ARMANDO BARCELLANO VS DOLORES BANASWhere the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretationPONENTE: PEREZFACTS:Respondent Dolores Bans, an heir of Bartolome Bans owned a lot in Bacacay, Albay. Adjoining the said lot is a property owned by Vicente Medina. In 1997, Medina offered his lot for sale to the owners of the adjoining lots. The property was eventually sold to Armando Barcellano. The heirs of Bans contested the sale, and conveyed their intention to redeem the property. However, according to Medina, the deed of sale has been executed. There was also mention that the Bans heirs failed to give the amount required by medina for them to redeem the lot. Action to redeem the property was filed before the RTC. It denied the petition on the ground that the Bans heirs failed to exercise their right to redemption within the period provided in article 1623 of NCC. On appeal, such ruling was reversed. ISSUE: W/N the RTC decision to deny the Bans heirs of their right of legal redemption is validHELD:The court denied the petition, and affirmed the appellate court decision granting the Bans heirs the right to redeem the subject property. The decision was based on the provisions of article 1623 NCC. A written notice must be issued by the prospective vendor. Nothing in the record and pleadings submitted by the parties showed that there was a written notice sent to the respondents. Without a written notice, the period of 30 days within which the right of legal redemption may be exercised does not exist.In this case, the law was clear. A written notice by the vendor is mandatory.G.R. No. 152259, July 29, 2004ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division) and the PEOPLEof the PHILIPPINES, respondents.FACTS:The People ofthe Philippines, through the Presidential Commissionon Good Government (PCGG), filed onJuly 12, 1989 aninformation before theanti-graft court charging the accused with violation of Section 5, Republic ActNo. 3019,5 as amended.That on or about and during the period from July 16, 1975 to July 29, 1975, inMetro Manila, Philippines, and withinthe jurisdiction of theSandiganbayan,Alfredo T. Romualdez, brother-in-law of Ferdinand E.Marcos, former Presidentof the Philippines, and therefore, related to thelatter by affinity within thethird civil degree, did then andthere willfully and unlawfully, and with evidentbad faith, for thepurpose of promoting his self-interested and/or that ofothers, intervene directly or indirectly, in a contract between theNationalShipyard and Steel Corporation (NASSCO), agovernment-owned andcontrolled corporation and the Bataan Shipyardand Engineering Company(BASECO), a private corporation, the majority stocks of which is owned byformer President Ferdinand E. Marcos, whereby theNASSCO sold, transferredand conveyed to theBASECO its ownership and all its titles andinterests overall equipment andfacilities including structures, buildings, shops, quarters,houses, plants and expendable and semi-expendable assets, located at theEngineer Island known as the Engineer Island Shops including some of itsequipment and machineries from Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte neededby BASECO in itsshipbuilding and ship repair program for theamount ofP5,000,000.00.ISSUE:Whether the constitutional right of the petitioner to be informed ofthe nature and cause ofthe accusation against him was violated for notspecifying the acts ofintervention that he supposedly performed.HELD:The Court did notagree with the petitioner's contention.When allegations in the information are vague or indefinite, the remedy ofthe accused is not amotion to quash, but amotion for a bill ofparticulars.The pertinent provision in the Rules ofCourt is Section 9 ofRule 116, whichwe quote:"Section 9. Bill ofparticulars. --The accused may, before arraignment, movefor a billof particulars to enable him properly to plead and prepare fortrial.The motion shall specify the alleged defects ofthe complaint or informationand the details desired.

Alfredo T. Romualdez,petitioner, vs.The Honorable Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) and the People of the Philippines,respondents._______________________________________________________________________

Facts: People of the Philippines, through PCGG, filed a petition charging the accused with violation of Section 5, RA. 3019 as amended. Said petitioner, brother-in-law of former President Marcos and therefore, related by affinity within the third civil degree, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, and with evident bad faith, for the purpose of promoting his self-interested sic and/or that of others, intervene directly or indirectly, in a contract between the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation (NASSCO), a government-owned and controlled corporation and the Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company (BASECO), a private corporation, the majority stocks of which is owned by former President Marcos, whereby the NASSCO sold, transferred and conveyed to the BASECO its ownership and all its titles and interests over all equipment and facilities including structures, buildings, shops, quarters, houses, plants and expendable and semi-expendable assets, located at the Engineer Island known as the Engineer Island Shops including some of its equipment and machineries from Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte needed by BASECO in its shipbuilding and ship repair program for the amount ofP5,000,000.00.

Issue: whether or not petitioner enjoys derivative immunity from suit.

Ruling: In Estrada vs. Desierto,the SC exhaustively traced the origin of executive immunity in order to determine the extent of its applicability. Executive immunity applied only during the incumbency of a President. It could not be used to shield a non-sitting President from prosecution for alleged criminal acts done while sitting in office. The reasoning of petitioner must therefore fail, since he derives his immunity from one who is no longer sitting as President. Verily, the felonious acts of public officials and their close relatives are not acts of the State, and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands on the same footing as any other trespasser.

ANTONIO A. MECANO,petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON AUDIT,respondent.Ponente: CAMPOS, JR.FACTS:Petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917(RAC). Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman, in his 7th Indorsement, denied petitioners claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec. Order No. 292), solely for the reason that the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the latter.Petitioner also anchored his claim on Department of Justice Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 by Secretary Drilonstating that the issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abrogate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code.The COA, on the other hand, strongly maintains that the enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 operated to revoke or supplant in its entirety the RAC.ISSUE:Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917.HELD:NO. Petition granted. Respondent ordered to give due course on petitioners claim for benefits.RATIO:Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect. Hence, before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment.It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. The two Codes should be readin pari materia.

Persons and Family Relation45EXPRESS AND IMPLIED REPEALMAGKALASvs. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITYG.R.No.138823September17,2008Facts:Plaintiff and her predecessors-in-interest have been occupying a lot designated as TAG-77-0063, Block 1, Barangay 132, located at the corner of 109 Gen. Concepcion and Adelfa Streets,Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, for the past 39 years.On March 26, 1978, P.D. No. 1315 was issued expropriating certain lots at Bagong Barrio,Caloocan City.In thesame Decree,the NationalHousing Authority(NHA) wasnamedAdministrator ofthe BagongBarrio UrbanBliss Projectwith theformer to take possession, control(sic) and disposition of the expropriated properties with the power of demolition. During theCensus survey of the area, the structure built by the plaintiff was assigned TAG No. 0063. Afterconducting studies of the area, the NHA determined that the area where plaintiffs structure islocated should be classified as an area center (open space). The Area Center was determined incompliance with the requirement to reserve 30% open space in all types of residential development.Plaintiff, together with Mr.& Mrs. Josefino Valenton and Mr.& Mrs. Rey Pangilinan, throughcounsel, filed an appeal from the decision to designate the area where the plaintiff and the two otherspouses have erected structures, as an Area Center. The said appeal was denied by the NHA. In aletter, dated August 6, 1985, the NHA sent a Notice of Lot Assignment to plaintiff recognizing thelatter as a Censused Owner of a structure with TAG No. 0063-04 which was identified forrelocation.On August 23, 1985, plaintiff filed a Complaint for Damages with prayer for the issuance ofa restraining order and writ of Preliminary Injunction against the NHA with the Regional TrialCourt of Caloocan City.TheOrderdenyingplaintiffsprayerforissuanceofawritofpreliminaryinjunctionwasappealed, by way of Petition for Certiorari, to the Court of Appeals (docketed therein as CA-G.R.No. 33833).On March 10,1999, the trialcourt promulgatedits assaileddecision dismissingpetitioners complaint. Petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied bythe trial court in its Order dated May 14, 1999. Hence, this petition for review of the said decisionand order of the RTC.Issue:Whetherornotthedemolitionorrelocationofthepetitionersstructurewillviolatethevestedrightsofthepetitionerovertheacquiredpropertyunderthesocialjusticeclauseoftheconstitution.Ruling:Petitioner maintains that she had acquired a vested right over the property subject of thiscase on the ground that she had been in possession of it for forty (40) years already. Thus, to orderher relocation and the demolition of her house will infringe the social justice clause guaranteedunder the Constitution.

Fernando vs St. Scholasticas CollegeGR 1611107, 12 March 2013Facts: Respondent SSCs property is enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence. Marikina City enacted an ordinance which provides that walls and fences shall not be built within a five-meter allowance between the front monument line and the building line of an establishment.The City Government of Marikina sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to demolish, replace, and move back the fence. As a response, the respondents filed a petition for prohibition with an application for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court of Marikina. The RTC granted the petition and the CA affirmed. Hence, this certiorari.Issue: Is Marikina Ordinance No. 192, imposing a five-meter setback, a valid exercise of police power?Ruling: No. Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. Two tests have been used by the Court the rational relationship test and the strict scrutiny test:Under the rational relationship test, an ordinance must pass the following requisites: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The real intent of the setback requirement was to make the parking space free for use by the public and not for the exclusive use of respondents. This would be tantamount to a taking of private property for public use without just compensation. Anent the objectives of prevention of concealment of unlawful acts and un-neighborliness due to the walls and fences, the parking area is not reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of these goals. The Court, thus, finds Section 5 of the Ordinance to be unreasonable and oppressive. Hence, the exercise of police power is not valid.