Salazar vs. Mathay, G.R. No. L-44061, September 20, 1976The Civil Service Commission: AppointmentsFacts: On January 20, 1960, petitioner Melania C. Salazar was appointed by the Auditor General confidential agent in the Office of the Auditor General, Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). Her appointment was noted by the Commissioner of Civil Service. On March 28, 1962 and on February 12, 1965 she was extended another appointment by way of promotion, as confidential agent in the same office.On March 18, 1966, petitioner received a notice from the Auditor General that her services as confidential agent have been terminated as of the close of office hours on March 31, 1966. On March 31, 1966, the Auditor General uponfavorable recommendation of Mr. Pedro Encabo, Auditor of the GSIS issued an appointment to petitioner as Junior Examiner in his office which was approved by the Commission of Civil Service. On the same day, petitioner assumed the position.On December 27, 1966, petitioner wrote the Commissioner of Civil Service requesting that she be reinstated to her former position as confidential agent. However, no action was taken on said letter. Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with the Supreme Court to compel the Auditor General to reinstate her to her former position but the Supreme Court dismissed the petition without prejudice to her filing the proper action to the Court of First Instance. Issue: (1) Whether or not the position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential or not.(2) Whether or not the services of petitioner as confidential agent was validly terminated on the alleged ground of loss of confidence, and if not, whether or not she could still be reinstated to said position after accepting theposition of Junior Examiner in the same office.Held:(1) The position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential. There are two instances when a position may be considered primarily confidential: (1) When the President upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil Service (now Civil Service Commission) has declared the position to be primarily confidential; or (2) In the absence of such declaration when by the nature of the functions of the office, there exists close intimacy between the appointee and appointing power which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment orfreedom from misgiving or betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state. In the case before us, the provision of Executive Order No. 265, declaring ...confidential agents in the several department and offices of the Government, unless otherwise directed by the President, to be primarily confidential brings within the fold of the aforementioned executive order the position of confidential agent in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS, as among those positions which are primarily confidential.(2) Yes. Her position being primarily confidential, petitioner cannot complain that the termination of her services as confidential agent is in violation of her security of tenure, primarily confidential positions are excluded from the merit system, and dismissal at pleasure of officers or employees therein is allowed by the Constitution. This should not be misunderstood as denying that the incumbent of a primarily confidential position holds office at the pleasure only of the appointing power. It should be noted, however, that when such pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not removed or dismissed from office his term merely expires, in much the the same way as officer, whose right thereto ceases upon expiration of the fixed term for which he had been appointed or elected, is not and cannot be deemed removed or dismissed therefrom, upon the expiration of said term. The main difference between the former the primarily confidential officer and the latter is that the latter's term is fixed of definite, whereas that of the former is not pre-fixed, but indefinite, atthe time of his appointment or election, and becomes fixed and determined when the appointing power expresses its decision to put an end to the services of the incumbent. When this even takes place, the latter isnot removed or dismissed from office his term has merely expired.

Laurel V vs. CSC, 203 SCRA 195FACTS: Petitioner, the duly elected Governor of the Province of Batangas, appointed his brother, Benjamin Laurel, as Senior Executive Assistant in the Office of the Governor, a non-career service position which belongs to the personal and confidential staff of an elective official. Upon the vacancy of the position of Provincial Administrator of Batangas, petitioner designated his brother as Acting Provincial Administrator. Then, he issued Benjamin Laurel a promotional appointment as Civil Security Officer which is a position which the Civil Service Commission classifies as "primarily confidential" pursuant to P.D. No. 868. ISSUE: Does nepotism apply to designation?RULING: Yes. The court ruled that petitioner could not legally and validly appoint his brother Benjamin Laurel to said position because of the prohibition on nepotism under Section 49 of P.D. No. 807. They are related within the third degree of consanguinity and the case does not fall within any of the exemptions provided therein. The exemption in the said section covering confidential positions cannot be considered since the said position is not primarily confidential for it belongs to the career service.Petitioners contention that the designation of his brother is not covered by the prohibition cannot be accepted for by legal contemplation, the prohibitive mantle on nepotism would include designation, because what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. His specious and tenuous distinction between appointment and designation is nothing more than either a ploy ingeniously conceived to circumvent the rigid rule on nepotism or a last-ditch maneuver to cushion the impact of its violation. Section 49 of P.D. No. 807 does not suggest that designation should be differentiated from appointment. Reading the section with Section 25 of said decree, career service positions may be filled up only by appointment, either permanent or temporary; hence a designation of a person to fill it up because it is vacant, is necessarily included in the term appointment, for it precisely accomplishes the same purpose.

Ampong vs. CSC, G.R. 167916, Aug. 26, 2008, 563 SCRA 293FACTS: Petitioner Sarah P. Ampong and Decir were public school teachers under the supervision of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). Later, Ampong transferred to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Alabel, Sarangani Province, where she was appointed as Court Interpreter III. On July 5,1994, a woman representing herself as Evelyn Decir went to the Civil Service Regional Office (CSRO) No. XI, Davao City, to claim a copy of her PBET Certificate of Eligibility. During the course of the transaction, the CSRO personnel noticed that the woman did not resemble the picture of the examinee in the Picture Seat Plan (PSP). Upon further probing, it was petitioner Ampong who took and passed the examinations under the name Evelyn Decir. ISSUE: What is the extent of the administrative jurisdiction the Civil Service Commission have over courts and judicial personnel?RULING: The answer to the question at the outset is in the negative but the Court rules against the petition on the ground of estoppel. It is true that the Civil Service Commission (CSC) has administrative jurisdiction over the civil service. As defined under the Constitution and the Administrative Code, the civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, and government-owned or controlled corporations. Pursuant to its administrative authority, the CSC is granted the power to control, supervise, and coordinate the Civil Service examinations.This authority grants to the CSC the right to take cognizance of any irregularity or anomaly connected with the examinations.However, the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court is given exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and judicial personnel. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. It may take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

LABAN vs. Comelec, G.R. 161265, Feb. 24, 2004FACTS: The General Counsel of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), a registered political party, informed the COMELEC by way of Manifestation that only the Party Chairman, Senator Edgardo J. Angara, or his authorized representative may endorse the certificate of candidacy of the partys official candidates. The same Manifestation stated that Sen. Angara had placed the LDP Secretary General, Representative Agapito A. Aquino, on "indefinite forced leave." In the meantime, Ambassador Enrique A. Zaldivar was designated Acting Secretary General. However, Rep. Aquino filed his Comment, contending that the Party Chairman does not have the authority to impose disciplinary sanctions on the Secretary General. As the Manifestation filed by the LDP General Counsel has no basis, Rep. Aquino asked the COMELEC to disregard the same.ISSUE: Is the ascertainment of the identity of political party and its officers within COMELEC jurisdiction?RULING: Yes. The court ruled that the COMELEC correctly stated that "the ascertainment of the identity of [a] political party and its legitimate officers" is a matter that is well within its authority. The source of this authority is no other than the fundamental law itself, which vests upon the COMELEC the power and function to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. In the exercise of such power and in the discharge of such function, the Commission is endowed with ample "wherewithal" and "considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure the accomplishment of the great objectives for which it was created to promote free, orderly and honest elections."In the case at bar, the Party Chairman, purporting to represent the LDP, contends that under the Party Constitution only he or his representative, to the exclusion of the Secretary General, has the authority to endorse and sign party nominations. The Secretary General vigorously disputes this claim and maintains his own authority. Clearly, the question of party identity or leadership has to be resolved if the COMELEC is to ascertain whether the candidates are legitimate party standard bearers or not.