Aris Phil Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.G.R. No. 90501 August 5, 1991

Facts:Respondents, which are employees of herein petitioner Aris Phil Inc. lodged a protest against their

employer for hazardous and detrimental working conditions. Because of this protest they were dismissed on the ground of violation of company rules and regulations.

These dismissed employees then filed an action for illegal dismissal against their employer. The labor arbiter ruled in their favor ordering reinstatement. After promulgation of judgment respondent file a motion for execution based on the provision of Sec 12. of Republic Act 6715 or Art. 223 of the Labor Code which provide for immediate execution of award of reinstatement by the Labor Arbiter. This provision is assailed by the petitioner for its alleged unconstitutionality.

Issue:Whether or not Sec 12. of Republic Act 6715 is unconstitutional.

Held:The Court find the petition lack of merit. As explained, the provision is in the exercise of the police

power of State, given that the employer has power to discharge its employee, the state, in ensuring the protection of employment and livelihood as it is considered a property of a person as embodied by the Constitution, may exercise its such power. The execution pending appeal is designed to stop the threat on the survival of the dismissed employee.

With the foregoing there is it can be seen that the provision haven’t breach the Constitution.Laws are presumed constitutional to support its nullification it must be a clear and unequivocal breach,

not a doubtful and argumentative implication. As put by Justice Malcolm, “to doubt is to sustain”.

Hon. Alfredo Lim vs. Hon. Felipe G. Paquing and Associated Development CorporationG.R. No. 115044 January 27 1995

Teofisto Guingona Jr. And Dominador Cepeda Jr. Vs. Hon. Vetino Reyes and Associated Developmeny Corporation

G.R. No. 117263 January 27, 1995

Facts:Among the legislative powers of the Municipal Board as provided by the Charters of Manila is to tax,

license, permit and regulate amont others the game of jai-alai. However Executive Order No. 392, vest the authority to Games and Amusements Board in regulating this jai-alai. Subsequently Congress enacted RA. 954 prohibiting certain activities which includes jai-alai. However, the Municipal Board of Manila pass an ordinance authorizing the Mayor to allow and permit the Associated Development Corporation to establish and maintain and operate a jai-alai in the City of Manila. Years after Pres Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree 771 revoking all powers and authority to the local government in granting franchise to certain activities which include jai-alai. But in a few months the president issued again another presidential decree, which is Presidential Decree 810 which allow the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation to operate jai-alai(basque pelota) in greater Manila. But then Pres. Aquino issued Executive Order 169 expressly repealing Presidential Decree 810 which revoke and cancel the franchise granted to the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation. However, on May 1998, the Associated Development Corporation tried to operate a jai-alai. To which the government through GAB opposed invoking Presidential Decree 771. ADC question the constitutionality of Presidential Decree 771 saying that it is violative of equal protection clause and non-impairment clause.

Issue:Whether or not Presidential Decree 771 is unconstitutional for violation of equal protection clause and

non-impairment clause of the 1987 Constitution.

Held:

The Court says that all laws including Presidential Decree 771 are presumed valid and constitutional unless otherwise ruled by the Supreme Court. It also emphasizes of Art XVIII Sec 3 of the Constitution.

The petitioners argument must fail because there is nothing on record that shows Presidential Decree 771 being repealed, altered, amended by any subsequent law or presidential decrees. The contention of the petitioner that in one case in the Court of First Instance, the Presidential Decree has been declared unconstitutional must fail, for it is only the Supreme Court, sitting en banc, can declare a law unconstitutional.

Jovencio Lim and Teresita Lim vs. The People of the Philippines, The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 217, The City Prosecutor of Quezon City and Wilson Cham

G.R. No. 149276 September 27, 2002

Facts:Petitioner is assailing constitutionality Presidential Decree 818 which amended Art 315 of the Revised

Penal Code by increasing the penalties for estafa by means of bouncing checks. He point out that it is violative of due process clause, the right to bail, and the provision against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue:Whether or not Presidential Decree 818 is unconstitutional in violation of provisions about due process

clause, the right to bail, and the provision against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment of the 1987 Constitution.

Held:When the law is questioned, presumption is in favor of its constitutionality. The burden of proving

otherwise is in the person who questions it. The breach must be clear and unequivocal not doubtful and argumentative. The petitioner failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat such presumption.

Karen Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the PhilippinesG.R. No. 94723 August 21, 1997

Facts:Petitioner was lured and detained by an American tourist Greg Bartelli for four days. Through out those

days he was also raped by said foreigner. On the fourth day Bartelli was arrested, the police obtain from him a Dollar check ; COCOBANK Bank book ; Dollar Account in China Banking Corp ; an ID ; Philippine Money ; six pieces of door keys ; and a stuffed toy he used for luring the said victim.

He was charged for illegal detention and four counts of rape. He was also set to answer a separate civil case for damages with preliminary attachment for the same offense.

While detained, Bartelli escaped jail. But in the meantime the trial court issued a preliminary attachment and notice of garnishment to the dollar account of Bartelli in China Banking Corporation. However the said bank refused to comply invoking Section 113 Central Bank Circular which provides that dollar accounts are exempt from attachment.

The criminal case for Bartelli was adjudged and rendered a judgment by default against him ordering him to pay the victim damages. A writ of execution was issued but the same bank still didn’t act on it. Even saying that the provision is aimed to the development and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit System and offshore banking.

Issue:Whether or not Section 113 of Central Bank Circular can be applied to the present case.

Held:This Court rules that the applicability of laws must depend on the extent of justice. If the Court would

allow the said provision to prevail it would be used as a device for future wrongdoers to escape liability at the expense of the victim. Surely this could not be the intent the legislative thought of when they passed the law.

Carlos Alonzo and Casimira Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and Tecla PaduaG.R. No. L-72873 May 28, 1987

Facts:Brothers and sister inherited in equal pro indiviso a parcel of land from their deceased parents. Two-

fifths of the said land was sold to herein petitioner. Sometime in 1975, petitioner’s son, Eduardo decided to build a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area his parents have bought.

Mariano Padua, one of the co-heirs sought to redeem the are, but his complaint was dismissed for he is an American citizen. A complaint was then filed by another co-heir, Tecla Padua invoking the same right as Mariano.

The complaint was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that the right has prescribed, saying that the protest must be filed 30 days from the notice of sales. Although there is no written notice, the trial court say the actual knowledge or notice may suffice.

The respondent court, Intermediate Appellate Court, reversed the order saying that written notice although in whatever form must be strictly complied.

Issue:Whether or not actual knowledge will be sufficient in compliance with the 30 day notice rule in the

sale of land.

Held:The Court sustained the lower court’s order. Saying that it is unaccepted to allow the pretense posed by

the respondent in having no knowledge of the said sale. Allowing their strict contention of written notice would enable the law to be device for injustice. It is evident what the legislature want in enacting such provision is to provide redemptioners due notice. The court is satisfied, the parties being brother and sisters, that these complainant are actually informed and written notice is immaterial.

Achilles Berces Sr. Vs. Hon. Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona Jr., et al.G.R. No. 112099 February 21, 1995

Facts:Mayor Corral is facing two administrative cases file by herein petitioners in the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan of Albay. The cases were grounded on abuse of authority and oppression and dishonesty. Said body ruled in favor of the petitioner and ordered its suspension.

Mayor Corral appealed to the Office of the President and prayed for stay execution pursuant to Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18. The Office granted it to avoid undue prejudice to public interest, respondent being a Mayor.

To this effect petitioners contend that said law has been repealed by Republic Act 7160 which took effect on January 1, 1991, later than that assailed law which took effect February 12, 1987.

Issue:Whether or not Republic Act 7160 impliedly repealed Administrative Order No. 18?

Held:Sec. 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 provides for the power of the president to order, as it may deem

just and reasonable, stay execution pending appeal. While Sec. 68 of Republic Act 7160 provides that “an

appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final and executory.”Petitioner invokes the repealing close of Republic Act 7160, but the Court found it to be devoid of

merit for it didn’t specifically identify Administrative Order No. 18 to be repealed. Nor the case is a case of implied repeal. Our justice system having presumption against implied repeal, the petitioner must show there is a substantial conflict between the new and prior laws. It must be an irreconcilable inconsistency and a repugnancy must exist in the terms of the new and prior law that two cannot stand together.

The two laws not having this conflict must be read together and harmonized.

Antonio Mecano vs. Commission on AuditG.R. No. 103982 December 11, 1992

Facts:Petitioner, a Director II in the NBI was hospitalized for cholecystitis, a service connected illness. He

now claims with the COA reimbursement for his hospitalization for the illness under Sec. 699 of Revised Administrative Code. However the COA denied his claim saying that the provision where the petitioner’s claim is based is already not enforce it being not restated or reenacted by the provision of Administrative Code of 1987, which respondent treats as a repeal to the Revised Administrative Code.

Respondent assails the repealing clause of said law. However time and again that in order for one to be an express repeal the particular provision must be specifically indicated in the repealing clause. The nature of the repealing clause mentioned is on of a general repealing provision, it is a clause which predicates that under the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. The failure to add the specific law to be repealed indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist. This situation falls within the ambit of an implied repeal.

Issue:Whether or not the enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 operates to repeal the Revised

Administrative Code of 1917.

Held:Comparing the two codes, the later code does not cover the whole subject of the former, there are

several matters not included therein. And lastly, a well settled rule in statutory construction that repeal by implication is not favored. For the legislature in enacting laws is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject.

Danilo Paras vs. Commission on ElectionsG.R. No. 123169 November 4, 1996

Facts:Petitioner an incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula Cabanatuan won during the last regular election of

1994. However, a petition for recall was filed by the registered voters of his barangay. The COMELEC acting on the petition set the signing of the petition. 29.30% sign the petition, above the 25% requirement provided by law.

An opposition was filed by the petitioner saying that the recall was not proper. Citing Sec. 74 of Republic Act 7160 which states that no recall shall take place within 1 year from the date of the official’s assumption of office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election. The petitioner saying that an SK election, is considered as regular local election, is going to happen in a span of four months, therefore recall is improper.

Issue:Whether or not Sangguniang Kabataan Election can be considered a regular local election.

Held:

The court did not rule in favor of the petitioner.An SK election is to be held every three years thereafter, while the provision one year after the

assumption of official’s office is to be construed as his 2nd year of office. If petitioner’s contention that SK election is a regular local election then no recall shall ever happen. It would render the recall provision of LGC inutile. It is a rule in statutory construction that it is presumed that the legislature intended to enact an effective law and did not include a vain provision in the enactment of the statute.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. ESSO Standard Eastern Inc. and The Court of Tax AppealsG.R. Nos. 28502-03 April 18, 1989

Facts:ESSO, herein respondent overpaid income tax sometime in 1959, it was accordingly granted by the

Commissioner in 1964. However in 1960, he was found to have been short of payment. In 1964 he was ordered to pay the sum of short payment. He paid the sum under protest saying that the sum of his excessive tax paid on 1959 should be subtracted from his payment for 1960. ESSO then asked for refund but was denied by the Commissioner. On appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals, the court ordered payment to ESSO its refund claim.

Issue:Whether or not the Commission Internal Revenue should refund the excess payment made by ESSO

Standard Eastern Inc,

Held:The Court upheld that the respondent must be granted its claim.The Commissioner having been in fact acknowledging the mistake in which the respondent paid excess

tax had the obligation to return the same to ESSO. The contention of the petitioner that the acknowledgment was made 4 years after the payment negates actuality. The court held that, obligation to return money mistakenly paid arises from the moment that payment is made and not from the time that the payee admits the obligation to reimburse.

From the foregoing respondent should not be legally or logically considered a debtor of the government and whatever obligation ESSO may incur should be reduced to the sum which the government holds as obligation to ESSO.

Nothing is better settled than that courts are not to give words a meaning which would lead to absurd or unreasonable consequences.

Cesario Ursua vs. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 112170 April 10, 1996

Facts:Atty. Palmones, lawyer for the petitioner wrote a letter the Office of the Ombudsman to be able to be

furnished with a copy of complaint against petitioner. He asked the petitioner to bring this letter to the Ombudsman because said lawyer’s messenger is running some other errands. Petitioner comply, however he asked said messenger what to to do as he was afraid to go to that office because he is one of the respondents in the case. The messenger told him that he could just sign his name, Oscar Perez, to avoid being recognized. And so the petitioner did as told. He obtain the requested complaint from Ms. Loida Kahulugan. But before leaving the premises he was greeted by an acquaintance. However, this acquaintance was also known to Loida which enable her to find that the one he gave the complaint was not Oscar Perez himself.

Petitioner was accordingly charged and was found guilty by the trial court in violation of Sec 1 of CA No. 142 as amended by RA 6085.. He appealed to the Court of Appeals but it affirmed the decision of the lower court. Hence this petition.

Issue:Whether or not the use of a different name belonging to another in isolated transaction falls within the

prohibition of Court of Appeals No. 142.

Held:The objective of the provision mentioned is to curb the common practice among Chinese of adopting

scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. An alias is name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transaction in addition to his real name registered at birth. Hence the use of fictitious name or a different name by another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name is addition to his name does not fall within the prohibition contained in the said provision.

In addition to that a rule in statutory construction is there is a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure. The case being an undesirable consequence and interpretation of the law must be reversed.