Digest ABC

8/17/2019 Digest ABC

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RIGHT TO INFORMATION

Legaspi v CSC 150 SCRA 530 (1987)Facts: The petitioner invokes his constitutional right to information on matters of public concern in a specialcivil action for mandamus against the CSC pertaining to the information of civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. The standing of the petitioner waschallenged by the Solicitor General of being devoid of legal right to be informed of the civil service eligibilitiesof government employees for failure of petitioner to provide actual interest to secure the information sought.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner may invoke his constitutional right to information in the case at bar

Held: The court held that when the uestion is one of public right and the ob!ect of the mandamus is to procurethe enforcement of a public duty" the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whoseinstigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result" it being sufficient to show that he is a citi#en and as such interested in the e$ecution of the laws. The Constitution provides the guarantee of adopting policy of full public disclosure sub!ect to reasonable conditions prescribed by law as in regulation in the manner of e$amining the public records by the government agencyin custodythereof. %ut the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute&nder the Constitution" access to official records" papers" etc." are 'sub!ect to limitations as may be provided by

law' ()rt. ***" Sec. +" second sentence,. The law may therefore e$empt certain types of information from publicscrutiny" such as those affecting national security.

The court delves into determining whether the information sought for by the petitioner is of public interest. )llappointments in the Civil Service Commission are made according to merit and fitness while a public office is a public trust. -ublic employees therefore are accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities totheir positions in the government. The court also noted that the information on the result of theCSC eligibility e$amination is released to the public therefore the reuest of petitioner is one that is not unusualor unreasonable. The public" through any citi#en" has the right to verify the civil eligibilities of any personoccupying governmentpositions.

Valmonte Vs Belmonte

)CTS / -etitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary in!unction invoke their right toinformation and pray that respondent be directed/ (a, to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the %atasang-ambansa members belonging to the &0*D1 and -D-23aban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the ebruary + election thru the intercession4marginal note of the then irst 3ady *melda 5arcos6 and4or(b, to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans6 and4or (c,to allow petitioners access to the public records for the sub!ect information 1n 7une 89" :;almonte wrote respondent another letter" saying that for failure to receive a reply" '(W,e

are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desiredob!ective in pursuance of public interest.'

*SS&? / W10 >almonte" et. al. are entitled as citi#ens and ta$payers to inuire upon GS*S records on behestloans given by the former irst 3ady *melda 5arcos to %atasang -ambansa members belonging to the &0*D1and -D-23aban political parties.

H?3D / @espondent has failed to cite any law granting the GS*S the privilege of confidentiality as regards thedocuments sub!ect of this petition. His position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The !udiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is" and not what the law should be. &nder our system of government" policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of the


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government" and of the people themselves as the repository of all State power. The concerned borrowersthemselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy" considering the public offices theywere holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been granted. *t cannot be denied that because of theinterest they generate and their newsworthiness" public figures" most especially those holding responsible positions in government" en!oy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals" their actions being sub!ect to closer public scrutiny The 'transactions' used here * suppose is generic and" therefore" it cancover both steps leading to a contract" and already a consummated contract" Considering the intent of theframers of the Constitution which" though not binding upon the Court" are nevertheless persuasive" and

considering further that government2owned and controlled corporations" whether performing proprietary orgovernmental functions are accountable to the people" the Court is convinced that transactions entered into bythe GS*S" a government2controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the peopleAsright to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings. )lthoughciti#ens are afforded the right to information and" pursuant thereto" are entitled to 'access to official records"'the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists" abstracts"summaries and the like in their desire to acuire information on matters of public concern.

THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTAATO vs! THE "OVERN#ENT OF THE REP$ IC OF THE

PHI IPPINES "R% 183591& O'*e+ 1,& -008

Carpio25orales" 7/

Facts:The 5emorandum of )greement on the )ncestral Domain )spect of the G@-25*3 Tripoli )greement of-eace of 899: (51), is assailed on its constitutionality. This document prepared by the !oint efforts of theGovernment of the @epublic of the -hilippines (G@-, -eace -anel and the 5oro *slamic 3iberation ront(5*3, -eace -anel" was merely a codification of consensus points reached between both parties and theaspirations of the 5*3 to have a %angsamoro homeland

Issue:

When the ?$ecutive Department pronounced to abandon the 51)" is the issue of its constitutionality merelymoot and academic and therefore no longer !usticiable by the CourtB

Held:es. Since the 51) has not been signed" its provisions will not at all come into effect. The 51) will foreverremain a draft that has never been finali#ed. *t is now nothing more than a piece of paper" with no legal force or binding effect. *t cannot be the source of" nor be capable of violating" any right. The instant -etitions" therefore"and all other oppositions to the 51)" have no more leg to stand on. They no longer present an actual case or a !usticiable controversy for resolution by this Court

)n actual case or controversy e$ists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legalclaims" which can be resolved on the basis of e$isting law and !urisprudence. ) !usticiable controversy isdistinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute" in that the former involves a definite andconcrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. ) !usticiable

controversy admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in character" whereas an opinion onlyadvises what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts

The Court should not feel constrained to rule on the -etitions at bar !ust because of the great public interestthese cases have generated. We are" after all" a court of law" and not of public opinion. The power of !udicialreview of this Court is for settling real and e$istent dispute" it is not for allaying fears or addressing publicclamor. *n acting on supposed abuses by other branches of government" the Court must be careful that it is notcommitting abuse itself by ignoring the fundamental principles of constitutional law.


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Petitioner: LEO ECHEGARA

Res!ondents: "ECRETAR OF #$"TICE% ET AL

)CTS/

1n 7anuary " :;;;" the SC issued a T@1 staying the e$ecution of petitioner 3eo ?chegaray scheduled on that

same day. The public respondent 7ustice Secretary assailed the issuance of the T@1 arguing that the action of

the SC not only violated the rule on finality of !udgment but also encroached on the power of the e$ecutive to

grant reprieve.

*SS&?/ Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary @estraining 1rder (T@1, on the

e$ecution of ?chegaray despite the fact that the finality of !udgment has already been rendered. that by

granting the T@1" the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an e$ecutive function.

H?3D/

0o. @espondents cited sec :;" art >**. The provision is simply the source of power of the -resident to grant

reprieves" commutations" and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final !udgment. The

provision" however" cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their

decisions after their finality.The powers of the ?$ecutive" the 3egislative and the 7udiciary to save the life of a death convict do not e$clude

each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.

or the public respondents therefore to contend that only the ?$ecutive can protect the right to life of an

accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co2eual and coordinate powers of the three

branches of our government.CHAVE& V" PCGG

G.@. 0o. :E9+:= December ;" :;;<)CTS/ -etitioner rancisco *. Chave#" in his capacity as ta$payer" citi#en and a former government official asked the court to prohibit and en!oin respondents F-CGG and its chairman

from privately entering into" perfecting and4or e$ecuting any agreement with the heirs of the late-resident erdinand ?. 5arcos . . . relating to and concerning the properties and assets of erdinand 5arcos located in the -hilippines and4or abroad / including the so2called 5arcosgold hoard.Chave# assailed the validity of the General and Supplemental )greement e$ecuted by thegovernment (through -CGG, and the 5arcos heirs on December 8* of the Constitution"specifically provides/ '0o law granting any ta$ e$emption shall be passed without theconcurrence of a ma!ority of all the 5ember of the Congress.' The -CGG has absolutely no power to grant ta$ e$emptions" even under the cover of its authority to compromise ill2gottenwealth cases.


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?ven granting that Congress enacts a law e$empting the 5arcoses form paying ta$es on their properties" such law will definitely not pass the test of the eual protection clause under the %illof @ights. )ny special grant of ta$ e$emption in favor only of the 5arcos heirs will constituteclass legislation. *t will also violate the constitutional rule that 'ta$ation shall be uniform andeuitable.' 0either can the stipulation be construed to fall within the power of the commissioner of internalrevenue to compromise ta$es. Such authority may be e$ercised only when (:, there isreasonable doubt as to the validity of the claim against the ta$payer" and (8, the ta$payerAs

financial position demonstrates a clear inability to pay. Definitely" neither reuisite is present inthe case of the 5arcoses" because under the )greement they are effectively conceding thevalidity of the claims against their properties" part of which they will be allowed to retain. 0or canthe -CGG grant of ta$ e$emption fall within the power of the commissioner to abate or cancel ata$ liability. This power can be e$ercised only when (:, the ta$ appears to be un!ustly or e$cessively assessed" or (8, the administration and collection costs involved do not !ustify thecollection of the ta$ due. *n this instance" the cancellation of ta$ liability is done even before thedetermination of the amount due. *n any event" criminal violations of the Ta$ Code" for whichlegal actions have been filed in court or in which fraud is involved" cannot be compromised.

RIGHT TO FORM A""OCIATION

SSS Ep2ee Ass! v CA 175 SCRA 8 (42 -8& 1989)Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the union6s demands concerning theimplementation of their C%). SSS filed before the court action for damages with prayer for writ o preliminary in!unction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court issued a temporary restrainingorder pending the resolution of the application for preliminary in!unction while petitioners filed a motion todismiss alleging the court6s lack of !urisdiction over the sub!ect matter. -etitioners contend that the courmade reversible error in taking cogni#ance on the sub!ect matter since the !urisdiction lies on the D13? or the 0ational 3abor @elations Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The SSS contends on one hand thatthe petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws" rules and regulation thus have no right to strike. They are

not covered by the 03@C or D13? therefore the court may en!oin the petitioners from striking.

Issue: Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike Whether or not the C) erred in taking !urisdiction over the sub!ect matter.

Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human @ights and Social 7ustice provides guarantee amongworkers with the right to organi#e and conduct peaceful concerted activities such as strikes. 1n one handSection : of ?.1 0o. :


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0either the D13? nor the 03@C has !urisdiction over the sub!ect matter but instead it is the -ublic Sector3abor25anagement Council which is not granted by law authority to issue writ of in!unction in labor disputeswithin its !urisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the general court for the issuance of a writ of in!unction toen!oin the strike is appropriate.

e:ai Vi'+ia vs Ei;ae+s? $i

%en!amin >ictoriano" an *glesia ni Cristo (*0C, member" has been an employee of the ?li#alde @ope actory

(?@, since :;ictoriano tendered his resignation from ?-W&

claiming that as per @) EE9 he is an e$emption to the close shop agreement by virtue of his being a member of

the *0C because apparently in the *0C" one is forbidden from being a member of any labor union. *t was only

in :;+ that his resignation from the &nion was acted upon by ?-W& which notified ?@ about it. ?@ then

moved to terminate >ictoriano due to his non2membership from the ?-W&. ?-W& and ?@ reiterated that he

is not e$empt from the close shop agreement because @) EE9" which provides that close shop agreements shall

not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labororgani#ation" is unconstitutional and that said law violates the ?-W&6s and ?@6s legal4contractual rights.

I""$E: Whether or not @) EE9 is unconstitutional.

HEL': 0o. The right to religion prevails over contractual or legal rights. )s such" an *0C member may refuse

to !oin a labor union and despite the fact that there is a close shop agreement in the factory where he was

employed" his employment could not be validly terminated for his non2membership in the ma!ority therein

urther" the right to !oin a union includes the right not to !oin a union. The law is not unconstitutional. *t

recogni#es both the rights of unions and employers to enforce terms of contracts and at the same time it

recogni#es the workers6 right to !oin or not to !oin union. @) E9 recogni#es as well the primacy of a

constitutional right over a contractual right.

I Re@ E


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FREE'OM OF E(PRE""ION

")" *s Comelec

acts/-etitioner SWS and I-C states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the

elections and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. -etitioners arguethat the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the e$ercise offreedom of speech without any clear and present danger to !ustify such restraint.

*ssue/)re the Comelec @esolutions prohibiting the holding of pre2polls and e$it polls and the dissemination of theirresults through mass media" valid and constitutionalB

@uling/ 0o. The Court held that Section (, is invalid because (:, it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom ofe$pression" (8, it is a direct and total suppression of a category of e$pression even though such suppression is

only for a limited period" and (E, the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by meansother than suppression of freedom of e$pression.*t has been held that 'Fmere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience maywell support regulation directed at other personal activities" but be insufficient to !ustify such as diminishes thee$ercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.

FRANCI"CO CHAVE&% *s+ RA$L M+ GON&ALE"

acts/The case originates from events that occurred a year after the 899 national and local elections. 1n 7une "899" -ress Secretary *gnacio %unye told reporters that the opposition was planning to release an audiotape of a

mobile phone conversation allegedly between the -resident of the -hilippines" Gloria 5acapagal )rroyo" and ahigh2ranking official of the Commission on ?lections (C15?3?C, which was audiotaped allegedly throughwire2tapping. 1n 7une


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C$"TO'IAL INVE"TIGATION

Pepe v Pia' 15 SCRA 75 (1988)Facts: The accused was convicted for two separate criminal cases for robbery and robbery with homicide. Heassailed his conviction on the contention that the court erred in admitting his e$tra!udicial confession asevidence which was taken by force" violence" torture" and intimidation without having appraised of

his constitutional rights and without the assistance of counsel

Issue: Whether or not due process was observed during the custodial investigation of the accused.

Held: The court find it meritorious to declare that the constitutional rights of the accused was violated in thefailure of the authorities in making the accused understand the nature of the charges against him withoutappraising him of his constitutional right to have a counsel during custodial investigation. 5oreoverthe prosecution merely presented the e$tra!udicial confession of the accused which is inadmissible as evidenceand the other evidences provided therein are merely circumstantial and sub!ect for rebuttal. The court acuittedthe accused.

@epublic )ct 0o. +E< )pril 8+" :;;8

)0 )CT D?*0*0G C?@T)*0 @*GHTS 1 -?@S10 )@@?ST?D" D?T)*0?D 1@ &0D?@ C&ST1D*)3*0>?ST*G)T*10 )S W?33 )S TH? D&T*?S 1 TH? )@@?ST*0G" D?T)*0*0G )0D*0>?ST*G)T*0G 1*C?@S" )0D -@1>*D*0G -?0)3T*?S 1@ >*13)T*10S TH?@?1

%e it enacted by the Senate and House of @epresentatives of the -hilippines in Congress assembled//

Section :. Statement of -olicy. *t is the policy of the Senate to value the dignity of every human being andguarantee full respect for human rights.

Section 8. @ights of -ersons )rrested" Detained or &nder Custodial *nvestigation6 Duties of -ublic 1fficers.

(a, )ny person arrested detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel.

(b, )ny public officer or employee" or anyone acting under his order or his place" who arrests" detains orinvestigates any person for the commission of an offense shall inform the latter" in a language known to andunderstood by him" of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel" preferably ofhis own choice" who shall at all times be allowed to confer privately with the person arrested" detained or undercustodial investigation. *f such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel" he must be provided with acompetent and independent counsel by the investigating officer.lawphi:J

(c, The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by the investigating officer" provided that before such report is signed" or thumbmarked if the person arrested or detained does not know how to read andwrite" it shall be read and adeuately e$plained to him by his counsel or by the assisting counsel provided by theinvestigating officer in the language or dialect known to such arrested or detained person" otherwise" suchinvestigation report shall be null and void and of no effect whatsoever.

(d, )ny e$tra!udicial confession made by a person arrested" detained or under custodial investigation shall bein writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or in the latterAs absence" upon a validwaiver" and in the presence of any of the parents" elder brothers and sisters" his spouse" the municipal mayor" themunicipal !udge" district school supervisor" or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him6 otherwise" suche$tra!udicial confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding.


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(e, )ny waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of )rticle :8 of the @evised -enal Code"or under custodial investigation" shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel6otherwise the waiver shall be null and void and of no effect.

(f, )ny person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be allowed visits by or conferenceswith any member of his immediate family" or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by himor by any member of his immediate family or by his counsel" or by any national non2governmental organi#ation

duly accredited by the Commission on Human @ights of by any international non2governmental organi#ationduly accredited by the 1ffice of the -resident. The personAs 'immediate family' shall include his or her spouse"fiancK or fiancKe" parent or child" brother or sister" grandparent or grandchild" uncle or aunt" nephew or niece"and guardian or ward.

)s used in this )ct" 'custodial investigation' shall include the practice of issuing an 'invitation' to a person whois investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed" without pre!udice to theliability of the 'inviting' officer for any violation of law.

Section E. )ssisting Counsel. )ssisting counsel is any lawyer" e$cept those directly affected by the case"those charged with conducting preliminary investigation or those charged with the prosecution of crimes.

The assisting counsel other than the government lawyers shall be entitled to the following fees6

(a, The amount of 1ne hundred fifty pesos (-:9.99, if the suspected person is chargeable with lightfelonies6lawphi:Lalf (b, The amount of Two hundred fifty pesos (-89.99, if the suspected person is chargeable with less grave orgrave felonies6(c, The amount of Three hundred fifty pesos (-E9.99, if the suspected person is chargeable with a capitaloffense.The fee for the assisting counsel shall be paid by the city or municipality where the custodial investigation isconducted" provided that if the municipality of city cannot pay such fee" the province comprising such

municipality or city shall pay the fee/ -rovided" That the 5unicipal or City Treasurer must certify that no fundsare available to pay the fees of assisting counsel before the province pays said fees.

*n the absence of any lawyer" no custodial investigation shall be conducted and the suspected person can only bedetained by the investigating officer in accordance with the provisions of )rticle :8 of the @evised -enalCode.Section . -enalty Clause. (a, )ny arresting public officer or employee" or any investigating officer" whofails to inform any person arrested" detained or under custodial investigation of his right to remain silent and tohave competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice" shall suffer a fine of Si$ thousand pesos(-="999.99, or a penalty of imprisonment of not less than eight (


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The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding" any security officer with custodial responsibility over anydetainee or prisoner may undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure his safety and prevent his escape.Section . @epealing Clause. @epublic )ct 0o. 0o.


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(a, That he is a recidivist" uasi2recidivist" or habitual delinuent" or has committed the crime aggravated bythe circumstance of reiteration6

(b, That he has previously escaped from legal confinement" evaded sentence" or violated the conditions of his bail without valid !ustification6

(c, That he committed the offense while under probation" parole" or conditional pardon6

(d, That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail6 or

(e, That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.

The appellate court may" motu proprio or on motion of any party" review the resolution of the @egional TrialCourt after notice to the adverse party in either case. (a,

Section =. Capital offense defined. / ) capital offense is an offense which" under the law e$isting at the timeof its commission and of the application for admission to bail" may be punished with death. (=a,

Section +. Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment" not bailable./ 0o person charged with a capital offense" or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or lifeimprisonment" shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong" regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. (+a,

Section


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(!, -endency of other cases where the accused is on bail.

?$cessive bail shall not be reuired. (;a,

Section :9. Corporate surety. / )ny domestic or foreign corporation" licensed as a surety in accordance withlaw and currently authori#ed to act as such" may provide bail by a bond subscribed !ointly by the accused and anofficer of the corporation duly authori#ed by its board of directors. (:9a,

Section ::. -roperty bond" how posted. / ) property bond is an undertaking constituted as lien on the real property given as security for the amount of the bail. Within ten (:9, days after the approval of the bond" theaccused shall cause the annotation of the lien on the certificate of title on file with the @egister of Deeds if theland is registered" or if unregistered" in the @egistration %ook on the space provided therefor" in the @egistry ofDeeds for the province or city where the land lies" and on the corresponding ta$ declaration in the office of the provincial" city and municipal assessor concerned.

Within the same period" the accused shall submit to the court his compliance and his failure to do so shall besufficient cause for the cancellation of the property bond and his re2arrest and detention. (::a,

Section :8. Mualifications of sureties in property bond. / The ualification of sureties in a property bond shall

be as follows/

(a, ?ach must be a resident owner of real estate within the -hilippines6

(b, Where there is only one surety" his real estate must be worth at least the amount of the undertaking6

(c, *f there are two or more sureties" each may !ustify in an amount less than that e$pressed in the undertaking but the aggregate of the !ustified sums must be euivalent to the whole amount of bail demanded.

*n all cases" every surety must be worth the amount specified in his own undertaking over and above all !ustdebts" obligations and properties e$empt from e$ecution. (:8a,

Section :E. 7ustification of sureties. / ?very surety shall !ustify by affidavit taken before the !udge that he possesses the ualifications prescribed in the preceding section. He shall describe the property given as security"stating the nature of his title" its encumbrances" the number and amount of other bails entered into by him andstill undischarged" and his other liabilities. The court may e$amine the sureties upon oath concerning theirsufficiency in such manner as it may deem proper. 0o bail shall be approved unless the surety is ualified. (:Ea,

Section :. Deposit of cash as bail. / The accused or any person acting in his behalf may deposit in cash withthe nearest collector or internal revenue or provincial" city" or municipal treasurer the amount of bail fi$ed bythe court" or recommended by the prosecutor who investigated or filed the case. &pon submission of a propercertificate of deposit and a written undertaking showing compliance with the reuirements of section 8 of this

@ule" the accused shall be discharged from custody. The money deposited shall be considered as bail andapplied to the payment of fine and costs while the e$cess" if any" shall be returned to the accused or to whoevermade the deposit. (:a,

Section :. @ecogni#ance. / Whenever allowed by law or these @ules" the court may release a person incustody to his own recogni#ance or that of a responsible person. (:a,

Section :=. %ail" when not reuired6 reduced bail or recogni#ance. / 0o bail shall be reuired when the lawor these @ules so provide.

When a person has been in custody for a period eual to or more than the possible ma$imum imprisonment


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prescribe for the offense charged" he shall be released immediately" without pre!udice to the continuation of thetrial or the proceedings on appeal. *f the ma$imum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro"he shall be released after thirty (E9, days of preventive imprisonment.

) person in custody for a period eual to or more than the minimum of the principal penalty prescribed for theoffense charged" without application of the *ndeterminate Sentence 3aw or any modifying circumstance" shall be released on a reduced bail or on his own recogni#ance" at the discretion of the court. (:=a,

Section :+. %ail" where filed. / (a, %ail in the amount fi$ed may be filed with the court where the case is pending" or in the absence or unavailability of the !udge thereof" with any regional trial !udge" metropolitan trial !udge" municipal trial !udge" or municipal circuit trial !udge in the province" city" or municipality. *f the accusedis arrested in a province" city" or municipality other than where the case is pending" bail may also be filed withany regional trial court of said place" or if no !udge thereof is available" with any metropolitan trial !udge"municipal trial !udge" or municipal circuit trial !udge therein.

(b, Where the grant of bail is a matter of discretion" or the accused seeks to be released on recogni#ance" theapplication may only be filed in the court where the case is pending" whether on preliminary investigation" trial"or on appeal.

(c, )ny person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any court in the province"city" or municipality where he is held. (:+a,

Section :


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accused has been surrendered or is acuitted. (8:a,

Section 88. Cancellation of bail. / &pon application of the bondsmen" with due notice to the prosecutor" the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of his death.

The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acuittal of the accused" dismissal of the case" ore$ecution of the !udgment of conviction.

*n all instances" the cancellation shall be without pre!udice to any liability on the bond. (88a,

Section 8E. )rrest of accused out on bail. / or the purpose of surrendering the accused" the bondsmen mayarrest him or" upon written authority endorsed on a certified copy of the undertaking" cause him to be arrested by a police officer or any other person of suitable age and discretion.

)n accused released on bail may be re2arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart fromthe -hilippines without permission of the court where the case is pending. (8Ea,

Section 8. 0o bail after final !udgment6 e$ception. / 0o bail shall be allowed after the !udgment ofconviction has become final. *f before such finality" the accused has applies for probation" he may be allowed

temporary liberty under his bail. When no bail was filed or the accused is incapable of filing one" the court mayallow his release on recogni#ance to the custody of a responsible member of the community. *n no case shall bail be allowed after the accused has commenced to serve sentence. (8a,

Section 8. Court supervision of detainees. / The court shall e$ercise supervision over all persons in custodyfor the purpose of eliminating unnecessary detention. The e$ecutive !udges of the @egional Trial Courts shallconduct monthly personal inspections of provincial" city" and municipal !ails and their prisoners within theirrespective !urisdictions. They shall ascertain the number of detainees" inuire on their proper accommodationand health and e$amine the condition of the !ail facilities. They shall order the segregation of se$es and ofminors from adults" ensure the observance of the right of detainees to confer privately with counsel" and striveto eliminate conditions inimical to the detainees.

*n cities and municipalities to be specified by the Supreme Court" the municipal trial !udges or municipal circuittrial !udges shall conduct monthly personal inspections of the municipal !ails in their respective municipalitiesand submit a report to the e$ecutive !udge of the @egional Trial Court having !urisdiction therein.

) monthly report of such visitation shall be submitted by the e$ecutive !udges to the Court )dministrator whichshall state the total number of detainees" the names of those held for more than thirty (E9, days" the duration ofdetention" the crime charged" the status of the case" the cause for detention" and other pertinent information.(8a,

Section 8=. %ail not a bar to ob!ections on illegal arrest" lack of or irregular preliminary investigation. / )n

application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or thelegality of the warrant issued therefor" or from assailing the regularity or uestioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him" provided that he raises them before entering his plea. Thecourt shall resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the case. (n,

GOVERNMENT OF HONG ,ONG "PECIAL A'MINI"TRATIVE REGION V"+ OLALIA

G+R+ NO+ -./01.% APRIL -2% 3441

)CTS/-rivate respondent 5uNo# was charged before the Hong Iong Court with three (E,counts of the offense of'accepting an advantage as agent"' in violation of Section ; (:, (a, of the -revention of %ribery 1rdinance" Cap.


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89: of Hong Iong. He alsofaces seven (+, counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud" penali#ed by thecommon law of Hong Iong. Warrants of arrest were issued against him. *f convicted" he faces a !ail term ofseven (+, to fourteen (:, years for each charge.1n September :E" :;;;" the D17 received from the Hong Iong Department of 7ustice a reuest for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The @TC issued an 1rder of )rrest against private respondent. Thatsame day" the 0%* agents arrested and detained him.-rivate respondent filed a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. )fter hearing" 7udge %ernardo" 7r.issued an 1rder denying the petition for bail" holding that there is no -hilippine law granting bail in

e$tradition cases and that private respondent is a high 'flight risk.' 7udge %ernardo" 7r. inhibited himself fromfurther hearing the case" it was then raffled off to %ranch < presided by respondent !udge. -rivate respondentfiled a motion for reconsideration of the 1rder denying hisapplication for bail and this was granted byrespondent !udge.-etitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above 1rder" but it was denied by respondent !udge. Hence" theinstant petition.

*SS&?/Whether or not respondent !udge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or e$cess of !urisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential e$traditee.

H?3D/ 0o. %earing in mind the purpose of e$tradition proceedings" the premise behind the issuance of the arrestwarrant and the 'temporary detention' is the possibility of flight of the potential e$traditee. This is based on theassumption that such e$traditee is a fugitive from !ustice. Given the foregoing" the prospective e$traditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.The -hilippines" along with the other members of the family of nations" committed to uphold the fundamentalhuman rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. Clearly" the right of a prospectivee$traditee to apply for bail in this !urisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the-hilippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. &nder these treaties" the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus" the -hilippines should see to it that the right to liberty of everyindividual is not impaired.

Section 8(a, of -residential Decree (-.D., 0o. :9=; (The -hilippine ?$tradition 3aw, defines 'e$tradition' as'the removal of an accused from the -hilippines with the ob!ect of placing him at the disposal of foreignauthorities to enable the reuesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminalinvestigation directed against him or the e$ecution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal lawof the reuesting state or government.'?$tradition is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential e$traditee. 0or is it a full2blowncivil action" but one that is merely administrative in character. *ts ob!ect is to prevent the escape of a personaccused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled" for the purpose of trialor punishment. *t does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations" the -hilippines shoulddiminish a potential e$traditee6s rights to life" liberty" and due process. 5ore so" where these rights areguaranteed" not only by our Constitution" but also by international conventions" to which the -hilippines is a

party. We should not" therefore" deprive an e$traditee of his right to apply for bail" provided that a certainstandard for the grant is satisfactorily met.there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Conseuently"this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail onthe basis of 'clear and convincing evidence.'The time2honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the -hilippines honor its obligations under the?$tradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Iong Special )dministrative @egion. ailure to comply withthese obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of e$tradition. However" it doesnot necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations" the -hilippines should diminish a potentiale$traditee6s rights to life" liberty" and dueprocess. 5ore so" where these rights are guaranteed" not only by ourConstitution" but also by international conventions" to which the -hilippines is a party. This Court should not"


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therefore" deprive an e$traditee of his right to apply for bail" provided that a certain standard for the grant issatisfactorily met.)n e$tradition proceeding being sui generis" the standard of proof reuired in granting or denying bail canneither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance ofevidence in civilcases. While administrative in character" the standard of substantial evidence used inadministrative cases cannot likewise apply given the ob!ect of e$tradition law which is to prevent the prospective e$traditee from fleeing our !urisdiction. *n his Separate 1pinion in -urganan" then )ssociate 7usticenow Chief 7ustice @eynato S. -uno" proposed that a new standard which he termed 'clear and convincing

evidence' should be used in granting bail in e$tradition cases. )ccording to him" this standard should be lowerthan proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential e$traditee must prove by 'clear and convincing evidence' that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the e$tradition court. *n this case" there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence toshow that he is not a flight risk. Conseuently" this case should be remanded to the trial court to determinewhether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of 'clear and convincing evidence.' @ead full te$t

PRE"$MPTION OF INNOCENCE

Mar5ue6 *s COMELEC GR --3772 8A!ril -7% -22.9

)CTS/%ienvenido 5arue#" a defeated candidate in the -rovince of Mue#on filed a petition for certiorari praying forthe reversal of the C15?3?C @esolution which dismissed his petition for uo warranto against ?duardo@odrigue#" for being allegedly a fugitive from !ustice.*t is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy" a criminal charge against himfor ten (:9, counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the 5unicipalCourt of 3os )ngeles 7udicial District" County of 3os )ngeles" State of California" &.S.). ) warrant issued bysaid court for his arrest" it is claimed" has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his allegedflight from that country.-etitioner 6s subseuent recourse (in G.@. 0o. :9E:9, from the C15?3?C6s 5ay


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undue circumscription of the law.&nfortunately" the C15?3?C did not make any definite finding on whether or not private respondent is in facta fugitive from !ustice as such term must be interpreted and applied in the light of the Court6s opinion.The omission is understandable since the C15?3?C outrightly dismissed the petition for uo warranto on the basis instead of @ule +E of the @ules and @egulations promulgated by the 1versight Committee. The Court" not being a trier of facts" is thus constrained to remand the case to the C15?3?C for a determination of thisunresolved factual matter.

ITO CORP$B vs! PEOP E OF THE PHI IPPINES

"!R! N! 18001& Ap+i -9& -01,

PERA TA& 4!@

#$L 7% 34- ; AR'E"G$ERRA

)CTS/

)ccused Corpu# received from complainant Tangcoy pieces of !ewelry with an obligation to sell the same andremit the proceeds of the sale or to return the same if not sold" after the e$piration of E9 days.The period e$pired without Corpu# remitting anything to Tangcoy.When Corpu# and Tangcoy met" Corpu# promised that he will pay" but to no avail.Tangcoy filed a case for estafa with abuse of confidence against Corpu#.Corpu# argued as follows/a. The proof submitted by Tangcoy (receipt, is inadmissible for being a mere photocopy. b. The information was defective because the date when the !ewelry should be returned and the date when crimeoccurred is different from the one testified to by Tangcoy.c. ourth element of estafa or demand is not proved.d. Sole testimony of Tangcoy is not sufficient for conviction

I""$E" and R$LING

Can the court admit as evidence a photocopy of document without violating the best evidence rule (onlyoriginal documents, as a general rule, is admissible as evidence)?

es. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely ob!ection to evidence at the timethey were offered in evidence" such ob!ection shall be considered as waived.Here" Corpu# never ob!ected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified" marked andtestified upon in court by Tangcoy. Corpu# also failed to raise an ob!ection in his Comment to the prosecution6s formal offer of evidence and even admitted having signed the said receipt.

Is the date of occurrence of time material in estafa cases with abuse of confidence?

0o. *t is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence under )rticle E:" paragraph :"subparagraph (b, of the @-C is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the pre!udice

of the owner and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime. Hence" the e$clusion ofthe period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime" as reflected in the *nformation" do not make thelatter fatally defective.urther" the following satisfies the sufficiency of information/:. The designation of the offense by the statute68. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense6E. The name of the offended party6 and. The appro$imate time of the commission of the offense" and the place wherein the offense was committed.The th element is satisfied. ?ven though the information indicates that the time of offense was committed onor about the th of 7uly :;;:" such is not fatal to the prosecution6s cause considering that Section :: of thesame @ule reuires a statement of the precise time only when the same is a material ingredient of the offense.

https://pinoylegalmatters.wordpress.com/2014/07/08/lito-corpuz-vs-people-of-the-philippines-g-r-no-180016-april-29-2014-peralta-j/https://pinoylegalmatters.wordpress.com/author/ardyesguerra/https://pinoylegalmatters.wordpress.com/2014/07/08/lito-corpuz-vs-people-of-the-philippines-g-r-no-180016-april-29-2014-peralta-j/https://pinoylegalmatters.wordpress.com/author/ardyesguerra/


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What is the form of demand required in estafa with abuse of confidence?

0ote first that the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows/(a, that money" goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust" or on commission" or foradministration" or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of" or to return the same6(b, that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his partof such receipt6(c, that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the pre!udice of another6 and(d, that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.

0o specific type of proof is reuired to show that there was demand. Demand need not even be formal6 it may be verbal. The specific word demand need not even be used to show that it has indeed been made upon the person charged" since even a mere uery as to the whereabouts of the money Fin this case" property" would betantamount to a demand.*n Tubb v. -eople" where the complainant merely verbally inuired about the money entrusted to the accused"the uery was tantamount to a demand. May a sole witness be considered credible?

es. 0ote first that settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses" SC gives great respect to theevaluation of the trial court for it had the uniue opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and theirdeportment on the witness stand" an opportunity denied the appellate courts" which merely rely on the records ofthe case.

The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight ofsome fact or circumstance of weight and influence" especially when such finding is affirmed by the C). Truth isestablished not by the number of witnesses" but by the uality of their testimonies" for in determining the valueand credibility of evidence" the witnesses are to be weighed not numbered.

RIGHT TO BE HEAR' B HIM"ELF AN' CO$N"EL

PEOPLE V"+ HOLGA'O 3742= 33 MAR -2.4?

acts/ )ppellant risco Holgado was charged in the court of irst *nstance of @omblon with slight illegaldetention because according to the information" being a private person" he did 'feloniously andwithout!ustifiable motive" kidnap and detain one )rtemia abreag in the house of )ntero Holgado for about

eight hours thereby depriving said )rtemia abreag of her personal liberty. He pleaded guilty (without acounsel, and said that he was !ust instructed by 5r. 1campo" which no evidence was presented to indict thelatter.*ssue/ Whether or 0ot there was any irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court.Held/ es. @ule ::8" section E of @1C that / *f the defendant appears without attorney" he must be informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney being arraigned." and must be asked if he desires the aid ofattorney" the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. ) reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney. This was violated. 5oreso the guarantees of our Constitution that 'no person shall be heldto answer for a criminal offense without due process of law'" and that all accused 'shall en!oy the right to beheard by himself and counsel.' *n criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given theopportunity to be heard by counsel.

The trial court failed to inuire as to the true import of the ualified plea of accused. The record does not showwhether the supposed instructions of 5r. 1campo was real and whether it had reference to the commission ofthe offense or to the making of the plea guilty. 0o investigation was opened by the court on this matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no way of determining whether the supposed instruction is a gooddefense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. )pparently the court became satisfied with thefiscalAs information that he had investigated 5r. 1campo and found that the same had nothing to do with thiscase. Such attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal was notsufficient to overcome a ualified plea of the accused. %ut above all" the court should have seen to it that theaccused be assisted by counsel especially because of the ualified plea given by him and the seriousness of theoffense found to be capital by the court.

http://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/02/people-vs-holgado-85-phil-752-grl-2809.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/02/people-vs-holgado-85-phil-752-grl-2809.html


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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE"%!lainti@@>a!!ellee

V"+

E'$AR'O AGBAANI MEN'O&A% accused>a!ellant

G+R NO -33114% #anuar -0% -227

FACT":

?duardo )gbayani was charged for raping his :2year old daughter" ?den )gbayani at the sanctity oftheir rented room on 7uly :;" :;; and was found guilty of the crime of rape. ) motion for a new trial was filed before the court by the new counsel of the accused assailing the irregularities pre!udicial to the substantial rightsof the accused invoking the failure of the court to inform the accused of his right to choose his own counsel. Hefurther alleged that his counsel de oficio was never prepared during all the scheduled hearings6 worse" evenwaived the presence of appellant after the third witness for the prosecution was presented. He also averred thatthe trial court uses its inherent power of contempt to intimidate private complainant.

I""$E:

Whether or not the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial !udge advised the accusedof the right to have counsel is sufficient ground to reverse the !udgment of conviction and to send the case backfor a new trial.

R$LING:

*t is settled that the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial !udge advised the accusedof his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse conviction. The reason being that the trial court must be presumed to have complied with the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases" and thatsuch a presumption can only be overcome by an affirmative procedure prescribed by law for the hearing andtrial of cases" and that such a presumption can only be overcome by an affirmative showing to the contrary.

Thus it has also been held that unless the contrary appears in the record" or that it is positively proved that thetrial court failed to inform that accused of his right to counsel" it will be presumed that the accused wasinformed by the court of such right. Sec :; of the @ules of Court provides that after a plea of not guilty" the accused is entitled to two (8,days to prepare for trial unless the court for good cause grants him further time. *t must be pointed out that theright must be e$pressly demanded. 1nly when so demanded does denial thereof constitute reversible error and aground for new trial. urther" such right may be waived" e$pressly or impliedly. *n the instant case" appellant didnot ask for time to prepare for trial" hence" he effectively waived such right. *t is untenable to believe that thecounsel who represented the appellant was not prepared during the trial as records showed he was able to cross2e$amine the complainant and there was no ground to claim he is incompetent to represent the appellant in court.The SC thereby affirmed the decision of the lower court finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Peco * Peo!le 303 "CRA .-7 8-2209

acts/ The decision of the Supreme Court for convicting the accused for the comple$ crime ofattempted estafa thru falsification of official and commercial document was assailed with the contention of thedefense that the accused may not be convicted of the crime for double !eopardy. The charge against the accusedwas on violation of @) E9:; of which he was acuitted because it only penali#es consummated crime. *n theabsence of evidence that shows that the crime was consummated the accused was acuitted but the court held !udgment of prosecuting his conviction for attempted estafa thru falsification of official andcommercial document which is necessarily included in the crime charged. )ccused invokes the defense ofdouble !eopardy since his acuittal from the charge involving @) E9:; is a bar for prosecution on the crime ofattempted estafa thru falsification of official and commercial document and that the accused was not informed


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of this charge against him in the filing of the information.

*ssue/ Whether or not the accused was informed of the nature and cause of the crime to which he is convicted

Held/ The court presented the ob!ectives of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause ofthe crime he is charged with as follows/

To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense6

To avail himself of his conviction or acuittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause6To inform the court of the facts alleged" so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support aconviction" if one should be had.*n order that this reuirement may be satisfied facts must be stated/ not conclusions of law. The complaint mustcontain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime. What determinesthe real nature and cause of accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the informationor complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated" they being conclusions of law. *t follows then that an accusedmay be convicted of a crime which although not the one charged" is necessarily included in the latter. *t has been shown that the information filed in court is considered as charging for two offenses which the counsel ofthe accused failed to ob!ect therefore he can be convicted for both or either of the charges.

However by reviewing the case at bar the SC finds lack of sufficient evidence that would establish the guilt ofthe accused as conspirator to the crime of estafa beyond reasonable doubt" the prior decision of the SC wasdeemed to be based merely on circumstantial evidence" thus the accused was acuitted.

"ORIANO V"+ "AN'IGANBAAN


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BOR#A V"+ MEN'O&A


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serving the warrant to/ (:, readily identify the properties to be sei#ed and thus prevent them from sei#ing thewrong items6 and (8, leave said peace officers with no discretion regarding the articles to be sei#ed and thus prevent unreasonable searches and sei#ures. What the Constitution seeks to avoid are search warrants of broador general characteri#ation or sweeping descriptions" which will authori#e police officers to undertake a fishinge$pedition to sei#e and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to an offense. However" it isnot reuired that technical precision of description be reuired" particularly" where by the nature of the goods to be sei#ed" their description must be rather general" since the reuirement of a technical description would meanthat no warrant could issue.

CON'E V"+ RIVERA 4/>"C% 32 #une 344-?

acts/ 1n :E 5arch 899:" the Iapisanan ng mga %rodkaster ng -ilipinas (I%-," an association representingduly franchised and authori#ed television and radio networks throughout the country" sent a letter reuesting theSupreme Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filedagainst former -resident 7oseph ?. ?strada before the Sandiganbayan in order 'to assure the public of fulltransparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history.' The reuest was seconded by 5r.Cesar 0. Sarino in his letter of )pril 899: to the Chief 7ustice and" still later" by Senator @enato Cayetano and)ttorney @icardo @omulo. 1n :+ )pril 899:" the Secretary of 7ustice Hernando -ere# formally filed the petition.

*ssue/ Whether the press should be allowed to air ?strada6s trial to the public.

Held/ The press is a mighty catalyst in awakening public consciousness" and it has become an importantinstrument in the uest for truth. @ecent history e$emplifies mediaAs invigorating presence" and its contributionto society is uite impressive. The Court" !ust recently" has taken !udicial notice of the enormous effect of mediain stirring public sentience during the impeachment trial" a partly !udicial and partly political e$ercise" indeedthe most2watched program in the boob2tubes during those times" that would soon culminate in ?DS) **. The propriety of granting or denying the petition involve the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees offreedom of the press and the right to public information" on the one hand" and the fundamental rights of theaccused" on the other hand" along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring


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a fair and impartial trial. When these rights race against one another" the right of the accused must be preferredto win. With the possibility of losing not only the precious liberty but also the very life of an accused" it behooves all to make absolutely certain that an accused receives a verdict solely on the basis of a !ust anddispassionate !udgment" a verdict that would come only after the presentation of credible evidence testified to by unbiased witnesses unswayed by any kind of pressure" whether open or subtle" in proceedings that are devoidof histrionics that might detract from its basic aim to ferret veritable facts free from improper influence" anddecreed by a !udge with an unpre!udiced mind" unbridled by running emotions or passions. Due processguarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial that is not lifted above

its individual settings nor made an ob!ect of publicAs attention and where the conclusions reached are inducednot by any outside force or influence but only by evidence and argument given in open court" where fittingdignity and calm ambiance is demanded. Thus" an accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him" more than anyone else" where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. ) public trialaims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be un!ustly condemned and that his rights are notcompromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. ) public trial is not synonymous with publici#ed trial6 it onlyimplies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come" sit in the available seats" conductthemselves with decorum and observe the trial process. *n the constitutional sense" a courtroom should haveenough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings" not too small as to render theopenness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions" who shallthen be totally free to report what they have observed during the proceedings

$nited "tates *s+ #a*ier -3224% 3- #anuar -2-7?

acts/ Doroteo 0atividad on the afternoon of 88 1ctober :;:" fastened his carabao valued at -:9 in his corralsituated in the barrio of Trapiche" municipality of Tananuan" -rovince of %atangas. 1n the following morningwhen he went to look after the animal" he found the gate to the corral open and that the carabao haddisappeared. He reported the matter to the Constabulary" and a patrol of the Constabulary under the leadershipof sergeant -resa (O, on 0ovember 89" encountered 3a#aro 7avier" )polinario 5endo#a" and -lacido de Chave#leading a carabao. When the ladrones saw the Constabulary" they scattered in all directions. 1n the followingday" the Constabulary found the carabao tied in front of the house of one -edro 5onterola in the barrio of SantaClara" municipality of San -ablo. The carabao was identified by Doroteo 0atividad as the one which had been

taken from his corral on the night of 88 1ctober :;:" and by the Constabulary as the one seen in the possessionof 7avier. 7avier was charged for stealing the carabao before the !ustice of the peace of the municipality of SantoTomas" -rovince of %atangas. During trial" the sworn statement of sergeant -resca" now deceased" was presented in court by the prosecution. -rescaAs signature in the statement was identified. 7avier alleged that thelower court erred in admitting said sworn statement as evidence.

*ssue/ Whether the sworn statement" which was e$ecuted by a person now deceased" is inadmissible inasmuchas the accused is not given the opportunity to cross2e$amine the author thereof.

Held/ The -hilippine %ill of @ights provides 'That in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall en!oy the rightto meet the witnesses face to face"' and the provision of the Code of Criminal -rocedure" section : (," states

taht '*n all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall be entitled/ to be confronted at the trial by and to cross2e$amine the witnesses against him.' With reference to the clause of the %ill of @ights" it 'intends to secure theaccused in the right to be tried" so far as facts provable by witnesses are concerned" by only such witnesses asmeet him face to face at the trial" who give their testimony in his presence" and give to the accused anopportunity of cross2e$amination. *t was intended to prevent the conviction of the accused upon depositions ore$ parte affidavits" and particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the recollection of the witness inthe e$ercise of the right of cross2e$amination.' *n other words" confrontation is essential because cross2e$amination is essential. ) second reason for the prohibition is that a tribunal may have before it the deportmentand appearance of the witness while testifying. The sworn statement of -resa was not made by uestion andanswer under circumstances which gave the defense an opportunity to cross2e$amine the witness. The provisoof the Code of Criminal -rocedure as to confrontation is therefore inapplicable. -resaAs statement again is not


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the testimony of a witness deceased" given in a former action between the same relating to the same matter.Conseuently" the e$ception provided by section 8;


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The rule in every case is that the trial court should e$ercise the utmost circumspection in granting a motion forseparate trial" allowing the same only after a thorough study of the claimed !ustification therefor" if only toavoid the serious difficulties that may arise" such as the one encountered and regretted by the respondent court"in according the accused the right of confrontation.The right of confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution ; to the person facingcriminal prosecution who should know" in fairness" who his accusers are and must be given a chance to cross2e$amine them on their charges. 0o accusation is permitted to be made against his back or in his absence nor is

any derogatory information accepted if it is made anonymously" as in poison pen letters sent by persons whocannot stand by their libels and must shroud their spite in secrecy. That is also the reason why e$ parte affidavitsare not permitted unless the affiant is presented in court :9 and hearsay is barred save only in the cases allowed by the @ules of Court" like the dying declaration. ::We have carefully studied the decision under challenge and find that the respondent court did not consider thetestimony given by &lat in convicting the petitioner. The part of that decision finding Talino guilty made nomention of &lat at all but confined itself to the petitionerAs own acts in approving the uestioned vouchers as proof of his complicity in the plot to swindle the government.The factual findings of the respondent court being supported by substantial evidence other than &latAs testimonywe see no reason to disturb them. *t is futile for the petitioner to invoke his constitutional presumption of

innocence because his guilt has in the view of the trial court been established beyond reasonable doubt" and weagree.WH?@?1@?" the !udgment appealed from is )*@5?D" with costs against the petitioner.

CHAVE& V" CA

TIME TO INVO,E RIGHT AGAIN"T "ELF>INCRIMINATION IN CRIMINAL CA"E

)CTS/-etitioner herein was charged of ualified theft of a motor vehicle"one Thunderbird car" with accessoriesamounting to -88"999.

That this theft was committed when the petitioner with the help of one" )sistio have completed a deed of sale ofThunderbird which belongs to 7ohnson 3ee. Chaves# telephoned 3ee and made an appointment for the sale ofThunderbird with Sumilang as a introduced buyer.)s payment was made to ?ugene6s restaurant in Mue#on City" all of them then drove to the place. Chave# andSumilang" pretending to get the money for the perfection of sale of the Thunderbird car" left the two Chinesealone" 7ohnson 3ee and his brother.When the two Chinese went outside to look for Chave# and Sumilang" they could no longer locate the formerand the Thunderbird car was also from the parking lot. 0evertheless the Thunderbird was impounded however" it was already been repainted.During the trial" the iscal Grecia presented Chave# as a witness. )nd despite of Chave#6s ob!ection beingaware that the latter would be self incriminated" the Court sustained the stand of the iscal saying.

What he will testify to does not necessarily incriminate him" counsel.)nd there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness stand including theaccused.*SS&?/Whether or not the petitioner 6s statement against himself can be used to convict him.H?3D/ 0o. *t is in the conte$t that we sat that the constitutional guarantee may not be treated with unconcern. Torepeat" it is mandatory/ it secures to every defendant a valuable and substantive right.The court may not e$tract from a defendant6s own lips and against his will an admission of his guilt.*n reality" the purpose calling an accused as a witness for the -eople would be to incriminate him.


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*n the case at bar" the petitioner did not volunteer to take the witness stand in his own defence6 he did not offerhimself as a witness6 on the contrary" he claimed the right upon being called to testify.There is not even a valid waiver of the privilege. To be valid and effective" a waiver must be certain anduneuivocal" and intelligently" understandably and willingly made.Wherefore the accused is acuitted.

Peo!le *+ Es!aras 8-2209

#+ Puno

Facts: ?sparas was charged with violation of DD) for importing 89kg of shabu. )fter arraign2ment and pleading not guilty" she escaped from !ail and was tried in absentia. She was foundguilty and was sentenced to death. She remains at large at present. This is the issue.Issue: Whether the Court may proceed to automatically review ?sparas6s death sentence despiteher absence.Held: es. *n &S v. 3aguna (:;:9," the Court held that its power to review a decision imposingthe death penalty cannot be waived either by the accused or by the courts. There" the Court said"mainly" that the !udgment of conviction (capital punishment of death, entered on trial is not final"cannot be e$ecuted" and is wholly without force or effect until the cause has been passed upon bythe Supreme Court. TC acts as a commissioner who takes the testimony and reports the same tothe Court with its recommendation. ) decision of TC does not become final unless and until it

has been reviewed by the Court. )n accused who was sentenced with the highest penalty is enti2tled under the law to have the sentence and all the facts and circumstances upon which it isfounded placed before the Court" as the highest tribunal of the land" to the end that its !ustice andlegality may be clearly and conclusively determined. Such procedure is merciful. *t gives a sec2ond chance for life. 0either the courts nor the accused can waive it. *t is a positive provision ofthe law that brooks no interference and tolerates no evasions. (The Court here applied Sec. 9"Gen. 1rders 0o. *** provided for review by the Court of death penalty cases. %oththe @ules of Court of :;9 and :;= reuire the transmission to the Court of the recordsof all cases in which the death penalty was imposed by TC" whether the defendant has appealed

or not" for review and !udgment. These rules were taken from the General 1rders itself. The:;+E Constitution did not also prohibit death penalty. Sec. ;" @ule :88 provided the procedurefor review of death penalty cases by the Court. Sec. :9" @ule :88 of the :;illanueva (:;E," the Court held that the withdrawal of appeal by a death con2vict does not deprive the Court of !urisdiction to review his conviction. *n -eople v. Cornelio(:;+:," which involved the escape of a death convict" the Court held that said escape does not re2lieve the Court of its duty of reviewing his conviction. *n -eople v. Daban (:;+8," the Court said"speaking about convictions by TC of death penalty on the defendant" that until after the Courthas spoken en consulta" no finality could be attached to said decision. This automatic review can2

not be waived by the accused nor by the courts. The mere fact of escape of the accused cannot bea bar at all. *n -eople v. Saliling (:;+=," the Court said that it is not precluded from reviewing thedeath sentence of an accused who is at large. *n -eople v. %uynay (:;


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+=; and the death penalty for rape. %oth were denied. Conseuently" Congress changed the mode of e$ecutionof the death penalty from electrocution to lethal in!ection" and passed @epublic )ct 0o.


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@.). 0o. ia!ar b y then hurl ing the latte r w ith a s tone "hitting said 5iguel >ia!ar onthe right cheek" thereby inicting physical in!uries whichreuired medical attendance from Q to ' days baringcomplications. Rn 7uly " 'Q"the accused entered a plea of not guilty Uslight physical in!uriesA. Rn 7une ("'Q"when >ia!ar developed a permanent scar and deformity on the face" he ,led a moreserious charge Userious physical in!uriesA arising from the same incident.

JKEPs there double !eopardy in this caseOEL'

o. 2hen the complaint was ,led on pri l Q " 'Q" onl y three days had passedsince the incident inwhich the in!uries were sustained took place" and there were yetno indications of a graver in!ury or conseuenceto be su4ered by said o4endedparty. 9vidently" it was only later that the alleged deformity becameapparent . Pn :eople v. 8orac" it was held that if after the ,rst prosecution a new fact superveneson whichdefendan t ma y be held liable " r esul ting in alter ing the character of the crime and giving rise to a newand distinct o4ense" the accused cannot be said to bein second !eopardy if ind ict ed for the new o4ense .Pn other words" in the peculiar circumstances of this case" the plea of double !eopardy of private respondentama 7r. cannot hold.

CITI&EN"HIP

Co *+ HRET

)CTS/The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House of@epresentatives ?lectoral Tribunal (H@?T,. The H@?T declared that respondent 7ose 1ng" 7r. is a natural bornilipino citi#en and a resident of 3aoang" 0orthern Samar for voting purposes.1n 5ay ::" :;


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and ualifications of their respective members. (See )rticle >*" Section :+" Constitution,The authority conferred upon the ?lectoral Tribunal is full" clear and complete. The use of theword sole emphasi#es the e$clusivity of the !urisdiction of these Tribunals.The Supreme Court under the :;"ANTIAGO

G@ 0o. 32


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While normally the uestion of whether or not a person has renounced his -hilippine citi#enship should beheard before a trial court of law in adversary proceedings" this has become unnecessary as this Court" no less"upon the insistence of petitioner" had to look into the facts and satisfy itself on whether or not petitionerAs claimto continued -hilippine citi#enship is meritorious.-hilippine citi#enship" it must be stressed" is not a commodity or were to be displayed when reuired andsuppressed when convenient.

REP$ IC VS E A ROSA

-osted by kaye lee on :8/:= )5FACT":

September 89" :;;: 2 rivaldo filed a petition for naturali#ation under the Commonwealth )ct 0o. =E beforethe @TC 5anila.1ctober +" :;;: 2 7udge dela @osa set the petition for hearing on 5arch :=" :;;8" and directed the publicationof the said order and petition in the 1fficial Ga#ette and a newspaper of general circulation" for E consecutiveweeks" the last publication of which should be at least = months before the date of the said hearing.7anuary :" :;;8 2 rivaldo asked the 7udge to cancel the 5arch := hearing and move it to 7anuary 8" :;;8"citing his intention to run for public office in the 5ay :;;8 elections. 7udge granted the motion and the hearing

was moved to ebruary 8:. 0o publication or copy was issued about the order.ebruary 8:" :;;8 2 the hearing proceeded.ebruary 8+" :;;8 2 7udge rendered the assailed Decision and held that rivaldo is readmitted as a citi#en of the@epublic of the -hilippines by naturali#ation.@epublic of the -hilippines filed a petition for Certiorari under D @ule of the @evised @ules of Court inrelation to @.). 0o. 9 and Section 8 of the *nterim @ules" to annul the decision made on ebruary 8+" :;;8and to nullify the oath of allegiance taken by rivaldo on same date.

I""$E:

Whether or not rivaldo was duly re2admitted to his citi#enship as a ilipino.R$LING:

0o. The supreme court ruled that -rivate respondent is declared 01T a citi#en of the -hilippines and thereforedisualified from continuing to serve as governor of the -rovince of Sorsogon. He is ordered to vacate his officeand to surrender the same to the >ice2Governor of the -rovince of Sorsogon once this decision becomes finaland e$ecutory. The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities/(:, the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing" without a publication of the orderadvancing the date of hearing" and the petition itself6(8, the petition was heard within si$ months from the last publication of the petition6(E, petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the !udgment6 and(, petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two2year waiting period.

Ra a*& 4+! vs Cissi

Ee'is

*n :;


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marriage with the )ustralian was later declared void for being bigamous. 3abo further asserts that even if he 6s

considered as an )ustralian" his lack of citi#enship is !ust a mere technicality which should not frustrate the will

of the electorate of %aguio who voted for him by a vast ma!ority.

I""$E":

:. Whether or not 3abo can retain his public office.

8. Whether or not 3ardi#abal" who obtained the second highest vote in the mayoralty race" can replace 3abo in

the event 3abo is disualified.

HEL'/ :. 0o. 3abo did not uestion the authenticity of evidence presented against him. He was naturali#ed as

an )ustralian in :;+=. *t was not his marriage to an )ustralian that made him an )ustralian. *t was his act of

subseuently swearing by taking an oath of allegiance to the government of )ustralia. He did not dispute that he

needed an )ustralian passport to return to the -hilippines in :;

Digest ABC

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