DIGEST for Oblicon
Transcript of DIGEST for Oblicon
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G.R. No. L-4197 March 20, 1952
FIDELA SALES DE GONZAGA, plaintiff-appellant,vs.
THE CROWN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, defendant-appellee.
FACTS:
September 26, 1939: Crown Life Insurance Co. whose home
office is based in Toronto, Canada issued to Ramon Gonzagathrough its branch office in Manila a 20-year endowment
policy for P15,000 which had an annual premium of P591.
Payment was only until September 6, 1941 because of the
outbreak of the war since Crown is an enemy corp. order to
be closed during the Japanese occupation. However,
despite that it offered a privilege to accept premium
payments in the place of its employee in Ermita but of
which Gonzaga did not avail.
Through the automatic premium loan clause, it continued
until June 12, 1943
May 1, 1945: It reopened but still Gonzaga did not pay
although there was a reinstatement clause providing certain
conditions within three years from the date of lapse on
application of the insured
June 27, 1945: Gonzaga died from an accident
Crown refused to pay because of the lapse of premium
payment
RTC: against Gonzaga
ISSUE: W/N Gonzaga's widow can claim despite the absence of
premium payment during the outbreak of the war
HELD: NO. Affirmed
Non-payment at the day involves absolute forfeiture is such
be the terms of the contract
failure to notify the postal address during the war is not an
excuse
There is no duty when the law forbids and there is noobligation without corresponding right enjoyed by another
opening of an interim office partook of the nature of the
privilege to the policy holders to keep their policies
operative rather than a duty to them under the contract
Villaroel v. Estrada, 71 Phil. 140(1940)
Petitioner: JUAN F. VILLARROEL
Respondent: BERNARDINO ESTRADA,
Ponente: Avanceña
DOCTRINE: (Natural Obligation)
Not being based on positive law but on equity and natural law, do
not grant a right of action to enforce their performance, but aftervoluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they authorize the retention
of what has been delivered or rendered by reason thereof.
FACTS:
1. On May 9, 1912, Alexander F. Callao, mother of Juan F.
Villaroel, obtained from the spouses Mariano Estrada and
Severina debt of P1,000, payable after seven years
2. Alejandra, passed away, leaving Villaroel as sole heir. The
spouses Mariano Estrada and Severinaalso passed away, leaving
Bernardino Estrada as sole heir.3. On August 9, 1930, Villaroel
gave a document to Estrada, in which he declared in owing the
amount of P1,000, with an interest of 12 percent per year. This
action turns on the collection of this amount.4. The Court of First
Instance of Lagoon, in as interposed this action, and decided for
Villaroel to pay the amount demanded of P1,000 with its legal
interests of 12percent from August 9, 1930 to its complete
payment. Villaroel appealed.
ISSUES: WON Villaroel should pay the amount despite the
prescription of the original debt
RULING + RATIO: The present action is not based on the original
obligation contracted by the mother Villaroel, which hasprescribed, but on that which he contracted on August9, 1930
when assuming the fulfillment of that obligation. Being the sole
heir of the indebted one, with right her inheritance, that debt
which was contracted by his mother legally, although no longer
effective by prescription, now is, nevertheless, amoral obligation.
That consideration is sufficient to create and to make his
obligation voluntarily contracted, effective August of 1930.The
rule in which a new promise to pay a prescribed debt must be
done only by the same person or another who is legally
authorized by her, is not applicable to the present case, because
Villaroel voluntarily wanted to assume this obligation.
G.R. No. 46274 November 2, 1939
A.O. FISHER, plaintiff-appellee,vs.
JOHN C. ROBB, defendant-appellant.
FACTS: The defendant had an agreement with the plaintiff to be a
stockholder of Philippine Greyhound Club. Having paid the second
subscription, the organization was changed to Philippine Racing
Club.
ISSUE: Whether or not a consideration for the obligation
established
HELD: Yes. In onerous contracts the consideration as to each of
the parties is the delivery or performance or the promise of
delivery or performance of a thing or service by the other party; in
remuneratory contracts the consideration is the service or benefit
for which the remuneration is given, and in contracts of pure
beneficence the consideration is the liberality of the benefactors.
The case presenting the question whether a moral obligation will
sustain an express executory promise may be divided into fiveclasses:
(1) Cases in which the moral obligation arose wholly from ethical
considerations, unconnected with any legal obligations, perfect or
imperfect, and without the receipt of actual pecuniary or material
benefit by the promisor prior to the subsequent promise;
(2) cases in which the moral obligation arose from a legal liability
already performed or still enforceable; (3)
cases in which the moral obligation arose out of, or was
connected with, a previous request or promise creating originally
an enforceable legal liability, which, however, at the time of the
subsequent express promise had become discharged or barred by
operation of a positive rule of law, so that at that time there was
no enforceable legal liability; (4) casesin which the moral obligation arose from, or was connected with,
a previous request or promise which, however, never created any
enforceable legal liability, because of a rule of law which rendered
the original agreement void, or at least unenforceable; and
(5) cases in which the moral obligation arose out of, or was
connected with, the receipt of actual material or pecuniary
benefit by the p romisor, without, however, any previous request
or promise on his part, express or implied, and therefore, of
course, without any original legal liability, perfect or imperfect.
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G.R. No. L-48006 July 8, 1942
FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner,vs.
SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.
FACTS: At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanilla’s taxi collided
with a “kalesa” thereby killing the 16 year
old Faustino Garcia. Faustino’s parents filed a criminal suit againstFontanilla and reserved their right to file a separate civil suit.
Fontanilla was eventually convicted. After the criminal suit, Garcia
filed a civil suit against Barredo – the owner of the taxi (employer
of Fontanilla). The suit was b ased on Article 1903 of the civil code
(negligence of employers in the selection of their employees).
Barredo assailed the suit arguing that his liability is only subsidiary
and that the separate civil suit should have been filed against
Fontanilla primarily and not him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Barredo is just subsidiarily liable.
HELD: No. Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-
delict or "culpa aquiliana ". He is primarily liable under Article
1903 which is a separate civil action against negligent employers.
Garcia is well within his rights in suing Barredo. He reserved his
right to file a separate civil action and this is more expeditious
because by the time of the SC judgment Fontanilla is already
serving his sentence and has no property. It was also proven that
Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees because it was shown
that Fontanilla had had multiple traffic infractions already before
he hired him – something he failed to overcome during hearing.
Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a separate civil action,
Barredo would have only been subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo
is not being sued for damages arising from a criminal act(his
driver’s negligence) but rather for his own negligence in selecting
his employee (Article 1903).
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code
and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are
only of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the
criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification,
merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the
former are punished only if there is a penal law clearly covering
them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any
king of fault or negligence intervenes." However, it should be
noted that not all violations of the penal law produce civil
responsibility, such as begging in contravention of ordinances,
violation of the game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when
nobody is hurt.
G.R. No. L-32599 June 29, 1979
EDGARDO E. MENDOZA, petitionervs.
HON. ABUNDIO Z. ARRIETA, Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Courtof First Instance of Manila, FELINO TIMBOL, and RODOLFOSALAZAR, respondents.
Facts: Salazar’s owner jeep hit the car of the herein petitioner,
started that Montoya who is the truck driver hit Salazar’s owner
that is the proximate cause of the said events. Montoya was held
liable of criminal charge of reckless imprudence, damages was
awarded to Salazar and no to the petitioner.
The petitioner herein filed a civil action to Salazar and the truck
owner Timbol. The respondent judge dismissed the case for the
reason that it should be expressly reserved the filing separate civil
action
Issue: WON the petitioner is barred to file a separate civil action
to Timbol based on quasi-delict
Held: No. For petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in the
civil case is based on quasi-delict. Respondent Judge committed
reversible error when he dismissed the civil suit against the truck-
owner, as said case may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. Article 31 of
the Civil Code provides that, “When the civil action is based on an
obligation not arising from the actor omission complained of as a
felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.”
G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, JUAN D.LIM, BENJAMIN P. PAULINO, ANTONIO M. MAGTALAS, COL.PEDRO SACRO and LT. M. SORIANO, petitioners,vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGINA ORDOÑEZ-BENITEZ, in hercapacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court,Manila, SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA and ARSENIA D.BAUTISTA, respondents.
Facts: Carlitos Bautista was stabbed while on the second f loor
premises of the schools by assailants who were not members of
the schools academic community. This prompted the parents of
the deceased to file a suit in the RTC of Manila for damages
against PSBA and its corporate officers.
The defendant schools (now petitioner) sought to have the suit
dismissed on the ground of no cause of action and not within the
scope of the provision of Art 2180 since it is an academic
institution. The trial court overruled the petitioner’s contention
and its decision was later affirmed by the appellate court.
Issue: WON the decision of the appellate court primarily anchored
on the law of quasi-delicts is valid.
Held: Although the Supreme Court agreed to the decision of the
Court of Appeals to deny the petition of motion to dismiss by the
PSBA, they do not agree to the premises of the appellate court’s
ruling.
Art 2180, in conjunction with Art 2176 of the civil code establishes
the rule of in loco parentis, they can not be held liable to the acts
of Calito’s assailants which were not students of the PSBA and
because of the contractual relationship.
The school and the students, upon registration established a
contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations. The
institution of learning must provide their students with an
atmosphere that promotes or assists its primary undertaking of
imparting knowledge, and maintain peace and order within its
premises.
The SC dismissed the petition and the case was remanded to the
trail court to determine if the school neglected its obligation to
perform based on the contractual relation of them and the
students.
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G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988
JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORAJR., NORMA A. YLAYA PANTALEON A. AMADORA, JOSE A.AMADORA III, LUCY A. AMADORA, ROSALINDA A. AMADORA,PERFECTO A. AMADORA, SERREC A. AMADORA, VICENTE A.AMADORA and MARIA TISCALINA A. AMADORA,petitionersvs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS, VICTOR LLUCH SERGIO P. DLMASO JR., CELESTINODICON, ANIANO ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFFON thru his parentsand natural guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR GUMBAN, andROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his guardian, A. FRANCISCOALONSO, respondents.
FACTS: 17 year old Alfredo Amadora was shot and killed by his
classmate Pablito Daffon inside the school campus, in which he
about to submit his Physics project as a prerequisite to graduation
practices. Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless
imprudence. The parents filed a civil action for damages under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose
Recoletos, its high school principal, the dean of boys, the physics
teacher, Daffon and two other students, through their respective
parents. The complaints against the students was later dropped.
Upon appeal to CA, the decision was reversed and all the
defendants were completely absolved.
ISSUE: Whether or not the school should be held liable for the
acts of its students.
RULING: No. In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys
should probably be held liable considering that he had earlier
confiscated an unlicensed gun from a student and later returned
to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter
to the higher authorities. Though it was clear negligence on his
part, no proof was shown to necessarily link this gun with the
shooting incident.
The responsibility of the school authorities over the student
continues even if the student should be doing nothing more than
relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and
friends. Under the Article 2180 of the Family Code, it is the
teacher-in charge is the one who is imposed on the liability of
his/her students and not the school. As long as defendant can
show that he had taken the necessary precautions to prevent the
injury complained of, he can exonerate himself from the liability
imposed by Art. 2180.
Air France v Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155
Nature: Petition for Review by Certiorari of a decision of CA
FACTS: Rafael Carrascoso was one of the 28 Filipino pilgrims who
left Manila for Lourdes. He had a first class round tripticket from
Manila to ROME.However, when the plane was in Bangkok, the
Manager forced him to vacate his first class seat because a white
manhad a better right to the seat. Carrascoso filed complaint for
damages.
ISSUE: won damages may be recovered on the basis of expulsion
HELD: Yes
Ratio:The contract of air carriage generates a relation attended
with public duty. Passengers should be protectedand insured a
pleasant tripWrongful expulsion is a violation of public duty by the
air carrier – a quasi delict. Damages are proper.Doubt WON ticket
was confirmed as first class is immaterial as claim is based on the
wrongful expulsionitself.
De la Cruz v.s. Northern Theatrical Enterprises 95 Phil . 739
(1954)
CASE NO: L-7089
DATE: August 31, 1954
PETITIONER: Doming de la Cruz
RESPONDENT: Northern Theatrical Enterprises Inc., et. al.
FACTS: In 1941 the Northern Theatrical Enterprises Inc. operated
a movie house in Laoag, Ilocos Norte and employed a certain
Domingo de la Cruz as a special guard assigned at the main
entrance. In the afternoon of July 4, 1941, Benjamin Martin (gatecrasher) wanted to enter the movie house without a ticket but
refused by De la Cruz. The former (Martin) attacked De la Cruz
with a bolo. De la Cruz defended himself until he was cornered to
save his life he shot Martin, which caused Martin’s death. He was
charged of homicide (Criminal Case No. 8449) of the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte, but was granted a motion to dismiss on
January 1943.
However, on July 8, 1947, he was again accused of homicide and
was acquitted of the charge. In both cases De la Cruz employed a
lawyer to defend himself. He demanded from Northern Theatrical
Enterprises and to its three board members to recover
reimbursement for Atty. Conrado Rubio’s fees as well as moral
damages, a total of Php 15,000.00. Northern asked for the
dismissal of the complaint. The CFI after rejecting the theory of De
la Cruz that he was an agent and such was entitled to
reimbursement of expenses incurred in connection with the
agency.
ISSUE:
Whether the relationship was that of principal and agent?
Whether or not De la Cruz is entitled for reimbursement?
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was a mere
employee hired to perform a specific task or duty.
NO. In terms of his reimbursement, an employee who in the line
of duty may recover damages against his employer. However, the
damages incurred consisting of the payment of lawyer’s fee did
not flow directly from the performance of his duties.
Pelayo v. Lauron
FACTS: Petitioner Pelayo, a physician, rendered a medicalassistance during the child delivery of the daughter-in-law of the
defendants. The just and equitable value of services rendered by
him was P500.00 which the defendants refused to pay without
alleging any good reason. With this, the plaintiff prayed that the
judgment be entered in his favor as against the defendants for the
sum of P500.00 and costs.
The defendants denied all of the allegation of the plaintiff,
contending that their daughter-in-law had died in consequence of
the child-birth, and that when she was alive, she lived with her
husband independently and in a separate house, that on the day
she gave birth she was in the house of the defendants and herstay there was accidental and due to fortuitous circumstances.
ISSUE:Whether or not the defendants are obliged to pay thepetitioner for the medical assistance rendered to their daughter-
in-law.
HELD:According to Article 1089 of the Old Civil Code (now 1157),obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts,
by illicit acts and omissions or by those which any kind of fault or
negligence occurs. Obligations arising from law are not presumed.
Those expressly determined in the Code or in special law, etc., are
the only demandable ones.
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The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised
among the mutual obligations to which the spouses are bound by
way of mutual support as provided by the law or the Code.
Consequently, the obligation to pay the plaintiff for the medical
assistance rendered to the defendant’s daughter-in-law must be
couched on the husband.
In the case at bar, the obligation of the husband to furnish his
wife in the indispensable services of a physician at such critical
moments is especially established by the law and the compliance
therewith is unavoidable.
Virata v. Ochoa
81 SCRA 472
Torts and Damages – Double Recovery of Civil Liability
FACTS: In September 1975, Borilla was driving a jeep when he hit
ArsenioVirata thereby causing the latter’s death. The heirs of
Virata sued Borilla through an action for homicide through
reckless imprudence in the CFI of Rizal. Virata’s lawyer reserved
their right to file a separate civil action the he later withdrew said
motion. But in June 1976, pending the criminal case, the Viratasagain reserved their right to file a separate civil action. Borilla was
eventually acquitted as it was ruled that what happened was a
mere accident. The heirs of Virata then sued Borilla and Ochoa
(the owner of the jeep and employer of Borilla) for damages
based on quasi delict. Ochoa assailed the civil suit alleging that
Borilla was already acquitted and that the Virata’s were merely
trying to recover damages twice. The lower court agreed with
Ochoa and dismissed the civil suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of Virata may file a separate civil
suit.
HELD: Yes. It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved
parties may choose between an action under the Revised Penal
Code or of quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. What is prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines is to recover twice for the same negligent act.
Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an
accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt
or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil
liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a
quasi-delict or ‘culpa aquiliana’. But said article forestalls a double
recovery.
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The Roman Catholic Bishop Of Jaro vs. Gregorio De La PeñaG.R. No. L-6913 November 21, 1913
FACTS :
The plaintiff is the trustee of a charitable bequest made for the
construction of a leper hospital and that father Agustin de la Peña
was the duly authorized representative of the plaintiff to receive
the legacy. The defendant is the administrator of the estate ofFather De la Peña.
In the year 1898 the books Father De la Peña, as trustee, showed
that he had on hand as such trustee the sum of P6,641, collected
by him for the charitable purposes aforesaid. In the same year he
deposited in his personal account P19,000 in the Hongkong and
Shanghai Bank at Iloilo. Shortly thereafter and during the war of
the revolution, Father De la Peña was arrested by the military
authorities as a political prisoner, and while thus detained made
an order on said bank in favor of the United States Army officer
under whose charge he then was for the sum thus deposited in
said bank. The arrest of Father De la Peña and the confiscation of
the funds in the bank were the result of the claim of the military
authorities that he was an insurgent and that the funds thusdeposited had been collected by him for revolutionary purposes.
The money was taken from the bank by the military authorities by
virtue of such order, was confiscated and turned over to the
Government.
While there is considerable dispute in the case over the question
whether the P6,641 of trust funds was included in the P19,000
deposited as aforesaid, nevertheless, a careful examination of the
case leads us to the conclusion that said trust funds were a part of
the funds deposited and which were removed and confiscated by
the military authorities of the United States.
ISSUE :
Whether or not Father de la Peña is liable for the loss of the
money under his trust?
RULINGS :
The court, therefore, finds and declares that the money which is
the subject matter of this action was deposited by Father De la
Peña in the Hongkong and S hanghai Banking Corporation of Iloilo;
that said money was forcibly taken from the bank by the armed
forces of the United States during the war of the insurrection; and
that said Father De la Peña was not responsible for its loss.
Father De la Peña's liability is determined by those portions of the
Civil Code which relate to obligations. (Book 4, Title 1.)
Although the Civil Code states that "a person obliged to give
something is also bound to preserve it with the diligence
pertaining to a good father of a family" (art. 1094), it also
provides, following the principle of the Roman law, major casus
est, cui humana infirmitas resistere non potest , that "no one shall
be liable for events which could not be foreseen, or which having
been foreseen were inevitable, with the exception of the cases
expressly mentioned in the law or those in which the obligation so
declares." (Art. 1105.)
By placing the money in the bank and mixing it with his personal
funds De la Peña did not thereby assume an obligation different
from that under which he would have lain if such deposit had not
been made, nor did he thereby make himself liable to repay the
money at all hazards. If the had been forcibly taken from his
pocket or from his house by the military forces of one of the
combatants during a state of war, it is clear that under the
provisions of the Civil Code he would have been exempt from
responsibility. The fact that he placed the trust fund in the bank in
his personal account does not add to his responsibility. Such
deposit did not make him a debtor who must respond at all
hazards.
Cruzado v. Bustos
Facts:
Agapito Cruzado was a poor man living in Pampanga,
he had a job in court but was still not enough to support his
family. He aspired to hold the office of procurador in the CFI of
Pampanga but he was unable to give the required bond, an
indispensable condition for his appointment.
Since Cruzado was friends with Bustos, a rich woman in
their place. He begged the latter to simulate a mortgage deed of a
certain property and have it executed in court in his favor only topose that he has real p roperty to enable him to qualify to such
position of procurador. In truth, the said mortagage was a front
and fraudulent but was effected by making a pretended contract
which bore the appearance of truth.
It is unquestionable that the contract of sale was
perfect and binding upon both contracting parties since their
names both appear in that instrument to have agreed upon the
thing sold. But it is also undeniable that the said contract was not
consummated. 1.) Cruzado did not pay the purchase price of
P2,200 2.) he never took possession of the land apparently sold in
the said deed. All that the vendee did was to pledge the land as a
security for the faithful discharge of the duties of his office.
Santiago Cruzado, the son, brought an action for
recovery of possession, founded on the right transmitted to him
by his father at his death – a right arising from the said simulated
deed of sale of the land in question.
Issue:
W/N the said deed of sale was simulated, not with the
intent to defraud 3rd persons, but for the sole purpose
of making it appear that Agapito Cruzado has real
property?
W/N rights of transmission acquired by SantiagoCruzado from the death of his father, pertaining to the
said land in contest is valid and without defect?
Held:
Under the law, the contract of purchase and sale, as
consensual, is perfected by consent as to the price and
the thing and is consummated by the reciprocal
delivery of the one and the other. Full ownership of
the thing sold being conveyed to the vendee, from
which moment the right of action derived from this
right may be exercised. – the record discloses that
there was no payment made by Cruzado to Bustos,
thus, rendering the contract not to be consummated.
Art 1164 states that, a creditor has a right to the fruitsof the time the obligation to deliver it arise. However,
he shall not acquire a property right thereto until it has
been delivered to him.
Besides the failure to pay the purchase price, neither
the vendee nor his heirs, had at any time taken
possession of the land. Seven witnesses attest to the
fact, Bustos and her husband while still living,
continued to possess the said land supposedly sold to
Agapito Cruzado and cultivated it, as she had done
long before the sale of September 1875 to September
1891, the date of complaint by Santiago Cruzado.
Consequently, at the death of Agapito, he could not
have transmitted to the Santiago as his successor any
greater right than a personal right to exact fulfillmentof a contract, as plaintiff was not the owner of the said
land, he could not validly register it. This fulfillment of
a right has already prescribed since, under the law,
prescription towards real property shall be 30 years. In
the case at bar, the action to recover took 34 years to
bring it to court, thus has already prescribed.
Petition is denied.
Caleon v. Agus Development Corp.(G.R. No. 77365. April 7, 1992)
FACTS:
Agus Development Corporation leased to Rita Caleon its lot for
P180.00/month. Caleon built a 4-door apartment and sub-leased
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it at P350.00/door/month without Agus’ consent. Agus’ filed an
ejectment suit under Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 25 after Caleon
refused to vacate the lot. Caleon argued that B.P. Blg. 25 cannot
be applied because there is a perfected contract of lease without
any express prohibition on subleasing. The MTC ruled in favor of
Agus. It was appealed to the RTC but was dismissed outright.
Hence this petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not B.P. Blg. 25 is unconstitutional for being violative
of “non-impairment clause” on the ground that it impaired thelease contract.
HELD:
No. B.P. Blg. 25 is valid and constitutional. The lease contract is
subordinate to the police power of the state. Petition is denied.
RATIO:
B.P. Blg. 25 is derived from P.D. No. 20 which has been declared
by the Supreme Court as police power legislation so that the
applicability thereof to existing contracts cannot be denied. The
constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of
contract is limited by and subject to the exercise of police power
of the state in the interest of public health, safety, morals and
general welfare. In spite of the constitutional prohibition, theState continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital
interests of its people. Legislation appropriate to safeguarding
said interest may modify or abrogate contracts already in effect.
Song Fo and Co., vs. Hawaiian-Philippine Co. [47 SCRA 821 G.R.
No. 23769. September 16, 1925]
Facts:
Hawaiian-Philippine Co. got into a contract with Song Fo & Co.
where it would deliver molasses to the latter.
Hawaiian-Philippine Co. was able to deliver 55,006 gallons of
molasses before the breach of contract.
SFC filed a complaint for breach of contract against Hawaiian-
Philippine Co. and asked P70,369.50. Hawaiian-Philippine Co.
answered that there was a delay in the payment from Song Fo &
Co. and that Hawaiian-Philippine Co. has the right to rescind the
contract due to that and claims it as a special defense.
The judgment of the trial court condemned Hawaiian-Philippine
Co. to pay Song Fo & Co. a total of P35,317.93, with legal interest
fromthe date of the presentation of the complaint, and with
costs.
Issue:
(1) Did Hawaiian-Philippine Co. agree to sell 400,000 gallons ofmolasses or 300,000 gallons of molasses?
(2) Had Hawaiian-Philippine Co. the right to rescind the
contract of sale made with Song Fo & Co.?
(3) On the basis first, of a contract for 300,000 gallons of
molasses, and second, of a contract imprudently breached by
Hawaiian-Philippine Co., what is the measure of damages?
Held:
(1) Only 300,000 gallons of molasses was agreed to by Hawaiian-
Philippine Co. as seen in the documents presented in court. Thelanguage used with reference to the additional 100,000 gallons
was not a definite promise.
(2) With reference to the second question, doubt has risen as to
when Song Fo & Co. was supposed to make the payments for the
delivery of molasses as shown in the documents presented by the
parties.
The Supreme Court said that Hawaiian-Philippine Co. does not
have the right to rescind the contract. It should be noted that the
time of payment stipulated for in the contract should be treated
as of the presence of the contract. There was only a slight breach
of contract when the payment was delayed for 20 days after
which Hawaiian-Philippine Co. accepted the payment of theoverdue accounts and continued with the contract, waiving its
right to rescind the contract. The delay in the payment of Song Fo
& Co. was not such a violation for the contract.
(3) With regard to the third question, the first cause of action of
Song Fo & Co. is based on the greater expense to which it was put
in being compelled to secure molasses from other sources to
whichSupreme Court ruled that P3,000 should be paid by
Hawaiian-Philippine Co. with legal interest from October 2, 1923
until payment.
The second cause of action was based on the lost profits on
account of the breach of contract. Supreme Court said that Song
Fo & Co. is not entitled to recover anything under the second
cause of action because the testimony of Mr. Song Heng will
follow the same line of thought as that of the trial court which in
unsustainable and there was no means for the court to find out
what items make up the P14,000 of alleged lost profits.
Velarde, et.al. vs. CA [361 SCRA 56 GR No. 108346. July 11, 2001]
Facts:
David Raymundo (private respondent) is the absolute and
registered owner of a parcel of land, located at 1918 Kamias St.,
Dasmariñas Village Makati, together with the house and other
improvements, which was under lease. It was negotiated by
David’s father with plaintiffs Avelina and Mariano Ve larde
(petitioners). ADeed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage was
executed in favor of the plaintiffs. Part of the consideration of the
sale was the vendee’s assumption to pay the mortgage
obligations of the property sold in the amount of P 1,800,000.00
in favor of the Bank of the Philippine Islands. And while their
application for the assumption of the mortgage obligations is not
yet approved by the mortgagee bank, they have agreed to pay the
mortgage obligations on the property with the bank in the
name of Mr. David Raymundo. It was further stated that “in the
event Velardes violate any of the terms and conditions of the said
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage, they agree that the downpayment
P800,000.00, plus all the payments made with the BPI on the
mortgage loan, shall be forfeited in Favor of Mr. Raymundo, asand by way of liquidated damages, w/out necessity of notice or
any judicial declaration to that effect, and Mr. Raymundo shall
resume total and complete ownership and possession of the
property, and the same shall be deemed automatically cancelled”,
signed by the Velardes.
Pursuant to said agreements, plaintiffs paid BPI the monthly
interest loan for three months but stopped in paying the
mortgage when informed that their application for the
assumption of mortgage was not approved.
The defendants through a counsel, wrote plaintiffs informing the
latter that their non-payment to the mortgagee bank constituted
non-performance of their obligation and the cancellation and
rescission of the intended sale. And after two days, the plaintiffsresponded and advised the vendor that he is willing to pay
provided that Mr. Raymundo: (1) delivers actual possession of the
property to them not later than January 15, 1987 for their
occupancy (2) causes the release of title and mortgage from the
BPI and make the title available and free from any liens and
encumbrances (3) executes an absolute deed of sale in their favor
free from any liens and encumbrances not later than Jan. 21,
1987.
The RTC of Makati dismissed the complaint of the petitioners
against Mr. Raymundo for specific performance, nullity of
cancellation, writ of possession and damages. However, their
Motion for Reconsideration was granted and the Court instructed
petitioners to pay the balance of P 1.8 million to private
respondent who, in turn were ordered to execute a deed of
absolute sale and to surrender possession of the disputed
property to petitioners.
Upon the appeal of the private respondent to the CA, the court
upheld the earlier decision of the RTC regarding the validity of the
rescission made by private respondents.
Issue:
Whether the rescission of contract made by the private
respondent is valid.
Held:
There is a breach of contract because the petitioners did not
merely stopped paying the mortgage obligations but they also
http://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/03/song-fo-and-co-vs-hawaiian-philippine.htmlhttp://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/03/song-fo-and-co-vs-hawaiian-philippine.htmlhttp://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/03/velarde-etal-vs-ca-361-scra-56-gr-no.htmlhttp://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/03/velarde-etal-vs-ca-361-scra-56-gr-no.htmlhttp://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/03/song-fo-and-co-vs-hawaiian-philippine.htmlhttp://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/03/song-fo-and-co-vs-hawaiian-philippine.html
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failed to pay the balance purchase price. Their conditional offer to
Mr. Raymundo cannot take the place of actual payment as would
discharge the obligation of the buyer under contract of sale.
Mr. Raymundo’s source of right to rescind the contract is Art.
1191 of the Civil Code predicated on a breach of faith by the other
party who violates the reciprocity between them. Moreover, the
new obligations as preconditions to the performance of the
petitioners’ own obligation were repudiation of
an existing obligation, which was legally due and demandable
under the contract of sale.
The breach committed by the petitioners was the non-performance of a reciprocal obligation. The mutual restitution is
required to bring back the parties to their original situation prior
to the inception of the contract. The initial payment and
the mortgage payments advanced by petitioners should be
returned by private respondents, lest the latter unjustly enriched
at the expense of the other. Rescission creates the obligation to
return the obligation of contract. To rescind, is to declare a
contract void at its inception and to put an end to it as though it
never was.
The decision of the CA is affirmed with modification that private
respondents are ordered to return to petitioners, the amount
they have received in advanced payment.
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CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS LTDvs. SPOUSES DANIEL VASQUEZ
and MARIA LUISA MADRIGAL VASQUEZ[G.R. No. 150843. March
14, 2003]
FACTS:
In respondents’ return flight to Manila from Hongkong, they were
deprived of their original seats in Business Class with their
companions because of overbooking. Since respondents were
privileged members, their seats were upgraded to First Class.Respondents refused but eventually persuaded to accept it. Upon
return to Manila, they demanded that they be indemnified in the
amount of P1million for the “humiliation and embarrassment”
caused by its employees. Petitioner’s Country Manager failed to
respond. Respondents instituted action for damages. The RTC
ruled in favor of respondents. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
RTC decision with modification in the award of damages.
ISSUE/s
1. WON Cathay breached its contract of carriage
with the Vs when it upgraded their seat
accommodation.2. WON the upgrading was made in bad faith or with
fraud.
3. WON the Vasquezes are entitled to damages.
RULING
1. YES. The Vazquezes never denied that they were
members of Cathay’s Marco Polo Club. They knew that
as members of the Club, they had priority for
upgrading of their seat accommodation at no extra
cost when an opportunity arises. But, just like other
privileges, such priority could be waived. The
Vazquezes should have been consulted first whether
they wanted to avail themselves of the privilege or
would consent to a change of seat accommodation
before their seat assignments were given to other
passengers. Normally, one would appreciate and
accept an upgrading, for it would mean a better
accommodation. But, whatever their reason was and
however odd it might be, the Vazquezes had every
right to decline the upgrade and insist on the Business
Class accommodation they had booked for and which
was designated in their boarding passes. They clearly
waived their priority or preference when they asked
that other passengers be given the upgrade. It should
not have been imposed on them over their vehement
objection. By insisting on the upgrade, Cathay
breached its contract of carriage with the Vazquezes.
2. NO. The Vazquezes were not induced to agree to
the upgrading through insidious words or deceitful
machination or through willful concealment of
material facts. Upon boarding, Ms. Chiu told the
Vazquezes that their accommodations were upgraded
to First Class in view of their being Gold Card members
of Cathay’s Marco Polo Club. She was honest in telling
them that their seats were already given to other
passengers and the Business Class Section was fully
booked. Ms. Chiu might have failed to consider the
remedy of offering the First Class seats to other
passengers. But, we find no bad faith in her failure to
do so, even if that amounted to an exercise of poor
judgment. Neither was the transfer of the
Vazquezeseffected for some evil or devious purpose.
As testified to by Mr. Robson, the First Class Section isbetter than the Business Class Section in terms of
comfort, quality of food, and service from the cabin
crew.
3. YES. Case law establishes the following requisites
for the award of moral damages: (1) there must be an
injury clearly sustained by the claimant, whether
physical, mental or psychological; (2) there must be a
culpable act or omission factually established; (3) the
wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the
proximate cause of the injury sustained by the
claimant; and (4) the award for damages is predicated
on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil
Code.
Moral damages predicated upon a breach of contract
of carriage may only be recoverable in instances where
the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith or where the
mishap resulted in the death of a passenger. Where in
breaching the contract of carriage the airline is not
shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith,
liability for damages is limited to the natural and
probable consequences of the breach of the obligation
which the parties had foreseen or could have
reasonably foreseen. In such a case the liability does
not include moral and exemplary damages. The breach
of contract of carriage, which consisted in the
involuntary upgrading of the Vazquezes’ seat
accommodation, was not attended by fraud or bad
faith. The Court of Appeals’ award of moral damages
has, therefore, no leg to stand on.
The deletion of the award for exemplary damages by
the Court of Appeals is correct. It is a requisite in the
grant of exemplary damages that the act of the
offender must be accompanied by bad faith or done in
wanton, fraudulent or malevolent manner. Such
requisite is absent in this case. Moreover, to be
entitled thereto the claimant must first establish his
right to moral, temperate, or compensatory damages.
Since the Vazquezes are not entitled to any of these
damages, the award for exemplary damages has no
legal basis. And where the awards for moral and
exemplary damages are eliminated, so must the award
for attorney’s fees.
The most that can be adjudged in favor of theVazquezes for Cathay’s breach of contract is an award
for nominal damages under Article 2221 of the Civil
Code, which reads as follows:
Article 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in
order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been
violated or invaded by the defendant, may be
vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
H. O'LEARYvs. MACONDRAY and CO., INC
FACTS:
It is alleged that on January 30, 1920, the plaintiff, who is a
resident of Manila, and the defendant, a domestic corporation,
made the following agreement:
"MACONDRAY & CO.
"Manila, P. I.
"Through G. H. Hayward.
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SIRS: Appertaining to the residence to be
erected for your firm in Pasay, for which I
have been requested by G. H. Hayward to
submit a proposition, I have the honor to
state that I have examined the plans and
site and would undertake the work and
complete the building in accordance with
the plans and instructions, and under the
supervision of the said architect for the
amount of the actual cost plus twelve and
one-half per cent (12 ½%).
Payments to be made monthly on
statements supported by vouchers,
approved and certified to by the architect.
It is understood that time is an important
provision, and with due consideration
therefor materials suitable for the work are
to be purchased in such quantities and at
such times as may appear to be to your best
interest.
Very respectfully,
(Sgd.) "H. O'LEARY
Accepted for and on behalf of Macondray&
Co.
By (Sgd.) "CARLOS YOUNG"
That plaintiff commenced the construction of the building under
the supervision of the architect, and continued the work thereon
until near its completion, and kept and performed all the terms
and provisions of the contract by him to be kept and performed,
and that pursuant to such agreement he paid out for labor and
materials the sum of P20,287.03, which was the actual cost; and
that the defendant is indebted to him in the further sum of
P2,535.83, being 12 ½ per cent of the actual cost of such labor
and materials, and for and on account of his services and
superintendence of the building, and he prays judgment for
P22,822.86, with interest from the filing of the complaint and
costs.
In its second amended answer, after admitting the making of the
contract and the formal all allegations of the complaint, the
defendant denies all other material allegations, and, as a special
defense, alleges that, through plaintiff's negligence in the
construction of the building and the purchase of materials, the
defendant was damaged in the sum of P32,624.25, as specified in
seven different counterclaims. It is then alleged that the plaintiff
was indebted to the Luneta Motor Company in the sum of
P702.49, and to the Insular Lumber Company in the sum
P9,766.23, both of which claims are assigned to the defendant,
and it prays judgment against the plaintiff for the total of all of
such claims amounting to P43,092.97.
The parties entered into a stipulation as to certain exhibits, and
upon such issues, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of
the plaintiff for P12,201.99, with legal interest from the filing ofthe complaint and costs, from which the defendant appeals,
contending that the court erred in allowing interest from the filing
of the complaint, and in its computation and as to the duplicated
item of the Tuason&Sampedro bill, in refusing to receive evidence
of the rental value of the house, in failing to make special findings
of fact, and in failing to find that the delay caused in the
completion of the house was caused by plaintiff's negligence, in
finding for the plaintiff on defendant's second counterclaim for
damages in the sum of P797, in finding for the plaintiff on
defendant's third counterclaim for damages in the sum of
P5,440.11, and in finding for the plaintiff on defendant's fourth
counterclaim for damages in the sum of P13,407.25, the amount
of the alleged increase in the cost of labor caused by plaintiff's
negligence.
Plaintiff's cause of action is founded upon the contract above
quoted, the making of which defendant admits. By its express
terms, plaintiff says that he "would undertake the work and
complete the building in accordance with the plans and
instructions, and under the supervision of the said architect for
the amount of the actual cost plus twelve and one-half per cent
(12 ½%)." Payments are to be made on monthly statements
accompanied by vouchers to be approved and certified by the
architect. It then recites:
It is understood that time is an important provision,
and with due consideration therefor materials suitablefor the work are to be purchased in such quantities
and at such times as may appear to be to your best
interest.
To say the least, the contract was very loosely drawn. No date is
specified in which the building is to be completed, and time is not
made the essence of the contract. It is true that the materials
were to be purchased in such quantities and at such times as may
appear to be to the defendant's interest.
The defense is founded upon the theory that the labor was not
furnished and that the materials were not purchased for its best
interest. There is no claim or pretense of fraud, or that the
plaintiff was dishonest. In its final analysis, defendant's
counterclaims are founded upon plaintiff's mistakes and errors of
judgment in the employment of labor and the purchase of
materials.
Assuming that there were mistakes and errors of judgment only,
the plaintiff would not be liable for them under the contract. The
fact that the price of lumber or of labor went up or down, or was
cheaper at a certain time, would not make the plaintiff liable for a
breach of contract, so long as he was exercising his best judgment
and acting in good faith.
It will be noted that the materials were to be purchased "in such
quantities and at such times as may appear to be to your best
interest." That vested in the plaintiff a discretionary power as to
the time and manner for the purchase of materials, for which he
would not be liable for honest mistakes or errors of judgment.
The same thing is true as to the employment of labor. It is true
that the contract recites "that time is an important provision." But
it does not say when the building is to be completed, or that time
is of the essence of the contract. In other words, under the terms
of the contract, the employment of labor, the purchase of
materials and the completion and construction of the building
were all matters which were largely left to the discretion of the
plaintiff, for which he would not be liable for honest mistakes or
errors of judgment.
Pending the trial the judge of the lower court made a personal
inspection of the building and of the labor and materials used in
its construction, and upon a ll of such questions, we agree with the
trial court.
Although this action is founded upon contract, the amount of
plaintiff's claim was vigorously disputed. In fact the defendant
claimed judgment against the plaintiff for a much larger amount.
Upon such a state of facts, and under recent decisions of this
court, plaintiff is only entitled to interest from the date of the
judgment, and defendant's first assignment of error must besustained. It also appears that a clerical error was made in
computing 12 1/2 per cent on P1,772.14, and that the amount
which should be deducted was P221.52 and not P22.15, as found
by the trial court. Correcting this error, the amount of plaintiff's
judgment should be P12,002.63.
The judgment of the lower court will be modified, and instead of
P12,201.00, the amount of plaintiff's judgment will be P12,002.63,
which will draw interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from
the first day of August, 1923, the date of the judgment in the
lower court. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed, with
costs in favor of the appellant in this court. So ordered.
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GUTIERREZ v. GUTIERREZ
Facts:
A passenger truck (bus) and a private automobile collided. Narciso
Gutierrez, a passenger of the bus, seeks to recover damages in the
amount of P10, 000, for physical injuries suffered as a result of an
automobile accident
Truck: driven by the chauffeur Abelardo Velasco, and was ownedby Saturnino Cortez.
Private automobile:
operated by Bonifacio Gutierrez, a lad 18 years of age,and was owned by Bonifacio's father and mother, Mr.and Mrs. Manuel Gutierrez
The father was not in the car at the time of the
accident, but the mother as well as other members of
the family where accomodated therein.
Issue: Who is liable for the injuries suffered by NarcisoGutierrez?
Held: Manuel Gutiererez (father of the kid who drovethe car), and Abelardo Velasco (driver of the bus), and
Saturnino Cortez (owner of the bus) are JOINTLY and
SEVERALLY liable.
Ratio:
Liability of father
Article 1903 of the Civil Code: the father alone and not the minor
or the mother, would be liable for the damages caused by theminor
US jurisprudence shows that “the head of a house, the owner ofan automobile, who maintains it for the general use of his family
is liable for its negligent operation by one of his children.”
The running of the machine by a child to carry other members of
the family is within the scope of the owner's business, so that he
is liable for the negligence of the child because of the relationship
of master and servant.
Liability of the truck owner and driver
The liability of the truck owner and the driver is based from
contract.
VAZQUEZ VS. BORJA
Antonio Vasquez, petitioner, vs. Francisco de Borja, respondent
Francisco de Borja, petitioner,vs. Antonio Vasquez, respondent
Ponente: Ozaeta, J.
Facts:
The action was commenced by de Borja against Vasquez and
Fernando Busuego to recover from them jointly and severally the
total of PhP 4702.70 upon three alleged causes:
First, Vasquez and defendants jointly and severally obligated
themselves to sell to the plaintiff 4,000 cavans of palay, which
they will deliver. Vasquez and Busuego, after receiving 8,400
pesos from de Borja, only delivered 5,224 pesos worth of cavans
of palay. They refused to deliver the remaining cavans amounting
to 3,175.20 pesos.
Second, de Borja suffered damages as a result of the refusal to
deliver
Third, on account of the agreement mentioned, de Borja
delivered 4000 empty sacks but only 2,490 were returned to the
plaintiff. 1,510 sacks were refused to deliver. There are also
damages for the non-delivery of the empty sacks.
Vasquez denies that he entered into the contract mentioned in his
own and personal capacity. He said that the agreement for the
purchase of the cavans of palay and the payment of the price of
8,400 were made by de Borja not with him but with Natividad-
Vasquez Sabani Development Co. Inc. (NVSDCI), a corporationorganized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. Vasquez
was the acting manager when the transaction took place. On
account of the filing of this action against him, he filed a
counterclaim of 1,000 pesos for damages.
Vasquez was ordered by the trial court to pay de Borja the sum of
P3,175.20 plus P377.50. The said court absolved Busuego, the
corporations’ treasurer, from paying the said sums. Said amount
was reduced by the Court of Appeals. The case was then
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings upon
Vasquez’s motion for reconsideration. Vasquez filed a petition for
certiorari for the review and reverse of the CA judgement. De
Borja also filed a cross-petition for certiorari to maintain the
original CA judgement.
The trial court found Vasquez guilty of negligence in the
performance of the contract and held him personally liable on
that account. Likewise, CA ruled that he was not only negligent
but should also responsible for paying the amount of the demand
under Arts. 1102, 1103 and 1902 of the Civil Code.
Issues:
1. Whether the plaintiff entered into the contract with
the defendant Antonio Vasquez in his personal
capacity or as manager of the Natividad-Vasquez
Sabani Development Co., Inc.
2. Whether the trial court and/or the Court of Appeals
erred in its rulings.
3. Whether Vasquez could claim damages against Borja.
Held/ Ratio:
1. Vasquez entered the contract in his capacity as acting president
and manager of NVSDCI.
The action being on a contact, with the NCSDCM being the party
liable on the contract, the complaint should have been dismissed.
A corporation is an artificial being invested by law with its own
personality, which is distinct and separate from its stockholders or
the people who run its affairs. Even if the agents are the one
acting for the corporation, it does not make the agent personally
liable for entering a contract in behalf of the corporation. The
corporation’s personality, a legal fiction, may only be disregarded
if the agent used the corporation to hide an unlawful or
fraudulent purpose.
There is no legal basis upon which to hold Vasquez liable on the
contract either principally or subsidiarily. There are no allegations
that Vasquez personally
benefited through the contract that he entered for the
corporation. It was also not contended that he entered into the
contract for the corporation in bad faith and with intent to
defraud the plaintiff.
2. Both the trial court and CA erred in their ruling that Vasquez is
guilty of negligence and must be personally liable. Since it was the
corporation’s contract, the corporation is the one liable and not
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the agent even if the non-fulfilment of the contract is due to
negligence or fault or any other cause.
Vasquez could be principally liable under article 1902 of the Civil
Code if independent of the contract, he caused damage to the
plaintiff by his fault or negligence. The basis of such separate
liability should be on culpa aquiliana and not based on the
contract. But since there was no such cause of action in this
complaint, the trial court has no jurisdiction over that issue.
3. No. As the acting president and manager of the corporation, he
has a moral duty towards the part with whom he contracted in
said capacaity to see to it that the corporation he represents
fulfilled the contract by delivering the palay it had sold. Since he
was not able to fulfill that moral duty, he has no legitimate cause
for his claim of damages.
Dissenting Opinion (Paras, J.):
Vasquez should be made liable to de Borja. As acting president
and manager of NCSDCM, Vasquez has full knowledge of the
insolvent status of his company but still agreed to sell to de Borja
4000 cavans of palay. The failure and refusal to deliver the
undelivered cavans resulted from his negligence.
DE GUIA VS. MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD & LIGHT COMPANY
Manuel De Guia, plaintiff, v. Manila Electric Railroad & Light
Company, defendant Ponente: Street, J.
Summary:
The plaintiff got injured after he boarded a car (which I think in
this case refers to one of the old trains) which got derailed and hit
a post. Because the motorman who was driving the car was held
to be negligent, it was also held that the company was also liablefor damages. The relationship between the parties was
contractual in nature and thus the company was bound to deliver
the plaintiff safely and securely with reference to the degree of
care which, under the circumstances, is required by law and
custom applicable to the case.
Facts:
De Guia boarded the car (of a train) and he remained at the back
platform holding the right-hand door. The wheels of the rear car,
after coming out of a switch, got derailed and it ran for a short
distance until it struck a concrete
post. The post was shattered and the De Guia was thrown against
the door with some violence, receiving bruises and possibly
certain internal injuries.
The company of the car alleged that the derailment was due to
the presence of a stone in the juncture of the switch which had
accidentally been lodged there. Thus in this view, the derailment
would have been due to casus fortuitous and not chargeable to
the negligence of the motorman.
Issue: WON the motorman and the company were liable fordamages to the injured plaintiff
Held: Yes. The motorman had been negligent and it results thatthe company is liable for damage resulting to the plaintiff as a
consequence of that negligence.
Richard Beltran
Ratio:
As regards the motorman’s negligence: The inference that there
had been negligence in the operation of the car could be gleanedfrom the distance which the car was allowed to run with the front
wheels of the rear truck derailed. An experienced and attentive
motorman should have discovered that something was wrong and
would have stopped before he had driven the car over the entire
distance from the point the wheels left the track to the place
where the post was struck.
As regard the company’s liability: Because the motorman was
negligent, it also results that the company was liable for the
damage to the plaintiff as a consequence of that negligence. The
plaintiff had boarded the car as a passenger b ound for Manila and
the company undertook
to convey him for hire. The contractual nature of the relation
between the parties meant that the duty of the carrier was to
convey and deliver the plaintiff safely and securely with reference
to the degree of care which under the circumstances, was
required by law and custom applicable to the case. Upon failure
to comply with that obligation, the company incurred liability. The
liability already incurred, the company could not avail itself of the
defense that it had exercised due care in selecting and instructing
the motorman because such defense could only be availed in the
absence of a contractual relation, or in other words to quasi-
delicts.
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US v. Barias
Facts:
On November 2, 1911, defendant Segundo Barias, a motorman
for the Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company, was driving
his car along Rizal Avenue and stopped at an intersection to take
on some passengers. He looked backward, presumably to be sure
that all passengers were aboard, and then started the car. At that
moment, Fermina Jose, a 3-year old child, walked or ran in frontof the car. She was knocked down and dragged at some distance
to death. Defendant knew nothing of this until his return, when
he was informed of what happened. He was charged and found
guilty of homicide resulting from reckless negligence.
Issue:
Whether the evidence shows such carelessness or want of
ordinary care on the part of the defendant as to amount to
reckless negligence
Held:
Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is
a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its
application depends upon the situation of the parties and the
degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably
require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is
necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care
under the circumstances.
The evidence shows that the thoroughfare on which the incident
occurred was a public street in a densely populated section of the
city. The hour was six in the morning, or about the time when the
residents of such streets begin to move about. Under such
conditions a motorman of an electric street car was clearly
charged with a high degree of diligence in the performance of his
duties. He was bound to know and to recognize that any
negligence on his part in observing the track over which he was
running his car might result in fatal accidents. He had no right to
assume that the track before his car was clear. It was his duty to
satisfy himself of that fact by keeping a sharp lookout, and to do
everything in his power to avoid the danger which is necessarily
incident to the operation of heavy street cars on public
thoroughfares in populous sections of the city. At times, it might
be highly proper and prudent for h im to glance back before again
setting his car in motion, to satisfy himself that he understood
correctly a signal to go forward or that all the passengers had
safely alighted or gotten on board. But we do insist that before
setting his car again in motion, it was his duty to satisfy himself
that the track was clear, and, for that purpose, to look and to see
the track just in front of his car. This the defendant did not do,
and the result of his negligence was the death of the child.
We hold that the reasons of public policy which impose upon
street car companies and their employees the duty of exercising
the utmost degree of diligence in securing the safety ofpassengers, apply with equal force to the duty of avoiding the
infliction of injuries upon pedestrians and others on the public
streets and thoroughfares over which these companies are
authorized to run their cars. And while, in a criminal case, the
courts will require proof of the guilt of the company or its
employees beyond a reasonable doubt, nevertheless the care or
diligence required of the company and its employees is the same
in both cases, and the only question to be determined is whether
the proofs shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the failure to
exercise such care or diligence was the cause of the accident, and
that the defendant was guilty thereof.
Standing erect, at the position he would ordinarily assume while
the car is in motion, the eye of the average motorman might just
miss seeing the top of the head of a child, about three years old,
standing or walking close up to the front of the car. But it is also
very evident that by inclining the head and shoulders forward very
slightly, and glancing in front of the car, a person in the position of
a motorman could not fail to see a child on the track immediately
in front of his car; and we hold that it is the manifest duty of a
motorman, who is about to start his car on a public thoroughfare
in a thickly-settled district, to satisfy himself that the track is clear
immediately in front of his car, and to incline his body slightly
forward, if that be necessary, in order to bring the whole track
within his line of vision. Of course, this may not be, and usually isnot necessary when the car is in motion, but we think that it is
required by the dictates of the most ordinary prudence in starting
from a standstill.
Sarmiento v Sun-Cabrido (Torts)
SARMIENTO V SUN-CABRIDO (2003)
[G.R. No. 141258. April 9, 2003]
TOMASA SARMIENTO, petitioner, vs. SPS. LUIS & ROSE SUN-
CABRIDO and MARIA LOURDES SUN, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner, Tomasa Sarmiento, states that sometime in April 1994,
a friend, Dra. Virginia Lao, requested her to find somebody to
reset a pair of diamond earrings into two gold rings. Accordingly,
petitioner sent a certain TitaPayag with the pair of earrings to
Dingding’s Jewelry Shop, owned and managed by respondent
spouses Luis and Rose Cabrido, which accepted the job order for
P400.
Petitioner provided 12 grams of gold to be used in crafting the
pair of ring settings. After 3 days, TitaPayag delivered to the
jewelry shop one of Dra. Lao’s diamond earrings which was earlier
appraised as worth .33 carat and almost perfect in cut and
clarity.Respondent Ma. Lourdes (Marilou) Sun went on to
dismount the diamond from its original setting. Unsuccessful, she
asked their goldsmith, Zenon Santos, to do it. Santos removed the
diamond by twisting the setting with a pair of pliers, breaking the
gem in the process.
Petitioner required the respondents to replace the diamond with
the same size and quality. When they refused, the petitioner was
forced to buy a replacement in the amount of P30,000.
Petitioner filed a complaint for damages on June 28, 1994.
private respondents vigorously denied any transaction between
Dingdings’ Jewelry Shop and the petitioner, through TitaPayag.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:1. MTC: declared respondents liable.
2. RTC: absolving the respondents of any responsibility arising
from breach of contract. while ostensibly admitting the existence
of the said agreement, private respondents, nonetheless denied
assuming any obligation to dismount the diamonds from their
original settings.
3. CA: declared the private respondents not liable for damages.
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES:
Respondents
- dismounting of the diamond from its original setting was part of
the obligation assumed by the private respondents under the
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contract of service.
Petitioners
- agreement was for crafting two gold rings mounted with
diamonds only and did not include the dismounting of the said
diamonds from their original setting.
ISSUE:
Whether respondents are liable
RULING:Yes.
it is beyond doubt that Santos acted negligently in dismounting
the diamond from its original setting. It appears to be the practice
of
PART 1: OVERLAND TRANSPORTATION CHAPTER 1: GENERAL
CONCEPTSI. Concept of COMMON CARRIER1.1
Definition1)Crisostomovs Court of Appeals
FACTS
: A travel agency is not an entity engaged in the business of
transporting either passengers or goods and is therefore, neither
a private nor a common carrier. Respondent did not undertake to
transport petitioner from one place to another since its covenant
with its customers is simply to make travel
arrangements in their behalf. Respondent’s services as
a travel agency include procuring tickets and facilitating travel
permits or visas as well as booking customers for tours. It is in this
sense that the contract between the parties in this case was an
ordinary one for services and not one of carriage.Petitioner EstelaL. Crisostomo contracted the services of respondent Caravan
Travel and ToursInternational, Inc. to arrange and facilitate her
booking, ticketing, and accommodation in a tour
dubbed “Jewels of Europe”. A 5% discount on the total
cost of P74,322.70 which included the airfare was given to the
petitioner. The booking fee was also
waived because petitioner’s niece, MeriamMenor,was
respondent’s ticketing manager.
On June 12, 1991, Menor went to her aunt’s residence to deliver
petitioner’s travel documents and plane tickets. In return,
petitioner gave the full payment forthe package tour. Menor then
told her to be at theNAIA on Saturday, June 15, 1991, two hours
before herflight on board British Airways. Without checking
hertravel documents, petitioner went to NAIA and to herd is may,
she discovered that the flight she wassupposed to take had
already departed the previousday. She learned that her plane
ticket was for the flight scheduled on June 14, 1991. She called up
Menortocomplain and Menor suggested upon petitioner totakeanother tour
–
“British Pageant”. Petitioner was asked
anew to pay US$785.00. Petitioner gave respondentUS$300 as
partial payment and commenced the trip.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Caravan did notobserve the standard
of care required of a commoncarrier when it informed the
petitioner wrongly of theflight schedule.
HELD:
The petition was denied for lack of merit. The decision of the
Court of Appeals was affirmed.A common carrier is defined under
Article 1732 of theCivil Code as persons, corporations, firms
orassociations engaged in the business of carrying ortransporting
passengers or goods or both, by land,water or air, for
compensation, affecting their servicesto the public. It is obvious
from the above definitionthat respondent is not an entity
engaged in thebusiness of transporting either passengers or
goodsand is therefore, neither a p rivate nor a commoncarrier.
Respondent did not undertake to transportpetitioner from one
place to another since its covenantwith its customers is simply to
make travel
arrangements in their behalf. Respondent’s services as
a travel agency include procuring tickets andfacilitating travel
permits or visas as well as bookingcustomers for tours. It is in this
sense that the contractbetween the parties in this case was an
ordinary onefor services and not one of carriage.The standard of
care required of respondent is that of a good father of a family
under Article 1173 of the CivilCode. This connotes reasonable care
consistent withthat which an ordinarily prudent person would
have observed when confronted with a similar situation. It is clear
that respondent performed its prestationunderthe contract as
well as everything else that wasessential to book petitioner for
the tour. Hadpetitioner exercised due diligence in the conduct of
her affairs, there would have been no reason for her tomiss the
flight. Needless to say, after the travel paperswere delivered to
petitioners, it became incumbentupon her to take ordinary careof her concerns. Thisundoubtedly would require that she at least
read thedocuments in order to assure herself of the
importantdetails regarding the trip.
Rodzssen Supply Co. Inc. vs. Far East Bank & Trust Co. (357
SCRA 618)
14 Jan
FACTS:
Petitioner opened with respondent a domestic letter of credit
(LOC) in favor of Ekman and Company, Inc. (Ekman) for the
purchase of five hydraulic loaders. The first three hydraulic
loaders were received by the petitioner before the expiry of LOC
and respondent paid Ekman. The remaining two hydraulic loaders
were received by the petitioner after the expiry of LOC/contract
but respondent still paid Ekman. Petitioner refused to pay
respondent. Respondent filed a case. Petitioner answered by way
of affirmative defense that respondent had no cause of action
being allegedly in bad faith and breach of contract. The trial court
and Court of Appeals ruled in favor of respondent to recover from
the cost of two hydraulic loaders.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is entitled of reimbursement from
petitioner for its payment out of mutual negligence.
RULING:
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YES. Petitioner should pay respondent bank the amount the latter
expended for the equipment belatedly delivered by Ekman and
voluntarily received and kept by petitioner. Respondent bank’s
right to seek recovery from petitioner is anchored, not upon the
inefficacious Letter of Credit, but on Article 2142 of the Civil Code
which reads: “Certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give
rise to the juridical relation of quasi-contract to the end that no
one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of
another.” When both parties to a transaction are mutually
negligent in the performance of their obligations, the fault of onecancels the negligence of the other and, as in this case, their rights
and obligations may be determined equitably under the law
proscribing unjust enrichment.
81 SCRA 472 Virata
Torts and Damages – Double Recovery of Civil Liability
In September 1975, Borilla was driving a jeep when he hit
ArsenioVirata thereby causing the latter’s death. The heirs of
Virata sued Borilla through an action for homicide through
reckless imprudence in the CFI of Rizal. Virata’s lawyer reserved
their right to file a separate civil action the he later withdrew said
motion. But in June 1976, pending the criminal case, the Viratas
again reserved their right to file a separate civil action. Borilla was
eventually acquitted as it was ruled that what happened was a
mere accident. The heirs of Virata then sued Borilla and Ochoa
(the owner of the jeep and employer of Borilla) for damages
based on quasi delict. Ochoa assailed the civil suit alleging that
Borilla was already acquitted and that the Virata’s were merely
trying to recover damages twice. The lower court agreed withOchoa and dismissed the civil suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of Virata may file a separate civil
suit.
HELD: Yes. It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved
parties may choose between an action under the Revised Penal
Code or of quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. What is prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines is to recover twice for the same negligent act.
Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an
accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt
or not, shall not be a ba r to a subsequent civil action, not for civil
liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a
quasi-delict or ‘culpa aquiliana’. But said article forestalls a double
recovery.
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CLAUDINA VDA. DE VILLARUEL, ET AL. VS.
MANILA MOTOR CO., INC.
104 PHIL. 926
FACTS:
On May 31, 1940, the plaintiffs Villaruel and
defendant Manila Motor Co. Inc. entered into a contract
whereby the defendant agreed to lease plaintiffs building
premises.
On October 31, 1940, the leased premises were placed in
the possession of the defendant until the invasion of 1941.
The Japanese military occupied and used the property
leased as part of their quarters from June, 1942 to March,
1945, in which no payment of rentals were made. Upon the
liberation of the said city, the American forces occupied the same
buildings that were vacated by the Japanese.
When the United States gave up the occupancy of the
premises, defendant decided to exercise their option to
renew the contract, in which they agreed. However, before
resuming the collection of rentals, Dr. Alfredo Villaruel upon
advice demanded payment of rentals corresponding to the time
the Japanese military occupied the leased premises, but the
defendant refused to pay. As a result plaintiff gave notice seeking
the rescission of the contract and the payment of rentals from
June, 1942 to March, 1945; this was rejected by the defendant.
Despite the fact the defendant under new branch manager paid
to plaintiff the sum of P350 for the rent, the plaintiff still
demanded for rents in arrears and for the rescission of the
contract of lease. The plaintiff commenced an action before the
CFC of Neg. Occidental against defendant company. During the
pendency of the case, the leased building was burned down.Because of the occurrence, plaintiffs demanded reimbursement
from the defendants, but having been refused, they filed a
supplemental complaint to include a 3rd cause of action, the
recovery of the value of the burned building. The trial court
rendered judgment in favour of the plaintiff. Hence the
defendants appeal.
ISSUE:
Is Manila Motor Co. Inc. liable for the loss of the leased premises?
RULING:
No. Clearly, the lessor's insistence upon collecting
the occupation rentals for 1942-1945 was unwarranted in
law. Hence, their refusal to accept the current rentals
without qualification placed them in default (mora
creditoris or accipiendi) with the result that thereafter,
they had to bear all supervening risks of accidental injury
or destruction of the leased premises. While not expressly
declared by the Code of 1889, this result is clearly inferable from
the nature and effects of mora.
In other words, the only effect of the failure to
consign the rentals in court was that the obligation to paythem subsisted and the lessee remained liable for the
amount of the unpaid contract rent, corresponding to the
period from July to November, 1946; it being undisputed
that, from December 1946 up to March 2, 1948, when the
commercial buildings were burned, the defendants appellants
have paid the contract rentals at the rate of
P350 per month. But the failure to consign did not
eradicate the default (mora) of the lessors nor the risk of
loss that lay upon them.
Central Bank of the Philippines v. CA ( 1985)
Ponente: Makasiar, C.J.Topic: Delay (Art. 1169)
Facts:April 28, 1965 - Island Savings Bank (ISB) approved the loan
application for P80,000 of Sulpicio Tolentino, who, asa security for
the loan, also executed a real estate mortgage over his 100-ha
land. The approved loan application called for P80,000 loan,
repayable in semi-annual instalments for a period of 3 years, with
12% interest .May 22, 1965 – a mere P17,000 partial release of
the loan was made by ISB, and Tolentino and his wife Edita signed
a promissory note for P17,000 at 12% annual interest, payable
within 3 years from the date of execution of the contract at semi-
annual instalments of P3,459.An advance interest for the P80,000
loan covering a6-mo period amounting to P4,800was deducted
from the partial release of P17,000, but this was refunded
to Tolentino on July 23, 1965, after being informed by ISB thatthere wasno fund yet available for the release of the P63,000
balance. Aug. 13, 1965 – the Monetary Board of the Central Bank
issued Resolution No. 1049, which prohibited ISB from making
new loans and investments, after finding that it was suffering
liquidity problems. June 14, 1968 – the Monetary Board issued
Resolution No. 967, which prohibited ISB from doing business in
the Philippines, after finding that it failed to put up the required
capital to restore its solvency. Aug. 1, 1968 – ISB, in view of non-
payment of theP17,000 covered by the promissory note, filed an
application for the extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage covering the 100-ha land; and the sheriff scheduled
auction. Tolentino filed a petition with the CFI for injunction,
specific performance or rescission and damages with preliminary
injunction, alleging that since ISB failed to deliver the P63,000
remaining balance of the loan, he is entitled to specific
performance by ordering ISB to deliver it with interest of 12% per
annum from April 28, 1965, and if said balance cannot be
delivered, to rescind the real estate mortgage.CFI issued a TRO
enjoining ISB from continuing with the foreclosure of the
mortgage, however, after finding Tolentino’s petition
unmeritorious, ordered the latter to pay ISB P17,000 plus legal
interest and legal charges and lifting the TRO so the sheriff may
proceed with the foreclosure.CA, on appeal by Tolentino,
modified CFI’s decision by affirming dismissal of Tolentino’s
petition for specific performance, but ruled that ISB can neitherforeclose the mortgage nor collect the P17,000 loan.SC: The
par ties, in the P80,000 loan agreement, undertook reciprocal
obligations, wherein the obligati