TECSON V. COMELEC1

G.R. NO. 161434, 3 MARCH 2004

FACTS: The case at bar is a consolidated case filed by petitioners questioning the certificate of candidacy of herein private respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. The latter filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) party. He represented himself in said certificate as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, which reason that petitioners filed a petition before the Comelec to disqualify private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy on the ground that the latter made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino when in truth his parents were foreigners and he is an illegitimate child. The Comelec dismissed the petition. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

HELD: Before discussing on the issue at hand it is worth stressing that since private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. was born on August 20, 1939, the applicable law then controlling was the 1935 constitution. The issue on private respondent’s citizenship is so essential in view of the constitutional provision that, “No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.” Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Based on the evidence presented which the Supreme consider as viable is the fact that the death certificate of Lorenzo Poe, father of Allan Poe, who in turn was the father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. indicates that he died on September 11, 1954 at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. Evidently, in such death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Poe was stated to be San Carlos, Pangansinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence before death. Considering that the allegations of petitioners are not substantiated with proof and since Lorenzo Poe may have been benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902, there is no doubt that Allan Poe father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. was a Filipino citizen. And, since the latter is governed by the provisions of the 1935 Constitution which constitution considers as citizens of the Philippines those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines, Fernando Poe, Jr. was in fact a natural-born citizen of the Philippines regardless of whether or not he is legitimate or illegitimate.

1

Senate of the Phils. v Executive SecretaryG.R. No. 169777  April 20, 2006

Facts:1.       Assailed in this petition was the constitutionality of Executive Order 464 issued by the

President. Petitioners contend that the President abused its power and prayed that said law be declared null and void. EO 464 requires that heads of departments obtain the consent of the President before they can validly appear before investigations including the one conducted in the Senate. It also grants executive privilege on all classified or confidential information between the President and the public officers covered by the EO.

2.       The Senate conducted an investigation and issued invitations to various officials of the Executive department as resource speakers in a public hearing on the North Rail project. Said public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Sen.  Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the said project. The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations to officials of the AFP.

3.       Executive Ermita sent a letter to the Senate requesting postponement of the hearing. On the same day (Sept 28, 2005) the President issued EO 464.  Despite this development, the investigation pushed through, with only Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani among all the AFP officials invited attending. Both were subsequently relieved for defying the President’s order.

4.      Hence, three petitions (Bayan Muna, Sen. Chavez, Alt.. Law Group), for certiorari and prohibition and TRO, were filed before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of E.O. 464.

ISSUE 1: Whether or not E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress

YES. EO 464 bars the appearance of executive officials before the Congress, hence it deprives it of the information in possession of these officials.

1.       The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Sec. 21 Article VI of the Constitution. This power is incidental to the legislative function. The power of inquiry – with process to enforce it -- is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and when it does not possess the required information, recourse must be had on others who possess it. This power is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch. The operation of the government is a proper subject for investigation, as held in Arnault case.

2.     Although the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which fall under the rubric of ‘executive privilege’.  It is defined by Schwartz as “the power of the government to withhold information from the public, the courts and the Congress.” (e.g. state secret privilege, informer’s privilege, generic privilege)

3.     The power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.

4.     Congress undoubtedly, has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.

The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible. 

5.       Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.

Sec. 21 (Inquiry in Aid of Legislation) vs Sec. 22 (Question Hour)

6.       A distinction was made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. These are two distinct functions of the legislature. Sec. 21 and 22 while closely related does not pertain to the same power of the Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation with the aim of eliciting information that may be used in legislation while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. Hence, the oversight function of Congress may only be

facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.

7.       When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for the department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege, and not by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power – the president on whom the executive power is vested, hence beyond the reach of the Congress except by the power of impeachment. Members of SC are likewise exempt from this power of inquiry. This is on the basis of separation of powers and fiscal autonomy, as well as the constitutional independence of the judiciary.

On the constitutionality of EO 464

8.       Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of department heads in the question hour contemplated in the provision of said Section 22 of Article VI. The reading is dictated by the basic rule of construction that issuances must be interpreted, as much as possible, in a way that will render it constitutional. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.

9.     Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated. Section 3 of E.O. 464, therefore, cannot be dismissed outright as invalid by the mere fact that it sanctions claims of executive privilege. This Court must look further and assess the claim of privilege authorized by the Order to determine whether it is valid. The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress.

10.  The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is, just as direct as its violation of the legislature’s power of inquiry.

11.   Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking

said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible. Resort to any means then by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge information cannot be presumed valid. Otherwise, we shall not have merely nullified the power of our legislature to inquire into the operations of government, but we shall have given up something of much greater value – our right as a people to take part in government.

PIMENTEL vs  CONGRESS( Joint Committee of Congress to Canvass the Votes Cast for President and Vice-President in the May 10, 2004 Elections  [G.R. No. 163783. June 22, 2004]

EN BANC R E S O L U T I O N

Facts:Petition for Prohibition. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring null and void the

continued existence of the JointCommittee. The petition corollarily prays for the issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Joint Committee to cease and desist from conducting any further proceedings pursuant to the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on Canvassing.

Petitioner posits that with "the adjournment  sine die(w/o date fixed) on June 11, 2004 by the Twelfth Congress of its las tregular session, [its] term ... terminated and expired on the said day and the said Twelfth Congress serving the term 2001 to 2004 passed out of legal existence." Henceforth, petitioner goes on, "all pending matters and proceedings terminate upon the expiration of ... Congress.

ISSUE: WON the Joint Committee performing election canvass even after the termination of congress’ session is constitutional. RULING:Sec. 15. Art VI - The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it may determine until thirty days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call a special session at any time.

Contrary to petitioner's argument, however, the term of the present Twelfth Congress did not terminate and expire upon the adjournment  sine die of the regular session of both Houses on June 11, 2004.

Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution cited by petitioner does not pertain to the term of Congress, but to its regular annual legislative sessions and the mandatory 30-day recess before the opening of its next regular session (subject to the power of the President to call a special session at any time).

Section 4 of Article VIII provides that "[t]he term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unlessotherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election." Similarly, Section 7 provides that"[t]he Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years. Consequently, there being no law to the contrary, until June 30, 2004, the present Twelfth Congress to which the present legislators belong cannot be said to have"passed out of legal existence."

The legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may have come to a close upon the final adjournment of its regular sessions on June 11, 2004, but this does not affect its non-legislative functions. In fact, the joint public session of both Housesof

Congress convened by express directive of Section 4, Article VII to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the newly elected President and VP has not, and cannot, adjourn  sine die until it has accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a board of canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered  functus officio . Its membership may change, but it retains its authority as a board until it has accomplished its purposes.

Since the Twelfth Congress has not yet completed its non-legislative duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the duly elected President and VP, its existence as the National Board of Canvassers, as well as that of the Joint Committee to which it referred the preliminary tasks of authenticating and canvassing the certificates of canvass, has not become  functus officio.

SOLIVEN vs. MAKASIAR

167 SCRA 393 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – President’s Immunity From Suit – Must Be Invoked by the President

FACTS: Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together with others, was charged with libel by the then president Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a president would sue then the president would allow herself to be placed under the court’s jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the president may not be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other than the president.

HELD: No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder’s time, also demands undivided attention.

But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President’s behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the President is the complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court’s jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President’s prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.

Rubrico vs. ArroyoFebruary 18, 2010

FACTS:Rubrico, in her petition, said she was abducted on April 3, 2007 by armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron, based at the Philippine Air Force Field Station at Fernando Air Base in Lipa City, Batangas. During her detention, the petitioner added, her daughters Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel and Jean Rubrico Apruebo were harassed by Senior Insp. Arsenio Gomez and that there were also armed men following them. The petitioners prayed that a writ of amparo be issued, ordering the individual respondents to desist from performing any threatening act against the security of the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended party. It also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes.The respondents then filed a joint return on the writ specifically denying the material inculpatory averments against them. Respondents interposed the defense that the President may not be sued during her incumbency.Petitioners pleaded back to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against the President, et al.By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the case .

ISSUE:WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their] Petition and dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.HELD:The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or her tenure.Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the amparo case against other respondents for failure of the petition to  allege ultimate facts as to make out a case against that body for the enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the threats and harassment that followed.

GLORIA vs. CA

FACTS:  Respondent was appointed School Division Superintendent, Division of City Schools, Quezon City.  Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the President reassigned him as Superintendent of the Marikina Institute of Science and Technology on the ground that he is an expert in vocational and technical education.  Respondent questioned the validity of his reassignment on the ground that it is indefinite and it violated his security of tenure.HELD:  There is nothing to show that the reassignment of respondent is temporary.  The evidence or intention to reassign respondent had no definite period.  It is violative of his security of tenureHELD:  The contention is untenable.  The petition is not directed against the President.  Presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts.

CIVIL LIBERTIES vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

194 SCRA 317 – Political Law – Ex Officio Officials – Members of the Cabinet – Singularity of Office – EO 284

FACTS: In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No.  284 which allowed members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which provides:

“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.”CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution“, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.

HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s understanding thereof.

In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

SECTION 8 ARTICLE 7, 1987 CONSTITUTIONESTRADA VS. DESIERTO

(G.R. NO. 146710-15, MARCH 2, 2001)

PUNO, J.:FACTS:

In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Both petitioner and the respondent were to serve a six-year term commencing on June 30, 1998.During his term, the petitioner experienced a sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000 when Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The exposẻ immediately ignited reactions of rage. Numerous investigations commenced both from the Senate and the House of Representatives. Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air that on October 11, Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral letter asking the petitioner to step down from the presidency as he had lost the moral authority to govern.

Political tensions continued to heat up as key economic advisers and members of the cabinet defected. On November 13, in a tumultuous session, the house of representatives finally transmitted the articles of impeachment to the senate signed by 115 represenatatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives. On November 20, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. Twenty-one (21) senators took their oath as judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding. The political tension rose during the impeachment trial particularly during the December hearings when Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice president of Equitable-PCI Bank testified on the existence of the Jose Velarde account. The impeachment trial reached its turning point when on the fateful day of January 16, by a vote of 11-10 the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name "Jose Velarde." The non-opening of the second envelope led to the resignation of the public and private prosecutors and the spontaneous outburst of anger by the people in EDSA which is now referred to as the EDSA dos.

Petitioner’s fall from power became more apparent starting January 19 when key officials from the armed forces, the PNP and his other cabinet members withdrew support. At about 12:00 noon of January 20 Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace while leaving a press statement indicating his strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of the proclamation of the respondent as President and that he is leaving the Palace as he does not wish to “prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.”

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the case at bar is a political question and hence, are beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to decide

2. Whether or not petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.

HELD:

1.)No the case at bar is not a political question. Accordingly, it is within the jurisdiction of the Court to decide. In the case of Tanada v. Cuenco, the Court, through former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure." To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.

Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II is clear. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a political question; EDSA II involves legal questions.

2. ) No. President Estrada is not on leave, he resigned from office. Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.

In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacañang Palace. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his act and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. Using this totality test, the Court holds that petitioner resigned as President. The petitioner’s resignation is shown in the following instances:

a. he left Malacañangb. he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic

albeit with reservation about its legalityc. he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the

sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears

d. he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them.e. he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come

ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up;

f. he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency.

ISSUES:

1.Whether or not the petitioner Is only temporarily unable to Act as President2.Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the

criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada3.Whether or not the petitioner is immune from the charges filed against

HELD:

1. No, petitioner is not only temporarily unable to act as president. House Resolution Nos. 175,176, and 178, as well as Senate Resolutions No. 82, 83 and 84 show that both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability.

2.) No. Conviction in the impeachment proceedings is not a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of the petitioner. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Since, the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his

prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a better situation than a non- sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him

3.) No. The petitioner is not immuned from the cases filed against him by virtue of him being an unsitting president. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and conditions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.

Executive power; power of reorganization; rationale.  And in Domingo v. Zamora [G.R. No. 142283, February 6, 2003], the Court gave the rationale behind the President’s continuing authority in this wise:  “The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his office ‘to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.’  The Office of the President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch.  To remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies.  After all, the Office of the President is the command post of the President.”  Pichay, Jr. v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs-Investigative and Adjudicatory Division, et al., G.R. No. 196425. July 24, 2012.

Executive power; power of reorganization; nature.  Generally, this authority to implement organizational changes is limited to transferring either an office or a function from the Office of the President to another Department or Agency, and the other way around.  Only Section 31(1) [of the Administrative Code] gives the President a virtual freehand in dealing with the internal structure of the Office of the President Proper by allowing him to take actions as extreme as abolition, consolidation or merger of units, apart from the less drastic move of transferring functions and offices from one unit to another.  Again, in Domingo v. Zamora, the Court noted:  “However, the President’s power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 should be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper.  Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of the President Proper byabolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from one unit to another.  In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the President’s power to reorganize offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the

Office of the President is limited to merelytransferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to Departments or Agencies, andvice versa.”

ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTMARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS

(177 SCRA 668)

FACTS:

In February 1986, Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent “people power” revolution and forced into exile. Corazon C. Aquino was declared President of the Philippines under a revolutionary government.

After three years, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Aquino has stood firmly in the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family - considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of the government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward.

ISSUE: Whether or not in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

HELD:

Yes, the President has the Power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning to our country.

The Constitution says that the executive power shall be vested in the President. It also enumerates certain specific powers. The enumeration, however, does not exhaust the totality of executive powers. Tradition recognizes that the powers of the President are more than the sum of enumerated executive powers. The duty of the government “to serve and protect the people” as well as to see to the “maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare” argue towards the existence of “residual instated powers.”

ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTBINAMIRA VS. GARRUCHO(188 SCRA 154 [1990])

FACTS:

The petitioner, Binamira, was the former General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority by virtue of the designation of the Minister of Tourism with the approval of President Aquino. Subsequently, Garrucho was delegated by the President as the new Secretary of the Ministry. Garucho then had taken over the position of Binamira as the General Manager of Philippine Tourism Authority. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:1. W/N a person designated to a position by a member of the

cabinet should step down to a person newly designated bythe President to that same position.

2. Distinguished designation from appointmentHELD:

1. YES.The designation of the petitioner cannot sustain his claim that he has been illegally removed. The reason is thatThe decree clearly provides that the appointment of theGeneral Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority shallBe made by the President of the Philippines, not by anyother officer. Appointment involves the exercise of discretion,Which because of its nature cannot be delegated. Legallyspeaking, it was not possible for Minister Gonzales toassume the exercise of that discretion as an alter ego of thePresident.His designation being an unlawful encroachment on a

presidential prerogative, he did not acquire valid title thereunder to the position in question. Even if it be assumed that it could be and was authorized, the designation signified merely a temporary or acting appointment that could be legally withdrawn at pleasure, as in fact it was (albeit for a different reason).

2. Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the naming of a particularperson to a specified public office.

That is the common understanding of the term. However, where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person named.

MATIBAG VS. BENIPAYO

G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002

FACTS:

On February 1999, petitioner Matibag was appointed Acting Director IV of the Comelec’s EID by then Comelec Chairperson Harriet Demetriou in a temporary capacity. On March 2001, respondent Benipayo was appointed Comelec Chairman together with other commissioners in an ad interim appointment. While on such ad interim appointment, respondent Benipayo in his capacity as Chairman issued a Memorandum address transferring petitioner to the Law Department. Petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department. She cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads of government offices that "transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election period. Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated November 6, 2000, exempting Comelec from the coverage of the said Memo Circular.

Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc. She also filed an administrative and criminal complaint16 with the Law Department17against Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil service laws, rules and regulations.

During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.

RULING:

We find petitioner’s argument without merit.

An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until

disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.

In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended permanent appointments during the recess of Congress. They were not appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity, unlike Commissioner Haydee Yorac in Brillantes vs. Yorac34 and Solicitor General Felix Bautista in Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista.35 The ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by the Constitution which authorizes the President, during the recess of Congress, to make appointments that take effect immediately.

While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC "shall be independent"36, this provision should be harmonized with the President’s power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold that the independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before the appointees can assume office will negate the President’s power to make ad interim appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give meaning and effect to every provision of the law. It will also run counter to the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution.