Did the Cake of Custom Break?

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.................................D I D THE CAKE OF CUSTOM BREAK?

C h a rl e s T i l l yU n i ve r s i t y o f M i c h i ga n

December 1978.................................

CRSO Worki ng Pa per No. 189 ' C op ie s a va i l a b l e t h r ough :C e n t e r f o r R e s e a r ch onS o c i a l O r g a n i z a t io n

U n i ve r s i t y o f M i c h i ga n330 P a c ka r d S t r e e tAnn Arbor, Michigan 48109


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DID THE CAKE OF CUSTOM BREAK?

Charles TillyUniversity of MichiganDecember 1978

Draft of chapter 2 in John Merriman, ed.CONSCIOUSNESS AND CLASS EXPERIENCE INNINETEENTH CENTURY EUROPE (New York:Holmea C Meier; scheduled for publicationin 1979)

. Peasants into Frenchmen. Eugen Weber's big book, has caused astir among historians of France. Many people have called it brilliant,some have called it great, and others have spoken of it as the mostimportant work of the last decade. Considering the competition fromsuch masters as Richard Cobb, Ennnanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Pierre Goubertand Maurice Agulhon, a book which receives such praise milst beimpressive.

Indeed it is. Weber's discussion of changes in rural France from1870 to 1914 is vivid, rich. witty and bubbling with insiglit. (Who else,after all, would think to sho w us how recently twentieth-century necessitieshad been luxuries by pointing out that in the nineteenth-century Vivarnisthe visitor's ritual gift had been a package of coffee , a kilo of sugar,or a loaf of white bread?) Weber has found the means of blending folklore,ethnography and local history into a lively portrayal of a lost world.Every page bears a rich weave of proverbs, customs, couplets and anecdotes.

Beneath the brocade, however, the shape of Wcber's argument isfamiliar. Until well into the nineteenth century, he tells us, most ofrural France lived in near-isolation from the rest of the world, acongeries of diverse, slow-changing and, yes, barbarous little societiesbarely penetrated by French civilization. The thin, incoherent ruralcultures had grown up as devices for coping with desperate poverty,. Allthis, says Weber, changed fast after 1870. As the whole of France grew

more prosperous, roads, rail lin es, markets, schools and militaryconscription cut into the countryside. These nntional,izing, ationaltzLng,institutions weakened rural particularism, flooded the hinterland withnew ideas, goods and practices, then tied the countryside into an urbane


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na t i onn l c u l t r l r e a nd soc i a l l i f e . T he c ruc i a l cha nge s , i n Weber 'saccount , were menta l: confronted wi th new ins t i tut ion s and a l ter edoppor t un i t i e s , pe a sa n t s c onve r te d t o rn t i ona l i sm a nd i n s t rum e n ta l i sm.The crtke of custom, to use Walter Bagehot's famous phrase , broke.From div ers i ty and barbari ty emerged homogenei ty and c ivi l iza t io n.In a word, ru ra l France modernized.

Wcber draws hi s evidence f or th is view from three main sourc es:t he t e s t i m on i e s o f e l i t e obse rver s such a s gove rnme nt o f f i c i a l s , doc t o r s ,sc hoo l t e nc he r s a nd t r a ve l e r s : t he r e p o r t s o f t he f o l k l o r i s t s who swa rm edove r ru r a l F ra nce du r i ng t he e a r l y de c a de s o f t he t we n t i e t h c e n t u ry ; a ndthe r egional monographs for which French geographers and his tor ian s havebecome ju st ly famous. Ilc avoid s two so rt s of evid ence which would, Ithink, requ tre him to mend hi s argument extensively: a ) sy stemat ic observat io nsof th e geography of "moder nization" -- i nc om e, l i t e r a c y , mob i l i t y , i ndu s t r i a lproduct ion, p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y , a nd s o on -- for France as a whole ; b) obs ervat ionson the pace and character of h is c ruc ia l changes before 1870. That makesi t poss i b l e f o r h im t o a rgue t ha t

T ra d i t i ona l c om munit i es c on t i nue d t o ope ra t e i n t he t r a d i t i o na lm anne r a s l ong a s c ond i t i ons r e t a i ne d t he i r t r a d i t i on a l sha pe :low product iv i ty , mnrket f luc tu at i ons beyond the producer ' s con trol .a low ra t e o f sa v i ngs , l i t t l e su rp l us . What su rp l us t he pe a san tcould accumulate was taken from him in taxe s or usur ious i nte res t ,spe n t on c hu rc h bu i l d i ngs a nd f e a s t s , o r i nve s t e d i n l a nd . But l a ndd i d no t i nc re a se t o t a l p roduct i on un t i l c a p i t a l i nves t m en t i nimprovements became both pos sib le and thinkab le. And th is did nothappen un t i l the market became an acces sibl e rea l i t y , tha t i s , u n t i lthe expanding communications network brought i t wi t h i n r e a c h(Weber 1976: 481-482).

'Z - ' . -.- . .,...- - .I - 3 -

Tlia t nineteenth-century agr icu l tu rnl l i f e was grim, r l 'accord.. But theidea t l ia t th e grimness resul te d from lack of invol .vement in t he marketi s a basi c misapprehension! the French countryside was a l rendy heav i lyi nvo l ve d i n p roduct i on fo r r e g i on a l , na t i ona l , a nd e ven i n t e r na t i on a lmarkets by the end of t he e ighteenth century.

Weber appli es th e nsme noti ons of i so la ti on ancl autnrkyt o p o l i t i c s :

Po l i t i c a l d i spu t e , e ven r e be l l i on , on t he na t i ona l . l c vc l p la yedi t s p a r t i n d i m i n is h i n g t h e s i g n if i c a n c e o f l o c a l n o l i d a r i t i c s .suggest ing new riv a l ones, l i ke th e new-fangled idea of c l a s s .A t mid-century, loc al so l id ar i ty had re igned supreme. By theend of th e century i t had lost i t s exclusive re levance . The

I a u t a rk i e s c ha ra c t e r i z i ng m ost o f t he n i ne t e e n t h c e n t u ry we rebreaking down. Great loca l quest ions no longer found the i r or igi no r so l u t i on i n t he v i l l a g e , bu t had t o be r e so l ve d ou t s i de andfa r f rom i t . The peasantry g radual ly awakened to urban ( t l ia t i s ,ge ne ra l ) i de a s , a bs t r a c t ( t ha t i s , not local) concerns (Weber 1976: 276).

This t ime Weber' s reasoning con ta ins an e lement of t r uth . Nottonali s sue s a nd i n t e r e s t s d i d be g i n t o l oom much l a rge r i n l oc a l p o l i t i c sdu r i ng t he n i ne te e n t h c e n t u ry . Yet t h e .a na l ys i s goe s wrong i n se v e ra limportant ways.

F i r s t ( a l t hough t he voca bu l ary o f c l a s s wa s, j ndee d , c h i e f l y a

n i ne t ee n t h -ce n t u ry c r e a t i on ) , t he r e a l i t y o f c l a ss d i v i s i on wa s a ppa re n ti n r u ra l c omm uni t ie s e a r l y i n t he n i ne t e e n t h c e n t u ry , a nd be fo re . P i e r r e

II de Saint -Jacob, af te r a l l , devoted much of his master ly study of e ighteent l i-!

century Burgundian peasants t o th e con fl i c ts which sepnrntec l peasants andl a nd l o rds ; t he Re vo lu t i on , i n h i s v ie w, c rys t a l l i z e d d i v i s i ons whi chhad long been forming.


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- 4 -Second, Weber concen t rates on i ssu es wi th resp ect t o which vi l l ag er s

took the ini t ia t iv e. l ie forget s the innumerable occasions on whichco u n t ry p eop l e r eac t ed t o o u t s i d e ch a l l en g es : ch a l l en g es t o l o ca l P ro t es t an tr e l i g i o u s p r a c t i c e s i n t h e s i x t e e n t h a n d s e v e nt e e n t h c e n t u r i e s ; c h a l l en g e st o l o c a l f i s c a l r i g h t s i n t h e s e v e n te e n t h a nd e i g h t e e n t h c e n t ur i e s ;ch a l l en g es t o l o ca l co n t ro l o v er t h e foo d su p p ly i n t h e e i g h t een t h an dn i n e t een t h cen t u r i es . R el i g io u s s t ru g g l es , t ax r eb e l l i o n s an d fo od r i o t sh ad o cc i ~ r r e d r eq u en t l y i n t h e Fren ch co u n t ry s id e fo r t h r ee cen t u r i esbefore 1870; they involved "great lo ca l quest ions". In fact , Yves-HarieBerce? has bu i l t a whole ser ie s of books around the theme of a sol i dary .s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d peasant communi ty responding t o outs ide at t ac ks by meanso f r ep ea t ed r eb e l l i o n s . Onl y wi t h t h e n i n e t een t h cen t ury , acco rd i n g t oBercc? , d i d t h e u n i f i ed i n t e r es t and t h e so l i d a r i t y d ec l i n e t o t h e p o i n to f u n d ermin i ng t h e b a s i s f o r p easan t r ev o l t s .

Third, Weber 's t iming i s o f f : t h e s h i f t t ow ar d na t i o n a l p o l i t i c sbecame not icea ble d uring th e French Revolut ion, and had gone fa r by themi d dl e of t h e n i n e t een t h cen t u ry . The mass iv e ru r a l p ar t i c i p a t i o n b o t hi n t h e mo b i l i za t i o n o f 1 8 48 an d i n t h e 1 8 5 1 r es i a t an ce t o Lo u i s Nap ol eon ' scoup demonst rates tha t nat io nal i zat i on (see Merr iman 1978) .

F i n a l l y , t h e c r i t i c a l n in e t ee n th - c en t ur y a l t e r a t i o n i n t h e p o s i t io nof ru ra l communi t ies was not a move from autarky t o inte gra t io n, but as h i f t i n c o n t r o l of t h e i r i n t e r e s t s f ro m l o c a l a nd r e g i o n a l e l i t e s t on a t i o n al c ap i t a l an d t h e n a t i o n al s t a t e . The ad op t i o n o f an imag e o fmodernizat ion a s the breaking of the cake of custom makes those changes ino rg an i za t i o n and i n t er e s t s h ard t o se e , an d h ard er t o u n d er s tan d .

The view of so ci al change as the di sso lut ion of customary smal l -scales o c i a l l i f e is f a m i l i a r . I t became th e dominant bourgeois anal ysi s oft h e n i n e t een t h cen t u ry . I t k n i t s n i ce l y wi t h t h e n o t i o n t h a t weal t h.mobi l i ty and urban experience corrupt vi r tu ous peasants. I t f i t s j u st

a s w e l l , p a r a d ox i c a ll y , w i th t h e c a l l f o r a c i v i l i z i n g m i s sl o n on t h e p o r tof schools, loc al government and mi l i ta ry serv ice . 'She former i s tilec o n s e rv a t i ve , n o s t a l g j c v e r s i o n, t h e l a t t e r t h e l i b e r a l , p r o g re s s i vev er s i o n , o f tlie same theory . The deli ghtE ul vibrancy of Weber's bookr e s u l t s f ro m h i s d e f t u s e o f t h e c o n s e r v a ~ i v e s ' p r ef er r e d so r t s of ev i d en cei n t h e ser v i ce o f t h e p ro g ress i v e t h eo ry . A t bot tom, he f inds the oldway s b arb ar i c , and t h e mi ss i o n c i v i l i sa t r i ce wel l wo rt h u n der t ak i ng ; y e tfo l k l o r e and l o c a l h i s t o ry p ro v i de h im wi th h i s mat er i a l s .

The b o u rg eoi s an a l y s i s g av e r i s e t o t h e g r ea t n i n e t een t h -cent u rydichotomies: Gemeinschaft and Gesel l schafL, s ta t i ~s nrl cont mc t , mecl~onicnlan d o rg an i c so l i d ar i t y . I t al so helped form such presumptuous dis cip l in esas sociology and anthropology, whose objec ts were to document , to expl ainand perhaps to guide the t ra nsi t io n from one side of th e dlchotomy to t l ieo t h e r .

Nor d i d t h e i d eas d i e wi t h t h e n i n e t een t h cen t u ry . On t h e c o n t r a r y .They become the basi s of standa rd twent iet ll -century concept ions, bothacademic and popular , of large- scale so ci al change. Al t l~ough hep ar t i cu l a r se t o f v ar i an t s ca l l e d "mod erni za ti o n t h eo ry " ro s e andfe l l i n t h e q u ar t e r - cen t u ry af t e r Wo rl d War 11, t h e g en era l i d ea o fmodernizat ion through disso lut ion and integ rat i on hns survived from theninetee nth cen tury t o our own t ime. I t h as s i ~ rv i v ed ,a s we haveseen, in t o the fas cina t ing work of Eugen Weber. In one form oran o t h er , i t appea rs widely in North American ana lyse s of Europe,includin g those of such widely-read auth ors as C yri l Block, Edward

Shorter , Pet er Stearns and John Gi l l i s . The di ff ere nce between Weberand h i s co l l eag u es d o es no t l i e i n t h e n o v el ty o f h i s b as i c a rgu men t .but i n his ins ist enc e on the per iod from 1870 to 1914 and, more important .

9i n h i s ex t r ao rd i n ary u se o f e t h n o g rap hi c d e t a i l t o p r esen t t h e a rgu men t .


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Familiarity is not truth. Is it true that the dominant socialchanges in nineteenth-century Europe comprised (or resulted from) thediaplncement of traditional, localized, immobile cultures by industrinlism,urbanism nnd expanding communicotions7 That is doubtful. It is doubtfulon two rnther different grounds: 1) because many of the most important concretechanges in the social life of nineteenth-century Europe did not followthe paths required by theories of modernization; 2) because the massiveindustrialization, ~~rbanizationnd communications shifts -- which did.indeed, occur -- grew from the interaction of two deeper and widerprocesses: the growth of national s tates and the expansion of capitalism.

My discussion will dwell on the first point: the failure ofimportant processes to follow the courses charted by theories ofmodernization. That is the easier of the two points to establish.It also lends naturally to consideration of.the reasons for the theories'failure, then to reflection on alternative general accounts of socialchange in nineteenth-century Europe. Those alternatives will easilytaka us bock to capitalism and stntemaking.

The issues matter in their own right: we ar e asking, after all.how the world changes, and how the world we know came into being. Theissues also matter in another way: theories of modernization underliemany accounts of nineteenth-century conflict, consciousness andcollective action. Conservative modernization models nest neatly withinterpretations of protest, conflict and collective action as irrationalresponses to the stresses and strains of rapid change. Progressivemodernization models, on the other hand, articulate plausibly with avision of ownkening consciousness, of increasing integration into cosmopolitanworld-views which guide collective action on a la rge scale. If theunderlying models prove incorrect, we shall have to consider another

alternative more seriously: that most of the time ordinary people hovean idea, more o r less cl ear, of their short-run interests, but varyenormously in their capacity and opportunity to nct on those interests.If that is the case -- 08, obviously, I think it is -- the proper substitutefor the study of "modernization" ia likely to be the study of the ways inwhich large social changes alter the interests, copocitfes and opportunitiesof ordinary people.Notions of Modernization

Whether theories of modernization are worthless or merely cumbersomedepends, however, on how much we ask of them. In an undemanding version,the notion of modernization is simply a na me for general features ofcontemporary life: intense communications, big'organ izations, ass productlon,and so on. If our program is simply to inquire whether those features ofsocial life were already visible in the nineteenth century, and to search

,

for their origins, then the analysis of modernization 1s no more misleadingthan most other retrospective schemes.

In a somewhat more demanding guise, modernization becomes a lobe 1for dominant patterns of change. Rainer I.epsius, for instance, breaksmodernization into these elements:

1. differentiation2. mobilization3. participation4. institutionalization of conflict (Lepsius 1977: 24-29).

The fit between these terms and the maln trends in nineteenth-centuryEurope depends on their specification: which units are supposed to bedifferentiating, who is supposed to be mobilizing with respect to whatend. and s o on. It also depends on our vantage point: from the


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perspective of the national state and the national elite, differentiation,mobilization, participation and institutionalization summarize many oftlie changes going on in nineteenth-century Europe. From the perspectiveof tlie local community, many of the same changes involved de-differentiation,de-mobillzotion, perhaps even de-institutionalization; rights, ritualsand rounds of life which had previously prevailed now lost their strength.Nevertheless, any model of social change requires us to take some vantagepoint, and the center is as permissible a vantage point as any other.Thus we can make it a question of fact whether differentiation, mobilization,participation and institutionalization do, indeed, describe the maintrends in nineteenth-century Europe, as seen from its central locations.

Tl~e eal difficulties with modernization theories only begin whenwc move from simple inventories of common themes to the analysis of

what sorts of structures changed, and why. Did urbanism, industrialismand expanding communications dissolve previously stable, small, self-containedstructures, release people from their control, generate disorder as aconsequence, and finally produce a new, complex, large-scale set ofconnections to replace the old'? Such an account, to my mind, has for toolittle power, interest and conflict in it. But even if it were sometimesa plausible account of social change, it would be a n unlikely model forthe European nineteenth century. Its most important weakness as a guideto the nineteenth century is jts starting-point: a closed, traditional.unconnected, immobile set of social worlds. In the remainder of thisessay, I shall spend a major part of my effort in demonstrating theopenness, connectedness and mobility of the European world as itfaced the nineteenth century. Because the rural world is the one in

which modernization models should apply most clearly, 1 shall concentrateon changes in Europe's rural areas.

What will we find in the countryside? We will find a mobile.differentiated population heavily involved in different forms of

production for the market, and responsive to changes occurring forfrom home. We will find varying forms of mercantile capitalismpenet rathg deep into village life. We will find agents of ~iationalstotes intervening actively in local organization, in order to extractthe men, food and money required for armies and other expensivegovernmental activities. We will find a sensitive interplay betweeneconomic structure and family life -- between the organization ofproduction and of reproduction. We will find few traces of the isolation

i and autarky which are dear to theorists of modernization.None of this means that,the nineteenth century was a time of

stability, or of trendless turbulence. Industrial capitalism tookshape in important parts of Europe. Capital concentrated and the scaleof production rose. The working population, urban and rural, proletarianized.Firms, parties; trade unions and other specialized ossociations assumedmuch more prominent roles in public life. National stotes continued togain power by comparison with any other organizations. Capitali~m ndstate mking , in short, transformed social life. That includes the sociallife of the countryside.

We con have no hope of enumerating, much less of analyzing, thefull range of nineteenth-century change in one brief essay. After alook at broad patterns of nineteenth-century change over the continent


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as a wlrole, l e t trs clone in on the nature of employment in Europe's r ur al Ia r e a s . iIPopula tion Growth and Vital Rates

A g l an c e a t t h e e l e m en t a ry s t a t i s t i c s o f t h e p e r i o d g i v e s animmediate sense of th e nineteen th ce ntur y 's dynamism. The European

Ipopulat ion of 1800 stood in the vic ini ty of 190 mi l l i on, tha t of 1900around 500 mi l l ion. The increas e of more than 300 mi l l i on people impl iesa growth rot e around one perce nt per year . Such a ra te i s n o t sen sa t i o n s1by twent ieth-century standa rds: a s Table 1 indicates, Europe i s s t i l lg ro wi ng a t a b o ut t h a t r a t e , a nd a l l o t h e r c o n t i n e n t s a r e g r ow ln g f a s t e r .B ut fo r a who le co n t i n en t t o g row so f as t f o r so l o n g was an ex t r ao rd i n aryevent in th e his to ry of t he world up to t ha t time ( see Durand 1967. McKeown1976). Ii

The i n crease o ccu r r ed , f u r t h ermo re , d es p i t e a p ro b ab le n e t l o sst h ro u fi h mi ~ r a t i o n n t h e o rd er o f 3 5 mi l l i o n p eo p l e . For t h e cen t u ry 'a sa whole, a reasona ble guess i s t h a t 4 5 mi l l i o n Eu rop ean s l e f t t h e co n t i n en t ,and 10 mi l l ion returne d home. C l os e t o h a l f t h e c e n t u r y ' s e m i g ra n ts l e f tf ro m B r i t a i n an d I r e l an d , an d t h r ee q u ar t e r s o f t h e B r i t i sh and I r i shwent t o North America. The v as t maj o r i t y o f emi g ran t s f rom a l l p ar t s o fEurope sai le d to the Americas; th e t ra ns at la nt ic movement was one of t heg ran d es t mi g ra t i o ns o f a l l t i me. In she er numbers and dista nce s, i t wasprobably unprecedented in human histo ry.

I f t h e es t i mat es o f mi g ra t i o n ar e co r r e c t . Eu rop e ' s ex cess o f b i r t h so ve r d ea t hs d u r i n ~ h e cen t u ry as a who le t o t a l ed c l o s e . t o 35 0 mi l l i o n . .Wit h a p l au s i b l e c ru d e b i r t h r a t e o f 3 5 fo r t h e wh ol e co n t i n en t and t h ewho le cen t u ry , t h a t f i g u re implies a c r u d e d ea t h r a t e i n t h e v i c i n i t y o f 2 5 .In t h e wo r ld o f t h e l a t e r t wen t i e t h cen t ury . a c ru d e b i r t h r a t e o f 3 5and a crude death rat e of 25 could only occur in a poor country. For

4 purposes of comparison, Tahl e 1 p r e s e n t s c o n t i n e n t a l

Table 1. Annual Growth Rat es and Vi ta l Rates fo r Major World Areas, 1960-1.968

Area-Afr i caNorth AmericaLatin AmericaAsiaEuropeSoviet UnionOceania

annual growth rate2.4%1. 42.92. 00. 91. 32. 1

c r u de b i r t h r a t e452140381 82026

c r u de d e a t h r a t e21

9121710

710

World 1. 9 34 15

Source: Annuai re Sta t i s t iq ue de lo France 1970/71: 7".


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rates from the 1960s. No continent now approximates the Europeannineteenth-century situation: all continents now have lower mortality.and the poorer parts of the world all have larger gaps between birthrate and death rate; that means, of course, that the rates of naturalincrease are higher today than they were in nineteenth-century Europe.The closest approximations of Europe's situation a hundred years agoare contemporary Africa and Asia.

Within Europe, the nineteenth century brought pivotal changes in thecharacter and geography of natural increase. Over the continent as a whole,the trend of nineteenth-century fertility was no doubt a gentle decline,as compared with a significant drop in mortality; the difference betweenthe two rates of decline accounted for the continent's large natural in-crease. Table 2 presents some scattered observations of birth rates and

death rates for 1800, 1850 and 1900. In general, the poorer parts ofEurope (which were probably also, on the average, the areas of higherfertility and mortality throughout the century) lack data for the earlyyears; there was a rough correlation between prosperity and statisticalreporting. As of 1900, the range of variation was large: crude birth ratesrunning from 21.3 in France to 49.3 in Russia, crude death rates from 15.8in Norway to 31.1 in Russia. As Ansley Coale and his collaborators haveshown, a long frontier separated the high-fertility regions of eastern andsoutheastern Europe from the low- to medium-fertility regions of the northand west. In these statistics, Bulgaria, Hungary. Romania, Russia andSerbia stand well above other countries.

The national units mask further diversity: fertility andmortality correspond much more closely to economic and cultural regionsthan to political boundaries. Although tlungary shows up in these statistics

Table 2. Vital Rates for Selected European Areas in 1800, 1850 and 1900

CountryAustriaBelgiumBulgariaDenmarkFinlandFranceGermanytlungaryIrelandItalyNetherlands

Crude Birth Rate_1800 1850 1900- - -39.6 35.030.0 28.9

42.329.9 31.4 29.737.6 35.7 32.632.9 26.8 21.3

37.2 35.639.422.733.0

34.6 31.6Norway 22.7 31.0 29.7Portugal 30.5Romania 38.8Russia 49.3Serbia 42.4Spain 33.9Sweden 28.7 31.9 27.0Switzerland 28.6England, Wales 33.4 28.7Scotland 29.6(Source: Mitchell 1975: 105-120)

Crude Death Rate1800 1850 1900- - -32.9 25.221.2 19.3

22.628.5 19.1 16.825.5 26.3 21.927.7 21.4 21.9

25.6 22.127.019.623.8

22.2 17.927.6 17.2 15.8

20.324.231.123.529.0

31.4 19.8 16.819.3

20.8 18.218.5


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as a h i g h - f e r t i l i t y a r ea , f o r ex ampl e , l lu ng ary ac t u a l l y i n c l u d ed so meo f Eu ro p e ' s l o wes t - f e r t i l i t y r eg i o n s . Rudolf Andorka and hi s colle agu esh ave d on e f ami l y - r eco n s t i t u t i o n s t u d i es o f sev era l v i l l a g es i n t h e 0 rm&sa/gand ~Lrk hz egions of Hungary during the ei ghteent h and nineteenthcen t u r i es : t h er e t h ey hav e d i sco v ered mar i t a l f e r t i l i t y p lu mmeti ng t oremarkably low level s. In those are as an arrangement known a s the"one-chi ld fami ly system" prevai le d; by 1850 act ual completed fami lysi ze s were running between 3 and 4 (Andorka 1977). P l en t y o f o t h ers t u d i es f ro m e l sewh ere sh ow s i g n i f i ca n t v i l l ag e- t o -v i l l ag e v ar i a t i o nas a funct ion of economic opportuni ty and family st ru ctu re (e.8 . Levine1977, Gaunt 1977, Sp agnol i 1977).I n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n

One of t l ie fac tor s behind the changing microgeography of f er t i l i tyi n n i n e teen t h -cent u ry Eu ro pe was t h e co n t i n en t ' s i n d u s t r i a l i za t i o n .In d u s t r i a l i za t i o n h as t wo d imen s io n s : 1 ) a d ecrease i n t h e p ro p o r t i o n o fecon omic ac t i v i t y d ev o ted t o ag r i cu l t u r e . h r es t r y en d f i sh i n g , 2) ani n crease i n t h e sca l e o f p ro d u ci n g u n i t s . Our t went i e t h -cen t u ry p r e j u d i ce --compounded by a slogsneering idea of t h e In d u s t r i a l R ev ol u ti o n and af i x a t i o n on t h e f ac t o ry a s t h e v eh i c l e o f i n d u s t r i a l g rowt h -- i s t ot h i n k o f t h e two as t i g h t l y co r r e l a t ed . I n f ac t , t h ey h ave o f t en v ar i edq u i t e sep ara t e l y f ro m each o t h er . Many regi ons of Europe were alre adyr e l a t i v e l y i n d u s t r i a l w i t h r e s p e c t t o h e f i r s t d im e ns io n b y t h e e nd o fthe eightee nth century: major shar es of the rur al and smal l -town populat ionwere involved in var i ous forms of manufactur ing. But the sca le remained verysmal l : the household and t lie smal l shop were the ty pic al producing uni ts .The n i n e t een t h cen t u ry saw b o t h a su b s t an t i a l d ec l i n e i n t h e sh are o f

No une has so fa r assembled comparable accounts of ' thcse ntn eteent h-cen t u ry ch an ges fo r a l l r eg i o n s o f Eu ro pe . Some fea ture s of t l ie cl~anges.n e v e r t h e l e s s , a r e f a i r l y c l e a r :

1. The ar ea s whi ch ex p er i en ced maJor i n d u s t r l a l i za t l o n d u r i n g t h eninetee nth century were bas ica l ly of two kinds:a ) are as in which smal l -scale manufactur ing had al rea dy beeni mp o r t an t d u r i n g t h e e i g h t een t h cen t u ry -- tlie regions ofNanchester , L il le , Milan, Barce lona, Moscow, and so on --and which experienced an urbanizat ton and increa se i n thesca l e of t h a t i n d u s t ry d u r i n g t h e n i n e t een t h ;b) are as i n which coal de posi t s combined wi th wnter andlorr a i l t r an sp o r t a t i o n t o f ac i l i t a t e t h e dev el o pment of h eav yindust ry: Yorkshi re, much of Relgium, Si le si a, e tc .

2. As t h i s " i mpl o si o n" o f i n d u s t ry o ccu r r ed , l a rg e p a r t s o fthe European countrys ide &-indust r ial ize d, devot ing themselvesmore ex c l u s i v e l y t o ag r i cu l t u r e .3. In ab so l u t e t e rms , ag r i c u l t u r e , f o r es t ry and F i sh i n g d i d n o td ec l i n e . They act ual ly grew, but more slowly than manufactur ingand serv i ces . I n sh eer n umber s, t h e ag r i c u l t u r a l l ab o r fo r ceprobably reached i t s maximum some time around World War I .4. Wage-laborera -- p r o l e t a r i a n s i n b o t h a g r i c r ~ l t u r e n d i n d u s tr y --i n cr eased f a r more r ap i d l y t h an t h e r e s t o f t h e l ab o r fo r ce . Onereaso n ab l e g u ess i s t h a t p ro l e t a r i an s an d t h e i r f ami l i es co mpr i sed90 mi l l ion of Europe's 190 mi l l ion people in 1800, and had grownt o 3 00 mi l l i o n o f t h e t o t a l o f 5 0 0 mi l l i o n a t t h e en d o f t h ecen t u ry . Mos t o f t h e i n cr eas e t o o k p l ace i n c i t i es . Urb an i za t i o nan d p ro l e t a r i an i z a t i o n were i n t e rd ep en d en t p ro cesses .

As a r e s u l t o f t h e s e c ha n ge s , r e g i o n a l d i s p a r i t i e s i n i n d u s t r i a l a c t i v i t y ,weal th , urban concent ra t ion and populat ion densi t y increased through then i n e t een t h cen t u ry . Around 1900 the major count r ies of Europe dis t r i but edthemselves in th is manner:

s g r i c u l t u r e , fo r es t ry and f i sh i r i g, an d a d r amat i c r i s e i n t h e av erag esca l e o f p ro d u ct i o n .

8


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over 70% of the labor force in agriculture, forestry and fishing:Bulgaria 81.9, Romania 79.661-70%: Hungary 70.0, Portugal 65.1. Spain 68.1. -:ustria 59.8, Finland 51.5, Italy 58.7, Russia 58.6, Sweden 53.541-504: Denmark 46.6, France 41.4, Ireland 42.9, Norway 40.8, Poland 45.9,31-40%: Germany 39.9, Switzerland 34.2,leas than 31%: Belgium 27.1, Netherlands 30.8. United Kingdom 9.1(Sources: Mitchell 1975: 153-165; Bairoch 1968: 83-120)

Thc proportions rose., broadly speaking, with increasing distancefrom the English Channel.

The changing geography of wealth shows up in Paul Bairoch's estimatesof per capita groas national product. To take only the eight highest-rankingareas in 1830 and 1900: '

1830-Netherlands 347United Kingdom 346Belgium 295Norway 280Switzerland 276Italy 265France 264Spain 263

1900-United Kingdom 881Switzerland 785Belgium 721Germany 639Denmark 633Netherlands 614France 604Norway 577

EUROPE 240 EUROPE 455(Bairoch 1976: 286; figures in 1960 U.S. dollars and prices.)

Real GNP per capita, according to Bairoch's estimates, rose by about90 percent over those 70 years. 'That is slow growth by twentieth-centurystandards, but extraordinary as compared with anything that had happened

a before. Per capita GNP grew fastest in Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland,

Table 3. Number of Inhabitants and Percentage of Population 1.n Citlcs of100,000 or More, 1800-1900, in Selected Areas of Europe

Number of Inhabitantsin Cities of 100,000or More (Thousands)Area 1800 -850 1900Austria . 231.9 549.6 2462.4Belgium - 326.7 1148.7Denmark 105.0 142.0 491.3Finland 0 0 0France 852.4 2025.7 6005.4Greece 0 0 111.5Hungary 0 170.0 837.2Ireland 165.0 258.4 722.1Italy 1053.0 1607.5 3206.4Netherlands 200.0 224.0 1137.5Norway 0 0 227.6Poland 100.0 160.0 989.8Portugal 180.0 240.0 529.4Prussia/Germany 272.0 799.0 9007.3Romania 0 120.0 282.1Scotland 0 490.7 1390.9Spain 400.0 450.0 1676.3Sweden 0 0 452.6Switzerland 0 0 364.7European Turkey 600.0 850.0 1230.0

Percentage of Populationin CLties of 100,000or More1800 1850 1900- - -.7 3.0 9.5- 7.5 17.110.7 9.4 20.20 0 03.2 5.8 15.40 0 4.40 1.3 4.33.0 3.9 16.15.8 6.7 9.99.3 7.2 22.00 0 10.13.3 3.3 9.95.8 6.3 9.81.1 2.3 16.00 3.1 4.50 16.8 30.83.3 3.1 9.00 0 8.90 0 11.013.3 15.2 20.0

England andWales 959.3 3992.1 12806.2 10.5 21.7 39.0European Russia 470.0 850.0 5012.5 1.3 1.5 5.0TOTAL EUROPE 5406.6 12656.9 50091.0 2.8 4.8 10.1(Source: Tilly, Fonde, O'Shea 1972)


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Germany and Belgium -- e s p e c i a l l y , t h a t i s , in the ar eas which sow thedevelopment of coal -consuming, metal -processing indust r ies.

lh e map of urban p opulati on conformed more and more clo se ly to t hemap of large-sca le indus t ry . Table 3 summarizes the changes. In 1800,something l i ke 3 percent of th e European populat ion l ived i n ci t ie s of100,000 or more. By 1 85 0 , t h e p ro p o r t i o n h ad r i sen t o a ro un d 5 p ercen t .By 1900, 10 percent . That meant a r i s e f rom 5.4 mi l l ion to 12.7 mi l l i ont o 5 0 .1 m i l l i o n i n h a b i t a nt s o f b i g c i t i e s -- almost a quadrupl ing in thel a s t h a l f o f t h e cen t u ry. The co mb in at io n o f su b s t an t i a l n a t u r a l i n cr ea sewi thin ci t i e s and massive rural - to-urhan migrat fon produced thunderousurban growth: about 0 .6 p ercent p er year f rom 1800 to 1850, about 2 .1percent per year f rom 1850 to 1900.1

The regional dis pa r i t ie s were wide in 1800, and widened during the ,Icen t u ry . In 1800, th e presence of giant Constant inople made th e Europeansegment of what was to become Turkey the most urban of t he co nti nen t' s maJor ip o l i t i ca l u n i t s : 1 3 .3 p ercen t of Eu ro pean Tu rkey ' s e n t i r e p o p u la t i o n l i v edin th at one ci t y of 600.000. Elsewhere, th e range ra n downward from th e1 0 o r 11 p ercen t For Denmark, E ngland and Wales to a number of c ountr ies i(1with no ci ty of 100,000 or more. By t h e en d o f t h e cen t ury . F i n l andwas t h e o n l y l a rg e p o l i t i ca l u n i t w i t h n o c i t y o f 1 0 0 ,00 0 ; l l e l s i n k ithen hod about 90.000 res ide nts . But th e range ran from under 5 percentin Finlan d, Greece, Hungary and Romania to over 30 per cen t i n Scotland .England and Wales. The r an k o rd er s o f u rb an i za t i o n an d i n d u s t r i a l i za t i o nhad converged.

1. In Table 3 , many st at es (e.g . Greece. Finlhr id) did not exi st fo rsome o r a l l o f t h e n i n e t e e nt h c e n t u r y; i n ~ . t h o s e a s es , t h e f i g u r e s r e f e rt o t h e b o u n d ari es a t t h e acq u i s i t i o n o f i n d ep end en ce . Others (e.g .

Ei t h er b ecause no o ne wi t h t h e h ero l c s t a t i s t i c a l cap ac i t i es o f aPaul Bai roch has so f ar compiled t h e ev i d en ce o r b ecau se t h e ch an ges i n -volved do not len d themselves to sim ple nr~me rica l ummary, ot her mnjorchanges which were undoubtedly happening are ha rder to document. Roads.t h en r a i l r o ad s , p ro l i f e r a t e d ; mai l and t e l eg rap h co mu n i ca t i o n s mu l t i p l i ed ;n ewsp ap ers c i r cu l a t ed a s sch o o l i n g an d l i t e r ac y i n cr eased ; v o l u nt ary n sso-c i a t i o n s , t r ad e u n i o n s , p o l i t i ca l p ar t i es wax ed ; and so on t h ro u g l ~ h einventory of communications, orga niza t ions and everyday rout1,nes.

Amid the grea t swi r l of t rans format ion , the expansion and reorganiza-t io n of European st at es s et some of th e main curr ents of change. Perhapsthe most dramat ic fe atu re of Europe's nineteenth-ce ntury statemaking wast h e co n so l i d a t i o n o f t h e s t a t e sy s t em i n t o a smal l e r an d smal l e r se t o El arg e r and l a rg er u n i t s : ab o u t 50 s t a t es o f v ar i o u s so r t s o n t h e ev e o fthe French Revolut ion; a ra dic al reduct ion t l l rougl~F r e ~ l c l ~onquests toabout 25 sta te s i n 1800 and about 20 in 1812; a temporary reversion toabout 35 st at es wi th France' s def eat . fol lowed by a new consol ida t ion pro-ces s which le f t 20 to 25 independent b tat es (depending on how we defin e"independent" and "state ") a t World War I . Althoc~gh French imper inlism------Prussia/Germsny) changed boundaries rad ica l ly ; in those cases , t he f igur esr ef er t o t h e b o un d ar i es a t t h e d a t e sho wn . The p o p u l a t i o n es t i mat es i nChandler h Fox 1 97 4 y i e l d s l i g h t l y h i g h er t o t a l s an d s l i g h t l y h i g h erp ercen tag es , b u t t h e p a t t e rn is e s s e n t i a l l y t h e s a me a s i n my c o m p il a t io n s .l lere ar e Bai roch 's f ig ure s for Europe wi thout Russia (Rairoch 1977: 43-44):

p e r c e nt i n c i t i e s p e r ce n t i n c i t i e sda te of 20,000 o r more- of 100,000 or more


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cleared th e way and nlneteenth-century wars took the i r t ol l , the chiefpat l l s to consol ida t ion pnssed througl~ emi-voluntary unions, notably thos eof Germany and I ta ly . Throughout the process, s ta te st r uc t ure s expanded,centr a l ize d and became the dominant orga niza t ions wi thin t he i r own te rr i - iitor ies ' . A number of innova tion s followed: uniformed prof ess iona l poli cefo rc e s , na t i on a l e l e c t i o ns and r e f e re nda , c e nsuse s a nd s t a t i s t i c a l bu re a ux ,i nc om e t a xe s , t e c hn i c a l sc hoo ls fo r spe c i a l i s t s , c i v i l se rv i c e c a re e r s ,and many other piec es of the s ta te appara tus t ha t pr evai led in to our ownt mc .

Can we reasonably apply the word "moderniza t ion" t o th isensemble of changes7 That depends on how demanding an idea ofmodernization we adopt. I f a l l we r e q u i r e i s tha t recognizablefe a t u re s o f t we n t ie t h -ce n t u ry l i f e e me rge , t he n t h e u rba n i z at i on ,

l a rge - sc a l e i ndus t r i a l i z a t i on , f e r t i l i t y de c l i ne a nd o t he r c ha nge sp o rt r ay e d b y t h e s t a t i s t i c s e a s i l y q u a l i f y a s m o de r ni z at i on .I f we demand common pat hs o f ch ang e -- something l i ke Rainer Lepsius 'd i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , m o b il i z at i o n , p a r t i c i p a t i o n a n d i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o no f c o n f l i c t -- t he que s t i on r e m a ins m oo t; obse rva t i ons a t a na t i ona lor European sca l e simply do not t e l l us how the changes occurred. Andi f we want t o t r y a caus al model of moderniza t ion (one in which, fo rinsta nce , int ens i f i ed communicat ions produce new sta te s of consciousnesswhich in tur n make people more open to r a t i on al sol ut i ons f or t he i rproblems), the hopelessness of approaching the analy sis wi th hugelyaggregated evidence becomes c lea r . We must look a t evidence whichc om es c l o s e r t o t he e xpe r i e nc e s o f i nd i v i dua l s a nd sm a l l g roups .Let us cons ider how work changed i n Europe ' s ru ra l a reas .

Pe a sa n t s a nd Pro l e t a r i a nsIn order t o understand changes in the nlneteenth-century European

countrys ide , we must exo rc is e the ghos ts in the word "peasantry". Ifa l l we mean by peasan ts is poor people who work the so ll , then in 1800most Europeans were peas ants . Usuall y, however, we have nometl~ingmorep re c i se i n m ind: some t h ing l i ke a g r i c u l t u r a l i s t s o rga n i z e d i n househo1 .d~which control the land on which they l iv e , draw most of the i r s ubsisten cefrom that land, and supply the bulk of t he i r own labor requirements fromt he i r own e f f o r t s . By t ha t de f i n i t i on , t he bu l k o f t he Europe an ru ra lpopula t ion was a l ready non-peasant by the st ar t of th e nCneteenth century.In much of Ea stern and Southern Europe, l ar ge lan dlor ds made the basi ca g r i c u l t u ra l p roduct i on de c i s i ons , a nd used a va r i e t y o f de v i c e s to drawlabor from a mass of agri cul tur a l workers who contr ol led l i t t l e o r n oland. In much of Northern and Western Europe. a major sha re of th ea g r i c u l t u ra l l a bo r fo rc e c ons i s t ed e i t he r o f da y - la bo re rs o r o f l i ve - i nserva nts and hands. Al though the ser fn of Eastern Europe and th e day-l a bo re r s o f W e st ern E urope o f t e n ha d ga rde n p l o t s o r sm a l l f i e l d s o fthe i r own, they depended for su rvi val on the sa le of th e i r householdlabor power. They were. in a c las sic Marxian sense of the word, prole t ar ia ns.

Aga in a l i t t l e e xo rc ism i s i n o r d e r . Des pite Marx' own cle arconcentra t ion on changes in t he ru r a l l a bo r fo rc e , t he word "p ro l e t a r i a n"has taken on en urba n-in dus tria l imagery: Modern Times, wit h Cha rli e Chaplin

t u rn i ng bo l t s on t he a sse mbl y l i ne . I f we c on f i ne t he p ro l e t a r i a t t o pe op l ework i ng a t subd iv i de d t a sks i n l a r ge un i t s unde r c l o se t i m e -d i sc i p li ne , t he n t ha ti n d u s t r i a l p r o l e t a r i a t c e r t a i n l y g r ew d u r i ng t h e n i n e t e e n t l ~ e n t u ry , b u tI t p r ob a bl y d i d n ot a pp r oa ch a f i f t h o f t h e , ~ u r b ~ e s na bor f o rc e i n 1900.


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If , however , we include a l l people whose survi val depended on thesa l e o f t h e i r l ab o r p ower -- whi ch was , a f t e r a l l , Marx ' s b as i c i d ea o ft h e p r o l e t a r i a t -- t h en by t h e en d o f t h e n i n e t een t h ce n t u ry t h e g r e a tmajori t y of the European labo r force was proleta r ian . Agricul tural wage-l ab o rer s were p ro b abl y t h e l a r g es t ca t eg o ry , b u t i n d u s t r i a l an d serv i ceworkers were then competing for the le ad. Before the middle of the nine-t een t h cen t u ry , mo st o f t h e l a r g e i n cr eas e i n t h e p ro l e t a r i a n p o p ul a t i o no ccu r r ed i n smal l t o wn s and ru r a l a r eas . By a rough computation fromt h e f i g u res p r esen t ed ear l i e r , p erh ap s 5 0 mi l l i o n o f t h e 7 0 mi l l i o n i n -cre ase i n the European populat ion from 1800 to 1850 occurred i n placesunder 20,000. I t i s r easo n ab le t o sup p o se t h a t a t l e as t 4 0 o f t h a t 5 0mi l l i o n i n cr ease i n smal l e r p l aces co n s i s t ed o f wage-wo rk er s and t h e i rf a m i l i e s . During the second hal f of th e century. the smal l er place s mayhave grown by another 140 mi l l ion, wi th th e great bulk of the inc rea sep ro l e t a r i a n . By t h en , h owev er, t h e c i t i es were b eg i n n in g t o tak e ov er :100 mi l l ion of the 240-mil l ion incr eas e occurred in places of 20.000 o rmore, and many of t h e smal l e r se t t l emen t s t h a t g r ew were ac t u a l l y su b u rb sa nd s a t e l l i t e s o f m aj or i n d u s t r i a l c e n t e r s . To be su re , i n t h e p r esen ts t a t e o f t h e ev i d en ce an y such nu mb er s r e s t o n a t i s su e o f su p p o s i t i o n s .Yet the main point i s f i rm: the pat te rns of urban growt tt and of to ta lpopulation growth imply a mass iv e p ro l e t a r i a n i za t i o n o f t h e Eu ro peanp eo p l e d u r i n g t h e n i n e t een t h cen t u ry . Contra ry t o common impre ssion s,much o f t h a t p ro l e t a r i an i za t i o n t o ok p l ace i n smal l e r t o wn s and ru r a la r e a s .

The sketchy evidence I h ave p resen t ed l eav es o p en t h e p o ss i b i l i t ytha t the "places of fewer than 20,000 inhabi tants" i n quest io n were mainly

4

s e a t s o f mi ne s, m i l l s an d o t h e r l a rg e - s c a le i n d ~ ~ s t r l a lsLabl ishments.Some were; t he hinte r lan ds of Manchester and I , i l le, for example, werefu l l o f smal l e r i n d u s t r i a l cen t er s . Even i n t h o se t wo q u i n t e ssen t i a lman u fac t ur i n g r eg t o n s , h o wev er, ag r i c u l t u r a l p ro l e t a r i a n s n nd ru r a loutworkers mul t ipl ied during the nineteenth c entury. Away from themajor poles of i ndu st r ial growth, much more of the cxpnnsion took placei n a g r i cu l t u r e an d i n man u fac t ur i n g on a v ery s m a l l s c a l e .

The ea r l ie r European experie nce provides numerous examples ofp r o l e t a r i a n i z a t i o n w it h i n r u r a l a re a s . I n f a c t , t h e r u r a l v er s i o ns o fp r o l e t a r i a n i z a t i o n w e re s o v i s i b l e a t t h e m i dd l e of t h e n i n e t e e nt hcentury t hat K arl Marx considered them the ba sis of pr im i t ive occumulst ion:"Th e ex p ro p r i a t i on o f t h e ag r i cu l t u r a l p ro d u cer, o f t h e p easan t , f ro m t h es o i l , is t h e b as i s o f t h e who l e p ro cess" (C ap i t a l , ch ap t er 2 6 ) . It wouldb e u sefu l , h owev er, t o d i f f e r en t i a t e t y p es of ag r i c u l t u r a l r eg i o n s r a t h ermore than Marx did. At a minimum we need to di st ing uis h:

1. areas , su ch as co a s t a l F l an d er s , i n wh ich p easan t s sp ec i a l i z edin cash-crop product ion, and non-producing l andlord s were unimportant ;2 . a r ea s , su ch as Eas t P ru sa i a , i n whi ch l a rg e l an d l o rd s prod ucedgrai n for t he market by means of ser vi le labo r , whose subsisten cecame mainly from smal l p lo ts assigned to th ei r households;3. area s , su ch as so u t h ern En g lan d, i n whi ch l a rg e l an d l o rd s l i k e wi seproduced grain f or t he market , but wi th wage labo r;4 . a r ea s , su ch as wes tern Fran ce , i n wh ich l an d l o rd s l i v ed f romren t s and p easan t s l i v ed from vario us combinat ions of owned, re ntedand sharecropped land.

Within category 1, p ro l e t a r i a n i za t i o n t en d ed t o o ccu r as a co n sequ en ce o fd i f f e r e n t i a t i o n wi t h i n t h e p easan try : ex t r a ch i l d r en and h ou seho l d s l o s i n gin t he lo ca l compet i t ion moved i .n to wage labor f or oth er pensants . I ncate gory 2, th e red is tr ib ut io ns of l and which common1.y accompanied


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nineteenth-century emancipations produced a temporary movement awayfrom the proletariat, but the substitution of cash payments for accessto subsistence plots created a far larger movement toward wage labor.Category 3 began with an essentially proletarian agricultural labor force,and grew by adding more wage laborers. Category 4, finally, sometimestransformed itself into category 1 by means of the increasing involvementof peasants in cash-crop production, sometimes transforemd itself intocategory 3 as the landlords consolidsted thefr control over production,but rarely created proletarians within the agricultural sector. (Category4 was not, however, a bulwark against proletarianization; it was an especiallyfavorable environment for cottage industry.) The European agrarianstructure, then, provided multiple paths out of the peasantry and multiplepaths into the agricultural proletariat. Over the nineteenth century,the net shift from one to the other was very large.

In Europe as a whole, the proletarianization of agricultural laborhad begun well before the nineteenth century. Great Britain was one sortof extreme; except for some portions of its Celtic fringes. Britain hadessentially eliminated its peasantry by the start of the nineteenth century.By the time of the 1831 census, the breakdown of agricultural familiesin Britain ran as follows:

occupying families employing labor 144,600occupying families employing no labor 130,500laboring families 686,000

Table 4. Percent Distribution of Occ~~pntlonuf Males 20 and Over inGreat Britain, 1831

Category England Wales Scotland -otalAgricultural occupiersemploying laborers 4.4 10.1 4.7 4.7Agricultural occupiersnot employing laborers 3.0 10.3 9.8 4.3Agricultural laborers 23.3 28.5 15.9 22.5Employed in manufacturing 9.8 3.2 15.3 10.3Employed in retail tradeor handicraft 30.1 22.2 27.7 29.4Capitalists, bankers.professionals and othereducated men 5.6 2.7 5.3 5.4Non-agricultural laborers 15.7 16.2 13.9 15.4Servants 2.2 1.1 1.1 2.0Others 5.9 5.7 6.4 6.0Total 100.0 100.0 100.1 100.0Number 3,199,984 194.706 549.821 3,944.511Source: Great Britain. Census Office. Abstract of the answers and returnsmade pursuant to an act, passed in the eleventh year of the reign of HisMajesty King George IV,intituled."An Act for Taking an Account of thePopulation of Great Britain, and of the Increase or Diminution Tl~ereof"(Westminster: House of Commons, 1831) Vol. I, p. xlii, "General Summary ofGreat Britain"

961.100 (1831 Census Abstract,Vol. I : ix)

Table 4 presents the occupations of males 20 and over for 1831. Both


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the breakdown fo r fam i l ie s and the breakdown fo r ad ul t males showab o ut 7 1 p ercen t o f Grea t B r i t a i n ' s ag r i cu l t u r a l l ab o r fo r ce t o beesse n t i a l l y l an d l ess l ab o rer s . Fo r En gl an d a l o n e , t h e f i g u re was76 per cen t. Although th e div isi on between owners and wage-workerswi t h i n t h e ca t eg o ry "R et a i l Trad e o r Han d i cr af t " ( i n wh ich t h e l e t t e rP, fo r example, includes Paper-maker; Past ry-cook. Confect ioner; Pa t ten-maker ; Pawnb ro ker ; Po u l t e r e r ; P r i n t er ; P r i n t s e l l e r ; Pu b l i can , Ho t e l o rInnkeeper , Reta i ler of Beer) i s h ard t o g uess , t h e f i g u re s sug g es t t h a ti n 1 8 3 1 B r i t a i n ' s ag r i cu l t u r a l l ab o r fo r ce was more p ro l e t a r i a n t h ant h e r e s t . By 1 85 1. l ab o rer s amou nt ed t o some 85 p ercen t o f a l l ag r i c u l t u r a lworkers (Deane and Cole 1967: 143-144). Th at was t h e p eak ; t h er eaf t e r .h i r ed l ab o r b egan t o d ese r t B r i t i sh ag r i cu l t u r e fo r i n d u s t ry , and mach in esb eg an t o r ep l ace o r d i sp l ace l ab o r as n ev er b efo re (Jones 1964: 329-344).

Al though Bri t ain was ext reme, i t was not unique. Much of East ernEurope began the ninetee nth ce ntury wi th the bulk of i t s a g r i c u l t u r a lp o p u l a ti o n p ro l e t a r i an s o f a d i f f e r e n t k i n d from t h e i r En g l i sh co u s i n s :se rv i le land less labor ers on lar ge es ta te s (Blum 1978: 38-44) . Al thoughnineteenth-century emancipat ions eventual ly gave some of the m t i t l e t ol an d , t h e main t r en d r an t o ward t h e c r ea t i o n o f a v as t ag r i cu l t u r a lp ro l e t a r i a t . Peasan t p ro p er t y may hav e i ncr eased i n ab so l u t e t e rms ,but the ru ra l populat ion grew much fa st er . A common inte rpr eta t io n ofthos e tren ds ( e.g. Blum 1978: 435-436) is that an exogenously-generatedpopulat ion inc reas e overran the supply of land; my own view i s t h a tp ro l e t a r i a n i za t i o n h e l ped cr ea t e t h e p o p u l a t i o n i n cr ease ; wh ich ev erargument i s co r r ec t , h o wev er, t h e co r r e l a t i o n be tween p ro l e t a r i an i z a t i o nand rura l populat ion growth i s c l ea r . I n such so u t h ern Europ ean ar easas S i c i l y , l i k e wi se , t h e d i sp o ssess i o n o f f eu d al l an d l o rd s mad e p ro p er ty -owners of some former tenants; but i t s m ai n e f f e c t w a s t o a c c e l e r a t e t h e

I

expropr iat ion of t he land by larg e farmers and bourgeois, and thus toh as t en t h e p ro l e t a r i a n i za t i o n o f t h e r emai n der o f t h e ag r i c u l t u r a lworkers (Romano 1963. Schneider 6 Schneider 1976: 116-118). Again or ap i d p o p u l a t io n i n c r ease ag g rav ated t h e p ro cess o f p ro l e t n r i a n i za t i o n ,an d ag a i n t h e cau sa l co n nect i o n s b e tween p ro l e t a r l a n i z a t i o ~ ~ndp o p u l at i o n i n cr ea se a r e d eb at ab l e .

The cases of Easte rn and Southern Europe or e wel l known. Less knownu n t i l r ecen t l y was t h e ex t en s i v e p ro l e t a r i an i za t i o n o f t h e Scan d in av ianru ra l p o p u l a t i o n . Christer Winberg sums up the Swedish experience:

Between 1750 and 1850 the popula tion of Sweden doubled. Thei n creas e i n p o p u la t i o n was p ar t i cu l a r l y r ap i d a f t c r 1 8 10 .Throughout th is per iod about 90 perce nt of the nat i onal populat ionl i v ed i n ru r a l a r eas . The i n cr ease was v ery u n eq u al l y d i s t r i b u t e damon g t h e d i f f e r en t s o c i a l g ro up s o f t h e r u r a l p o p u l a ti o n . Thenumber of bbnder (peasants) rose by c. 10 per ce nt , w hi le thenumber of landless -- i . e . t o rp are ( c ro f t e r s ) , i n h y aes l ~ j o n b o rd ar s) .s t a t a r e ( f a rm wo rker s p ar t l y p a i d i n k i n d ) e t c . -- more thanquadrupled (Winberg 1978: 170).

Win berg a t t r i b u t es t h e ru r a l p ro l e t a r i an i za t i o n t o t wo main p ro cesses :a cap i t a l i s t i c r eo rg an i za t i o n o f l a r g e es t a t es wh ich sq ueezed o u t t h et en an t s i n f av o r o f wag e l ab o rer s , and an i n cr eas i n g i n t eg ra t i o n o f t h epeasa nt ry in to th e nat io nal market economy, which in turn producedi n creased d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n b e tween l an d ed an d l an d l ess . If t h a t i s t h eca se , Sweden combined the pa ths of ca tegor y 1 and category 2, and endedwi t h a co mb i n at i on o f a smal l nu mb er o f c ap i t a l i s t l a n d l o r d s , a l a r g e rnumber of cash-crop farm ers, and a very lar ge number of ag ric ul t ura lwage-workers.


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Pro t o i n d u s t ry an d Pro l e t a r i an i za t i o nSweden was unusual i n one impor tant r egard : unle ss we count mining

and forest ry , very few of Sweden 's r ur al workers went in to indust ry . OverEurop e as a wh ol e , man u fact u r in g p l ay ed ' s l a rg e p a r t i n t h e t r an s fo rmat i o nof the nineteenth-century countryside. Economic histo r ia ns have recen t lybegun to speak of protoi ndust r ial izat ion: the growth of manufactur ingt h rou g h t h e mu l t i p l i ca t i o n o f smal l p ro d uci n g u n i t s r a t h e r t h an t h ro u ght h e co n cen t r a t i o n of c ap i t a l an d l ab o r. Economic histor ian Frankl inMen dels i n t ro d u ced t h e t e rm i n t o t h e l i t e r a t u r e i n o rd e r t o cop e wit ht h e way t h a t sec t i o n s o f r u r a l F l an d er s made l a rg e sh i f t s f ro m ag r i c u l t u r eto manufactur ing wi thout the development of fa cto r ie s, wi thout importantchanges in product ion techniques, wi thout lar ge accumulat ions of cap i ta l ,w i t h ou t su b s t an t i a l u rb an i za t i o n o f t h e wo rk in g c l ass .

Older economic his tor ian s, back to Marx, knew about cot ta ge ind ust ryand al l ie d forms of product ion long ago. The advantage of the new termi s to draw at t ent ion to th e var i ety of ways in which European ent reprene ursof th e seventeenth to nineteenth ce ntu r ie s organized networks of householdst o produce la rge volumes of cheap goods Eor nat io nal and int ern at i ona lmarkets. In th e process, they made manufa cturing not a mere by-employmentfor farmers, but the dominant economic act i vi t y in important par ts of theEuropean countryside. A r ecen t b oo k. I n d u s t r i a l i s i e ru n g v o r d er I n d u s t r i a l i s i e ru n g ,by Pete r Kriedte . Hans Medick and ~ii rg en chlumbohm, surv eys th e growingl i te ra tu re on the subje ct . The book emphasizes the ways in whichp ro t o i n d u s t r i a l i za t i o n t r ans fo rmed t h e r e s t o f t h e ru r a l econ omy, es t ab l i sh edi t s own pecu l iar pa t te rns of fami ly st ruc tur e, and cleare d the way forl a r g e- s c a l e i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . I t mak es c l ear t h e u t t e r i n adeq u acy o fany p o r t r ay a l o f t h e n i n e t een th -cen tu ry ru r a l wor l d as a t e r r i t o ryess ent ial ly populated by peaaants and fundamental ly devoted to agricul ture.

As Pete r Kriedte sums up the importance of prot oindu st r ia l iza t ion:

Proto- industr y sta nds between two worlds , tlie narrow world of th evi l la ge and the boundary-breaking world of t rade , between th eagr ar ian economy and merchant capi ta lis m. The ag rar i an s ec t o r p rod u cesa labor supply. a supply of merc l~ant -ent repreneur knowledgeand ca pi tal , suppl ie s of products and markets. Merchant capi ta lopens foreign markets to ru ra l cra f ts , whose personnel thus :&++become aware of th e opportuni ty f or expansion i f they ente ri n t o p r o t o i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . . . The uni f ied symblosis ofmerchant ca pi t al and peasant soc iety there by marks a deci t i ives t e p on t h e way t o i n d u s t r i a l cap i t a l i sm (Kr i edt e e t a l . 1 97 7: 8 8 ) .

The genera l l in e of argument , in terms of "vent -for-surplus". goesback t o Adam Smith (s ee Caves 1965, 1971). But Kriedte and his col l abor ator sg o o n t o p o i n t o u t t h e i r r e v er s i b l e e f f e c t s o f t h e new sy mb io s i s :commercial izat ion of the e nt i r e rur al economy, dependence on adjacentag t i cu l t u r a l a r eas fo r su b s i s t en ce , t r an s fo rmat i o n of h o useh ol d s i n t osup pli er s (and bree der s) of wage-labor, detachment of marringe andrep ro du ct i o n f rom t h e i n h er i t an ce o f l an d . ac ce l er a t i o n o f p o p u l a t io ng rowth , r i s i n g ru r a l d en s i t i es , t h e gro wt h o f an i n d u s t r i a l p r o l e t a r i a ti n t h e co u n t ry s i de .

K r i e dt e e t a t . b r u sh a g a i n s t , b u t d o n o t q u i t e s t a t e , a f un da m en ta lad v an t age o f p ro t o i n d u s t r i a l p ro d uct i o n o v er u rb an sh o ps an d l o r f ac t o r i es :i n a t i me o f smal l - sca l e ag r i c u l t u r a l p ro d u cti o n wi t h hi g h co s t s 8 o r t h et r an sp o r t a t i o n and s t o r ag e o f f o o d , p ro t o i n d u s t ry k ep t t h e b u l k o f t h el ab o r fo r ce c l o se t o t h e fo od so u rces , an d made i n d u s t r i a l l ab o r o v ai l h b l e ,in odd moments and peak seasons, f or food product ion. Up to a point .the i ndivi dual mercliant could assume tha t the workers would feed themselves.The l o g i c o f t h e sy s t em, i n sh o r t : a ch eap , e l as t i c , co mp l ian t l ab o rfo rce fo r merch ant s who ar e sh o r t o n cap i t a l an d t ech n i ca l ex p e r t i se b u t


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long on knowledge of opportunities and connections.Protoinduntrial production and producers multiplied beginning

well before 1800, and did not start to contract visibly until wellinto the nineteenth century. A labor force consisting largely of dispersed.part-time and seasonal workers resists enumeration; we are unlikely everto have precise counts of tlie rise and fall of protoindustrial workers.Nevertheless, we have enough evidence to be s ure that protoindustrializationwas not simply one of several known patterns of change. Before the middleof tlie:.nineteenth century, when manufacturing increased significantlyin some part of Europe, it normally increased through the multiplicationof households and other small, dispersed producing units linked to nationalend international markets by webs of entrepreneurs and merchants. Itincreased, that i s, not through the concentration of capital, labor andthe scale of production, but through protoindustrialization.

That is notably truc of textile production. As Milward and Saulput it: . .,. .. -It is impossible not to be struck by the extraordinary growth of

spinning and weaving in:.the ountryside of many European areas.In.some nreas the manufacture of iron products, toys or watchesdeveloped in the same way. but textiles, whether of linen, wool orthe newfangled cotton were the typical rural product. The technologicaltransformations which initiated the Industrial Revolution in Britain,were heavily concentrated in these rural textile industries and theirdevelopment on the continent may therefore be seen as the trueprecursor of the Industrial Revolution there rather than the older'manufactures'. But setting on one side the developments of theIndustrial Revolution itself and looking at the matter simply from

those industries were 'revolutionised' or not it would still betrue to say that tlie most industrial landscapes in late cighteenth-century Europe. for all their lack of chimneys, were the countryareas around Lille, Rouen. Barcelona, Zurich, Rose1 and Geneva(Milward and Saul 1973: 93-94).

The rise of coa l-bon ing and metal-working industries during tilenineteenth century eventually changed the picture. B I I ~t took a longtime. The expansion of manufacturing continued Lo toke a protoindustrialform well past 1800.

Because of Rudolf Braun's rich, intensive analyses of the Zi'ricbregion, the Zcricher Oberland has become the locus classicus for studentsof protoindustrialization. In the Zuricl~er berland, the poor subsistence-fanning areas far from the city had been thinly-settled exporters ofdomestic servants and mercenaries until the eighteenth century. Then thegrowth of an export-oriented cotton industry based in Zt'rich but drawingthe bulk of its labor from the countryside transformed the uplnnds: farmworkers took to spinning and weaving, emigration slowed, populationdensities rose, and an essentially industrial way of life took over thevillages and hamlets of.the mountains. A rural proletariat took shape.. .

During the nineteenth century, as the scale of production in ZCrichand its immediate vicinity rose, the process reversed. The I~interl.and ,de-industrialized, and migrants flowed toward ~Kr ich . The Z~ri ch egionmoved from 1 ) urban manufacturing fed by a largely agricultural countrysideto 2) rural protoindustrialization coupled with expanded mercnntlleactivity in the central city to 3) concentration of industry near thecenter, bringing hardship to rural producers, to 4) de-industriilizntionof the countryside. ~jr ich's sequence provides a paradigm for tlie

the point of view of employment in industrial activities whether


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regional history of protoindustry throughout Europe. The chief variablesare when the sequence occurred, how extensive each stage waa, and whethera significant industrial nucleus survived the final period of urbanimplosion and rural contrnction.Urbanization of Industry, De-Industrialization of the Country

Properly ~enerali zed. Zurich's experience has significant implicationsfor ~uro pe's ineteenth-century experience as a whole. Protoindustry didfinally give way to its urban'competit ora hroughout the continent. Ifso, the rural workers involved disappeared. .But only in the artificialworld of statistics can workers simply vanish. In real life, Europe'sprotoindustrial workers either hung on unemployed, moved into otheremployment in the countryside, or followed industry to the city. Theydid all three, although in what proportions we do not know so far. Inthe region of Lyon, at mid-century, rural workers miles from the citylived in its long shadow. "For if we observe," comments Yves Lequin,

the co~~centrationf workers in urban centers which were seizing,to their advantage, declining rural industries, the latter held onto a considerable share; in some places, indeed, the spreading ofwork into the countryside had found ita second wind and was promotingthe expansion of other more dynamic branches of industry. Thelarge shares of the districts of Saint-Etienne and Lyon should notmislead us: cities without boundaries, they attracted people, to besure, but even more so they projected their energy into distantvlllagea: rather than men coming to industry, it was work that wentto men (Lequin 1977: I, 43).

The balance shifted in the next half-century. Despite a decline in theold handicraft manufacture of silk, despite a distinct suburbanization ofLyon's manufacturing, and despite some tendency for mills with power

looms to head for the water power of the Alpine slop es, the industrialcapital swelled. Lyon grew from 235,000 to 456 ,000 inhabitants between 1851and 1906. The depression of the 1870s and 1880s first struck at themanufacturing population of the countryside and temporarily augmentedthe agricultural labor force. But the depression marked the end of along expansion for the hinterland. The villnjies began to leak wolncn andmen to the cities.

Especially to Lyon. The changing relationship between Lyon and itshinterland had a paradoxical efEect: the geograpl~ical ange from which thecity recruited its working population narrowed during the latter halfof the nineteenth century. Instead of arriving from Switzerland, fromItaly, from industrial centers elsewhere in France, they arrivedincreasingly from Lyon's own surrounding region. Within the region,

however, Lyon and the other industrial cities did not simply attracta cross-section of the rural population; they drew disproportionntelyfrom the old centers of rural industry (Lequin 1977: I, 239-246). Theincomplete evidence suggests that they also drew disproportionately onthe people of the hinterland who were already involved in their industrialnetworks

The other side of this process was a wholesale de-industrializationof the countryside. Rural areas became more exclusively agriculturalthan they had been for centuries. Area by area, the homogenization ofrural life was even greater, for the specialization in one cash crop oranother tended to convert whole regions into vineyards, or wheat fields.or dairy farms. So we srrive at a set of unexpected consequences: anindustrialization which recruited, not peasants, but experienced industrialworkers from the countryside: a "ruralization" of that same countrysideas a consequence of the increasing importance of the city; an increasinglygreat contrast between the economic activities of city nnd country.


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Rural ExodusIn a bso l u t e t e rms . ~ u r ope ' s u rn l popu l at i on ke p t g rowi ng un t i l

some t ime in t l ie twent ie th century. I t s p ropo r t i on de c l i ned on l y be c a usethe urhan popula t ion grew fas ter t l~ sn he rur a l . Nevertheless. t l iecloud of numbers throu gh which we have made ou r way impl ies a hugenineteen th-cen tury exodus from the European coun trys ide. Let 11s t a kea ve ry c onse rva ti ve a ssum pti on : t ha t r a t e s o f na t u ra l i nc r e a se were j u s ta s h i gh i n p l a c e s a bove 20,000 f nha b i t a n t s a s i n sm a l l e r p l a c e s . Evenon tha t assumpt ion, t he f i gu re s i mp l y t ha t t he sm a l l e r p l a c e s l o s t a bou t25 m i l l i on pe opl e t o ne t m i g ra ti on i n t h e f i r s t ha l f o f t he c e n t u ry , e ndabout 90 mi l l i on i n the second hal f . A sub sta nt i a l number of those migrantswent overseas, but t he net movement to la r ge r places wi thin Europe musthave been on tlie ord er of 80 or 90 m i l l i on m i g ra n t s.

Who l e f t ? That depended on the pat ter n of opport uni t i es in country,c i t y , a nd ove r se a s a r e a . Those pat te rns var ied wi th t ime and place .A s n working hypothesis, I suggest th e fol lowing rough rank order f ordepar tures from the nineteenth-century European countryside:

1. r u r a l i n d u s t r i a l w o rk e rs2. agr icu l tu ra l wage-workers3. tenants and sharecroppers4 . landowning farmers.

I sugge s t , hu t wi t h g re a t e r he s i t a t i on , t ha t t h e i r sc hoo l- l e a v ing c h i l d re n

e m ig ra te d i n rouuhl y t he sam e o rde r : c h i l d re n o f ru r a l i ndu s t r i a l worker sf i r s t , a nd s o o n. The logic of th e hypothesis is s i m p l e: ha v i ng t r a ns fe ra b l esk i l l s p romot es m i g ra t i on , bu t ha v i ng a s t a k e i n t he l a nd i mpedes i t . Thesam e l og i c sugge s t s t ha t i n t he c a se o f m i g ra t i on t o f a rm s e l sewhe re ( a sin much of the Scandinavian migra t ion t o th e American Midwest ) . agr icu l tu ra lworkers headed the l i s t . Rut tha t was a secondary st ream; most people who

4

f le d Europe ' s ru ra l a reas entered urban emplovmcnt .The consequence of such an order of de part ure would be f i r s t t o

d e i n d u s t r in l i z e t h e c o u n t ry s i d e, t h en t o s t r i p i t of i t s remainingprol e tar i ans. At t l ie log ica l end of such s proc css, family farms wouldpredominate . For Europe as a whole , rur a l na t ura l increase may wel lhave exceeded out-migration -- thus producing conti nued slow growth int h e t o t a l r u r a l p o pu l at i on -- un t i l t he end o f t he ce n t u ry . In t heprecocious case of rura l France , however, la r ge regions were losingpopula t ion before 1900. In those regions, by and lar ge , the remainingpopula tion was becoming more nearl y peas ant than i t had been fo r centur ies.T here a nd e l se where , de i ndus t r i a l i z a t i on a nd ru r a l e xodus had t he i r on i cconsequence .,of c rea t in g an agr arian world which resembled t he " t r a d i t i ona l "countrys ide postula ted by simple models of moderniza t ion.

At f i r s t v i e w, t he ru r a l e xodus i t s e l f se em s t o f i t one pn r t o fthe moderniza t ion model : the presumed r is e of mob i l i ty and of urbancon tsc ts breaks down rurnl i s ola t i on and opens the countrysid e toc i v i l i z a t i o n . A c l ose r l ook s t n i ne te e n t h-c e n tu ry m ob i l i t y pa t t e rns ,however, gives a very di f fer ent idea of what was going on. In the earl ynineteenth century and before , lo cal markets f or wage labor were veryact i ve , gener a l ly involved more than a sing le vi l l age , and commonlypromoted widespread seasonal, a nnual a nd l i f e t kne m i g ra t i on f rom v i l l a get o v i l l a ~ e . In a r e a s o f wa ge l a bo r , m ob i l i t y r a t e s c ompa ra b le t o t hosepreva i l ing i n the contemporary Uni ted Sta t es -- a f i f t h of t he popu l a t ionchanging residence in an average year -- seem t o have b een connnon ( se e . e .gEriksson h Rogers 1978: 177-239). Temporary migr atio n, over sh or tdist ances and long, permit ted mi l l i ons of European workers to supplementthe inadequate incomes avai l able a t th e i r homes by meeting t he seasonaldemand for labor e lsewhere (see , e .g ., ~h%cel .nin1976).


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Some rural regions (upland Switzerland i s a famous example) bu il tthe i r economic surviv al on the exporta t ion of domest ic servan ts andmercenaries, and the importa t ion of r emit tances from the serva nts and Jmercenaries, un t i l the expansion of cot ta ge indust ry permit ted excess 1hands to remain on the land (see , e . g., Perrenoud 1971). Crowing c i t i es Igenera ted huge migra tion f lows because c i t ie s both 1) recrui ted many

iof th ei r workers a s temporary migrants who moved on or retu rned homeand 2 ) were death-t raps. espe cia l l y for the migrants themselves: bothfac to rs meant th a t th e tot a l numbers of migrants were far . Ear grea t erthan the net incre ases through migra t ion (see , e .g.. Sharl in 1978).

Al l t he s e f e a t u re s we re t ru e o f E uropea n m ob i l i t y pa t t e rn s be fo ret he n i ne t e en t h c e n t u ry , a nd c on t inue d we l l i n t o t he c e n t u ry . Yet t l i enineteenth century did not simply bring more of t he same. Overseasmigra t ion, as we have a l ready s een, played an incomparably er ea t er

!ro l e t ha n i t had i n p re v i ous c e n t u r i e s . T he ne t f l ows of m i g ra nt s t o .c i t i e s f romrur a l a r e a s ro se f a r a bove e a r l i e r l e ve l s . T he ave ra ge d i s t a nc e s peop l emoved undo~~btedlyncreased. The def ini t iv ene ss of long-distance movesprobably increased as wel l : fewer people spending the i r l i f e t i mes i nrepented migra t ion from one dis ta nt locat io n to another . Short -distancem i g rat i on p roba bl y de c l i ne d , a t l e a s t r e l a t i ve l y . a s pe op le be ga n t osub s t i t u t e da i l y c omm ut at ion by r a i l o r b i c yc l e fo r l onge r- t e rm c hange sof residence . (For a genera l survey of thes e t rends. see C. Ti l ly 1978).111th one cr uci a l except ion -- th e inf lu ence of governments, wars andp o l i t i c a l c r i s e s on inter nat fo nal migra t ion was t o become preponderantdu r i ng t he t we n t i e t h c e n t u ry -- the mobi l i ty pa t tern s wi th which Europeansare f amil i ar today were taking shape. The mistake i s t o t h i n k t h a t

Summed up, the ninetee nth-cen tury cl~a nges n work, mob ilit y andpopula t ion dist r ibu t io n have another impoftant impl ica t ion. The locunof p ro l e t a r i a n i z a t i on wa s sh i f t i n g r a d i c a l l y . For a long t i m e , mostindiv idua ls and famil ies who passed in to the pr ole tar ia t had made thefa t e fu l t r a n s i t i o n i n v i l l a ge s a nd sm a l l t owns . Duri ng t he n i ne t e e nt hc e n t u ry , t he bal a nc e sh i f t e d t owa rd c i t i e s . W i th i n t he c i t y , a nd i n t hemove to the c i t y, people passed from having some control over t he i r meansof product ion t o depending on the sa l e of t he i r labo r power t o others.Tliose oth ers were most ly ca pi ta l i st s of one var ie t y or another . The workt hey o f f e re d c ons i s t e d i nc re a s i ng l y o f d i sc i p l i ne d wa ge - la bor i n r e l a t i ve l yl a r g e o rg a n iz a t io n s : o f f i c e s . s t o r e s , f a c t o r i e s , railroads, hosp i t a l s , a ndso on. Ca p i t a l i s t s , m a na ger s and l a rge o rga n i z a t i ons t ook ove r t he t a sk o fcrea t ing a compl iant prole t ar i a t . While the smal l ent repren eurs whopreceded them had rel ie d on cash payments, p erso nal patro nage and communityp re ssu re t o se c u re c om pli a nce , t he n i ne te e n t h-c e n t ury c a p i t a l i s t bo l d l yundertook the crea t io n of new kinds of people : t i dy, dis c ip l in ed, so ber ,re l ia ble and uncomplaining. Tl ia t they did not qu i te succeed i s a t r i b u t eto t he sta ying power of t he European working c las s.Did th e Cake of Custom Break?

Much more changed, of cour se, i n nineteen th-cent ury Europe. Inorder t o bui l d a comprehensive analy sis of nineteenth-century so cia lchange, we would have t o fol low t he expansion and e labor a t ion of capi t a l i s m

much far t her . We would have to deal ser io usly wi th the concentra t ion ofpower in na t ional s ta tes . W would have to examine the changes inorganiza t i on, product i ve technique , communications, po l i t i c s a nd e ve ryda y

those contemporary mobi lity p att er ns emerged from a previ ousl y immobileworld.


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experience wl i icl~ eveloped from the inte rac t io n of capi t al i s m and statemaking.W wou ld h ave t o t ak e acco u n t of t h e i n t e rd epen d en t b u t d i s t i n c tt ra jec tor ies of ce nter and per iphery, of North , South. East and West.The thin s l i ce we have taken from the century i s f a r . fr om a c ro ss - sec t i o n .

Neverthef.ess, the evid ence we have reviewed is broad enough to makecl e ar wh at d i d not happen. A co n g er i es o f i so l a t ed , i mmo bi le ag rar i anso ci e t i es d i d n o t g i v e way u n d er t h e i mp act o f i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n ,urbaniz at ion and expanding communicat ions. The i so lat ed, immobile so ci et ie sdid not give way during the ninete enth c entury because they did notex i s t a t t h e b eg i nn i n g of t h e cen t u ry . The European world bequeathedt o t h e n i n e t een t h cen t u ry b y t h e e i g h t een t h was ac t u a l l y co n n ect ed , mo b i l eand even, i n i t s way , i n d u s t r i a l . There was no sol i d cake of custom to break.

What did change, then? The sca le of producirig,organizat ions increiisedgrea t ly . The average range of geographic mobi l i ty expanded. Nat ionals t a t es , n o t i o n al p o l i t i c s and n a t i o n al mark et s became i n creas i n g l y d omi nan t.Tlie populat ion of Europe urbanized and prole tar i aniz ed. The long t ra nsi t io nfrom a high-fertilitylhigh-mortality world began. Inanimate source s-dfen erg y s t a r t e d t o p l ay an i n d i sp en sab l e ro l e i n ev ery d ay p ro d u ct i o n andconsumption. Cap ital ism matured. The European way of l i f e we now knowtook shape.

So is ther e anything wrong wi th summing up tho se changes a s th e"moderniza tion" of Europe? No, i f the name is nothing but a co"venient

name. The erro rs only begin wi th the elev at io n of the idea of modernizat ionin to a model of cliange -- esp ecia l ly a s a model in which expanded conta ctw i t h t h e o u t s i de w or ld a l t e r s p e o p l e 's m e n t a l i t i e s , a nd a l t e r e d m e n t a l i t i e sproduce a break wi th t rad i t i ona l forms of behavior . That magic mental i smi s not onl y wrong, but unnecessary. The an a l y s i s o f c ap i t a l i sm an d o fs t a t emak in g o f f e r s a f a r more ad equ at e b as i s f o r t h e u n d er s t an d in g o f

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