DetectingSpearPhishingAttacks

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Detecting and Preventing Spear Phishing Attacks Using DNS Mike Saunders - @hardwaterhacker [email protected]

Transcript of DetectingSpearPhishingAttacks

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Detecting and Preventing Spear Phishing Attacks Using DNS

Mike Saunders - @hardwaterhacker [email protected]

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About Mike

Pen tester with a defender background (purple team!)

17 years in IT

9 years security

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The Problem: Typosquatting

What is it?

Intentionally misspelled domain names intended to imitate legitimate domain names

Why is it bad?

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The Problem

Why is it bad?

Often difficult to easily spot

Users may be duped into visiting a malicious site

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MotivationsFinancial

Advertising revenue on parked domains

Drive traffic to a competitor’s site

Malware delivery

Harvest email from misspelled domains

Phishing attacks

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Types of Typosquatting

Repeated characters www.google.com www.gooogle.com

Omitted character www.amazon.com www.amzon.com

Charater swap www.defcon.org www.decfon.org

Character insertion www.derbycon.com www.derbycin.com

Missing dots www.microsoft.com wwwmicrosoft.com

Singular/plural www.apple.com www.apples.com

Vowel swapping www.fedex.com www.fadax.com

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Types of Typosquatting

Homophones www.route.com www.root.com

Homoglyphs www.derbycon.com www.derbyc0n.com

Wrong TLD www.whitehouse.gov www.whitehouse.com

Misspelling www.arcticcat.com www.articat.com

Different country code www.evilcorp.com www.evilcorp.cm

Bit flipping www.facebook.com www.fccebook.com

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Real-World Examples

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Real-World Examples

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Real-World Examples

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Real-World Examples

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Real-World Examples

Anthem BCBS

wellpoint.com targeted using we11point.com

Premera BCBS

premera.com targeted using prennera.com

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More Real-World Examples

carefirst.com targeted with ‘l’ and ‘1’ for ‘i’.

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More Real-World Examples

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Available ToolsUrlCrazy

Andrew Horton - @urbanadventur3r

http://www.morningstarsecurity.com/research/urlcrazy

dnstwist

Marcin Ulikowski - @elceef

https://github.com/elceef/dnstwist

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A Better Way

crazyparser

https://github.com/hardwaterhacker/crazyparser

Detect changes between iterations

Uses both urlcrazy and dnstwist output

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Demo Time

Configuration files

Command line options

Output

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Preventative MeasuresBlock in web proxy

Blackhole DNS

Increase monitoring

Proxy logs

email containing links to these domains

Client DNS queries

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+ and -Will find some variations, like we11point.com

prennera.com not originally detected - dnstwist supported - 9/16

careflrst.com detected, caref1st.com wasn’t originally. dnstwist support added 9/16

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+ and -

Will not detect things like service-paypal.com

Does not protect external users / customers

Unless you pursue domain seizure under WIPO UDRP or US Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act

https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/guidance-domain-seizures-07mar12-en.pdf

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Questions?

https://github.com/hardwaterhacker/crazyparser

@hardwaterhacker

[email protected]

http://hardwatersec.blogspot.com