Diamond - Eating Meat and Eating People

8/13/2019 Diamond - Eating Meat and Eating People

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Royal nstitute of Philosophy

Eating Meat and Eating PeopleAuthor(s): Cora DiamondSource: Philosophy, Vol. 53, No. 206 (Oct., 1978), pp. 465-479Published by: Cambridge University Presson behalf of Royal Institute of PhilosophyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3749876.

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EatingMeat and EatingPeopleCORA DIAMONDThis paper s a responseo a certainort f rgumentefendingherightsof nimals. art isa briefxplanationf hebackgroundndof he ort fargument wantto reject;Part I is an attempto characterizehosearguments:hey ontain undamentalonfusionsbout moralrelationsbetween eople ndpeople ndbetweeneople ndanimals. ndPart IIis an indicationf what think an stillbe said on-as it were-theanimals' ide.

The backgroundo thepaper s therecentiscussionsf nimals' ights yPeter inger ndTom Regan nd a number f other hilosophers.1hebasic ype f rgumentnmany f hese iscussionssencapsulatedntheword speciesism'. he word think s originallyichardRyder's, utPeterSinger s responsibleormakingtpopularn connection ith nobvious ort f rgument:hatn our ttitudeo membersfotherpecieswe haveprejudiceswhich re completelynalogous o theprejudicespeoplemayhave with egardo membersfother aces, ndthese re-judiceswill econnectedith hewaysweareblind oour wn xploitationandoppressionftheother roup.We areblind othefact hatwhatwedo to themdepriveshem ftheir ights;we do notwantto see thisbecauseweprofitromt,andso we makeuseofwhat rereallymorallyirrelevantifferencesetweenhem nd ourselveso ustifyhedifferencein treatment.uttingt fairly rudely:fwe say You cannotiveherebecauseyouareblack', hiswouldbe supposed o be parallel o saying'You can beusedfor urexperiments,ecauseyou reonly nanimal ndcannot alk'. f thefirstsunjustifiablerejudice,oequallys the econd.Infact, oth ingerndRegan rgue,fwe, s a ustificationor ifferentialtreatment,oint othingsike he ncapacityfanimalsousespeech,weshould ecommittedotreatingnthe ameway sanimals hosemembers

1 See especiallyeter inger, nimal iberationNewYork,NewYorkReview,1975), Tom Regan nd Peter inger, ds,Animal ightsndHumanObligations(EnglewoodCliffs: rentice-Hall,976), Stanley nd RoslindGodlovitchndJohnHarris, ds, Animals,Men and Morals New York: Grove, 972), andRichardRyder,Speciesism:The Ethicsof Vivisection'Edinburgh: cottishSociety or hePreventionf Vivisection,974).Philosophy 3 1978 465

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Cora Diamond

of our own species who let us say) have braindamage sufficiento preventthe development f speech-committedto allowingthem to be used aslaboratory nimalsor as food or whatever. f we say These animals re notrational, o we have a right o kill themforfood',but we do notsay thesame of people whose rationality annot developor whosecapacitieshavebeen destroyed,we are plainlynot treatingike cases alike. The funda-mentalprinciplehere s one we could put thisway the formulations basedon Peter Singer's statements):We mustgive equal consideration o theinterests f any beingwhich s capableofhaving nterests; nd the capacitytohave interestss essentially ependent nlyon thecapacity or ufferingand enjoyment. his we evidentlyharewith nimals.Here I wanttomention pointonlytoget t out oftheway.I disagreewith greatdeal ofwhatSinger ndReganand otherdefendersfanimals'rights ay, but I do not wish to raise the ssue how we can be certain hatanimalsfeelpain. I think inger nd Reganareright hatdoubt aboutthatis, in most ordinary ases, as much out ofplace as it is in manycases inconnectionwithhumanbeings.It will be evidentthat theformof argument have described s veryclose to what we find n Bentham nd Mill; and Mill, in arguing ortherights fwomen, ttacksChartistswhofight or herights fallmen, nddrop the subjectwhen therights fwomencomeup,with n argument fexactly he form hat Singeruses. The confinementfyourconcernforrights o the rights f men hows thatyou are not reallyconcernedwithequality, s you profess o be. You areonly Chartist ecauseyouare not alord.2And so toowe are tolda centuryater hat heconfinementfmoralconcern to human animals is equally a denial of equality. Indeed thedescription f humanbeingsas 'human animals' s a characteristicartoftheargument. he pointbeingmade there s thatust as our anguagemayembody prejudices againstblacks or against women,so may it againstnon-human nimals. t supposedly mbodiesourprejudice, hen,when weuse the word animal' to set themapartfromus, just as ifwe were notanimalsourselves.It is on the basis of this sortof claim,thatthe rightsof all animalsshouldbe given qual consideration,hatSinger ndReganandRyder ndothershave argued hatwemustgive up killing nimalsforfood, nd mustdrastically ut back-at least-the use of animals in scientific esearch.And so on.That argument eemstome to be confused. do notdispute hat hereareanalogiesbetween hecase ofour relations o animals nd thecase of adominant roup's relation o some othergroupofhuman beings which texploitsor treatsunjustlyn otherways.But theanalogies re not simple

2 'The Enfranchisement f Women'; Dissertations nd Discussions Boston:Spencer, i864), vol. III, pp. 99-ioo. Mill's share in writingthe essay is dis-puted,but his hand is evident n the remarks bout Chartism.466



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and straightforward,nd it s not clearhow far heygo. The Singer-Reganapproach makes t hard to see what s important ither n our relationshipwith otherhuman beings or in ourrelationship ith animals.And that swhat shalltry o explain n Part I. My discussionwill be limited o eatinganimals, but much of what I say is intendedto apply to other uses ofanimals s well.II

Discussions ofvegetarianismnd animals'rights ften tartwithdiscussionof humanrights.We may thenbe askedwhat t is thatgrounds he claimsthatpeople have such rights, nd whether imilar roundsmaynot after llbe found n the case of animals.All such discussions re beside thepoint.For they sk whywe do not killpeople (very rrational nes, let us say) forfood, or why we do not treatpeople nwayswhichwould cause themdistress ranxietynd so on,whenfor he sake of meat we are willing nough to kill animals r treat hem nways which cause them distress. his is a totallywrongwayofbeginningthe discussion,because it ignores ertain uite central acts-facts which,ifattended o, would make t clearthatrights renotwhat s crucial. Wedonot atourdead, even when theyhave died inautomobile ccidents rbeenstruck y ightning,nd their leshmight e firstlass.We do noteatthem;or ifwe do, it is a matter f extreme eed, or of some special ritual-andeven in cases ofobvious extreme eed, there s verygreatreluctance.Wealso do noteat ouramputated imbs. Or ifwe did, t would be inthe samekinds of special circumstancesn whichwe eat our dead.) Now the factthatwe do not eat our dead is nota consequence-not a direct ne in anyevent-of ourunwillingnessokillpeopleforfood orotherpurposes. t isnota direct onsequence of our unwillingness o cause distress o people.Of course it would cause distressto people to think that they mightbe eatenwhentheywere dead, but t causes distress ecause of what t s toeat a dead person.FHencewe cannotelucidatewhat if anything)s wrong-if that s the word-with eating people by appealingto the distress twouldcause, n thewaywe canpoint o thedistress ausedby stamping nsomeone'stoe as a reasonwhywe regardt as a wrong ohim.Now ifwedonoteatpeoplewhoare already ead andalsodo notkillpeoplefor ood, t sat least prima acie plausiblethatour reasons n the two cases mightberelated, nd hence mustbe looked nto byanyonewho wants o claim thatwe have no good reasonsfornot eating people which are not also goodreasons ornoteating nimals.Anyonewho, ndiscussinghis ssue,focuseson our reasonsfornotkillingpeople or ourreasonsfornotcausingthemsufferinguite evidently unsa riskof leaving altogether ut of his dis-cussion those fundamental eatures f our relationship o other humanbeingswhichare involved n our noteating hem.

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the dead. They accuse philosophers f ignoring he problemscreatedbyanimals in their discussionsof human rights,but they equally may beaccused of gnoring he hard casesfor heir wn view. The hardness f thecase for them, though, s a matterof its hardness for any approach tomorality erivingmuchfrom tilitarianism-deriving uch, hat s, fromutilitarianonception fwhatmakes something possible objectof moralconcern.)I do not think t an accidentthat the arguments f vegetarians ave anaggingmoralistic one. They are an attempt o show something o bemorallywrong, n the assumptionhatwe all agree hat t s morallywrongtoraise peopleformeat, nd so on. Now the objection o saying hat hat smorallywrong snot,or not merely, hat t s too weak. What we should begoing against in adopting Swift's Modest Proposal' is somethingweshould be going gainst nsalvaging he dead moregenerally: seful rgansfortransplantation,nd the rest for supper or the compostheap. And'morallywrong' s not too weakfor hat,butin thewrongdimension.Onecould say that it would be impiousto treat the dead so, but the word'impious' does not make forclarity,t onlyasksforexplanation.We canmostnaturally peakof a kindof action as morallywrongwhen we havesomefirm raspof whatkindofbeingsare involved.But there re someactions, ike giving people names,that are partof the way we come tounderstandnd indicateourrecognitionf whatkind t is withwhich weare concerned.And 'morallywrong'willoftennotfit ur refusals oact insuch a way,or our acting n an opposed sort ofway,as whenGradgrindcalls a child Girl numbertwenty'.Doing her out of a name is not likedoingherout of an inheritanceowhich he has a right nd in which shehas an interest.Rather,Gradgrind ives in a world,or would like to, inwhich tmakesno difference hetherhe hasa name, number eingmoreefficient,nd in which a humanbeing is not somethingo be named,notnumbered.gain, t is not morallywrong'to eat ourpets; peoplewho atetheir etswould not havepets nthesame senseof that erm. Ifwe call ananimalthatwe arefatteningor he able pet,we aremaking crudeokeofa familiarort.)A petis notsomethingoeat, t is given name, s let ntoour housesandmaybe spoken o nways n whichwedo notnormallypeaktocowsorsquirrels. hat is tosay, t sgiven omepartofthe characterfperson. This maybe more or less sentimental;tneednotbe sentimentalatall.) Treatingpets n theseways s not atall a matter frecognizingomeinterest hichpetshavein beingso treated.There is not a class ofbeings,pets,whosenature,whosecapacities, re such that we owe it to them totreat hem n theseways.Similarly,t is not out ofrespect or he nterestsofbeingsofthe classtowhichwe belongthatwegivenames to eachother,orthatwe treathuman exuality r birth r deathas we do,markinghem-in theirvariousways-as significantr serious.And again, it is notrespectfor our interestswhich s involved n our not eatingeach other.

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These are all things hat go to determinewhat sort of concept humanbeing' is. Similarlywithhavingduties to humanbeings.This is not aconsequenceofwhathumanbeings are, t is not ustified ywhat humanbeings are: it is itself ne of the thingswhichgo to build our notion ofhuman beings.And so too-very much so-the idea of the differencebetweenhumanbeingsand animals. We learn what a human being isin-among otherways-sittingat a table whereWE eat THEM. We arearoundthe table and they re on it.The differenceetweenhumanbeingsand animals s not to be discovered ystudies f Washoeorthe activitiesfdolphins. t is notthat ort fstudy rethologyrevolutionaryheoryhatis goingto tell us thedifferenceetweenus and animals: the differences,as I havesuggested, central onceptforhuman ife nd is more n objectofcontemplationhanobservationthough hatmightbe misunderstood;I am notsuggestingt is a matter f intuition).One sourceof confusionhere s thatwe failto distinguish etween thedifferenceetween nimalsand people' and 'the differences etweenanimalsand people'; the samesortof confusionoccurs in discussions of the relationship f men andwomen. In both cases people appeal to scientific vidence to show that'the difference's not as deep as we think;but all that such evidencecanshow,or showdirectly,s that hedifferencesre less sharpthanwe think.In the case ofthe differenceetween nimals ndpeople, t s clearthatweform the idea of this difference, reate the concept of the difference,knowing erfectly ell theoverwhelminglybvious similarities.It may eemthatbythe sort f ine have been suggesting, shouldfindmyself aving o ustify lavery. or do we not earn-if we live in a slavesociety-whatslavesare and whatmasters re through he structure f alife nwhichweare here nddo this, ndthey rethere nd do that?Do wenotlearnthedifferenceetween masternda slave thatway? n fact donot think t worksquite thatway,but at thispoint I am not trying ojustify nything,nlyto indicate hatour starting oint n thinking bouttherelationshipsmonghumanbeings s nota moral gent s an item onone side,and on the other being apable of suffering,hought,peech, tc;and similarly mutatismutandis)n the case of our thought bout therelationship etweenhumanbeings nd animals.We cannotpoint nd say,'This thing whatever oncepts tmay fallunder) s at any rate capable ofsuffering,o we oughtnot to make it suffer.'That sentence,JonathanBennett aid, struck imas so clearly alse hathe thought could not havemeant t literally; shall come back to it.) That 'this' is a being whichoughtnot to make suffer, r whose suffering should try to prevent,constitutes specialrelationshipo it, or rather, ny of a numberof suchrelationships-for xample,what its sufferings in relation o me mightdepend upon its being my mother.That I ought to attendto a being'ssufferingsnd enjoyments s not thefundamentalmoral relationto it,determining owI ought o act towards t-no morefundamentalhan hat470



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thisman, eingmybrother,s a being boutwhom shouldnot ntertainsexual antasies. hat life s like n which recognizeuchrelationshipsas theformerith t any ate ome nimals, ow t s differentrom hosein which osuchrelationshipsrerecognized,r differentnes, nd howfar t s possible osaythat ome uch ives re esshypocriticalr richerorbetter han hosenwhich nimals re forus mere hings ould henremain o be described. uta startingointn any uchdescription ustbeunderstandinghat s involvedn such hingss ournot ating eople:nomore han urnot ating etsdoesthat est nrecognitionf he laimsof a being implys onecapableofsufferingndenjoyment.o argueotherwise,o argue s Singer ndRegando, is~not togivea defencefanimals; t is to attack ignificancen human ife.The Singer-Reganargumentsmount o this:knee-jerkiberals n racism nd sexism ughttogo knee-jerkbout ows ndguinea-pigs;ndthey ertainlyhowhowthat an be done,notthat tought obe. They might eply: fyouareright,henweare, r should e, willingo et nimals ufferor he ake fsignificancen our ife-forthesake, s it were, f theconcept fthehuman. ndwhatsthat ut peciesismgain-morehigh-falutinerhapsthan hefamiliar indbut no lessmorally isreputableor hat? igni-ficance,hough,s not nend, s not omethingamproposings an alter-nativeothepreventionfunnecessaryuffering,o which he attermightbesacrificed.hewaysnwhichwemarkwhat umanifesbelongothesource fmoralife,nd noappeal othepreventionf ufferinghich sblind othis an nthe nd be anythingut elf-destructive.

IIIHave I notthen, yattackingucharguments,ompletelyawnoff hebranch amsittingn? s therenyotherway f howingnyonehat edoeshavereason otreat nimals etter hanhe istreatinghem?I shall ake atinghem s anexample,utwant opoint ut hat atinganimals,ven mong s, snotustonething. o put t at ts implest yanexample,friendfmine aises isownpigs; hey ave uite good ife,andhe shoots ndbutchershemwith elpfrom neighbour.is childrenare nvolvedn theoperationsnvariousways, nd thewholebusinesssverymuch subject f onversationndthought.his sobviouslynsomewaysverydifferentrom icking p one ofthe several illion hicken-breasts f 978 America utofyour upermarketreezer.o when speakofeatingnimals mean lotofdifferentases, nd what saywill pplytosomemore han thers.What hen s involvedntryingo show omeone hatheought ottoeat meat? havedrawn ttentionoonecurious eaturef hePeter ingersortofargument,hich s thatyourPeterSinger egetarianhouldbe

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perfectly appyto eat the unfortunateamb thathas ust been hit by a car.I wantto connect hiswith moregeneral haracteristicf the utilitarianvegetarians'approach. They are not, they say, especiallyfond of, orinterestedn, animals.They may pointthat out theydo not love them'.They do notwantto anthropomorphizehem, nd are concerned o puttheir osition s distinct rom newhich hey ee as sentimentalnthropo-morphizing. ust s you do nothave to provethatunderneathhis blackskin theblack man has a whiteman inside n order orecognize isrights,you do not have to see animals n termsofyouremotionalresponses opeople to recognizetheirrights.So the direction f theirargument s:we are only one kind of animal; if what is fairforus is concernfor ourinterests,hatdependsonlyonourbeing iving nimalswith nterests-andif that s fair, t is fairfor ny animal.They do not, that s,want to movefromconcernforpeople to concernfor four-legged eople or featheredpeople-to beingswhodeserve hatconcern nlybecause we think fthemas having littleperson nside.To make a contrast, wantto takea pieceof vegetarian ropaganda f averydifferentort.

Learningto be a DutifulCarnivore3Dogs and cats and goats and cows,Ducks and chickens, heepand sowsWovenintotalesfor ots,Pictured n theirwalls and pots.Time fordinner Come and eatAll your ovely, uicymeat.One dayham from ercyPorker(In thecomicshe's a corker),Then the breastfromMrs CluckOr thewingfromDonald Duck.LivernextfromClara Cow(No, it doesn't hurthernow).Yes, that eg's from eterRabbitChew itwell; make that habit.Eat thecreatures illedfor ale,But neverpull thepussy'stail.Eat theflesh romfilthy ogs'Butneverbe unkind o dogs.Growup into double-think-Kiss the hamster; kinthe mink.Neverthink f slaughter, ear,

3The British egetarian,an/Feb969, p. 59.472



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That'swhy nimals rehere.Theyonly ome nearthodie,So eatyourmeat, nd don't skwhy.Jane egge

What hat s tryingobring ut s a kind f nconsistency,rconfusionmixedwithhypocrisy-whatt sees as that-in our ordinary aysofthinkingbout nimals, onfusionshat ome ut,notonly ut trikingly,in what hildrenretaughtbout hem. hat stosay, hepoemdoesnotaskyoutofeel n this rtheotherway bout nimals. ather,t takescertain ange ffeelingsorgranted. hereare certainwaysoffeelingreflectedn our ellinghildrenlassical nimal tories,nourfeeding irdsandsquirrelsnthewinter,ay-in our nterferingithwhat hildren oto animals s we interferehen heymaltreatmaller hildren:Neverpullthepussy's ail'.The poemdoesnot ry ogetus tobehave ike hat,or togetus to feel 'transportfcordiality'owards nimals. ather,tis addressedopeoplewhose esponseo animals lreadyncludes varietyofsuch kinds f behaviour,nd taking hatforgrantedt suggests hatother eaturesfourrelationshipo animals how onfusionr hypocrisy.It isvery mportant,think,hat t does not ttemptny ustificationortherange fresponsesgainst hebackgroundfwhich ertain ther indsofbehaviourre supposed o look hypocritical.here s a real questionwhetherustificationouldbe in place for hesebackgroundesponses.I want obringhat ut byanotheroem,not bitofvegetarianr anyother ropaganda.his s a poem fWalter e la Mare's.

TitmouseIfyouwouldhappy ompany in,Dangle palm-nutrom tree,Idly ngreenosway ndspin,Itssnow-pulpedernelor ait; and seeA nimbleitmousentern.Out ofearth's astunknownf ir,Out of llsummer,rom ave o wave,He'llperch,ndprank isfeathersair,Jangle glass-clear ilderingtave,And takehis commonshere-Thistinyon of ife; his pright,By momentaryuman ought,Plumewillhiswingnthedapplingight,Clash imbrelhrill ndgay-And ntoTime's enormous ought,Sweet-fed illflitway.

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Whatnterestseheres the hraseThistinyonof ife'.t s mportantthat his s connectednthepoemwith hebird's ppearingutofearth'svastunknownfair, ndflittingff ntoTime's enormous ought.He isshown s fellow reature,ith his ery trikinghrasesonof ife'. wanttosay ome hings bout he deaof fellow reature.First, hat t indicates directionf thoughteryunlike hatof theSinger rgument.herewe start upposedlyromhebiologicalact hatweanddogs nd rats nd titmicendmonkeysre all species f animal,differentiatedndeed n terms f thisor theother apacity,ut what sappropriatereatmentormembersf ourspecieswouldbe appropriateto membersf nywhose apacitiesave hemimilarnterests. eareallequallynimals,hough,or start-with,herefore,nequalrightohavewhateverur nterestsre takennto ccount. he startingoint or urthoughts what sgeneralnd n commonndbiologicallyiven.mplicitlyin theJane eggepoem,ndexplicitlynthede aMare,wehave differentnotion,hat f iving reature,r fellow reature-whichsnot biologicalconcept.t doesnotmean, iologicallynanimal,omethingith iologicallife-itmeans beingn a certainoat, s itwere, fwhom t makesensetosay, mong therhings,hattgoesoffntoTime'senormous ought,and whichmaybe sought s company.he response o animals s ourfellowsnmortality,n ife n this arththink ere fBurns's escriptionof himselfo themouseas 'thypoorearthbornompanion,/An'ellowmortal'), epends pon conceptionfhumanife. t is an extensionf anon-biologicalotion fwhathuman ife s. You can call it anthropo-morphic,utonlyfyouwant o create onfusion.he confusion,hough,iscreatednly ecausewe donothave clear deaofwhat henomenahewordanthropomorphic'ight over,ndtend ouse tfor aseswhich resentimentaln certain haracteristicays,which he de la Marepoemavoids, oweverarrowly.The extensiono animals f modesofthinkingharacteristicf ourresponseso humanbeings s extremelyomplex,nd includes greatvarietyf things. he ideaof an animal s companys a strikingindofcase; itbringstout that henotion fa fellowreature oesnot nvolvejust the extensionf moral onceptsikecharityr ustice.Those are,indeed, mong he mostfamiliarf suchextensions;husthe dea of afellow reature aygowith eedingirdsnwinter,houghtfas some-thing kinto charity,r againwithgiving hunted nimal sportingchance,where hat s thoughtfas somethingkin o ustice rfairness.I should ay hat henotionf fellow reaturesextremelyabile,ndthatispartlyecauset s not omethingver nd above he xtensionsf uchconceptss ustice,harityndfriendship-or-companionship-or-cordiality.(I hadthoughthat he xtensionf hefriendship'ange fconcepts asobviously ossible nly n somecases,titmicend nothippopotamuses,e.g.;butrecentilms ftherelation etween hales nd theirGreenpeace474



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rescuers show that I was probably taking an excessivelynarrowview.)Independence s anotherof the important xtended concepts,or rather,the dea of an independentife, ubject, s any s, to contingencies; nd thisis closely connectedwith the idea of something ike a respect or theanimal's independent ife. We see such a notion n, for example, manypeople's objections o the performance f circus tricksby animals,as anindignity.he conception f a hunted nimal as a 'respected nemy' s alsoclosely related. Pity is another central concept here, as expressed, forexample, n Burns's To a Mouse'; and I should note thatthe connectionbetween pityand sparing someone's lifeis wholly excluded fromvege-tarian arguments f the sort attacked n Part I-it has no place in therhetoric fa 'liberationmovement'.It does normally, r very ften, o with he dea of a fellow reature, hatwe do eat them. But it then characteristicallyoes withthe dea thattheymust be huntedfairly r raised withoutbad usage. The treatmentf ananimal as simplya stage (the self-moving tage) in the production f ameatproduct s notpartof this mode ofthinking; nd I shouldsuggestalso that he conceptof vermin' s at leastsometimes sed in excluding nanimalfrom he classoffellow reatures. owever, tmakes n importantlydifferentind of contrastwith fellow reature' rom he contrast ouhavewhenanimals re taken s stages ntheproduction f a meatproduct, r as'verydelicatepiecesofmachinery'as in a recentBBC programmen theuse of animals n research). shall have moreto sayabout thesecontrastslater;thepoint wishtomakenowis that t is notafactthata titmousehas a life; f one speaksthatway it expresses particular elationwithinbroadly pecifiable angeto titmice. t is no morebiological han t wouldbe a biologicalpointshouldyou call anotherpersona 'traveller etweenlife nddeath':that snota biological ointdressedup inpoetical anguage.The fellow-creatureesponse its n us alongside thers.This is broughtout byanother oemofde la Mare's, Dry August Burned',whichbeginswith childweepingher heart ut on seeing dead hare ying impon thekitchen able. Buthearing teamof field rtillery oingbytomanoeuvres,she runs out and watches t all in thebright un. After heyhavepassed,she turns and runs back into the house, but the hare has vanished-'Mother',she asks, please may go and see it skinned?' n a classicstudyof intellectual rowthn children, usan Isaacs describes t some lengthwhat she calls theextraordinarilyonfused nd conflicting ays n whichwe adultsactuallybehave towards nimals n thesightofchildren, nd inconnectionwithwhich hildren avetotry o understand urhorrortthecruelty heymaydisplay owards nimals, ur nsistence hat hey e kind'tothem.4 he mentions heenormously ariedways nwhich nimal deathand thekilling fanimals re a matter-of-courseeature f the ife hildren

4 Intellectual rowth n Young ChildrenLondon: Routledge,930), pp.i6o-i62.475



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see and are told about. They quite earlygrasptherelation etweenmeatand the killingof animals,see insectpests killed,or spidersor snakesmerely ecausethey redistasteful;heyhearabout thekilling fdangerousanimalsorofsuperfluous uppiesand kittens,nd areencouraged arly ofish r collectbutterflies-and o on.I am not concernedhere to ask whetherwe should or should not dothese hings oanimals,but rather obring ut thatwhat smeantby doingsomething o an animal,what s meantby something's eingan animal, sshaped bysuchthings s Mrs Isaacs describes.Animals-these objectsweare actingupon-are notgivenfor our thought ndependentlyf such amass ofwaysof thinkingbout and responding o them. This is partofwhat meant arlierwhen dismissed he dea ofsaying fsomething hatwhatever oncepts t fellunder, t was capable of sufferingnd so oughtnot to be made to suffer-the laim Bennett ound o clearly alsethathethought mustnot havemeant t. I shallreturn o it shortly.This mass of responses,and more,Mrs Isaacs called confusedandcontradictory.ut there re significantatternsn it; it is no more ust alot of confused ndcontradictory odesofresponse han s themass whichenablesus to think f ourfellowhumanbeingsas such. For example, henotionof verminmakes sense againstthe backgroundof the idea ofanimals n general s not merethings.Certaingroupsofanimalsare thensingled ut as not o be treated ully s the rest re,where he deamight ethatthe rest re to be huntedonlyfairlynd notmeanlypoisoned. Again,thekilling fdangerous nimals n self-defence orms artof a patternnwhich ircumstancesf mmediate angermakea difference,ssuming s abackground he independentifeofthe lion (say), perceived n termsnotlimited o thewayitmight erveour ends. What I am suggesting ere sthat certainmodes of response may be seen as withdrawals rom omeanimals ('vermin'),or from animals in some circumstancesdanger),ofwhatwould otherwise elongto recognizinghem as animals, ust as thenotionof an enemyor of a slavemayinvolvethewithdrawingrom heperson nvolved fsomeofwhatwouldbelongto recognitionf him as ahumanbeing.Thus forexamplein the case of slaves,theremaybe noformal ocial institutionf the slave's name n the samefull ense as thereis forothers, r theremaybe a denialofsocially ignificantncestry, ndso on. Or a man who is outlawedmaybe killed ike an animal. Here thenthe idea would be that the notionof a slave or an enemyor an outlawassumes a background fresponseto persons, nd recognitionhat whathappens n these ases is thatwe have somethingwhichwe are not reatingas what t-in a way-is. Ofcourse, ven nthesecases,a greatdeal oftheresponse o humanbeing' mayremain ntact, s for xamplewhat may bedone with the dead body. Or again, if the enemyhood s so deep as toremove even these restraints,nd men dance on the corpses of theirenemies, s for xamplerecentlyntheLebanon, the point f this an only476



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be understoodn terms f heviolationfwhat s taken o be howyou reatthe orpse f human eing. t isbecause ouknow t s that, hat ou retreatingtwithome oint s thats not o be treated. ndno onewhodoesit couldhave he lightestifficulty-whateverontempte might eel-inunderstandinghy omeone adgoneoff nd been ick nstead.Now suppose am a practical-mindedardheadedlaveholderhoseneighbouras, n hisdeathbed,reed is laves. might egarduch manasfoolish,utnot s batty, otbattyn theway should hink f omeoneifhe had, et us say,freed iscows on his deathbed. ompare hecaseOrwell escribes,rom isexperiencen the SpanishCivilWar,ofbeingunable o shoot ta half-dressedanwhowasrunninglong he opof hetrencharapet, olding phis trousers ith othhands s he ran. I hadcomehere o shoot t"Fascists", ut manwho sholding phis rousersis nota "Fascist",he is visibly fellow-creature,imilar o yourself,ndyoudo notfeel ike hootingt him.'5 he notionfenemy'Fascist') ndfellow reaturere therena kind ftension,nd even manwhocouldshoot t a manrunning olding is trousersp might ecognize erfectlywellwhyOrwell ouldnot.The tensionheres in such cases between'slave'or enemy'nd fellow uman eing')may ereflectedotmerelynrecognitionf hepoint f omeonelse's ctions,ut lso ndefensivenessofvariousorts,s when ou sk omeone here e s from ndthe nsweris SouthAfrica ndyoudonot reat hem erywellhere ither'. ndthatis liketelling omeone am a vegetarianndgettingheresponseAndwhat reyour hoesmadeof?'What ouhave henwith n mage r sightike hat f heman unningholdinghis trousers p is something hichmaycheckor alterone'sactions, utsomething hich s notcompelling,r notcompellingoreveryonehocan understandtsforce,nd thepossibility,venwhere tis notcompellingor omeone, fmaking ordiscomfortr ofbringingdiscomfortoawareness. should uggesthat heJane eggepoem s anattemptobring similarort fdiscomfortloser o the urface-buthatimages f fellow reaturesrenaturally uch esscompellingnes thanimages f fellow uman eings' an be.I introducedhenotion f a fellowreaturenanswer o thequestion:Howmight go about howingomeone hathe had reasonnot to eatanimals? do not think have answeredhat o much as shown hedirectionn which should ookfor nanswer. ndclearlyhe pproachI have uggesteds notusablewith omeonenwhom here s no fellow-creatureesponse, othingt all in thatrange. amnot thereforen aweaker ositionhan hosewhowoulddefendnimals' ightsnthebasisof an abstract rinciple f equality. or although heypurport o beprovidingeasonswhich rereasons or nyone,Martianr human eing5Collectedssays, ournalismndLettersLondon:Secker ndWarburg,968),Vol. I, p. 254.

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might e called hedark ideofhuman olidarityasanalogieswith hedark ide of sexual olidarityrthe olidarityf a human roup,nd thepainofseeing his s I thinktronglyresentn thewritings havebeenattacking.t is their rgumentshavebeenattacking,hough,nd nottheir erceptions,otthe sense hat omes hroughheirwritingsf theawfulndunshakeableallousnessndunrelentingnessithwhichwe mostoften onfronthe non-human orld.The mistakes to think hat hecallousnessannot e condemned ithout easonswhich re reasons oranyone, o matter owdevoidofall human maginationr sympathy.Hencetheir mphasis n rights,n capacities,n interests,n thebio-logicallygiven; hence the distortionf theirperceptions y theirarguments.6UniversityfVirginia

6 Formuchnthispaper am ndebtedodiscussions ithMichaelFeldman.I havealsobeenmuchhelpedbyJonathanennett'sommentsn an earlierversionf Part I.Permissiono quote the poemson pp. 472-3 was kindlygivenby theVegetarian ociety, nd by the Societyof Authors s representativeftheLiteraryrustees fWalter e la Mare.479

Diamond - Eating Meat and Eating People

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