction against hearingthe cases by the Hearing Officer, as Reorg.Plan 2-A is null and void.

- 3RD case: Numeriana Raganas filed with CFIa complaint against Sen Bee Trading Companyfor being underpaid, not being paid overtime,without sick leave and vacation leave pay, as aseamstress.- Sun Bee filed motion to dismiss, and insistedthat CFI does not have jurisdiction as moneyclaims must be filed with Regional Office ofDoL under Reorg. Plan 2-A

- 4th case: Vicente Romero filed case againstSia Seng at the DoL Sia Leng did not file ananswer and a decision was rendered in favor ofRomero. But Labor Administrator Hernandorefused to issue the writ of execution of thedecision as he believed that Sia Seng deservedto be heard they insist as well that Reorg. Planis not validly passed as a statute andunconstitutional.

- 5th case: Mariano Pabillare filed at the DoL acomplaint against Fred Wilson and Co., as hewas summarily dismissed wihout cause,without separation pay, and without sufficientnotice.- They moved to dismiss as it is only anadministrative body, with no power toadjudicate money claims.- Certiorari, prohibition and injuction was filedas well that Reorg Plan is null and voidinsofar as it vest original exclusive jurisdictionover money claims.

ISSUES1. WON Reorganization Plan 20-A, preparedand submitted under the authority of RA 997as amended by RA 1241, is valid, insofar as itconfers jurisdiction to the

Regional Offices of the Department of Labor todecide on claims of laborers for wages,overtime and separation pay, etc.2. WON Reorganization Plan 20-A was validlypassed by Congress.HELD1. No it is not valid.- While the Reorganization Commission couldcreate functions, it referred merely toadministrative and not judicial functions suchas deciding on money claims.Judicial power rests exclusively on the judiciary- While legislature may confer administrativeboards quasi-judicial powers, it must beincident to the exercise of administrativefunctions.- Conferment of quasi-judicial functions cannotbe implied from a mere grant of power tocreate functionsin connection withreorganization of the Executive.

2. No it was not validly passed by Congress- A law is not passed by mere silence or non-action of Congress even if it be stated in Sec6(a) of RA 997.- It is contrary to well-settled and well-understood parliamentary law- that two housesare to hold separate sessions for theirdeliberations and the determination of the oneupon a proposed law is to be submitted to theseparate determination of the other.


8/12

TANADA VS TUVERAESCOLIN; April 24, 1985FACTS- Petition to review the decision of theExecutive Assistant to the President.- Invoking the peoples right to be informed onmatters of public concern, a right recognized inSection 6, Article IV of the 1973 constitution,petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compelrespondent public officials to publish, and/orcause the publication in the OfficialGazette, of various presidential decrees, lettersof instructions, general orders, proclamations,executive orders, letter of implementation andadministrative orders. The respondents wouldhave this case dismissed on the ground thatpetitioners have no legal personality to bring

this petition. Petitioners maintain that since thesubject of the petition concerns a public rightand its object is to compel public duty, theyneed not show any specific interest.Respondents further contend that publicationin the OG is not a sine qua non requirement forthe effectivity of laws where the lawsthemselves provide for their own effectivitydates.

ISSUEWON publication in the Official Gazette is anindispensable requirement for the effectivity ofthe PDs, LOIs, general orders, EOs, etc. wherelaws themselves provide for their owneffectivity dates.

HELDYes. It is the peoples right to be informed on

matters of public concern & corollarily accessto official records, & to documents & papers

pertaining to official acts, transactions, ordecisions, shall be afforded the citizens subjectto such limitation as may be provided by law(Sec. 6, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). Laws, tobe valid & enforceable, must be published inthe OG or otherwise effectively promulgated.The fact that a PD or LOI states its date ofeffectivity does not preclude their publication inthe OG as they constitute important legislativeacts.

The publication of presidential issuances ofpublic nature or of general applicability is arequirement of due process. Before a personmay be bound by law, he must first be officiallyinformed of its contents.Decision Respondents ordered to publish inOfficial Gazette all unpublished presidentialissuances of general application, and unless sopublished shall have no binding force andeffect.Important Point: It illustrates how decrees &issuances issued by one man Marcos arein fact laws of general application and providefor penalties. The constitution afforded Marcosboth executive & legislative powers.- The generality of law (CC Art. 14) will neverwork w/o constructive notice. The ruling of thiscase provides that publication constitutes the

necessary constructive notice & is thus thecure for ignorance as an excuse.- Ignorance will not even mitigate the crime.

TANADA VS TUVERACRUZ; December 29, 1986FACTS- In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985,the Court affirmed the necessity for thepublication of some of these decrees, declaringin the dispositive portion as follows:"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby ordersrespondents to publish to the Official Gazetteall unpublished presidential issuances whichare of general application, and unless sopublished, they shall have no binding force andeffect."- This is a motion forreconsideration/clarification of the firstdecision, specifically, on the followingquestions:

ISSUES1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or"general applicability"?2. Must a distinction be made between laws ofgeneral applicability and laws which are not?3. What is meant by "publication"?4. Where is the publication to be made?5. When is the publication to be made?


9/12

HELD1 & 2. The term "laws" should refer to all lawsand not only to those of general application,for strictly speaking all laws relate to thepeople in general albeit there are some that donot apply to them directly. We hold thereforethat all statutes, including those of localapplication and private laws, shall be publishedas a condition for their effectivity, which shallbegin fifteen days after publication unless adifferent effectivity date is fixed by thelegislature. Covered by this rule arepresidential decrees and executive orderspromulgated by the President in the exercise oflegislative powers whenever the same arevalidly delegated by the legislature or, atpresent, directly conferred by the Constitution.

Administrative rules and regulations must also

be published if their purpose is to enforce orimplement existing law pursuant also to a validdelegation.

3. The publication must be in full or it is nopublication at all since its purpose is to informthe public of the contents of the laws. Themere mention of the number of the

presidential decree, the title of such decree, itswhereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"),the supposed date of effectivity, and in a meresupplement of the Official Gazette cannotsatisfy the publication requirement. This is noteven substantial compliance.33

4. We have no choice but to pronounce thatunder Article 2 of the Civil Code, thepublication of laws must be made in the OfficiaGazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirementfor their effectivity after fifteen days from suchpublication or after a different period providedby the legislature.

5. We also hold that the publication must bemade forthwith, or at least as soon as possible,to give effect to the law pursuant to the said

Article 2. There is that possibility, of course,although not suggested by the parties that alaw could be rendered unenforceable by amere refusal of the executive, for whateverreason, to cause its publication as required.This is a matter, however, that we do not needto examine at this time.

The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province of Maguindanaobut it is not part or ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a plebiscite held in1989. Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The 1st legislative district comprises of Cotabato Cityand 8 other municipalities.

A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMMs Organic Act and vesting it with power to createprovinces, municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional Assemblycreated Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the

municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City.

For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1st district is now onlymade of Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that status quoshould be retained however just for the purposes of the elections, the first district should be calledShariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City this is also while awaiting a decisive declaration fromCongress as to Cotabatos status as a legislative district (or part of any).

Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1stdistrict). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district and


10/12

that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably because her rival Dilangalen wasfrom there and D was winning in fact he won). She contended that under the Constitution, uponcreation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains legislative representationand since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City so in effect Cotabato is being deprived of arepresentative in the HOR.

COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of S. Kabunsuanbeing created, the legislative district is not affected and so is its representation.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can create validly LGUs.

HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10,Article X of the Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished orits boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the localgovernment code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the politicaunits directly affected.

Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or barangaymust comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow thecriteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with anyprovision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.

There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution forCongress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local governmentunits. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodiesthe power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflictarises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards,and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject tocompliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebisciterequirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot validly create ShariffKabunsuan province.

Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k, and that aprovince, once created, should have at least one representative in the HOR. Note further that inorder to have a legislative district, there must at least be 250k (population) in said district. CotabatoCity did not meet the population requirement so Semas contention is untenable. On the other hand,

ARMM cannot validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a legislative district.

But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely inCongress. At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces.


11/12

EN BANC[G.R. No. 157870, November 03, 2008]

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), PETITIONER, VS. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD AND PHILIPPINEDRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA), RESPONDENTS.

Facts:In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registeredpolitical party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine DrugEnforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute unduedelegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers todetermine the manner of drug testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal protectionclause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable. Andfor a third, a person's constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached by saidprovisions.Issues:(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualificationfor candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications forcandidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution? And

(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do theseparagraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and theequal protection clause? Or do they constitute undue delegation of legislative power?Held: WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declares Sec.36(g)of RA 9165and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLYGRANT the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and(d) of RA 9165CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned agencies are,accordingly, permanently enjoined from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165.No costs.Ratio/Doctrine: Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It isbasic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is nulland void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no actshall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution.[8] In the discharge of their defined functions, thethree departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of theConstitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.[9] It ought to be made abundantly clear,however, that the unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its having infringed theconstitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run forand serve as senator. Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification formandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutionalviability of the mandatory, random, and suspicion less drug testing for students emanates primarilyfrom the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, andfrom their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In the

case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, andsuspicion less drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy andrequirement. We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the publicprosecutor's office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonmentThe operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and "suspicion less."In thecase of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing cannever be random or suspicion less. The ideas of randomness and being suspicion less are antitheticalto their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither arethey beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singledout and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled


12/12

before the prosecutor's office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be thecase, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy.[40] Toimpose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as atool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165.Drug testing in this casewould violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worsestill, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

Inquiry in Aid of LegislationSenate Rules of ProcedureIn 2005, tapes which allegedly contained a conversation between GMA and COMELEC CommissionerGarcillano surfaced. The said conversation contained a plan to rig the elections to favor GMA. Therecordings then became subject to legislative hearings conducted separately by each House. In hisprivilege speech, Sen. Escudero motioned a congressional investigation jointly conducted by theCommittees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security,Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondentHouse Committees). During the inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged.Lacsons motion for a senate inquiry was referred to the Committee on National Defense and Securityheaded by Biazon. Garci subsequently filed to petitions. One to prevent the playing of the tapes inthe each house for they are alleged to be inadmi8ssible and the other to prohibit and stop the

conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.ISSUE: Whether or not to grant the petitions of Garci.HELD: Garcis petition to strike the tapes off the record cannot be granted. The tapes were alreadyplayed in Congress and those tapes were already highly publicized. The issue is already overtaken bythese incidents hence it has become moot and academic. The second petition must be grantedhowever. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislativeinquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutionalrequirement.Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that [t]he Senate or the House ofRepresentatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation inaccordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The requisite of publication of the rules isintended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it willbe the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law orrule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes publicationis set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that [l]aws shall take effect after 15 daysfollowing the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper ofgeneral circulation in the Philippines.The Senate admits in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of ProcedureGoverning Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation onlyin 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which theterm of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the

publication of these rules when they first opened their session.

Digested Cases Admin

Documents

Transcript of Digested Cases Admin