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ARCHIV 78465
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Diffusion of Precommercial Inventions Developed in Govern ment-Fu nded Research Institutions in Nigeria
Titus Adeboye
April 1988
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PERIODICALS PEMODIQUES
DIFFUSION OF PRECOMMERCIAL INVENTIONS DEVELOPED IN
GOVERNMENT-FUNDED RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS IN NIGERIA
Titus Adeboye
Consultant-Coordinator, West African Technology Policy Studies Network
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IDRC-MR180e
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Material contained in this report is reproduced as submitted and has not been subjected to peer review or rigorous editing by IDRC Communications Division staff. Unless otherwise stated, copyright for the material
in this report is held by the author. Mention of proprietary names does not constitute endorsement of the product and is given only for information.
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FOREWORD
In this report, Dr. Titus Adeboye describes the extent to
which technological inventions made in three of Nigeria's R and D
institutions advanced beyond conception, through the intermediate
stages, to commercial application in industry. The institutions whose
inventions were studied are the Federal Institute of Industrial
Research, Oshodi (FIIRO), the Leather Research Institute of Nigeria
(LERIN) and the Project Development Agency (PRODA).
The importance of the subject of this report will be readily
recognized. R and D institutions such as those whose inventions are
considered here were established, often at relatively great cost, for
the purpose of generating technologies for the local economies.
Clearly, knowledge of the extent to which that purpose is being served
in practice is important. It is even more important in periods of
economic crises through which Nigeria and other African countries are
now going; then there is the further expectation that the institu-
tions will work even harder to bring ,quick reprieve from the crises.
There is, moreover, a,related question about the links that
R and D institutions need to_,maintain with potential users of their
inventions in order to assure wide application of those inventions.
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Although it is believed widely (no doubt correctly) that links between
African R and D institutions and the productive sector are tenuous,
systematic studies to document this belief are still rare. Weak arti-
culation of the aims of domestic R and D institutions to the needs of
local industry is believed to explain why few usable technologies come
from those institutions, but the evidence remains largely anecdotal.
By contrast, this report attempts a systematic examination of the
factors that seem to determine whether an invention will advance all
the way to commercial application or whether it will stop with a
demonstration of purely theoretical principles.
I hope that researchers in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa
will find this report useful, and that they will wish to make similar
studies of other R and D institutions. I must emphasize, however,
that the International Development Research Centre does not necessari-
ly agree with the views and recommendations contained in it.
Paul Vitta
Senior Programme Officer
Social Sciences Division
International Development Research Centre
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Nigeria faces many crises. There is massive unemployment, partly because
of retrenchment in government and business. The fluctuations in
international oil prices mean that Nigeria has had its share of financial
crises -- not because of the size of its debt, but because of its
lessening inability to repay it. There is the crisis that results from
depending on imports not only for consumption, but as input to domestic
manufacturing. Given the shaky position of its reserves of foreign
currency and the massive underuse of present production capability, the
national government has been pressed to seek ways of reducing waste,
cutting out unnecessary imports, putting idle resources to productive
use, eliminating or reducing the serious price distortions that plague
Nigeria and, indeed, restructuring the entire economy.
The crisis that has resulted from excessive dependence on imports
seems to have worsened in the last few years. Nigeria not only imports
the bulk of its manufacturing machinery, but also depends on imports for:
Most of the agricultural raw materials for its manufacturing such as
wheat and maize (until imports of these grains were banned),
oilseeds, and sugar;
All the intermediate inputs required in industry such as chemicals,
petrochemicals, dyestuffs, soft-drink concentrates, barley malt,
citrus fruit concentrates and spirit;
All the components used in the assembly plants that have mushroomed
in the country.
Recently, the foreign exchange crisis has seriously reduced the
availability of these industrial inputs. Foreign-exchange licensing and
quantitative restrictions have forced many factories to shut down, and
those still operating carry unacceptable levels of excess capacity (a
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recent survey shows capacity utilization in manufacturing was only 30% in
1985). In 1980 the manufacturing sector grew by 17.6%; this was its
best year of growth. Growth was 9.5%, 2.7% and -12.3% in 1981, 1982 and
1983 respectively.
Early in 1986 the Nigerian government announced that it would phase
out imports of certain industrial raw materials, on the grounds that
local substitutes have been developed. Prominent are wheat for flour and
barley malt for beer brewing. Maize and rice imports were banned. All
import-dependent manufacturers now have to go to a new second-tier
foreign-exchange market to acquire the inputs they need. The implication
is that costs will escalate.
Through the years, however, the federal government, some state
governments, universities, polytechnics and even private establishments
have been funding research on the country's problems, and all these
research institutions have been and constantly are developing technically
feasible solutions. It is of great interest, therefore, to find out to
what extent the problems of manufacturers, especially with respect to
imported inputs, have been solved by the research institutes and adopted
by manufacturers. Apart from the effects of the activities of research
institutes on the formal manufacturing sector, to what extent have these
institutes offered better alternatives to traditional technologies?
Objectives
The narrow objective of this investigation is to find out the extent
to which precommercial inventions developed in relevant government-funded
research institutes in Nigeria have been applied in industry. The basic
question is: have research institute inventions been adopted by
commercial ventures? If not why not and, if so, why? In explaining the
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extent of diffusion, we hope to reveal policy implications.
By precommercial inventions we mean products or processes that are
patentable but have not yet reached the stage (described in the economic
literature as "innovations") at which they become commercialized.
Precommercial inventions have been demonstrated to be technically feasible
and in most cases have been shown to be economically feasible. Our
definition does not extend to minor improvements, inasmuch as these
usually are not patentable.
This paper covers manufacturing technologies developed at three
Nigerian research institutes since their inception -- the Federal
Institute of Industrial Research at Oshodi (FIIRO), the Leather Research
Institute of Nigeria (LERIN) and the Project Development Institute (PRODA). The Nigerian government also funds 20 other research institutes -- 18
devoted to agriculture, one to medicine and one to highways -- the work at
which is not relevant to this paper.
Methods
In general, we first examine the precommercial inventions and later
summarize the important ones. Our study began with desk work. We
examined the annual reports of the three institutes, and other published
materials covering their activities, including periodicals, journals,
briefs, workshop and seminar papers, technical information bulletins and
special research reports.
At this stage we classified the inventions into two broad categories.
The first, product inventions, included new product introduction, radical
transformation of existing products and substitutes for existing products.
The second, process inventions, included new raw materials for producing
existing local products, indigenous substitutes for imported raw materials,
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new uses for otherwise unused resources, new artifacts for performing
existing manufacturing tasks, and radical modification of existing
artifacts for performing new manufacturing tasks.
We have been guided by the final use of an invention. Thus, where an
invention is used by a manufacturer, even when the inventor sees it as a
new product, we define it as process invention. This is important in
measuring diffusion.
our field work consisted mainly of interviewing research personnel
and the recipients or prospective recipients of the technologies under
study. The purpose of the interviews was:
To examine the problems that the inventions solve, the cost of
development, the technical problems encountered during development,
the sources of solutions, the various disciplines involved and how
these factors have affected the rate of diffusion;
To determine'for each invention the years elapsed since the
demonstration of technical feasibility and number of adoptions of the
invention or extent of diffusion as defined by growth in market share;
To evaluate performance problems, raw material availability,
equipment, specification, input-output efficiency and utility usage
efficiency in the experience of users and prospective users;
To identify the bottlenecks to greater diffusion such as product or
process engineering, administrative, institutional, commercial,
financial or other problems; and
To discover policy implications for better rates of diffusion.
We measured diffusion at two stages:
First we specified the inventions and the number of years since the
demonstration of technical feasibility. From research institute responses
we obtained the number of recipients of the inventions. At this first
stage the crude measure was the number of businesses started on the basis
of patents or agreements reached with the research institutes to use their
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technology. Where no such business was started, diffusion was assumed to be zero.
The second stage of measuring diffusion related to percentage of
market share. The rate of diffusion of a technology at this second stage
was defined as the increase in the number of adopters divided by the time
over which the increase occurred in any given product group.
As all three research institutes under study run programs to aid
prospective adopters of their technology, part of the diffusion process
can be assumed to take the form of training courses. For accuracy,
therefore, it is necessary to distinguish these elements of diffusion:
0 Attendance at courses to train prospective investors or their staffs
in the use of the technology;
Purchase of a patent licence or process technology for commercial
operation;
Purchase of equipment and other fixtures and artifacts based on a
research institute's design or licence;
Commercial scale operation on the basis of a research institute's
technology.
We are also interested in diffusion through the decision of research
institute personnel to start their own business using the technology they
developed. This is known as technological entrepreneurship.
We did not use questionnaires.
The institutes
FIIRO
The Federal Institute of Industrial Research at Oshodi was
established in 1956 to conduct applied research in the general area of
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manufacturing. As at the time of this report the institute's staff
strength was 515. Its functions are:
To conduct applied research into Nigerian raw materials to find out
their potential industrial uses;
To develop processes that can be most effectively used to convert
these raw materials into finished products;
To carry out pilot-scale trials of processes found in the laboratory
to be technically feasible;
To assess the viability of such processes if established on a
commercial scale; and
To develop import-substituting products and thus conserve foreign
exchange for Nigeria. FIIRO is the most developed of the three institutes under study,
having more direct R & D graduate-level personnel, scope of activities
and engineering facilities. Of the 515 employees, about 125 had
university degrees or the equivalent. Of these, 35 had higher degrees.
Disciplines included mechanical, chemical, civil, electrical and
industrial engineering, chemistry, physics, biochemistry, biology, food
technology and systems engineering. Recently, an experienced design
engineer was employed by the institute. Situated on about 5 ha
of ground at Oshodi, the institute has wide engineering capability,
including design, detail engineering, fabrication, installation, trouble
shooting and maintenance. The engineering capabilities of the three
institutes are compared in Table 1 and Table 2. FIIRO also interacts with
many subsectors of manufacturing through contracts for such technical
services as analysis of materials, material testing, engineering,
fabrication of parts and electroplating, training and workshop courses and
patent services to Nigerian inventors.
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LERIN
The Leather Research Institute of Nigeria started operations in 1964 under the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), at the request of the Government of Nigeria. The FAO project came to an end in June 1972. The institute then functioned as a division of the federal
livestock department between 1972 and 1976. As part of the federal
national science policy, the Ministry of Science and Technology was created. In 1986 LERIN came under it along with other research institutes. LERIN was formally established under a decree of 1973, its main objectives being:
To collaborate with the relevant government departments and
organizations to provide raw materials, labour, leather, and
standardization in production;
To conduct fundamental and applied research in leather science and
technology with a view to ultimately developing the leather and
allied industries to maximize the quality of production for domestic
and export purposes;
To conduct periodic market surveys at home and abroad and thereby
gain market intelligence for use by the Nigerian leather and allied
industries;
To investigate vegetable tanning materials and other leather
auxiliary chemicals indigenous to Nigeria, toward developing a strong
base for their supply to the leather industry;
To build up a national information system on leather science and
technology; and
To develop the institute into a fully fledged regional centre for
leather and leather products.
It had a total staff strength of 248 at the time of our survey. Of
this number, 56 had graduate qualifications in the physical sciences and
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leather technology. of these about 18 had postgraduate training in
various fields of leather technology. There was one mechanical engineer.
The institute is organized around five divisions -- administration,
research and extension, training, production and maintenance. It had 14
research programs at the time of this study. These were: hides and skins
improvement, collagen, tanning agents and mechanisms of tannage, leather
auxiliaries, tanning and finishing, footwear and leather goods, quality
control and standardization, leather trades engineering, slaughterhouse
and tannery byproducts, control and treatment of effluents, economics and
marketing, technical training, research extension and library,
publications and documentations.
LERIN has the weakest engineering base of the three institutes under
study. Maintenance is constrained by lack of spare parts, and at the time of
our study such machine tools as it had were unserviceable.
PRODA
The Projects Development Institute is an industrial research and
development organization established by the defunct East Central State
Government in 1977. It was taken over by the central government in 1976
and is one of the research institutes under the federal Ministry of Science
and Technology. Its main aim is the development of industrial projects
using local raw materials and indigenous manpower through laboratory and
pilot plant investigation. Its range of activities covers:
Chemical and physical analysis of food and food products, chemicals
and drugs and industrial raw materials;
The manufacture of science equipment for educational and industrial
establishments;
Geological investigations covering soil testing for engineering
purposes, drilling for mineral deposits, water-well drilling, and
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hydrological investigations;
Ceramic research, including research on whitewares (pottery), heavy
clays, refractories, physical and chemical characteristics of clays
and ceramic raw materials;
Engineering design, fabrication of miscellaneous machine parts,
production of castings in aluminium and brass and pre-investment
surveys; and Pulp and paper raw materials.
At the time of the study, PRODA employed 534 people. Of this number,
about 180 were graduate-level research and development personnel. It was
then developing its new 55-ha site at Enugu; several laboratories and
the staff quarters were already built.
The inventions
We first examined the broad range of inventions developed in the three
institutes and categorized them as adopted and non-adopted. They were
further examined in detail with a view to explaining why they were adopted
or not adopted by users.
Table 3 shows that 21 of the 31 inventions of FIIRO are product
inventions while only 10 are process inventions. FIIRO, however, sees all
inventions as products. On the other hand, all the inventions of LERIN
are process inventions, which is how LERIN also sees them. Of PRODA's 30
inventions, 18 are product inventions and 22 are process inventions. It
is clear that the bulk of the inventions are agro-based. Both FIIRO and
PRODA have done extensive R&D on the crop, cassava, from which different
staple foods are derived. Five product and two process inventions from
FIIRO are from cassava, as are seven of PRODA's process inventions.
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Measure of diffusion
To determine the diffusion of these inventions we counted the number
of users of each invention. Two types of diffusion must be distinguished
here. The first type relates to the outright purchase of the R&D
institute's invention as a final product. The second type is the starting
of production facilities on the basis of an institute's invention.
Only seven of the 31 inventions of FIIRO (mechanized garri, potable
spirit, palm-wine bottling, Nico cream, smoke curing of fish, sparkling
wine and soap making) have been diffused to outside manufacturers and
therefore qualify as innovations. Soy-ogi, perhaps one of the oldest of
FIIRO inventions, has not been successfully commercialized to any outside
group. Discussions are, however, still being held with two large
multinational companies for commercialization. The first three inventions
in Table 4, soy-ogi, garri flour and fufu, are currently being produced by
FIIRO itself in pilot plants. They are, however, products that have been
commercialized by the institute itself. The institute also produces and
sells garri on a limited scale from its pilot plant.
The two most widely diffused inventions of FIIRO are palm-wine
bottling and soap making, with 40 and 60 users respectively. Calculations
show that only these two inventions have significant shares of the
market. FIIRO technology users have the entire bottled palm wine market
in Nigeria. In spite of the large numbers of users of FIIRO technology in
soap making their share of the laundry and bath soap market at the time of
this report was about 5%.
Five of the 31 PRODA inventions have been diffused and thereby
qualify as innovations, the most important ones being related to garri
making. The science laboratory equipment factory set up in Enugu was
responsible for more than 40% of all science equipment distributed to
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schools by the federal government in 1986.
The traffic lights invention is still being produced by PRODA. No factory has been started to do this.
The number of attendances at courses is much higher than the number of actual enterprises started; this is especially true of palm wine and soap making, as can be seen in Table 4 and Table 5. Table 5 shows that the PRODA inventions were diffused by the direct sale of equipment and machinery.
To date not too many patent licences have been taken out for the use of technologies developed by the research institutes. None the less, several licensing agreements have in fact been concluded, although the technologies have not yet been put into operation. Table 6 shows licensing agreements made for FIIRO technologies.
However, despite these agreements and the extent of the diffusion
that has already been reviewed, we have to conclude that as yet most of the inventions from the research institutes remain unused. In particular, those that appear to address the import-dependence problem do not appear to have been diffused (see Table 7).
In view of the ban on importing wheat and the proposal to phase out barley malt imports, one is surprised that neither sorghum malt nor the composite flour products have been adopted by the industries most
affected. The importance of this question is further underlined by the
import dependence of Nigeria implied in Table 8. Why were these
inventions, which seem to address more directly the country's import-
dependence problem, not diffused?
Several studies on diffusion of new technologies have shown
conditions that help or hinder diffusion. It has been shown that where
innovation was a direct response to expressed need, especially by the
ultimate user, diffusion was swift (Schmookler 1966). In this sense,
contract R&D in direct response to a user's request is more likely to be
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diffused than inventions produced independent of an identified user
(Freeman 1974). Inventions that demonstrate clear advantages over
existing alternatives are diffused more easily than those where no clear
advantage is shown (Rogers 1971). Usually the advantage results in higher
profitability or a better product. Where prospective adopters perceive
the effects of an invention as positive, they are more likely to adopt it
(Agarwala 1972). The lower the risk involved with the new technology, the
higher the chances of diffusion. Technical risks, real or perceived, tend
to prevent diffusion. Inventions that change the habits of users in any
substantive way tend not to be diffused. On the other hand,
inventions compatible with existing values, needs or habits tend to be
diffused more widely. Finally, the type of innovation decision affects
the rate of diffusion.
Is it possible to identify the conditions that led to diffusion in
the case of the inventions of the three research institutes under study
here? This question was approached first from the point of view of the
researchers, and then from that of the users.
Respondents at the research institutes gave reasons for successful
diffusion. In the cases of palm wine and soap it was their opinion that
diffusion was due to the recipient's perception of high profitability and
the fact that the institute was prepared not only to train entrepreneurs
but also to supply equipment and technology required to operate the new
business. Moreover, no royalties or patent fees were required, and the
initial equipment costs were quite low -- about NGN 32000 for
soap and NGN 30000 for palm wine.
Ten soap makers and eight palm-wine bottlers were subsequently
interviewed, as were five mechanized garri manufacturers. The most
frequently given reasons for adoption of the institutes' technologies were
their relative technical advantage, low investment risk and the absence of
technical problems. With respect to palm wine and soap, respondents said
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that the training they had had made them very conversant with the technology involved. Their only problem was the availability of raw material. Low investment cost was also underscored by the recipients. The responses are summarized in Table 9.
Explanations for non-diffusion
To explain the non-diffusion of the bulk of FIIRO inventions,
particularly those relevant for relieving import dependence, it is
pertinent to examine the inventions in greater detail. It would be cumbersome to treat all the unexploited inventions; therefore we shall examine those most important for saving foreign exchange.
SORGHUM MALT
History
Traditionally malt is "barley malt". It is obtained by steeping malt in water, allowing it to germinate, drying it in kilns, and grinding it to flour. Lager beers are normally brewed from barley malt. But foreign
exchange constraints have put pressure on the continued use of barley.
It was estimated that Nigeria. was spending over NGN 140 million on imports of
barley malt annually. After several years of research, FIIRO developed
malt from a variety of sorghum, which is a staple food in the whole of
northern Nigeria and is widely grown. Short Kaura sorghum was found to
have very good malting qualities. Although the development of sorghum
malt was started in the early 1970s, it was only after the Brewing
Industry Research Foundation, Nutfield, made malting and brewing equipment
available to FIIRO in 1976 that the work made progress. Seven sorghum
cultivars were malted and the malts were combined to comprise one portion
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of sorghum-barley composite malt (i.e. a ratio of 1:1) for the first trial production of the seven sorghum cultivars: YG5760, L-1412, FD1, FFBL,
MDW, RZ1 and SK5912. The malts worts and the beers were fully analyzed.
The lager beer was acceptable and had a shelf life of 26 weeks. Short
Kaura sorghum (SK5912) was chosen as a result of these tests. In 1984
commercial scale brewing was done by a major brewer using two replacement
levels of 25% and 50% of SK5912 sorghum malt. The two products were
branded Femos Special and Femos Extra. The analyses of the two beers are
included in Table 10.
After the initial success with both brands of Femos beer, the
products were market tested in 1984. The criteria used were taste,
flavour, aroma, after-palate strength, after-effect, clearness and
foaminess. The markets used were Lagos, Jos, Makurdi, Port Harcourt, Aba
and Benin -- the main beer-consuming centres of the country. The locally
dominant beer was used as the reference lager in each town. The result
showed that Femos Extra was preferred to all the reference beers and to
Femos Special.
Later, higher sorghum substitution levels of 60%, 70% and 100% were
achieved in FIIRO laboratories. It was discovered that for 100% sorghum
malt the only modification to the process equipment required was the
replacement of the false-bottom filtration system with a press filter.
Industry resistance
The first pilot brew report was not accepted by brewers on the
grounds that sorghum was different from barley malt in carbohydrate
chemistry, taste, stability, high fat, tannin and nitrogen content. Even
after Femos taste acceptance tests had shown some of these fears to be
false, only one major brewer and a few minor brewers have shown any
serious interest in sorghum or composite malt.
Interviews held with personnel of the two leading beer brewers --
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Nigerian Breweries Ltd. and Guinness Nigeria Ltd. -- are revealing. The
most serious technical reason given for resisting sorghum malt is that any
beer not made from barley malt cannot technically be called a lager.
They also assert that sorghum malt does not contain husks and
therefore the enzymes required in the brewing process have to be sought
separately. Also, they resist any major investment on the basis of
laboratory results not,replicable in commercial scale production. Last,
they see sorghum malting as being still in its infancy, requiring several
years of genetic engineering to technically replace barley as a malting
medium. From the point of view of researchers at FIIRO the real reason
for industry resistance is the commitment of the different brewers to
brewing specific brands of lagers in the Nigerian market. In their view
an outright ban on the import of barley malt will force brewers to use
local resources.
Certain conclusions seem to follow the case of sorghum malt. Brewers'
perception of the product is different from the researchers' perception.
The brewers see it as experimental with many technical problems
still unsolved -- cultivars, chemistry, requisite changes in equipment and
tooling, market testing of 100% sorghum malt beers and the effects of
these on branding. Unlike the other diffused inventions, sorghum malt is
not perceived as having passed through all the stages from demonstration
of technical feasibility to full commercialization. A ban on barley malt
imports will certainly hasten the development of the process; it will not
obviate the necessity for further work, as brewers still have the final
consumer to deal with.
Composite flour
This product was introduced in response to the high demand for wheat
flour in Nigeria and the country's inability to produce more than 5% of
the requirements of the many large flour mills in the country.
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Composite flour is the name given to wheat flour that has been
diluted with non-wheat materials such as cassava, maize and sorghum, which
are more available in the country. Breads and other confectionery are
usually made from wheat flour, which contains gluten, a high-protein
source that gives bread the universal characteristic for which it is
known. The challenge of replacing wheat is that of finding suitable
substitutes for wheat gluten.
After several experiments diluting wheat flour with flours from maize,
sorghum and cassava, several baking tests and consumer acceptance surveys
were carried out. It was found that the most suitable dilution for
straight dough was 20% cassava starch, 5% soybean flour and 75% wheat
flour. For mechanical dough the respective percentages were 25, 5 and 70.
Thus, the wheat requirement is still substantial and the saving in
foreign exchange is less than 25%. Unfortunately, bakers have resisted
the composite flour because it involves a major change in their baking
habits. The majority of Nigerian bakers do not use the mechanized dough
process. Composite flour, being weaker than wheat flour, is more
susceptible to gluten damage in the process that Nigerian bakers use.
This risk probably explains the non-diffusion of this innovation since
it was introduced in 1974.
Recently, total elimination of wheat was achieved in laboratory
trials for composite flour. The new product is still experimental.
With the government ban on wheat imports as from January 1987, it
will be interesting to see whether that will hasten the development and
subsequent diffusion of the composite flour invention.
Certain conclusions seem clear from the composite flour project. The
invention requires a major change in the baking habits of bakers and
involves a high risk of loss. It is not surprising that is has remained
largely undiffused. In its non-wheat form, it is still an invention with
too many unanswered development problems. It requires a change of taste
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by consumers. As long as pure-wheat flour is available this invention is unlikely to be diffused, as no price advantage seems to accompany the required change.
SOY-OGI
This product was developed as a response to two problems. Low-income Nigerians feed their infants on pap, a corn meal high in starch and low in protein. This has resulted in a high incidence of Kwashiorkor, a disease that retards the mental and physical growth of children. On the other hand the enriched, imported baby foods that are high in protein are not
affordable for the poor. The FIIRO price for soy-ogi is about 60% of the price of imported equivalents.
Soy-ogi was developed to be both affordable and high in proteins,
minerals and vitamins. It is made from corn, soy beans, vitamins and essential minerals.
It was first introduced and test marketed in 1972-1973. Production
of it has continued in FIIRO's pilot plant. Unfortunately none of the big
baby-food manufacturers in Nigeria has been licensed to produce it.
Currently discussions are on with Nestle and Food Specialties -- two multinationals -- for the purpose of commercializing the product.
The non-diffusion of soy-ogi seems to be due to the initial problem
encountered with toxicity in the product after it has been introduced into
the market. It had to be withdrawn for safety reasons. The technical
problem has since been solved but consumer resistance remains. This
resistance has been helped by the availability of cheap, imported, baby
foods of known brands marketed by highly efficient multinational
companies.
In spite of soy-ogi's low cost and high nutritional value, it has
remained largely a pilot project produced and marketed by FIIRO.
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GINGER POWDER, OLEORESIN AND CONCENTRATE
Background
At the time this paper was written there were 41 operating soft-
drink bottling factories in Nigeria, all using imported soft-drink
concentrates. Although only five of these make ginger-based soft drinks,
the market potential for this invention has been estimated about NGN 8
million per annum. That represents potential savings in foreign exchange
of about NGN 3 million. Ginger in its raw form has taste and aroma that are gastronomically
important. However, it has to be processed to become edible. The purpose
of processing ginger is therefore to extract its desirable properties and
store these in concentrated form as powder, oleoresin or concentrates, to
be reconstituted according to the desired end. FIIRO has invented a
process to do this.
The various extracts are obtained through cleaning, drying, milling,
extraction, packaging, desolventization and encapsulation depending on
which ginger product is desired. Products obtainable from ginger include
ginger ale, which is bottled by five soft drinks plants, and ginger beer.
However, all the concentrates used in the industry are at present imported
although Nigeria is a leading and preferred producer of raw ginger, and
despite the FIIRO invention.
As well as having invented the product, FIIRO can fabricate most of
the equipment for processing ginger-washing troughs, picking tables and
cold extractors. Mitchell-type trays, air dryers, Apex hammer milling
machines and solvent strippers have to be imported.
Enquiries to soft-drink bottlers regarding reasons for non-adoption
of the FIIRO invention reveal two main reasons. First, ginger drinks
represent only about 5% of the soft-drinks market, and many bottlers do
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not make it; those who do, produce under licence, and part of the condition of the licence is the purchase of concentrate from the licensor.
The second reason is that soft-drink bottlers view the FIIRO invention with
caution.
Perhaps the technical barrier to diffusion among bottlers is that it
requires new investment by recipients whose facilities are geared to
production from concentrates. Perhaps the most promising avenue of
diffusion will be to erect legal or fiscal barriers to continued imports
of ginger in any form.
Explanation of the non-diffusion of LERIN products
None of the inventions of LERIN were diffused. Yet in each case
technical feasibility has been demonstrated.
Acacia nilotica (bagaruwa) pods have been shown to be a technically
feasible tanning agent. Trials yielded the following results: tannins,
60-65%; non-tans, 25-30%; moisture, 7-8%; insolubles, 2-3%; pH, 4.4%.
The institute researchers also were able to determine improved
conditions for leaching and filtration under a countercurrent system and
improved retention of active ingredients during storage.
Preliminary assessment shows that a commercial plant to make tanning
extracts is critical for successful commercialization. Another
prerequisite is the availability of A. nilotica pods on a commercial scale.
At present they grow as wild plants. For commercialization it is
necessary to develop plantations of the plant before a successful business
can be developed out of the new product. In other words, the project is
still far from commercialization.
The initial assumption was that the plant was widely available
throughout the northern states and that it was a wasting resource that
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20
could be used productively. However, if large quantities of the pods are
required for every pilot plant, the problems of collection and regularity
of supply become critical. The next questions are: What quantity of the
plant can be collected? How is it to be stored for processing? Are the
plants sold commercially? At what price? Our initial enquiries show that
bagaruwa pods are sold commercially, but not in quantities that can be
relied on by a commercial producer of extracts. Availability is also
seasonal. So far two plantations of the tree have been developed in
Kaduna and Niger states. However, they are not yet ready for harvesting.
Storage is not a serious problem once the pods are sundried or otherwise
dehydrated.
Methods of producing extracts from the tannin have also been
developed on pilot scale, but commercial scale equipment for large-scale
production could not be developed locally. A European firm is currently
developing this.
The product is highly significant, because if extracts could be
commercialized up to NGN 5 million could be saved in foreign exchange as a
result of replacing imported tannins. The conclusion that seems clear as
regards the A. nilotica invention is that critical preconditions for
commercialization are largely unmet. Anogeissus schimperii (marke) leaves
and Parkia clappertoniana (dorowa) husks have also been shown to be viable
tanning materials. The constraints to commercialization are not the
availability of the raw materials, but those of artifact prototype
development. LERIN does not have either the design or the fabrication
capability for this. In this case also it is crucial to produce the
tannins in extract form rather than to use the vegetables directly.
In the case of leather fatliquors, research work at LERIN had
concentrated on edible oils. In all cases, products have been developed
that were technically acceptable but proved uneconomic because of
competition with human consumption. Ground-nut oil was developed first
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21
but proved too expensive. At present oil from the rubber tree has been developed for use as a fatliquor in the tanning process. It has good promise because it is not edible. It has not been commercialized however.
Also the mangrove tree has been shown to produce fatliquor oil. It is a scientific success to the extent that it has been shown as a good
substitute for edible oils, but this development, as with rubber tree oil, has not been commercialized.
Work on a bating agent -- Adenopus breviflorus (tagiri) is in a similar state. R&D work is virtually completed and industrial_ trials have been done.
The PRODA inventions
Of the 31 inventions of PRODA analyzed, only five qualify as innovations. The remaining 26 have remained essentially uncommercialized.
For uniformity we examine four of these in some detail in order to explain their non-diffusion. We have selected the four with the most potential for foreign exchange savings from greater diffusion -- sorghum malting and beer brewing, alcohol distilling, palm-nuts processing and a bread oven.
SORGHUM MALTING AND BEER BREWING
The PRODA sorghum malt project was undertaken in the 1970s about the
same time as the FIIRO efforts were on hand. In it, sorghum grain was
steeped, drained and malted. A three-stage decoction mashing method was
used. Gelatinized maize starch and sucrose were used as adjuncts. Bottom
fermenting yeast (Saccharomyces uvarum) was used for fermentation. After
fermentation, the product beer was decanted and lagered.
The malt obtained from initial experimental work gave these results:
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22
moisture, 5%; cold water extract, 5.2%; hot water extract, 22.8%; protein,
10.85%; nitrogen, 1.74%; extract (as is), 25.8%; extract (dry basis),
30.3%; apparent extract (0 plato), 4.65; diastatic power (0L), 10. The experimental beer was analyzed as indicated in Table 10.
The PRODA beer was made 100% from sorghum and was branded Dawa beer.
The engineering fabrication of a small pilot plant to brew 1000 bottles a
day of Dawa for taste acceptance was started in 1983 and completed in
1986. Also a pilot malting plant capable of malting 700 kg of sorghum
grain was built and is carrying pilot malting for Premier Brewery Ltd.
However, the project has remained essentially experimental.
Interviews reveal the same kind of industry-resistance that faced the
FIIRO project. These need not be repeated here.
ALCOHOL DISTILLING-
In view of the substantial expenditure of Nigeria on imports of
industrial (ethanol) and potable alcohols, PRODA developed an alcohol
distilling plant that could convert fermented raffia sap to ethanol,
extract ethanol from molasses and purify the local gin "ogogoro" into
potable alcohol by reducing to a minimum the methanol, fusil oils and
aldehydes in it. The plant comprised rectifying towers, a deodorizing
tower, boilers, a centrifugal pump, process control facilities etc. PRODA
is able to deliver this plant in three sizes, one of 180 1/d capacity
costing NGN 40 000, one of 500 1/d capacity costing NGN 72 475 and one of
1000 1/d capacity costing NGN90 000. In spite of excellent test results,
however, there has not been an order for such plants from any customer.
In view of the technical superiority of the PRODA plant over the local
distillers' facilities, it is surprising that it was not adopted.
It seems that non-commercialization of this invention is due to the
relative cheapness of the traditional process and the non-visibility of
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23
the product superiority of the PRODA process. More important, one
researcher suggested that a lot of traditional distillers are able to
produce very cheaply because they do not pay the high excise tariffs that
they will have to pay once they adopt the bigger-scale, more efficient
PRODA machinery. This aspect was not verified by us, because the
traditional distillers were not interviewed.
PALM-NUT PROCESSING
At the time of our investigations, Nigeria's oil-palm resources were
estimated at 400 000 ha of scattered plantations and wild growth.
Before the discovery of oil in commercial quantities in Nigeria, palm
produce was the third major source of export earnings after groundnuts and
cocoa. All the exported palm oil and kernel oil was extracted by
traditional hand-operated mills until the Dutch-designed Pioneer oil mills
were imported in the 1950s.
But the Pioneer oil mills were found unsuitable for the small peasant
farmers who formed the bulk of oil processors. Moreover they broke down
frequently, were plagued with lack of spare parts and were inefficient and
inappropriate for the newer high-yielding oil-palm varieties introduced to
the plantations.
PRODA palm-oil mills were developed for use in rural communities to
take care of the technical shortcomings of the Pioneer oil mills. The
mills comprised a bunch stripper, which spikes out the nuts from bunches,
a palm-fruit cooker capable of holding up to 200 kg of loose palm nuts, a
digester, which is a cylindrical container with an axial rotating shaft
that mashes the oil pericarp, an oil press to extract the oil, a kernel
cracker, which cracks dried palm kernels, and a screen.
If this invention were diffused, it is estimated that it could save
Nigeria about NGN 10 million annually in imported machinery. It seems that
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24
the invention was not commercialized for many reasons. PRODA did not have
the resources to fabricate the various components of the mill; it has only
the specification of the components and the prototypes. The only unit
available for sale was the kernel-nut cracker. The large plantations seem
to prefer imported machinery, while the small peasant holders continue to
use traditional methods.
PRODA BREAD OVENS
It was estimated that there were more than 10 000 bakeries in Nigeria
in 1984. Most were using either mud ovens or imported gas or electric
ovens. The small-scale bakeries rely predominantly on imported ovens.
PRODA saw its bread oven invention as a "welcome relief" to bakers. It
was described as cheap'and efficient, and made from local raw materials.
The technical problem that PRODA researchers set out to solve was that of
building an oven that would have even heat distribution and good heat
utilization as cheaply as possible. They built prototypes and tested
these. The oven is four-deck, each deck measuring 2.1 x 1.22 x 0.23 m, with its own inlet pipe from the heating unit. The heat is supplied to
the oven by a 320 000-btu/h oil burner with heat controls.
The oven has good distribution and high utilization of heat, and it
bakes bread evenly without burning. It takes about 20 minutes to bake 300
loaves of 450 g each. The bread oven is said to be in commercial use in many parts of
Nigeria. However, we were not able to visit any of the bakers said to
have purchased the ovens from PRODA. The invention is not commercialized
in the sense of an established factory geared to commercial production of
the ovens. PRODA itself is unable to cope with the production of the
ovens or any other of its inventions on a commercial scale for technical
and financial reasons.
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25
Non-commercialization: a summary
After examination of some of the key inventions of the three research
institutes that were not commercialized, it seems useful to consolidate
the various reasons for non-commercialization.
The process of technological innovation has the following important
ingredients:
Idea generation;
The recognition of a need requiring a technical solution;
Research leading to invention or demonstration of technical
feasibility;
Development of a product or process, including raw materials, a
prototype, the design, fabrication and erection of equipment,
product and process debugging and modification, test marketing
and product promotion; and
Commercialization -- the design, fabrication, erection,
installation and commissioning and operation of a commercial
scale plant, The conditions for success at each of these stages are not the same.
The competence required at each stage is also different. The cheapest of
the stages is idea generation. Costs escalate as one moves along the
stages. The literature on innovation is replete with evidence that the
first three stages to invention are the cheapest and represent a small
fraction of the total cost to commercialization. Usually product
development and commercialization represent the bulk of the cost of
innovation -- varying from 60% to 90% of total cost. All the stages are
required for an innovation to result.
However, very few organizations have the capacity to provide all the
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26
ingredients of innovation in-house. For instance, the largest and most
versatile R & D organization in the world is Bell Laboratories in the U.S.,
and some of the greatest technological breakthroughs came from it. But
most of the development work and eventual commercialization were done by
outside firms, some of which came into being merely to exploit the
inventions.
One other important fact that must be kept in mind in appraising
commercialization performance is the fact that only a small fraction of
inventions end up as successfully commercialized innovations. Several
studies show that the percentage is between 5% and 25%. The pruning
process usually takes place within the various development activities.
Given this basic framework the appraisal of the commercialization
efforts of the three research institutes becomes simplified. We reviewed
a total of 66 inventions, for the three institutes. Of these, 13 were
commercialized in the sense that new production facilities were started on
the basis of their innovation. This represents over 20% of the total
number of inventions. This is consistent with previous research findings
in the field. Furthermore, we have seen that the best equipped of the three
institutes also has the highest frequency of diffusion of its innovations.
However, even FIIRO, with its extensive design and fabrication capability,
is ill-equipped to develop all its inventions to the commercialization
stage. In fact, evidence shows that to attempt to do that would be
inefficient and probably a misallocation of resources. It is possible
that the bulk of the non-commercialized inventions could not survive the
development process. This is borne out by the cases discussed in this
research. The development problems ranged from perceived technical risk
to market resistance or the sheer absence of development capability.
Also, commercialization is closely linked with the process of
selection of research programs. It seems that R&D programs are chosen
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27
around the broad functions set out in the legal instruments setting up the
research institutes. Within the broad programs individuals seem to
concentrate their research in accordance with their personal interests.
There seems a complete absence of government R&D contracts similar to
those that so stimulated Bell Laboratories. It seems that each institute
conducted research and development in accordance with its determination of
national needs. This probably explains the duplication of projects in the
two most developed institutes (for instance, the garri innovations are
repeated in both FIIRO and PRODA). Chances are that if more research and
development programs were given to the institutes with clear mandates and
budgets, better coupling would be achieved.
Finally, all three institutes seem starved of funds even to keep
present programs alive. The best-funded programs apparently had enough
money to pay salaries and purchase some basic consumables, according to
interviews we held with the researchers. It is, however, necessary to
investigate this issue more concretely to reach firmer conclusions.
Policy implications
The policy implications that come out of this research must be
qualified by certain limitations. The first limitation is that our
investigation did not concentrate on the dynamics of the innovation
process. It would have been enriched had we observed the various stages
of the innovation process in each of the institutes, including sources of
innovation ideas, the various disciplines brought to bear on the solution
of particular problems, the various constraints and how the hurdles were
scaled, the various actors in the process and the rivalries, intrigues and
infighting that usually characterize R&D organizations. The second
limitation of this research is that no attempt was made to assess the cost
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28
of each invention and the cost of running each of the institutes. All we
collected were budget and plan allocations, which may have little bearing
on the actual expenditures. We have therefore avoided any assessment of
the direct or indirect benefits of their activities. These were not the
aims of the research, but data on these could have enriched the research
The first policy implication is that government-funded research needs
drastic rationalization. All the research programs of the institutes need
to be evaluated to:
Eliminate duplication by merging similar programs and assigning
each duplicated program to a single institute; this may require
some exchange or transfer of personnel in the case of important
programs;
Pool the institutes' meagre resources, which are fragmented in
duplicated projects; funds come from the Ministry of Science and
Technology; therefore, it should be easy to effect this pooling
with minimum disruption;
Discontinue projects and programs on which other institutions
already have inventions; examples of these are the ceramic
projects in FIIRO or the Sorghum malt projection in
PRODA; and
Cancel programs and projects that are carried forward from year
to year without adequate resources, unless these are seen to be
related to national needs.
Second, government should begin to fund R&D activities by identifying
specific social, economic, technical, and other problems needing R&D
solutions. The next step should be to develop research programs with
specific objectives and, after dialogue with R&D institutes, evolve means
for achieving the desired results. Funds should then be tied to specific
research programs. R&D institutes should sink or swim on the basis of the
number of viable need-oriented research programs they can attract and what
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29
number of viable need-oriented research programs they can attract and what
they can do with the programs. This means ending the practice of blanket
funding of institutes.
Third, the basis of reward for R&D personnel should cease to be their
inventiveness or the number of feasible technical solutions they can devise
for problems. Rather, they should be rewarded in relation to the ultimate
utility of the solutions they devise.
Fourth, it seems that the federal government and the institutes should
stop trying to commercialize R&D inventions in house. It is a dissipation
of their meagre resources when they constitute themselves into
manufacturing outfits, trying to market their inventions. The best of them
lacks the range of capabilities for success. However, the Nigerian
entrepreneur will require substantial technical input from the R&D
institutes to commercialize the inventions. The commercialization role of
R&D institutes should be limited to:
Running training programs for prospective entrepreneurs who wish
to commercialize inventions. FIIRO already runs several courses
for this category of people in areas such as soap making, gum
Arabic production, palm-wine bottling, potable alcohol, and
peanut butter making;
Acting as technical consultants paid by entrepreneurs, providing
detail designs, specification of manuals, and other technical
services;
Encouraging technological entrepreneurship among those of their
personnel who have been responsible for inventions -- these
should be encouraged to branch out on their own to found their
own production facilities; and
Solving (for fees) various developmental problems encountered in
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30
the course of commercialization.
Fifth, the R&D institutes need to use restraint in presenting their
inventions to the public and policymakers; they can otherwise give the
misleading impression that the demonstration of technical feasibility in
itself constitutes a sufficient condition for commercialization.
Nondiffusion tends to be seen as deliberate use resistance rather than the
fact that development has to precede commercialization. When inventions are
mistaken for innovations the required investment in further development is
not made, and commercialization is further delayed.
Sixth, the climate in Nigeria for the commercialization of inventions
has to be substantially improved for better diffusion. For this improvement
several steps need to be taken;
The need to commercialize the inventions has to be created or
forced on the nation. This has been borne out by the rushed
introduction of many brands of sorghum beer, once it was
announced that barley malt imports will be banned. Once a move of
this kind is forced on the nation, it must be sustained for a
long time for it be worthwhile for investors to commit resources;
Government policies that deter self-reliance must be scrapped if
commercialization of useful inventions is to take place. These
policies include liberalization of imports; blanket interest
rates for all classes of investment; indiscriminate withdrawal of
subsidies for agricultural inputs, which may badly affect local
raw materials; and deregulation of interest rates. The last
penalizes delayed returns, and as R&D projects involve varied
delays they are the hardest hit by interest rate deregulation.
Seventh, it is necessary to develop a specialized institution that can
provide nursery beds for R&D institute inventions. Such an institution
should be funded and made independent to enable it to:
0 Collect as many promising inventions as possible;
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31
Evaluate each of them and determine the ones with sufficient
promise;
Select and fund the development of such promising inventions;
0 Hive off the successfully developed and commercially viable ones
to willing entrepreneurs. (The new entrepreneurship development
program of the federal ministry of Labour should be tied to these
activities);
Underwrite the losses from developed inventions that prove
commercially unviable.
Lastly, to make the R&D institutes more relevant to the needs of the
country, they should be allowed to sell their services to the private
sector as well. They should be enabled legally to compete for research
projects initiated in the private sector. For this to be effective the
government needs to provide incentives for the private sector to use R&D
services. A climate of liberal imports will not create the need to solve
problems from internal resources. The carrot should be in the form of
special tax rebates or outright matching funds for R&D expenditures,
especially when using indigenous R&D institutes.
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Table 1. Metal-working facilities in FIIRO, LERIN and PRODA.
Type of machine
Number available
Specification Function FIIRO LERIN PRODA
Welding equipment High-pressure To weld metals 1 1 1 oxy-acetylene metals and alloys
Electric arc 1 - 1
Universal nibbling - Circular cutting, 1 - 1 machine dishing, straight
and rectangular cutting, round and square notching louvre cutting pipe beading
Hydraulic press 16-t with Press-shop 1 bits, dies, operations punches, 10- 20 mm
Hydraulic guillotine Shearing with Shearing mild 1 shear machine 3200 mm steel < 13 mm
thick and cutting stainless steel
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33
TOTAL
Medium-duty Planing lathe Precision turn Gear cutting, and screw-cut- lapping, honing, ting lathe etc.
Universal mill -
Vertical type -
Grinding machines -
Other Shaping, bench drilling, cylin- drical boring, power hacksaw
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 - 1
1 - 1
2 - 1
6 - 2
31 4 9
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Table 2. Foundry and other fabrication capability at FIIRO, LERIN and PRODA.
Number Available FIIRO LERIN PRODA
Foundries Melting 1-t iron 1 1
Melting 250 kg brass and other non-ferrous metals
1 1
Lift-out type for ferrous and non-ferrous
1
Heat treatment Electrically heated salt bath, oil bath, air furnace
2
Inspection equipment Quench tank 2
Ultrasonic tester 1
Magnetic particle tester 1
Hardness tester 1
Electroplating For cadmium, copper, bright nickel bright chromium and zinc plating
1
TOTAL 11 - 2
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35
Table 3. Precommercial inventions developed in three Nigerian research institutes, 1971-86.
Institute Product inventions Process inventions
FIIRO 1. Cassava flour 1. Cassava peeling and grating
2. Cassava starch 2. Detoxified cassava 3. Gums, glues, adhesives
from cassava starch 3. Garri-making machinery
4. Garri and garri flour 4. Gluco-amylase enzyme 5. Fufu 5. Sorghum malt 6. Maize flour 6. Bottled palm wine process 7. Soy-ogi baby food 7. Refined kaolin and gypsum 8. Composite flour 8. Ginger powder, oleoresin
and concentrate 9. Sorghum flour 9. Dye ing jig
10. Femos beer 10. Fish kiln for fish smoke-curing.
11. Potable alcohol 12. Bottled palm wine 13. Pitto (local beer) 14. Table vinegar 15. Tomato puree, ketchup
and powder 16. Peanut butter 17. Salad cream and
mayonnaise 18. Full-fat soy grits
and oil 19. Nico skin cream 20. Laundry soap and bath soap 21. Smoked fish
LERIN 1. Tannins from Acacia nilotica (Bagaruwa) pods
2. Tanning extracts from Anageissus schimperii (Marke) leaves
3. Tannins from Parkia Clappertoniana husks
4. Local lime upgrading for modern tanning
5. Local fatliquors for leather continued
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36
Institute Product inventions Process inventions
6. Unhairing and bating agents from Adenopus breviflorus (Tagiri)
PRODA A. Cassava-related 1. Laboratory equipment,
wood work products, glass products, thermometers
1. Cassava peeling machine
2. Steam cooker 2. Cassava grating machine 3. Air blower 3. Pulp dewatering screw
press 4. Traffic lights 4. Depulping machine 5. Multi-purpose grinder 5. Garri frying machine 6. Foundry products, (bearing 6. Garri screening machine
bars, bearing housing, (rotary or shaker) water valves, pulleys, metal ingots)
7. Refractory bricks 8. Industrial adhesive
7. Garri cyclone unit
B. Farming-related 1. Seed planter 2. Maize sheller 3. Palm oil mill (with
bunch strippers, palm fruit cookers, digester)
4. Kero-oil press 5. Sheff dryer 6. Solar dryer 7. Solar hothouse C. Miscellaneous inventions 1. Industrial blender 2. Low-cost oven 3. Bread oven 4. Ceramic pottery equipment
(blunger, vibrating sieve, spray booth, potter's wheel)
5. Alcohol distilling plant 6. Distilled water plant 7. Industrial washing
machine 8. Sorghum malt
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37
Table 4. Number of users of research institutes' inventions, 1971-86.
Institute Invention Number of users
FIIRO 1. Soy-ogi baby food 1
2. Mechanized garri flour 1
3. Mechanized fufu 1
4. Mechanized garri production 6
5. Potable spirits production 4
6. Palm-wine bottling 40
7. Smoke-curing of fish using FIIRO kiln 1
8. Nico cream production 2
9. Sparkling-wine production 1
10. Soap making 60
PRODA 1. Automated garri processing factory 4
2. Village garri unit 2
3. Moi moi factory 1
4. Laundry and washing machine 2
5. Traffic lights 2
6. Science laboratory equipment factory 1 LERIN Nil
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38
Table 5. Modes of technology diffusion.
Diffused invention Attendance at Institute course
Number diffused by patent purchase
Number diffused by
(Number attending) equipment purchase
Mechanized garri - 5
Potable spirits 3 3
Palm-wine bottling 46 40
Fish curing - 1
Nico cream 2 2
Sparkling wine 1 1
Soap making 63
Cassava peeling and automated garri processing
4
Village garri unit 2
Moi moi factory
Traffic light
1
Science laboratory equipment factory
1
TOTAL 115 3 57
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39
Table 6. Patent agreements based on FIIRO technology.
Invention Patent fee Royalty due Number of recipients in negotiation
Nico skin cream 15000 2% of sales 1 Soy-ogi 30000 it if is 2 Femos beer 100000 it it it 1 Ginger powder, 89625 is to of 1
oleoresin and concentrate
Tomato puree, 15000 - 1 ketchup and powder
Refined kaolin 7500 2% of sales 1 and gypsum
Table 7. Inventions relevant to import-dependence.
Invention Product to be Industry Extent of Import substituted affected dependence (1982)
(NM)
Sorghum malt Barley malt Beer (38 operat- 140 ing brewers)
Composite flour Wheat flour Baking (15 large 125 users)
Soy-ogi Weaning baby Food industry 23 foods
Ginger powder Soft drink Soft drinks (41 52 oleoresin concentrates bottlers) concentrate
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40
Table 8. Imports by major sections, Nigeria (NGN million).
'74 '75 '76 '77 '78 '79 '80 '81 '82 '83 '84
Food and live animals 155 298 441 736 1021 767 1438 2115 1756 1341 1052
Beverage and tobacco 9 48 64 133 71 50 12 17 11 9 7
Crude materials 64 74 79 79 108 112 157 202 172 168 144
Mineral fuels 55 100 175 129 175 207 155 176 151 132 111
Oils and fats 4 9 25 47 73 52 115 123 129 97 85
Chemicals 191 333 397 498 648 540 914 1256 1013 963 852
Manufactured goods 523 1008 1136 1565 1850 1524 1982 2641 2165 1928 1242
Machinery and Trans- portation equipment
612 1562 2445 3387 3588 3792 3650 5407 4653 3666 3257
Miscellaneous manu- facturing articles
114 278 372 510 665 415 645 953 711 582 418
Miscellaneous 11 12 15 9 14 14 29 29 11 18 11
TOTAL 1737 3722 5149 7094 8212 7473 9096 12919 10771 8904 7178
Notes: 1982 Figures revised. 1983, 1984 figures estimated.
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41
Table 9. Critical factors leading to diffusion of research institute inventions.
Factor
Demand pull
Relative advantage (technology push)
FIIRO innovations PRODA innovations
Nico cream Laboratory equipment
mechanized garri (3) Automated garri process Sparkling wine (1) Village garri unit (1)
Perceived advantage Palm-wine bottling (8) washing machine (2) Soap making (6)
Low risk (technical or Palm-wine bottling (10) economic) Soap making (8)
Potable spirit (2)
Compatibility with Smoke curing of fish (1) existing habits, methods
Type of innovation decision
Note: Figures in parenthesis represent number of respondents who gave the factor as the reason for adoption.
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42
Table 10. Analyses of PRODA and FIIRO beers.
PRODA FIIRO Dawa Extra Special
Colour at 430 mm (OSRM) 3.30 5.0 10.25
Specific gravity (200C) 1.01608 1.00351 1.0034
Apparent extract ($) 3.10 0.90 1.25
Real extract ($) 5.80 2.79 3.33
Alcohol by weight ($) 3.10 4.11 4.40
Alcohol by volume ($) 4.70 5.16 NA
Extract 8f original wort ( plato)
13.00 10.81 11.86
Real degree of fermentation ($)
55.5 74.00 71.92
Apparent degree of fermentation ($)
76.4 92.00 89.46
Total acidity 0.44 NA NA (eslacticacid) ($)
pH 5.00 3.75 4.40
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43
References
Agarwala, A.N. 1972. University and the international dissemination of managerial techniques. In Solo, R.A., and Rogers, E.M., Inducing Technological Change in Developing Nations -- A Symposium, Lansing, MI, USA, Michigan State University Press.
Freeman, C. 1974. Economics of industrial innovations. London, UK, Penguin Modern Economics Texts.
Rogers, E.M. 1971. Communication of innovations: a cross cultural approach. New York, USA, Free Press.
Schmookler, J. 1966. Invention and economic growth. Cambridge, MA, USA, Harvard University Press.