DIAMOND East Timor scenario Stephen Bocquet Defence Systems Analysis Division DSTO Australia.

DIAMOND East Timor scenario

Stephen Bocquet

Defence Systems Analysis Division

DSTO Australia

Outline

– East Timor

– INTERFET

– DIAMOND

– East Timor DIAMOND scenario

– Conclusions

East Timor

East Timor

– Former Portuguese colony, invaded by Indonesia in 1975

– Between 100,000 and 230,000 East Timorese killed by military action, famine and disease in the first few years of Indonesian occupation

– August 1999 referendum: 78.5% vote for independence

– September 1999 - Militias created and armed by Indonesia unleash a wave of violence and destruction. 500,000 people displaced from their homes

INTERFET

– 12 September 1999 - Indonesia agrees to the deployment of an international force in East Timor

– 14 September 1999 - Australia agrees to lead the force

– 15 September 1999 - UN Security Council Resolution 1264 under Chapter VII of UN Charter authorises the establishment of the International Force East Timor (INTERFET) to restore security

– 19 September 1999 - MAJGEN Cosgrove appointed commander INTERFET

– 20 September 1999 - First INTERFET troops deploy

INTERFET operations

– Militia rounded up and disarmed in Dili in the first week of operation

– Districts bordering West Timor secured in early October by airmobile operations, supported by amphibious landings of armoured vehicles and other equipment

– 22 October 1999 - further airmobile / amphibious operation to secure Oecussi enclave

– Several firefights with militia, but no sustained combat

– 23 February 2000 - authority transferred to UN Transitional Administration in East Timor

DIAMOND

– Diplomatic And Military Operations in a Non-warfighting Domain

– Dstl (UK) high level simulation model for peace support operations

– Object oriented, event stepped simulation

– Node and arc network

– Multiple ‘sides’ or parties, with a stochastic representation of negotiation between them

– Each party has a command structure and communications network

DIAMOND command structure

– High Level Commander

Campaign progress

– ‘Component Commander’ (CC)

Allocation of missions and resources

– Intermediate Commander (IC)

Operational Command of individual missions

– Entities

Prosecution of missions

C C

E n tity E n tity

IC E n tity

C C C C

H ig h L e ve lC o m m a n d er

DIAMOND missions

– Transport

– Move

– Evacuate

– Intelligence

– Engineering

– Reserve

– Escort

– Presence

– Defend

– Strike

– Secure

– Deny movement


– INTERFET operation 20 Sept 1999 - 23 February 2000 Scenario covers the first 5 weeks or so.

– Parties:

– INTERFET

– INTERFET B

– FALINTIL

– Indonesia

– Pro-integration Militia

– UN

– Civilians


Relationships between the parties:

INTERFET INTERFET B UN TNI Militias FALINTIL CiviliansINTERFET Friendly Friendly Friendly Neutral Hostile Neutral FriendlyINTERFET B Cooperative Friendly Friendly Neutral Uncooperative Neutral FriendlyUN Cooperative Cooperative Friendly Neutral Uncooperative Neutral FriendlyTNI Neutral Neutral Neutral Friendly Cooperative Hostile NeutralMilitias Hostile Hostile Uncooperative Friendly Friendly Hostile HostileFALINTIL Cooperative Cooperative Cooperative Hostile Hostile Friendly FriendlyCivilians Cooperative Cooperative Cooperative Neutral Hostile Cooperative Friendly


Scenario covers:

– Deployment and operations of INTERFET

– Withdrawal of Indonesian forces

– Militia and FALINTIL activities

– Civilians

Not covered:

– Humanitarian operations (IOs / NGOs / INTERFET)

– Destruction & reconstruction of infrastructure

– Return of refugees

– Intelligence & Information ops


INTERFET Mission areas


Amphibious operations represented by first moving the unit to a sea node, then moving it to the beach.


Fictitious ‘Airmobile Coy’ used to represent airmobile operations. In DIAMOND infantry units will only board helicopters if there is no ground route to their objective.


Company Equivalent Units in East Timor

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35

Day

Indonesia

INTERFET


Cumulative Attrition

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

4000

4500

5000

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35

Time (Days)

Ca

su

alt

ies Civilians

Militia

INTERFET

FALINTIL


– Attrition levels are far too high compared with the actual operation.

– In most cases militia were arrested and disarmed, rather than engaged in combat. The DIAMOND combat model cannot represent this properly.

– In DIAMOND, combat halts all other activities in a node. This is a particular problem in Dili, where movements in and out continued while INTERFET rounded up militia and secured the area.

Conclusions

– East Timor scenario could be further developed to include more aspects of the operation

– DIAMOND needs improvement in

Command structure

Combat model

Transport missions

– DIAMOND will be an effective tool for analysis of peace support operations after some further development. In particular the software needs to be more robust.


Questions

DIAMOND East Timor scenario Stephen Bocquet Defence Systems Analysis Division DSTO Australia.

Documents

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