DETECTING A CYBER-ATTACK SOURCE IN REAL TIME R. Romanyak 1), A. Sachenko 1), S. Voznyak 1), G....

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DETECTING A CYBER-ATTACK SOURCE IN REAL TIME R. Romanyak 1) , A. Sachenko 1) , S. Voznyak 1) , G. Connolly 2) , G. Markowsky 2) 1) Ternopil Academy of National Economy 2) Department of Computer Science, U. of Maine

Transcript of DETECTING A CYBER-ATTACK SOURCE IN REAL TIME R. Romanyak 1), A. Sachenko 1), S. Voznyak 1), G....

Page 1: DETECTING A CYBER-ATTACK SOURCE IN REAL TIME R. Romanyak 1), A. Sachenko 1), S. Voznyak 1), G. Connolly 2), G. Markowsky 2) 1) Ternopil Academy of National.

DETECTING A CYBER-ATTACK SOURCE IN REAL TIME

R. Romanyak1), A. Sachenko1), S. Voznyak1), G. Connolly2), G. Markowsky2)

1) Ternopil Academy of National Economy2) Department of Computer Science, U. of Maine

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The Web Neighborhood Watch Project

• This project seeks to identify websites belonging to dangerous people such as terrorists

• In addition to the artificial intelligence components, there is a need for locating the website in physical space

• At last year's conference, work was presented on using the distributed traceroute approach to help locate computers physically

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• Not only is locating computers physically important for the Web Neighborhood Watch Project, but for dealing with cyber-attacks in general

• Current methods for tracking Internet-based attacks are primitive.

• It is almost impossible to trace sophisticated attacks using current tools.

Locating Computers in Physical Space

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Intruders

Attack Sophistication andIntruder Technical Knowledge

High

Low

1980 1986 1992 1998 2004

IntruderKnowledge

AttackSophistication

Cross site scripting

password guessing

self-replicating code

password cracking

exploiting known vulnerabilities

disabling audits

back doors

hijacking sessions

sweepers

sniffers

packet spoofing

GUIautomated probes/scans

denial of service

www attacks

Tools“stealth” / advanced

scanning techniques

burglaries

network mgmt. diagnostics

distributedattack tools

Staged

Auto Coordinated

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Techniques for Physically Locating Computers

• Whois

• Traceroute

• Distributed Traceroute

• Time Delay Method (new)

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Whois Limitations

• Whois contains information about top-level domains only

• Distributed databases are not always connected

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Traceroute Limitations

• It does not take advantage of the fact that there typically exist several different paths to the target computer

• Executing a single trace from a single location tends to produce results that are geographically insufficient

Page 8: DETECTING A CYBER-ATTACK SOURCE IN REAL TIME R. Romanyak 1), A. Sachenko 1), S. Voznyak 1), G. Connolly 2), G. Markowsky 2) 1) Ternopil Academy of National.

Distributed Traceroute Limitations

• The results are not always as accurate as one would want

• This approach cannot be applied when the attacker uses intermediate hosts with software redirectors to make a cyber-attack

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Time Delay Method (new)

• Based on the concept that the most recent computer from which the attack was received was either:– a) The actual attacking computer– b) An intermediate host being used with

redirection software

• Choosing between a) and b) is based on comparing the time delay between the attacking computer (AC) and the victim computer (VC) to the most recent time delay

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A Cyber-attack using Redirectors

Ttotal = t1 + t2 + t3 +…+tn+ tn+1,

ti - the time delay of the i-th link

Attacking Computer

Redirector 1t1 t2

t3

tntn+1

Redirector 2

… Redirector n Victim Computer

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Experimental Results

• The following servers were used:– TANE (Ternopil Academy of the National

Economy, Ukraine, 217.196.166.105)– Kiel University (Germany, 134.245.52.122)– HTTL (Home To good service and

Technology Ltd, London, England, 217.34.204.1)

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Direct connection

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Time Delays From HTTL to TANE

0.00E+00

2.00E+05

4.00E+05

6.00E+05

8.00E+05

1.00E+06

1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27

IP-packets

tim

e d

elay

s, μ

s

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Time Delays from TANE to HTTL

0.00E+00

2.00E+05

4.00E+05

6.00E+05

8.00E+05

1.00E+06

1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27

IP-packets

tim

e d

ela

ys

, μ

s

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Connection using redirector

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Time Delays from HTTL to TANE using Kiel-redirector

0.00E+00

2.00E+06

4.00E+06

6.00E+06

8.00E+06

1.00E+07

1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27

IP-packets

tim

e d

ela

ys

, μ

s

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Conclusion

• The Time Delay Method has the ability to locate a remote computer in real time based on delays in IP packet travel

• The Time Delay Method can also be used to analyze the nature of the links involved in the attack chain